You know that feeling when you look at a promising stock and ask yourself, “Is this the next big thing that will send me into early retirement, or a spectacular belly landing?” That’s exactly where we are right now at Hydreight Technologies in August 2026. The telemedicine sector is currently an absolute shark tank. While the competition is whining about falling margins and a brutal price war, Hydreight simply achieved 449% sales growth in the first quarter. But on the stock market, yesterday’s success is already cold coffee today. The upcoming Q2 figures, probably this week, will be the ultimate stress test. And in the background? There sits Victory Square Technologies (VST) and rubs its hands in the face of an ingenious contract clause.

The 449 percent shock and the awakening of the competition

Let’s put the facts on the table for a moment: In the first quarter of 2026, Hydreight virtually pulverized all expectations. Revenue jumped to $24.9 million (up 449% year-over-year), and adjusted EBITDA shot up over 1,400% to $3.3 million. The management was so confident that it cemented the annual guidance at a whopping USD 150 million.

But now it gets tricky. The overall market for telemedicine and weight loss drugs (GLP-1) is cooling down massively. Big fish such as Hims & Hers or LifeMD presented their Q2 figures in August and absolutely disappointed the market. The episode? Massive crashes because the price war eats away at gross margins.

“The upcoming second quarter must now prove that this level is sustainable, especially since the strong competition in the telemedicine sector has recently revealed massive margin problems.”

Why this point is so crucial: This market environment makes Hydreight’s Q2 report an absolute showdown. If the entire sector weakens, but Hydreight continues to deliver such growth with stable profitability (the targeted 15% to 17% EBITDA margin), this signals a certain “pricing power” to the market. It shows that Hydreight’s B2B approach is more robust than the competition’s error-prone end-user (D2C) model.

The Anatomy of a Record Quarter – What Q1 Told Us

To understand what we can expect in Q2, we need to look at the machine under the hood. Hydreight not only earned brilliantly in the first quarter, but also ended the quarter with CAD 24.2 million in cash and CAD 32.0 million in working capital. That’s a gigantic cushion for a micro-cap player.

However, there is also a small warning: the gross margin fell from 33% to about 20.4%. This is a clear sign that the sales mix is shifting.

Why this is so crucial: The decline in gross margin may seem like an alarm signal at first glance, but it illustrates the true business model: volume. As long as Hydreight can keep fixed costs extremely low due to this massive volume (operating costs fell to only 9% of sales in Q1), the so-called “operating leverage” will apply. This means that every additional dollar earned has a disproportionately strong impact on pure profit (EBITDA).

VSDHOne – The Actual Brain of the Surgery

The real star of the show is not the single nurse who gives an IV IV, but the platform behind it: VSDHOne. This plug-and-play digital infrastructure gives healthcare brands instant access to a nationwide network in all 50 U.S. states.

By August 2026, licenses sold had exploded from around 3,000 at the end of 2025 to an incredible 12,000+. In addition, there are over 300 doctors and more than 3,000 nurses who support this network.

Why this point is so crucial: The 12,000 licenses are a massive leading indicator. A sold license is not yet immediate revenue, but it represents the future transaction volume. The network is now large enough to handle even the largest national health campaigns. Anyone who owns this “rail network” of telemedicine collects money on every single train journey.

Victory Square Technologies (VST) – The Laughing Puppeteer in the Background

Now it gets really exciting for investors. Victory Square Technologies (VST) not only holds around 44.5% of the shares in Hydreight (Value: approximately 98 million CAN$, market capitalization: approximately 66 million CAN$), but has also secured a contractual goldmine when it was founded: a direct “profit share” of 10% on the VSDHOne platform.

And here is the crucial difference that is often misunderstood: It is not a revenue share, but a profit share. VST receives 10% of the money left over after deducting all of the platform’s direct operating costs. Historically, Hydreight had waived all payments to VST until the end of 2025, but since Q1 2026, the clock has been ticking – and the first provisions ($192,000) have already been recognized.

Why this point is so crucial: This clause is a masterpiece of corporate structuring. VST has thus secured a completely market-independent cash flow. Whether Hydreight’s share price falls or rises by 20% tomorrow – as long as the platform generates an operating profit, hard money will flow into VST’s coffers. It is the ultimate in enterprise-level passive income.

The Magic Table – When Economies of Scale Really Bang (2026-2030)

Let’s play with the numbers a bit. Analysts believe that Hydreight can maintain annual revenue growth of a whopping 60.2% through its scaling and could even crack the $1 billion mark in the medium term. At the same time, we assume that the efficiency of the platform will increase the profit margin from a conservative 15% in 2026 to 25% in 2030. Revenue and margin will then look like this:

How does this affect VST’s 10% profit share?

These mind-blowing numbers are: Look at operating leverage: Revenue doesn’t even increase tenfold in this model (it increases by about 6.6 by a factor), but the annual payout to VST increases elevenfold from $2.25 million to nearly $25 million. Over the entire 5-year period, VST would cumulatively pocket around $52.7 million in cash flow – and that’s just from this one contractual clause, mind you, completely independent of the value of their 44.5% share package!

The reality check – Where are the stumbling blocks for Q2?

The upcoming quarterly figures are no walk in the park. To achieve its annual guidance of $150 million, Hydreight needs to turn over an average of nearly $42 million per quarter in the three quarters (Q2 to Q4).

In addition, the company is diluting its share base. Due to a CAD 15 million financing in January and outstanding convertible bonds, there is a moderate to high dilution risk. Although management has announced a share buyback program (NCIB) for up to 9.3% of the shares, mere permission to buy back does not mean that the shares will actually be bought.

Why this point is so crucial: A “beat” (exceeding expectations) is extremely likely, as the prior-year quarter (Q2 2025) was extremely weak operationally with only CAD 5.38 million in GAAP revenue and tiny profits. So the percentage growth rates will look astronomical again. However, the smart money does not look at the previous year, but at the comparison to Q1 2026. And more importantly, will the EBITDA margin remain stable?

The final conclusion

Hydreight Technologies is sitting on an absolute gold vein if the company succeeds in continuing to establish its VSDHOne platform as the industry-wide standard for telemedicine infrastructure. The upcoming Q2 will show us unequivocally whether the company is building a true “pricing power” monopoly, to the great delight of Victory Square Technologies. or just surf along on the short-term hype wave of weight loss injections.

What do you think about the stock?

My wikifolios PPinvest Low Vola and PPinvest AI system have a combined AUM of over 15 Mio. Euro and are both in the Top 10 ranked, out of > 30.000 wikifolios.

My investment style is a mixture of value/momentum investor. Based on the fundamental data (VALUE) and the price development of the last 52 weeks (MOMENTUM), the stock is currently one of my TOP stocks. These are the stocks where I see the highest chances of strong price gains in the medium term (1-3 years).

I also buy these values in my wikifolios and at FollowMyMoney.

Subscribe now

My stock ideas are part of the “Elite Investor Feed” at ☛ Yellobrick

ELITE INVESTORS are the top 5% of investors, in a database of over 3,000 investors.

The performance of my stock ideas is tracked, independently of me.

At the moment, it looks like this.

“Speculative investments are like a tennis match: the decisive factor is to concentrate fully on the next ace instead of being annoyed by the last double fault.” A. Gerstenberger

Disclaimer

This text was partly created with AI applications.

All content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities or other financial market instruments. Of course, I try to present the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief, but they can still be false in whole or in part.

Therefore, I do not accept any liability for investment decisions that you make on the basis of the information presented here.

Conflict of interest: At the time of publication, the author of this publication holds shares/securities of the securities/companies discussed here and intends to sell them depending on the market situation and could benefit in particular from increased trading liquidity. As a result, there is a concrete and clear conflict of interest.

In the last few weeks, some fresh money has been invested in my wikifolios, especially in the wikifolio PPinvest Low Vola and PPinvest AI system.

Thank you for the trust!

Imitators are always welcome 😄

I will do my best, because I myself, as well as Family & Friends are invested here. What can an investor expect?

All my wikifolios are intended for the long-term investor. I try to ignore short-term fluctuations and focus on long-term wealth accumulation. I want to encourage my investors to do the same – both in times of outperformance and underperformance.

Current trend stocks, investor favorites and shares of the “Magnificent 7” will NOT be found in my wikifolios. Investing off the beaten track means consciously looking where others are not yet looking. This is my world! It means not letting yourself be driven by the crowd, but cultivating your own convictions, analyses and perspectives. Those who choose this path accept that real opportunities rarely appear loudly. They hide in niches, in early trends, in underestimated markets and in ideas that initially seem unusual. In my opinion, however, the chances are much higher here.

Away from the familiar routes, there is room for clarity: less noise, less herd instinct, more focus on substance. This is exactly where investments can grow that not only bring returns, but also the feeling of having discovered something of their own. It is the courage to think against the tide — and the serenity to trust in one’s own preparation. Investing off the beaten track is not an adventure out of recklessness, but a path for people who recognize opportunities before they become obvious.

I strongly believe that my strategy of buying high-quality and under-noticed small businesses at low prices will deliver attractive absolute and relative returns in the long run.

I expect a performance similar to the market when prices rise in general. In downward phases, I expect a strong outperformance to the market! But I can’t give a guarantee for it! So far, my expectation has worked out very well, see charts.

wikifolio PPinvest Low Vola (green) vs. MSCI World

wikifolio PPinvest AI system (green) vs. MSCI World

Due to my expensive experiences 😜 from 2000 and 2008, I am no longer a “LONG ONLY” investor. I can only achieve an above-average return through market timing. With other investors, it can be quite different.

“Our head is round so that thinking can change direction. (•‿-) Francis Picabia”

The wikifolios are not oriented towards a specific region, an industry or a hip trend. That wouldn’t make sense either, since every bubble bursts at some point and the wikifolios are intended for the long-term investor.

Thanks to all those invested for their trust! It is a great privilege for me to invest other people’s hard-earned money.

Disclaimer

All content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities or other financial market instruments. Of course, I try to present the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief, but they can still be false in whole or in part.

Therefore, I do not accept any liability for investment decisions that you make on the basis of the information presented here.

Conflict of interest: The author of this publication holds shares/securities of the stocks/companies discussed here at the time of publication and intends to sell them depending on the market situation.

On July 23, 2026, Seoul, South Korea-based global online and mobile game developer and publisher GRAVITY Co., Ltd. (Nasdaq ticker symbol: GRVY) officially announced that its highly anticipated MMORPG sequel “Ragnarok M: Eternal Love 2” has successfully received an ISBN (Game License) from the Chinese National Administration of Press and Publication for release on mobile devices and PC. This regulatory approval milestone means that the commercial hurdles in China, the world’s largest and most competitive gaming market, have been completely removed for this product, paving the way for a large-scale release in partnership with well-known Chinese gaming company X.D. Network Inc.

Against the backdrop of this very positive news, Gravity is in a phase of extreme and historic undervaluation on the capital market. By the end of July 2026, the company’s share price on the Nasdaq had fluctuated at around $62, which corresponds to a total market capitalization of only about $430 million with around 6.95 million shares outstanding. In stark contrast to this small market capitalization, Gravity has staggering cash and cash equivalents. According to financial data filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the company’s cash, cash equivalents and short-term financial instruments totaled 611.615 billion South Korean won (approximately $401.5 million) as of March 31, 2026. If you subtract these massive net cash reserves from the market capitalization, Gravity’s enterprise value (EV) is almost zero.

Considering operating profit of 30.83 billion won (about $20.2 million) in the first quarter of 2026 alone and total operating profit of an impressive 77 billion won for the full year 2025, the current market valuation reflects an extremely low EV/EBITDA multiple of about 0.3x. This valuation level is not only significantly lower than that of Asian industry peers such as Nexon and NCSoft, but also expresses the deep pessimism of the capital market, as Gravity has long been considered a “value trap” that neither pays dividends nor buys back shares.

Due to massive pressure from activist investor Strategic Capital, which recently increased its stake in parent company GungHo to 13.67%¹, this situation has now changed radically. GungHo is now not only paying out a sharply increased dividend of JPY 90 per share, but is also buying back its own shares worth up to JPY 5 billion. This pressure from shareholders and the massive equity requirements of the parent company are now having a direct effect on Gravity: The company announced in a current mandatory announcement (Form 6-K) that it will pay an interim dividend for the first time in the company’s history, which marks the long-awaited starting signal for the release of cash reserves².

Catalyst Detail Analysis: The Commercial Logic Behind ISBN Approval for “Ragnarok M: Eternal Love 2”

Obtaining an ISBN number from the Chinese government is the most challenging, but also potentially the most lucrative milestone for any foreign game developer. The license, granted on July 23, 2026, is not only a regulatory recognition of the content of “Ragnarok M: Eternal Love 2”, but the central growth engine for Gravity’s Asia strategy.

The synergy effects of the strategic partner XD Inc.

Another great certainty for the commercial success of “Ragnarok M: Eternal Love 2” lies in Gravity’s close ties to the local Chinese development and publishing giant X.D. Network Inc. (XD Inc.). The game is being developed jointly by both parties, and XD Inc. is responsible for preparing for its release on both mobile and PC in mainland China.

XD Inc. not only has world-class development capabilities, but also controls TapTap, China’s most influential and commission-free community platform for mobile games. TapTap is playing a disruptive role in the Chinese game distribution landscape. While traditional Android app stores often charge game developers up to 50% of revenue as a channel fee, TapTap adheres to a “free-to-distribute” model, monetizes exclusively through advertising, and doesn’t claim a revenue share from in-game purchases. TapTap has tens of millions of highly active, young users who are willing to pay for high-quality games.

With XD Inc.’s dual role as co-developer and publisher, “Ragnarok M: Eternal Love 2” is sure to receive the highest priority in traffic allocation and tailored community promotion in the run-up to its release on the TapTap platform. These channel synergies can dramatically reduce customer acquisition costs (CAC) and significantly increase the overall profit margin of the development alliance. Gravity typically records XD Inc. revenue in the form of revenue sharing or royalties. This is a high-margin business model (asset-light) where Gravity does not have to bear the high server and marketing costs in mainland China.

Analysis of financial fundamentals: transition in fiscal year 2025 and earnings explosion in Q1 2026

A strong IP portfolio and the breakthrough in licensing in overseas markets must ultimately be reflected in hard cash on the balance sheets. Analysis of Gravity’s financial results for the 2025 financial year to the first quarter of 2026 shows that its business model is highly resilient to crises and has astonishing operating leverage.

The cyclical decline in Q4 2025

In the fourth quarter of 2025, Gravity experienced a brief performance low. Preliminary, unaudited consolidated revenue for the quarter was 113 billion won, with an operating profit of 12 billion won. Compared to the previous quarter (QoQ), revenue decreased by 18.6% and by 12.9% compared to the same period last year (YoY). Management pointed out that this decline was primarily due to the natural life cycle and the consequent decline in revenues of “Ragnarok M: Classic”, which had previously been launched in Southeast Asia (released in February 2025), as well as Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau (released in April 2025). Despite the weak performance in the fourth quarter, Gravity’s total consolidated revenue for the full year 2025 still reached 560 billion won, and its annual operating profit came in at a whopping 77 billion won, maintaining its extremely healthy cash flow generation.

The explosive recovery in Q1 2026

With the start of 2026 and the release of several new games, Gravity has seen rapid positive development. In the first quarter ended March 31, 2026, Gravity generated total revenue of 161.878 billion won (approximately $106.3 million), representing a massive 42.7% increase from the previous quarter (QoQ) and a 17.8% growth from the same period last year (YoY).

Even more impressive than the growth in sales was the rapid increase in profitability. Operating profit for the first quarter came in at 30.83 billion won (about $20.2 million), up 163.1% sequentially and 24.7% year-over-year. Net income attributable to shareholders of the parent company rose to 29.394 billion won (about $19.3 million), up 138.7% QoQ and 33.4% YoY.

Performance drivers and analysis of operating leverage

A deeper analysis of the report for the first quarter of 2026 shows that the strong revenue growth was mainly driven by the mobile games sector (which contributed 132.8 billion won to revenue, up 54.1% QoQ). The main driver of this growth was the initial sales of “Ragnarok: The New World”, which was released on January 15, 2026 in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau, as well as “Ragnarok Origin Classic”, which was successively rolled out in regions such as Southeast Asia, while “Ragnarok X: Next Generation” held a solid base on the global servers. At the same time, PC online games also recorded revenue of 25.906 billion won, thanks to the return of users to the classic “Ragnarok Online” in Japan and Thailand, as well as additional revenue from the “Ragnarok Online America Latina” version launched in Latin America in May 2025.

The secret to the triple-digit percentage increase (+163.1%) in operating profit compared to the previous quarter lies in Gravity’s excellent cost control and operating leverage. While revenue rose sharply, operating expenses (opex, mainly selling, administrative and research/development expenses) fell to 20.824 billion won in the first quarter, down 24.2% QoQ and 17.6% YoY. This significant reduction is primarily due to the fact that older games (such as “Ragnarok Online” in Thailand, “Nobunaga’s Ambition: The Road to the World” in Japan) entered a mature profit phase and the costs of advertising and user acquisition were drastically reduced. This gap, which widens as sales increase while fixed and marketing costs decrease, perfectly demonstrates the economic power of game distribution in the middle and late stages of the life cycle. Although the cost of revenue (mainly channel fees and royalties) rose to 110.224 billion won in parallel due to new game launches, the compressed operating costs were enough to give the operating profit margin a significant jump.

Extreme valuation outliers and an unassailable liquidity fortress

To understand Gravity’s core investment logic, it is not enough to look at its excellent income statement. The real argument lies in the almost counterintuitive accumulation of cash on the balance sheet and the resulting “valuation failure” of the capital markets.

The financial miracle of a near-zero enterprise value

As of March 31, 2026, Gravity had a staggering 611.615 billion won in cash, cash equivalents and short-term financial instruments (about $401.5 million at the exchange rate at the time). On December 31, 2025, this liquidity reserve even reached a peak of 618.633 billion won (about 421 million US dollars). Thanks to this exceptional ability to generate strong cash flows over the years, Gravity has built an unassailable liquidity fortress.

However, the Nasdaq market’s valuation of Gravity expresses extreme indifference. Based on the share price from mid to late July 2026, the price per share fluctuated between $61 and $63 (the last closing price was around $61.98). With 6.9489 million shares outstanding, this results in a market capitalization of only about 430 million US dollars.

If the interest-free cash reserves (approx. USD 401.5 million) are subtracted from the market capitalization (approx. USD 430 million), only an insignificant amount of around USD 28.5 million remains for the enterprise value of Gravity. Comparing this to the operating profit of around $20.2 million that Gravity generated in the first quarter of 2026 alone (projected to be over $80 million per year), this means that Gravity’s current EV/EBITDA valuation multiple is only about 0.3x.

Peer Group Comparison

In the entire global gaming industry, such a valuation is extremely rare and illogical.

• Nexon Co., Ltd. As Gravity’s structurally closest competitor in the Asian gaming market (both generate profits by converting classic PC game IPs into mobile games for the Asian, especially the Chinese market), Nexon mentioned in its financial report that the huge success of its game “Dungeon & Fighter Mobile” in the Chinese market compensated for the declines in other business areas. Nevertheless, Nexon’s EV/EBITDA multiple on the capital market is consistently between 8x and 12x.

• NCSoft: Another behemoth for traditional Korean MMORPGs that is currently suffering from player losses and yield declines, NCSoft still claims an EV/EBITDA multiple between 6x and 10x.

• Even at the traditional price-to-earnings (P/P/E ratio), Gravity’s current static P/E ratio is only around 8.2x to 8.6x, while competitors like Nintendo have double-digit P/E ratios and other Western publishers like EA enjoy even higher premiums.

What exactly is the reason for this extremely “stingy” pricing of the capital market for Gravity? The answer lies in the long-standing conglomerate discount and the market’s utter desperation over the company’s capital allocation strategy. Investors have long assumed that Gravity’s huge cash reserves would never be returned to minority shareholders in the form of dividends or share buybacks, but would remain in the accounts as “dead money”. However, this pessimism is fundamentally called into question by the latest announcements.

Corporate governance dilemma, majority shareholder dynamics and the historic breakthrough

The roots of Gravity’s capital allocation dilemma lie in its shareholder structure. Since its IPO, Tokyo Stock Exchange-listed gaming company GungHo Online Entertainment (TSE: 3765) has continuously controlled 59.3% of Gravity’s shares. GungHo, in turn, is closely intertwined with SoftBank Group and Masayoshi Son’s younger brother, Taizo Son. Under GungHo’s leadership, Gravity has historically never paid a dividend and has repeatedly clarified in its annual SEC 20-F filings that there is no intention to pay dividends in the near future.

Intervention by activist investor Strategic Capital (increase to 13.67%)

However, this rigid strategy of hoarding cash at the subsidiary experienced an unprecedented turn in mid-2026. The well-known Japanese activist investment firm Strategic Capital (led by Tsuyoshi Maruki) initiated a vigorous campaign against the parent company GungHo. In order to give massive weight to its own demands, Strategic Capital increased its stake in GungHo from 10.51% to a remarkable 13.67% on July 8, 2026 (a total of 7,267,500 shares held⁾¹.

Strategic Capital publicly condemned GungHo’s low capital efficiency, unequivocally calling for more aggressive capital allocation, the launch of share buyback programs for Taizo Son’s shares, drastically higher dividends, and even considering potential delisting by a third-party buyer¹.

Under this escalating pressure, parent company GungHo had to take drastic measures and boost its shareholder returns. GungHo now pays a 50% increased dividend of JPY 90 per share and has also announced a JPY 5 billion share buyback program for up to 2.3 million treasury shares. In addition, on January 9, 2026, GungHo published an all-new compensation concept for the Board of Directors, which links the incentives for top management directly to the Total Shareholder Return (TSR) over a three-year period compared to the TOPIX index.

Governance reform becomes reality: Gravity pays dividend for the first time

The parent company’s need to finance its freshly increased dividend payments and share buybacks in the long term allowed only one conclusion: GungHo would access the more than $400 million in cash reserves of its subsidiary Gravity. This logical chain has now been confirmed as a real fact.

A recent Form 6-K filing by Gravity with the SEC indicates that the company will actually pay an interim dividend for fiscal 2026 for the first time in its history2. In order to determine the eligible shareholders for this dividend, Gravity has set the record date for June 30, 2026 and has decided to close the shareholder register between July 1 and July 10, 2026².

Even though the exact amount of this initial dividend has yet to be formally decided by the Board of Directors, the announcement of this step alone represents a historic turning point². The announcement pulverizes the governance discount that has long depressed Gravity’s stock price and formally forces a repricing of the stock towards multiples that match the level of competitors such as Nexon.

A deep moat through intellectual property: Copyright renewal eliminates terminal value risks

In addition to the historic restructuring on the capital side, Gravity has taken a strategic move at the most basic level of its business – intellectual property (IP) – to eliminate a material long-term risk.

Many game companies that develop games based on third-party licenses are often exposed to the great risk of a drastic drop in terminal value in financial valuation models (such as DCF models). As soon as the license agreements expire, they either lose their main source of income or are exposed to horrendous renewal demands from the licensors. The majority of Gravity’s revenue depends heavily on the IP “Ragnarok”, which originally came from Korean comic book artist Myoung-Jin Lee and his comic book of the same name. Previous contracts required Gravity Myoung-Jin Lee to pay royalties based on a percentage of sales or net profit, with a fixed term.

In September 2024, Gravity took a historic step: the company not only revised the licensing agreement with Myoung-Jin Lee, but also directly acquired the copyrights to the plot and characters of “Ragnarok” for the development, sale, distribution, marketing of games and animations, and commercialization of merchandise. The most crucial point here is that the exclusive control period for this copyright has been extended directly into the year 2063.

This license renewal agreement with a term of almost 40 years dispels all uncertainties surrounding the “Ragnarok” IP. For institutional investors, this means that they can confidently add long-term discounted cash flows (DCF) to Gravity’s core values in their valuation models, as the company’s “lifetime moat” is legally secured.

Potential investment risks

Despite the rare positive response to fundamentals, valuation and regulatory policies, the following inherent risks must be carefully considered before investing in Gravity:

1. Concentration risk for IPs: Even as the diversification strategy progresses, over 80% of Gravity’s revenue still comes from the only “Ragnarok” IP. Should players in Greater China and Southeast Asia develop a “fatigue” towards this IP, or if “Ragnarok Online 3” falls short of expectations after release, this would have a direct negative impact on the company’s future cash flow forecasts.

2. Execution risk in the Chinese market: Although “Ragnarok M: Eternal Love 2” has received the extremely valuable license, today’s Chinese market for anime and open-world games is dominated by mega-hits from giants such as Tencent, NetEase, and HoYoverse. The joint publishing with XD Inc. must be perfectly orchestrated in terms of PR strategy and long-term operations in order to stand out from the crowd.

3. Currency risk (FX exposure): Gravity’s financial reports are settled in South Korean won (KRW), but the majority of its revenue comes from overseas. If the won appreciates sharply against these currencies, this will lead to negative exchange rate losses when converted for the balance sheet, which will visually depress sales growth

4. Risk regarding the dividend amount: Although Gravity has finally announced an interim dividend after years of “value trap” status2, the exact amount of the payout has yet to be formally decided by the Board of Directors. If this first distribution is only symbolic and does not make substantial use of the enormous cash reserves, the hoped-for dramatic valuation adjustment of the share could fall short of investors’ expectations.

Conclusion and strategic investment conclusion

In summary, the granting of the Chinese ISBN license for “Ragnarok M: Eternal Love 2” on July 23, 2026 not only proves Gravity’s excellent compliance and PR capabilities in overseas markets, but also kicks off making maximum profits in the world’s largest gaming market, China, with the help of XD Inc. and its commission-free TapTap channel.

At a fundamental level, the impressive financials for the first quarter of 2026 (a 163% sequential increase in operating profit) prove that Gravity’s global publishing pipeline (particularly in Southeast Asia and Latin America) already has strong growth momentum that is breaking away from old cycles. As for the security of the underlying assets, the almost 40-year copyright extension (until 2063) has ensured that the cash cow “Ragnarok” is fully protected from the risk of legal uprooting.

Most importantly, there is an irrational bias in Gravity’s current valuation. A market capitalization of approximately $430 million with cash and cash equivalents of over $400 million means that investors are acquiring the core business of this game developer, which generates over $80 million in operating profit on an annual basis, at virtually no cost. With activist investor Strategic Capital massively increasing its stake in parent company GungHo to 13.67%¹, the pressure generated has finally turned the tide. With the formal confirmation of the first-ever interim dividend in Gravity’s history (record date: June 30, 2026)², the knot in capital allocation is now bursting. The long-awaited catalyst that converts cash directly into shareholder value has been realized, making Gravity’s current risk-return profile an extremely rare and hard-to-beat appeal.

Gravity is expected to publish its results for the second quarter of 2026 on August 7. The probability that Gravity will miss earnings expectations can be classified as moderate to high (critical) this quarter. Although the operating business has been going well recently, the immense upfront costs for the gigantic game launches in July 2026 (Southeast Asia and America) fell entirely into the second quarter and are likely to temporarily weigh heavily on margins. Perhaps a good time to enter in the event of a setback!

Current price 61.5 USD

My price target for the next 3 years is 147.6 USD (+240%).

My basic idea when investing is to buy a stock cheaper than it is actually worth. I work with a “fair P/E ratio” (P/E ratio - price-earnings ratio), which is supposed to reflect the fair value of a stock. If a fair P/E ratio of 15 is calculated for a company and is currently trading on the stock exchange for a P/E ratio of 10, then it would be a cheap buy. The bigger the gap between fair and current P/E ratios, the cheaper I am in purchasing! From this “gap” I calculate the potential for future price gains, because sooner and unfortunately sometimes later, the stock market recognizes the “fair P/E ratio”.

According to my calculations, the “fair P/E ratio” here is 22.5

My investment style is a mixture of value/momentum investor. Based on the fundamental data (VALUE) and the price development of the last 52 weeks (MOMENTUM), the stock is currently one of my TOP 25 stocks. These are the stocks where I see the highest chances of strong price gains in the medium term (1-3 years). I also buy these values in my wikifolios and at FollowMyMoney.

References

1. https://tokyobrief.com/articles/strategic-capital-gungho-stake-13-67-percent

2. GRAVITY (NASDAQ: GRVY) sets June 30, 2026 interim dividend record date - Stock Titan, https://www.stocktitan.net/sec-filings/GRVY/6-k-gravity-co-ltd-current-report-foreign-issuer-690624ab118e.html

What do you think about the stock? My stock ideas are part of the

“Elite Investor Feed” at ☛ Yellobrick

the performance of my stock ideas is tracked, independently of me. At the moment, it looks like this.

I am one of the ELITE INVESTORS—the top 5% of investors in a database of over 3,000 investors.

“Speculative investments are like a tennis match: the decisive factor is to concentrate fully on the next ace instead of being annoyed by the last double fault.” A. Gerstenberger

Disclaimer

This text was partly created with AI applications.

All content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities or other financial market instruments. Of course, I try to present the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief, but they can still be false in whole or in part.

Therefore, I do not accept any liability for investment decisions that you make on the basis of the information presented here.

Conflict of interest: At the time of publication, the author of this publication holds shares/securities of the securities/companies discussed here and intends to sell them depending on the market situation and could benefit in particular from increased trading liquidity. As a result, there is a concrete and clear conflict of interest.

A lot has happened since then!

The starting point: A silent giant in the micro-cap universe

In order to understand the implications of the current situation in all its depth, we must first take an analytical look at the protagonists. The U.C.A. Aktiengesellschaft, listed on the over-the-counter market under the ISIN: DE000A12UK57, is not a loud, shrill venture capital booth that throws buzzwords around at hip conferences. Historically, it has been an extremely conservatively managed private equity and venture capital company. The business model is based on providing equity capital to medium-sized companies, whether through early-stage investments, growth financing or management buy-outs.

For many years, the management team has demonstrated an extremely fine, almost uncanny nose for niche topics that generate stable cash flows or become dominant market leaders in their respective segments. But the real game changer that has catapulted the U.C.A. from its tranquil existence as an illiquid micro-cap – with a free float of just around 29.15 percent – into the bright spotlight of professional value investors bears the name Pflegia.

Until recently, Pflegia was the absolute crown jewel in the U.C.A. portfolio. A majority stake that not only solves an urgent social challenge, but also scales incredibly profitably in the process. When a company experiences such a massive, fundamental increase in value, the investor inevitably faces the question at some point: hold on and hope or cash in? The U.C.A. has opted for a third, far more intelligent path, which we will examine in detail.

The fascinating thing about the current situation is the blatant inefficiency of the market. In a highly efficient market, such as the one we see in DAX or S&P 500 stocks, an ad hoc announcement of such an inflow of liquidity would raise the price to net asset value (NAV) within fractions of a second by high-frequency traders. However, for companies with low free float, minimal trading volumes on exchanges such as Lang & Schwarz, and a complete lack of analyst coverage, this pricing process often takes months, if not years. It is precisely in this time lag that the arbitrage opportunity lies for the informed, patient private investor. The U.C.A. is a prime example of the fact that markets are not perfect on a small scale.

The Care Miracle: How to Monetize the Care Crisis

Let’s dive deep into the mechanics of Pflegia, because this is where the rain of money comes from. Founded in 2019 by Lennart Steuer, Felix Westphal and Masoud Shahryari, the company set out to repair one of Europe’s most dysfunctional and painful labour markets: the health and care sector.

Hospitals, clinics and nursing homes have been suffering from a chronic, structural shortage of staff for years. Historically, these institutions have resorted to expensive temporary employment agencies or classic headhunters to fill vacancies. These intermediaries demanded horrendous hourly surcharges for temporary workers, while the nurses burned out and often resigned themselves to unattractive shift work. Traditional job boards also didn’t work, as they only generated a flood of unqualified or poorly matching applications.

Pflegia’s strategic stroke of genius was the consistent introduction of an AI-supported, data-driven “reverse recruiting” model. The platform simply reversed the established power dynamics. Instead of the already stressed nurse rummaging through irrelevant job advertisements, the clinic applies to the nurse.

The process is elegant and smooth: candidates create a structured, digital profile in five simple steps. They indicate their certified competencies, specializations, geographical boundaries, preferred shift models and, of course, their salary expectations. When this anonymous profile is complete, Pflegia’s proprietary matching engine takes over. The algorithm compares these data points with the vacancies of the verified healthcare facilities and assigns compatibility scores. Employers can then send targeted offers to nursing staff. The candidates decide autonomously who they want to meet.

The decisive competitive advantage that distinguishes Pflegia from classic temporary work (temporary work) is the focus on direct, permanent positions. Pflegia only charges employers a fee when a position is successfully filled, and demonstrates its confidence in long-term relationships through a reimbursement guarantee in the event that the caregiver leaves the company during the probationary period.

With this superior architecture, Pflegia built enormous two-sided network effects. By mid-2026, the proprietary database had grown to over 900,000 registered caregivers, supported by partnerships with more than 10,000 caregivers nationwide. Pflegia quickly became the undisputed top dog in the German-speaking world.

The financial result of this technological dominance is breathtaking. Based on the key financial figures for the calendar year 2025, Pflegia generated sales of a whopping 30.0 million euros and an operating result (EBITDA) of 7.0 million euros. This corresponds to an impressive operating EBITDA margin of around 23.3 percent with robust revenue growth of 25 percent year-on-year.

These outstanding unit economics naturally aroused covetousness in the high-finance world. In a highly structured sales process led by the investment bank Raymond James, which started at the end of 2025 with the first non-binding offers (NBOs), a global heavyweight finally joins the company. The French private equity giant Ardian struck via its dedicated growth strategy and acquired the majority stake in Pflegia. This leveraged growth buyout was financed by senior credit facilities from the debt fund Artemid. On July 9, 2026, U.C.A. AG announced the official closing of the transaction.

The sale of Pflegia to Ardian is an academic lesson in successful venture capital. A real, urgent problem with enormous suffering on the customer side is solved by a scalable technological platform. This leads to extreme margins, strong network effects and ultimately to massive premium valuations at exit. The fact that a globally active sponsor like Ardian is getting involved here underlines the institutional quality of the asset. For the U.C.A., this means the end of the risky construction phase and the glorious entry into the harvest season.

The “Second Bite at the Apple”: Why 18.5 percent is better than 100 percent

Now it’s getting extremely clever from a structuring point of view. If the U.C.A. had sold its entire shares (previously it held over 57 percent as the majority owner), we would have seen a clean, complete exit. The money would be in the account, the Pflegia chapter would be closed for good. However, in classic private equity transactions of this caliber, the seller is often offered a so-called “rollover” – a reinvestment in the new buyer structure.

U.C.A. has exercised this option and retains around 18.5 percent as a minority stake in Pflegia. Why is this strategic move so essential? Because Ardian didn’t buy the company to put it on the shelf as a trophy and milk dividends. Ardian’s growth fund pursues the aggressive goal of scaling profitable technology companies and expanding across borders. The plan is to build Pflegia from an all-German market leader into an integrated, pan-European digital talent platform for healthcare.

With Ardian’s huge capital, M&A expertise and international network behind it, Pflegia is poised for the next, even more gigantic phase of growth. The three founders, Lennart Steuer, Felix Westphal and Masoud Shahryari, will remain on board and retain their operational management roles as well as significant own shares, perfecting the alignment of interests.

“The remaining 18.5% stake will transform U.C.A. from a direct operating value driver into a highly attractive financial investment that can act as a lever on the future valuation of U.C.A. AG without tying up its own liquidity.”

This assessment from the available analyses hits the nail on the head. If Ardian resells Pflegia to an even larger strategic buyer or via an initial public offering (IPO) in a typical four to seven years (the classic PE holding cycle), the company’s valuation is expected to be many times what it is today. The U.C.A. will then participate in this increase in value again with its 18.5 percent and completely without any operational action of its own. This is the proverbial “Second Bite at the Apple”.

While Pflegia is expected to retain all profits (retention) in this expansion phase to finance growth, the U.C.A. no longer bears the entrepreneurial risk and massive capital requirements. The role changes from the responsible majority owner to the comfortable, strategic co-investor.

This move is the financial definition of “eat the cake and still keep it”. It realizes an immense cash gain in the mid-double-digit million range, which ensures the survival and payability of the holding company for decades, but at the same time retains the asymmetrical upside opportunity of a real tech rocket. The risk of loss of the remaining 18.5 percent is cushioned mentally and balance sheet by the massive cash return that has already been realized, but the chance of profit is theoretically completely open.

The HGB secret: hidden reserves as the value investor’s best friend

If you, as a modern investor, run the balance sheets of U.C.A. AG through a standardized screener, you will probably stumble across an accounting circumstance that is confusing for many international algorithms, but a source of constant joy for cunning German value investors: the German Commercial Code (HGB).

The U.C.A. does not balance its financial statements in accordance with international IFRS standards. IFRS would require that financial assets be regularly remeasured at their current fair value. The German HGB, on the other hand, is extremely protective of creditors and conservative. It knows the strict acquisition value principle and the imparity principle. In concrete terms, this means a fascinating effect for our remaining stake in Pflegia: With the contractual disposal of the majority, the position in the U.C.A. balance sheet moves to the classic financial investments. Their value is poured into concrete and “frozen” at the historical acquisition cost of the re-investment, so to speak.

No matter how fantastically Pflegia develops in the hands of Ardian in the next 36 months, no matter whether the value of the company explodes through clever acquisitions in France or Scandinavia – there will be absolutely nothing to be seen in the audited HGB balance sheet of the U.C.A. According to the strict HGB realisation principle, future fundamental increases in value may only be reported as profit in the income statement (P&L) if the shares are actually sold at the final secondary sale.

The balance sheet of the U.C.A. will “lie” structurally and completely legally in the coming years – and massively downwards. This effect builds up enormous hidden reserves. In the foreseeable future, the reported book value will be drastically below the true economic value (net asset value) of the investment. For automated screeners and superficial analysts, the stock looks visually more expensive than it is in reality, as equity is reported too low. For the deep-digging, thinking investor, on the other hand, this is an official invitation to acquire a hidden treasure before the market is forced to realize it in hard currency on future exits. It’s the perfect hide-and-seek game for clever allocators.

Cash Cow MedLearning: The Invisible, Reliable Fortress in the Background

Due to the media hype about the exit, one could easily fall into the mistaken belief that the U.C.A. is a classic “one-trick pony”, a company that exists exclusively through the singular Pflegia stroke of luck. That would be a fatally wrong assumption. Let’s take an analytical look at the company’s current operational “cash cow”, which often flies completely under the radar: MedLearning AG, in which the U.C.A. holds a remarkable 78.00 percent of the shares.

The business model of MedLearning, in which the U.C.A. has been on board since 2009, is as incredibly reliable as Swiss clockwork. Through its renowned portal cme.medlearning.de, the company acts as one of the leading providers of online medical training in Germany. In Germany (as in many other Western health care systems), established and clinical doctors are strictly obliged by law to undergo continuous training. They must collect so-called CME (Continuing Medical Education) points at regular intervals in order not to jeopardize their approval.

MedLearning provides the digital platform for exactly this purpose. Monetization is not done by the doctor, but extremely lucrative in the B2B sector. The training modules are usually sponsored by the pharmaceutical industry or medical technology companies, which communicate their latest scientific findings to the medical profession in this way.

This model generates highly reliable, recurring revenues and extremely stable operating cash flows. Through an existing profit transfer agreement, around one million euros in pure profit flow directly into the coffers of the U.C.A. every year. In addition, MedLearning has not stood still technologically. The company is now making targeted use of artificial intelligence (AI) solutions to make the platform, administration and, above all, expensive content generation massively more efficient.

MedLearning is the fundamental, rock-solid ground on which the U.C.A. house stands. With a market capitalization of the holding company of around 44 to 48 million euros and a secure, recurring profit contribution of around 1 million euros, this investment alone offers a massive safety net. If we apply a price-earnings ratio (P/E) of 12 to 15, which is conservative for this crisis-proof segment, this results in an enterprise value of 12 to 15 million euros for MedLearning alone.

MedLearning finances the ongoing operations of the holding company almost single-handedly. This has an invaluable strategic advantage: the immense exit proceeds from other projects (such as the sale of Pflegia) do not have to be nibbled at to cover administrative costs (overhead). They can be used for new strategic initiatives, acquisitions or massive dividends without any time pressure. It’s the perfect, invisible foundation for a long-term dividend machine.

The broadly diversified remaining portfolio

Even apart from the dominance of Pflegia and the reliability of MedLearning, U.C.A. has built up a multifaceted, highly interesting portfolio of smaller minority holdings and co-investments over the years. This “residual portfolio” is often set at a value of zero in superficial valuations, but on closer inspection it offers potential.

The management often invests directly, but sometimes also indirectly via vehicles such as Upside Co-Invest 2019 GmbH or through investments in funds (e.g. Index Growth V) in more mature companies.

In addition to these more mature investments, the U.C.A. operates a classic “Global Brands Portfolio”, consisting of around 20 international blue-chip stocks and ETFs for liquidity management. However, the latest initiative is far more exciting: Since the end of 2022, the U.C.A. has been specifically participating in very early financing rounds (so-called pre-seed and seed financing).

Corporate Governance and the Strategic Relocation: Why Grünwald?

Before we get to the all-important question of future capital allocation, it is worth taking a brief look at the structure and management of the company. U.C.A. AG is managed by a lean, experienced Executive Board. As a graduate in business administration, Dr. Jürgen Steuer steers the company’s fortunes operationally.

Two details are particularly revealing for analysts. First, insider transactions. In mid-2023 (and early 2025), there were minor restructuring by the Management Board member Dr. Jürgen Steuer as well as closely related persons (such as K.F.P. GmbH & Co. KG), which is part of normal liquidity management for family- or founder-led investment companies, but is always an indicator of the close ties of the management to the share.

Secondly, and this is the far more interesting aspect, the U.C.A. recently gave up its venerable headquarters in Munich’s Stefan-George-Ring. The move took place in the directly adjacent, famous Grünwald. In investor forums such as wallstreet:online, this step was attentively registered and aptly commented: “The assessment rate of the trade tax looks friendlier”.

And that’s exactly the point. Grünwald is notorious in Germany for its extremely low trade tax rate compared to the expensive state capital of Munich. For an investment company that is on the verge of realizing a capital gain in the mid-double-digit million range, this move is a strategic masterstroke of tax optimization. It shows that the management not only has a knack for good investments, but also masters the keyboard of business cost optimization down to the last detail. Every euro saved in trade tax is one euro more, which can be distributed to shareholders as a dividend in the future.

The 50 million euro crucial question: What happens to the cash?

We come to the absolutely critical point of the entire analysis, the linchpin for the short- to medium-term share price development. On July 9, 2026, U.C.A. received a “net cash inflow in the mid-double-digit million range” through the official closing of the Pflegia deal. In well-informed financial circles and based on Pflegia’s rumoured company values, this amount is estimated at around 40 to 50 million euros.

To better understand the dimension: The total market capitalization of the U.C.A. in July 2026 was also in this range (approx. 44 to 46 million euros) at a share price of around 71 euros. The company now de facto consists almost exclusively of pure cash on the balance sheet, based on the current market capitalization.

The crucial, all-dominating question now is: How will management allocate this huge capital? Based on the structural data (approx. 623,281 circulating dividend-bearing shares after deduction of approx. 38,700 treasury shares), four probable future scenarios can be outlined:

Scenario 1: The massive special dividend (probability: high, approx. 70%) This is the variant that investor dreams are made of. With an inflow of 40 million euros, for example, around 64 euros per share in liquid funds would be freely available in purely mathematical terms. U.C.A. has traditionally been extremely shareholder-friendly. Just recently, on July 2, 2026, a dividend of 4.70 euros per share (from the 2025 retained profit of just under 3 million euros) was distributed.

A large part of Pflegia’s proceeds is likely to be proposed as a special dividend as part of the annual figures for 2026 (expected in spring 2027) and distributed after the Annual General Meeting in May/June 2027. It fundamentally contradicts the economic DNA of the U.C.A. to let such a “cash mountain” sit on the balance sheet unused and, in the current interest rate environment, possibly with negative interest rates in real terms. The return to the shareholders is the logical, value-generating consequence.

Scenario 2: Re-investment & establishment of new portfolio companies (probability: very high, approx. 80%) This scenario will almost certainly occur in combination with scenario 1. U.C.A.’s very own core business is investing, building up and selling companies. Since the Pflegia exit is now missing a massive revenue and value driver in the operating portfolio, the management will have to retain part of the liquid funds (expected to be 10 to 15 million euros). This capital will be used continuously from the third quarter of 2026 onwards to build up new majority or significant minority shareholdings in the core competencies of HR tech, software or digital health.

Scenario 3: Share buyback program (probability: medium, approx. 30%) On the academic paper, a share buyback would make a lot of sense at the current valuation. It’s a tax-efficient way to return capital to investors and would massively increase the intrinsic value of the remaining shares by buying below the NAV. But in practice, there is a fundamental catch: the liquidity of the stock on the stock exchange. The free float of 29.15% is already tiny. A large-scale buyback program would completely dry up trading in the stock on stock exchanges such as Lang & Schwarz. If at all, this instrument will only be used homeopathically (up to a maximum of 10% of the share capital) as a supplementary measure to cushion temporary price weaknesses.

Scenario 4: Growth financing of existing investments (probability: medium to high, approx. 60%) Parts of the fresh money could be used intelligently to massively accelerate the growth of the remaining cash cows such as MedLearning AG through targeted capital increases or shareholder loans. Investments in even deeper AI integrations for content creation or a classic buy-and-build strategy in which smaller competitors in the CME market are taken over and integrated would be conceivable here.

It is obvious that we will see a “hybrid solution”. In the coming quarters, the U.C.A. will channel a noticeable amount into new, promising companies of the future in order to keep the engine of its business model running. At the same time, however, it will present loyal shareholders with a historic, substantial special dividend in spring 2027. Already today, some informed investors are trying to anticipate this fantasy in the price, which drove the value above the 70 euro mark in the summer of 2026 (in some cases with ask prices at 72.50 euros to 87.00 euros on tight trading days). Nevertheless, the broad market consistently underestimates the sheer mathematical force of this imminent distribution. If you buy today at around 71 euros, you could in the best case get back an enormous part of your investment within a year through the dividend after tax alone.

The Naked Truth of Mathematics: The NAV Calculation

All the fine words about strategic visions, clever HGB balance sheets and a tax-saving move to Grünwald ultimately pale in front of the cold, hard and incorruptible mathematics. What is U.C.A. AG really worth on the stock market today?

The calculation of the so-called net asset value (NAV), i.e. the substantial net asset value per share, is the only serious and meaningful valuation benchmark for an investment company. Let’s start from the known, verifiable structural data: The current market capitalization is around 44 to 48 million euros at a price of around 71 euros. After deduction of the treasury shares held in the portfolio, exactly around 623,281 shares in circulation that are entitled to dividends remain.

A customary, conservative sum-of-the-parts (SOTP) estimate immediately after the closing of the Pflegia deal in July 2026 is as follows:

Conclusion on the valuation: At a current stock market price of a good 71 euros, the U.C.A. share is quoted at an almost high discount to its intrinsic value. The market has taken note of the enormous inflow of liquidity from the Pflegia deal in the form of a press release, but has not yet fully priced it into the price.

What do you think about the stock? My stock ideas are part of the

“Elite Investor Feed” at ☛ Yellobrick

the performance of my stock ideas is tracked, independently of me. At the moment, it looks like this.

“Speculative investments are like a tennis match: the decisive factor is to concentrate fully on the next ace instead of being annoyed by the last double fault.” A. Gerstenberger

Disclaimer

This text was partly created with AI applications.

All content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities or other financial market instruments. Of course, I try to present the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief, but they can still be false in whole or in part.

Therefore, I do not accept any liability for investment decisions that you make on the basis of the information presented here.

Conflict of interest: At the time of publication, the author of this publication holds shares/securities of the securities/companies discussed here and intends to sell them depending on the market situation and could benefit in particular from increased trading liquidity. As a result, there is a concrete and clear conflict of interest.

A fundamental analysis of the extreme valuation gap between Market capitalization and net asset value (NAV)

In the global financial markets, a lack of liquidity, inefficiencies in the micro-cap sector or simple misunderstandings on the part of investors repeatedly lead to blatant mispricing. However, the extent of the discrepancy that is currently unfolding at Victory Square Technologies (CSE: VST | OTCQX: VSQTF | FSE: 6F6) dwarfs even historical value anomalies. This post summarizes the current status quo (the “now”) as well as the highly effective growth scenario (the “tomorrow”) and calculates the mathematical price potential of the stock.

1. The “Now”: A Balance Sheet in a State of Absurd Undervaluation

Currently, Victory Square Technologies is valued by the market like an insolvency-prone shell or a passive, unprofitable fund. At a current share price of approx. $0.68, the total market capitalization amounts to just around $71 million. However, this compares to a net asset value (NAV) of $170 million (equivalent to $1.63 per share), conservatively estimated by management. The market is therefore currently granting investors a flat discount of almost 60% on the intrinsic value of the company. The situation becomes particularly absurd when the current NAV is broken down into its individual parts.

The listed core stake in the healthcare infrastructure platform Hydreight Technologies alone significantly exceeds VST’s total market capitalization:

The conclusion of the status quo: When buying a VST share, investors acquire the liquid Hydreight stake at a whopping discount of over 35% – while the rest of the private portfolio ($40 million), the IP ($14 million) and the cash reserves ($5.2 million) are literally valued at zero by the market.

This discount cannot be justified by anything fundamentally. Hydreight is not a speculative concept, but already generated $3.3 million in adjusted EBITDA and $2.6 million in net income in Q1, supported by over 12,000 licenses sold and a network of over 3,000 healthcare professionals in all 50 US states. VST acts as an operational venture builder, whose created infrastructure can be used by new portfolio companies within minutes via plug-and-play, which also earns VST a direct 10% profit share.

2. Tomorrow: Dynamic growth and the $9.25 scenario

Anyone who thinks that the upside potential ends at the current NAV of $1.63 is overlooking the inherent scaling power of the portfolio. Hydreight continues to grow rapidly. Analysts put the average price target for Hydreight Technologies shares at $9.25.

Since VST holds a firm position of 23.9 million Hydreight shares , any upward movement by the subsidiary will result in massive leverage on Victory Square’s NAV. If Hydreight reaches its fair price target of $9.25, the fundamental reality shifts dramatically:

● Future value of Hydreight interest: 23.9 million shares × $9.25 = $221.08 million (an increase of over $112 million from current levels).

● VST Total Future NAV: Adding up the remaining portfolio (consistently valued at approximately $61 million), VST’s intrinsic value climbs to an impressive $282.08 million.

3. The mathematical price potential calculation in direct comparison

Based on the exact number of approx. 104.22 million VST shares outstanding, there are two highly asymmetric profit scenarios for investors, depending on whether “only” the current discount closes or Hydreight’s growth scenario also occurs:

Taking into account the growth scenario (Scenario B), a fair value of around $2.70 per VST share is calculated. Based on the current price level of $0.68, this represents a potential quadrupling of capital (+297.1%).

4. Catalysts to release value

To close this monumental valuation gap in the short to medium term, management has several operational and capital market-specific levers at its disposal:

● Share buybacks: At a discount of almost 60%, the buyback of own shares represents the highest-yielding capital allocation. Every dollar repurchased increases the NAV of the remaining shareholders disproportionately.

● Spin-Outs & Share Distributions: Through the direct

Distribution of shares of successful subsidiaries as a dividend in kind to the

VST shareholders, the management can securitize the value directly on the stock exchange and pass it on to investors, bypassing the market.

● The next generation in the ecosystem: While Hydreight was the validation of the model, the next giants are already waiting in the wings. Insu Therapeutics is revolutionizing the multi-billion dollar market for peptide and GLP-1 injections (weight loss drugs) with a patent-protected buccal platform (oral intake via mucosa). At the same time, Pawsible Ventures is transferring the entire successful Hydreight infrastructure playbook to the booming pet market (”Hydreight for Humans. Pawsible for Pets.”).

Conclusion: A countercyclical must-have for value and growth investors

Victory Square Technologies offers fundamental hedging in the "now" through liquid, highly profitable assets that are far above the current market capitalization. In the "Tomorrow", the company ignites by scaling Hydreight to the analyst target of $9.25 as well as the as the launch of new platforms such as Insu and Pawsible.

If you are looking for an asymmetric risk profile where the downside is protected by hard assets and the upside offers a potential of around 300%, there is currently no way around VST.

What do you think about the stock? My stock ideas are part of the

“Elite Investor Feed” at ☛ Yellobrick

the performance of my stock ideas is tracked, independently of me. At the moment, it looks like this.

“Speculative investments are like a tennis match: the decisive factor is to concentrate fully on the next ace instead of being annoyed by the last double fault.” A. Gerstenberger

Disclaimer

This text was partly created with AI applications.

All content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities or other financial market instruments. Of course, I try to present the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief, but they can still be false in whole or in part.

Therefore, I do not accept any liability for investment decisions that you make on the basis of the information presented here.

Conflict of interest: At the time of publication, the author of this publication holds shares/securities of the securities/companies discussed here and intends to sell them depending on the market situation and could benefit in particular from increased trading liquidity. As a result, there is a concrete and clear conflict of interest.

All financial metrics presented in this analysis are presented in U.S. dollars (USD). The data is based on the latest status as of June 15, 2026 and focuses on the core factors that are currently driving the share price massively.

The Essentials: Transformation and the TheFork Sale

Tripadvisor (NASDAQ: TRIP) is undergoing a radical period of upheaval. The once dominant hotel review portal is struggling with declining advertising revenues due to competition from Google, but has successfully positioned itself in the fast-growing market for on-site experiences and tours through its subsidiary Viator. This segment now accounts for almost 50% of Group sales.

The gamechanger of the day: Today, June 15, 2026, Tripadvisor announced that it would sell its European restaurant reservation platform TheFork to American Express for $700 million in cash. The transaction, which is expected to close before the end of 2026, flushes massive liquidity into the coffers and allows management to fully focus on scaling Viator. This liberating blow immediately triggered a price jump of over 14% (to over USD 14.20) in pre-market trading.

Fundamental Valuation: The Sum-of-the-Parts (SOTP) Anomaly

Tripadvisor’s fundamental valuation resembles a blatant market anomaly. The stock market drastically misvalues the sum-of-the-parts.

At a share price of about $12.41 (right before the deal announcement), the company’s market capitalization was around $1.44 billion. If you perform a simple enterprise value calculation (enterprise value = market cap + debt - cash) taking into account the TheFork sale, the massive undervaluation becomes apparent:

• Cash (after massive debt repayment in April): approx. USD 775 million

• Future cash proceeds from TheFork: $700 million

• Pro-forma gross liquidity: approx. USD 1.475 billion

• Remaining debt (Term Loan B): approx. USD 838 million

• Pro-forma net liquidity: approx. USD 637 million

If you subtract this $637 million in pure net liquidity from the market capitalization ($1.44 billion), the remaining operating business – consisting of the classic hotel division and the high-profile Viator segment (which alone generates almost $1 billion in annual revenue) – is valued by the market at only around $800 million.

Since Viator would have to achieve a multiple of this value in an isolated setting (Pure Play) due to its rapid growth, Tripadvisor shares are fundamentally extremely cheaply valued.

The setup for an explosive short squeeze

The most asymmetrical and exciting element of this stock is the current positioning of short sellers, who may have fallen into a historic bear trap due to today’s news.

The extreme short-selling metrics: Tripadvisor has an exceptionally high short rate. Current data shows short positions of up to 36.99% of the outstanding shares (which corresponds to approximately 27% to 29% of the tradable free float). The “days to cover” ratio is 12 to just under 15 days. This means that with average trading volume, short sellers would need over two full weeks to close out all their positions and buy back shares.

The mechanics of the bear trap:

1. The failed short case: Short sellers speculated for months on a liquidity crisis. They were betting that Tripadvisor would have to issue new shares due to maturing convertible bonds (USD 345.4 million in 2026) and massively dilute the existing shareholders. However, management thwarted this plan completely unexpectedly and paid out these bonds in full in cash on April 1, 2026. The risk of dilution has thus already been reduced to zero.

2. The accelerant (TheFork sale): With the now binding commitment of 700 million US dollars from the Amex deal, the company’s balance sheet is absolutely unassailable. A bankruptcy or refinancing risk no longer exists.

3. The pressure in the cauldron: Due to today’s price jump of over 14%, numerous short sellers have abruptly slipped deep into the loss zone. Tripadvisor has explicitly announced that it wants to use the 700 million US dollars potentially for share repurchases. As soon as the company buys massive amounts of its own shares from the market, the free float decreases further. The short sellers would then have to outbid each other in a panicked short squeeze to escape from their positions, which can explosively drive up the share price.

Conclusion and the next catalyst

Tripadvisor is no longer primarily treated by the market as a shrinking hotel review portal, but has mutated into a crisis-proof cash mountain with an attached growth asset (Viator).

The huge discrepancy between the extreme undervaluation on a SOTP basis and the massive short-selling ratio makes the stock highly volatile upwards. The decisive catalyst for igniting the potential short squeeze is now the presentation of the Q2 results, which is expected to take place on August 6, 2026. If the management – driven by the activist investors (Starboard Value) on the board of directors – formally announces an aggressive share buyback program on that day, the pressure on the short sellers is likely to reach a critical level.

What do you think about the stock? My stock ideas are part of the

“Elite Investor Feed” at ☛ Yellobrick

the performance of my stock ideas is tracked, independently of me. At the moment, it looks like this.

“Speculative investments are like a tennis match: the decisive factor is to concentrate fully on the next ace instead of being annoyed by the last double fault.” A. Gerstenberger

Disclaimer

This text was partly created with AI applications.

All content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities or other financial market instruments. Of course, I try to present the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief, but they can still be false in whole or in part.

Therefore, I do not accept any liability for investment decisions that you make on the basis of the information presented here.

Conflict of interest: At the time of publication, the author of this publication holds shares/securities of the securities/companies discussed here and intends to sell them depending on the market situation and could benefit in particular from increased trading liquidity. As a result, there is a concrete and clear conflict of interest.

This analysis is based on the most recent available data up to June 2026, and all fundamental and operational financial measures in this report are presented in U.S. dollars (USD), as this is the Company’s primary reporting currency. Share prices, market capitalizations and dividend figures refer to the main listing on the London Stock Exchange (AIM) and are quoted in British pence (GBX) or pounds sterling (GBP). The Company’s shares also trade on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) under the ticker SBI and on the U.S. OTCQX market under SRBIF. All derived financial measures, margins and strategic implications reflect the market environment at the end of the first half of 2026.

Company Introduction: Geological Heritage and Strategic Architecture

Serabi Gold plc is a Brazil-focused gold exploration, development and production company. With a workforce of around 1,080 employees, the company operates deep in the heart of the Amazon. Serabi Gold’s entire operations are focused exclusively on the Tapajós mineral belt in the state of Pará in northern Brazil. This decision to concentrate geographically is not a coincidence, but the result of in-depth geological analysis. The Tapajós region is known globally as one of the historically richest, but least systematically explored gold provinces.

The portfolio: Two pillars of growth

The Company’s revenue streams are based on two primary assets that are synergistically linked: the established Palito Complex and the ramp-up Coringa Gold Project.

The Palito Complex forms the financial and operational backbone of the company. For many years, this mine has delivered an absolutely stable, reliable baseload production of about 30,000 to 40,000 ounces of gold per year. This base production acts as a safety net that ensures the company generates adequate cash flows even during weaker periods, but it is not enough on its own to propel Serabi into the league of mid-tier producers.

The real growth engine driving Serabi Gold’s transformation is the Coringa Gold Project. This project, located approximately 200 kilometres south of Palito, was acquired by Anfield Gold Inc. (now part of Equinox Gold) in December 2017 for US$22 million. Coringa hosts high-grade orebodies such as the Serra, Meio and Galena zones. The Company’s strategic goal is to increase consolidated annual production to over 60,000 ounces by 2027 through the expansion of Coringa and to achieve producer status of 100,000 to 200,000 ounces through continued exploration over the next three to five years.

Revenue trends and profit growth (fiscal year 2025)

The full year 2025 marked a turning point. The company produced 44,169 ounces of gold, an increase of 18 percent from the 37,520 ounces in 2024. This increase in volume, coupled with a 45 percent increase in average realized gold price of $3,481 per ounce (2024: $2,407), led to a massive jump in sales. Annual revenue skyrocketed by 65 percent to USD 155.8 million (2024: USD 94.5 million).

The development of profitability is even more impressive: Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) rose disproportionately by 117 percent to USD 77.9 million. Net income reached $53.9 million, an increase of 94 percent compared to the previous year ($27.8 million). Diluted earnings per share nearly doubled to 71.18 US cents.

The acceleration in the first quarter of 2026

Financial momentum accelerated further in the first quarter of 2026 (Q1 2026) as the price of gold tested new record levels. The following table illustrates the leverage effect of the sharp increase in margins with only moderate growth in sales volumes.

Although only 6 percent more gold was physically sold in the first quarter of 2026 than in the same quarter last year, sales exploded by 83 percent. This is due to the exceptional average selling price of US$4,926 per ounce that has been realised. These figures objectively prove that Serabi Gold is able to pass rising commodity prices directly into net profit.

Share PPinvest

The company’s cash generation is simply phenomenal. For the full year 2025, operating cash flow was $55.9 million (up 81 percent from 2024). After deducting mine development costs of $5.3 million, net operating cash flow was $50.6 million.

This massive glut of liquidity has allowed management to completely clean up the balance sheet. In January 2026, Serabi Gold repaid a remaining, unsecured working capital loan of USD 5.3 million at Banco Santander (Itaú Bank) in Brazil. Since that moment, the company has been 100 percent debt-free.

As of March 31, 2026, the company reported a gigantic cash balance of $64.4 million (compared to $49.2 million at year-end 2025 and $22.2 million at the end of 2024). Net cash flow from operations was an impressive $24.2 million in the first quarter of 2026 alone, even after deducting $3.1 million for mine development and upfront costs. Management expects Serabi Gold to generate $80 million to $100 million in free cash flow for the full year 2026 with a continued strong gold environment.

Fundamental valuation: A blatant undervaluation

Based on fundamental key figures, the stock appears grotesquely undervalued on the London and Toronto stock exchanges. At a share price of around 337 to 360 GBX (pence) at the beginning of June 2026, the market capitalisation is only around 272.5 million GBP (approx. 353 million USD).

Subtracting net cash of $64.4 million from this market capitalization, the enterprise value (EV) is just under $290 million. If you put the projected free cash flow of $80 million to $100 million for 2026 in relation to market capitalization, the stock trades with an absurd free cash flow yield (FCF yield) of 22 to 28 percent. According to data providers, the price-earnings ratio (P/E / P/E ratio) is a dirt cheap 5.6x to 6.37x. A company that is debt-free, grows organically and generates almost a third of its stock market value in cash within a year represents classic, deep value play.

Upheaval in the shareholder structure: The Starboard catalyst

In the recent past, a tectonic change in the ownership structure has taken place, which has massive strategic implications. Historically, Greenstone Resources II LP and Fratelli Investments Limited have been the dominant anchor shareholders. In a large-scale transaction, Greenstone and Fratelli together sold almost 21 percent of their shares (15,689,395 shares) to selected British and European institutional investors, as well as around 20 percent to the Classe Roca Magma FIP fund in a separate, binding agreement.

Behind the Classe Roca Magma fund is Starboard Asset Ltda, one of the leading private equity firms in Brazil. Starboard now controls 24.99 percent of the shares in Serabi Gold, while Fratelli continues to hold 10 percent. Other notable institutional shareholders include Ruffer PLC (approximately 4.3%), Gold 2000 (2.4%) and River and Mercantile (1.2%), with approximately 67% of the shares in free float with retail investors and other institutions.

Management rebuild and skin in the game

At first glance, the direct shareholding of the board of directors with only 0.2 percent appears to be a disappointment. However, the Board of Directors has taken drastic measures to enforce the congruence of interests. From 2026, a rigid, binding share ownership policy will apply: Chief Executive Officer Mike Hodgson will be required to build up 150 percent of his annual base salary worth of Serabi shares within five years. The new Chief Financial Officer, Colm Howlin, will have to reach a position of 135 percent of his salary. Until these quotas are met, the company is forcing executives to keep 50 percent of the net shares from all future stock-based compensation. In addition, significant “Conditional Share Awards” were issued on May 12, 2026, the exercise price of which is linked to the volume-weighted average price (VWAP). In addition, financial screeners point out that significant insider purchases were made in the summer of 2026.

Risk analysis: Where are the potential pitfalls?

As flawless as the financial façade may seem, mining in the Amazon region is not forgiving. A merciless analysis reveals three existential risk clusters that have the potential to hit shareholder returns sensitively.

1. Operational and ESG risk: The tragedies of January 2026

The most serious operational risk materialized tragically at the end of January 2026. Within a few days, two unrelated, fatal accidents occurred. On January 25, an employee at the Coringa mine was killed in an accident on the production front. Just a few days later, on January 30, another employee was killed in a traffic-related underground accident in the Palito complex.

The impact of these incidents goes far beyond human tragedy. The affected mining sectors were immediately closed by the Brazilian authorities, including the police, in order to carry out official investigations. Serabi Gold was forced to commission an external audit of its own health and safety processes. In a panic, 7 additional health and safety workers, 4 mine supervisors and a new mine manager were recruited.

2. The Regulatory Sword of Damocles: Coringa’s Approval Cliff

The entire growth scenario of over 60,000 ounces is based on the ramp-up of the Coringa mine. The problem: Coringa does not yet have a final installation and operating license. Currently, the mine is only operating under a three-year trial permit, which expires irrevocably on January 29, 2027.

3. Macroeconomic fragility: What if the price of gold falls?

Currently, the company is highly profitable because the gold price is trading above USD 4,400. However, the cost structure (AISC of $2,293 in the first quarter) gives an idea of how sensitive Serabi is to price declines. If real interest rates in the US continue to rise and geopolitical trouble spots cool down, the gold price could experience a sharp downward correction. If gold falls to even $3,000, Serabi’s margins would shrink drastically. The targeted $80 million to $100 million in free cash flow for 2026 would evaporate, hurting the company’s ability to sustain its ambitious exploration programs and dividends.

Special opportunities and price potential: Why this stock is an “Undiscovered Gem”

Despite the risks involved, Serabi Gold offers a combination of value, growth and catalysts that is rarely seen in today’s mining landscape.

The establishment of a reliable dividend policy

On May 1, 2026, the Board of Directors announced a decision that fundamentally changes the investment case: to pay an annual dividend of 5 pence per share (about 7 US cents) for the past financial year 2025. This corresponds to a total distribution of around USD 5.41 million.

Much more important than this initial distribution is the implementation of the binding capital return policy for 2026: The company has officially committed to returning between 20 and 30 percent of the generated free cash flow to shareholders annually in the form of dividends or share buybacks. If this promise is calculated based on the expected free cash flow of $80 million to $100 million for 2026, $16 million to $30 million would be available for distributions in the coming year. Based on the current market capitalization of around USD 353 million, this would correspond to a dividend or buyback yield of 4.5 to 8.5 percent. This reliable, transparent capital return qualifies Serabi Gold for inclusion in specialized dividend funds, which will put structural buying pressure on the stock.

Upcoming catalysts: What will drive the stock price in the next few months?

A dense news flow is emerging for Serabi Gold for the second half of 2026:

1. Regulatory breakthrough (H1/Q2 2026): The most potentially price-driving news would be the confirmation that FUNAI has approved the ECI study and that INCRA is clearing the land-use change. As soon as the state environmental agency SEMAS issues the final installation license (LI) for Coringa, the greatest existential risk (the expiration of the GUIA in January 2027) will be eliminated.

2. Exploration Updates (Q2/Q3 2026): Management has announced a comprehensive exploration update for the second quarter of 2026 that will provide results from the 30,000 metre drill program. Positive drill results from new zones such as Galena fuel the M&A fantasy.

3. Financial results for the second quarter (end of August 2026): The publication of the Q2 report will have to prove that the enormous free cash flow from Q1 was not a flash in the pan.

4. Commissioning of the 4th ball mill in Palito (Q4 2026): The planned completion of the mill installation will finally raise the processing capacity to 900 tpd. This milestone marks the moment when Serabi is physically able to run the 60,000 ounce run rate.

Conclusion: The transformation to a highly profitable mid-tier producer

Serabi Gold plc (LSE: SRB) represents an exceptional investment thesis in the middle of 2026. The company embodies the rare case of a gold producer that does not burn the macro euphoria of record gold prices above USD 4,400 in wasteful acquisitions or bureaucratic inefficiencies, but directs it directly into free cash flow via an ingenious, capital-efficient approach.

The fundamental basis is undeniably strong: a flawless cash balance of $64.4 million, zero debt, organic production growth towards 60,000 ounces, a projected P/E ratio in the single-digit range and a contractually anchored dividend policy that distributes 20 to 30 percent of cash flow. The entry of the Brazilian private equity firm Starboard Asset also gives a necessary local political clout.

Current price 5.01 USD

My price target for the next 3 years is 27 USD (+438%).

My basic idea when investing is to buy a stock cheaper than it is actually worth. I work with a “fair P/E ratio” (P/E ratio - price-earnings ratio), which is supposed to reflect the fair value of a stock. If a fair P/E ratio of 15 is calculated for a company and is currently trading on the stock exchange for a P/E ratio of 10, then it would be a cheap buy. The bigger the gap between fair and current P/E ratios, the cheaper I am in purchasing! From this “gap” I calculate the potential for future price gains, because sooner and unfortunately sometimes later, the stock market recognizes the “fair P/E ratio”.

According to my calculations, the “fair P/E ratio” here is 19.2

My investment style is a mixture of value/momentum investor. Based on the fundamental data (VALUE) and the price development of the last 52 weeks (MOMENTUM), the stock is currently one of my TOP 25 stocks. These are the stocks where I see the highest chances of strong price gains in the medium term (1-3 years). I also buy these values in my wikifolios and at FollowMyMoney.

What do you think about the stock? My stock ideas are part of the

“Elite Investor Feed” at ☛ Yellobrick

the performance of my stock ideas is tracked, independently of me. At the moment, it looks like this.

“Speculative investments are like a tennis match: the decisive factor is to concentrate fully on the next ace instead of being annoyed by the last double fault.” A. Gerstenberger

Disclaimer

This text was partly created with AI applications.

All content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities or other financial market instruments. Of course, I try to present the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief, but they can still be false in whole or in part.

Therefore, I do not accept any liability for investment decisions that you make on the basis of the information presented here.

Conflict of interest: At the time of publication, the author of this publication holds shares/securities of the securities/companies discussed here and intends to sell them depending on the market situation and could benefit in particular from increased trading liquidity. As a result, there is a concrete and clear conflict of interest.

1. Assessment of the quarterly season

Date and currency: Hydreight Technologies is expected to publish its figures for the past quarter on June 1, 2026. The Company’s accounts are in Canadian dollars (CAD) by default.

The probability that the forecasts in the coming quarter (Q1 2026) will be met or exceeded is very high from a fundamental point of view. At the beginning of February, the management issued firm “floor case” guidance, which is based purely on existing partner agreements and visible transaction volumes. Speculative income from new acquisitions or international markets was deliberately excluded.

Scenario Model: Probabilities & Market Reaction

The stock has already staged an impressive rally (+130%) over a 12-month period, which means that a solid performance is already expected by the market. The price reaction depends on how clearly the upper end of the internal forecast (CAD 25 million) is cracked.

Key drivers, opportunities and risks

Positive drivers: The key driver is the scaling of the VSDHOne platform, which has now been used to book more than 12,000 licenses from healthcare professionals (e.g. for IV therapies and telemedicine). Since the company’s digital infrastructure is already in place across the board, revenue is currently growing significantly faster than operating leverage, which is increasing profitability exponentially.

Risks & Opportunities: A tremendous opportunity is the recent expansion into new, high-margin healthcare segments, such as the lucrative market for at-home STI testing. The biggest risk at the moment is the dilution of the shares through a capital increase (bought deal) of CAD 15 million in January 2026. In addition, the fundamental valuation of the share has become sporty due to the recent price gains, which would immediately punish errors in operational execution.

To illustrate the rapid growth, you can follow the rapid development from the weak first quarter of 2025 to the record in winter to the current guidance in the following graphic:

Insight: The graphical jump between Q1 2025 and Q1 2026 clearly shows that the company has moved into an entirely new valuation and revenue category with the launch of the VSDHOne platform.

2nd & 3rd key figures and consensus forecast (Q1 2026)

4. Comparison of the previous quarter (Q4 2025)

• Strong or weak? Extremely strong. Revenue was CAD 14.95 million (+270% year-over-year).

• Special features: The fourth quarter marked a decisive turning point. Adjusted EBITDA rose to CAD 1.58 million, proving for the first time that the platform model can scale profitably. Operating costs as a percentage of revenue fell to historic lows of 15%.

5. Comparison of the same quarter of the previous year (Q1 2025)

• Strong or weak? Relatively weak (sales at just over CAD 4 million).

• Special features: In the first half of 2025, the new VSDHOne platform was still on the verge of its breakthrough. High initial development costs and low transaction volumes dominated the picture before adaptation increased rapidly in the second half of the year.

6. Development of product prices (sales side)

Hydreight acts as a technology intermediary and generates its revenues primarily through subscription fees for platform use as well as percentage commissions on each transaction processed (B2B2C). Due to the clear first-mover advantage and the offer of complete solutions (including insurance and legal protection), the company has a high pricing power vis-à-vis the affiliated nursing staff. Fees on the sales side remain extremely stable.

7. Development of input costs (raw materials, energy, wages)

As a classic platform and software company, Hydreight is almost completely decoupled from raw material or direct energy prices. By far the largest input factor is the wages of developers and sales. A massive lever (”operating leverage”) has formed here: In the second half of 2025, Hydreight was able to increase its revenue by almost 160%, while operating costs grew by only 18%. Since the software infrastructure was developed once, new users cost the company almost no additional cent in acquisition, which secures the strong margins for the future.

Conclusion: I expect a positive surprise and am positioned accordingly.

Disclaimer

This text was partly created with AI applications.

All content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities or other financial market instruments. Of course, I try to present the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief, but they can still be false in whole or in part.

Therefore, I do not accept any liability for investment decisions that you make on the basis of the information presented here.

Conflict of interest: At the time of publication, the author of this publication holds shares/securities of the securities/companies discussed here and intends to sell them depending on the market situation and could benefit in particular from increased trading liquidity. As a result, there is a concrete and clear conflict of interest.

1. Assessment

In anticipation of the upcoming release of audited financial results for the fourth quarter of 2025 and the full fiscal year 2025, Hydreight Technologies Inc. (TSXV: NURS, OTCQB: HYDTF) is in a fundamental and highly disruptive phase of transformation. The company, which originally began as a mobile-only care network for intravenous infusion therapies and on-site healthcare services, has evolved into a full-fledged back-end infrastructure for digital healthcare providers through the aggressive technological scaling of its proprietary platforms. Dubbed the “Shopify of Digital Healthcare” by management, Hydreight now empowers third-party clinics, entrepreneurs and traditional retailers to launch their own direct-to-consumer (D2C) telehealth brands in all 50 U.S. states in a matter of days.

The quantitative probability that Hydreight Technologies will exceed current market forecasts for sales and earnings in the fourth quarter of 2025 is estimated at 75% as part of this analysis. The probability of an “in-line” result, in which the consensus expectations are only met with pinpoint accuracy, is assessed at 15%. In view of the available empirical preliminary data points, a failure to meet the forecasts is considered highly unlikely and is estimated at only 10%.

The current market consensus for the fourth quarter of 2025 is for revenue of approximately CAD 15.09 million. However, on February 2, 2026, the Company issued a formal and “conservative” baseline guidance for the immediately following first quarter of 2026 (Q1 2026) of CAD 25 million to CAD 28 million. To justify such a steep run rate for the first quarter of 2026, the fourth quarter of 2025 must act as a logical and continuous growth bridge. Sequential revenue growth that only reaches the consensus of CAD 15.09 million in the fourth quarter would imply an implausibly abrupt jump in revenue of nearly 80% between the fourth quarter of 2025 and the first quarter of 2026. The company announcements, according to which more than 1.3 million product orders had already been processed by December 18, 2025, thus exceeding the operating target for the year ahead of schedule, strongly indicate that the acceleration in growth was already deeply anchored in the fourth quarter of 2025 and that the run rate must have significantly exceeded consensus estimates.

Scenario model and simulated market reaction

The following scenario model simulates the likely immediate price reactions of Hydreight shares when the quarterly figures are released, depending on which grid the actual fundamental results and metrics fall into. The model takes into account the current discrepancy between the market capitalization and the projected growth path.

The significant upward reaction in the event of outperformance is facilitated by the fact that management has installed a comprehensive share buyback program (Normal Course Issuer Bid, NCIB) in parallel, which came into force on March 12, 2026 and authorizes the purchase of up to 4,951,189 ordinary shares (approximately 10% of the public free float). A strong quarterly result, combined with the systematic buying pressure from the NCIB and the re-evaluation of the multiples by institutional investors, is likely to be a significant catalyst for the share price’s performance.

The key drivers underpinning these forecasts are a complex mix of operational, strategic, and capital markets factors. On the positive side, exponential revenue growth is primarily driven by the VSDHOne platform. This was launched in June 2025 and went through its second full quarter of commercial revenue recognition in the fourth quarter of 2025. The platform overcomes the regulatory barriers to entry of the U.S. healthcare market by bundling all compliance, healthcare professionals, e-commerce technology, and a nationwide 503A and 503B pharmacy network into one modular SaaS offering. Another highly potent driver is the company’s multi-vertical strategy. Unlike many peers in the telemedicine sector, Hydreight is not a pure-play GLP-1 (weight loss drug) business, as these treatments currently account for only about 28% of the total platform activity. The company is experiencing growth in the Testosterone Replacement Therapy (TRT), Peptide Therapy, NAD+ Infusions, Hair Loss Treatments, and Sexual Health Services segments.

In addition, the aggressive market entry into the home testing sector for sexually transmitted diseases (STIs) on December 31, 2025 acts as an additional revenue catalyst. With 50,000 pre-orders generated from a standing start, Hydreight is tapping into a high-margin revenue stream that will be fully reflected in the books in the first quarter of 2026. The strategic capital position was massively strengthened in January 2026 by an oversubscribed “bought deal” LIFE-Offering (Listed Issuer Financing Exemption) of CAD 15 million at an issue price of CAD 4.05 per unit. This financing round, led by Canaccord Genuity and Beacon Securities, resolves any short-term liquidity risk and enables the unchecked scaling of production capacities and platform rollouts.

On the negative side, there are driving factors that could temporarily dampen margin expansion. The upfront investment in the development of the VSDHOne 2.0 architecture, which aims to achieve even greater automation and scalability in B2B onboarding, requires significant capital investment. In addition, hypergrowth is forcing the company to drastically increase spending on marketing and support infrastructure in order to maintain the network effect between nurses, patients, and pharmacies. Although the company has crossed the profitability threshold, the absolute pace of scaling to a projected annual revenue of CAD 150 million in 2026 could put pressure on the adjusted EBITDA margin in individual intermediate quarters if operating fixed costs increase faster than expected.

A clear picture emerges regarding the future risks and opportunities that dominate the outlook for Hydreight. The most significant opportunity lies in the roll-off of the initial discounts. To accelerate the adoption of the VSDHOne platform at launch in the summer of 2025, incentive pricing has been granted to early B2B partners. The expiration of these discounts in the fourth quarter of 2025 and first quarter of 2026 offers a huge opportunity for asymmetric gross margin expansion while maintaining the same transaction volume.

The vertical integration of the supply chain through the acquisition of a 5% stake in Perfect Scripts Pharmacy in November 2025, including an option to increase to 40%, also gives the company direct control over input costs in the pharmacy business and shields it from external price shocks.

The primary risk in this expansive construct is classic operational execution risk. The extremely fast onboarding of hundreds of B2B customers requires an error-free software architecture and uncompromising compliance in a highly regulated environment.

U.S. state regulatory interventions regarding telehealth prescribing practices remain a systemic risk, although Hydreight’s legal framework is explicitly designed to navigate this complexity in all 50 states in a legally secure manner.

2. Key figure (revenue, EBITDA, profit)

Hydreight closed fiscal 2024 with positive adjusted EBITDA of $490,000 and consistently expanded that operating profitability across all reported quarters of 2025, with adjusted EBITDA of $620,000 in the third quarter of 2025 alone. The forward-looking EBITDA margin for 2026 is estimated by management to be between 15% and 17% of projected revenue, which would translate to absolute operating cash flow of over $22 million.

GAAP net income is the ultimate indicator of financial health, strictly adhering to all regulatory accounting requirements. Unlike many comparable digital health platforms that buy growth through deep red balance sheets, Hydreight has proven that hypergrowth and GAAP profitability can coexist. The company reported GAAP net income of $362,000 in the third quarter of 2025, compared to a net loss of just under $90,000 in the same quarter last year. This series of now four consecutive profitable quarters underscores management’s operational discipline.

Gross margin is also presented in a GAAP and adjusted version. Adjusted gross margin is defined as GAAP gross margin plus inventory impairment and deferred revenue from contracts with business partners. In the third quarter of 2025, GAAP gross margin was $2.33 million, an increase of 52% year over year. The continued expansion of this margin will be critical to how quickly the company can scale higher-value medical categories (such as genetics, GLP-1, and STI testing) through the VSDHOne platform and how effective automation (VSDHOne 2.0) is at reducing partner onboarding costs.

3. Consensus forecast (current quarter/half-year)

Capital market analysts’ consensus forecast for the fourth quarter of 2025 illustrates an intriguing divergence between historical estimation models and the actual operational reality communicated by the company in real time. For the reporting quarter ended December 31, 2025, the average estimate of the analysts’ guild is for total revenue of $15.085 million to $15.09 million. On the earnings side, the market expects earnings per share (EPS) of $0.02 for the fourth quarter.

These consensus numbers are formed by a group of renowned North American investment banks and analyst firms, including Canaccord Genuity, Beacon Securities, and Maxim Group, among others. Analysts have significantly revised their price targets upwards in the months leading up to April 2026, with the average 12-month price target currently priced in a range of $9.75 to $9.95. Measured by a share price fluctuating between $3.95 and $4.20 in the run-up to the figures, the analyst consensus implies a massive fundamental undervaluation of nearly 57%, or an upside potential of over 130%. Canaccord Genuity, for example, explicitly initiated the coverage of the stock with a “buy” rating, emphasizing the moat Hydreight has built through its network of over 3,000 nurses, 300 physicians, and the integrated 503A/503B pharmacy network.

In order to evaluate the plausibility of the Q4 consensus forecast of CAD 15.09 million, the analyst bias must be considered in the context of corporate communications from February 2026. On February 2, 2026, Hydreight published a formal financial guidance that electrified the market environment: For the first quarter of 2026 (Q1 2026), management expects revenues in the range of CAD 25 million to CAD 28 million. In parallel, an annual forecast for the fiscal year 2026 of around CAD 150 million was issued. The management around CEO Shane Madden expressly emphasized that this 150 million mark is to be understood as a “conservative floor case scenario”. It is based exclusively on existing partner relationships, currently active customer programs and the use of existing infrastructure. Potential revenues from future acquisitions, expansion into new international markets or new corporate partnerships that were not yet operational at the time of the announcement in February were completely excluded.

The discrepancy becomes obvious here: If Hydreight generated GAAP revenue of CAD 10.52 million in the third quarter of 2025 and conservatively expects at least CAD 25 million for the first quarter of 2026, then the fourth quarter of 2025 must be the logical and gradual link in this steep growth curve. The analysts’ forecast of CAD 15.09 million seems extremely conservative against this backdrop, as it assumes that the majority of the growth leap would not occur until post-December 2025. However, the empirical data, such as exceeding the mark of 1.3 million processed product orders in mid-December 2025 ahead of schedule, speak a contrarian language.

They indicate that the acceleration in growth on the VSDHOne platform is likely to have pushed transaction volume well above the consensus mark of CAD 15 million as early as the fourth quarter. Consensus lags behind operational reality, a phenomenon often seen in hyper-growing micro-cap technology stocks, as analysts often readjust their models structurally only after the publication of audited results.

4. Comparison of the previous quarter

The immediately preceding third quarter of 2025 (Q3 2025), which ended on September 30 and was communicated at the end of November 2025, marked a historic turning point in Hydreight Technologies’ operating performance. It acts as the crucial benchmark against which the results of the fourth quarter are measured.

Was the previous quarter strong or weak? The third quarter of 2025 was an exceptionally strong record quarter by all objective measures of financial analysis. The company experienced hyperinflationary revenue growth, which impressively demonstrated the viability of its business model. Topline revenue escalated to CAD 12.83 million, a massive increase of 110% compared to the same quarter last year. Even more impressive was the development of GAAP revenue, which reached CAD 10.52 million, registering a growth of 132% year-over-year.

Margin and profitability metrics also followed this positive trend vector. GAAP gross margin expanded by 52% to CAD 2.33 million (compared to CAD 1.53 million in Q3 2024). On an operational level, Hydreight generated adjusted EBITDA of CAD 620,000. Final GAAP net income was CAD 362,000, which was a remarkable turnaround compared to the net loss of CAD 90,000 in the third quarter of the previous year. The balance sheet structure was also extremely robust at the end of the third quarter, with the company having cash on hand of CAD 18.64 million and operating completely debt-free.

Looking at the first nine months of 2025 cumulatively, topline revenue was $26.71 million (up 61% year-over-year), while GAAP revenue climbed to $20.44 million (up 70% year-over-year).

Were there any special features or special effects? The most serious special effect that characterized the third quarter of 2025 and acts as a structural catalyst for the future was the first-time, full-scale recognition of revenues from the newly launched VSDHOne platform. While the first customers went through the complex, multi-month onboarding process (due to state and federal regulations) in late spring, they began to process substantial orders via the platform for the first time in June 2025. The third quarter thus benefited as the first quarter from the full commercial leverage of this D2C SaaS model. Management quantified this effect precisely: a remarkable 57% of the total revenue growth in the quarter was directly attributable to the new contributions of the VSDHOne platform.

In addition to VSDHOne, the underlying metrics of the underlying underlying business showed strong anomalies in a positive sense. Pharmacy order volumes increased by 72% year-on-year, reflecting a high rate of recurring use, treatment continuity, and broader adoption of categories such as TRT (testosterone replacement therapy) and peptides. The platform’s network effect also accelerated, with new nurse sign-ups up 49% year-over-year in the third quarter, and as much as 63% year-over-year on a nine-month basis (593 registrations compared to 364 last year).

5. Comparison of the same quarter and half-year of the previous year

In order to holistically understand the exponential speed and scale of Hydreight Technologies’ transformation, a detailed comparison with the corresponding quarter of the previous year (Q4 2024) as well as the entire fiscal year 2024 is essential. This historical perspective illustrates the transition from an emerging startup to a cashflow-positive platform ecosystem.

Was it strong or weak? From a historical perspective at the time, the fourth quarter of 2024 was considered exceptionally strong and a “milestone quarter” by analysts and management. It was the quarter that Hydreight finally crossed the Rubicon to profitability and generated positive operating cash flow. Topline revenue was $5.74 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, representing a solid 15% growth over Q4 2023. GAAP revenue was $4.04 million, an increase of 20% year-over-year. GAAP gross margin for the period was $1.37 million. On the earnings side, the company posted adjusted EBITDA of $270,000 in Q4 2024, which was a notable fundamental improvement from the EBITDA loss of $557,000 in the fourth quarter of 2023.

For the full fiscal year 2024, the record figures accumulated: topline revenue reached CAD 22.32 million (up 31% from 2023), GAAP revenue rose to CAD 16.04 million (up 39% from 2023), and closed the year with positive adjusted EBITDA of CAD 490,000 (a drastic turnaround from the loss of CAD 1.38 million in 2023).

Were there any special features or special effects? The primary feature of the fourth quarter of 2024 was the financial proof of concept. Achieving structural profitability eliminated the need for dilutive emergency financing, which is endemic to the early-stage digital health sector. This milestone opened up access to institutional capital for Hydreight and ultimately led to the company being included in Deloitte’s prestigious “2024 Technology Fast 50” list (as the 9th fastest growing company in Canada) as well as the top 50 of the TSX Venture Exchange.

If you now compare the metrics of Q4 2024 with the expectations for Q4 2025, the tectonic extent of the business expansion becomes evident. While GAAP revenue of just over CAD 4 million was generated in the fourth quarter of 2024, the analyst consensus projects revenue of around CAD 15 million for the fourth quarter of 2025 – with the internal guidance for Q1 2026 even targeting CAD 25 million to CAD 28 million. This means that quarterly revenue has almost quadrupled in just twelve months.

The underlying structural special effect that explains this discrepancy between 2024 and 2025 is the radical evolution of the business model. In 2024, Hydreight generated its revenue primarily as an enablement platform for independent caregivers and traditional brick-and-mortar clinics that wanted to offer mobile infusion services (white-label locations). It was a solid but linearly growing B2B business. During 2025, the company pivoted to VSDHOne – a direct-to-consumer SaaS platform. By offering a fully integrated backend solution that combines physician networks, telemedicine software, and pharmacy fulfillment, Hydreight was suddenly able to aggregate the total recurring prescription revenue and platform fees of hundreds of new D2C healthcare brands. This shift from a linear B2B service to an exponentially scalable D2C ecosystem is the isolated fundamental reason why Q4 2024 looks tiny in retrospect compared to what is expected in Q4 2025 and in 2026.

Conclusion: The quarterly figures should come soon. I expect a positive surprise and am positioned accordingly.

Disclaimer

This text was partly created with AI applications.

All content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities or other financial market instruments. Of course, I try to present the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief, but they can still be false in whole or in part.

Therefore, I do not accept any liability for investment decisions that you make on the basis of the information presented here.

Conflict of interest: At the time of publication, the author of this publication holds shares/securities of the securities/companies discussed here and intends to sell them depending on the market situation and could benefit in particular from increased trading liquidity. As a result, there is a concrete and clear conflict of interest.

1. Assessment

The fundamental and quantitative analysis of Flow Traders (Euronext: FLOW.AS) for the first quarter of 2026 reveals a highly asymmetric, positive risk-reward profile. As a global liquidity provider and designated market maker for exchange-traded products (ETPs), the firm’s profitability is not primarily correlated with absolute market direction or the performance of specific asset classes, but rather with aggregate trading volume and implied volatility in global financial markets. The systematic evaluation of the available market statistics, especially the escalating data points in the month of March 2026, signals a significant acceleration of trading activities. This results in an above-average probability that Flow Traders will noticeably exceed analysts’ previous consensus forecasts for the first quarter of 2026.

The first quarter of 2026 initially presented itself in a two-part macroeconomic regime. In January and February, markets remained in a state of moderate but stable risk aversion, which was reflected in robust but not exceptional base volumes. Global on- and off-exchange ETP trading volume amounted to EUR 8,068 billion in January and EUR 7,209 billion in February. During this phase, the VIX volatility index oscillated in an inconspicuous range between 16.18 and 19.21 points on a monthly average. However, the key catalyst for the quarter’s profitability unfolded abruptly in March 2026. An abrupt escalation of geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and the resulting fears about global supply chains and inflation shocks led to a panicked flight to safe havens. Investors were forced to reshuffle their portfolios at an unprecedented rate, catapulting the VIX to extreme highs of up to 31.65 points in the second half of March. This combination of enormous pressure from market participants to act and massive volatility peaks represents the optimal operational habitat for flow traders. When the willingness to sell meets drying liquidity, the market maker’s algorithms drastically widen the bid-ask spreads to compensate for the increased risk of adverse selection.

In order to precisely quantify the potential market reaction on the day of the publication of the quarterly figures (planned for April 24, 2026), the following scenario model was developed.

The most important drivers that underpin this high probability of a positive surprise scenario can be clearly identified. On the positive side, the sheer magnitude of volume growth acts as a fundamental engine. ETP market volumes increased globally by 73 percent year-on-year in the first quarter (up to the pre-close call at the end of March). The regional breakdowns are particularly impressive: Asia-Pacific (APAC) doubled its volume with a 100 percent year-on-year increase, while the Americas region grew by 70 percent and the core EMEA region by 27 percent. Another massive positive driver is the record-breaking inflows of funds into the ETF industry. According to the analyst firm ETFGI, in March 2026 alone, a net $174.42 billion flowed into global ETFs, raising the quarterly result to a historic record of $626.42 billion. These gigantic capital flows force asset managers to continuously execute orders, with Flow Traders acting as a central intermediary and continuously collecting spreads. In addition, the company is benefiting from its extremely strengthened balance sheet. With a trading capital that has been expanded to a record level of over EUR 1.044 billion through new credit facilities, the company has the necessary firepower to act as a liquidity provider of last resort during periods of market stress and aggressively take market share from weaker-capitalised competitors.

On the negative side and the main negative factors for the quarterly result, the persistently rising structural costs and the relative weakness in the digital asset segment are the main negative factors. Management has raised its guidance for fixed operating costs in 2026 to between EUR 220 million and EUR 230 million, raising the profitability threshold. These cost increases are the result of massive investments in technological infrastructure, especially in the development of deep learning and artificial intelligence models for algorithmic trading strategies, as well as the aggressive recruitment of highly specialized quant developers. Another negative driver is the unexpected slowdown in the crypto market. In contrast to the traditional financial market (TradFi), digital assets saw declining trading volumes and lower volatility on a quarter-over-quarter basis due to continued lethargy after major liquidation events in October 2025. Since Flow Traders had benefited massively from the introduction of the US Bitcoin spot ETFs in the same quarter of the previous year (Q1 2025), this specific tailwind is largely eliminated in the current reporting period.

2. Key figure (revenue, EBITDA, profit)

The financial architecture of Flow Traders requires a differentiated analytical approach, as traditional valuation metrics from industry or the service sector only apply to a limited extent here. In market making, the classic concept of turnover is replaced by the so-called “Net Trading Income” (NTI). The NTI represents the gross trading result minus all directly attributable transaction costs, such as clearing fees, settlement costs and exchange levies. The NTI is therefore the purest and most direct measure of the company’s operating profitability. It reflects the efficiency with which the trading algorithms monetize the bid-ask spread in relation to the volume handled.

For the first quarter of 2026, all quantitative indicators point to a highly dynamic and exceptional development of the NTI. During periods of low market volatility, typically characterized by a VIX index of less than 15 points, Flow Traders historically records an NTI in the range of EUR 80 million to EUR 100 million. However, as soon as macroeconomic shocks drive volatility above 20 points, the NTI expands exponentially rather than linearly. The mechanics behind this are simple but effective: In the event of extreme market movements, many regular market participants and risk-averse banks withdraw from providing liquidity. Flow Traders, equipped with robust risk management and a massive trading capital of over EUR 1.044 billion, remains active in the market and can dictate significantly wider spreads in this liquidity vacuum. With global ETP trading volume increasing by 73 percent year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026 and the VIX breaking massively above the 30-point mark in March, it is highly likely that the NTI will significantly exceed the EUR 140 million to EUR 150 million mark in the first quarter of 2026.

The transformation of net trading income into operating profit (EBITDA) at Flow Traders is determined by an extremely pronounced operating leverage and an industry-specific, highly flexible remuneration model. The basis of fixed operating expenses, which primarily includes base salaries, data center costs, connectivity and software licenses, is relatively rigid. For the full year 2026, management has forecast these fixed costs to be in a range of EUR 220 to 230 million, which corresponds to a quarterly figure of around EUR 55 to 57.5 million. However, the central instrument for margin protection and risk sharing is variable remuneration (variable employee expenses). Flow Traders pays moderate base salaries compared to the industry, but directly shares a fixed percentage of the operating profit with the employees (historically often in the range of 32 to 35 percent). This system guarantees that in extremely profitable quarters, such as the expected Q1 2026, absolute personnel costs increase sharply in nominal terms, but the EBITDA margin remains structurally protected from erosion by the percentage cap. Historically, Flow Traders has been able to continuously generate EBITDA margins of over 40 percent through this mechanism; in the fourth quarter of 2025, this was 41 percent, and in the exceptionally strong first quarter of 2025, it was as high as 46 percent. Under the premise of an expected NTI outbreak due to volatility in March, absolute EBITDA can be expected for the first quarter of 2026 that could easily reach the EUR 65 to 75 million mark, with an expected EBITDA margin in the corridor of 44 to 48 percent.

At the level of net profit, EBITDA is impacted by depreciation and amortization of the enormous proprietary technology investments and increased financing costs. The latter require special attention in the current reporting period. To fund its aggressive expansion strategy into the Asian region and strengthen its market share in the digital asset space, Flow Traders raised massive external funding in October 2025. Specifically, a $200 million private credit facility and a $75 million revolving credit facility were integrated into the balance sheet structure. This debt financing has lifted net trading capital to historic record highs, but mirrors significantly higher interest expenses in the first quarter of 2026 compared to the same period last year. Nevertheless, this capital structure is highly depreciating, as management has historically proven that it can generate returns on average trading capital of over 50 percent – in 2025, this figure was a remarkable 53 percent. The interest burden is therefore more than compensated many times over by the additional income generated by the internalisation of larger trading volumes. As a result, an extraordinarily strong, high-quality net profit is expected for the first quarter of 2026, which will immediately manifest itself in a significant jump in earnings per share (EPS).

3. Consensus forecast (current quarter/half-year)

Ahead of the earnings release, analysts’ estimates for earnings per share (EPS) for the first quarter of 2026 converged at a consensus level of about $1.22. This forecast implies the market’s expectation of a net profit roughly in the range of EUR 45 million to EUR 55 million. MarketScreener expects a profit of 41.73 million

However, the fundamental reality comparison of these consensus estimates with the operating developments of the first quarter reveals clear divergences. As part of the official pre-close call, which took place on March 26, 2026 after the close of trading, management provided crucial, qualitative parameters that have the potential to significantly challenge existing analyst models. The key message from the Investor Relations team was unequivocal: the combination of significantly higher trading volumes and the drastic surge in volatility in March led to a “positive impact on performance in all regions compared to the fourth quarter”. Since the fourth quarter of 2025 already had a net trading income (NTI) of EUR 123.8 million, the management is thus setting a hard, implied lower limit for Q1 2026. Any analyst consensus postulating an NTI of less than EUR 130 million for the past quarter effectively ignores the company’s explicit guidance.

Even more serious for assessing the consensus forecasts are the published ETP market statistics, which show volume growth that many analysts probably did not anticipate in its impact. The pre-close call confirmed a 73 percent year-on-year increase in global on- and off-exchange value traded for the current quarter. The regional fragmentation of this growth is essential for revenue modeling: In Asia (APAC), volumes almost doubled (+100 percent YoY), in the Americas they grew by 70 percent, and in the highly profitable core market EMEA by 27 percent. In view of the fact that the Americas and Asia regions already contributed 40 percent of the group-wide NTI in 2025, this asymmetric hypergrowth in the expansion markets is likely to have led to a drastic upward revision of profitability.

On the cost side, there are also clear guidelines for the analyst consensus, which almost rule out a negative surprise. In the pre-close call, the management confirmed that fixed costs in the first quarter were exactly within the previously communicated guidance range. Based on the annual forecast of EUR 220 million to EUR 230 million for 2026, this means that fixed costs are anchored at around EUR 55 to 57.5 million.

In summary, it can be said that although the current consensus forecasts reflect the macroeconomic environment to some extent, experience has shown that the force of the VIX breakout in the second half of March – with intraday swings above 31 points – has not been fully and timely incorporated into the models. This cements the belief that Flow Traders is well positioned to not only meet consensus expectations for the first quarter of 2026, but almost certainly substantially exceed them.

4. Comparison of the previous quarter (Q4 2025)

The fourth quarter of 2025 represented a period of fundamental stability for the company. In absolute terms, Flow Traders generated net trading income (NTI) of EUR 123.8 million in Q4 2025, which signalled a strong operating baseline, but was rather in the moderate midfield in the historical context of the volatility years. The company’s global ETP trading volume amounted to EUR 516 billion during this period, a respectable increase of 22 percent compared to the weak prior-year quarter (Q4 2024). Fixed costs amounted to EUR 52.4 million, and the company generated EBITDA of EUR 49.2 million, corresponding to an adequate margin of 41 percent. Net profit for the fourth quarter totaled EUR 35.1 million with EPS of EUR 0.81.

The decisive peculiarity of the fourth quarter of 2025 was the absence of any panic in the market. Volatility, measurable by the VIX, moved in extremely calm waters and oscillated almost continuously in the mid-teens (between 13 and 17 points). In such a “risk-on” scenario, where markets are rising steadily and information asymmetry is minimal, there is an intense price war among liquidity providers. In Q4 2025, Flow Traders earned its money primarily through the sheer mass of transactions processed and not through extended margins (revenue capture).

Even more formidable than the volume expansion, however, is the complete regime change in volatility. While Q4 2025 was characterized by serenity, the first quarter of 2026, driven by geopolitical upheavals in the Middle East, forced drastic and abrupt “risk-off” movements.

In summary, the previous quarter (Q4 2025) was a structurally strong, but low-volatility base quarter. It served as an operational launch pad on which the record capital was acquired. The first quarter of 2026 now unleashes the full potential of this capital in an environment of massively increased volumes and abrupt volatility shocks.

5. Comparison of the same quarter of the previous year (Q1 2025)

The comparison with the first quarter of 2025 (same quarter last year) provides deep insights into the structural evolution of Flow Traders and reveals how the sources of profitability can shift completely within a single year. The first quarter of 2025 will go down in the annals of the company as a historically exceptional quarter. Flow Traders delivered an excellent Net Trading Income (NTI) of EUR 140.2 million, EBITDA of EUR 62.3 million and a net profit of EUR 36.3 million.

In order to correctly calibrate the implications of the expectations for Q1 2026, the anatomy of this prior-year quarter must be precisely deconstructed. Q1 2025 was by no means characterized by broad macroeconomic crises. The dominant one-off effect that fueled this quarter was a regulatory earthquake in the crypto market: the long-anticipated approval of Bitcoin spot ETFs in the U.S. in January 2025. As one of the world’s leading institutional market makers in the digital asset space, Flow Traders sat at the direct intersection of these capital flows. Cryptocurrency volatility has been exorbitant, spreads have been extremely wide, and the sheer mass of institutional inflows has generated historical NTI contributions from the digital asset segment.

Despite this operational brilliance, Q1 2025 was overshadowed by a peculiarity in terms of balance sheets. The company had to record an impairment on intangible assets of EUR 10.5 million. This one-off effect resulted from the paradoxical situation that although Flow Traders had hedged its crypto holdings economically perfectly (which was positively reflected in the NTI), the strict IFRS accounting standards did not recognize these hedging constructs in the same P&L line, which led to book losses “below the line” that were difficult to predict.

If we now jump to the current reporting quarter (Q1 2026), we see a completely transformed operational setup. Last year’s crypto gold rush has cooled noticeably. In the pre-close call, management confirmed that while trading volumes for digital assets were even higher year-on-year, they were already falling quarter-on-quarter. Overall activity in the crypto market remained subdued after a major liquidation event in October 2025, and crypto asset volatility also declined year-on-year in Q1 2026.

Conclusion: The quarterly figures are planned for April 24, 2026. I expect a positive surprise and am positioned accordingly.

Disclaimer

This text was partly created with AI applications.

All content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities or other financial market instruments. Of course, I try to present the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief, but they can still be false in whole or in part.

Therefore, I do not accept any liability for investment decisions that you make on the basis of the information presented here.

Conflict of interest: At the time of publication, the author of this publication holds shares/securities of the securities/companies discussed here and intends to sell them depending on the market situation and could benefit in particular from increased trading liquidity. As a result, there is a concrete and clear conflict of interest.

Important note on the currency and data situation in advance: In order to ensure maximum transparency, we strictly separate the currencies. BlueNord’s balance sheet is in U.S. dollars (USD). The stock and dividends are traded on the Oslo Stock Exchange in Norwegian kroner (NOK). The European reference price for natural gas (Dutch TTF) is quoted in euros per megawatt hour (EUR/MWh). All data used in this report reflect the absolute most recent status as of the beginning of March 2026 (including the Q4 figures as of February 24, 2026).

1. The company: From developer to “harvesting machine”

BlueNord (formerly Noreco) is a European exploration and production (E&P) company with a sharp focus on the Danish North Sea.

Business model and revenue streams:

At the heart of BlueNord is a 36.8 percent non-operating stake in the Danish Underground Consortium (DUC). This consortium is operated by industry giant TotalEnergies (43.2%), while the Danish state has a stake via Nordsøfonden (20%). BlueNord generates its revenue from the sale of crude oil and especially natural gas, which is produced from four main hubs: Dan, Gorm, Halfdan and the newly redeveloped Tyra field.

The Tyra field as a game changer:

For years, the Tyra redevelopment project devoured billions. But since the successful restart, the investment phase (CAPEX) has largely been completed. The company is now in the harvest phase. The plant is state-of-the-art and produces gas with an extremely low emission intensity, which represents a significant competitive advantage in Europe.

BlueNord as a strategic hedge against the TTF gas price

This is where it becomes particularly interesting for investors in Europe. The ICE Dutch TTF Natural Gas Future (the benchmark for European gas) is trading at around 50EUR/MWh at the beginning of March 2026. Historically, this is a high and volatile level.

BlueNord is pursuing a disciplined hedging strategy designed to hedge the massive dividend payments downwards without sacrificing the opportunity for profits from rising gas prices.

The 50/50 balance (2026 focus): Based on the most recent reports (Q4 2025/February 2026), the company is positioned for 2026 as follows:

• Downside protection: BlueNord has tightened around 40-50% of its gas production via futures contracts (hedges) at an average price of around 35 EUR/MWh.

  • Your advantage: Even if the TTF price collapses due to a mild winter or high storage levels, the cash flow for the dividends remains stable. These hedges act as a “safety net”.

• Market participation (upside potential): The remaining 50–60% of production flows directly into the spot market unhedged.

  • If the TTF gas price rises back towards EUR 350 due to geopolitical tensions or supply bottlenecks, BlueNord will benefit directly with half of its total production volume. Every increase in TTF is directly reflected in higher operating cash flow.

3. Competitive environment and industry positioning

BlueNord operates in the Northwest European E&P sector. Competitors include Vår Energi, Aker BP, Equinor and Ithaca Energy.

• The USP (Unique Selling Proposition): Unlike companies that constantly have to raise new capital to develop new fields, BlueNord sits on a fully developed world-class infrastructure (Tyra). The “lifting costs” are a tiny USD 13 per barrel of oil equivalent (boe). That’s a fantastic margin.

• Advantages: No operational risks under your own responsibility (TotalEnergies operates). Enormous focus on shareholder returns.

• Disadvantages: Cluster risk (focused on a few fields in the DUC) and no operational control over day-to-day business.

4. Financial analysis: A look at the books (Q4 2025)

The figures for the fourth quarter of 2025, published on February 24, 2026, are simply brutally strong and prove the transition to the cash flow phase.

• Net production: 42,400 boepd (barrels of oil equivalent per day) – the highest quarterly production in BlueNord’s history.

• Q4 2025 revenue: $270.3 million (a whopping increase from Q3’s $251.4 million).

• Profitability (EBITDA): $185.9 million (adjusted approximately $190 million) – a 40% increase quarter-over-quarter (QoQ).

• Net income: A profit of $47.3 million (compared to $12.9 million in the previous quarter).

• Operating cash flow: $167.7 million.

• Valuation: With a current market capitalization of around NOK 13 billion to NOK 14 billion (approx. EUR 1.2 billion) and massive earnings, the stock is fundamentally very attractively valued with a P/E ratio of around 14 and extremely high cash flow yields.

Skin in the Game & Capital Structure

Good numbers are useless if management burns through the money or dilutes shareholders. What about BlueNord?

• Number of shares and dilution: There are currently only around 26.10 million shares outstanding. The company has recently bought back its own shares ($50 million worth of buybacks in 2025) and even implemented a capital reduction. There is no risk of dilution here, quite the opposite.

• Debt & Liquidity: BlueNord has just successfully refinanced its reserve-based lending (RBL) credit facility to approximately $800 million. The term was extended until 31 December 2031, with no repayments (amortisation) until the end of 2028. Liquidity is a comfortable USD 493 million.

• Insider buying: This is my favorite indicator. Is the management selling at the top or are they buying? On February 26, 2026 (a few days ago!), board member Kristin Færøvik bought 500 shares at a price of NOK 504 each. When insiders buy with their own money after announcing strong figures, it signals considerable confidence in future price performance.

6. The Upcoming Dividend Payment (The Catalyst)

This is where it gets exciting for yield hunters. BlueNord has committed itself to an extremely aggressive dividend policy.

For Q4 2025, BlueNord has proposed a dividend of NOK 42.84 per share (approximately USD 115 million in total). This represents approximately 70% of the quarter’s operating cash flow.

The most important dates for you:

• Consent (EGM): 23 March 2026

• Ex-dividend date: March 24, 2026 (You must already own the stock on this date)

• Payout: approx. 27 March 2026

This quarterly dividend alone corresponds to a quarterly yield of over 8% at the current price of around NOK 512. Extrapolated to the year, the forward dividend yield is in the range of over 30%. For the whole of 2025, BlueNord has returned over half a billion dollars (including buybacks) to shareholders.

7. Risk analysis: What can go wrong?

1. Single-asset cluster risk: BlueNord is extremely dependent on the DUC infrastructure and specifically the Tyra field. A technical defect on the offshore platform, a fire or lengthy maintenance work would immediately freeze the cash flow. You are almost investing in a “single point of failure” here.

2. Commodity price crash: If European gas storage facilities are full after the winter and renewables feed in massively, the TTF gas price can quickly fall below 25 EUR/MWh. In this scenario, BlueNord’s lavish dividend will be dramatically slashed. Leverage works in both directions.

3. Regulatory & Politics: Denmark is a pioneer in climate policy. The political risk for fossil fuels in Europe is high. New windfall taxes on “excess profits” or stricter environmental regulations can put an unforeseen burden on margins.

4. Resource depletion: Oil and gas fields are emptying. Without new investments, production will naturally decrease.

Conclusion

BlueNord is not a buy-and-hold stock for eternity that you invest in and then forget about for 30 years. Rather, it is a highly profitable cash flow vehicle in the “harvesting” phase. If you believe in high or volatile European gas prices (TTF) and want to hedge your portfolio against energy price shocks, BlueNord is currently a fundamentally strong, outrageously well-paying and transparently managed tool. The upcoming dividend at the end of March 2026 underlines management’s commitment to channeling every surplus dollar directly into the pockets of shareholders.

Current price 540 NOK

My price target for the next 3 years is 894 USD (+66%) and a generous dividend.

My basic idea when investing is to buy a stock cheaper than it is actually worth. I work with a “fair P/E ratio” (P/E ratio - price-earnings ratio), which is supposed to reflect the fair value of a stock. If a fair P/E ratio of 15 is calculated for a company and is currently trading on the stock exchange for a P/E ratio of 10, then it would be a cheap buy. The bigger the gap between fair and current P/E ratios, the cheaper I am in purchasing! From this “gap” I calculate the potential for future price gains, because sooner and unfortunately sometimes later, the stock market recognizes the “fair P/E ratio”.

According to my calculations, the “fair P/E ratio” here is 19

My investment style is a mixture of value/momentum investor. Based on the fundamental data (VALUE) and the price development of the last 52 weeks (MOMENTUM), the stock is currently one of my TOP 25 stocks. These are the stocks where I see the highest chances of strong price gains in the medium term (1-3 years). I also buy these values in my wikifolios and at FollowMyMoney.

Thanks for reading! This post is public so feel free to share it.

What do you think about the stock? My stock ideas are part of the

“Elite Investor Feed” at ☛ Yellobrick

the performance of my stock ideas is tracked, independently of me. At the moment, it looks like this.

“Authors Leaderboard” at ☛ Trade Ideas Flow

the performance of my stock ideas is tracked, independently of me. At the moment, it looks like this.

“Speculative investments are like a tennis match: the decisive factor is to concentrate fully on the next ace instead of being annoyed by the last double fault.” A. Gerstenberger

Disclaimer

This text was partly created with AI applications.

All content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities or other financial market instruments. Of course, I try to present the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief, but they can still be false in whole or in part.

Therefore, I do not accept any liability for investment decisions that you make on the basis of the information presented here.

Conflict of interest: At the time of publication, the author of this publication holds shares/securities of the securities/companies discussed here and intends to sell them depending on the market situation and could benefit in particular from increased trading liquidity. As a result, there is a concrete and clear conflict of interest.

The global software landscape, especially the area of software-as-a-service (SaaS) business models, is currently undergoing one of the most massive transformation phases in recent decades. Driven by the rapid development and penetration of generative artificial intelligence (AI), established software solutions are under scrutiny. In the midst of this paradigm shift, Docebo Inc. (NASDAQ: DCBO; TSX: DCBO), a Canadian provider of cloud-based learning management systems (LMS), reported its financial results for the fourth quarter and full year 2025 on February 27, 2026. At the same time, the company is implementing a substantial issuer bid of $60 million, which raises profound questions in the investor community about capital allocation, fundamental valuation and management’s confidence in its future. All financial ratios are in U.S. dollars

Presentation of the company

Docebo Inc., headquartered in Toronto, Ontario, with other global offices, operates at the strategically important intersection of human capital management (HCM) and artificial intelligence. The company provides an advanced, cloud-based software platform that enables organizations to design, manage, and deliver learning and training programs for internal employees, external partners, and end customers, and to measure their business impact. In a world where the half-life of skills is drastically decreasing, Docebo is transforming from a pure tool for delivering learning content to a mission-critical infrastructure.

Business model and revenue streams

Docebo’s business model is a classic and highly scalable B2B SaaS (Business-to-Business Software-as-a-Service) model. Revenue is primarily generated from recurring subscription fees, which are billed based on active users, company size, and specific subscribed modules. This model offers extremely high predictability of cash flows. In the fourth quarter of 2025, these high-margin subscriptions accounted for 94 percent of total revenue ($59.1 million out of $63.0 million total).

The remaining share of sales of around 6 percent is attributable to professional services. These are implementation, integration and consulting services that support customers in the initial setup of the platform and the migration of legacy systems.

Growth prospects and strategic change

The company’s strategic direction has changed significantly in recent years and is aimed at a paradigm that is described internally as the shift from “Scalable Efficiency” to “Scalable Learning”. The old model of scalable efficiency, a remnant of the industrial age, focused on cost reduction, standardization, and routine tasks. Docebo’s growth strategy for 2026 and beyond is based on scalable learning, where adaptability, innovation, and personalization define business success.

To realize this growth, Docebo focuses decisively on the enterprise market as well as on the public sector (government agencies). This is impressively demonstrated by the development of the average contract value (ACV), which increased by a remarkable 20.5 percent to $66,500 in the fourth quarter of 2025, compared to $55,200 in the previous year. Larger enterprise customers usually mean longer and more complex sales cycles, but offer the decisive advantage of significantly lower churn rates and enormous upselling potential over time.

Products and the evolution to the “Workforce Readiness Platform”

Docebo’s core platform has a modular structure and can be highly integrated via APIs (Application Programming Interfaces). It comprises various modules that cover the entire life cycle of corporate learning:

• Learn LMS: The central management system for assigning, tracking, and certifying learning paths.

• Shape: An AI-based tool for automated creation of learning content from raw materials.

• Discover, Coach & Share: A social learning module that allows subject matter experts in the company to share their knowledge peer-to-peer.

• Learning Impact: Advanced data analytics to measure actual learning success and its impact on business metrics (KPIs).

• E-Commerce & Headless Learning: Features that allow companies to sell training courses to customers as a white-label product or to invisibly integrate the LMS into their own software products.

An epochal turning point in the product history was the acquisition of 365Talents, an AI-powered skills intelligence and workforce analytics company based in Lyon, France, announced on January 20, 2026 and completed shortly thereafter. The purchase price was approximately $54.6 million in cash, funded by cash and the credit facility, plus up to $5.1 million in potential earn-out payments upon the achievement of certain financial milestones.

This acquisition transforms Docebo from a pure content delivery system (a system that only delivers courses) to a comprehensive workforce readiness platform. Analysis of the traditional LMS market shows that many skills development initiatives fail because skills are merely rotting as static metadata in large HR systems (”Skills that sit on shelves”). The integration of 365Talents allows Docebo to build a dynamic ontology of skills. The system uses AI agents to identify in real-time what skills are missing in the organization, proactively suggests individual learning paths, and links them directly to internal mobility and workforce decisions.

The combined capabilities include:

• Skills-triggered actions: Automatically initiate learning and mobility actions as business needs change.

• Outcome-linked learning: Connecting competency data and learning activities to measure real skills instead of just course completion rates.

• AI-powered personalization: Use of AI agents to identify gaps and adjust content in real-time.

• Skills mapping: Continuous application of machine learning to map and derive skills of the workforce.

While 365Talents is expected to operate as a standalone brand in 2026 and contribute about $9 million to revenue, deeper integration is planned for the second half of 2026, culminating in a “Unified Learner Profile”.

Target markets and customer dynamics

Docebo is primarily targeting medium to large enterprise customers in North America and Europe. The strength of the platform is reflected in the diversity of customer relationships newly acquired or expanded in the fourth quarter of 2025:

• A U.S. casual dining company with over 800 restaurants worldwide replaced an established HCM provider with Docebo to centralize frontline employee onboarding and training.

• A global quick-service restaurant guide (QSR) with over 35,000 locations chose Docebo for global franchise training.

• A global leader in logistics technology replaced its previous LMS with Docebo to unify sales enablement and partner training.

• A multinational European engineering and design software company with 50,000 employees chose the platform to unify its training.

• A major U.S. financial regulator chose Docebo to modernize its learning ecosystem, explicitly because of its AI innovations and analytics.

In particular, the foray into the highly regulated public sector (federal and SLED markets in the USA – State, Local, and Education) is of immense strategic relevance. After achieving the FedRAMP Moderate Authorization (Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program) in 2025, Docebo was able to win major contracts such as that of Miami-Dade County and an expansion of the Cyber Training Academy of the Department of War Cyber Crime Center (DC3) in partnership with Deloitte. These engagements reflect continued traction with government agencies advancing their workforce modernization initiatives.

Another crucial target market is “Extended Enterprise Learning” – i.e. the training of people outside the direct payroll, such as sales partners, franchisees and end customers. These use cases are often directly linked to the revenue generation and customer loyalty of Docebo customers. Software spending in this area is viewed by chief financial officers (CFOs) as sales-boosting investments rather than pure HR cost blocks, making them more resilient to budget cuts during economic downturns.

Competitive environment

The global market for learning management systems is extremely dynamic, highly fragmented and growing rapidly. Various market research institutes estimate the volume of the LMS market in 2025 to be around $30.92 billion and predict growth to over $100.7 billion by 2032, representing a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of over 18 percent. This tremendous growth is driven by the increasing adoption of digital learning, the rise of hybrid work models, and the constant need for upskilling and reskilling in an AI-driven economy.

Industry positioning and competitors

In this expanding market, Docebo competes with a wide range of players. The competition can be structurally divided into three main categories:

1. Integrated HCM suites and ERP giants: Large software vendors such as SAP (with SuccessFactors/Litmos) or Workday (with Sana Learn). These vendors often bundle learning as a module within a massive workforce management software.

2. Specialized Corporate/Enterprise LMS Providers: This is Docebo’s most direct peer group. These include Cornerstone OnDemand (Cornerstone Galaxy), Absorb LMS, D2L Brightspace, 360Learning, TalentLMS, and LearnUpon.

3. Academic and open-source platforms: Platforms like Canvas LMS and Moodle that are primarily geared toward universities and educational institutions, but occasionally make their way into the enterprise sector.

Docebo strategically positions itself in the upper midfield and in the enterprise segment as a “best-of-breed” solution that offers agility and state-of-the-art AI features that the rigid modules of the ERP giants often lack

Unique Selling Proposition (USP)

Docebo’s primary competitive strength (USP) lies in its consistent “AI-First” strategy, which was not only created as a reaction to the latest AI hype, but has formed the architectural foundation for years. While many competitors only use AI superficially as an add-on for rapid content generation, Docebo has embedded artificial intelligence deeply into the orchestration of learning processes. The acquisition of 365Talents underpins this technological advantage. By linking concrete learning activities with real-world, constantly updating skills data, companies can prove the actual ROI (return on investment) of training measures – a historical blind spot of many legacy LMS platforms.

Financial analysis

For the full year 2025, Docebo generated total revenue of $242.69 million, a solid 11.9 percent increase from $216.93 million in 2024. Crucial subscription revenue grew 11.8 percent to $228.38 million. Professional Services revenue rose 13.3 percent to $14.31 million.

In the isolated fourth quarter of 2025, revenue was $63.04 million, up 11 percent from $57.04 million in the year-ago quarter. Subscription revenue amounted to $59.08 million (+9.5 percent) in the fourth quarter.

Annual Recurring Revenue (ARR), the key forward-looking metric for SaaS companies, reached $238.1 million as of December 31, 2025, up 8.4 percent year-over-year (from $219.7 million at the end of 2024).

Profitability and operating margins

Docebo’s profitability metrics show impressive operating leverage. Gross profit margin was $50.3 million, or 79.8 percent of revenue, in the fourth quarter of 2025 (80.3 percent for the full year), which is typical for highly scalable cloud software.

The real breakthrough is evident at the level of operating profit. Adjusted EBITDA rose by an impressive 40.2 percent to $13.34 million in the fourth quarter of 2025. The adjusted EBITDA margin thus reached a company record level of 21.2 percent (significantly compared to 16.7 percent in the prior-year quarter). For the full year 2025, adjusted EBITDA was $43.89 million (+30.6 percent compared to 2024).

In the analysis of the income structure, special attention should be paid to the reported net income according to IFRS. This exploded to $26.85 million ($0.93 per diluted share) in the fourth quarter of 2025, a dramatic increase of over 125.5 percent from $11.91 million in the year-ago quarter. Since the reported net profit (USD 26.9 million) exceeds the adjusted operating profit before depreciation and taxes (EBITDA of USD 13.3 million) by double, this necessarily indicates a massive positive, non-operating special effect in the tax calculation.

Adjusted net income — the far more important metric for analysts as it eliminates special items, stock-based compensation, restructuring costs and currency fluctuations — came in at a realistic $13.26 million ($0.46 per share) in the fourth quarter, still an outstanding 53.2 percent year-over-year increase.

Cash flow and leverage ratio

The company’s real cash generation is extremely robust. For the full year 2025, Docebo generated operating cash flow of $28.17 million and free cash flow (FCF) of $38.38 million (an increase of 18.9 percent compared to $32.29 million in 2024). In the fourth quarter, FCF was $12.34 million, representing an outstanding FCF margin of 19.6 percent of revenue.

Historically, Docebo has operated with an extremely conservative balance sheet and has been virtually debt-free (debt-to-equity ratio of 0.06). However, the capital structure is currently undergoing a deliberate strategic change. To fund the massive share repurchase program while maintaining liquidity for operations and the 365Talents acquisition, the Company has increased its existing secured revolving credit facility with a syndicate of banks led by the National Bank of Canada by $50 million, bringing the total to $100 million. The Substantial Issuer Bid will be funded by $30 million from existing cash and a drawing of approximately $30 million from this new credit facility. Given the strong cash flow generation of nearly $40 million per year, debt service for this $30 million draw is easily affordable.

Q1 2026 and FY 2026 Outlook (Guidance)

The guidance for the coming year, published on February 27, 2026, demonstrates continued confidence on the part of management, albeit with a slight slowdown in percentage growth rates due to the increased revenue base and OEM disposals:

• Q1 2026: Total revenue between $63.5 million and $63.7 million. Adjusted EBITDA between $10.3 million and $10.5 million. The midpoint of the revenue forecast ($63.6 million) is slightly above the previous analyst consensus of $63.42 million.

• Full year 2026: Subscription revenue between $251.5 million and $253.5 million. Total revenue between $267.5 million and $269.5 million. Adjusted EBITDA is expected to be between $52.5 million and $54.5 million.

The midpoint of the revenue forecast for 2026 ($268.5 million) is slightly below analysts’ previous consensus estimates of $268.8 million. Nevertheless, the forecast represents solid growth of about 10.6 percent compared to 2025, with a further expansion of absolute profitability. It is important to note that management is acting conservatively in this guidance: the guidance assumes that macroeconomic conditions remain stable and that no new individual client contracts with an ARR of over $1,000,000 are entered into in 2026. In addition, Docebo expects that in 2026, about $9 million of revenue will come from the newly acquired 365Talents division.

Fundamental valuation

Based on a share price of $17.91 at the end of February 2026, Docebo’s market capitalization is around $500 million. Including the targeted total revenue for 2026 (approx. $268.5 million) and taking into account the new net debt after the share buyback, the company is trading at a forward EV/sales multiple of just under 2x. For a software company with an 80 percent gross margin, over 21 percent EBITDA margin, high cash flow conversion and double-digit growth, this is a historically extremely low valuation.

The adjusted price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio is around 24, which is close to the 5-year low and marks deep value territory by SaaS standards.

Skin in the Game & Capital Structure

As of December 31, 2025, Docebo reported 28,747,289 common shares outstanding. The history of recent years shows an extremely disciplined management of the number of shares. In 2024, the number decreased by almost 9 percent through regular buybacks. Stock-based compensation was only around $6.0 million in 2025, which is just under 2.5 percent of total revenue.

The Substantial Issuer Bid

By far the most important catalyst for the short-term capital structure is the “Substantial Issuer Bid” (SIB), which was announced at the end of January 2026 and formally launched on February 3. The Board of Directors has decided to use up to $60 million to buy back and then cancel treasury shares at a fixed price of $20.40 per share. This represents up to 2,941,176 shares, or approximately 10.23 percent of the total outstanding common shares. The offer runs until March 10, 2026.

Such a massive buyback is an unmistakable signal from management to the market: The Board considers the current market price to be significantly undervalued and “not fully representative of the value of the business and future prospects”.

Insider activities and institutional participation

Docebo’s ownership structure is unusually concentrated. The absolute majority shareholder is the investment company Intercap Equity Inc., which is controlled by Docebo Chairman Jason Chapnik. Intercap holds about 56.6 percent of the outstanding shares.

However, if you look at insider trading at the individual management level, a more nuanced, slightly cautionary picture emerges regarding the “skin in the game”. At the end of December 2025, a few weeks before the announcement of the massive buyback program and forecasts, Chief Financial Officer Brandon Farber and Chief Executive Officer Alessio Artuffo parted with substantial blocks of shares at prices around $30. Management sold at prices well above the current level of $17 and above the SIB price of $20.40, just before the market saw the massive price slump in the spring of 2026.

Risks

Despite its strong cash flows, disciplined share structure, and visually favorable valuation, Docebo faces several serious structural and macroeconomic risks. An investment in Docebo requires a clear, emotionless understanding of these dangers.

1. Cluster risk and the painful loss of OEM partners

The Achilles’ heel of the current sales development is the historical dependence on Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) partners. These partners invisibly integrated Docebo’s technology as a white-label solution into their own HR or software systems and distributed it to their end customers. As transparently explained in the “Annual Information Form” (AIF) and the earnings calls, Docebo is currently winding up its long-standing, gigantic partnership with Dayforce. According to management, this “wind down” is “faster than expected” and leaves deep scars on growth metrics. Dayforce historically accounted for a significant portion of annual recurring revenue (9.5 percent at the end of 2024, down to just 4.4 percent at the end of 2025). Dayforce’s contribution to total revenue is expected to shrink to 3.5 to 4.5 percent by 2026 and 1 to 2 percent in 2027 before becoming meaningless.

This problem is not isolated. In addition, another major customer, AWS (Amazon Web Services), has decided to downgrade massively in its “Skill Builder” program. This results in an immediate, uncompensated ARR loss of approximately $4 million from the first quarter of 2026. This double loss of massive anchor contracts visually pushes the Net Dollar Retention Rate (NDR) below the critical threshold of 100 percent and massively slows down ARR’s headline growth. If other large system integrators migrate in the future or decide to develop their learning systems in-house at low cost, there is a risk of further pressure on margins and sales, which could further compress the valuation.

2. The Existential AI Threat: Commoditization of Software

The all-determining, existential issue for B2B software companies in spring 2026 is the fear of the disruptive power of new generative AI models. The thesis of the bears and short sellers is relentless: If companies can program and maintain customized learning paths, rudimentary content management systems, and internal knowledge bases themselves in a few days at a fraction of the cost with the help of autonomous AI programming agents, the economic moat of established, expensive SaaS providers like Docebo will disappear completely. The fear is that LMS software will be degraded from a high-priced subscription to a cheap commodity.

Docebo counters this fundamental risk by fleeing forward: its own deep integration of AI agents and the strategic acquisition of 365Talents. The company’s counterargument is that the pure generation of learning content (texts, videos) may indeed become a mass product, but secure orchestration, the strategic governance framework (rights management, compliance tracking) and validated competence measurement in highly scalable, error-intolerant enterprise use remain highly complex and require dedicated platforms. Nevertheless, there remains a significant risk that price-sensitive customers, especially in the SMB segment, will migrate to cheaper lightweight solutions powered by generative AI, which could jeopardize Docebo’s pricing power and margins.

3. Integration and execution risk of the 365Talents acquisition

With an effective purchase price of $54.6 million in cash, Docebo has invested a significant portion of its hard-earned liquidity in an independent, foreign (French) company. M&A transactions (mergers and acquisitions) in the software industry statistically involve inherent and massive risks. While the 365Talents brand will continue to operate independently in 2026 for the time being so as not to disrupt ongoing contracts, the planned deep technological fusion of the two platforms – from the current API-only connection to a truly native, unified learner profile with shared data architectures in the second half of 2026 – is an extremely complex undertaking.

Special opportunities

1. Dominanz im Extended Enterprise & External Training

The majority of traditional SaaS LMS providers (such as Cornerstone or Workday Learning) focus purely on internal human resources (HR) and training of their own employees. Docebo, on the other hand, has been extremely successful in establishing itself as the leading platform for training people outside the company – the so-called “Extended Enterprise”. These include end customers, resellers, franchisees and sales partners.

This external training is strategically far more valuable to companies than internal compliance training (such as fire safety training) because it directly contributes to increasing customer loyalty, massively reducing support costs, and directly increasing sales to partners. If a software solution directly contributes to the customer’s revenue generation or significant cost savings, the willingness to pay is significantly higher and the cancellation rate is dramatically lower in times of crisis. The deep integration of e-commerce-supported modules also allows Docebo customers to sell their own training content directly to their users via the platform, thus transforming the LMS from a pure cost center into its own revenue stream (profit center). This moat is difficult to copy by simple AI tools.

Public Sector Conquest (FedRAMP)

A massive and relatively cyclical growth engine for Docebo is its successful entry into the highly regulated US government market. After receiving the extremely rigorous and time-consuming “FedRAMP Moderate” security certification in 2025, the company has been given the key to winning high-volume contracts at the federal and local level (SLED - State, Local, and Education).

Government contracts are extremely valuable from an investor’s point of view: they are massively “sticky”; once implemented and approved in terms of security, the probability of switching is astronomically high. In the earnings call, management emphasized that the pipeline in this government sector should unfold significantly in 2026 and contribute significantly to the ARR.

3. Enterprise-Expansion und Multi-Product-Cross-Selling

Despite the painful headwinds in the SMB segment, Docebo has been successful in acquiring large global corporations (enterprises). The significant increase in average contract value (ACV) to over $66,500 demonstrates the sales team’s increasing ability to structure and close complex, high-volume, multi-product deals. With the full integration of 365Talents, Docebo will no longer position itself as a pure LMS provider from 2026 onwards, but as a “true multi-product company” for the entire workforce management. This opens up immense, organic cross-selling potential: Docebo can now offer a powerful, agent-based skills intelligence tool (as an upsell) to its huge base of existing LMS customers and, conversely, migrate customers from 365Talents to the Docebo LMS. This drives up the customer lifetime value (LTV) and significantly reduces the relative cost of customer acquisition (CAC).

4. AI governance as a line of defense

While unregulated “shadow AI” poses an immense security risk for companies, Docebo is positioning its platform as a solution for controlled AI adoption. Analysis by the Brandon Hall Group confirms that Docebo’s strategic focus on “AI Literacy and Governance” is exactly what Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) in large corporations are currently looking for. This governance layer forms a technological barrier against cheap open-source AI solutions.

Analyst consensus and price targets

The established Wall Street consensus considers Docebo stock to be significant and unfairly undervalued after the Q4 report in February 2026. Based on 13 aggregated analyst ratings, the stock receives a strong “Moderate Buy”. The average consensus price target is $33.64. Based on the volatile closing price of around $17.91 at the end of February, this implies a massive, mathematical upside potential of almost 88 percent.

Possible catalysts

Docebo’s price performance over the next 6 to 12 months will not depend solely on market sentiment, but largely on the operational execution of the following specific events (catalysts):

1. Closing and Allotment of the Substantial Issuer Bid (March 10, 2026)

2. Publication of Q1 2026 results (expected May 2026)

3. Full technology integration of 365Talents (H2 2026)

4. Additional FedRAMP Contract Closings

Current price 17.91 USD

My price target for the next 3 years is 38.5 USD (+115%).

My basic idea when investing is to buy a stock cheaper than it is actually worth. I work with a “fair P/E ratio” (P/E ratio - price-earnings ratio), which is supposed to reflect the fair value of a stock. If a fair P/E ratio of 15 is calculated for a company and is currently trading on the stock exchange for a P/E ratio of 10, then it would be a cheap buy. The bigger the gap between fair and current P/E ratios, the cheaper I am in purchasing! From this “gap” I calculate the potential for future price gains, because sooner and unfortunately sometimes later, the stock market recognizes the “fair P/E ratio”.

According to my calculations, the “fair P/E ratio” here is 36.3

My investment style is a mixture of value/momentum investor. Based on the fundamental data (VALUE) and the price development of the last 52 weeks (MOMENTUM), the stock is currently one of my TOP 25 stocks. These are the stocks where I see the highest chances of strong price gains in the medium term (1-3 years). I also buy these values in my wikifolios and at FollowMyMoney.

Subscribe now

Thanks for reading! This post is public so feel free to share it.

What do you think about the stock? My stock ideas are part of the

“Elite Investor Feed” at ☛ Yellobrick

the performance of my stock ideas is tracked, independently of me. At the moment, it looks like this.

“Authors Leaderboard” at ☛ Trade Ideas Flow

the performance of my stock ideas is tracked, independently of me. At the moment, it looks like this.

“Speculative investments are like a tennis match: the decisive factor is to concentrate fully on the next ace instead of being annoyed by the last double fault.” A. Gerstenberger

Disclaimer

This text was partly created with AI applications.

All content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities or other financial market instruments. Of course, I try to present the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief, but they can still be false in whole or in part.

Therefore, I do not accept any liability for investment decisions that you make on the basis of the information presented here.

Conflict of interest: At the time of publication, the author of this publication holds shares/securities of the securities/companies discussed here and intends to sell them depending on the market situation and could benefit in particular from increased trading liquidity. As a result, there is a concrete and clear conflict of interest.

Sylvania Platinum Limited’s financial and operational performance in the first half of the 2026 financial year (HY1 FY2026) marks a significant turning point in the company’s history. In a market environment characterized by a massive recovery in platinum group metal (PGM) prices and stable operational excellence, the Group was able to deliver results well above historical averages.

All financial data in this report is presented in U.S. dollars ($) unless expressly stated otherwise. The South African rand (ZAR) is used as the functional currency of the operating subsidiaries for cost analysis, while reporting to shareholders follows the Group’s functional reporting currency.

Key metrics and financial performance

The financial performance in the reporting period is characterized by exceptional growth in all relevant metrics. The following table presents the key figures for the first half of FY2026 compared to the relevant previous periods.

Financial development and operational causes

The results achieved in the reporting period reflect a rare convergence of operational excellence and a highly favourable macroeconomic environment. The 110% increase in net sales to nearly US$100 million is the result of a strategic optimization of Sylvania Dump Operations (SDO), which was accompanied by a significant recovery in PGM prices.

Operational drivers of revenue growth

Sylvania Dump Operations (SDO) achieved record production of 49,164 4E PGM ounces during the period. This is the highest figure for a half-year in the history of the company. This development was driven by a 9% increase in PGM feed grades processed and a significant 10% improvement in feed grade PGM grades compared to the same period last year. The improvement in grades resulted from the optimized selection of tailings and a stable supply of current arisings, which typically have higher metal grades than historical stockpiles.

Market dynamics and price development

The financial leverage of the increased production was massively amplified by the 55% increase in the average 4E gross basket price to $2,162 per ounce. Compared to the first half of the previous year ($1,396/oz), Sylvania benefited from a strong price rally in platinum and especially rhodium. Market analysis suggests that above-ground inventories of these metals fell to multi-year lows, while demand from industry and for hydrogen fuel cell technologies increased structurally.

Particularly noteworthy is the development in the second quarter of FY2026 (October to December 2025), in which the realized basket price was already at $2,374 per ounce, which is a continuation of the upward trend from the first quarter ($1,953/oz). This sequential increase has driven EBITDA margins to regions last seen during the 2021 PGM boom.

Cost structure and margin measurement

Adjusted Group EBITDA rose disproportionately to revenue by 414% to $51.0 million. This illustrates the high operational leverage effect of the overburden processing business model. Since a large part of the operating costs (laboratory, energy, maintenance) are fixed in nature, incremental increases in sales due to higher prices flow almost entirely into the result.

Cash cost per 4E PGM ounce was $935 in the second quarter of FY2026, an increase from $863 in the previous quarter. This increase is primarily due to seasonal maintenance work and the commissioning of the filtration plant. Nevertheless, Sylvania remains a producer in the lowest cost quartile of the PGM industry, providing significant resilience to any price declines. In Rand-Termini (ZAR), the cost per ounce remained relatively stable due to higher production volumes, highlighting the efficiency of SDO.

One-off effects and special items

Net income for the first half year was impacted by a non-cash impairment charge of $12.3 million on the Hacra Exploration Project. The company’s management decided not to pursue this project as it does not fit into the strategic development plan and no further capital is to be allocated to it. Without this special effect, net income would have been around $35.5 million, which underlines the actual operating profitability even more clearly.

Another important factor is the start of the Thaba Joint Venture (Thaba JV) operational contribution. Although the ramp-up was slower than expected due to instabilities in the power supply (Eskom power line), the first chromium and PGM concentrates were shipped in the second quarter of FY2026. This marks the beginning of the diversification of revenues into the chromium market, which will serve as a buffer against PGM price volatility going forward.

Currency Effects and Liquidity

The exchange rate of the South African rand against the US dollar showed an appreciation trend at the end of the period during the period (closing rate: 16.58 ZAR/$ compared to 17.64 ZAR/$ at the end of FY2025). While an appreciation of the rand increases operating costs reported in USD, it often reflects greater confidence in the South African commodities sector. Sylvania does not have an active hedging policy for currencies or metals, which exposes the group directly to volatility, but at the same time allows it to participate fully in rising commodity prices.

Cash position decreased to $54.0 million as of December 31, 2025. However, this should not be seen as a weakness, but as a result of disciplined capital allocation. During the period, significant funds were invested in the Thaba JV project, new tailings storage facilities (TSF) and the dividend payment for FY2025 ($6.8 million). The Group remains debt-free and is financing its expansion entirely from operating cash flow.

Forecasts and outlook

Sylvania is looking forward to the rest of the 2026 financial year with increased confidence. The increase in the production guidance for PGMs to 90,000 to 93,000 ounces (from previously 83,000 to 86,000 ounces) is a strong signal to the market.

• Production: Targets for PGM have been increased, while the target for chromium concentrate has been adjusted to 60,000 to 90,000 tonnes due to the cautious Thaba ramp-up.

• Investments: Capital expenditures are expected to remain at a stable level in the second half of FY2026 to complete the Thaba JV infrastructure and secure new tailings dams.

• Dividends and buybacks: By announcing an interim dividend of 2.00 pence per share (well above last year’s interim 0.75 pence) and allocating $2.5 million to share buybacks, the company is reaffirming its shareholder-friendly capital allocation policy.

Summary Conclusion

Sylvania Platinum’s interim balance sheet for the first half of the 2026 financial year documents a period of exceptional profitability and operational maturity. The Company has taken advantage of the period of lower PGM prices to optimise its assets and advance strategic projects such as the Thaba JV, and is now reaping the rewards of these investments. With an EBITDA margin of over 50% and a significant increase in dividend payout, Sylvania underlines its status as one of the most efficient players in the PGM sector. The clear strategic focus, coupled with disciplined cost control, suggests that the company will continue to deliver above-average performance in the remainder of the fiscal year, making Sylvania an attractive value for investors in the commodities segment.

Current price 1,62 USD

My price target for the next 3 years is 8,1 USD (+400%).

My basic idea when investing is to buy a stock cheaper than it is actually worth. I work with a “fair P/E ratio” (P/E ratio - price-earnings ratio), which is supposed to reflect the fair value of a stock. If a fair P/E ratio of 15 is calculated for a company and is currently trading on the stock exchange for a P/E ratio of 10, then it would be a cheap buy. The bigger the gap between fair and current P/E ratios, the cheaper I am in purchasing! From this “gap” I calculate the potential for future price gains, because sooner and unfortunately sometimes later, the stock market recognizes the “fair P/E ratio”.

According to my calculations, the “fair P/E ratio” here is 20.1

My investment style is a mixture of value/momentum investor. Based on the fundamental data (VALUE) and the price development of the last 52 weeks (MOMENTUM), the stock is currently one of my TOP 25 stocks. These are the stocks where I see the highest chances of strong price gains in the medium term (1-3 years). I also buy these values in my wikifolios and at FollowMyMoney.

What do you think about the stock? My stock ideas are part of the

“Elite Investor Feed” at ☛ Yellobrick

the performance of my stock ideas is tracked, independently of me. At the moment, it looks like this.

“Authors Leaderboard” at ☛ Trade Ideas Flow

the performance of my stock ideas is tracked, independently of me. At the moment, it looks like this.

“Speculative investments are like a tennis match: the decisive factor is to concentrate fully on the next ace instead of being annoyed by the last double fault.” A. Gerstenberger

Disclaimer

This text was partly created with AI applications.

All content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities or other financial market instruments. Of course, I try to present the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief, but they can still be false in whole or in part.

Therefore, I do not accept any liability for investment decisions that you make on the basis of the information presented here.

Conflict of interest: At the time of publication, the author of this publication holds shares/securities of the securities/companies discussed here and intends to sell them depending on the market situation and could benefit in particular from increased trading liquidity. As a result, there is a concrete and clear conflict of interest.

Forget complicated Latin diagnoses. In the world of Viromed Medical $VME from germany, only one language counts right now: that of hard numbers. Imagine having a machine that solves a problem that costs hospitals billions every year. A problem that is so big that it affects almost every intensive care unit worldwide. With PulmoPlast, Viromed has not only invented a medical device based on the principle of the “controlled thunderstorm”. While the competition is still trying to persuade bacteria with chemicals, Viromed simply wipes them out physically. For investors, this is the chance for a jump in sales – and that’s just the warm-up.

A lot of TAM – TAM = Total Addressable Market

The TAM describes the maximum possible market size for a product or service.

The 216,000 locations bet: Where PulmoPlas wants to move in everywhere

To understand the scale of the market, you have to consider the sheer number of potential customers. According to current data from the Statista platform, the number of hospitals worldwide will grow to an impressive 215,977 by 2026. Almost every one of these hospitals has an intensive care unit (ICU). And this is exactly where Viromed’s hunting ground is located.

If we calculate conservatively and assume that only a fraction of these clinics will introduce the PulmoPlas system, this already blows up any conventional growth forecast. In Germany alone, there are over 1,900 hospitals with a massive ICU presence. Viromed estimates the short-term sales potential in the domestic market alone at 1,000 devices, which corresponds to a turnover of around 15 million euros. If you extrapolate this to the world market, it quickly becomes clear that Viromed occupies a niche here that is as big as an entire continent.

Patient Power: Why Millions of Lungs Are Crying Out for Plasma

But the calculation goes even deeper. It’s not just about the devices, but about the patients. Every year, over 5 million people are admitted to intensive care units in the USA alone. According to estimates, about 40% to 50% of these require artificial respiration. Globally, we are talking about 30 to 45 million seriously ill adults per year.

The problem: Up to 36% of these ventilated patients develop pneumonia (VAP) because germs multiply in the tubes like in a luxury resort. PulmoPlas is the bouncer who closes this resort. With a global incidence of millions of cases per year, the target group for Viromed is practically inexhaustible. The benefits are not limited to VAP; the technology also offers a potential alternative to antibiotics for other severe or influenza-associated pneumonias.

“Our innovative procedure has the potential to save lives and significantly shorten hospital stays, and could thus benefit all hospitals with intensive care units.” – Uwe Perbandt, CEO of Viromed Medical AG.

The 150 billion hole: The economic pain threshold

Why should a clinic spend money on plasma flashes? Because the alternative is priceless. A single infection in the intensive care unit (VAP) additionally costs a hospital between $24,000 and over $40,000. These costs are caused by longer hospital stays, expensive reserve antibiotics and massive personnel costs.

This is where the TAM calculation for Germany comes into play: The market for the prevention of pneumonia alone is estimated at over 150 million euros.

The “Razor Blade” Effect: Why the Real Wealth Lies in Accessories

The genius of the Viromed strategy is the business model. You don’t just sell a device once; the real sales engine is the sterile consumables, which have to be replaced regularly. This means recurring revenue with high margins. Since Viromed is the only company in the world to offer this technology for the lungs, they are currently building a “moat” of patents and clinical data.

The 80 million euro breath: How Viromed conquers the stock market with a “cold thunderstorm”

While pharmaceutical giants burn billions in the search for new antibiotics, Viromed sends a controlled, violet glowing thunderstorm into the lungs. PulmoPlas uses cold plasma to pulverize killer germs such as MRSA in seconds.

From measly figures to a financial quantum leap

In 2024, sales were still a modest 1.4 million euros. But for 2026, analysts at mwb research expect a jump to up to 80 million euros. In view of the recent scientific

The breakthrough: Scientific confirmation from the MHH

February 12, 2026 marks the turning point. Prof. Dr. Hortense Slevogt presented the results of a multi-year in vitro study at the Hannover Medical School (MHH). The data is groundbreaking: Cold atmospheric plasma effectively destroys several bacterial strains in lung tissue without damaging human cells. This demonstrated a clear “therapeutic window” that underlines the safety and efficacy of the technology.

“The results are groundbreaking. The use of cold plasma offers a safe alternative or complement to existing therapies and will significantly improve the prognosis of many patients.” – Prof. Dr. Hortense Slevogt.

The Roadmap to the Mass Market

The technology is now entering the next decisive phase: A final ex vivo validation in collaboration with Saarland University is expected within the next 2 to 3 months. This step is the prerequisite for the application for special approval at the Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices (BfArM) in autumn 2025. Positive validation is considered a massive catalyst for the stock price.

Conclusion: Investing in the next standard

Viromed provides the answer to the greatest economic threat to modern medicine: antibiotic-resistant germs. With global exclusive contracts – such as the cooperation with the UMECO Group for Asia, which is expected to bring in over 150 million euros by 2028 – the company is facing a rare scaling.

Current price € 6,35

My price target for the next 3 years is € 18,4 (+190%).

My basic idea when investing is to buy a stock cheaper than it is actually worth. I work with a “fair P/E ratio” (P/E ratio - price-earnings ratio), which is supposed to reflect the fair value of a stock. If a fair P/E ratio of 15 is calculated for a company and is currently trading on the stock exchange for a P/E ratio of 10, then it would be a cheap buy. The bigger the gap between fair and current P/E ratios, the cheaper I am in purchasing! From this “gap” I calculate the potential for future price gains, because sooner and unfortunately sometimes later, the stock market recognizes the “fair P/E ratio”.

According to my calculations, the “fair P/E ratio” here is 25.8

My investment style is a mixture of value/momentum investor. Based on the fundamental data (VALUE) and the price development of the last 52 weeks (MOMENTUM), the stock is currently one of my TOP 25 stocks. These are the stocks where I see the highest chances of strong price gains in the medium term (1-3 years). I also buy these values in my wikifolios and at FollowMyMoney.

Viromed Medical is a microcap and not very liquid. Therefore, always trade with limits!

What do you think about the stock? My stock ideas are part of the

“Elite Investor Feed” at ☛ Yellobrick

the performance of my stock ideas is tracked, independently of me. At the moment, it looks like this.

“Authors Leaderboard” at ☛ Trade Ideas Flow

the performance of my stock ideas is tracked, independently of me. At the moment, it looks like this.

“Speculative investments are like a tennis match: the decisive factor is to concentrate fully on the next ace instead of being annoyed by the last double fault.” A. Gerstenberger

Share PPinvest

Disclaimer

This text was partly created with AI applications.

All content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities or other financial market instruments. Of course, I try to present the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief, but they can still be false in whole or in part.

Therefore, I do not accept any liability for investment decisions that you make on the basis of the information presented here.

Conflict of interest: At the time of publication, the author of this publication holds shares/securities of the securities/companies discussed here and intends to sell them depending on the market situation and could benefit in particular from increased trading liquidity. As a result, there is a concrete and clear conflict of interest.

I had presented my top 25 year favorites here in December .

Welcome to the first big review of 2026! If you thought the stock market year 2025 was hard to beat with its record highs and AI excesses, then take a look at the first weeks of this year. We are in a market phase that experts are already calling the “Great Rotation” – away from the overheated mega-caps of Silicon Valley and towards the “picks and shovels” of global transformation.

In my depot of the “Top 25 Annual Favorites”, the hut is on fire right now – and mostly in a positive sense. While the major indices such as the DAX or the MSCI World are rather in sideways mode, our portfolio has already put a lot of horsepower on the road. In this report, I analyze for you why we are currently pulverizing the market, where the hidden risks lurk and which problem children we need to keep an eye on.

The status quo: portfolio overview and database

Before we get into the individual analysis, let’s take a look at the foundation: Our portfolio consists of a colourful mix of 25 stocks, which are primarily based in Canada, Germany and the Benelux countries. This geographical dispersion is not a coincidence, but a deliberate bet on industrial rebirth and securing critical supply chains in North America and Europe.

The following table shows you the bare facts. We have everything here: from tiny gold explorers to specialized medical technology pioneers.

Highflyers & Problem Children: A Detailed Analysis

It’s always the same game: a few rockets pull the cart out of the dirt, while the problem children could give you sleepless nights – if you didn’t know why they were weakening.

The Top 5: When Vision Meets Reality

1. Viromed Medical (+96.1%): The absolute monster in the portfolio. Viromed is the pioneer in cold plasma technology. Why is the thing going through the roof like this? The market is eagerly awaiting a press conference on February 12, 2026 at the Hannover Medical School (MHH). Groundbreaking findings on the treatment of lung diseases using cold plasma will be presented there. If the data live up to what the course promises, Viromed is on its way to becoming a standard in pneumology. The changeover to registered shares in January also increased transparency for institutional investors.

2. 5N Plus (+56.3%): This is where geopolitics meets semiconductor expertise. The US Pentagon has just awarded 5N Plus $18 million to secure the supply of germanium – a critical metal for infrared optics and space solar cells. 5N Plus is massively expanding its capacities and benefiting from the “friendshoring” trend. Analysts have already raised their price targets to CAD 30 and more.

3. U.C.A. AG (+40.3%): The “cash machine” from Munich. The investment in Pflegia GmbH proves to be a goldmine. Thanks to massive economies of scale in the care sector, profits are bubbling up. Shareholders are already speculating on a record dividend of up to 5.00 euros per share. A prime example of “understatement” in management, which is now unleashing itself in a 10-year high.

4. AMG (+27.7%): Critical materials are the topic in 2026, with AMG benefiting from the rising demand for lithium and vanadium. Particularly exciting: From the second quarter of 2026, AMG will be the only chrome metal producer in the USA. This vertical integration makes the company independent of Chinese imports and is a massive strategic advantage.

5. Neo Performance Materials (+26.4%): Rare earths are back on the agenda. Neodymium prices have risen by over 30% in early 2026. Neo is perfectly positioned to benefit from diversifying supply chains away from China.

The Flop 5: Growing Pains and Corporate Actions

1. Hydreight Tech (-18.2%): Ouch, that hurts. But look closely: The price decline is primarily due to a $15 million capital increase. The company is growing rapidly operationally (revenue up 132% in Q3) and forecasts revenue of $150 million in 2026. As soon as the dilution is digested, the pendulum could quickly swing again.

2. Net-Digital (-10.9%): Here we see a healthy consolidation after a strong run. Insider sales by KAVI Beteiligungen UG have exerted short-term pressure. Operationally, however, things are going excellently thanks to the 1&1 conversion and high margins in the AI payment area.

3. Birchtech (-10.0%): A risky stock. Birchtech is struggling with “going concern” doubts and a strong customer concentration. However, the victory in the patent dispute (judgment increased to USD 78 million) and the planned uplisting to the NYSE American on February 12 are positive. That could be the turning point.

4. Victory Square (-9.5%): The private equity firm suffers from general skepticism about tech accelerators. Despite strong portfolio companies such as Hydreight, VST is trading at a significant discount to the NAV.

5. Campine (-6.7%): The antimony market has cooled down after the hype in the summer. However, Campine is investing heavily in 3rd generation recycling technologies and is preparing to switch to continuous trading on Euronext Brussels, which should improve liquidity.

The big picture: sectors, countries and trends

If you look at the distribution of our portfolio, it quickly becomes clear where the music is playing. We have a massive preponderance in the materials sector (32% of stocks) and technology (28%).

Sector check: Who pulls, who brakes?

Country focus: Canada as a raw material hub, Germany as a hidden champion forge

Canada remains our anchor with 10 out of 25 titles. The country is benefiting massively from the US trend to relocate critical infrastructure and raw materials to “friendly” states. Germany, on the other hand, provides us with the extreme outliers to the upside – Viromed and U.C.A. show that there is still massive alpha to be gained in the German SME sector (SDAX/small-caps), while the DAX 40 is bobbing along rather sluggishly.

Portfolio vs. market: We play in a different league

Let’s move on to the mathematical part. How did we fare against the “big boys”?

Benchmark Comparison

As of today (early February 2026), YTD performance looks as follows:

• My Top 25 Portfolio: +13.0%

• S&P 500: +1.37%

• MSCI World: +0,81%

• DAX 40: +0.35%

Conclusion: We beat the MSCI World by almost a factor of 16! This is not a coincidence, but the result of a targeted strategy off the beaten track. While index investors are hoping for Nvidia and Apple, we are benefiting from the realignment of the global industry.

No bells are rung on the stock exchange to exit. (-‿-)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Disclaimer / Exclusion of liability

All content is for information purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities or other financial market instruments. Naturally, I endeavor to present the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief, but they may still be partially or completely incorrect.

I therefore accept no liability whatsoever for investment decisions that you make on the basis of the information presented here.

Conflict of interest: At the time of publication, the author of this publication holds shares/securities in the stocks/companies discussed here and intends to sell them depending on the market situation and could benefit in particular from increased trading liquidity. This represents a concrete and clear conflict of interest.

Have you ever tried to call a handyman because your basement is under water, or have you witnessed a nurse trying to smile for the next patient after a 12-hour shift? If so, then you know: The German labor market in these sectors is currently like a refrigerator on Sunday evening – it is yawningly empty, and the little that is left is desperately courted. The problem is as old as the demographic pyramid itself, but the solution has often been as charming as an official fax message: You place an ad, wait three months and then wonder why no one answers. But while politicians are still debating laws to strengthen care, a subsidiary of U.C.A. AG called Pflegia has established a principle that is as simple as it is ingenious: If the staff no longer comes to the boss, the boss has to come to the staff. And with a bouquet of benefits and a good dose of humility.

Subscribe now

The psychology of the change of power: When recruiting is suddenly fun

Those who work in nursing today usually don’t have one thing: time. Time for elaborate application letters, time for combing through dusty job portals or time for the umpteenth job interview, in which you only learn in the third sentence that weekend shifts are non-negotiable after all. The Handelsblatt has shed light on exactly this phenomenon in a formative article ( https://www.handelsblatt.com/adv/firmen/pflegia-erfahrungen.html ,in german) and shows how the U.C.A. AG holding Pflegia simply turns the tables: the so-called “reverse recruiting”. Here, employers apply directly to the skilled workers with concrete offers. You have to imagine it like an intelligent dating portal where the most desirable singles (the caregivers) can sit back and relax, while the admirers (the clinics and homes) try to score points with the best arguments.

This reversal of dynamics is far more than just a technical feature; it is a psychological revolution. For years, nurses were in the role of supplicants, who had to prove that they were “resilient” – as if that wasn’t the basic requirement for this profession anyway. Pflegia gives them back the power to make decisions. The candidates check the offers, check the hard facts such as salary and travel distance and then decide very confidently who they invite to get to know each other. This saves nerves and ensures an efficiency that has long been lost in the classic recruiting process.

“Employers apply directly to nurses with specific job offers - so the nurses decide for themselves which employer they want to get to know. The U.C.A. AG investment Pflegia offers nurses the fastest and easiest way to a new job.”

Why is this so important? Because according to statistics, the care sector is expected to have a need of 2.15 million workers by 2049, while the gap between supply and demand could grow to up to 690,000 missing people. In a market that is so empty, the time of the skilled worker is the most precious commodity. Anyone who wastes them with bureaucratic hurdles has already lost in the competition for the best minds before the first interview has even taken place. Pflegia acts as a digital protective wall against time thieves and as an accelerator for real matches.

The 800,000 Phenomenon: A Small Monopoly with a Big Impact

https://www.pflegia.de/

Numbers don’t lie, but they can impress. If you look at the growth of Pflegia, you stumble across a figure that makes every HR decision-maker sweat: Over 815,000 registered nurses are now in the platform’s database, after about 500,000 as of 08.2025. That’s 315,000 (38%) more in just 6 months. To classify this figure, you have to take a look at the overall market in the Federal Republic. According to the Federal Employment Agency, in 2024 there were about 1.7 to 1.8 million nurses in Germany who were subject to social security contributions. In plain language, this means that almost every second caregiver in Germany can theoretically be reached via Pflegia or has already stored a profile there.

This concentration makes Pflegia a “small monopoly” in an extremely fragmented market. While other portals try to score points with reach in all kinds of industries, Pflegia has dug deep into the DNA of the care industry. With over 40,000 listed jobs from more than 8,000 employers – from university hospitals to small outpatient care services – the platform offers a market depth that is second to none.

This market power is so interesting because it enables the platform to carry out data analyses that the Federal Statistical Office can only dream of. Pflegia not only sees who is looking for a job, but also why. When almost half of the market is gathered on one platform, trends become visible before they appear in official reporting. An ecosystem is created in which jobs are no longer just placed, but in which the conditions of the market are actively renegotiated. Employers who do not receive a response to Pflegia know immediately: My offer is not competitive. It is a merciless but fair mirror of reality.

Werkia: When the plumber becomes a digital nomad

People often say cobblers stick to your lasts – but what if the lasts work so well that you can revolutionize other industries with them? Under the name Werkia, the U.C.A. subsidiary expanded its successful model to include the skilled trades in 2024. The focus here is on the “critical” trades: electronics, plant mechanics for sanitation, heating and air conditioning (SHK) and refrigeration technology. In other words, industries in which you are currently more likely to get an audience with the Pope than a timely appointment for a heat pump installation.

The Werkia concept is an exact copy of Pflegia’s recipe for success, adapted to the needs of craftsmen. Here, too, the following applies: 100% anonymous, 100% free of charge for the candidate and, above all, employers apply to the professional. The craftsman simply states his wishes: How much salary? How long can the journey be? Is there also a company car for private use?. And bang: Werkia filters out the right companies, and the employer has to respond within 24 hours if he wants to have a chance.

“Werkia’s career consultant accompanied me from the very beginning in my job search and took care of everything - from the detailed presentation of the employers to the arrangement of the interview dates and even the contract negotiations - completely free of charge!”

Why did this hit the trade like a defective pipeline? Because craftsmen are often acquired via social media channels such as TikTok, Instagram or Snapchat, where Werkia is extremely present. The young generation of mechatronics engineers and electronics technicians is not in the mood for dusty guild portals. They want information via SMS directly to their mobile phones, clear salary announcements and a process that is as easy as clicking on Amazon. Werkia also offers personal career counseling that accompanies the candidate until he or she signs. In a world where good craftsmen are the new rock stars of business, Werkia is their personal agent.

The U.C.A. AG: The discreet powerhouse in the background

Behind the success of Pflegia and Werkia is a player that often flies under the radar of the general public, but is a real heavyweight in the world of medium-sized companies: U.C.A. Aktiengesellschaft. With a 57.5% stake in Pflegia, U.C.A. has not only provided capital, but also helped shape the platform from the ground up as an in-house development. It’s the classic story of an incubator that recognizes a gap in the market and fills it with technological precision.

U.C.A. AG is not a classic locust investor. With an annual net profit of over 3 million euros in 2024, the company shows that it can also be extremely successful economically with socially relevant topics. Particularly pleasing for shareholders: The dividend for 2025 has been massively increased to 4.50 euros per share, after it had been stable at 3.00 euros in previous years.

The reflection on the business model is interesting here: U.C.A. does not rely on short-term exits, but on buy-and-build strategies. Pflegia’s goal is to become Europe’s leading recruitment platform for nursing professions. With Werkia, this model is now being scaled up to the skilled trades. It’s a bet on the future of work, where intelligence and speed are the deciding factors.

In my financial models for the U.C.A., I expect very strong growth for the Pflegia investment, especially from 2025 onwards. All other participations maintain the status quo.

Current price € 65

My price target for the next 3 years is € 220 (+239%).

My basic idea when investing is to buy a stock cheaper than it is actually worth. I work with a “fair P/E ratio” (P/E ratio - price-earnings ratio), which is supposed to reflect the fair value of a stock. If a fair P/E ratio of 15 is calculated for a company and is currently trading on the stock exchange for a P/E ratio of 10, then it would be a cheap buy. The bigger the gap between fair and current P/E ratios, the cheaper I am in purchasing! From this “gap” I calculate the potential for future price gains, because sooner and unfortunately sometimes later, the stock market recognizes the “fair P/E ratio”.

According to my calculations, the “fair P/E ratio” here is 20.4

My investment style is a mixture of value/momentum investor. Based on the fundamental data (VALUE) and the price development of the last 52 weeks (MOMENTUM), the stock is currently one of my TOP 25 stocks. These are the stocks where I see the highest chances of strong price gains in the medium term (1-3 years). I also buy these values in my wikifolios and at FollowMyMoney.

U.C.A. is a microcap and not very liquid. Therefore, always trade with limits!

Subscribe now

What do you think about the stock?

Under Yellobrick ☛ https://www.joinyellowbrick.com/?authorName=ppinvest

the performance of my stock ideas is tracked, independently of me. At the moment, it looks like this.

“Speculative investments are like a tennis match: the decisive factor is to concentrate fully on the next ace instead of being annoyed by the last double fault.” A. Gerstenberger

Disclaimer

This text was partly created with AI applications.

All content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities or other financial market instruments. Of course, I try to present the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief, but they can still be false in whole or in part.

Therefore, I do not accept any liability for investment decisions that you make on the basis of the information presented here.

Conflict of interest: At the time of publication, the author of this publication holds shares/securities of the securities/companies discussed here and intends to sell them depending on the market situation and could benefit in particular from increased trading liquidity. As a result, there is a concrete and clear conflict of interest.

1. Executive Summary: An Asymmetric Investment Opportunity

This analysis is dedicated to q.beyond AG, one of the most high-profile IT service providers for German SMEs. At the time of this investigation in January 2026, the company is at a crucial point of reflection that has so far been insufficiently anticipated by the capital markets. After a phase of comprehensive restructuring under the “One q.beyond” strategy program, the company is providing operational proof of the successful turnaround.

Analysis of the financial data for the third quarter of 2025 and the forecast for the full year reveals a significant discrepancy between the company’s fundamental value and its current stock market valuation. While q.beyond has returned to profitability in operational terms and has net liquidity that covers almost half of its market capitalisation, the share continues to trade at the level of a restructuring case.

Core theses of the analysis:

1. Successful turnaround: With EBITDA of €3.0 million in Q3 2025 (previous year: €2.2 million) and a return to a positive Group result, q.beyond has bottomed out. The strategy of abandoning unprofitable sales growth in favor of margin quality is bearing fruit.

2. Sovereign Cloud as a moat: Contrary to the perception as a pure reseller, q.beyond is positioning itself as a premium provider of sovereign cloud solutions through the BSI C5 attestation. In a geopolitically uncertain world, guaranteed data storage in Germany is a decisive competitive advantage over US hyperscalers.

3. Balance sheet fortress: The company is debt-free and had net liquidity of €41.3 million as of September 30, 2025. At a share price of around €0.73, this corresponds to around €0.33 in cash per share – a massive margin of safety.

4. Catalyst corporate action: The Extraordinary General Meeting (AGM) convened for January 30, 2026 marks the beginning of a new era of shareholder value creation. The planned capital reduction technically cleans up the balance sheet and enables share buybacks from 2026 and dividend payments from 2027.

This analysis concludes that q.beyond is to be classified as a “High Conviction Buy”. The combination of extremely low valuation (EV/EBITDA 2026e < 3x), operating profitability and upcoming capital repayments offers an asymmetric risk-reward profile that is rarely found in the current market environment.

2. Macroeconomic environment and sector trends

In order to correctly classify the potential of q.beyond, an understanding of the specific challenges facing German SMEs (SMEs) in 2026 is essential. The German economy is undergoing a profound transformation, characterized by recessionary tendencies and regulatory pressure.

2.1 The digitization compulsion of SMEs

German SMEs, traditionally the backbone of the economy, are under enormous pressure. High energy costs and a shortage of skilled workers are forcing companies to increase efficiency through digitalization. It’s no longer about experimental projects, but about survival through automation and process optimization.

q.beyond addresses precisely this need. As a “one-stop-shop” for companies with 500 to 5,000 employees, q.beyond fills the gap between local system houses (which are often technologically overwhelmed) and global system integrators such as Accenture (for which SMEs are often too small).

2.2 Regulatory as a growth driver: NIS-2 and GDPR

A key external driver for q.beyond’s business model is the tightening of IT security laws. The implementation of the EU’s Network and Information Security (NIS-2) Directive has massively expanded the circle of companies that must demonstrate strict cybersecurity standards. Many medium-sized companies can no longer map these requirements internally. Operating your own Security Operations Center (SOC) in 24/7 mode is hardly feasible in terms of personnel and finances. Outsourcing to certified service providers such as q.beyond is therefore often the only economically viable option. In this context, the recently received C5 certificate from the BSI is not only a certificate, but a sales license to print money in regulated industries.

2.3 The Hybrid Cloud Trend

The market has said goodbye to the idea of a pure “public cloud only” world. The reality in 2026 is hybrid. Organizations use Microsoft Azure or AWS for scalable front-end applications, but retain critical core systems (legacy ERP, production data) in private clouds or on-premise environments.

q.beyond is positioning itself as an orchestrator here. The competence lies not only in the operation of a platform, but in the integration of different worlds. This binds customers in the long term, as the complexity of the interfaces makes it difficult to change providers (high lock-in effect).

3. Analysis of the business model: “One q.beyond”

The business model of q.beyond AG has been significantly sharpened over the past 24 months under the “One q.beyond” strategy. Historically grown silos were broken down in order to serve customers holistically and leverage cross-selling potential.

3.1 Segment Reporting and Earnings Mechanics

q.beyond reports in two primary segments that have different economic characteristics but complement each other synergistically.

Managed Services (The Cash Cow): This segment includes the operation of IT infrastructures, cloud platforms, and workplace solutions (Workplace-as-a-Service). Revenue in this area declined slightly to €89.1 million in the first nine months of 2025 (previous year: €99.5 million). However, this decline is primarily due to the deliberate clean-up of unprofitable contracts and the phasing out of low-margin hardware reselling businesses. The quality of the remaining sales is significantly higher, which is reflected in the stable gross margin.

Consulting (the growth engine): This is where q.beyond bundles its consulting expertise in all aspects of SAP S/4HANA, Microsoft technologies and software development. Revenue rose to €45.3 million in the first nine months of 2025 (previous year: €41.9 million). The margin explosion is remarkable: The gross margin in consulting almost doubled from approx. 7-8% in the previous year to over 14% in Q1 2025. The driving force behind this improvement is the optimized utilization and the increased use of nearshoring resources. q.beyond is building up capacities in more cost-effective locations (e.g. Latvia, Spain, India) in order to counter the German shortage of skilled workers and to optimise blended rates (average hourly rates).

3.2 The “One q.beyond” efficiency strategy

Under CEO Thies Rixen, the company was culturally and operationally transformed. “One q.beyond” means saying goodbye to the holding structure with largely autonomous subsidiaries towards an integrated group.

• Sales: Unified go-to-market approach. A managed services customer is actively approached about SAP transformations and vice versa.

• Administration: Combining HR, finance and marketing led to lower SG&A (Selling, General & Administrative Expenses) costs.

• Technology: Unification of the internal tool landscape and use of AI to automate standard processes in the service desk.

4. Deep Dive: German Data Centers and the Cloud Strategy

A central component of the investment thesis – and often a misunderstanding among investors – is q.beyond’s positioning in the data centre market. To understand the true value of the business, you need to understand the transformation from infrastructure owner to service orchestrator.

4.1 History: From owner to tenant (asset-light pivot)

Historically, q.beyond (then QSC AG) operated its own extensive infrastructure, including its own DSL network and several data centres. This was associated with high capital commitments (CAPEX) and depreciation. In 2021, the management made the far-sighted decision to sell the colocation subsidiary IP Exchange GmbH . The proceeds from the sale of approximately € 44 million massively strengthened the balance sheet and marked the transition to the asset-light model. Important for investors: q.beyond no longer owns “concrete gold” data centres on a large scale. Instead, the company rents state-of-the-art space (cages/racks) from large colocation providers or uses the capacities of hyperscalers.

4.2 Why the sale was strategically brilliant

The operation of data centers is a game of scale. Against giants such as Equinix, Digital Realty or CyrusOne, which invest billions in new facilities, a medium-sized player cannot keep up in the long term in terms of energy efficiency (PUE values) and construction costs.

Through the sale, q.beyond has divested itself of the commodity (electricity, cooling, space) and focused on value-add (management, security, operations). This structurally improves the return on invested capital (ROIC), as capital is no longer tied up in buildings.

4.3 The Sovereign Cloud: Creating Value Without Concrete

Despite the sale of the IP Exchange, q.beyond continues to be the “data centre provider” for its customers. The customer does not see who owns the building; he sees the service level agreement (SLA) and the contractual partner q.beyond. This is where the BSI C5 attestation comes into play. This certification is extremely complex and certifies that q.beyond’s cloud processes (regardless of the physical data center in which they run) meet the highest German security standards.

The range of services includes:

1. Private Cloud: Dedicated servers for customers who need maximum isolation (e.g. banks, insurance companies). These run in the certified zones rented by q.beyond in German data centres (locations such as Munich, Nuremberg, Hamburg).

2. Managed colocation: q.beyond manages the customer’s hardware. The customer brings in its servers, q.beyond takes care of networking, security and 24/7 monitoring. The ISG Study 2025 confirmed q.beyond as a “Leader” in this segment.

3. Hybrid Cloud Orchestration: q.beyond connects the private cloud to AWS or Azure via direct fibre (Direct Connect).

Conclusion Data Center: q.beyond is no longer a real estate company, but a tech service provider. In the long term, this justifies significantly higher valuation multiples than for pure colocation providers, as software and service revenues scale better than square meter rentals.

5. Financial analysis: The path to sustainable profitability

The financial figures for 2025 mark the successful completion of the restructuring. We analyse the key figures in detail to check the sustainability of this turnaround and validate the quality of returns.

5.1 Sales Development: “Shrinking to Greatness”

In the first nine months of 2025 (9M 2025), revenue fell to €134.4 million (9M 2024: €141.4 million). At first glance a warning signal, but on closer inspection it is a sign of quality.

• Adjustment: q.beyond divested itself of revenues that did not deliver a contribution margin. In the Managed Service segment, revenue fell by around €10 million (from €99.5 million to €89.1 million).

• Margin effect: Despite the decline in revenue, gross profit in the managed service segment remained almost stable and the margin improved relatively. The company now has to “buy” less sales, which reduces working capital requirements and protects liquidity.

5.2 EBITDA & Net Income

The profitability indicators show an impressive decoupling from the sales trend (”Operational Gearing”):

• EBITDA 9M 2025: Increase to €8.1 million (previous year: €6.4 million).

• EBITDA Q3 2025: jump to €3.0 million (previous year: €2.2 million) with a margin of approx. 6.9%.

• Consolidated net income Q3 2025: Positive at €0.5 million (previous year: €-0.9 million).

• Root cause analysis: Gross margins are increasing (consulting >14%, managed services >20%), while the fixed cost base (administrative staff, marketing costs) is being managed more tightly through the “One q.beyond” program.

The following table illustrates the positive gap between sales and earnings:

5.3 Cash Flow and Liquidity

Probably the strongest pillar of the investment thesis is cash generation.

• Free Cash Flow (FCF): In 9M 2025, a positive FCF of € 3.6 million was generated (previous year: € 2.4 million). The company no longer burns money, but generates cash from its operating business.

• Net liquidity: As of 30.09.2025, there was €41.3 million in cash in the bank.

• Implication: In an environment in which many small caps have to carry out capital increases at ruinous conditions, q.beyond can act on its own. The “cash burn” rate is negative (i.e. cash build).

6. Balance sheet analysis and capital allocation: The gamechanger 2026

The announcement of December 12, 2025 about the planned capital reduction is the most important short-term catalyst for the stock. Many private investors do not fully understand the mechanics, which is why it is explained in detail here.

6.1 The Problem: The Balance Sheet Loss

According to German commercial law (HGB) and stock corporation law (AktG), a stock corporation may only distribute dividends or buy back shares if the balance sheet shows a “retained profit”.

Due to losses in the past (development years, restructuring), q.beyond has a so-called “loss carryforward” on its balance sheet. Even if the company is currently (2025) profitable (net income), this profit must first be used to reduce the old loss pot. That would take years, in which shareholders would come away empty-handed.

6.2 The Solution: Capital Reduction and Reverse Split

The management is planning a liberating blow at the Extraordinary General Meeting on January 30, 2026:

1. Reverse split (5:1): 5 old shares are merged into 1 new share. The total number of shares will fall from approx. 124.6 million to approx. 24.9 million.

   • Effect: Purely visual. The price rises mathematically from €0.73 to €3.65. This makes the stock more attractive to institutional investors, who are often not allowed to buy penny stocks (under €1) by statute.

2. Capital reduction: The share capital is reduced for accounting purposes. The book value freed up in this process is used to completely delete the loss carryforward in the balance sheet.

   • Effect: The balance sheet is “clean”. Future profits (from 2026) can be distributed immediately.

6.3 The new Capital Allocation Policy

The management has explicitly announced that it will use this technical measure for:

• Share buybacks from 2026: Given the undervaluation (price below book value, high net cash), this is the most rational use of capital. Every buyback at current prices massively condenses the value for the remaining shareholders.

• Dividends from 2027: q.beyond is transforming itself from a promise of growth to a dividend stock.

7. Competitive analysis and peer group comparison

The German IT service market is consolidating. q.beyond is in direct comparison with listed competitors, but is valued significantly lower.

7.1 The Peer Group

1. Datagroup SE (WKN: A0JC8S):

   • Model: Focus on standardized outsourcing (”CORBOX”). Very successful, growing strongly inorganically through acquisitions.

   • Valuation: Typically trades at an EV/EBITDA of 8x to 10x.

   • Difference: Datagroup is larger and has a longer track record of profitable growth.

2. Cancom SE (WKN: 541910):

   • Model: Stronger focus on hardware/reselling, but transforms into a system house.

   • Rating: EV/EBITDA approx. 10x.

   • The difference is that Cancom is more volatile in the hardware cycle, while q.beyond has a higher proportion of services.

3. Nagarro SE (WKN: A3H220):

   • Model: Digital Engineering (Software Development). Globally positioned, strong organic growth.

   • Rating: EV/EBITDA approx. 9x-12x.

   • Difference: Nagarro has governance problems and fluctuating margins, but is rated as “high growth”.

7.2 The valuation gap

The following table illustrates the undervaluation of q.beyond in comparison:

Analysis: q.beyond is valued as if the company were permanently stagnating or making losses. At a price of €0.73, the enterprise value (EV) is only approx. €51 million (92 million market cap minus 41 million cash). With an expected EBITDA of € 13.5 million (mean guidance € 12-15 million), this results in a multiple of 3.8x.

This is fundamentally unjustifiable for a profitable, debt-free IT company with recurring revenues. A revaluation to only 6x EBITDA (still a discount to the peer group) would justify a price of approx. €1.00 to €1.10 (before split).

8. Management, governance and shareholder structure

A look at the people and owners involved creates trust – or reveals risks.

8.1 Skin in the Game: The Founders

q.beyond’s ownership structure is a classic feature of German medium-sized companies and offers investors security against hostile takeovers or short-sighted management decisions.

• Dr. Bernd Schlobohm (Chairman of the Supervisory Board & Founder): 12.70 %

• Gerd Eickers (Supervisory Board & Founder): 12.66% Together, the founders control over 25% of the shares. This is a significant “skin in the game”. They have proven in the past that they are willing to support hard cuts (such as the sale of infrastructure) if it serves the long-term value of the company.

8.2 The Case of AQTON SE (Stefan Quandt)

In older analyses, AQTON SE (investment vehicle of BMW heir Stefan Quandt) often appeared as an anchor shareholder.

• Current status: In the current voting rights notifications and shareholder lists at the end of 2025, AQTON no longer appears as a major shareholder (>3%) subject to reporting requirements.

• Interpretation: Investors should assume that AQTON has reduced its stakes over the years. Although this increases the free float (approx. 74%), it also means the loss of a prominent anchor investor. However, the stability provided by the founders Schlobohm/Eickers compensates for this.

8.3 Insider activities

In 2024 and 2025, there were regular insider purchases (directors’ dealings), especially by CEO Thies Rixen.

• Signal effect: When the CEO buys shares, it is usually a strong signal that he knows the internal planning and considers the current price to be too low. There have been no significant sales by management in the last 12 months.

9. Valuation

Based on the available data, various valuation scenarios can be derived.

9.1 Liquidation Value

The “floor” of the valuation is the cash balance.

• Market capitalization: ~€92 million

• Net liquidity: ~€41 million

• Enterprise Value: ~€51 million

The market values the entire operating business (1,100 employees, customer contracts, software IP, brand) at only €51 million. This corresponds to less than 0.4 times the annual turnover. Historically, IT service companies are often valued at 0.8x to 1.2x revenue in acquisitions.

9.2 DCF approximation (discounted cash flow)

Under conservative assumptions:

• Sustainable free cash flow from 2026: €8-10 million (with moderate growth and margin expansion).

• Discount rate (WACC): 9.5% (small cap risk premium).

• Growth in perpetual annuity: 1.5%.

This results in an enterprise value (equity value) of approx. €140 - 160 million.

This corresponds to a fair value per share of €1.12 to €1.28 (before split).

9.3 Analyst consensus

Current studies by companies such as Warburg Research or NuWays see price targets in the range of €1.30. This is in line with the fundamental models and implies an upside potential of almost 80%.

10. Risk Report

Every investment involves risk. q.beyond focuses on the following factors:

10.1 Wage inflation and margin pressure

As a personnel-intensive company (approx. 1,100 employees), q.beyond is vulnerable to wage increases.

• Risk: If wages increase by 5%, but prices cannot be adjusted for customers due to fixed contracts, the margin decreases.

• Mitigation: q.beyond uses index clauses in new contracts that link prices to the consumer price index. In addition, the nearshoring mix (India/Spain) has a dampening effect on average costs.

10.2 Customer concentration (cluster risk)

Historically, the retailer Tchibo was a dominant customer, from whose IT department q.beyond (then QSC) partly emerged.

• Status 2025: Although no exact percentages for 2025 are published, the dependence on top customers is structurally given in the managed services industry. A loss of a top 5 customer would have a noticeable impact on sales and margins. The strategy aims to dilute this concentration by acquiring new customers in medium-sized companies.

10.3 Technological Disruption (AI)

Artificial intelligence (generative AI) could disrupt the business model of software development and consulting.

• Risk: If code is written by AI in the future, the need for human developers will decrease (decline in sales after “time & material”).

• Opportunity: q.beyond integrates AI into its services (”AI-Ready Infrastructure Consulting”). Those who have a better command of AI can offer services more cheaply and gain market share. Q.beyond seems to be acting proactively here.

11. Sentiment and market sentiment

The mood around the stock is currently characterized by a “wall of fear” and disinterest, which is often a good sign for countercyclical investors.

• Analysts: All recommendations are “buy” or “hold”, with price targets well above the current price. There are no “sell” ratings, indicating a consensus that the bottom has been reached.

• Private investors (forums): In forums such as Wallstreet Online, the planned capital measure is sometimes controversially discussed. Some investors fear (wrongly) disadvantages from the reverse split. The mood is skeptical, but is slowly turning positive in view of the insider buying.

• Market technique: The price bottom at €0.70 seems stable. Turnover on the stock market is low, which means that even small buy orders can move the price significantly.

12. Conclusion

In January 2026, q.beyond AG is a prime example of a “special situation” in the German small-cap sector. The company has successfully mastered the painful transformation, but is still being traded by the market at the discount of a restructuring case.

The investment thesis in three points:

1. Safety First: The massive cash position and freedom from debt limit the risk to the downside considerably.

2. Profitability: The operational turnaround is evidenced by Q3 figures. q.beyond is earning money again.

3. Catalyst: The capital reduction in January 2026 opens the door for share buybacks. As soon as the company starts buying its own shares, the upward price pressure is likely to increase.

Current price €0.73 (before split)

My price target for the next 3 years is €1.26 (+73%).

My basic idea when investing is to buy a stock cheaper than it is actually worth. I work with a “fair P/E ratio” (P/E ratio - price-earnings ratio), which is supposed to reflect the fair value of a stock. If a fair P/E ratio of 15 is calculated for a company and is currently trading on the stock exchange for a P/E ratio of 10, then it would be a cheap buy. The bigger the gap between fair and current P/E ratios, the cheaper I am in purchasing! From this “gap” I calculate the potential for future price gains, because sooner and unfortunately sometimes later, the stock market recognizes the “fair P/E ratio”.

According to my calculations, the “fair P/E ratio” here is 22.4

My investment style is a mixture of value/momentum investor. Based on the fundamental data (VALUE) and the price development of the last 52 weeks (MOMENTUM), the stock is currently one of my TOP 25 stocks. These are the stocks where I see the highest chances of strong price gains in the medium term (1-3 years). I also buy these values in my wikifolios and at FollowMyMoney.

What do you think about the stock?

Unter Yellobrick ☛

https://www.joinyellowbrick.com/?authorName=ppinvest

the performance of my stock ideas is tracked, independently of me. At the moment, it looks like this.

“Speculative investments are like a tennis match: the decisive factor is to concentrate fully on the next ace instead of being annoyed by the last double fault.” A. Gerstenberger

Disclaimer

This text was partly created with AI applications.

All content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities or other financial market instruments. Of course, I try to present the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief, but they can still be false in whole or in part.

Therefore, I do not accept any liability for investment decisions that you make on the basis of the information presented here.

Conflict of interest: At the time of publication, the author of this publication holds shares/securities of the securities/companies discussed here and intends to sell them depending on the market situation and could benefit in particular from increased trading liquidity. As a result, there is a concrete and clear conflict of interest.

1. Introduction: The Anatomy of a Binary Investment Thesis

It’s January 2026. Global financial markets are in a period of recalibration, where technology microcaps are often overlooked unless they are on the verge of transformative events. The stock of Intermap Technologies Corporation (hereinafter “Intermap” or “the Company”) represents just such a scenario: a company on the cusp of a fundamental revaluation, caught in the tension between proven technological excellence and the tough reality of bureaucratic procurement processes in emerging markets.

The share price, which is currently in the range of CAD 1.65, reflects deep market uncertainty. The market capitalization of about CAD 125 Mio. does not currently price in the full success of the Indonesian expansion or the growing potential of the insurance business. Rather, it is an option premium on the continuation and possible breakthrough.

We are not looking at a classic value investment in the sense of steady cash flows and dividends. We look at an asymmetric bet on the digital sovereignty of one of Southeast Asia’s largest economies. The key question that concerns every investor is: Will Intermap be awarded the contract for the next phase of the “Integrated Land Administration and Spatial Planning Project” (ILASPP) in Indonesia? And if so, when?

This analysis will not only dissect the financial metrics, but will dive deep into the physics of remote sensing, the geopolitical necessity of Indonesia’s “One Map Policy” and competitive dynamics. We will determine the probability of winning the contract not by reading tea leaves, but through a forensic analysis of World Bank procurement policies, technical specifications and strategic alliances on the ground.

The thesis on which this report is based is complex: Intermap has created a “moat” through its proprietary IFSAR technology, which is almost insurmountable for optical satellite competitors, especially in the tropics. At the same time, the management has eliminated the existential liquidity risk for the time being through the capital increase in September 2025, which gives the company the necessary time (”runway”) to sit out the inevitable delays in Jakarta. But caution is advised: the risk is real, and it is binary.

2. Company background and strategic realignment

To predict the future of Intermap, an understanding of the company’s DNA is essential. Intermap is not a startup that has yet to prove itself, but a veteran of the geospatial industry with a history that dates back to the beginnings of aerial surveying.

2.1 From Hardware to Intelligence: The Evolution of the Business Model

Originally positioned as a data supplier selling physical maps or datasets on hard drives, Intermap has undergone a painful but necessary transformation. The modern Intermap sees itself as a provider of Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) and Elevation-as-a-Service.

This transformation was necessary because the commodification of satellite data (by providers such as Planet Labs or Maxar) has drastically reduced the prices of simple 2D images. Intermap, however, does not operate in the market for “beautiful images”, but in the market for precise 3D structural data. Today, the core business is divided into two main pillars:

1. Government Services: These are large-volume, project-based contracts for the creation of national spatial data infrastructures (SDI). The prime example is Indonesia. These orders are high-turnover, but irregular (”lumpy”).

2. Commercial Solutions: This is an attempt to generate recurring revenue. These include subscription services for the insurance industry that use Intermap’s elevation data to accurately model flood risks.

2.2 Financial Restructuring: The Importance of the 21 Million Financing

A critical turning point in the company’s recent history was September 2025. Up to this point, the sword of Damocles of illiquidity hovered over the company. Cash was tight, and the auditors’ “going concern” warning (doubts about the continuation of the company’s activities) deterred institutional investors.

Management conducted a bought deal financing that raised gross proceeds of $21 million.

The strategic importance of this step cannot be overestimated:

• Elimination of insolvency risk: With working capital of USD 23.3 million at the end of the third quarter of 2025 ⁴, the “going concern” note was removed from financial reports.

• Negotiating power: When negotiating with governments, the financial stability of the contractor is a decisive criterion. No state awards a 100 million project to a company that could be bankrupt in three months. The full war chest signals to Jakarta and the World Bank: We are ready to deliver.

• Investment capability: The capital allows Intermap to make upfront payments (e.g. mobilisation of aircraft) before the first milestone payments are made.

2.3 Management and shareholder structure

A look at the shareholder structure shows an interesting dynamic. Patrick Blott, the CEO, holds a significant stake of over 8.5% (approx. 6.2 million shares). This ensures a strong alignment of interests (”skin in the game”) with the free shareholders. Institutional investors are still underrepresented (around 2.3%), which is typical of microcaps, but also leaves room for future buying interest once market capitalization increases and risks decrease.

The dilution of existing shareholders due to the capital increase was painful – the number of outstanding shares increased by 35%. But in the weighing up between dilution and insolvency, this was the only rational step. Now management must prove that it can efficiently allocate the fresh capital to increase shareholder value beyond dilution.

3. The technological moat: Physics beats hype

In an era where AI and software are often the focus, Intermap’s advantage is based on hard physics. To assess the likelihood of the Indonesia deal, we need to understand why Intermap’s technology (IFSAR) is unrivaled for this specific scenario.

3.1 The Tropical Paradox: Clouds and Vegetation

Indonesia is located on the equator, in the heart of the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ). This means:

1. Permanent cloud cover: Satellites that work in the optical spectrum (such as Google Earth, Maxar) are often useless for topographic mapping because they can’t see the ground for all the clouds.

2. Dense vegetation: Even if there are no clouds, dense rainforest covers the ground. A simple radar or photo only sees the treetops (Digital Surface Model - DSM). For infrastructure planning (roads, dams, drainage), however, you need the terrain under the trees (Digital Terrain Model - DTM).

3.2 IFSAR: The Goldilocks Solution

Intermap relies on Airborne IFSAR (Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar). This technology uses radar waves emitted by aircraft (Learjets).

• Cloud Penetration: Radar waves penetrate clouds, fog and smoke effortlessly. Intermap can therefore fly and collect data even during the monsoon season, while optical satellites are blind.

• Foliage Penetration (Fopen): Intermap’s sensors often use X-band (for surface detail) in combination with P-band or special algorithms to penetrate the canopy and model the soil. This is the key difference to standard satellite radar.

3.3 The Comparison: IFSAR vs. LiDAR vs. Satellites

Why doesn’t Indonesia just use LiDAR or satellites? This is where the cost-benefit analysis comes into play. For the required scale of 1:5,000, IFSAR is the only technology that can keep the project on time and on budget. LiDAR would be the “Rolls Royce”, but Indonesia needs a fleet of robust off-road vehicles. Satellites are too inaccurate. This is exactly where Intermap’s moat lies: they occupy the niche of “Country-Scale Precision Mapping”.

The fact that Intermap has already successfully completed Phase 1, exceeding the technical specifications, is the strongest proof of the superiority of this technology in this specific context.

4. The Indonesia Project (ILASPP)

This is the core of the investment thesis. The Integrated Land Administration and Spatial Planning Project (ILASPP) is not just a map project. It is a fundamental building block of Indonesian state reform.

4.1 Macroeconomic Driver: Why Now?

Indonesia is under enormous pressure.

1. The capital shift: Jakarta sinks into the sea and suffocates in traffic. The government is building a new capital, Nusantara, on the island of Borneo (Kalimantan). This is one of the largest infrastructure projects in world history. You can’t build a new city in the jungle without knowing exactly where the water flows and how steep the slopes are.¹³

2. Legal certainty and investment: Foreign investors are often reluctant to buy land in Indonesia because land titles are uncertain (overlaps, disputes). The “One Map Policy” is intended to create a single, legally binding map (”Single Source of Truth”). This is a prerequisite for further economic growth.

3. Civil protection: Indonesia is on the “Ring of Fire”. Volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis are common. Accurate elevation models are essential for evacuation plans and risk modeling.

4.2 Project structure and financing by the World Bank

The project is massively supported by the World Bank (loan no. P180860). The total volume of ILASPP is often associated with USD 200 million, with the mapping component being a central part of this.

Key facts from the procurement documents:

• Financing: Since the World Bank is involved, payments (once the contract is signed) are secure. Currency risk (Indonesian rupiah vs. USD) is minimized, as World Bank projects are often settled or hedged in hard currency.

• Transparency: The World Bank requires strict award guidelines (”International Open Competitive Procurement”). This is both a curse and a blessing. A blessing because it makes corruption more difficult. Curse because it slows down processes and creates complex bureaucratic hurdles.

4.3 Phase 1: The proof-of-concept on Sulawesi

Intermap won the contract for Phase 1 in January 2024: The mapping of the island of Sulawesi for USD 20 million.

• Partners: Intermap worked exclusively with PT Pratama Persada Airborne (PPA). PPA is a subsidiary of a state-owned enterprise (SOE).

• Performance: The project was carried out in 2024/2025. Intermap provided data that exceeded expectations.

• Insight: In the world of government contracts, past performance is the most important indicator. The fact that Intermap has delivered in one of the most difficult terrains in the world (Sulawesi is extremely mountainous and rugged) gives them a massive leap of faith in the Indonesian authority BIG (Badan Informasi Geospasial).

4.4 Phase 2: The current tender and the delay

This is the current pain point for investors. Intermap has submitted bids for all four lots of the next phase (Sumatra, Kalimantan, etc.). A decision was originally expected at the end of 2025.

Status Quo (January 2026):

The decision was postponed. In a press release dated December 18, 2025, Intermap announced that the selection committee had postponed the date for the next phase by “two weeks” to allow for “further reviews and coordination.” In fact, this means that the process will slide deep into the first quarter of 2026.

4.5 Partnering with PPA: The Strategic Lever

The exclusive partnership with PT Pratama Persada Airborne (PPA) is Intermap’s ace up its sleeve.

• Local Content: Indonesia has strict regulations regarding local value creation (”Tingkat Komponen Dalam Negeri” - TKDN). A foreign company can hardly win on its own.

• Political support: As an SOE subsidiary, PPA is politically networked and enjoys the trust of the government.

• Logistics: PPA provides local logistics, permits (flight permits in Indonesia are notoriously difficult to obtain), and ground staff.

This alliance creates a barrier for competitors who might try to enter the market “solo” or with weaker local partners.

5. Analysis of the probability of winning

Let’s get to the core question of your inquiry: How strong is the probability that they will get the deal?

To answer this question, we need to analyze the competitive landscape and the incentives of decision-makers.

5.1 The Competitors

Who could be dangerous for Intermap?

1. Fugro (Netherlands):

   • Profile: A global giant in geo-data, strong in the maritime sector and offshore gas (Eni deal in Indonesia).

   • Threat: Fugro has deep pockets and a strong presence in Indonesia. They could try to push into the market via price.

   • Weakness: Fugro’s land mapping technology (RAMMS) is often based on LiDAR. As analyzed above, LiDAR is often too inefficient for nationwide areas in the tropics. Fugro would have to massively adjust its strategy to beat IFSAR. In addition, Fugro is primarily a maritime company, while ILASPP is a land project.

2. Pasco Corporation (Japan):

   • Profile: Had carried out projects in Sumatra from 2010-2014. Historically strong due to Japanese development assistance (JICA).

   • Threat: Japan has traditionally had strong geopolitical influence in Indonesia. Pasco knows the terrain.

   • Weakness: Their technology base in previous projects was often a mixture of satellite radar and aircraft. Intermap argues that their integrated end-to-end solution (data collection + AI processing) is faster and more homogeneous. In addition, Pasco may lack exclusive access to a partner like PPA in its current constellation.

3. Hexagon (Sweden) / Leica Geosystems:

   • Profile: Leading sensor manufacturer.

   • Threat: More as a supplier of sensors to local companies, rather than as a direct service provider for nationwide campaigns.

5.2 Synthesis of Probability

I evaluate the probability as follows:

• Scenario 1: Full profit or significant majority share (>70% of the lots).

  • Probability: 65% - 75%.

  • Rationale: Intermap is the incumbent. You have successfully delivered Phase 1. Their technology is the “Fit for Purpose” standard. You have the strongest local partner (PPA). A change of provider would massively increase the risk of data incompatibility (Sulawesi vs. Borneo). Civil servants are risk-averse; they rarely choose a new provider if the old one worked.

• Scenario 2: Split award (Intermap gets 1-2 lots, competitor the rest).

  • Probability: 20% - 25%.

  • Rationale: In order to avoid dependencies (”vendor lock-in”) and to signal competition to the World Bank, BIG could decide to spread the risk. This would still be financially very positive for Intermap, but not a “company maker” in the extreme sense.

• Scenario 3: Loss (no surcharge).

  • Probability: <10%.

  • Rationale: This would only happen if Intermap had made a catastrophic mistake in its offer or if geopolitical reasons (e.g. massive pressure from China or Europe in favour of other actors) prevailed. In view of the successful phase 1, this is unlikely.

Conclusion on the probability: The probability of a substantial profit is very high. The main risk is not the loss, but the time. A delay until mid-2026 would put investors’ patience to the test.

6. The Malaysia Project (Sabah): A Strategic Signal

In the shadow of the Indonesia discussion, Intermap won an important victory in neighboring Malaysia in December 2025.

• The project: Delivery of digital elevation models (DEM) for the state of Sabah (on Borneo!) for the national flood prediction and warning program.

• The client: Department of Irrigation and Drainage (DID) under the Ministry of Energy Transition.

• Strategic relevance:

  1. Validation: It proves that intermap’s data is essential not only for land titles, but also for climate resilience .

  2. Geography: Sabah is located on the same island as the new Indonesian capital Nusantara. The success in Sabah is a direct reference for the projects on the Indonesian side of the border.

  3. Application: The focus on flood mapping directly links the government business with Intermap’s insurance business. It shows that the underlying data (”Build Once”) can be monetized multiple times (”Sell Twice”).

7. The Sleeping Giant: The Insurance Business and AI

While the market stares at government contracts, Intermap is quietly building a scalable software business.

7.1 Der “Risk Assistant”

Intermap has developed an AI-powered platform that helps insurers manage natural catastrophe risks (esp. flood).

• The problem: Traditional flood maps are often based on outdated government data or rough postcode models.

• The solution: Intermap uses its own high-resolution 3D data to calculate physical models. Does the water flow into the basement of this specific house during heavy rain ?

• Traction: In Q3 2025, commercial revenue grew by 37%. A single upsell at a leading U.S. insurer raised $2.25 million.

7.2 Why this is important for the evaluation

Government contracts are often valued at low multiples (e.g. 1x turnover) on the stock market because they are irregular. Software subscriptions (SaaS) are valued at high multiples (e.g., 5-10x revenue).

If Intermap can prove that a significant portion of its revenue (e.g., $>10 million) comes from recurring insurance contracts, it would trigger a revaluation of the stock (multiple expansion), regardless of Indonesia.

8. Financial modelling and scenarios

Management has issued guidance of USD 30 - 35 million in revenue for 2026 with an EBITDA margin of 28%.

Let’s put these numbers into context:

2026 Guidance (Management)

Implicit valuation (at current price)

Revenue $30 - $35 million - EV/Sales ca. 2.5x - 3.0x

EBITDA $8.4 - $9.8 million - EV/EBITDA ca. 8x - 10x

Valuation: An EV/EBITDA of less than 10x for a company that is growing highly profitably (if successful) and has a unique technology is favorable. The market is currently pricing in a high probability of failure or massive delays.

Cash Burn Analysis:

With $23.3 million in working capital and operating cash flow approaching breakeven (or exceeding it at project entry), Intermap has a runway of at least 24 months, even without massive new project revenue, provided they control costs. The acute risk of further dilution is therefore low for 2026, unless they need working capital for a gigantic project profit (which would be a luxury problem).

9. Risk factors: What can go wrong?

No analysis is complete without looking at the abysses.

1. Delay death: If the Indonesian government delays the decision until the end of 2026, the fixed costs will eat up the cash reserves. The stock would slowly bleed out.

2. Political risk: Indonesia is stable, but changes in government or prioritization (e.g., budget cuts in favor of subsidies) can halt projects overnight.

3. Currency risks: Although many contracts are in USD, Intermap operates globally (Canada, USA, Indonesia, Malaysia, Europe). Currency fluctuations can weigh on margins.

4. Technological disruption: In the long term, new satellite technologies (e.g. constellations of cheap SAR satellites such as ICEYE or Capella Space) could increase price pressures. Intermap needs to strengthen its AI processing as a differentiator, not just data collection.

10. Summary and recommendation for action

Intermap Technologies is not an investment for the faint of heart. It is a classic “special situation”.

The facts:

• Technology: Validated and market-leading for the specific use case (tropical/nationwide).

• Finances: Stabilized by capital increase, no immediate risk of insolvency.

• Indonesia: Probability of profit very high (>70%), but timing uncertain (Q1/Q2 2026).

• Diversification: Insurance business is growing and validating data quality.

The subjective assessment (analyst opinion):

The market is behaving irrationally pessimistically because of the lag. He ignores the fact that delays in World Bank projects are the norm, not the exception. The partnership with PPA and the successful Phase 1 are fundamental anchors that will not be washed away by short-term volatility.

Conclusion:

For investors who are willing to endure volatility and have a time horizon of 12-24 months, Intermap offers an attractive risk-reward ratio. The current price around CAD 1.65 appears to be an attractive entry point, as long as you are aware that you are betting on the outcome of a government procurement process.

The probability that Intermap will get the deal is high. However, the patience of investors will be the currency with which this profit will have to be paid.

Current price CAD$ 1.65.

My price target for the next 3 years is CAD $4.14 (+151%).

My basic idea when investing is to buy a stock cheaper than it is actually worth. I work with a “fair P/E ratio” (P/E ratio - price-earnings ratio), which is supposed to reflect the fair value of a stock. If a fair P/E ratio of 15 is calculated for a company and is currently trading on the stock exchange for a P/E ratio of 10, then it would be a cheap buy. The bigger the gap between fair and current P/E ratios, the cheaper I am in purchasing! From this “gap” I calculate the potential for future price gains, because sooner and unfortunately sometimes later, the stock market recognizes the “fair P/E ratio”.

According to my calculations, the “fair P/E ratio” here is 22.7

My investment style is a mixture of value/momentum investor. Based on the fundamental data (VALUE) and the price development of the last 52 weeks (MOMENTUM), the stock is currently one of my TOP 25 stocks. These are the stocks where I see the highest chances of strong price gains in the medium term (1-3 years). I also buy these values in my Wikifolios, and at FollowMyMoney.

What do you think about the stock?

At Yellobrick ☛ https://www.joinyellowbrick.com/?authorName=ppinvest

the performance of my stock ideas is tracked, independently of me. At the moment, it looks like this.

“Speculative investments are like a tennis match: the decisive factor is to concentrate fully on the next ace instead of being annoyed by the last double fault.” A. Gerstenberger

Disclaimer

This text was partly created with AI applications.

All content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities or other financial market instruments. Of course, I try to present the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief, but they can still be false in whole or in part.

Therefore, I do not accept any liability for investment decisions that you make on the basis of the information presented here.

Conflict of interest: At the time of publication, the author of this publication holds shares/securities of the securities/companies discussed here and intends to sell them depending on the market situation and could benefit in particular from increased trading liquidity. As a result, there is a concrete and clear conflict of interest.

I am a great friend of a systematic approach. I have developed a system for my investments over the years. Investment decisions should be made without emotions on the basis of facts.

As a rule, I hold stocks for the long term for years. But it also happens that I trade news, for example, and only hold positions for a short time. I would describe myself 90% as an “investor” and only 10% as a “trader”.

I’ve been through a lot of ups and downs in the many years I’ve been on the stock market. It is therefore very important to me that I can react flexibly and at short notice to changes in the markets. I designed my investment portfolio (securities such as shares, ETFs, bonds, without real estate) accordingly.

My investment style is a mixture of value/momentum investor. I attach great importance to valuation, dividends, share buybacks and “skin in the game”. This means that I prefer cheaply valued stocks with a high insider share and high dividend yield. The basic idea is that decision-makers should also bear a personal risk when making decisions that have an impact on others.

Various criteria are included in the standardised valuation of the shares, such as:

• Revenue growth

• EBITDA growth

• Profit growth

• Dividend yield

• FCF-Margin (Free Cash Flow - Margin)

• P/E ratio

• Enterprise value/EBITDA

• Price/book value ratio

• Price potential (derived from the “fair P/E ratio”) and

• Relative Strength

My basic idea when investing is to buy a stock cheaper than it is actually worth. I work with a “fair P/E ratio” (P/E ratio - price-earnings ratio), which is supposed to reflect the fair value of a stock. If a fair P/E ratio of 15 is calculated for a company and is currently trading on the stock exchange for a P/E ratio of 10, then it would be a cheap buy. The bigger the gap between fair and current P/E ratios, the cheaper I am in purchasing! From this “gap” I calculate the potential for future price gains, because sooner and unfortunately sometimes later, the stock market recognizes the “fair P/E ratio”.

The weighting of the “relative strength” increases more and more in the course of the year!

“Let profits run - limit losses”

What stands out about the top 25 stocks:

• The shares come from many different industries.

• From the region, most stocks come from Canada (11 out of 25)

• Most stocks are small or micro caps that “swim completely off the beaten track” and want to be discovered.

• All stocks are cheaply valued and have a high price potential (at least doubling in the next 3 years) or a very high dividend yield.

• 3 of the top 25 stocks were also included in the 2025 vintage, see here.

My top 25 stocks, ranked by weighting for 2026 are:

1. Campine ($CAMB | ISIN: BE0003825420)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. EUR 300 million

• Dividend yield: approx. 7% % (basis: own estimate for 2025)

• Target price (3 years): 1,118 EUR (+465% own calculation, antimony boom)

Analysis:

• The business model: Campine is a Belgian industrial specialist that focuses on two niches: fire retardant additives (antimony trioxide) and the recycling of lead (e.g. from car batteries). The company buys industrial waste, recycles it and sells the pure metals or special chemical products back to industry.

• The USP (unique selling point): Campine occupies a critical niche in the circular economy. As one of the few European players that can process and recycle antimony (a strategic metal), the company benefits from EU regulation that promotes independent sources of raw materials in Europe.

• The bull scenario: The demand for refractory materials (for e-car plastics) and recycled lead remains high. Analysts see the stock as fairly valued in December 2025, but with potential through efficiency gains. A P/E ratio of around 5 signals a favorable valuation for a stable payer.

• The risks: Commodity price fluctuations (esp. antimony and lead) have a direct impact on the margin. In addition, the stock is market-tight; low trading volumes can lead to high volatility.

2. Victory Square Technologies ($VST. CN, $VSQTF | ISIN: CA92650P1045)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. CAD 76 million

• Current dividend yield: 0% (growth focus, occasional spinoff dividends)

• Target price (3 years): CAD 2.85 (+274% own calculation, depending on portfolio development -exit)

Analysis:

• The business model: Victory Square is a “venture builder” that finances, builds and takes startups in the areas of Web3, gaming and digital health to the stock exchange. They generate income through management fees and exits (sale of shares).

• The USP (unique selling point): Victory Square Technologies has a 56.6% stake in Hydreight Technologies. This stake alone is worth much more (approximately CAD 111 million) than the total market capitalization of Victory Square Technologies (CAD 76 million).

• The bull scenario: Hydreight signals aggressive expansion, see stock 3) in the digital health sector. Successful exits could drive up NAV (net asset value).

• The risks: The model is extremely cyclical and depends on the development of Hydreight. In bear markets for tech/crypto, the value of the holdings collapses. In addition, the liquidity of the stock is low.

3. Hydreight Technologies ($NURS. V, $HYDTF | ISIN: CA44877L1013)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. CAD 210 million

• Current dividend yield: 0%

• Target price (3 years): CAD 14.60 (+233% own calculation, based on US expansion)

Analysis:

• The business model: Hydreight offers a mobile health platform (”Uber for nurses”) that enables nurses in the USA to offer medical services (IV Drips, Botox, laboratory tests) on the go. Hydreight provides the app, legal coverage and pharmacy logistics.

• The USP (unique selling point): The proprietary app and the network of over 1,000 doctors who legally approve the treatments form a strong moat in the USA, where telemedicine and home care are booming.

• The bull scenario: Q3 2025 was the fourth profitable quarter in a row with a 132% jump in revenue. With an expected 1.3 million orders in 2025 as a whole, the model scales exponentially, without high fixed costs of its own (gig economy model). For 2026, I expect an increase in sales of about 250%!

• The risks: Regulatory changes in the U.S. healthcare system could jeopardize the business model. In addition, there is a risk that competitors will push into the market with more capital.

4. Digital Net ($VRL | As of DE000A2BPK34)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. EUR 37 million

• Current dividend yield: 0%

• Target price (3 years): EUR 36.4 (+111% own calculation, driven by AI payment solutions)

Analysis:

• The business model: The German payment service provider develops payment platforms for digital content and is increasingly using AI for fraud detection and process optimization.

• The USP (unique selling point): net digital is deeply integrated into the infrastructure of telecommunications providers (”carrier billing”). These interfaces are difficult to replicate and provide stable cash flow.

• The bull scenario: The company has significantly raised its forecast for 2025 (revenue ~EUR 34 million, EBITDA ~EUR 3.7 million). The doubling of sales in the first half of the year shows that the economies of scale are now taking effect.

• The risks: dependence on a few major customers in the telecommunications sector. Technological change in the payment sector requires constant investment.

5. GoldMoney ($XAU:CA, $XAUMF | ISIN: CA38149Q1046)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. CAD 126 million

• Current dividend yield: 0% (focus on buybacks)

• Target price (3 years): CAD 30.7 (201% own calculation, strongly correlates with gold price)

Analysis:

• The business model: GoldMoney stores precious metals (gold, silver, platinum) for customers in high-security vaults worldwide and enables trading and payments with them. The company also owns a portfolio of real estate and jewellery brands (Mene).

• The USP (unique selling proposition): One of the few companies that combines physical precious metal custody with modern fintech technology, without the risks of a mining company (no exploration risks).

• The bull scenario: In an environment of geopolitical uncertainty at the end of 2025, investors are fleeing into gold. The stock is technically showing an upward trend. Rising gold prices directly increase assets under management and thus fee income.

• The risks: A falling gold price directly affects the core business. In addition, the conglomerate of jewelry, real estate and crypto is too complex for some investors (”conglomerate discount”).

6. BQE Water ($BQE:CA, $BTQNF | ISIN: CA0556402059

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. CAD 83 million

• Current dividend yield: 0%

• Target price (3 years): CAD 158 (149% own calculation, growth due to increasing environmental regulations)

Analysis:

• The business model: BQE Water purifies mine water in the mining industry. They remove toxic metals (such as selenium) and enable mine operators to comply with strict environmental regulations.

• The USP (unique selling point): Patented technologies (Selenium-IX) that can not only clean, but also recover valuable metals. They often act as a technical partner with long-term service contracts, not just as a plant manufacturer.

• The bull scenario: Q3 2025 showed solid profits ($2.8 million net income). The trend towards “green mining” is irreversible; Mines no longer get an operating license without such water solutions. The recurring revenue model is growing.

• The risks: project delays for mine customers. Since BQE depends on the activity of the mines, a commodity bear market can delay new projects.

7. Warsaw Stock Exchange ($GPW | ISIN: PLGPW0000017)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. PLN 2.67 billion

• Current dividend yield: 5% (Pays reliably)

· Target price (3 years): PLN 192 (203% own calculation, takeover fantasy)

Analysis:

• The business model: GPW operates the largest stock exchange in Central and Eastern Europe. Revenue comes from trading commissions, listing fees, and the sale of market data.

• The USP (unique selling point): monopoly position in Poland and the hub for the entire CEE region. High barriers to entry for competitors due to regulation and network effects.

• The bull scenario: Poland’s economy continues to grow strongly in 2026. The dividend yield of almost 5% is attractive in a falling interest rate environment. New listings from the tech sector are stimulating business. Acquired by Euronext.

• The risks: State influence (Poland holds shares) can lead to political decisions that are not always in the interest of the minority shareholders. Dependence on trading volume.

8. Alphamin Resources ($AFM | ISIN: MU0456S00006)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. CAD 1.5 billion

• Current dividend yield: approx. 13% (variable depending on the tin price)

• Target price (3 years): CAD 2.80 (203% own calculation, tin price)

Analysis:

• The business model: Alphamin operates the Mpama North Mine in the DR Congo, one of the highest-grade tin mines in the world. Tin is essential for solder joints in any electronics.

• The USP (unique selling point): The ore grade is many times higher than that of the competition, which allows for extremely low production costs. Even with falling tin prices, Alphamin remains profitable.

• The bull scenario: In October 2025, the production forecast was raised to 18,000+ tonnes. Q3 EBITDA was a strong USD 96 million. The commissioning of the Mpama South extension is driving volume. Tin is “the oil of technology”.

• The risks: Country risk DR Congo (political instability, logistics). Cluster risk, as only one main asset exists.

9. MTI Wireless Edge ($MWE | ISIN: IL0010958762)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. 38 million GBP

• Current dividend yield: approx. 6.0%

• Target price (3 years): 1.12 GBP (96% own calculation)

Analysis:

• The business model: The Israeli company has three divisions: antennas (military/civilian), water management controllers (Mottech) and distribution systems.

• The USP (unique selling point): The military expertise in antennas secures stable government contracts, while the water division (irrigation control) serves a secular growth trend (climate change/water scarcity).

• The bull scenario: High dividend of 6% makes the stock a basic investment. The defense sector is booming worldwide, which supports the antenna division. The balance sheet is debt-free and cash-strong.

• The risks: Geopolitical situation in Israel. Currency fluctuations (shekel/dollar/pound).

10. Flow Traders ($FLOW | ISIN: BMG3602E1084)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. EUR 1,000 million

• Current dividend yield: 0%

• Target price (3 years): 90 EUR (271% own calculation, hedge against market crash)

Analysis:

• The business model: A Dutch high-frequency trader and market maker specializing in ETPs (Exchange Traded Products). You earn on the spread between the buy and sell price.

• The USP (unique selling point): Flow Traders benefits from volatility. When the markets crash (”fear”), spreads widen and trading volume increases – Flow then earns the most. It is a perfect hedge for the portfolio.

• The bull scenario: As soon as uncertainty (interest rates, politics, war) returns, profits explode.

• The risks: Long phases of low volatility (sideways markets) put massive pressure on margins. Regulation of high-frequency trading.

11. CeoTronics ($CEK | As of DE0005407407)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. EUR 105 million

• Current dividend yield: approx. 1.5%

· Target price (3 years): EUR 25.2 (93% own calculation, upgrade, Rheinmetall Partner)

Analysis:

• The business model: production of audio and video systems for demanding environments (police, military, fire brigade). Headsets, radios, noise protection.

• The USP (unique selling point): Certified supplier for authorities (NATO, Bundeswehr). The products are deeply integrated into the equipment and are not easily replaceable.

• The bull scenario: Record sales in the financial year (€55.8 million) and an order backlog of over €60 million secure capacity utilization well into 2026. The Bundeswehr’s special fund flows directly into orders for CeoTronics.

• The risks: dependence on public tenders. Delays in the award of contracts due to bureaucracy.

12. Electrovaya ($ELVA | ISIN: CA28617B6061)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. USD 326 million

• Current dividend yield: 0%

· Target price (3 years): 10.00 USD (51% own calculation, own battery technology)

Analysis:

• The business model: Development and production of lithium-ion batteries, specializing in heavy-duty applications (forklifts, robots, buses) with its own “Infinity” technology.

• The USP (unique selling point): Focus on durability and safety (ceramic separators). The batteries last longer than those of the competition, which is crucial in 24/7 industrial use.

• The bull scenario: FY 2025 was the first profitable year ($3.3 million net profit) with 43% revenue growth ($63.8 million). The new Gigafactory in Jamestown (USA) is financed by government loans and multiplies capacity for 2026.

• The risks: Execution risk in the construction of the Gigafactory. Strong competition from Asia (CATL, BYD), even if Electrovaya serves niches.

13. Birchtech ($BCHT | ISIN: US59833H1014)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. 80 million USD

• Current dividend yield: 0%

· Target price (3 years): $2.1 (158% own calculation, patents)

Analysis:

• The business model: Formerly “Midwest Energy Emissions”. The company supplies mercury capture technologies in coal-fired power plants and is expanding into water treatment.

• The USP (unique selling point): Patented chemical processes (SEA technology) that help power plants meet strict EPA requirements without disrupting operations.

• The bull scenario: Birchtech receives around US$ 78 million (MCap 80 million) in patent infringement proceedings against large energy companies. The company is debt-free and profitable. Entering the water market diversifies the business away from coal.

• The risks: In the long term, coal is a dying market (”sunset industry”). Success depends on how quickly Birchtech can scale its water business.

14. METALS X ($MLX | ISIN: AU000000MLX7)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. A$944 million

• Current dividend yield: approx. 0% (reinvestment)

• Target price (3 years): AUD 2.13 (99% own calculation, tin price)

Analysis:

• The business model: Australia’s largest tin producer (50% stake in the Renison mine in Tasmania).

• The USP (Unique Selling Point): Renison is one of the few large, long-lived tin mines in a politically stable Tier 1 region (Australia).

• The bull scenario: As with Alphamin, the tin demand for AI hardware and electronics is driving the price. The outlook for 2025 and 2026 is stable. The Company is using the cash flow for exploration to extend the life of the mine.

• The risks: Operational risks in underground mining. Cost inflation in Australia (wages, energy).

15. Kontron ($KTN | ISIN: AT0000A0E9W5)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. EUR 1.4 billion

• Current dividend yield: approx. 3.3%

• Target price (3 years): 29.8 EUR (30% own calculation, IoT fantasy)

Analysis:

• The business model: Austrian IoT (Internet of Things) specialist. Kontron supplies hardware and software for networked machines, trains and medical devices.

• The USP (unique selling point): After the sale of the IT services division, Kontron is a pure IoT player with higher margins. Strong proprietary operating system (KontronOS).

• The bull scenario: The forecast for 2025 (sales approx. EUR 2 billion, EBITDA >EUR 220 million) was confirmed. The order backlog already covers a large part of the turnover for 2026. The stock is considered a valuation bargain in the tech sector.

• The risks: cyclical dependence of industrial customers in the DACH region. Integration risks in smaller acquisitions.

16. Viromed Medical ($VMED | ISIN: DE000A3MQR65)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. EUR 72 million

• Current dividend yield: 0%

• Target price (3 years): 16.7 EUR (328% own calculation, cold plasma technology fantasy, razor-and-blade business model)

Analysis:

• The business model: medical technology with a focus on cold plasma therapy (wound healing) and the sale of medical devices.

• The USP (unique selling point): Cold plasma technology has the potential to revolutionize the treatment of chronic wounds.

• The bull scenario: After the restructuring, Viromed expects a jump in sales to EUR 8-10 million and a slightly positive result for 2025. In 2026, sales of EUR 56 million are to be achieved.

• The risks: Market acceptance of the new plasma devices. The company is still small and has to pre-finance distribution costs.

17. Cyberoo ($CYB | ISIN: IT0005546103)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. EUR 60 million

• Current dividend yield: 0%

• Target price (3 years): 3.3 EUR (132% own calculation, Cybersecurity Ex USA)

Analysis:

• The business model: Italian cybersecurity company specializing in MDR (Managed Detection and Response) for medium-sized companies.

• The USP (unique selling proposition): Provides enterprise-level security for organizations that can’t afford their own Security Operations Center (SOC). 24/7 surveillance.

• The bull scenario: H1 2025 showed stable sales (€10.4 million). Profit suffered from investments in the new AI platform “Keatrix”, which, however, lays the foundation for scaling from 2026. The demand for cybersecurity in SMEs is growing at a double-digit rate.

• The risks: Intense competition from large US players. Shortage of skilled workers in Italy in the IT security sector.

18. U.C.A. ($UCA | ISIN: DE000A12UK57)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. EUR 26 million

• Current dividend yield: approx. 10.5%

• Target price (3 years): 94.6 EUR (126% own calculation, caregiver needs)

Analysis:

• The business model: investment boutique specializing in medium-sized investments (”old economy” meets growth).

• The USP (unique selling point): Experienced management with a nose for undervalued “hidden champions”. The real story lies not in the key figures alone, but in the investments – first and foremost Pflegia GmbH.

• The bull scenario: Pflegia GmbH (57.5% shareholding) – Reverse recruiting platform for nurses grows to become the market leader. The portfolio is performing well, and exits could allow for special dividends.

• The risks: Low transparency in day-to-day business (typical for investment companies). Dependence on German SMEs.

19. Pulse Seismic ($PSD:CA $PLSDF | ISIN: CA74586Q1090)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. CAD 145 million

• Current dividend yield: approx. 10% (incl. special dividends)

• Target price (3 years): CAD 4.60 (109% own calculation)

Analysis:

• The business model: Pulse owns the largest library of 2D and 3D seismic data in Canada. Oil and gas companies license this data for exploration instead of carrying out expensive new measurements.

• The USP (unique selling point): 100% margin on every additional data sale, as the costs (data acquisition) have long since been written off. “Cash Cow” model.

• The bull scenario: YTD 2025 net income of over $21 million CAD. The company distributes almost all of its free cash flow via regular and special dividends. Debt-free.

• The risks: Dependence on the willingness of the oil industry in Western Canada to invest. Long-term energy transition risk.

20. Advanced Metallurgical Group ($AMG | ISIN: NL0000888691)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. EUR 992 million

• Current dividend yield: approx. 1.5%

• Target price (3 years): 53.3 EUR (102% own calculation)

Analysis:

• The business model: producer of critical materials (lithium, vanadium, tantalum) and supplier of high-vacuum furnace systems.

• The USP (unique selling point): diversification into commodities. While lithium weakened in 2025, the strong engineering division and vanadium recycling (from oil refinery waste) are supporting the result. Own lithium refinery in Bitterfeld.

• The bull scenario: As soon as the lithium price turns, it acts as a massive lever, as the infrastructure is in place.

• The risks: volatility of commodity prices. Start-up problems with new refinery projects.

21. Virtu Financial ($VIRT | ISIN: US9282541013)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. $2.9 billion

• Current dividend yield: approx. 2.9%

• Target price (3 years): 65.9 USD (96% own calculation, hedge against market crash)

Analysis:

• The business model: One of the largest electronic market makers in the world. Virtu provides liquidity on global exchanges and profits from every trade.

• The USP (unique selling point): economies of scale and technology. Virtu can trade profitably where others fail. Counterpart to Flow Traders, but more broadly positioned (stocks, crypto, FX).

• The bull scenario: P/E ratio < 7 very low. Q3 2025 exceeded expectations (EPS $1.05). Sales +20%. The aggressive share buyback policy continues to drive up EPS.

• The risks: “Payment for Order Flow” (PFOF) regulatory risks in the USA (SEC). Dependence on market volumes.

22. 5N Plus ($VNP | ISIN: CA33833X1015)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. CAD 1,100 million

• Current dividend yield: 0%

· Target price (3 years): CAD 23.9 (83% own calculation, rare earths, commodities)

Analysis:

• The business model: production of special semiconductors and high-performance materials (bismuth, tellurium) for space solar cells and medical imaging.

• The USP (unique selling point): World market leader in ultra-pure materials for satellite solar panels. The only Western supplier of certain critical minerals (independence from China).

• The bull scenario: Q3 2025 revenue +33%, EBITDA +86%. Annual forecast raised. The boom in the space sector (satellite constellations) fills the order books.

• The risks: complexity of production. Dependence on a few major customers in the space industry.

23. Neo Performance Materials ($NEO:CA $NOPMF | ISIN: CA64046G1063)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. CAD 485 million

• Current dividend yield: approx. 2.5%

· Target price (3 years): CAD 20.8 (31% own calculation, rare earths, commodities)

Analysis:

• The business model: Processing rare earths into magnetic powders and magnets (for electric motors).

• The USP (unique selling point): Neo owns the only commercial separation plant for rare earths in Europe (Estonia). Strategically extremely valuable for the European automotive industry.

• The bull scenario: EBITDA guidance for 2025 raised to $64-68 million. The new magnet factory in Estonia is nearing completion and will start delivering sales in 2026.

• The risks: Price volatility for rare earths (NdPr). China dominates the market and can dictate prices.

24. Cyviz ($CYVIZ | IS: NO0010015175)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. NOK 490 million

• Current dividend yield: 0%

· Target price (3 years): NOK 91.1 (154% own calculation, rare earths, raw materials)

Analysis:

• The business model: high-end technology for control rooms and conference rooms. Customers are Microsoft, Accenture and the US Department of Defense.

• The USP (unique selling point): Standardized, IT-based platform instead of “tinkering solutions”. Enables global management of hundreds of rooms remotely.

• The bull scenario: Strong order intake in Q3 2025 (NOK 242 million). The backlog is growing. The decline in revenue in Q3 was timing-related; the pipeline for 2026 is full, driven by defense orders.

• The risks: “Lumpiness” – Revenue fluctuates strongly between quarters as it depends on major projects. Liquidity of the stock is low.

25. Majestic Gold ($MJS:CA $MJGCF | ISIN: CA5609121077)

Key financial data:

• Market capitalization: approx. USD 114 million

• Current dividend yield: 7.3%

· Target price (3 years): $0.28 (157% own calculation, gold).

Analysis:

• The business model: Canadian gold producer that operates the Songjiagou gold mine in China.

• The USP (unique selling point): Extremely low valuation (P/E ratio often below 6). Negative EV/enterprise value due to cash > market capitalization. High dividend yield. The mine is a bulk tonnage operation with stable costs.

• The bull scenario: The company is highly profitable. If the market reduces the “China discount”, a revaluation is due.

• The risks: Geopolitical risk (Canadian company with an asset in China). Difficulties in repatriating profits from China (dividend flow to holding).

During the year, the system constantly checks whether there are currently better stocks on the market. The “bottom performer” at that time is then replaced by the new value.

No bells are rung on the stock exchange to exit. (-‿-)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Disclaimer / Exclusion of liability

All content is for information purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities or other financial market instruments. Naturally, I endeavor to present the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief, but they may still be partially or completely incorrect.

I therefore accept no liability whatsoever for investment decisions that you make on the basis of the information presented here.

Conflict of interest: At the time of publication, the author of this publication holds shares/securities in the stocks/companies discussed here and intends to sell them depending on the market situation and could benefit in particular from increased trading liquidity. This represents a concrete and clear conflict of interest.

Campine is one of my top 25 stocks I hold. I expect Campine to release a financial year 2025 earnings announcement later this month or early next month. Will the stock probably exceed or fall short of expectations/forecasts in the 2nd half of 2025? I want to be prepared!

Campine is in a historic exceptional year. After an explosive first half of the year, the question for investors is: Can the pace be maintained in the second half of the year (H2 2025), or do we see a normalization at a high level? The share has corrected from the all-time high in October (€ 285) to around € 200, signalling a reassessment of expectations.

1. Conclusion & Assessment

Probability: Slightly exceed forecast (outperform vs. guidance)

The management has set the bar for the full year 2025 conservatively (”EBITDA > € 80 million”). Since € 53.4 million was already achieved in the first half of the year, this implies “only” >€ 26.6 million for H2.

In view of the still extremely high antimony prices, this hurdle is low. I expect Campine to beat this conservative forecast but flatten the momentum from H1 2025.

The market is currently playing the “peak earnings” scenario, which explains the recent price decline. Fundamentally, however, the company remains massively undervalued (P/E < 8) as long as the antimony shortage continues.

Scenario model (result H2 2025):

Key drivers (positive/negative):

• Positive (+): Security of supply: Campine benefits massively from Chinese export restrictions, as they can demand a premium as a “non-Chinese” supplier with their own recycling quota.

• Risk (-): Normalization: The massive jump in profits in H1 was partly driven by inventory appreciation effects (cheap inventory sold at high prices). This one-off effect is not repeated to the same extent in H2.

2. Focus on key figures

For the second half of the year (H2 2025), the following values are crucial to support the valuation:

• Revenue H2: Expectation in the range of € 160 – 180 million (decline vs. H1 possible due to lower volumes).

• EBITDA H2: Must be > €27 million to meet full-year guidance of €80 million.

• Margin: Monitoring of the gross profit margin – can Campine continue to pass on the high purchase prices for antimony ores in full?

3. Consensus Forecast (Implicit)

• Full year 2025: The market firmly expects EBITDA of over €80 million.

• H2 implication: Investors know that H2 will be weaker than H1 operationally (typical seasonality + base effects). A “crash” in profits is not expected, but a normalization is.

• Share price: The market is currently pricing in that 2025 is a “year of the century” that cannot be repeated in 2026 (hence the low P/E ratio).

4. Comparison of the previous quarter (H1 2025 - Sequential)

• Status: H1 was the absolute record (”peak”).

• H1 ‘25 figures : Revenue €384 million, EBITDA €53.4 million.

• Analysis: H2 will be weaker in direct comparison to H1. This is normal, as H1 was driven by a wave of panic buying by customers who have now stocked up. The H2 vs. H1 comparison is therefore likely to be negative (”decline”), but this should already be priced into the price.

5. Comparison of the same period of the previous year (H2 2024 - Year-over-Year)

• Status: Strong growth expected.

• H2 ‘24 figures: EBITDA was approx. €22 million (full year 2024 was €41.7 million, H1 was €19.7 million).

• Expectation: Compared to the previous year, Campine will also grow significantly in H2 2025 (+20% to +40% in EBITDA is realistic). So the “growth” is YoY intact, only the dynamics slow down.

6. Development of antimony prices (the key factor)

The price development is the dominant factor for Campine shares:

• Status quo: Antimony continues to trade at historic highs (in some cases > $35,000/t), driven by the deficit on the world market.

• China factor: China’s export restrictions (since the end of 2024/2025) on antimony are drastically reducing supply in the West. This gives Campine pricing power.

• Trend H2 2025: The price curve shows stabilization at a high level (”plateau”) in Q3/Q4. There are no signs of a crash, but the upside potential seems to have been exhausted in the short term.

• Impact: Campine earns excellently, but the “windfall profit” (inventories that increase in value) is lower than in H1.

7. Development of input costs

• Raw materials: The purchase of antimony ores and raw metal has become extremely expensive. Campine has to tie up a lot of working capital to secure material. Although this depresses free cash flow in the short term, it is strategically necessary.

• Recycling advantage: Campine’s big advantage (”moat”) is the Circular Metals division. Since they obtain part of the antimony from recycling (e.g. lead-acid batteries), they are less dependent on the extreme world market prices for primary raw materials than pure traders. This protects the margin in H2.

Deep Dive: Evaluation & Peer Group Comparison

How much “air” is in the current price of approx. 200 € still available? To answer this, we compare Campine with direct competitors in the metal recycling and specialty chemicals sectors.

The central insight first: Campine is trading at a massive discount. While big players are often valued at 8 to 10 times their operating profit (EBITDA), Campine is currently priced as if business will collapse tomorrow.

The valuation check (key figures 2025e)

Note: EV/EBITDA (enterprise value to operating profit) is the more important metric here, as it takes into account debt and cash on hand. A value below 5 is considered a “bargain” in the recycling sector.

Why is Campine so “cheap”? (The discount)

The market is currently granting Campine a “small-cap & cyclical discount” of approx. 30-40% compared to the peer group. There are two reasons for this:

1. Fear of the “one-hit wonder”: Investors fear that the profit of 2025 (EBITDA > €80 million) will be a one-off peak, driven by the antimony panic. The market is pricing the stock as if profits would be halved in 2026.

2. Illiquidity: With a market capitalization of only ~€300 million and low trading volume, large funds can’t just get in and out. This structurally depresses the valuation.

The “buffer” (safety margin)

How low can the antimony price or profit fall before the stock becomes “expensive”?

• “Normalization” scenario: Even if EBITDA were to fall from the expected €85 million (2025) to €50 million in 2026 (a decline of -40%!), Campine would still be valued at an EV/EBITDA of 6.8x with a current enterprise value of approx. €340 million .

• Conclusion: This corresponds pretty much exactly to the fair average of the competition (see table).

This means that at the current price of €200, it is already priced in that profits will collapse massively. However, if antimony prices remain “higher for longer” (keyword: structural deficit due to China), Campine builds up massive cash reserves, which must either be distributed as a special dividend or used for acquisitions (M&A).

Strategic assessment:

For value investors, the current level (P/E ratio < 7) is highly attractive, as the downside risk is cushioned by the substantial valuation (book value is rising rapidly). The risk is not the valuation, but only the antimony price chart.

What do you think about the stock?

At Yellobrick ☛

https://www.joinyellowbrick.com/?authorName=ppinvest

the performance of my stock ideas is tracked independently of me. At the moment, it looks like this.

“Speculative investments are like a tennis match: the decisive factor is to concentrate fully on the next ace instead of being annoyed by the last double fault.” A. Gerstenberger

Disclaimer:

This text was partly created with AI applications.

All content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities or other financial market instruments. Of course, I try to present the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief, but they can still be false in whole or in part.

Therefore, I do not accept any liability for investment decisions that you make on the basis of the information presented here.

Conflict of interest: At the time of publication, the author of this publication holds shares/securities of the securities/companies discussed here and intends to sell them depending on the market situation and could benefit in particular from increased trading liquidity. As a result, there is a concrete and clear conflict of interest.