So goes the received wisdom at the “micro” level of politics. But for politics at the “macro” level, ideology is not a static identity but, rather, a dynamic reflection of how citizens process policy change and react to shifting political environment.

Ideological Identification

Public opinion research typically rely on self-reported placement on an ideological spectrum to capture Americans’ ideological identification. Some survey house, like GfK and Langer, offer respondents 5 choices (“very conservative,” “conservative,” “moderate,” “liberal” or “very liberal”), whereas Gallup only offers “conservative”, “moderate”, or “liberal.”

Such questions simplify a multi-dimensional “operational” ideology into discrete categories that allow us to map “symbolic” ideology over time. Because they correlate positively, though not perfectly, these measures approximate the broader dynamics of issue preferences — policy “mood” — of the electorate.

Figure 1 reports the trends from these four survey houses. Yet the distinct question wordings render distinct readings, making it hard to discern just how liberal or conservative the American public is in any given moment.

_{Figure 1 - Does contain images generated by ChatGPT. Image of data from listed sources, FOX, GfK, Langer, and GALLUP.}

Macro-Ideology

A macro-political approach to ideology seeks to provide a summary number to track shifts in Americans’ symbolic ideology over time. Following in this tradition, we added the survey marginals above (housed at The Roper Center) to James A. Stimson’s historical dataset.

We estimated ideological liberalism from these surveys using Stimson’s “dyads-ratio” algorithm. The estimates capture the percentage of “liberal” responses divided by the sum of the percentages of “liberal” and “conservative” responses. So, higher values indicate greater symbolic liberalism.

_{Figure 1.2 .Estimates represent the percent of liberal divided by the percent liberal + the percent conservatives. Data comes from James A. Stimson and our updates from The Roper Center. Estimates generated by the dyads-ratio algorithm.}

Looking at Figure 1.2, we see that symbolic liberalism is also lower than symbolic conservatism (100 - liberalism), never passing the 50% threshold. Students of American politics have long documented Americans’ predilection for the “conservative” identity even as their policy stances often conflict with strictly conservative issue stances (e.g., Erikson et al. 2002, Stimson 2015).

Liberalism reaches crescendos around the the 1992 election of President Bill Clinton and the 2020 election of President Joe Biden. The 2021 reading of 43.7% is the peak of liberalism in our timeline. These observations beg the question: why does ideology move at all?

Thermostatic Dynamics

A key insight of the macro-political tradition is that public opinion is locked into a thermostatic relationship with policy. As first conceptualized by Christopher Wlezien (1995), the public’s reaction to government policies as akin to a thermostat adjusting a room’s temperature. Put in policy terms, if public policy leans too far in one direction, public preferences tend to swing back in the opposite direction.

Many societies experienced notable liberalization of social norms and values in the 1990s, driven in part by the rise of ideological liberalism—a philosophy emphasizing individual rights, free markets and secular progress.

The liberal category in the GFK, Langer and Gallup polls in Figure 1.1 experienced a minor spike between 2024 and 2025 coinciding with executive actions from the incoming Trump administration that pulled policies further to the right. This and similar cases suggest that public ideology is not fixed. Instead, the public reacts to the direction of government policy, in a thermostatic direction.

The dominant ideological position across the polls in Figure 1.1 above is moderate. This observation potentially reflects citizens having mixed policy stances or a reject of extreme positions. Likewise, our liberalism index in Figure 1.2 is moderate. The persistent concentration in the moderate category highlights how macro-level policy mood is shaped by micro-level cognitive complexity. Because most everyday citizens balance competing considerations, the electorate rarely shifts to ideological extremes. As Stimson’s thermostatic model suggests, the public acts as a stabilizing force. The stability of the moderate category in our research does not signify a lack of political engagement but reflects how the electorate continuously balances conflicting priorities.

2026 Midterms

The U.S. is quickly approaching midterm elections, with multiple states having concluded their primary run-off elections over the summer. Stimson might indicate that there will be a liberalism spike within these upcoming midterms, with increasing inflation and unemployment rates. Considering the current political climate is leaning further to the right, citizens may express their desire for a change at the voting polls. While people may symbolically identify as conservative, they may favor a transition in the liberal direction with their policy positions. American’s suffering the realities of increased inflation, in 2026, may recognize the significance of their majority conservatively run government. However, fear possibly remains with conservatives in associating the liberal identification directly with the Democratic Party. Will American’s be able to consciously separate ideology vs. political party?

Sources

• Erikson, R. S., Mackuen, M. B., & Stimson, J. A. (2002). The Macro Polity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139086912

• Fox News. (1998–2013). Political ideology survey data [Survey data]. Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Cornell University. https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/ipoll/trend/4134d59b-b623-426d-92f9-8faf6b0ef332

• Gallup. (1992–2025). Political ideology [Annual survey data]. https://news.gallup.com/poll/388988/political-ideology-steady-conservatives-moderates-tie.aspx

• GfK. (2011–2024). Political ideology survey data [Survey data]. Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Cornell University. https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/ipoll/trend/8ac2ad99-74d2-457c-a1d2-11b1ba741494

• Alexander Kustov. Good to Know: The public is thermostat. Good Authority. goodauthority.org/news/good-to-knowthermostatic-politics-public-opinion/

• Langer Research Associates. (1987–2023). Political ideology survey data [Survey data]. Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Cornell University.https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/ipoll/trend/f3acca36-8be1-4032-a3eb-2569631e55b

• Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. (n.d.). Roper iPoll database. Cornell University. https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/

• Stimson, J. A. (2015). Tides of consent: How public opinion shapes American politics, Second Edition. Cambridge University Press.

• Wlezien, Christopher. (1995). “The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending.” American Journal of Political Science 39(4): 981–1000. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111666.

Adriana was pregnant: her baby’s due date, however, was over three months away. Georgia’s 2019 near-total abortion ban law went into effect after the 2022 Supreme Court decision to overturn Roe v Wade. Abiding by this law, doctors at Emory refused to take Adriana off of life support, because “the state bans abortion after cardiac activity can be detected.” For three months, Adriana was kept alive until the hospital performed a cesarean section to deliver her son, Chance, who weighed just 1 pound 13 ounces. Adriana was taken off of life support four days later.

In a post-Roe world, this case highlights the real-life impacts laws governing abortion law. But where do Americans position themselves on this issue? Has it changed over time and, if so, why?

Views on abortion, 1995-2026

According to political scientist James A. Stimson, “The slow shift of public opinion is one of the central forces in American politics.” Tracking the changing preferences of the American public can help us to infer how the public reacts to policy and the direction future policy is likely to take. Americans’ mood toward abortion, for example, may not align with the topic’s hyper-polarized treatment by politicians and media but may nonetheless indicate which way the policy wind is blowing.

The graphic below suggests support for legal abortion in all or most cases trended stronger until about 2024. And despite the seemingly stark divide between political parties on the topic, a majority of Americans support it.

^{% of U.S. adults who say abortion should be…}

Americans became increasingly supportive of more liberal abortion policy between roughly 2008 and the Dobbs decision in 2022. The election of President Barack Obama and the Blue Wave that swept into Congress in 2009 raised the specter that Roe v. Wade, or a more liberal policy, might be codified into law. State legislatures reacted with a wave of increasingly restrictive abortion legislation, including Texas House Bill 2 (HB2), heartbeat bills, mandatory waiting periods, and clinic regulation.

Between 2011 and 2019, the hundreds of abortion restrictions enacted by states, made that decade one of the most active periods of abortion policymaking since Roe v. Wade and substantially reduced access in many parts of the country (Stimson, Tides of Consent, Ch.3; Nash et. al, 2019). By 2019, several states had enacted six-week “heartbeat” bans and/or other restrictions directly challenging the constitutional framework established under Roe, signaling that abortion policy was becoming increasingly restrictive at the state level.

Simultaneously, the Supreme Court became increasingly conservative, which raised questions regarding the future of Roe v. Wade. Specifically, appointments to the Court during this period produced a conservative majority, which many took as a signal that the constitutional protections established under Roe v. Wade could eventually be reconsidered.

Together, these developments (growing state-level restriction and a changing Supreme Court) are consistent with thermostatic public opinion, in which citizens gradually adjusted their preferences in response to an increasingly restrictive political environment rather than reacting only after the Dobbs decision itself.

Despite differences in survey methodology, both the individual survey series and the updated policy mood estimates show a gradual increase in support for more liberal abortion policy beginning around 2013 and continuing through Dobbs, followed by relatively stable levels of support afterwards.

This nuanced data is something even Stimson acknowledges in Tides of Consent: “It is difficult to make sense of trends in abortion attitudes.” Additionally, an interesting chart from Stimson shows the correlations between partisanship and abortion attitudes, which suggests the issue has become more party-aligned over time:

Abortion became an issue in which tradition - be it religious or constitutional - had no answers to. Because it was new, it created a dangerous issue: attitudes did not fall along party lines. Prior to Roe V. Wade, support for abortion came from Americans with higher incomes, were well educated, and voted for Republicans. In fact, 69% of delegates to the 1972 Republican National Convention expressed support for abortion rights, while many Democrats of the time tended to be more aligned with the views of the Catholic Church.

Consequently, abortion attitudes did not fall along party lines, making it a controversy that political candidates on both sides began to latch onto, mobilizing their primary voters by taking the “correct” side and thus winning their race. Eventually, those who are out-of-line with their party’s new issue alignment will be replaced with a candidate who fully is.

Roe & Dobbs: What do the data say?

When we frame the issue evolution of abortion in America with this historical context, we can begin to make sense of why court cases that we would assume had major and lasting shifts in public opinion on the topic - Roe v. Wade (1973) and most recently, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022) - and why they actually did not. Because Dobbs overturned nearly fifty years of federal abortion protections and returned abortion policy to the states, many expected public opinion to shift dramatically in response.

To see what the data say, we return to Stimson’s abortion preferences dataset in order to estimate a summary measure of the public’s position on the liberal-conservative spectrum — their “mood” towards abortion policy — and to see its interplay with shifting abortion policies and laws.

After incorporating newly available data from Pew and AP-NORC surveys, our updated abortion mood estimates in the graph below do in fact show an increasingly liberal views on abortion, but not one as large as many may have expected (from 61% support in April 2022, to 62% support in June 2022).

^{Stimson Abortion Mood Dataset 1972-2023, estimated using the dyads-ratio algorithm with updated data for 2024-2026}

Instead, public opinion remained relatively stable after Dobbs. Support for legal abortion generally stayed higher than it had been before 2022 instead of returning to earlier levels . Although the exact percentages may differ across survey organizations due to differences in methodology or question wording, they largely move in the same direction: a gradual increase followed by steady support. Moreover, extending the series with the updated data allowed us to see whether the shifts observed immediately after Dobbs were temporary or continued over time.

Taken together, the Gallup, Pew, AP-NORC and ABC News/Washington Post data made it easier to distinguish long-term changes in public opinion from the normal variation that exists between individually surveys. Overall, the updated data suggests that abortion remains one of the country’s most politically debated issues, but public opinion has been more consistent, stable, and nuanced than public discourse and media tend to suggest. While the debate has become increasingly polarized and partisan-aligned, the broader public mood appears to have shifted gradually toward greater support for legal abortion while remaining relatively stable over time.

Issue Evolution: Slow & Steady

As a whole, data for public opinion and historical context of abortion views between political parties reflect broad social transformations in America over time - though there have been notable shifts in attention and engagement on the topic, the overall trend suggests that public mood has evolved gradually, over time, as newer generations with different social values become a larger share of our electorate.

Stimson argues in Tides of Consent that policy mood changes gradually rather than shifting permanently overnight after a single event. Drawing on the idea of thermostatic change, he explains that public opinion responds to and is driven by variables such as: political events, issue framing, social conditions, religious affiliation, polarization, and reactions to policy changes. This helps explain why landmark decisions such as Roe v. Wade and Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization did not produce the dramatic shifts that many people expected. Instead they became part of a much longer process in which Americans gradually adjusted their views, while Abortion, in tandem, became increasingly tied to partisan identities.

Correlations Between Partisanship and Abortion Attitudes: National Election Studies, 1960 to 2012

^{Stimson, James A.. Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics, Figure 3.3 (p. 67). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.}

As Stimson notes in Figure 3.2. Case 3, abortion has become increasingly aligned with partisan identities over time, making it a more stable political issue in comparison to decades earlier. Our updated series suggests that this gradual evolution has continued. Although abortion remains one of the country’s most politically debated issues, support for more liberal abortion policy has remained relatively stable after Dobbs, even as the tension surrounding the issue has intensified.

During her celebration of life, Adriana Monet Smith was described as a dedicated nurse who loved to travel, loved her family, and brought much joy to the people around her. It can be easy to fall into the mundane lull of policy issues in America, wrought with seemingly deep divides and never-ending politicization. A story like Adriana’s is one worth zooming into, and then out of, to find the fuller and more complete picture of how and why public policy mood ebb and flows matter.

When a political leader dies in office, how does the public respond? Public reactions can vary depending on several factors, including the cause of death, the leader’s popularity before their death, and the political climate at the time. By examining leaders who died from assassination, illness, and sudden medical emergencies, we explore how different circumstances surrounding a leader’s death may influence executive approval and public support for their successors.

Here we focus on four world leaders from different continents and political systems to see what patterns emerge.

USA

President John F. Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, in Dallas. At 12:30 PM, while President Kennedy was riding in an open-top motorcade, suspect Lee Harvey Oswald fired shots from the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository. At 1:00 PM, President Kennedy was pronounced dead at Parkland Memorial Hospital.

In his final quarter, his presidential approval rating was 49.5%, which was a 1-point drop from the previous, and a full 5-point fall from the rating two quarters prior (see Figure 1). When Lyndon B. Johnson took office, there was a rally in popularity, with approval increasing to 53.5% following JFK’s death (see Figure 2. The assassination led to a wave of emotion that accelerated policy and consolidated public support for Democrats.

_{Figure 1. These graphs display the quarterly approval ratings of each deceased leader during their time in office.}

_{Figure 2. These graphs display the monthly approval ratings of each deceased leader’s successor. For reference, the series begins with the predecessor’s approval rating in the final month of his tenure. (There is no data available for Iranian successor Masoud Pezeshkian.)}

France

President Georges Pompidou died from Waldenstrom’s macroglobulinemia, a rare type of blood cancer. He passed away on April 2, 1974, at the age of 62. His presidency ran from June 20, 1969, to April 2, 1974.

In his final quarters public approval was fairly flat and in the mid-40’s—no rally was evident (see Figure 1). This may be because he died from natural causes rather than from a sudden event. In the months before his death, there were rumors about his condition, and he appeared in public less frequently, which may have prepared citizens for a change in leadership.

Monthly approval decreased from 43.8% to 41.7% after interim President Alain Poher took over. After official elections, President Giscard began his tenure with an approval rating of 39%. By September 1974, Giscard’s approval had risen to 47.7%. (see Figure 2).

Japan

Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira died on June 12, 1980, after suffering a heart attack while campaigning for the upcoming general election. He was 70 years old and had served as Prime Minister from December 7, 1978 to June 12, 1980.

In the final quarter before his death, his approval rating was 33.33% (see Figure 1). After his death, approval increased to 46.4% (see Figure 2), which could be explained by a sympathy rally from the Japanese public. Since his death occurred just days before the election, many citizens rallied around the Liberal Democratic Party and supported the peaceful transition of leadership.

Iran

Former President of the Republic Ebrahim Raisi died on May 19, 2024, at age 63 in a helicopter crash along with Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdolahian and six other passengers and crew. His term lasted from August 3, 2021, to May 19, 2024.

At the beginning of his term, there was a honeymoon bump that pushed his approval rating from 48.1% to 65.5%. Afterward, approval steadily declined due to nationwide protests that were handled poorly by Raisi’s government, a worsening economy, tightened law enforcement, and ongoing conflict with Israel.

These factors, combined with his death, may help explain why his approval rating ended at 47.9% (see Figure 1). Lack of data prevents us from assessing how this impacted his successor’s popularity.

Conclusion

The cases examined in this paper demonstrate that executive succession following the death of a national leader can produce different political outcomes depending on institutional stability, public confidence, and the broader political environment. In the United States, France, and Japan, successor approval data allow for a comparison of public opinion during the first months of the new administration. Iran also illustrates an important transition, although comparable successor approval data were not available in the dataset used for this analysis.

Comparing the final approval ratings of outgoing leaders with the early approval trends of their successors provides a more complete understanding of executive transitions than examining either leader in isolation. Across these cases, the evidence suggests that public reactions to executive succession are shaped by more than just the death of a leader. The transition itself, the legitimacy of the successor, and broader national conditions all influence how citizens evaluate a new administration. Where comparable approval data were available, examining approval across both administrations provides a clearer picture of how public opinion evolves during one of the most consequential moments in executive politics.

On Tuesday, November 3, the State of Florida will elect its next Governor. The primaries for both the Republican and Democratic parties have yet to take place, but there are two notable candidates who are likely to face off. Representative Byron Donalds (R-FL) is the presumptive Republican nominee, and former Representative David Jolly is the presumptive Democratic nominee. Both candidates continue to take the lead against their respective opponents, with neither facing any particularly challenging opposition. The real competition will occur between the two of them.

This year’s gubernatorial election is different from the past two. Governor Ron DeSantis (R-FL) will not be participating as he reaches the end of his second term. This makes the race relatively open. While there will be no incumbent in this race, the Republican Party will serve as the incumbent party, giving a structural baseline advantage to Rep. Donalds, who seeks to frame himself as the successor to Gov. DeSantis. For this year’s gubernatorial election, I forecast a Republican victory in the State of Florida. Rep. Donalds will likely secure his victory with 48.3% of the vote and reinforce the Republican stronghold in Florida state politics.

Background

The Governor of Florida is elected to a four-year term and coincides with midterm elections. The Governor is limited to two consecutive terms, and elections operate under a plurality voting system. This means that there is no requirement in Florida election law to win a simple majority. Candidates do not need 50% or more of the vote to win the seat. The candidate who receives the highest vote total wins the election regardless of whether they pass the 50% threshold. Minor-party candidates typically win 1% or 4% of the vote, and candidates can win the governorship with as little as 47% or 48%. Senator Rick Scott (R-FL) won his term as Governor of Florida with only 48.87% of the vote against the democratic candidate Alex Sink, who earned 47.72%. He then won reelection with 48.14% of the vote against democratic candidate Charlie Crist, who earned 47.72%.

Candidate Profiles

Representative Byron Donalds (R)

Rep. Byron Donalds serves Southwest Florida’s District 19 and first secured the seat in 2020. He then won reelection twice in 2022 and 2024. Hailing from Brooklyn, New York, Rep. Donalds first got his start in Florida by attending Florida State University and graduating with a Bachelor’s degree in finance and marketing. He first ran to represent the 19th district in 2012 but came fifth in a six-candidate primary. After this, he ran for Florida’s State House of Representatives and won the election for District 80 in 2016. He then secured reelection in 2018

Rep. Donalds is currently running for Governor on a platform focused on improving the job market, regulating insurance companies, and strengthening government transparency. He currently faces a crowded Republican primary including Lieutenant Governor Jay Collins (R-FL), former Florida House Speaker Paul Renner, and businessman James Fishback.

Former Representative David Jolly (D)

David Jolly served Florida’s 13th District as a Republican from 2014-2017 and switched parties after becoming a prominent critic of President Donald Trump. Jolly also served as an attorney and worked as a Television analyst. After his tenure in Congress, Jolly spent seven years as an independent, organizing voters across the country on issues such as protecting democracy, ending gerrymandering, opening primaries, and reforming our broken campaign finance laws. He launched his bid for Governor in June 2025 and has since toured around the state to engage with all kinds of voters.

Jolly is currently running for Governor on a platform of homeowner’s insurance reform, the expansion of primary healthcare services, and investing in more community public schools. He currently faces a crowded Democratic primary including State Representative Dotie Joseph, former teacher Dayna Marie Foster, Advocate Evelyn Castillo-Bach, and retired Air Force Technician Thomas Fernandez.

Issues:

Affordability

Housing costs and property insurance consistently rank as the greatest concerns for Florida voters. According to a poll from the University of North Florida, these two issues combined made up one-third of what voters were most concerned about. In another poll from Florida TaxWatch, nearly 90% of Floridians expressed severe concern for inflation and housing. This is to be expected as property insurance premiums continue to increase alongside mortgage and rental rates.

Education

Florida voters are sharply divided over education frameworks, the conflict between school choice funding and public school support, and curriculum standards. A poll from the University of North Florida demonstrated this divide with 53% of Florida respondents supporting the expansion of state-funded education vouchers. Another poll found that one-third of searching parents expressed dissatisfaction with school curricula.

LONG-TERM TRAJECTORY TRENDS

Figure 1

Pollitik’s forecasts derive their predictive power from a machine-learning approach and Multiple Linear Regression. With approval ratings available, forecasts can be made by analyzing political and economic fundamentals up to six months before the election date. The most important political fundamental for this forecast is the approval rating measured for Gov. DeSantis. Figure 1 displays the quarterly approval ratings measured for the Florida governor from the beginning of his second term to the second quarter of 2026. Throughout 2025, his approval rating was absolutely stable, hovering around the 50% mark. This trend continued into early 2026 when he began with 50% approval. His approval rating has stayed around 50% in 2026 and spiked towards the third quarter of the year, rising from 49%.

This increase in approval occurred after Florida’s regularly scheduled legislative session that concluded with the signing of a new state budget. The budget consisted of $117 billion in spending but featured roughly $2 billion in tax breaks. This was achieved by the permanent repeal of the business rent tax and the establishment of popular sales tax holidays covering disaster preparedness, outdoor recreation, and fishing gear. Before signing the budget, Go. DeSantis used his line-item veto power to slash hundreds of millions in state spending, reinforcing his fiscal conservative policy. Rep. Donalds is likely to benefit from this Republican victory.

Figure 2

The second most important political fundamental used for this forecast is the quarterly approval ratings for President Donald Trump measured in Florida. As depicted in Figure 2, the President’s approval ratings have proven quite stable throughout his second term, remaining within the 52%-49% range. The President began his term with a slight honeymoon period in Florida, securing that 52% high point. The post-inaugural decline typically happens as the executive begins to implement policy and the enthusiasm among voters declines. From there, his approval declines through 2025 and recovers at the beginning of 2026. His approval then rises to a 2026 high point of 49% in the second quarter. The President’s approval has a solid baseline of 47% and is bolstered in Florida because it has changed into a more Republican state.

Methodology

My forecast uses a Multiple Linear Regression framework, also known as an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) framework. This model predicts a continuous outcome variable (GOP candidate vote share) based on a weighted sum of independent variables and an intercept variable. This model was chosen because it accounts for open-seat dynamics and cross-level political linkages.

Findings

To elaborate, the non-weighted variables include the sitting Governor’s approval rating, the President’s statewide approval rating, the candidate’s and the party’s incumbency status, and the rival party’s statewide vote share in the previous presidential election. Both the President’s and Gov. DeSantis’s approval ratings are also only measured six months ahead of the election to account for pre-election volatility. Statistical models derived from OLS regression typically carry a Standard Error of ±3% to ±4.5%. With this in mind, Rep. Donalds is likely to earn a vote share between 45.3% and 51.3%. 48.3% is the expected value, since it falls in the middle.

Another Forecast

Researchers Gregory Love, Ryan Carlin, and Matthew Singer have conducted their own forecast, which closely resembles mine. They forecast that Rep. Donalds will earn 47.8% of the vote share, and this fits within a confidence interval of 40% and 55.5%. In reaching their conclusion, the researchers utilized a machine-learning variable selection technique known as LASSO. This stands for Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator, and the technique only includes variables that contribute to predictive accuracy. The researchers applied LASSO to 378 gubernatorial elections spanning 1990 to 2024 and chose variables resembling the political fundamentals used in my model.

Conclusion

I forecast Rep. Byron Donalds to win Florida’s upcoming gubernatorial election by earning 48.3% of the vote. This is based on Pollitik’s OLS framework and the selected political fundamentals. This forecast closely resembles that of researchers using the LASSO technique and fits with the precedent set by previous Republican victors.

Sources

https://davidjolly.com/about-david/

https://byrondonalds.com/about/

https://www.fox35orlando.com/news/casey-desantis-favored-florida-governors-race-poll-finds

https://www.news4jax.com/news/local/2026/04/07/florida-cost-of-living-surges-as-prices-quintuple-pace-of-growth-squeezing-residents/

https://www.unf.edu/coas/porl/_files/polls/statewide/certified.rf.UNF-Mar-Statewide-2023.pdf

https://schoolchoiceweek.com/florida-survey-2026/

Team

James Swafford

On November 3, 2026, Georgia voters will select a new governor following two consecutive terms of Republican Governor Brian Kemp. The term-limited Kemp has enjoyed a strong public support throughout his final term in office. While Georgia has not elected a Democratic governor since the 1998 election of Roy Barnes, support for Democratic candidates has grown significantly in recent years. The 2026 gubernatorial race pits former Atlanta mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms (D) against rags-to-riches billionaire and political newcomer Rick Jackson (R).

In 2020, the state narrowly supported Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden, the first Democratic presidential candidate to carry Georgia since 1992. Pressure from the Trump Administration to overturn the 2020 election results shadowed subsequent elections and bolstered Governor Kemp’s appeal to moderate and independent voters. During the fallout of the controversy, voters supported Democratic U.S. Senate candidates Raphael Warnock and Jon Ossoff in 2021 runoff elections, with Warnock winning reelection in 2022. In the off-year 2025 elections Democrats Alicia Johnson and Peter Hubbard easily flipped two seats on the Georgia Public Service Commission. The landslide election marked the first statewide non-Federal level victory for Georgia Democrats since 2006. Senator Jon Ossoff’s competitive reelection campaign against Republican challenger Mike Collins headlines the 2026 general election. The increasingly optimistic Ossoff has campaigned alongside Keisha Lance Bottoms and promoted the team as a dual ticket, creating the potential for senatorial coattails in the governor’s race.

BACKGROUND

ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Georgia’s state code includes special provisions for triggering mandatory runoff elections. If neither candidate receives at least 50% of the vote, a runoff occurs between the candidates with the two highest vote percentages. This rule applies to primaries, regular elections, and special elections, in contests that span the gap from small-town city council races or U.S. Senate elections. The absence of a Libertarian candidate on the 2026 general election ballot means the race for governor will likely be decided on Election Day.

The 2026 Republican primary ended with a runoff between Burt Jones, Georgia’s sitting Lieutenant Governor, and newcomer Rick Jackson. Notably, Burt Jones was an unindicted co-conspirator in Fulton County’s 2020 election interference case, running with President Trump’s endorsement. Although he lacked the president’s endorsement, Jackson has promised to be “Donald Trump’s favorite governor” if elected. Keisha Lance-Bottoms easily cleared a crowded Democratic primary without advancing to a runoff.

CANDIDATE PROFILES

KEISHA LANCE BOTTOMS (D)

Georgia politicos regard the Atlanta mayor’s office the state’s most powerful dead end job. Keisha Lance Bottoms wants to prove them wrong. Her single, tumultuous term as mayor was defined by the crises of 2020: COVID-19 and the following summer of protest. Bottoms gained praise and a growing national profile for her initial responses to both. Her meteoric rise was brought firmly back to earth after an officer-involved shooting, a 23-day armed occupation of the site, and the death of eight-year-old Secoriea Turner at an encampment barricade — all amid record homicide rates. The “Cop City” training center she approved sparked further protest.

Bottoms declined to seek reelection, the first Atlanta mayor in modern history to do so. Despite her sometimes troubled tenure at home, Bottoms’ national profile rose alongside Joe Biden’s successful 2020 presidential campaign. Rumored to be on Biden’s Vice Presidential shortlist, Bottoms served as a prominent campaign surrogate and later directed the White House Office of Public Engagement. In the 2026 primary, Bottoms handily won the Democratic primary outright despite state party leaders overwhelmingly endorsing her opposition.

RICK JACKSON (R)

Money can’t buy love, but can it buy the Governor’s Mansion? Billionaire businessman Rick Jackson’s late entry to the Republican gubernatorial primary shocked the Georgia political establishment. Five months and $108 million later, Jackson toppled a Trump-endorsed frontrunner and sitting Lieutenant Governor to become the Republican gubernatorial nominee.

While the Jackson campaign has emphasized his outsider status and “foster care to billionaire” background, Jackson is far from a political novice. He has served as a prominent Republican political donor and advocate for foster care reform. In the 2016 presidential campaign, Jackson was among Jeb Bush’s most generous Georgia donors. Bush continues to serve on the advisory board of Jackson Healthcare, Jackson’s privately held healthcare staffing, search, and technology company, alongside former US Representative and Trump Health and Human Services Secretary Tom Price. Jackson hosted fundraisers for other prominent Republicans including former governor Nathan Deal and former lieutenant governor Casey Cagle.

In December 2025 Jackson made a $1 million donation to super PAC Make America Great Again Inc., his first donation benefiting Trump. Jackson’s late support for Trump drew criticism during the Republican gubernatorial primary. While Trump’s endorsement went to Lieutenant Governor Burt Jones, the Jackson campaign borrowed from Trump’s 2016 playbook, casting Jackson as a self-made billionaire against corrupt career politicians. The bitter Republican primary made history as Georgia’s most expensive, with Jackson spending over $108 million of his own fortune to defeat Jones.

ISSUES

THE GHOST OF 2020

The 2026 Governor’s race is haunted by the shadow of the 2020 election controversy. Brad Raffensberger, Georgia’s Secretary of State who famously refused to “find extra votes” for President Trump, was soundly defeated in the Republican Party primary. Jeff Duncan, who defected to the Democratic Party over the controversy, was similarly defeated, while former Republican frontrunner Burt Jones, allegedly a key actor in Trump’s “fake electors” scheme, finished as runner-up in the GOP primary.

The 2020 Election controversy has been back in the news since January, when the FBI raided an election office in Union City, Georgia. Trump recently made groundless claims that both Georgia Senators were not legitimately elected. Senator Jon Ossoff (D), also up for reelection this November, has made this “attack on Democracy” a central issue of his campaign. As a result, the Georgia Governor’s race is inseparably tied to both the 2020 election and its concurrent U.S. Senate race.

AFFORDIBILITY

In 2026, the issue that matters most to Georgia voters is affordability. According to a recent poll conducted by the Atlanta Journal Constitution, inflation and cost of living ranked as the top issue for both 31% of Democratic primary voters and 17% of Republican primary voters. Affordability emerged as a major concern during 2025 off-year elections, when two Democrats running for Georgia’s statewide Public Service Commission routed sitting Republicans, the first Democratic victory for statewide since 2006.

FUNDING

The money gap is stark. Jackson spent $108 million of his own fortune to win the primary, with plenty of dry powder left for the general election. The Jackson team launched a $87 million ad buy in July alone. Bottoms raised just $1.1 million to fund her primary victory, a fraction of what she'll need to compete through November.

LONG-TERM TRAJECTORY TREND

An overview of Georgia survey data from 2024 onward tells a diverging story. Incumbent governor Brian Kemp is leaving office on a high note, with approval ratings often surpassing the 60% threshold.

Donald Trump’s approval rating in Georgia consistently falls far below Governor Kemp’s. From a high-water mark of 51% prior to the 2024 presidential election, Trump’s popularity in Georgia has steadily fallen throughout his second term. Alongside escalating gas prices due to the unpopular conflict in Iran and a growing focus on affordability, Trump’s Georgia slide creates potential electoral headwinds for midterm GOP candidates.

Our forecasting model considers fundamentals including the statewide approval ratings of both the president and sitting governor. These figures are calculated six months prior to the November 2026 general election. Additional factors measured include partisan vote share in the previous presidential election, the party of the incumbent governor, co-partisanship, and more.

As of July 27, 2026, Pollitik’s Fundamentals Forecaster estimates Republican Rick Jackson to receive 47.4% of the overall vote, indicating a potential victory for Democratic candidate Keisha Lance Bottoms.

A separate forecasting model by Love, Carlin, and Singer (2026) complicates this forecast. It predicts Jackson to receive 49.2% of the vote (+/- 7 points) indicating a squeaker in favor of Bottoms. However, the same model shows a 54.0% chance that Republicans hold the Georgia Governor’s Mansion. The discrepancy reflects a heavy weight put on states’ recent partisan lean based on the logic that growing polarization and the nationalization of state campaigns should make it harder for either party to flip a governorship.

The predictions trading market Polymarket gives Democrats a 58% chance of victory in the Georgia gubernatorial election, with $59,890 wagered as of July 29, 2026. Polymarket and similar platforms aggregate the opinions of those who choose to bet on election outcomes. Unlike polling, which measures opinion at a given moment, Polymarket odds shift continuously and can move dynamically in response to events. These trends help capture the public mood. Polymarket odds have swung meaningfully over the campaign, from a Democratic high of 72% in late April (amid the contentious GOP primary and an unsettled Democratic race) down to a 51% GOP advantage in mid-July. The current advantage for Bottoms holds with our core findings. Democrats hold a slight, fragile advantage in the race.

FINDINGS

Most Likely Scenarios

WINNER:

Too Close to Call! In the 2017 Atlanta mayoral runoff, just 823 votes put Keisha Lance Bottoms over the top. 2026 could be a statewide rewind. While Democrats maintain a vote share advantage in both models, the Bottoms campaign will have to work hard to overcome the 54% likelihood of a Republican successor to Brian Kemp. With no Libertarian on the 2026 ballot and no organized write-in campaign, one candidate is likely to clear the 50% plus one first-round threshold. In a tight race, doing so may require a protracted count and struggle for every outstanding and provisional ballot. Could it be 2020 all over again?

OUTLOOK:

If Bottoms rides a Democratic wave into office, she’ll be Georgia’s first Democratic governor in a generation. With over two decades of pent-up Democratic ambition, Bottoms will have to prioritize with care. State Democrats will likely push to expand Medicaid, a long-time Democratic priority in the state. Bottoms will almost certainly face a Republican-controlled legislature, making a divided government likely in the event of a Bottoms victory. With redistricting imminent, a Governor Bottoms would give Georgia Democrats leverage in what is sure to be one of 2027’s most important statewide debates.

A Jackson victory may seem like a return to Republican rule and business as usual. Far from it. Jackson would enter office as a first-time candidate without many deep relationships under the Gold Dome. Victory for Jackson would hinge on his ability to paint himself as Brian Kemp’s heir apparent, distancing himself from Donald Trump while marshalling Kemp’s high favorability to drive GOP turnout. All this presents a tall order. In the scorched earth GOP primary, the self-funded outsider cast the establishment as corrupt. Jackson succeeded in alienating many longtime GOP leaders and future legislative partners. Kemp himself provided a late endorsement to Burt Jones. Jackson has prioritized cutting the state income tax and moving toward eliminating it. Doing so will require earning the support of powerful fellow Republicans in the legislature.

LOSER:

Television viewers. With over $162 million spent in the Republican primary alone, Georgians spent the spring and early summer marinating in Jackson and Jones attack ads. This may be a mere appetizer. In late July, the Jackson campaign announced a $87 million ad buy, the largest of the election season. Combined with a competitive Senate race that will likely be among the nation’s most expensive, Georgia viewers should be prepared to reach for the mute button.

MORE INFORMATION

DATA SOURCES

State Executive Approval Database (SEAD)
Civiqs | Public Opinion Insights

Other Sources

Atlanta Journal-Constitution Georgia Poll Archive

Polymarket Georgia Governor Election Winner

https://jacksonhealthcare.com/team-members

https://www.ajc.com/politics/2026/07/new-poll-shows-promise-and-peril-for-democrats-in-key-georgia-races/

https://www.newsweek.com/map-donald-trump-approval-rating-every-state-18-months-12213626

https://www.ajc.com/politics/2026/07/rick-jackson-is-rebuilding-the-kemp-machine-and-supercharging-it/

METHODS

Pollitik’s Fundamentals Forecast

Love, Carlin, and Singer 2026

TEAM

Ben Sandfelder

Thomas Stancil

Nicolas Williams

Does this received wisdom still hold? Perhaps elections swell fewer Americans with national pride that redounds to presidents. And even fewer wait around to see how the new president performs. Presidential approval is now shaped by “rigid partisan politicization,” locking in approval or disapproval from the jump not waiting until the the first 100 days or any other arbitrary marker.

Are honeymoons over?

So, presidential honeymoons may be shrinking. If opposition voters stay pat on disapproval, initial support levels should be low with little room to rise. And if voters from the president’s voters are at maximum support, they have nowhere to go but down but with a high floor. The result is a first year in which approval moves but not by much.

The chart above compares the first twelve months of approval ratings for Barack Obama in 2009, Donald Trump in 2017, Joe Biden in 2021, and Donald Trump again in 2025. The first thing that stands out is that none of them had a huge first-year approval boom. Obama and Biden had the strongest numbers overall, but even their approval mostly stayed within a narrow range.

Obama

Obama started at 44.2 percent, rose above 50 percent for multiple months, and reached his high point at 51.7 percent in the fifth month. After that, his approval slowly slipped and ended at 45.3 percent.

Biden

Biden’s path looked similar, although his first month started lower. He began at 40.6 percent, rose quickly to 52.1 percent by month five, and then fell through the rest of the year, ending at 42.5 percent.

Trump I

Trump’s 2017 numbers tell a different story. He started at 47.4 percent, which was actually a very solid starting point compared with the others. But that support dropped fast. By the second month, he was already down to 42.5 percent, and for most of the year he stayed below 40 percent. He ended month twelve at 37.9 percent, the lowest final number in the group.

Trump II

Trump’s 2025 numbers are steadier than his 2017 numbers, but they still move downward overall. He started at 46.8 percent and ended at 41.7 percent. There were a few small bumps along the way, but not enough to look like a real rebound.

It ain’t over till it’s over

Presidential honeymoon are not yet gone but have become fairly weak. Obama and Biden had some early lift before losing ground later in their first years. Trump in 2017 had the sharpest early fall, while Trump in 2025 showed more of a slow slide.

In today’s politics, the first year looks less like a national honeymoon and more like a test of whether a president can hold onto the voters who already supported him.

Transition Approval and Presidential Honeymoons

Source: Executive Approval Data. Monthly approval ratings were aligned by month of each president’s first year in office.

Author: Samuel Wilder, 002531862

OVERVIEW

Between 2022 and 2026, Costa Rica experienced a significant departure from its historical presidential approval patterns. President Rodrigo Chaves maintained an average approval rating above 40%, positioning him as the country’s most popular president in recent history. Unlike his predecessors, whose support often collapsed after an initial “honeymoon” period, Chaves demonstrated a unique resilience, with a disapproval rating that never outnumbered his approval.

The central explanation for this trend lies in Chaves’s ability to position himself as a reform-oriented alternative to traditional political parties, combined with a populist communication style that resonates in rural and coastal provinces. While economic and security shocks caused a temporary dip in support in early 2024, his administration entered its final year with a stable mandate, signifying a potential shift in the country’s long-term governability.

BACKGROUND

1. Elections and institutions

Rodrigo Chaves’s rise to the presidency was anything but a landslide. Emerging from a crowded multi-party field in 2022, he squeezed into the second round representing the newly formed Social Democratic Progress Party (PPSD) after securing just 16.7% of the initial vote. While he eventually claimed the presidency in April with 52.8% of the valid votes, a staggering 42% abstention rate initially cast a shadow over the breadth of his popular mandate. This fragile beginning meant Chaves entered the Casa Presidencial not with a blank check from the public, but with a mandate that was viewed as shallow and vulnerable to the immediate scrutiny that typically follows a narrow runoff win.

2. Politicians and parties

Rodrigo Chaves entered office leading the Partido Progreso Social Democrático (PPSD), a newer conservative party founded in 2018 and known for its reform‑oriented, security‑minded, and confrontational style. This contrasted sharply with earlier presidents like Carlos Alvarado and Luis Guillermo Solís of the more progressive PAC, and Laura Chinchilla and José María Figueres of the center‑left PLN, both long‑dominant left-leaning and progressive parties. Over time, PAC and PLN lost public favor as many voters associated them with rising crime, fiscal strain, corruption scandals, and persistent economic inequality. They did very little to address these issues and implemented very little change, which created space for a more conservative figure like Chaves to speak to the issues of the people and gain the support of the majority.

3. Social and economic background

While Costa Rica remains a regional economic leader, the “Pura Vida” image is currently being tested by a tightening fiscal rule and a record-breaking surge in organized crime. The security crisis, marked by peaking homicide rates in 2023 and 2024, has become a significant shock to the national psyche and a potential landmine for any administration’s popularity. This tension has exposed a deepening geographic rift: Chaves maintains a populist stronghold in rural and coastal provinces, while the urban middle class and intellectuals of the Central Valley have largely moved into the opposition. This polarization has forced the president to lean heavily into populist communication strategies to maintain his favor in the face of deep institutional resistance.

POPULARITY

1. Pattern description: levels, stability, and volatility

Chaves’ popularity remains very high for the majority of his duration in office with little volatility seen throughout most of his term. We see a strong honeymoon effect lasting through the first year of term, with a high reaching nearly 80% approval. Even after his honeymoon phase, Chaves managed a very high approval rating. In comparison to past presidents, Chaves’ popularity is unmatched, never having an average approval rating drop below 50% and never having a disapproval rating that outnumbers the approval.

Figure 1. Presidential approval

2. Identification of phases

● The first phase corresponds to the honeymoon period (2022), when optimism toward the new administration was dominant. Expectations mattered more than measurable results.

● The second phase was the governing adjustment period (2023), where approval declined as institutional conflict and policy limitations became more visible.

● The third phase began in 2024 and can be described as consolidation. Instead of continuing to fall, approval stabilized and partially recovered.

● The fourth phase, covering 2025–2026, is one of late-term endurance, where approval remains favorable despite accumulated controversies and governing fatigue.

3. Identifying shocks and breaks

Looking at the graphs, the two breaks in Chaves’s approval fit the same pattern seen under earlier presidents, where drops usually follow visible conflict or economic stress. Alvarado fell during the fiscal‑reform protests, Solís during the Cementazo fallout, and Chinchilla during the La Trocha scandal, showing how quickly approval reacts to shocks. In that same way, Chaves’s early‑2024 drop lines up with rising institutional confrontation and worsening perceptions of security and economic stability, even though he still kept over 40% approval and remained more positively evaluated than most presidents. His small late‑2024 rebound mirrors the late‑term recoveries seen in several past administrations, driven more by shifts in public mood than major policy changes.

4. Comparison and Contextualization

Rodrigo Chaves held an initial 70% popularity rating in 2022. With an average popularity ranking above 40% that positions Chaves to be Costa Rica’s most popular president in recent years. Chaves was the only president in recent years to never have a disapproval rating higher than his approval rating, the only previous exception being president Oscar Arias. Chaves is also an exception in post honeymoon approval. Previous presidents like Laura Chinchilla or Carlos Alvarado saw their approval plummet post honeymoon, whereas Chaves after his honeymoon saw steady approval ratings his whole term, even seeing a slight boost in approval in his final months in office, making him a rare outlier compared to most Costa Rican presidents.

Figure 2. Presidential approval

Óscar Arias remains one of the main benchmarks of sustained presidential popularity in Costa Rica. His administration benefited from political experience, international prestige, and comparatively favorable governing conditions. Although the national context was different, Arias is one of the few presidents whose popularity can be meaningfully compared with Chaves in terms of durability. This suggests that Chaves belongs to a relatively small group of presidents capable of maintaining broad support beyond the honeymoon phase.

Figure 3. Presidential approval

Laura Chinchilla presidency illustrates the political costs of governing under growing citizen dissatisfaction and institutional constraints. Her approval weakened considerably during the term, reflecting public frustration over management problems and declining confidence in traditional leadership. Compared with Chaves, her trajectory shows how difficult it is to maintain legitimacy once support begins to erode.

Figure 4. Presidential approval

Luis Guillermo Solís also entered office as an alternative to traditional party politics, but his approval weakened over time as governing constraints became more visible. He spent long periods below 40%, showing how difficult it is for outsider or reformist leaders to preserve public enthusiasm once in power. Chaves appears comparatively stronger because he has been more successful at converting anti-establishment rhetoric into durable backing, particularly among voters dissatisfied with traditional institutions.

Figure 5. Presidential approval.

Carlos Alvarado experienced one of the weakest approval trajectories among recent presidents. His term was marked by high volatility, contentious reforms, and prolonged periods of low support. By the end of his presidency, approval had fallen substantially. In contrast, Chaves inherited public frustration with the political establishment and transformed that sentiment into a more stable support coalition. Whereas Alvarado struggled to sustain legitimacy, Chaves has maintained a stronger and more resilient approval floor.

Taken together, these comparisons confirm that sustained approval is not the norm in Costa Rican politics. Against that broader historical pattern, Chaves’s trajectory appears exceptional rather than routine.

In comparative perspective, an approval level above 60% late in the term is unusual in Costa Rica. It suggests that although the president faces clear institutional limits, he has preserved political legitimacy among a significant share of voters. The central paradox of the Chaves presidency is therefore strong public support coexisting with constrained governability.

OUTLOOK

1. Determinants of Chaves’s future political influence

Chaves’s influence after leaving office will depend on whether his personal appeal can survive the transition to President‑elect Laura Fernández, whose victory shows his electorate can be partially transferred but not yet institutionalized. His long‑term relevance will hinge on whether his support becomes a durable partisan network or dissolves once he is no longer on the ballot. Security outcomes, economic perceptions, and administrative performance will shape retrospective evaluations, while his confrontational governing style ensures a polarized legacy. Ultimately, how Fernández governs, whether she improves security, reduces conflict, or struggles with the same constraints, will determine whether Chaves is remembered as the start of a realignment or a temporary personalist moment.

2. Economic and social context after the presidency

Costa Rica will enter the post‑Chaves period with strong institutions but persistent pressures tied to inequality, territorial divides, and unmet social expectations. The central challenge for the Fernández administration will be converting macroeconomic stability into visible improvements in wages, living costs, and public services, since voters judge governments through everyday experience. Labor market disparities, regional inequality, and rising insecurity, especially organized crime, will continue fueling frustration and outsider appeals. Although polarization may persist, Costa Rica’s institutional resilience offers space for negotiated solutions if new leadership addresses these structural grievances.

3. Institutional effects on the political system

The Chaves presidency is likely to deepen personalization of politics, weaken traditional parties, and normalize permanent campaign‑style communication. Persistent executive‑legislative conflict may heighten public frustration with institutional bargaining, while tensions with autonomous institutions could further politicize trust in checks and balances. His confrontational style has mobilized new voters but also intensified divisions, leaving a more engaged yet more polarized electorate. These dynamics accelerate Costa Rica’s shift toward a fragmented, leader‑centered model whose impact on governability will depend on how Fernández and future actors adapt.

MORE INFORMATION

Data sources

Al Jazeera. (2026, February 1). Polls open in Costa Rica as centre-right populists aim to extend mandate.https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/1/polls-open-in-costa-rica-as-centre-right-populists-aim-to-extend-mandate

Banco Central de Costa Rica. (2026). Informe de política monetaria: Enero 2026. https://www.bccr.fi.cr/comunicacion-y-prensa/Docs_Comunicados_Prensa/cp-bccr-003-2026-informe-politica-monetaria-enero-2026.pdf

Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2024). BTI 2024 country report: Costa Rica.https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/CRI

Cascante Cordero, V., & Lai Liu, E. S. (2025). Propuesta de reforma electoral: Acortamiento del intervalo entre rondas. Revista de Derecho Electoral, Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones.https://www.tse.go.cr/revista/art/39/cascante_lai.html

Transparencia Electoral. (2022). Elecciones presidenciales Costa Rica 2022: Situación post electoral.https://transparenciaelectoral.org/observatoriodemujeresypolitica/elecciones-presidenciales-costa-rica-2022-situacion-post-electoral/

Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. (2026). Encuestas electorales y disposiciones para las elecciones nacionales 2026.https://www.tse.go.cr/2026/encuestas.html

U.S. Department of State. (2021). Country reports on human rights practices: Costa Rica. https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/costa-rica/

Universidad de Costa Rica. (2026, marzo 4). Encuesta CIEP-UCR: El “candidato” Chaves fue el factor de más peso en el resultado electoral. https://radios.ucr.ac.cr/-/encuesta-ciep-chaves-factor-de-mas-peso

Methods

This report analyzes presidential approval in Costa Rica using a time-series of public opinion surveys from May 2022 to early 2026. The dataset was constructed from available polls with clear fieldwork dates to ensure consistency.

The data was processed in RStudio to generate trend visualizations. To identify underlying patterns, a LOESS smoothing technique was applied, reducing short-term fluctuations and highlighting medium-term dynamics in approval.

This approach allows for the identification of key phases, such as the honeymoon period, decline, and stabilization, providing a clearer interpretation of structural changes in public support over time.

Team

Octavio Gomez Hernandez, Elias Choudhury, Will Humphries, Maximo Vargas, Ingrid Portilla, Camila Sepulveda, Derrol Alexis.

Coverage

This report focuses on Costa Rica’s nation-wide presidential voting behavior in the 20-year events leading to and during the 2026 presidential election at February 1st.

OVERVIEW

The December 2025 Chilean presidential election resulted in a decisive victory for José Antonio Kast of the Republican Party, who defeated Jeannette Jara with 58.2% of the vote to 41.8%. This outcome marked a significant shift toward the political right following the left-wing administration of Gabriel Boric.

This report applies a backcasting approach, using only structural indicators and pre-election polling data to evaluate how the outcome could have been anticipated. While individual polls frequently showed Jara leading in the first round, broader electoral patterns and bloc-level support suggested a structural advantage for right-leaning candidates in a runoff scenario.

The findings indicate that a model incorporating both long-term electoral cycles and short-term vote consolidation would have identified Kast as a likely eventual winner, despite initial polling ambiguity.

BACKGROUND

1. Pre-Election Forecast Signals (Backcasting Framework): Pre-election polling data consistently placed Jara ahead in first-round vote intention. However, polling also revealed that support for right-leaning candidates was fragmented across multiple contenders. When aggregated, total support for right-leaning candidates frequently exceeded 45-50%, suggesting a latent electoral majority that was not fully captured by individual candidate polling. This distinction between candidate-level polling and bloc-level support is critical. A forecasting model accounting for ideological consolidation in a runoff would likely have identified Kast as the stronger second-round candidate.

2. The 2025 election reflected a polarized contest between competing visions of Chile’s political and economic future. Key campaign issues included public security, economic performance, and immigration policy.

Kast’s campaign aligned closely with rising voter concerns about crime and economic stagnation, while Jara’s platform emphasized continuity with the Boric administration’s reform agenda.

3. Role of Polls and Alternative Indicators: Traditional polling sources (e.g., CADEM, CEP, Criteria) struggled to fully capture the magnitude of right-wing support during the campaign period.

• Magnitude Error: Polls underestimated support for secondary right-wing candidates, making Jara’s lead appear more secure than it was.

• Bloc Underestimation: Aggregated right-wing vote intention exceeded that of the left in multiple surveys.

• Alternative Indicators: Measures such as political sentiment and approval trends signaled growing dissatisfaction with the incumbent government.

These dynamics suggest that reliance on individual polling alone led to systematic underestimation of Kast’s eventual margin of victory.

4. Factors of Victory (Recent Past): Kast’s victory can be explained through a combination of structural and short-term factors:

• Long-Term (Structural): Chile’s electoral pattern shows alternating support between left- and right-leaning coalitions (“electoral pendulum”), creating conditions favorable to a rightward shift after Boric’s presidency.

• Short-Term (Conjunctural): Rising concerns about crime, economic dissatisfaction, and effective campaign messaging allowed Kast to consolidate support across fragmented right-wing voters.

LONG-TERM TRAJECTORY

Chile’s presidential elections over the past decade demonstrate a pattern of alternating ideological control between left and right.

Source: Chile Electoral Service (SERVEL)

This pattern reflects a broader electoral pendulum, where voters shift between ideological blocs in response to incumbent performance.

By 2025, dissatisfaction with economic conditions and public security contributed to a political environment favorable to a right-leaning candidate. A fundamentals-based model incorporating these structural dynamics would likely have projected a competitive race with a rightward advantage.

Approval and Expected Electoral Performance in Chile (2017–2025)

Source: The EAP

This figure illustrates the relationship between candidate approval and predicted electoral performance across recent Chilean elections. While higher approval generally corresponds with stronger projected outcomes, the variation between cases highlights that approval alone is not determinative. For instance, Kast (2021) exhibits lower approval yet remains competitive, suggesting that broader structural dynamics, such as ideological alignment and bloc strength, play a decisive role. This reinforces the argument that Chile’s electoral outcomes are better explained by long-term patterns, including the electoral pendulum, rather than approval in isolation.

SHORT-TERM TREND

The chart shown below spans the period from January 2023 to November 16, 2025, incorporating data from the majority of national polls. The data illustrates a rising trend for right-wing forces, initially led by Evelyn Matthei. However, Matthei experienced a significant decline in polling preferences beginning in January 2025, a shift that coincided with a substantial surge for José Antonio Kast. Kast maintained this momentum and was ultimately elected following the electoral cleavage.

Polling and Fragmentation Dynamics

Pre-election polling consistently placed Jeannette Jara ahead in first-round vote intention. However, these projections masked a critical structural dynamic: the fragmentation of right-wing support across multiple candidates. While no single right-leaning candidate initially matched Jara’s polling numbers, the combined support of right-wing contenders frequently exceeded that of the left.

This discrepancy reveals a key limitation of candidate-level polling, which captures individual performance but fails to account for ideological bloc strength. As the campaign progressed, fragmented right-wing support consolidated, most notably around José Antonio Kast, transforming an apparent polling deficit into a competitive and ultimately dominant runoff position.

Actual vs. Predicted First Round Vote Share (2017–2025)
Source: The EAP

The figure above reinforces this dynamic by comparing forecasted and actual first-round vote shares. In 2017 and 2025, left-leaning candidates were overestimated, while right-leaning support was either underestimated or distributed across multiple candidates. These gaps highlight how polling, when interpreted at the candidate level alone, can misrepresent the broader electoral balance.

This forecast identifies three distinct and influential right-wing factions. The first is the traditional right, represented by Evelyn Matthei (UDI) of the Chile Vamos coalition, which has held office twice in the country’s history. The other two represent more ‘renewed’ and hard-line iterations of the right: José Antonio Kast (PR) and Johannes Kaiser (PNL). While Kaiser consistently ranked third in the polls and Kast second, the latter held a strategic advantage for the runoff election when aggregating the projected support from both right-wing and centrist candidates.

Ultimately, the forecasts project Jeanette Jara as the winner in the first round with 28.3% of the vote, followed by José Antonio Kast at 21.7%, who maintains a significant probability of prevailing in the runoff election. These candidates are followed by right-wing contenders Johannes Kaiser (15.8%) and Evelyn Matthei (14.9%). Finally, Franco Parisi is positioned with 10% of the vote, while Harold Mayne-Nicholls ranks last among the selected candidates with 2.6% of the vote.

FINDINGS

Combining long-term structural trends with short-term polling data provides a clearer explanation of the 2025 outcome.

• Long-term patterns suggested a likely ideological shift following Boric’s presidency

• Polling data indicated strong but fragmented right-wing support

• Runoff dynamics enabled consolidation behind a single candidate

The final result confirmed this model: Kast won with 58.2% compared to 41.8% for Jara.

A forecasting model incorporating both structural electoral cycles and bloc-level vote aggregation would have likely predicted:

• A Jara lead in the first round

• A competitive runoff

• A probable advantage for Kast in the final round

This case highlights the limitations of relying solely on candidate-level polling and underscores the importance of structural and bloc-based analysis in electoral forecasting.

MORE INFORMATION

Data sources

Chile Electoral Service (SERVEL) - official election results

Public opinion surveys (CADEM, CEP, Criteria, Panel Ciudadano)

Methods

This analysis uses a backcasting approach, combining historical election results with pre-election polling data. Long-term trends were assessed using past presidential elections (2017-2025), while short-term dynamics were evaluated using polling data from the final months of the campaign.

Team

Joseph Pagan-Portes, Aisha Siddiqi, Margaux Melby, Martin Ayala, Catalina Salamanca

Coverage

This report focuses on national-level presidential voting behavior in Chile’s 2025 election, with particular emphasis on runoff dynamics and ideological vote consolidation.

OVERVIEW

This report forecasts the outcome of the 2026 Colombian Presidential Election, specifically addressing whether the incumbent leftist coalition can retain power against a consolidating right-wing opposition. The institutional context is defined by a two-round system and a highly mobilized and polarized electorate. Long-term economic and political fundamentals suggest a difficult path for the incumbent party due to stagnant GDP growth. Short-term dynamics, captured via horse-race polling, show Iván Cepeda leading with 35.7% of the first-round vote. A critical “signal gap” exists as prediction markets (Polymarket) place Paloma Valencia as a near-equal contender for final victory (42.3%). Our final forecast projects a runoff between Cepeda and Valencia, with Cepeda holding a narrow 43.98% win probability; however, high polling volatility (±9%) and the market’s pivot toward Valencia indicate a race that remains statistically unsettled and highly sensitive to late-campaign shifts.

BACKGROUND

Election & electoral system

Key Dates: With upcoming legislative and primary elections beginning on March 8th, the stage is being set for the presidential elections on May 31st. If needed, a presidential runoff would begin on June 21st with the inauguration taking place on August 7th.

Offices: The President and Vice President are limited to one four-year term, and reelections are not allowed. The Senate can have 103 seats, with 100 members elected nationally, two seats reserved for indigenous communities and one seat for the presidential runner-up. The House of Representatives is made up of 183 seats, with 161 seats being territorial representatives, 16 seats being “Peace Seats” for conflict regions, and special seats for ethnic minorities and Colombians from abroad. Also, the runner up’s vice president is given a seat in the house of representatives as part of the Opposition statute.

Presidential Rules: Colombia uses a two-round system for the presidential election to ensure the winner has a broad mandate. A candidate must have more than 50% of the votes to win the first round and avoid a runoff. The March 8 inter-party primaries allow political coalitions to narrow down their fields, so that they don’t split their voter base during the first round in May.

Legislative Thresholds and Rules: For the Senate, a political party must have 3% of votes nationwide to qualify for any seats. Parties can choose between open lists, to vote for a specific person, and closed lists, to pick the party and fill seats based on a pre-set order. A proportional representation system is used in the house of representatives; and the system is based on departmental lists: not a single national count.

Candidates, parties

The 2026 presidential race has consolidated into four primary contenders following the March 8 consultations: each representing a distinct strategic position within the Colombian political spectrum:

Iván Cepeda (Pacto Histórico):

Position & Ideology: Left-wing continuity. He represents the State-led social reform cleavage.

Base: Strong support among urban youth, labor unions, and rural populations benefiting from land restitution programs.

Viability: High, as the administration’s successor, he holds a solid floor of 31.9% in recent polls (Invamer, 2025), though he faces a high rejection ceiling from opposition sectors.

Paloma Valencia (Centro Democrático):

Position & Ideology: Traditional Right. She embodies the Uribista cleavage, focusing on private property and institutional stability.

Base: Agribusiness owners, traditional conservative families, and the Antioquia region.

Viability: Very High. Her victory in the Gran Consulta por Colombia on March 8 (CNN, 2026) positions her as the primary challenger to the left, capable of consolidating the anti-Petrista vote.

Abelardo de la Espriella (Independent / MSN):

Position & Ideology: Right-wing Populist. He represents the Security vs. Chaos cleavage, utilizing an outsider, Bukele-style narrative.

Base: Middle-class voters concerned with urban crime and citizens disillusioned with traditional politics.

Viability: Moderate-High. While he lacks a traditional party machine, his high media profile and strong-arm discourse have disrupted the traditional right (Americas Quarterly, 2025).

Sergio Fajardo (Dignidad y Compromiso / Center):

Position & Ideology: Center / Moderate Reformism. He represents the “Anti-Polarization” cleavage.

Base: Academic sectors and middle-class urban voters seeking a technocratic alternative.

Viability: Low. His campaign has suffered a sustained decline, currently reaching a low of 4.8% in vote intention. With a winning probability of less than 1% in prediction markets, his role is likely limited to that of a marginal actor or a potential endorser for the runoff.

Issues, cleavages

The 2026 election is fundamentally structured around the legacy of the Petro administration and Petrismo vs. Anti-Petrismo cleavage. Iván Cepeda runs on continuity of land restitution, progressive taxation, and state-led reform, holding a consolidated polling floor of 31.9% according to Invamer’s 2025 polling.

Paloma Valencia, following her victory in the March 8 Gran Consulta por Colombia, is the primary vehicle for consolidating the Uribista anti-Petrista vote. Cutting across this is the Security vs. Paz Total cleavage. Petro’s ceasefire negotiations with the ELN, FARC dissidents, and the Clan del Golfo repeatedly collapsed. Rising homicide rates in departments like Arauca and Chocó deepened public frustration.

Abelardo de la Espriella has most aggressively exploited this through a Bukele-style security populism targeting urban middle-class voters disillusioned with both the left and the traditional right. Deeper structural tensions will shape second-round dynamics. Petro’s stalled healthcare and pension reforms entrenched a state intervention vs. market economy divide. This separates Cepeda’s continuity agenda from Valencia’s defense of private sector stability.

Claudia López offers a pragmatic fiscal middle ground. Her Imparables movement targets a growing anti-polarization sentiment among urban voters in Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali. Her lower-than-expected primary turnout as reported by AS/COA, however, confirms that this bloc is hard to mobilize. It will matter most as a decisive swing vote in a Cepeda-Valencia runoff.

Underlying all of this is a persistent urban-rural divide. Cepeda must hold the rural and Afro-Colombian communities Petro mobilized in 2022. Valencia remains anchored in Antioquia and among agricultural landowners. De la Espriella’s support is concentrated in urban centers where insecurity is a daily reality.

LONG-TERM TRAJECTORY

Colombia’s party system, once one of the region’s most stable, has splintered in the past two decades. No Colombian presidents in recent history, barring reelections, have been members of the same party.

Moreover, President Juan Manuel Santos repealed re-election for the presidency in this second term. Nevertheless, incumbents and their parties have tended to support candidates from other parties in the first and second rounds. This reflects fragmentation of the Colombian party system, as well as polarization. Indeed, we see a notable shift from centrist-leaning parties into more discernible left-and-right-wing parties, especially among the leading 2026 contenders

Table 1 : Colombia Presidential Election Results and Fundamentals Model Projections, 2006-2026

† Incumbent president Iván Duque’s Centro Democrático party endorsed Iván Zuluaga’s unsuccessful primary bid before shifting their support to Federico Gutiérrez in the general election.

Table 1 contextualizes our 2026 projection for Cepeda within Colombia's recent electoral history. A consistent pattern emerges across cycles: incumbents running for re-election enjoyed a structural advantage, as seen in win probabilities for Uribe in 2006 (84.08%) and Santos in 2014 (62.78%) .

Incumbent-backed candidates, by contrast, have historically underperformed, with win probabilities of 48.08% for Santos in 2010, 19.68% for Vargas Lleras in 2018, and 31.08% for Gutiérrez in 2022. Hence Cepeda’s projected 43.98% is the second highest of any incumbent-backed candidate in recent history This could suggest that Pacto Histórico is more consolidated than most outgoing parties in recent cycles.

To provide a sense of our forecasting model’s uncertainty, the table’s last column reports the differences between our projection and actual first-round vote share. On average, the absolute first-round difference across these recent cycles sits at 12.23 percentage points. Additionally, our model has consistently overestimated incumbent-backed candidates in recent cycles, with actual vote shares falling short of projections in 2014, 2018, and 2022. This adds a layer of caution to our 2026 projection. Notably, Santos in 2010 carried a win probability of 48.08%, below 50% yet still the highest in his field, and went on to win. Thus, while the model favors Cepeda, the race remains genuinely competitive.

SHORT TERM TREND

This section captures the recent electoral signal by analyzing polling aggregations and market based probabilities to identify the shifting dynamics of the race as of March 2026.

Methodological approach: to provide a reliable forecast, this report moves beyond individual snapshot polls. We utilize a LOESS smoothed aggregation (span = 0.4) of all available data points. This statistical method identifies the underlying trend by weighting data points and calculating a 95% Confidence Interval, which allows us to visualize the range of uncertainty for each candidate rather than treating a single percentage as an absolute truth.

Figure 1. Presidential vote intention trends in Colombia May2024 - March2026

Analysis of Trends and Momentum: The data covering the period from May 2024 to March 2026 reveals a highly competitive and polarized environment: Iván Cepeda (Leading but Volatile) currently holds the highest vote intention at 35.7%. His trajectory shows a consistent upward slope since late 2025. However, he presents the highest level of uncertainty, with a broad 95% CI ranging from 26.4% to 45%. Abelardo de la Espriella (Stable Challenger) is in second place with 28.2%. His trend is remarkably stable, evidenced by a very narrow 95% CI of 27.3% - 29.1%. This suggests a highly loyal and predictable “floor” of support compared to Cepeda. Paloma Valencia (Late Surge), after a period of stagnation, showed a sharp positive trend in early 2026, reaching 10%. Her 95% CI (5.1% - 14.8%) reflects recent momentum that is still stabilizing. Sergio Fajardo (Sustained Decline), the centrist vote, has systematically eroded reaching a low of 4.8%.

Uncertainty and market cautions: a critical signal gap exists between traditional polling and market sentiment, which serves as a necessary caution for this forecast.

Market Divergence: according to Polymarket, while Paloma Valencia polls at 10%, her winning probability is perceived at 36.5%, the second highest in the race. In contrast, De la Espriella polls at 28.2% but holds only an 18% winning probability in the market.

Statistical Overlap: The 95% CI bands for Cepeda and De la Espriella show significant overlap in the smoothed trend graph. This indicates that the gap between first and second place is not statistically insurmountable, and the lead remains within the margin of error in several scenarios.

Limitations: The high variance in Cepeda’s numbers (±9%) suggests a potential “ceiling” effect or sensitivity to late campaign events that the current model cannot yet fully account for.

FINDINGS

Winner

Based on the weight of both models, Iván Cepeda of the Pacto Histórico is the called winner of the 2026 Colombian presidential election. The long-term fundamentals model projects him to receive 34.32% of the first-round vote, closely corroborated by the short-term polling aggregation which places his smoothed vote intention at 35.7% as of March 2026. His overall win probability stands at 43.98%, reflecting a competitive but navigable path to the presidency through a Cepeda–Valencia runoff.

The most striking signal from the short-term analysis is the divergence between polling and prediction market sentiment. While Abelardo de la Espriella sits in second place in the polls at 28.2%, Polymarket assigns him only an 18% winning probability. Paloma Valencia, despite polling at just 10%, commands a 36.5% market probability. This divergence suggests that market participants expect Valencia, following her March 8 Gran Consulta victory, to consolidate the fragmented anti-Petrista vote in ways that current polling does not yet fully reflect.

The key trade-off heading into the runoff centers on where De la Espriella’s 28.2% goes. His Bukele-style security populism draws voters who reject both Petrismo and traditional Uribismo, making his coalition ideologically distinct from Valencia’s base. A meaningful share of those voters backed him specifically because they rejected the traditional right Valencia represents, meaning abstention is a real possibility rather than an automatic transfer to her. Fajardo’s 4.8% adds a further layer, as his urban middle-class voters lean toward Valencia when forced to choose, though those most hostile to Uribismo may similarly abstain. Whether the anti-Petrista vote consolidates cleanly around Valencia is the central uncertainty this race turns on.

Outlook

A Cepeda presidency would continue along the trajectory established under Petro, prioritizing land restitution, progressive taxation, expanded social spending, and state-led reform while resuming dialogue with armed groups under the total peace framework. However, a narrow mandate, congressional friction, and an economy that never broke above 1.2% quarterly growth during the Petro years would constrain his governing capital from the outset.

If Paloma Valencia defeats Cepeda in the second round, Colombia would pivot toward market-oriented governance anchored in Uribista priorities, including deregulation, resumed oil and gas exploration, fiscal consolidation, and a harder security line. However, the Pacto Histórico’s rural, Afro-Colombian, and labor union constituencies, still organized from 2022, would resist a sharp policy reversal, likely sustaining social conflict in a different ideological register.

Losers

The clearest losers are Paloma Valencia, Abelardo de la Espriella, and Sergio Fajardo, each for distinct reasons. Valencia, despite her 36.5% Polymarket probability, ultimately falls short. Her 10% polling average reflects an anti-Petrista consolidation that arrives too late and too narrowly to overcome Cepeda’s structural lead, with her market probability reflecting runoff expectations rather than a polling advantage she never established.

De la Espriella’s stable polling floor of 28.2% masks a structural ceiling. His Bukele-style outsider appeal translates into a loyal but bounded urban constituency unlikely to transfer well in a runoff, and his path to the presidency depends on consolidating a fragmented right that Valencia is better positioned to claim following her March 8 primary victory.

Fajardo represents the most complete collapse in the race. With vote intention at 4.8% and a winning probability of less than 1% on prediction markets, the anti-polarization message has consistent appeal but chronic difficulty mobilizing in a race framed entirely around Petrismo versus Anti-Petrismo. His most likely role is as a second-round endorser whose signal will be closely watched given the decisive weight of the urban middle-class voters he claims.

MORE INFORMATION

Team

University of San Sebastian

• Emily Miranda, Public Administration (2022-2026)

• María José Espinoza, Public Administration (2022-2026)

Georgia State University

• Kofi Opoku, B.A Political Science, Minor in Philosophy (2018-2022); M.A. Political Science (2024-2026)

• Mihir Bagchi, B.A Philosophy, Minor in Psychology (2016-2021); M.I.S. Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (2025-2026)

• Austin Cline, B.A. Political Science (2023-2027)

• Miguel Neri, B.S Biological Science (2025-2029)

Democratic Reversals

According to the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute at the University of Göthenburg, the last decade has seen a global resurgence of non-democratic governments. Using the Institute’s Liberal Democracy Index (LDI), which measures the extent to which a country limits the unilateral exercise of executive power by protecting civil liberties, a strict rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances, as of 2024, over 40% of the world’s population lives in ‘autocratizing’ countries, where quantifiable levels of democracy have continued to recede. Below, we have profiled 4 of the most notable cases of democratic backsliding: India, Turkey, Mexico, and El Salvador.

El Salvador

As illustrated below, El Salvador experienced a sharp decline in democracy between 2019 and 2021. Currently, the nation’s LDI is less than half of its score in 2018. This episode coincides with President Nayib Bukele’s tenure in office, which has been marked by his heavy-handed approach to combating the country’s persistent issues relating to crime, which has lowered the country’s homicide rate at the expense of its citizens’ civil liberties. In addition, since taking office, Bukele has used the military to intimidate lawmakers into passing his preferred bills, supplanted previous Supreme Court justices and the Attorney General with loyalists, sought to legally suppress civil society groups that oppose him, and overturned the country’s constitutional ban on re-election to remain in office.

Mexico

Mexico’s democratic score remained relatively stable until 2018, but the country has since entered a period of precipitous institutional decay. According to the Liberal Democracy Index, Mexico’s score dropped from 0.46 in 2018 to 0.25 by 2024. This has occurred during Andrés Manuel López Obrador and the MORENA party’s tenure in office. Similar to Bukele, AMLO reformed the country’s judiciary, mandating that all federal and state judges be popularly elected, under the guise of reducing corruption. He has also continuously undermined Mexico’s federal election institute, alleging that it robbed him of election victories in 2006 and 2012.

India

India’s declining level of democracy is attributed to the election of Narendra Modi in 2014. During his tenure in office, civil liberties have declined as political dissent has been suppressed using newly strengthened sedition laws. The government has prosecuted opposition actors, frequently accusing them of corruption. Concurrently, anti-Muslim violence and discrimation has been on the rise. In 2024, India Hate Lab, a non-profit group that researches hate speech in the country, found that incidents had grown 74% in that year, and were led by Modi and his BJP co-partisans. This has resulted in V-Dem classifying India as an electoral autocracy, and the Economist Intelligence Unit categorizing the country as a “flawed democracy”.

Turkey

Turkey frames itself as a competitive electoral democracy, yet its institutional trajectory reflects a shift toward a modern electoral autocracy. The Liberal Democracy Index remained relatively steady through 2013–2015, but the system entered a sharp collapse between 2015 and 2017, dropping from 0.233 to 0.104. After this decline, Turkey’s score stayed relatively stable, consistently low through to 2024. Reaching only up to 0.117, by far the lowest ranking in democracy level among the four countries, surpassed only by El Salvador in the final year (2024). During the beginning of his presidency in 2014 and after stepping down as prime minister in 2003, Erdoğan consolidated power by weakening judicial and bureaucratic checks, removing large numbers of public officials, and enabling pressure against critics and negative press, undermining the civil‑liberties and rule‑of‑law foundations that define liberal democracy. Limiting to up-to-date and completely unbiased data. Because Turkey had accumulated decades of democratic experience, citizens were less likely to view these actions as immediate threats, and partisan loyalties further insulated the incumbent from public sanction. These dynamics allowed Erdoğan to maintain electoral success even as the country’s liberal‑democratic order hollowed out.

Backsliders’ Approval

How does the public view backsliding leaders? If they are disappointed, we might expect them to exact accountability that could stave off or reverse democratic erosion. But if they voice support, the public should not be expected to act as an emergency brake.

Bukele

As illustrated below, El Salvador’s Bukele has enjoyed astronomically high approval ratings since his ascension to the Presidency. During his last 7 years in office, his latent approval rating, calculated using Pollitik’s Executive Approval Database, has not dipped below 79.6%. In line with findings from Guriev and Triesman’s The Popularity of Authoritarian Leaders, Bukele’s success in taming the country’s rampant gang violence has resulted in high approval. It is then unsurprising that his popularity was lowest (albeit still high) during flare-ups of gang-related violence in early 2022.

AMLO & Sheinbaum

Contrary to the assumption that democratic erosion leads to “widespread alienation,” Mexico’s executive has achieved historic levels of public support. As evidenced by the graph above, AMLO took office in 2019 with very high approval ratings, much higher than those of his scandal-ridden predecessor, Enrique Peña Nieto. Since then, his approval ratings remained high, peaking at a staggering 89.6% in March 2025. AMLO and MORENA’s popularity is mostly attributed to their commitment to delivering economic benefits to working-class voters as well as their stewardship of a growing economy. This is also consistent with Griev and Triesman’s findings, which show that stronger economic perceptions in informational autocracies lead to higher approval. In line with their expectations on informational control, the Wilson Center connected AMLO’s high approval rating to daily live press conferences. Moreover, Claudia Sheinbaum’s popularity since her inauguration at the end of 2024 also corroborates their findings that approval ratings soar after leader turnover.

Modi

In India, Modi’s approval is also high, although it has fluctuated more than that of his counterparts in El Salvador and Mexico. The COVID pandemic resulted in a sharp decline in 2021, as a particularly deadly second wave of the virus swept the country. Criticism of Modi’s lack of action following this surge sunk his popularity from the mid-60s down to below 40. Yet by late 2022 it was back in the 60s. Modi is seen as a strongman and his focus on nationalism contributes to his overall relatively high popularity. According to a Morning Consult survey in March 2026, Modi has the highest approval rating of world leaders globally.

Erdoğan

Turkey’s approval trajectory shows none of the dramatic swings that theories of democratic erosion often predict. Instead of collapsing as institutions weakened, Erdoğan’s support stayed mostly in the mid‑40s to low‑50s from 2013 to 2026, with only brief dips into the high‑30s that quickly rebounded. Rather than signaling widespread alienation, this stability points to a political environment where democratic experience, habitual voting patterns, and strong partisan alignment help maintain a consistent base of support despite the erosion of liberal‑democratic constraints. It also reflects an information environment shaped by media capture and agenda control: in line with Guriev and Treisman’s model, the government’s consolidation of major news outlets and selective censorship limited public exposure to institutional decline, helping preserve Erdoğan’s approval even as democratic checks weakened.

Executives around the world have been known to experience a phase at the start of their term: the Honeymoon phase. This has them enjoying higher-than-average approval ratings at the start of their term. However, for incumbents, their stories can differ, as the start of their second term generally begins less favorably in comparison to their first.

To better understand this phenomenon, this piece highlights the executive approval of the incumbents of Australia, Canada, Spain, Poland, Romania, and the United States.

Australia

Albanese’s trajectory becomes a simple shift from early momentum to steady decline. His first year in 2022 brought quick wins such as the minimum‑wage rise, the Climate Change Act, and the National Anti‑Corruption Commission, which lifted his approval to 60 percent before inflation, and the Voice debate weakened that optimism in early 2023.

In contrast, Albanese’s second‑term first‑year opened at 52 percent in June 2025 and slid to 38 percent by February 2026 as cost‑of‑living strained, the Bondi attack’s aftermath, rising social‑cohesion fears, a rate hike, a budget blowout, and One Nation’s growing prominence reshaped the political climate around him.

Canada

Justin Trudeau and Mark Carney show two different paths from early strength to shifting public moods. Trudeau began his first year in the low‑to‑mid 60 percent range, lifted by a post‑election honeymoon and optimism around his agenda, but his approval eased downward as worries about spending, deficits, and slower economic results grew.

Carney started in the high 50s and slipped into the low 50s mid‑year as cost‑of‑living pressures and trade uncertainty dominated debate, then recovered into the low 60s by year’s end as his economic message gained traction and his international role became more visible. Trudeau’s movement reflected fading early enthusiasm, while Carney’s shifts tracked changing views of economic management.

Spain

Pedro Sánchez’s early fortunes move from a constrained start to a brief lift and then a renewed decline. He entered office in 2018 through a no‑confidence vote, which kept his approval near 33% while he governed with only 84 seats and faced high unemployment and tense party dynamics. The April 2019 election briefly strengthened his position and pushed his approval into the low‑40s.

Conversely, his 2023 reelection produced a short honeymoon in the mid‑40s before support slipped again. A January 2024 rise to 35.7% followed a large minimum‑wage increase, but economic strain, corruption cases, polarization, and backlash to the “Only Yes Is Yes” law pulled his ratings downward once more.

Romania

Klaus Iohannis’s presidency reduces to an early surge of credibility followed by a steep collapse. Elected in 2014 with a mandate to advance European integration and curb corruption, he enjoyed approval above 50 percent and entered his 2019 second term with expectations of deeper reform.

Instead, his final years revealed a detached leader unable to address mounting domestic pressures, creating space for a rising far‑right that eventually threatened impeachment. By early 2025, his approval had fallen below five percent, and he resigned under intense pressure, leaving office as a symbol of stalled reform rather than the transformative figure many anticipated

United States

Donald Trump’s approval across his two terms can be reduced to a simple contrast between early lift and familiar decline. He began his first term in 2017 with approval in the mid‑40s and faced immediate polarization, as early executive actions such as the travel‑ban order triggered protests and prevented any real honeymoon.

His non‑consecutive second term opened with slightly higher month‑to‑month approval, suggesting that time out of office had softened some public attitudes, but the gains faded as he reversed key promises and economic pressures mounted. Rising inflation and unemployment eroded support among voters who had returned to him out of frustration with Democratic leadership, producing another downward slide.

Poland

Andrzej Duda’s approval followed two sharply different arcs, shaped by the political climate surrounding each term. His 2015 first year saw support rise from the low‑30s to the mid‑50s as the new Law and Justice government launched popular programs like the “500+” benefit, giving him a traditional honeymoon.

In his second term, beginning in 2020, it moved in the opposite direction: early high approval slipped into the mid‑40s amid the pandemic, clashes with the European Union over judicial reforms, and mass protests after the abortion ruling. The turbulence underscored how presidential approval often reflects the stability of the era more than the leader himself

Conclusion

Across six countries, the incumbent's honeymoon has proven fragile as economic pressures consistently override past achievements in shaping public approval. The lesson: incumbent popularity is dependent on their ability to pursue policies that resonate greatly with the majority of their citizens and increase popular sentiment retention.

Contextualizing the Scandal

Public discourse in the United States appears increasingly desensitized to political scandal amid a sharply intensifying climate of polarization. Before his second inauguration on January 20, 2025, President Donald J. Trump was convicted by a Manhattan jury on 34 felony counts of falsifying business records related to a 2016 hush-money payment. Because most felony convictions restrict voting rights for ordinary citizens, his election marked the first time a sitting U.S. president has held office as a convicted felon.

Partisan hostility has also risen significantly in recent years. In 2022, 72% of Republicans and 63% of Democrats said they viewed members of the opposing party as more immoral than other Americans—an increase from 47% and 35%, respectively, in 2016. Regarding the release of materials connected to Jeffrey Epstein, the Department of Justice made documents public in stages at a ‘ delayed ‘ pace.

Using a proprietary search tool, The New York Times reported identifying more than 5,300 files containing over 38,000 references to Trump, his wife, his Mar-a-Lago property in Florida, and related terms within a recent batch of emails+ and government records.

NPR also reported allegations that certain Epstein-related files were not included in publicly accessible DOJ databases, including documents referencing claims of sexual misconduct involving Trump. Separately, reports have indicated that Peter Mandelson, the former British ambassador to Washington, was arrested in connection with issues emerging from newly released files, which allegedly include email correspondence between Mandelson and Epstein.

Trump and Starmer’s Approval in the Wake of the Epstein Files

President Trump and PM Starmer maintained relatively stable approval levels through 2025 until the second tranche of Epstein files were released in January 2026. Following the arrests of high profile elites like Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor and Peter Mandelson, Starmer has seen an unexpected jump in his popularity. In contrast, a lack of prosecution in the United States and the perceived protection of predators is coupled with a sharp dip in Trump's approval.

Starmer’s Volatile Approval

Despite Keir Starmer having one of the lowest approval ratings in comparison to his predecessors, none have prompted greater calls for his early resignation than the recent fallout over the release of thousands of files linking his personally appointed ambassador, Peter Mandelson, to the United States. In September of 2025, in the aftermath of an article publicly making light of Peter Mandelson’s persistent connection to Jefferey Epstein, well after his conviction of procuring a minor for prostitution in 2008, Keir Starmer publicly defended his political ally before forcing him out of office the following day. Mandelson was later arrested on Monday, February 23, 2026, on suspicion of misconduct in public office.

The Mandelson arrest was also preceded just four days earlier by the arrest of Andres Mountbatten-Windsor, who was formally known as Prince Andrew before being stripped of his titles on suspicion of misconduct in public office relating to Jeffrey Epstein. These series of letdowns have created a sense of a “decaying order” within the British establishment that Starmer has struggled to contain. Senior figures like Health Secretary Wes Streeting have publicly stated that they feel “personally let down” (Times Radio, 2026) by the revelations, signaling a deep internal fracture within the Labour Party.

Trump’s Declining Approval

Political sentiment toward President Trump’s leadership has experienced notable fluctuations against the backdrop of increasing public intrigue surrounding the Epstein files. A Data for Progress poll revealed a growing sense of distrust among voters, which was reflected in Trump’s fluctuating approval ratings during this period.

According to the Executive Approval Data above, initially, Trump's approval rating stood at 41.4% in August. However, by December, this figure had dropped to 39.7%, marking a significant decline just one month before the anticipated Epstein Transparency Act was introduced. Following this downturn, there was a slight resurgence in January, where approval ratings rose 2 points to 41.7%. This brief recovery, however, was short-lived, as the start of 2026 saw a return to 41.4% in February.

However, the release of the Epstein flies on January 30th brought about a drastic decline in approval ratings, plummeting to 36% in March following the revelations from the Epstein files. This rapid drop emphasizes the profound impact of the information presented in these files on public perception, stressing the intertwining of political fallout and ongoing societal concerns regarding transparency and trust in leadership.

Future of US & UK Leadership

Official fallout within the Labour government will continue to pressure Prime Minister Starmer and threaten his authority, potentially pushing him to resign. Crucial local, Scottish, and Welsh elections upcoming in May 2026 could trigger a leadership challenge. As more files may come out, a commission to examine connections between English officials and Epstein may be established. Yet, it seems that for the US, less fallout was observed. But as public trust continues to decline, a stronger push for Trump’s impeachment grows.

Conflict and tragedy has been a constant presence in Israel and Palestine for decades, with tensions rising and ebbing continuously. Looking back at the polling data from the past two years, public sentiment about Israel’s offensives and de-escallations can be tracked and analyzed.

The Hamas offensive of October 2023 brought a blow to government approval, dropping 8.5 points in the following month as opposition’s rose 3.9 points. The headlines suggest this sudden drop was caused by public perception of the attacks as a failure of security and intelligence leading to a loss of credibility for Netanyahu’s image as a security expert.

Ceasefire 1- Nov 2023

November 24th 2023 marked the first ceasefire of the 2023 - 2025 Gaza Israel War. The week-long temporary ceasefire was based around a hostage exchange in which 108 hostages were released. During this period of time, a stabilization of the government’s approval rating can be observed; perhaps a reaction to the releasing of hostages.

While firing started back up on December 1st, peace negotiations remained ongoing following the end of the ceasefire but progress was stagnated. Netanyahu maintained a strong stance in negotiations refusing to fully withdraw without the complete dismantling of Hamas, a decision that appears to have paid off in polling.

Rafah Offensive- May 2024

The Rafah Offensive was justified by Israel as an attempt to completely dismantle Hamas, seeing as at the time, Rafah the ‘’last remaining stronghold for Hamas’ military battalions and its leadership’’ (Update: Everything You Need to Know about Rafah, Its Importance to Hamas, and Protecting Its Civilian Population, 2024). If Israel was successful in dismantling Hamas, the hostages could finally be rescued.

“We will enter Rafah because we have no other choice. We will destroy the Hamas battalions there, we will complete all the objectives of the war, including the return of all our hostages,”

- Benjamin Netanyahu, April 30th 2024

The offensive gave Israel control of all the entry points into Gaza through land, and received the bodies of hostages found in tunnels. The offensive marked the end of ongoing peace talks between Hamas and Israel, leaving no clear path to ending the conflict. The immense scale of the offensive and rate of casualties may have been the reason for the drop in approval after the offensive.

Ceasefire 2 - Jan 2025- March 2025

On the first anniversary of the war, a 5.6 point drop can be observed over a two month time period in Government approval. This follows an expansion of the conflict to new fronts with a ground invasion in Lebanon displacing Israelis living near the border. Simultaneously there is a rise in international discussion surrounding the conflict and human rights abuses. The government’s falling approval may be indicative of fatigue of a war gone on too long.

‘The international order is breaking down in Gaza’: UN experts mark one year of genocidal attacks on Palestinians’

‘Israel/Palestine: A Year of Horror’

During the second ceasefire, the Government oversaw a 2.9 point rise in approval and opposition fluctuates. This does imply that the population saw hope for the end of the war and optimism grew.

Gaza offensive- May 2025

Shortly after the second ceasefire ended, Israel ramped its efforts to bring the hostages back, and launched a Gaza offensive. It used the failed negotiations to show that an intense offensive was the only method to truly bring back the hostages. Once again, Israel linked taking out Hamas with bringing the hostages back.

“The greater the intensity of the attack here, the more directly it brings about Hamas’s defeat, and it also creates greater leverage for the release of the hostage,” -Kantz

The uptick in approval indicates Israelis may have perceived the Gaza offensive as a sign of strong leadership and taking control over a rapidly deteriorating situation.

Ceasefire 3- Oct 2025- Present (ish)

‘’Since the fragile truce started, Hamas has returned all 20 living hostages and 26 bodies…’’ (Al-Mughrabi & Cornwell, 2025). As of December 3rd, 2025, only the remains of two hostages are said to still be in Gaza.

The data shows a steady decline in the opposition’s approval, and stabilization of the current government’s approval.

By examining the approval rating for the current government and the opposition and comparing the data to the events ongoing at the time, we can see that the ceasefires bring stabilization and/or rise to the approval ratings of the government. The biggest priority for the Israeli people is to end the conflict and retrieve their hostages.

With the 2026 legislative elections on the horizon, if the current government wants to maintain its historic stronghold, it needs to do everything it can to preserve the ceasefire and bring back all of its hostages.

Methodology

We used data from The Executive Approval Database to create an averaged measure of vote intention polls collected throughout Israel. The Israeli government refers to the current bloc in power led by Netanyahu’s Likud Party and including the Religious Zionism Party, Otzma Yehudit Party, Shas Party and UTJ Party. Israel opposition refers to the bloc of opposition parties that have evolved over the course of the war with the Dems Party merging in 2024 and the Yashar and Bennett 2026 Party joining in 2025. The largest party in the opposition bloc is the centrist Yesh Atid Party led by Yair Lapid followed closely by Benny Gantz’ Blue and White party and including the Yisrael Beitienu party.

Sources

“The international order is breaking down in Gaza”: UN experts mark one year of genocidal attacks on Palestinians. (2024, July 11). OHCHR. https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/10/international-order-breaking-down-gaza-un-experts-mark-one-year

Al-Mughrabi, N., & Cornwell, A. (2025, December 3). Hamas says it will hand over a Gaza hostage body, Israel to open Rafah crossing. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-says-remains-handed-over-by-hamas-tuesday-are-not-gaza-hostage-2025-12-03/

Amnesty International. (2024, December 5). Amnesty International Concludes Israel Is Committing Genocide against Palestinians in Gaza. Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/12/amnesty-international-concludes-israel-is-committing-genocide-against-palestinians-in-gaza/

EAP. (2025). Executiveapproval.org. https://executiveapproval.org/

Israel-Hezbollah live updates: Hamas leader in Lebanon killed; Strike hits central Beirut. (2024, September 30). NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/israel-hezbollah-live-updates-hamas-leader-lebanon-killed-strike-hits-rcna173218

Israel’s Netanyahu is determined to launch a ground offensive in Rafah. Here’s why, and why it matters. - CBS News. (2024, May 2). Www.cbsnews.com. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-netanyahu-rafah-offensive-why-it-matters/

How do shutdowns influence Americans’ support for the president? Are presidents stronger or weaker in the aftermath?

Bill Clinton: 1995-1996 shutdown

The two shutdowns during Bill Clinton’s presidency revolved around the question of whether and how to balance the budget. Republicans preferred welfare cuts and tax decreases for the wealthy while Clinton preferred to increase spending in anticipation of economic growth.

The 1^st government shutdown in November 1995 ended the upward trend of Clinton’s approval that peaked at 53%. Thereafter, it continued to decline and plummeted during the 2^nd shutdown to 42%.

The government ultimately reopened in January 1996 with the passage of a budget-balancing agreement between the Democrat president and the GOP-dominated Congress. Clinton’s approval rating quickly rebounded to 54% in less than one month.

The dramatic drop and recovery in Clinton’s approval were thanks to factors below:

1. The shock of the first long-term shutdowns in US history

The government shutdowns under the Clinton administration lasted a total of 27 days, before which the shutdowns were only a day or two. Two longer shutdowns occurring back-to-back caused surprise and anxiety among Americans, in turn affecting their confidence in the government.

2. The halted public services

The 1995-1996 shutdown was the first time Americans experienced inconvenience from the prolonged delay in public services, increasing their dissatisfaction with the administration. All national parks and social security offices were closed. Federal loans and grants were delayed. The cleanup of toxic waste at hundreds of sites was halted. New patients were not accepted at the National Institutes of Health Clinical Center, and thousands of new Medicare applicants were turned away daily.

3. The bipartisan solution

The post-shutdown rebound in Clinton’s approval was in part associated with an agreement between Clinton and the GOP-led Congress to balance public budget in a way that accommodate both parties’ interests. This bipartisan decision met public desire, as 62% of Americans found balancing the budget very important according to Pew research.

4. Public blame on Republicans

The Public did not blame Clinton for the shutdown. Polling during the shutdown indicated that 49% of respondents blamed Republicans in Congress while 26% blamed president Clinton. The fear of the public blame for the shutdown and the oncoming presidential elections made Republicans accept Clinton’s budget proposal.

5. Positive economic prospects

When the government shut down in 1995, the economy was booming, and unemployment rate was declining. Though the estimated cost of the two shutdowns come to $400 million, the economic impact was only temporary as the boom lasted until early 2000s. The ongoing economic prosperity led people to move forward from their dissatisfaction with the shutdowns.

Barack Obama: 2013 shutdown

The 2013 shutdown occurred when President Barack Obama and congressional Republicans failed to reach an agreement on the federal budget, primarily due to disputes over funding for the Affordable Care Act (ACA). As partisan conflict escalated and the prospect of a shutdown grew, public anxiety increased and Obama’s previously steady approval rating began to decline.

Obama’s approval had dropped to 43% by the time the shutdown ended. Although congressional Republicans received most of the blame for the standoff, Obama was not completely insulated from public frustration. After a Senate compromise reopened the government, Obama’s approval recovered temporarily to 45% before it eroding to and remaining below pre-shutdown level for several months.

Three major factors shaped the decline and the short-lived recovery in Obama’s approval:

1. Disrupted Federal Services

The shutdown produced widespread inconvenience as government services halted, leaving millions without access to essential programs and furloughing federal workers without pay. These disruptions heightened economic anxiety and contributed to declining confidence in Washington. While Republicans were blamed more heavily, many Americans viewed the situation as reflective of broader governmental dysfunction, which negatively affected Obama’s approval.

2. Affordable Care Act Rollout Failures

The shutdown coincided with severe technical troubles in the ACA rollout, amplifying public frustration. Reports of website failures, enrollment barriers, and individuals’ prospect of losing essential insurance plans undermined trust in the administration at a critical moment. Although Obama experienced a brief approval bump after the shutdown ended and services resumed, persistent ACA problems quickly erased this recovery.

3. Weak Economic Environment

The shutdown took place during a period when the economy was still struggling to recover from the 2008 financial crisis. Federal spending cuts, slow economic growth, and concerns about social security and economic stability shaped public sentiment throughout 2013. These unfavorable economic conditions weakened Obama’s ability to sustain any post-shutdown gains and reinforced declining confidence in his leadership.

Donald Trump’s 1st term: 2018-2019 shutdown

The 2018 shutdown started with the unanimous passage of a regular budget appropriations bill in the Senate that Trump unexpectedly opposed on its way to the House, arguing it lack funds for the construction of a wall along the southern border with Mexico. Once the House passed an appropriations bill with funding for the wall, Senate Democrats filibustered it. After 35 days of stagnation, a compromise bill was passed that provided $1.375 billion for a fence along the border.

Trump’s approval stayed above 42% during the first half part of the shutdown but fell to about 40% by the shutdown’s end. Afterwards, Trump’s popularity rose to 44% within a month.

There are three factors behind the drop and the rebound:

1. Public disapproval of the shutdown

A CBS News poll in January 2019 found that 71% of Americans considered the border wall agenda “not worth the shutdown.” Polling during the shutdown indicated that 46% of respondents said Trump versus 35% said congressional Democrats deserved the most blame.

2. Limited impact on the public

Trump’s post-shutdown recovery is a product of limited real impact on the public. Welfare programs, including Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and healthcare services, were not directly impacted by the shutdown due to emergency funding being used or year-long funding being secured.

3. Distraction with immigration issue and economy

Following the shutdown, Trump immediately tried to declare an emergency to pull even more funding towards the border wall. This possibly led to a period where his polling numbers improved to pre-shutdown levels as his conservative base approved him for standing firm on immigration issue.

Furthermore, the 2018 shutdown coincided with a generally improving economy, lowering inflation, and booming job market. People’s positive perception of Trump’s economic handling led them to tolerate the shutdown.

Donald Trump’s 2nd term: 2025 shutdown

The 2025 shutdown was triggered when President Trump and Congress failed to agree on how to fund the government for the 2026 fiscal year. It was resolved when Trump signed a 3-bill package securing full-year funding for agriculture, military construction, veterans, and Congress itself and short-term funding for the rest of the federal agencies until January 30, 2026.

Within the 10 days before the 2025 government shutdown, Trump’s approval trended downward but stayed above 45%. It 43% when it ended. After the government reopened, Trump’s approval fell further to 42.4% and has remained below the pre-shutdown level, behind which there are 3 factors.

1. Weakening economy

Unlike the 2018 shutdown, the 2025 shutdown concurred with stagnant economy, deteriorating inflation, and declining job market. RealClearPolling shows lower shares of Americans approving Trump’s handling of economy (39.8%) and inflation (34.7%) than his overall job approval (43%) on average. The shutdown is projected to worsen an already struggling economy, with GDP growth in the 4^th quarter of the year forecasted to be negative.

2. Endangered healthcare subsidies

Unlike the 2018 shutdown that spared funding for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the 2025 shutdown risks healthcare affordability. The package to end the shutdown does not include the extension of the enhanced Affordable Care Act (ACA) subsidies that will expire on December 31, 2025. This signals skyrocketing prices for health insurances.

3. Political scandal

The Jeffrey Epstein files drew increasing public attention and criticism during the government shutdown. Trump and his GOP allies were reluctant to support the release of the files. A recent Reuters/Ipsos poll showed that Republicans approved of Trump’s handling of the Epstein files (44%) far less than of other issues (82%).

Frustration over the mishandling of economy, Medicaid, and Epstein files may undermine Trump’s ability to rally support and distract the public with his populist rhetoric as he has done in his first term.

Conclusion: The path of Trump’s post-shutdown approval

After comparing factors that shape patterns of pre- and post-shutdown approvals of previous presidents, we project that Trump’s post-shutdown approval is less likely to rebound significantly and may resemble Obama’s short-lived recovery followed by further decline. This can be explained with the pathways of government shutdown’s influence and the solution each shutdown delivers.

Government shutdowns affect presidential approval through direct and indirect pathways:

Direct pathways: Government shutdown directly delays federal services Americans depend on daily, triggering widespread dissatisfaction and complaints that cause people to question the government’s ability to serve. Such effects are usually temporary and would die down as the government and services get back on track.

Indirect pathways: On the other hand, government shutdown may reinforce the effect of other political, social, and economic issues on presidential popularity.

• Clinton and Trump’s 1^st term saw substantial and long-term recovery in their approvals, in part because their governments were shut down when the economy was improving.

• Obama’s short-lived rebound in his post-shutdown approval was partly due to the sluggish economy in 2013.

Americans tend to forgive their presidents for the shutdown if they perceive the latter’s positive handling of the economy. Trump may become less forgivable to voters who were disappointed with his failure to effectively fix economy and inflation.

Dissatisfaction with government shutdown amplifies voters’ attention to the issue of politicians’ misbehaviors. The delay in the house’s vote on Epstein files due to the 2025 shutdown sparked stronger public pressure and criticism among liberals and conservatives, forcing Trump and the GOP to approve the files’ release shortly after the shutdown. The information released are likely to hurt their public image.

The sustainability of the solutions delivered that end government shutdown also underpins Americans’ evaluation of the executive performance.

• The 1995-1996 shutdown ended with a bipartisan agreement setting groundwork for the 1997 balanced budget act and a budgetary surplus in 2002.

• The 2025 shutdown ended with short-term funding for most federal agencies and disregards the public demand for healthcare subsidies.

The stand-alone effect of government shutdown is temporary, but it can worsen other issues with long-term effects on presidential approval. The current upheavals could pose obstacles to Trump’s retrieval of popularity in the upcoming months.

Team:

Yu Nong

Valentine Morrison

Hala Altayyar

Sources:

1. Pelosi has edge over Trump on budget negotiations, CBS News poll shows

   https://www.cbsnews.com/news/pelosi-has-edge-over-trump-on-budget-negotiations-says-cbs-news-poll/

2. 1995 and 2013: Three differences between two shutdowns

   https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/01/politics/different-government-shutdowns

3. What is a government shutdown?

   https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-is-a-government-shutdown-and-why-are-we-likely-to-have-another-one/

4. President Trump Approval - Economy

   https://www.realclearpolling.com/polls/approval/donald-trump/issues/economy

5. President Trump Job Approval

   https://www.realclearpolling.com/polls/approval/donald-trump/approval-rating

6. Government Shutdown Concluded but ACA Subsidies in Limbo

   https://www.ajmc.com/view/government-shutdown-concluded-but-aca-subsidies-in-limbo#:~:text=Despite%20that%2C%20the%20bill%20passed,than%20double%20for%20some%20individuals.

7. Republicans give Trump weak marks on Epstein files

   https://www.reuters.com/investigations/republicans-give-trump-weak-marks-epstein-files-2025-11-21/

8. Clinton Ratings Hold: Balanced Budget A Public Priority, But Few See Personal Payoff

   https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/1996/01/18/clinton-ratings-hold-balanced-budget-a-public-priority-but-few-see-personal-payoff/#:~:text=Nonetheless%2C%20a%20balanced%20budget%20is,for%20the%20House%20next%20fall.

9. Government Shutdown Effects on Public Health: Lessons from the 2025 and 2018-2019 Closures

   https://www.astho.org/communications/blog/2025/government-shutdown-effects-on-public-health/#:~:text=The%202018%2D2019%20shutdown%2C%20which%20was%20sparked%20over,agencies%20%E2%80%94%20including%20CMS%2C%20CDC%2C%20HRSA%2C%20and

10. House and Senate on collision course as shutdown nears

    https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/20/border-wall-funding-house-1070940

11. Mitch McConnell blocks Senate Democrats’ move to reopen government

    https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/10/politics/senate-blocks-vote-congress-shutdown/index.html

12. As Congress Passes Spending Bill, Trump Plans National Emergency to Build Border Wall

    https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/us/politics/trump-national-emergency-border.html

13. Poll: Majority of Americans hold Trump and Republicans responsible for shutdown

    https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/427007-poll-majority-of-americans-hold-trump-and-republicans-responsible-for/

14. Trump says he could keep shutdown going for months or years

    https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/04/politics/shutdown-donald-trump-nancy-pelosi/index.html

15. Obama’s Job Approval Declined Steadily Throughout 2013

    https://news.gallup.com/poll/166727/obama-job-approval-declined-steadily-throughout-2013.aspx

16. Poll: 72 percent opposing shutdown over Obamacare

    https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/10/01/poll-72-percent-oppose-shutdown-over-obamacare

17. Obama’s approval rating match two-year low, the poll shows

    https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/26/us/politics/obamas-approval-rating-matches-two-year-low-poll-shows.html

18. Who Americans Usually Blame After Showdowns Over Federal Spending

    https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/government-shutdown-polls/

For years, the large influx of immigrants has strained the UK’s asylum system and increased demand for illegal boat crossings. As a result, the Labour Party worries that many immigrants have been unable to receive proper support to integrate into British society effectively, and crossing attempts have further endangered lives. Meanwhile, the Conservative Party, spearheaded by the UK Reform Party, aims to decrease immigration, viewing it as a driver of high living costs and a misuse of tax funds, with many party members believing that immigrants are prioritized over citizens and pose a threat to national identity, as reflected by recent protests against housing immigrants in hotels.

But as polarizing as these opinions on immigration are, both parties acknowledge that it is a significant issue in the UK. However, until recently, the British government has been reluctant to change its policies, leaving both parties dissatisfied with the government. This is reflected in the plummeting overall approval rating, which is now among the lowest in the world, while the unchanging immigration policy allows an ever-increasing number of immigrants to enter the country.

In an attempt to please both sides, the British Government has made sweeping reforms to its immigration policies, including changing the waiting period for citizenship and removing housing options for those with work permits. While these efforts somewhat appeal to both parties, it remains uncertain whether they will be enough to restore approval ratings or if the situation is already beyond recovery.

Sources:

https://www.ipsos.com/en-uk/public-concern-about-immigration-rises-its-highest-level-2016-brexit-vote

https://yougov.co.uk/topics/society/trackers/the-most-important-issues-facing-the-country

https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migrants-in-the-uk-an-overview/#:~:text=At%20the%20time%20of%20the%202021/22%20Census%2C,reliable%20data%20are%20available%20for%20later%20years.

The UN Refugee Agency

In the UK, new prime ministers used to enjoy a comfortable “honeymoon period”, which is a stretch of time where the public gave them the benefit of the doubt. But in recent years, that grace period has become much shorter and far more fragile. Voters expect results immediately, the media reacts instantly, and small mistakes can snowball into major crises.

Liz Truss, Rishi Sunak, and Keir Starmer are all examples of how early popularity can collapse. However, their honeymoons ended for a different reason.

Liz Truss: A Honeymoon Destroyed Overnight

Liz Truss’s time in office shows how a single decision can wipe out a honeymoon almost instantly.

Just weeks into her job, she introduced the September 2022 mini-budget, which proposed huge tax cuts funded by large amounts of government borrowing. It was meant to boost economic growth, but instead it caused panic in the financial markets. Investors doubted the plan, the pound crashed to a historic low, and confidence in the government evaporated.

What made things worse was Truss’s refusal to reverse the plan even as the situation spiraled. Voters saw it as stubbornness rather than leadership. Her approval ratings fell so fast that she simply didn’t have time to recover. Her honeymoon ended almost as soon as it began.

Rishi Sunak: A Slow, Steady Decline

Rishi Sunak’s honeymoon didn’t collapse suddenly—it faded slowly.

When he came into office after Liz Truss, people hoped he would restore stability and competence. But the problems he faced: like high living costs, rising interest rates, and pressure on ordinary families, didn’t improve under his leadership. Over time, frustration grew.

A few controversial decisions added to this slow decline.
One major example was his move to scrap the Manchester leg of the HS2 rail project. Many saw this as a step backwards for long-term infrastructure and investment, and even members of his own party were angered.

Then he weakened some of the UK’s net-zero climate plans. He argued that the original policies were too expensive, but many voters believed cutting them would cost more in the long run and harm the UK’s climate leadership.
None of these decisions sparked an immediate crisis, but together they chipped away at his early support.

Keir Starmer: Losing Support by Creating Early “Losers”

Keir Starmer’s honeymoon ended quickly because his early decisions directly affected and angered specific groups of voters. Two policies in particular caused trouble: the Winter Fuel Payment Cuts and the scrapping of the Rwanda Plan.

Right after taking power in July 2024, Starmer limited winter fuel payments to only the poorest pensioners. This upset many older voters who relied on the payment to afford heating, even if they weren’t among the very poorest. The backlash was strong enough that he reversed the decision in May 2025. The damage to his early popularity, however, had already been done.

He cancelled the previous government’s plan to send certain asylum seekers to Rwanda. But instead of replacing it with something more in line with Labour’s traditionally softer stance on immigration, he introduced a tough border-control approach. Many Labour supporters found this harsh and out of step with the party’s values.

In both cases, the issue wasn’t just the policy itself, it was the feeling that certain groups were being sacrificed early on. That kind of decision can end a honeymoon very quickly.

Conclusion

These three prime ministers show that there’s no single reason a honeymoon ends. Truss lost hers through a dramatic early mistake. Sunak lost his through slow disappointment. Starmer lost his by upsetting key groups right away.

Overall, British politics today leaves almost no room for error. Public patience is thin, media reaction is fast, and a prime minister’s early popularity is incredibly fragile. In this environment, honeymoons aren’t guaranteed—they have to be protected.

Sources

(2015). Cnn.com. https://media.cnn.com/api/v1/images/stellar/prod/gettyimages- 2014830063.jpeg?c=16x9&q=h_653

Crerar, P. (2025, May 21). Labour could review other benefit cuts after winter fuel U-turn, sources say. The Guardian; The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/may/21/labour-to-review-giving-more-pensioners-winter-fuel-payments

Dawson, Bethany. 2023. “Liz Truss: I Didn’t Crash the Economy.” POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/liz-truss-i-didnt-crash-economy-uk/.

Rainey, M. J. (2024, July 9). New UK Government Rescinds “Rwanda Plan” But Cruel System Remains - Refugee Research Online. Refugee Research Online - Providing a Platform for Academic Research and Documentation on Issues Surrounding Asylum Seekers and Refugees. Promoting Better Awareness of Related Issues through Publications and Public Forums. https://refugeeresearchonline.org/new-uk-government-rescinds-rwanda-plan-but-cruel-system-remains/

“Rishi Sunak Accused of ‘cancelling the Future’ with Climbdown over HS2.” 2023. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/oct/02/hs2-rishi-sunak-scrapping-manchester-leg.

“September 2022 United Kingdom Mini-Budget.” 2025. Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_2022_United_Kingdom_mini-budget.

“UK Net Zero Policies: What Has Rishi Sunak Scrapped?” 2023b. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/sep/20/uk-net-zero-policies-scrapped-what-do-changes-mean.

(2025). Mirror.co.uk. https://i2-prod.mirror.co.uk/article36262187.ece/ALTERNATES/s615b/1_Sir-Keir-Starmer.jpg

President of Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum

Fresh off her October 2024 inauguration, Mexican president Claudia Sheinbaum was forced to confront Trump’s threat of a 25% tariff on Mexican goods.1 During her morning press conference on November 26, Sheinbaum revealed a letter to Trump declaring that any tariff would be met with equal action.2

Her firm stance against the Trump Administration earned her favor with the Mexican public in the polls. The four-month period culminated into Sheinbaum’s peak approval to date, reaching a 79.2% average in mid-March of 2025.

Support for Sheinbaum was also felt in the streets. A major rally on March 9 in Mexico City’s central square (Zócalo) focused on drumming up national pride and unity in the midst of Trump’s ongoing tariff threats.

A couple days before the rally, a successful phone call between Trump and Sheinbaum led to Trump rescinding his tariffs for Mexican goods falling under the USMCA trade deal. The planned rally became a festival—a celebration of Sheinbaum’s continued strength against Trump.3

The final notable shift in approval occurs in August of 2025. Reports circulated that Trump had authorized the US military to target a group of Mexican cartels previously designated as terrorist organizations.4

On August 8, Sheinbaum responded in her daily press conference that while she is open to cooperation, the US military is in no uncertain terms unwelcome from intervening on Mexican soil.5

Once again, her ability to go toe-to-toe with Trump correlated to an increase in approval. Sheinbaum gained 6% approval between August and October, landing at 78.5%.

President of France, Emmanuel Macron

French President Emmanuel Macron typically holds a low baseline approval rating due to domestic policies and dissatisfaction with his handling of national crises. The graph, however, shows consistent 2–4% approval spikes whenever he meets with U.S. President Donald Trump—especially when those meetings take place in France.6

These increases suggest that Trump’s presence boosts Macron’s public image, particularly when Macron appears to oppose or challenge him, as seen during events like their 2017 handshake or NATO disagreements in 2018.7

Between 2021 and 2024, Macron’s approval steadily declined after Trump left office, dropping about 6% and reaching a career low even after Macron’s 2022 re-election. This trend reverses in 2024–2025, aligning with Trump’s announcement of his re-election campaign, which may have contributed to the sharp rise in Macron’s approval during that period.8

Prime Minister of Japan, Shigeru Ishiba

Japan’s former Prime Minister, Shigeru Ishiba, first met face-to-face with Donald Trump in February 2025.9 It was mostly amicable. The two leaders underscoring on the importance of an alliance between the two nations, and Trump agreed to increase U.S. exports to Japan.

After the meeting with Trump, Ishiba saw a decrease in approval during the following month, with his approval dropping from 38% in February to 34% in March. During April, Ishiba had a subsequent interaction with Trump over the phone regarding tariff measures. It was in that same month that Ishiba’s approval dropped to 31%. The drop was likely caused by the public’s concern over U.S. tariffs, and considering the phone call did not result in relief from U.S. tariffs, the public blamed Ishiba for not persuading Trump to reconsider.10

Despite most of Japan seeing Trump’s tariffs as a crisis and a threat to their economy, Ishiba spoke highly of Trump after their phone call which further emphasized the strained relationship between the Prime Minister and his country.11

Prime Minister of Norway, Jonas Gahr Støre

The prime minister of Norway, Jonas Gahr Støre, leader of the Labour Party, managed to secure the second term in office. This result was not only a personal triumph for Støre himself but also a symbolic defense of social democracy against the rising tide of right-wing populism.

Jonas Gahr Støre met with Trump on April 24th, 2025. His approval rate gradually increased from 49% to 58% after winning his second term in office—surviving years of turmoil within the Labour Party.

In April, Jonas Gahr Støre discussed the defense and security of cooperations to enforce a peace settlement in Ukraine and establish a bilateral trade relationship. Jonas said the interaction with Trump was productive and reaffirmed the strength of the US-Norway relationship.12

President of Ireland, Catherine Connolly

From March to October 2025, Ireland’s presidential approval ratings saw a dramatic decline, reflecting a growing sense of public frustration with the political establishment. The housing crisis, soaring cost of living, and a climate of social unrest converged to make the 2025 presidential election one of the most turbulent in recent memory.

President Catherine Connolly met with US President Donald Trump to discuss bringing “lasting and sustainable peace” to Ukraine and the Middle East. During the meeting with Trump, they discussed the Irish housing crisis, but declared it to be a sign of success. This was not well-received by the Irish public, for whom housing is becoming increasingly unaffordable. 13

Note: This article is an update of a previous election forecast for Honduras published earlier this year by Pollitik

Since winning the 2021 election, Honduran President Xiomara Castro’s approval has hovered between the high 50s and low 40s. She (along with her husband, ex-president Manuel Zelaya) has led Libertad y Refundación (AKA LIBRE), the first explicitly left-wing party to gain power in Honduras. This de facto ended Honduras’ two-party system. As Honduras doesn’t allow the president to run for reelection, Castro and LIBRE they’ve anointed ex-minister of defense Rixi Moncada to be the successor candidate. In opposition are the two traditional political parties of Honduras, Partido Nacional, the right-wing party, and Partido Liberal, the traditionally center/center-left party, which has become more centrist as LIBRE has cannibalized its left-wing support.

Tensions run high as the primary vote in the Spring saw irregularities and inconsistencies, and there are growing worries that this will carry into the election on November 30th. This election’s driving domestic issues are the economy, crime, and corruption. LIBRE has added to the social safety net, and they are popular. However, Honduras continues to have the highest murder rate in Central America & corruption continues to plague the country.

Geopolitics is also on the ballot. LIBRE decided to recognize China over Taiwan when they won back in 2021, while also being friendly to other left-leaning countries in Latin America. The Liberal party’s candidate Nasralla has already promised that if he wins, he will reverse course on these decisions and warm to the US and switch back to recognizing Taiwan, which would shock domestic markets and could have major geopolitical ramifications as well.

Background

Election, electoral system:

The president of Honduras is decided by who receives the most votes in one round. They will then serve a 4-year term after which they can’t run for reelection. The president must be natural born, be at least 30, and isn’t serving, or have served in the military or police for at least a year. Hondurans can vote when they turn 18 unless they have a criminal record. Also, members of the military can’t vote as they are charged with managing the elections.

Candidates, parties:

Nasry “Tito” Asfura - Partido Nacional (Right)

Asfura is the right-wing candidate. He represented Partido Nacional in the 2021 race, where he lost to the current president, Xiomara Castro, trailing by about 15 points in that election. He was the mayor of Tegucigalpa, the capital city & largest city in Honduras, from 2014 to 2022.

Rixi Moncada - Partido LIBRE (Left)

Moncada is running to be Xiomara Castro’s successor, representing her party LIBRE. She was a lawyer before becoming a politician. Recently, she has served as minister of finance as well as minister of defense during the current administration. There was controversy about her serving as minister of defense during the primary campaign, as the military is responsible for managing the elections. However, in the primaries, this wasn’t a major issue for her as she won with 92% of the vote.

Salvador Nasralla - Partido Liberal (Centrist)

Nasralla is representing the centrist party in this year’s election. He was the Vice President of Honduras from 2022 to 2024. Nasralla ran in both 2017 & 2021. He dropped out of the race in 2021 to become the running mate of Castro. In 2017, he officially lost; however, documents released during a corruption scandal by New York prosecutors in 2023 show he won the vote in the 2017 election with 57%.

Issues, cleavages

Corruption: Corruption in Honduras is a key issue within Honduran society. For years, the country has struggled with the intertwining of political power, organized crime, and weak institutions — a dynamic that has undermined public trust in institutions. Drug traffickers & Cartels have reportedly channeled untraceable cash into political campaigns and even assassinated some candidates. Meanwhile, the principal electoral authority (CNE) is riven by internal divisions and faces even more accusations of political interference.

Crime: Honduras’ murder rate has declined since Castro first took power in 2022, but its murder rate remains the highest in all of Central America. Cartels and gangs like MS13 have a major foothold in the country, which the state has struggled to grapple with.

Economy & Poverty: The economy has improved under the Castro administration as GDP has risen and the unemployment rate has fallen from 8 to 5 percent since she took office. However, still many of these jobs are low-skilled and low-paying, as according to the UNWFP, 63% of the country is still in poverty. This has meant that the LIBRE social programs have been popular, but cuts to them could have a major effect on the populace if either of the more conservative parties pulls ahead in the election.

LONG-TERM TRAJECTORY TREND

Our fundamentals model considers several political factors. Presidential Approval is the key factor that we consider, among other things, such as reelection and party type. Given that reelection is not possible, the results of our forecast equation are applied to the successor; in this case, Moncada, given Castro’s endorsement.

According to estimates from the Executive Approval Database, Castro during her honeymoon period her approval peaked in the high 50s. Since then, however, it has cooled down with her approval hovering between the low & high 40s.

According to Pollitik’s election forecast, we give Moncada around a 55% chance to win in the presidential election on the 30th.

FINDINGS

Most likely scenarios

Winner(s): Rixi Moncada & LIBRE look to be winners for the upcoming election, as it looks like they will hold onto power for another term. Rixi Moncada is likely to become Honduras’s second female president. This will allow LIBRE to continue to further their agenda and entrench themselves in national politics, as they are a relatively new party founded only in 2011 and will have won the presidency twice since then.

Outlook (governance/economy): Hondurans will benefit from LIBRE’s expanded social programs and some anti-corruption measures taken. A Moncada election may mean some uncertainty for international investors. LIBRE’s confrontational politics and skepticism of institutions, combined with left-leaning economic views, have already seen international investment slow down in Honduras; another LIBRE term with a slowing economy worldwide could see this trend continue. But a continuation of the LIBRE financial management & social program, along with potential foreign investment from China, could strengthen public trust in the government.

Losers (political landscape): Asfura & Nasralla would both be the biggest losers. For Asfura, this would be the second time he’d have lost to LIBRE, and he would’ve been out of office as the mayor of Tegucigalpa for 4 years, which would make it an uphill battle to get himself into a position to run for president again. For Nasralla, he cut himself loose from the Castro administration when he was Vice President, and much of the anti-corruption achievements he has campaigned on would have been achieved by the administration he left, leaving behind the credit with them. This may dampen his own political prospects as he would’ve seen himself on the outside of the president’s office three cycles in a row, which may kill his own political career.

MORE INFORMATION

Data sources

Executive Approval Project

Gallup World Poll

IPSOS-MORI

UNWFP

Borge y Asociados

Trading Economics

AmericasBarometer

Latinobarometer

Diario Paradigma

M&R Consultores

Methods

Fundamentals model. The long-run fundamentals forecasts are tailored to contexts with few elections. Our method consists of three steps. First, we pool election outcomes for incumbent and incumbent successors across roughly two dozen presidential democracies. Second, we leverage a machine-learning technique called LASSO to select the most predictive economic and political fundamentals measured six months prior to the election. For incumbent party vote shares, this methodology indicated presidential approval, a president running for immediate reelection, quarterly growth (annualized), and indicators for Ecuador and the Philippines. Forecasts of incumbent win probability included the same variables (minus the Philippines) but with the inclusion of “Time-for-Change”, a variable indicating the incumbent party seeking more than one consecutive term (per Abramowitz 1988). Finally, we employ the weights from these predictors to forecast the election outcome.

See Love, Carlin, and Singer (2025) for more details on the methodology.

Team

Javier Torres

Victoria Cook

Willow Shoffeitt

Eduard Karpoev

Coverage

Honduran Presidential (November 30th, 2025)