A federal judge in Idaho has issued a major ruling over the reach of state abortion restrictions after Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, resolving a challenge brought by a maternal-fetal medicine specialist who said Idaho’s laws prevented him from treating patients facing some of the most dangerous and medically complex pregnancies. The 81-page decision examines abortion through a framework that could carry implications well beyond Idaho in defining the constitutional boundaries left after the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade.

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Most attention surrounding the One Big Beautiful Bill Act focused on its policy changes. But one provision quietly set the stage for a major constitutional dispute over the National Firearms Act. A new federal court ruling is the first to address the implications of that change.

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For more than three years, Florida's law restricting minors from attending certain adult live performances has been effectively frozen. A federal judge blocked it before it could be enforced statewide, and many assumed the law was likely headed for the Supreme Court as a major First Amendment showdown. The case had its most significant development yet on Tuesday when the full bench of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit handed down its ruling.

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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, has issued one of the most significant Second Amendment decisions since the Supreme Court's landmark rulings in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi.

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The Supreme Court on Monday delivered a major constitutional defeat to President Donald Trump, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees citizenship to children born in the United States even when their parents are in the country unlawfully or only temporarily.

Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for a five-Justice majority joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Amy Coney Barrett, and Ketanji Brown Jackson. The Court held that children born in the United States to parents unlawfully or temporarily present are “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States and therefore citizens at birth.

The decision is the Court’s first major interpretation of the Citizenship Clause in more than a century and preserves the longstanding understanding of birthright citizenship established in United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898).

The Case

On his first day back in office, President Trump signed Executive Order 14160, declaring that children born in the United States would no longer automatically receive citizenship if their mother was unlawfully present in the country, or present only temporarily, and the father was neither a U.S. citizen nor a lawful permanent resident.

Several families challenged the order, arguing that it violated both the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which contains nearly identical language governing citizenship at birth. A federal district court certified a nationwide class of affected children and blocked enforcement of the order, prompting the Supreme Court to grant review before the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had ruled.

The Majority Opinion

Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause guarantees citizenship to nearly everyone born on U.S. soil, including children born to parents who are in the country unlawfully or only temporarily.

The Court framed the dispute as a question of constitutional text informed by history. It focused on the Citizenship Clause, which provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens.” The central issue, Roberts wrote, was the meaning of the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.”

The majority concluded that the Clause incorporated the longstanding common-law principle of jus soli—citizenship based on birth within the sovereign’s territory. According to the Court, that principle was well established before the Fourteenth Amendment, was reflected in the debates surrounding its ratification, and was ultimately confirmed by the Supreme Court’s 1898 decision in United States v. Wong Kim Ark.

Against that historical backdrop, the Court rejected the government’s argument that a child born in the United States must also satisfy additional requirements based on the immigration status, domicile, or allegiance of the child’s parents. Roberts emphasized that the Citizenship Clause imposes only two requirements: birth in the United States and being “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States. In the majority’s view, children born to parents who are unlawfully or temporarily present are subject to U.S. law in the ordinary sense and therefore satisfy the constitutional standard.

The Court acknowledged that the Citizenship Clause has recognized exceptions, but described them as “narrow and discrete.” Those exceptions include children born to foreign diplomats, children born to enemy forces occupying U.S. territory, and, at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, children born to members of sovereign tribal nations who were not fully subject to the United States’ political authority. The majority concluded that children of undocumented immigrants or temporary visitors do not fall within any of those historically recognized exceptions.

Applying that understanding, the Court held that Executive Order 14160 conflicts with the Constitution because it would deny citizenship to categories of children protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority, therefore, affirmed the preliminary injunction that blocked President Trump’s Executive Order while litigation continues.

Justice Kavanaugh: The Executive Order Is Unlawful, But Not Unconstitutional

Justice Brett Kavanaugh concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, agreeing that President Trump’s Executive Order cannot take effect but disagreeing with the majority’s decision to resolve the case on constitutional grounds. Instead, Kavanaugh concluded that the dispute should have been decided under the Immigration and Nationality Act, which provides that “a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” is a citizen at birth.

Kavanaugh reasoned that the statutory question was sufficient to resolve the case because the Executive Order conflicted with Congress’s existing citizenship law. Applying the principle of constitutional avoidance, he argued that courts ordinarily should not decide constitutional questions when a case can be resolved on narrower statutory grounds. In his view, because the statute independently foreclosed the Executive Order, the Court should have left the constitutional question for another day.

Although Kavanaugh agreed that the current statute grants citizenship to the children covered by the Executive Order, he disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the Constitution itself permanently fixes that rule. Looking to the history of the Citizenship Clause, he argued that Congress has long possessed authority to define and refine the scope of birthright citizenship through legislation, particularly when addressing circumstances unforeseen by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Kavanaugh rejected both parties’ categorical positions. He agreed with the government that the Constitution does not require citizenship for every child born on U.S. soil, regardless of circumstance, but also rejected the government’s assertion that the Executive Order could supersede Congress’s existing statute. Instead, he proposed that Congress may enact additional exceptions to birthright citizenship if they are sufficiently analogous to the historically recognized exceptions reflected in the Citizenship Clause and United States v. Wong Kim Ark.

Applying that framework, Kavanaugh concluded that Congress, not the President, must decide whether to create any new exceptions. Because Congress has not amended the citizenship statute to exclude children born to parents who are unlawfully or temporarily present in the United States, he agreed that the Executive Order is unlawful. But unlike the majority, his opinion leaves open the possibility that Congress could constitutionally enact such legislation in the future.

The Dissents

The dissenting Justices rejected nearly every premise underlying the majority’s historical analysis. They disputed the majority’s conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized the English common-law rule of jus soli, arguing instead that the Citizenship Clause adopted a distinctly American understanding of citizenship centered on allegiance and membership in the national political community. The dissenters also contended that the majority gave insufficient weight to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which granted citizenship to those “not subject to any foreign power,” and to statements by the Amendment’s framers describing “subject to the jurisdiction” as requiring complete political allegiance rather than mere subjection to U.S. law. Finally, they argued that United States v. Wong Kim Ark did not compel the majority’s result, maintaining that the decision was limited to the child of lawfully domiciled parents and did not resolve the citizenship status of children born to temporary visitors or those unlawfully present in the United States.

Justice Thomas, joined by Gorsuch, advanced a domicile rule. For Thomas, the Citizenship Clause protects children born in the United States whose parents are domiciled here—those who have made the United States their home. Children of lawful temporary visitors, including birth tourists, are not citizens because their parents are not domiciled here. As to undocumented parents, Thomas would reserve whether some may be domiciled here, but said the order was at least valid as applied to some non-domiciled parents, so the facial challenge should fail.

Gorsuch wrote separately to sharpen that point. He agreed with Thomas that citizenship turns not on whether the parents are citizens, but whether they, and by law their child, have made the United States their permanent home. He emphasized that temporary visitors do not qualify, but expressed doubt about denying citizenship to children born to parents who have lived here long-term and made the country their home despite violating immigration law.

Justice Alito’s dissent proposed a different rule: exclusive allegiance. For Alito, the Fourteenth Amendment confers citizenship only on children who, at birth, owe allegiance solely to the United States and are not “subject to any foreign power.” That would exclude many children born to foreign nationals if those children automatically acquire foreign nationality and legal duties through their parents’ country. He argued the executive order was at least valid as applied to children of birth tourists and to children who become nationals of foreign countries at birth, defeating the facial challenge.

Settled Law—For Now

The immediate consequence of the decision is straightforward: President Trump’s Executive Order cannot take effect.

Its longer-term significance, however, is considerably broader.

The Court did not merely hold that the Executive Branch lacks authority to redefine citizenship. Nor did it simply interpret the Immigration and Nationality Act. Instead, five Justices concluded that the Constitution itself answers the question.

That distinction matters enormously. Because the majority rooted birthright citizenship directly in the Fourteenth Amendment, future Congresses cannot simply enact legislation implementing the policy advanced by the Executive Order. Absent a constitutional amendment or a future Supreme Court willing to revisit today’s decision, the principle announced in Trump v. Barbara now stands alongside United States v. Wong Kim Ark as a foundational interpretation of the Citizenship Clause.

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The Supreme Court issued two landmark separation-of-powers decisions that will reshape the relationship between the President and independent federal agencies for decades to come.

In Trump v. Slaughter, the Court overruled Humphrey's Executor v. United States, a 1935 decision that had long permitted Congress to protect Federal Trade Commission commissioners from removal except for cause. Minutes later, however, in Trump v. Cook, the Court refused to allow President Donald Trump to remove Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook while litigation continues, concluding that the Federal Reserve's unique history and statutory structure distinguish it from ordinary executive agencies.

Taken together, the opinions significantly strengthen the constitutional theory of the unitary executive while simultaneously preserving what may be the federal government's most important independent institution.

The End of Humphrey’s Executor

The Court’s most consequential ruling came in Trump v. Slaughter.

In a 6-3 decision authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held that the Federal Trade Commission’s statutory protection allowing commissioners to be removed only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” violates the Constitution’s separation of powers.

The Court expressly overruled Humphrey’s Executor, which had upheld those protections for more than ninety years.

The case arose after President Trump dismissed Democratic Commissioners Rebecca Slaughter and Álvaro Bedoya shortly after beginning his second term. Rather than asserting one of the statutory grounds for removal, the President informed them that their continued service was inconsistent with his administration’s priorities and that he was acting pursuant to his constitutional authority under Article II. Slaughter sued, and the district court ordered her reinstated under the Supreme Court’s 1935 precedent.

The Supreme Court reversed.

Writing for the majority, Roberts returned to first principles. Article II, he explained, vests “[t]he executive Power” in a single President, who must “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” That constitutional structure, the Court concluded, necessarily requires that those exercising executive authority remain accountable to the President—and therefore removable by him. The opinion relies extensively on the Founding, the First Congress’s “Decision of 1789,” Alexander Hamilton’s writings in The Federalist, and the Court’s 1926 decision in Myers v. United States.

Why the Court Overruled Humphrey’s

The majority concluded that Humphrey’s Executor had become impossible to reconcile with modern constitutional doctrine.

The 1935 Court had reasoned that the FTC primarily exercised “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” powers rather than executive authority. Roberts rejected that characterization, noting that today’s FTC promulgates binding regulations, investigates violations of federal law, conducts enforcement proceedings, and brings lawsuits in federal court—functions the Court described as “the very essence” of executing the laws.

The Court further concluded that stare decisis did not justify retaining Humphrey’s Executor. Roberts described the decision as one that had become increasingly incompatible with subsequent cases such as Free Enterprise Fund and Seila Law, both of which emphasized presidential supervision over executive officials. Whatever reliance interests existed, the majority concluded, they could not overcome the Constitution’s structural commitment to democratic accountability.

Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a concurrence.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson, dissented, arguing that the majority unnecessarily discarded nearly a century of settled constitutional law governing independent agencies.

What the Decision Means

The immediate consequence is clear: the President now possesses substantially greater authority over agencies that exercise executive power.

Although the case involved the FTC, its reasoning will likely generate new litigation involving other multimember commissions with removal protections, including the National Labor Relations Board, Federal Election Commission, Consumer Product Safety Commission, and numerous other agencies created on the model approved in Humphrey’s Executor.

Just as notable, however, is what the Court did not decide.

Rather than announcing that the President has removal authority over every independent agency, Roberts specifically acknowledged that some institutions may fall outside today’s holding. Among those, the opinion pointed to the Federal Reserve, referencing earlier language in Seila Law suggesting that the central bank may represent a historically distinct institution.

Only minutes later, the Court confronted exactly that question.

Why the Federal Reserve is Different

In Trump v. Cook, President Trump sought to remove Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook after accusing her of misconduct relating to mortgage disclosures.

Unlike Slaughter, however, the Court refused to permit the removal to take effect while litigation proceeds.

Chief Justice Roberts again wrote for the Court, this time joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. The Court denied the administration’s emergency application, concluding that it had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.

The majority began with a lengthy examination of the history of American central banking. Looking to the Bank of North America, the First Bank of the United States, and the Second Bank of the United States, Roberts concluded that the United States has long maintained institutions deliberately insulated from ordinary political control in order to preserve confidence in the nation’s monetary system. According to the Court, the modern Federal Reserve follows directly in that historical tradition.

That history, the Court concluded, matters constitutionally. Unlike agencies such as the FTC, whose officials exercise ordinary executive power, the Federal Reserve occupies what the majority described as a “special arrangement sanctioned by history.” Its independence from day-to-day presidential supervision is not an historical anomaly but a feature of the constitutional tradition that stretches back to the Founding. The Court therefore held that the Federal Reserve’s statutory protection against at-will removal is consistent with the Constitution. In doing so, it transformed what had been dicta in Seila Law into a constitutional holding.

Having concluded that the Federal Reserve’s structure is constitutionally permissible, the Court turned to the President’s attempt to remove Cook.

The majority rejected the administration’s argument that the President possesses essentially unreviewable discretion to determine whether “cause” exists for removal. Instead, Roberts held that courts retain authority to determine whether the statutory standard has been satisfied and emphasized that “cause” must be interpreted in light of the Federal Reserve’s unique institutional role. Allowing presidents to remove governors based on minor or pretextual allegations, the Court explained, would undermine both the reality and appearance of the independence Congress sought to preserve.

The Court also held that the administration was unlikely to succeed because Cook was denied the procedural protections required before a for-cause removal could become effective. At minimum, Roberts wrote, she was entitled to notice of the allegations against her, disclosure sufficient to permit a meaningful response, an opportunity to respond before a final decision was made, and judicial review of the sufficiency of the asserted cause. Because those protections were not provided, the Court left the district court’s injunction in place while the litigation proceeds.

Reading the Two Cases Together

Viewed together, Slaughter and Cook establish a new constitutional framework for presidential removal power.

The Court has now made clear that agencies exercising ordinary executive authority cannot generally be insulated from presidential control merely because Congress labels them “independent.” The constitutional default is presidential supervision.

But the Court simultaneously recognized that not every governmental institution fits comfortably within that framework. The Federal Reserve’s unique history, institutional design, and longstanding role in safeguarding monetary policy distinguish it from agencies like the FTC.

Whether that exception extends to any other institution remains an open question.

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The Supreme Court on Thursday handed the Trump administration a major victory on immigration, ruling that federal courts generally cannot review the Department of Homeland Security's decisions to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for foreign countries and concluding that challengers to Haiti's TPS termination are unlikely to succeed on their constitutional discrimination claim.

In a fractured decision, the Court reversed lower court rulings that had blocked the administration from ending TPS protections for Syria and Haiti while litigation continued. Justice Samuel Alito announced the judgment of the Court. Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh joined the opinion in full, while Justices Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett joined all but one section. Justice Thomas filed a separate concurrence. Justice Elena Kagan dissented, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson.

What is Temporary Protected Status?

Congress created Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in 1990 to allow nationals of designated countries to remain in the United States temporarily when conditions such as war, natural disasters, or other extraordinary circumstances make a safe return impossible. TPS recipients are protected from removal and may receive authorization to work in the United States.

Although intended to be temporary, many TPS designations have remained in place for decades. Somalia has been covered since 1991, while several other countries have maintained TPS for more than 25 years.

After returning to office, President Donald Trump directed his administration to ensure that TPS designations remain limited in duration and comply strictly with the statute. According to the Court, the administration has terminated every TPS designation that has come up for review during the second Trump administration.

The Syria and Haiti Lawsuits

The two cases arose from separate decisions by then-Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem to terminate TPS for Syria and Haiti.

The Syria designation had existed since 2012 because of the country’s civil war and humanitarian crisis. Although the Secretary acknowledged that serious violence and humanitarian concerns remained, she concluded that conditions had improved sufficiently following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government to require termination under the statute. Syrian TPS recipients sued, arguing that the decision violated the Administrative Procedure Act because the Secretary allegedly failed to follow required procedures and acted arbitrarily. A federal district court and the Second Circuit allowed those challenges to proceed and blocked the termination while litigation continued.

Haiti had received TPS after the devastating 2010 earthquake. In terminating Haiti’s designation, the Secretary acknowledged continuing gang violence and instability but concluded that parts of the country were suitable for return and that continued TPS conflicted with U.S. national interests. Haitian TPS recipients challenged both the administrative process and alleged that the decision was motivated by racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court agreed they were likely to succeed and blocked the termination, a decision the D.C. Circuit largely left in place pending appeal.

The Court's central holding

The Court’s most consequential holding concerns the scope of judicial review.

A provision of the TPS statute states that there is “no judicial review” of any determination by the Secretary regarding the designation, extension, or termination of TPS for a foreign country. The lower courts concluded that this language did not prevent courts from reviewing procedural challenges, such as whether the Secretary adequately consulted other federal agencies or properly explained the decision.

The Supreme Court rejected that interpretation.

Justice Alito wrote that the statutory language is “clear” and “very broad.” The Court held that the word “determination” encompasses both the Secretary’s final decision and the process leading to that decision. As a result, procedural Administrative Procedures Act (APA) challenges are barred just as much as substantive ones. The Court also emphasized Congress’s use of the phrase “with respect to,” which it said broadly extends the judicial review bar to matters related to TPS termination decisions.

The Court rejected several arguments advanced by the challengers, including the claim that courts may still review procedural defects even if they cannot review the ultimate decision itself. It reasoned that allowing such lawsuits would enable litigants to circumvent Congress’s decision to shield these determinations from judicial review simply by reframing their claims.

That holding significantly narrows the role federal courts can play in future challenges to TPS terminations.

The constitutional claim survives—but likely fails

The Court reached a different conclusion regarding the Haitian plaintiffs’ constitutional claim.

Unlike statutory APA claims, constitutional claims are not barred by the TPS judicial review provision. The Court therefore considered whether the challengers had shown they were likely to succeed on their argument that Haiti’s TPS designation was terminated because of racial animus.

A plurality of the Court held they had not.

Justice Alito acknowledged statements made by President Trump and former Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem but concluded that none of the cited remarks were overtly racial and that each could reasonably be understood as reflecting immigration policy rather than racial discrimination.

Perhaps the opinion’s most notable passage described the challengers’ own litigation theory as undermining their constitutional claim. Justice Alito wrote that the plaintiffs themselves offered a race-neutral explanation for the administration’s actions: namely, that the administration opposes the modern implementation of the TPS program generally and has terminated every TPS designation presented for review.

That broader policy, Alito concluded, substantially weakens any inference that Haiti was singled out because of race.

Accordingly, the plurality held that the Haitian plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their equal protection claim and therefore were not entitled to preliminary relief.

An important note, however, is that Justices Gorsuch and Barrett did not join this section of Alito’s opinion, so it does not have the precedential effect that a majority-backed opinion would.

The Dissent

Justice Elena Kagan, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson, argued that the majority read the TPS statute’s jurisdiction-stripping provision far too broadly. In the dissent’s view, Congress barred judicial review only of the Secretary’s ultimate decision to designate or terminate Temporary Protected Status, not whether the Secretary complied with the procedures that Congress required before making that decision.

Kagan contended that courts have long distinguished between reviewing the substance of an agency’s discretionary judgment and ensuring that the agency followed the law in reaching that judgment. She warned that the majority’s interpretation effectively insulates the Executive Branch from judicial oversight even when challengers allege that the Secretary ignored mandatory statutory procedures or failed to conduct the required decision-making process.

The dissent also would have allowed the Haitian plaintiffs’ equal protection claim to proceed. Kagan concluded that the record contained sufficient evidence to warrant maintaining the preliminary injunction while the litigation continued, arguing that the lower courts should be permitted to fully examine the allegations of discriminatory intent before the TPS terminations take effect.

The decision represents one of the Supreme Court's most significant immigration rulings of the Term and one of the biggest wins for the Trump administration in their effort to expand immigration enforcement nationwide.

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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has allowed the Trump administration to immediately resume its nationwide expansion of expedited removal, ruling that the policy is unlikely to violate the Constitution's Due Process Clause and vacating a nationwide stay issued by a federal district court.

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The Supreme Court on Thursday handed down a significant Second Amendment decision, ruling that the federal government cannot constitutionally prosecute a Texas man for possessing a firearm based solely on his regular marijuana use.

Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote for the Court, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Sonia Sotomayor, Brett Kavanaugh, Amy Coney Barrett, and Ketanji Brown Jackson. Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice Elena Kagan, concurred only in the judgment.

The ruling is another major chapter in the Supreme Court’s ongoing effort to define the scope of gun regulations under its landmark decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller, New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, and United States v. Rahimi.

Importantly, the Court did not strike down the federal statute itself. Instead, the justices concluded that the government failed to demonstrate a historical tradition of disarming people like Hemani—an otherwise law-abiding citizen whose firearm possession was challenged solely because of his marijuana use.

How the Case Reached the Supreme Court

The case began in 2022 when federal agents searched Hemani’s family home in Texas while investigating possible terrorism-related activity.

According to the Court, Hemani cooperated with investigators throughout the search. He surrendered a firearm kept in the home, pointed agents to marijuana on the property, and later told law enforcement officers that he used marijuana about every other day.

But the investigation never resulted in terrorism-related charges.

Instead, more than six months later, federal prosecutors brought a single charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which prohibits firearm possession by anyone who is an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance.

The government did not allege that Hemani had committed any violent crime. It did not claim he had used his firearm unlawfully. Nor did it argue that he was addicted to drugs or posed a danger to himself or others.

Rather, prosecutors relied solely on his admitted marijuana use.

Hemani challenged the charge, arguing that applying the statute to him violated the Second Amendment. Lower courts agreed, setting up the Supreme Court showdown.

The Court’s Analysis

Under the framework established in Bruen, courts evaluating gun regulations must determine whether the challenged restriction is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

The government argued that historical laws targeting so-called “habitual drunkards” provided a sufficient analogue. Those laws, the government contended, demonstrated a longstanding tradition of restricting the liberties of individuals who regularly consumed intoxicating substances.

The Court was unpersuaded.

Writing for the majority, Gorsuch explained that historical laws aimed at habitual drunkards generally targeted people whose alcohol use rendered them incapable of managing their affairs, mentally incompetent, or dangerous to themselves or others.

By contrast, the federal law as interpreted by the government automatically disarms anyone who regularly uses any controlled substance unlawfully, regardless of the amount consumed, the effects of the drug, or whether the person poses any threat.

The majority stressed that historical laws did not typically sweep so broadly.

The Court also found significant differences in purpose. Many of the historical laws cited by the government were designed to prevent financial ruin, encourage productive labor, or protect habitual drunkards and their families. They were not primarily aimed at disarming people deemed categorically dangerous.

In addition, the majority noted that historical restrictions often required some form of judicial process before an individual’s liberties could be curtailed. Section 922(g)(3), by contrast, operates automatically, stripping firearm rights based solely on a person’s status as an unlawful drug user.

Taken together, the Court concluded, the government’s historical analogies failed.

A Narrow Decision

The majority repeatedly emphasized that its ruling was limited.

The Court did not decide whether Congress may prohibit firearm possession by drug addicts. It did not address laws preventing intoxicated individuals from carrying firearms. It also left open the possibility that Congress could enact more tailored regulations aimed at people whose drug use demonstrably makes them dangerous.

Likewise, the decision does not affect the federal prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons.

Instead, the ruling addresses only the government’s attempt to prosecute Hemani based solely on his regular marijuana use without any individualized showing that he posed a danger to himself or others.

The Separate Opinions

While seven justices agreed that the government could not prosecute Hemani under the facts of this case, several members of the Court wrote separately to emphasize different aspects of the decision.

Justice Clarence Thomas, whose opinions laid much of the groundwork for the Court’s modern Second Amendment doctrine, authored a separate concurrence. Although he joined the majority in full, Thomas argued that the historical evidence against the government’s position was even stronger than the Court suggested and emphasized that constitutional rights cannot be restricted based on broad assumptions about entire categories of people.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, also joined the Court’s opinion in full. But her concurrence criticized the Court’s Bruen framework itself. Jackson wrote that she continues to believe the Court “veered off course” when it replaced means-end scrutiny with a history-and-tradition test for Second Amendment cases. In her view, courts are better equipped to ask familiar questions about how serious the burden on gun rights is, how important the government’s interest is, and whether the law is properly tailored to that interest.

Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice Elena Kagan, concurred only in the judgment. While agreeing that Hemani’s prosecution could not stand, Alito declined to join the majority’s broader analysis. His opinion suggested that the government’s arguments in this case were too sweeping and that the historical record did not support the specific application of the law to Hemani. At the same time, Alito signaled that he remains open to upholding firearm restrictions on drug users in future cases supported by a stronger factual record or more tailored legal theory.

Together, the separate opinions underscore the narrow but important nature of the decision. The justices agreed that this prosecution could not stand. But they remained divided over the proper method for deciding Second Amendment cases and over the broader constitutional foundations of federal gun regulation.

A federal judge has blocked Idaho’s new restroom-access law, ruling that transgender plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that key provisions of the statute violate the Constitution’s Due Process Clause.

In a 30-page decision issued Tuesday, U.S. District Judge Amanda K. Brailsford granted a preliminary injunction preventing Idaho from enforcing House Bill 752 against a statewide class of transgender individuals while the litigation proceeds.

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The Supreme Court on Monday added three new cases to its merits docket for the October 2026 Term, agreeing to hear disputes involving immigration detention, federal habeas corpus, and the scope of the Sixth Amendment jury-trial right.

The grants came as part of an order list that also included notable denials in cases brought by former Trump campaign adviser Carter Page and Federal Circuit Judge Pauline Newman, as well as a solo dissent from Justice Samuel Alito in a student-speech case.

Court To Revisit Six-Person Juries

The most significant grant may be Kian v. Florida, where the Court agreed to decide whether the Sixth Amendment guarantees a 12-person jury in serious felony cases. The petition asks the justices to overrule Williams v. Florida, a 1970 decision holding that six-person juries satisfy the Constitution in noncapital criminal prosecutions.

The petitioner argues that the Court’s later Sixth Amendment decisions, particularly Ramos v. Louisiana, are inconsistent with Williams and support a return to the historical understanding of a jury as consisting of twelve members.

A ruling for the petitioner could have substantial consequences for states like Florida that continue to use six-person juries in felony cases.

Immigration Detention Case Granted

The Court also granted review in Genalo v. Black, a case involving prolonged immigration detention.

The dispute concerns whether noncitizens detained under a mandatory-detention provision of federal immigration law are constitutionally entitled to a bond hearing after extended periods of confinement and, if so, what procedures due process requires. The justices additionally directed the parties to brief whether one respondent’s claim has become moot, signaling that jurisdictional issues may play a role in the case.

The Supreme Court now has an opportunity to provide much-needed clarity on a question that has divided federal courts across the country as they grapple with the constitutional limits of mandatory immigration detention amid the Trump administration’s ongoing enforcement efforts.

Justices Take Up Habeas Dispute

In Guerrero v. Johnson, the Supreme Court agreed to decide a procedural question governing when prisoners may file a second or successive federal habeas petition based on a new rule of constitutional law.

Federal courts have taken different approaches to applying the relevant statutory requirements, creating uncertainty about when prisoners can rely on newly announced constitutional rules in seeking additional federal review.

Although the issue is technical, the Court's decision could have significant consequences for prisoners seeking to challenge their convictions or sentences through successive federal habeas petitions.

Court Declines Carter Page Appeal

The justices declined to hear an appeal brought by former Trump campaign adviser Carter Page arising from the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane investigation.

Page argued that claims challenging allegedly unlawful FISA surveillance should not begin running for statute-of-limitations purposes until the government reveals the surveillance and the facts necessary to challenge it.

Lower courts rejected that argument and concluded that Page had sufficient notice of his claims years earlier.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson did not participate in the case, citing her prior judicial service.

Pauline Newman Petition Denied

The Court also denied review in a closely-watched challenge brought by Judge Pauline Newman, the 98-year-old Federal Circuit judge who has been barred from receiving new case assignments during an ongoing judicial misconduct and disability proceeding.

Newman argued that federal courts should be able to review actions taken by judicial councils that effectively remove a judge from active service without impeachment.

The denial leaves lower-court rulings against Newman intact and allows the restrictions on her participation in new cases to continue.

Alito Dissents Alone

Justice Samuel Alito disagreed with the Court’s refusal to hear a First Amendment challenge involving a Students for Life club whose school blocked flyers featuring students holding “Defund Planned Parenthood” signs.

Alito argued that the Court should clarify when schools may treat student expression as school-sponsored speech and therefore subject it to greater regulation under existing precedent.

He pointed to what he described as conflicting lines of Supreme Court precedent governing student speech, and said lower courts have struggled to determine whether some student expression should be analyzed as private speech entitled to robust First Amendment protection or as school-sponsored speech that educators may regulate.

According to Alito, some schools have relied on the more deferential school-sponsored speech framework to justify restricting student expression that would otherwise receive greater constitutional protection, creating uncertainty that he said warrants the Court's review.

No other justice joined the dissent.

Looking Ahead

The Court will hear argument in the granted cases during its next Term, which begins in October, with decisions expected by the end of June 2027.

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A federal judge has blocked Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton from continuing a lawsuit against Democratic fundraising platform ActBlue, concluding that the organization is likely to prove the case was filed not to protect consumers, but to retaliate against political activity protected by the F…

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A former Twitter employee accused of secretly providing information about Saudi dissidents to a senior Saudi government official won a unanimous Supreme Court victory Thursday after the justices ruled that federal prosecutors brought one of the charges against him in the wrong court.

The case stems from allegations that Ahmad Abouammo accepted approximately $300,000 from a Saudi official in exchange for confidential information about Twitter users critical of the Saudi government. During a later FBI interview at his Seattle home, prosecutors alleged that Abouammo created a fake invoice and emailed it to investigators in an effort to support his explanation for the payments. That allegation ultimately led to a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1519, a federal law that prohibits falsifying documents with the intent to obstruct a federal investigation.

Although the alleged falsification occurred in Seattle, federal prosecutors brought the charge in the Northern District of California because the FBI agents conducting the investigation were based in San Francisco.

Abouammo argued that this venue was improper. The Constitution generally requires criminal defendants to be tried where their alleged crimes were committed, and he contended that any prosecution for falsifying the invoice had to occur in Washington state.

Lower courts disagreed. The Ninth Circuit concluded that because the statute requires proof that a defendant intended to obstruct a federal investigation, prosecutors could also bring the case where that investigation was located. Under that reasoning, San Francisco was a proper venue because the FBI investigation was being conducted there.

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Elena Kagan rejected that approach.

The Court explained that venue ordinarily depends on the conduct that constitutes the crime itself. Under § 1519, the prohibited conduct is falsifying a document. Once a person falsifies a document with the required intent, the offense is complete.

That meant prosecutors could not rely on the location of the FBI investigation to establish venue. While the statute requires proof that a defendant acted with intent to obstruct an investigation, it does not require that any actual obstruction occur. The effects of the alleged conduct, therefore, are not part of the crime’s conduct elements and cannot determine venue.

The justices likewise found no basis for treating the statute as a type of inchoate obstruction offense. Section 1519, the Court explained, creates a standalone crime rather than a preliminary step toward another offense. The venue must then be tied to the conduct prohibited by the statute itself.

The Court’s opinion was one of three decisions released Thursday. Several major cases involving executive power, election law, immigration, and constitutional rights remain pending as the Court enters the final weeks of its Term.

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The Florida Supreme Court on Wednesday declined to immediately intervene in a challenge to the state’s newly enacted congressional map, allowing the case to proceed through the ordinary appellate process even as key election deadlines draw closer.

The lawsuit challenges Florida's 2026 congressional districts under the state's Fair Districts Amendment, a voter-approved constitutional provision designed to curb partisan and discriminatory gerrymandering.

The dispute reached the state's highest court after a trial judge refused to issue a temporary injunction blocking the map last month. The challengers appealed that decision to Florida's First District Court of Appeal and asked the appellate court to fast-track the case directly to the Florida Supreme Court. When the First District declined that request, the challengers then turned to the Supreme Court itself, asking the court to invoke its extraordinary "all writs" authority and step in immediately rather than wait for the normal appellate process to unfold.

In a brief order, the Court declined to do so. The majority emphasized that the Supreme Court does not possess broad authority to intervene in ongoing litigation simply because doing so might be efficient or desirable. Instead, the justices said their jurisdiction is defined and limited by the Florida Constitution, and they cannot assume they will ultimately have authority to review the case once the current appeal is resolved.

Justice Adam Tanenbaum wrote separately to explain why he believed both the Supreme Court and the First District Court of Appeal acted appropriately. He said the appeal now before the First District is limited to whether the trial judge “abused his discretion” in denying a temporary injunction, not whether Florida's congressional map ultimately complies with the state Constitution. Because temporary injunction rulings are preliminary, Tanenbaum argued that it remains unclear whether the appellate court's eventual decision will provide a basis for Florida Supreme Court review, making extraordinary intervention inappropriate at this stage.

Tanenbaum also rejected arguments that the First District should have immediately certified the case to the Supreme Court under Florida's "pass-through" jurisdiction. District courts, he wrote, are designed to serve as courts of final appellate review in most cases and are not required to transfer high-profile disputes simply because they draw public attention. He added that the plaintiffs have not yet received a ruling on the merits of their constitutional claims and suggested that litigants sometimes use preliminary injunction proceedings to seek expedited appellate review instead of first obtaining a final judgment in the trial court.

Justice Jorge Labarga dissented, arguing that the Court was too quick to conclude that it lacked jurisdiction to act. Because every claim in the lawsuit arises under Florida's Fair Districts Amendment, he said it is highly likely that the dispute will eventually return to the Supreme Court. Given that reality, Labarga questioned whether the justices should have declined to intervene now rather than address the issues sooner.

He also criticized the First District Court of Appeal for refusing to certify the case directly to the Supreme Court and for declining to expedite review. With candidate qualifying for Florida's 2026 congressional elections set to begin June 12, Labarga argued that a challenge affecting the representation of millions of Floridians warrants the fastest possible judicial consideration. He pointed to criticism that the Supreme Court directed at the First District during earlier congressional redistricting litigation and suggested that similar concerns may be resurfacing.

The Court’s ruling does not address the ultimate question of whether Florida’s congressional map is constitutional. Instead, it leaves the challenge to proceed through the First District Court of Appeal and, ultimately, through further proceedings in the trial court on the merits. The Supreme Court also left open the possibility of later involvement if a future ruling creates a basis for its jurisdiction.

For now, however, Florida’s 2026 congressional map remains in effect.

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As the Supreme Court enters the final weeks of its Term, the justices have yet to rule on several high-profile cases involving presidential power, birthright citizenship, election law, gun rights, immigration, and digital privacy.

Several of those cases have the potential to reshape longstanding constitutional doctrines and alter the balance of power among the branches of government.

Here’s what you need to know.

Executive Power and the Administrative State

Two of the Court’s most significant cases ask a fundamental question: how much control should the President have over federal agencies?

The leading case is Trump v. Slaughter, which stems from President Trump's removal of Rebecca Kelly Slaughter from the Federal Trade Commission. The administration argues that limits on the President’s ability to remove FTC commissioners violate the Constitution’s separation of powers, while Slaughter argues that nearly a century of Supreme Court precedent permits Congress to provide such protections. The case is widely expected to determine the fate of Humphrey's Executor, the Court's 1935 decision upholding limits on a president's removal authority.

The Court is considering a similar question in Trump v. Cook, which involves President Trump's attempt to remove Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook. Unlike the FTC, however, the Federal Reserve occupies a unique role in the nation's economy. As a result, this case could reveal whether the justices view the Federal Reserve as constitutionally distinct from other independent agencies even if they expand presidential removal power elsewhere.

Citizenship and Immigration

Among the most closely watched cases of the Term is Trump v. Barbara, which concerns the scope of birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court is reviewing President Trump's executive order that denies automatic citizenship to certain children born to noncitizen parents.

The challengers argue that the order conflicts with the Citizenship Clause and longstanding Supreme Court precedent recognizing birthright citizenship. The administration argues that the Citizenship Clause does not guarantee citizenship to children born to parents who are unlawfully or temporarily present in the United States because such children are not fully “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States.

Another challenge to the Trump administration’s immigration policies concerns Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitian and Syrian nationals. Mullin v. Doe asks whether the administration may end TPS, a program that allows people from countries affected by war, disaster, or other extraordinary conditions to live and work legally in the United States for a limited period.

The administration argues that decisions about TPS are largely committed to executive discretion and should receive limited judicial review. The challengers argue that the government failed to follow the legal requirements for ending the program.

Mail Voting and Campaign Finance

Two election-related cases could affect how federal campaigns are run and how ballots are counted.

Watson v. Republican National Committee concerns when a mail ballot must be received in order to be counted in a federal election. The challenge targets a Mississippi law that accepts absentee ballots postmarked by Election Day if they reach election officials within five business days.

The Republican National Committee argues that federal law requires ballots to be received by Election Day itself. Mississippi contends that voters meet the legal deadline when they cast their ballots by Election Day, even if delivery takes longer. A decision for the RNC could force several states to change how they handle late-arriving mail ballots in future federal elections.

National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission asks whether federal limits on coordinated spending by political parties violate the First Amendment. The NRSC argues that political parties should be able to coordinate more freely with their own candidates when spending campaign funds.

Supporters of the limits argue that coordinated spending restrictions help prevent donors from using political parties to get around contribution limits to candidates.

Transgender Athletes in Women’s Sports

The Court is also considering a pair of cases, Little v. Hecox and West Virginia v. B.P.J., which challenge state laws that limit participation on girls' and women's sports teams to biological females.

The challengers argue that under the Equal Protection Clause, excluding transgender girls is unlawful discrimination. The states argue that sex-based athletic classifications help ensure fair competition and preserve opportunities for female athletes. B.P.J. also raises a question about Title IX, the federal law that prohibits sex discrimination in schools.

The Second Amendment

The Court continues to confront major questions about the scope of the Second Amendment following its recent decisions expanding gun rights.

Federal law generally prohibits firearm possession by people who are unlawful users of controlled substances. In United States v. Hemani, the justices will decide whether this restriction violates the Second Amendment as applied to Hemani.

Hemani argues that the government cannot point to a sufficient historical tradition of disarming drug users to justify the restriction, while the government argues that legislatures have long possessed the authority to disarm individuals who pose a danger to themselves or others.

Wolford v. Lopez involves a challenge to a Hawaii law that generally prohibits licensed gun owners from carrying firearms on private property that is open to the public unless the property owner gives permission.

Gun-rights advocates argue that the law makes it far more difficult to exercise the right to carry a firearm in public, but Hawaii argues that the law protects private-property rights and public safety.

Fourth Amendment and Digital Privacy

Chatrie v. United States arises from a bank robbery investigation in which police obtained a “geofence warrant” requiring Google to identify devices that were located near the crime scene during a specific period of time. Investigators then used that information to narrow their investigation and ultimately identify a suspect.

Chatrie argues that geofence warrants amount to unconstitutional digital dragnets that can sweep in location data from large numbers of innocent people. The government argues that the warrants are a valuable investigative tool and can be tailored to protect privacy while helping solve crimes.

The Court’s decision could determine the constitutional limits on law enforcement’s ability to obtain location data from technology companies and shape the future of digital privacy in the smartphone era.

Looking Ahead

The Supreme Court still has 23 argued cases awaiting decisions before the end of the Term. While this article focuses on several of the most closely watched disputes, every remaining case carries consequences for the parties involved and for broader areas of federal law.

Traditionally, the Court aims to resolve all argued cases before rising for its summer recess at the end of June, meaning the pace of decisions is likely to accelerate in the weeks ahead. The Court has already indicated that it may release rulings on Thursday, June 11, and additional opinion days are expected to follow as the justices work through the remainder of the docket.

For continuing coverage of every decision, order, and major development, subscribe below and follow SCOTUS Wire on X.

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