Perhaps you’ve heard of . They are an Irish-based think-tank who have found themselves in the limelight recently - whether that be for the right or the wrong reasons depends on who you ask1.

Earlier this year, they posted this article:

Progress Ireland

Speculators are a red herring

Read enough about housing and you will hear about the speculator…

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8 months ago · 9 likes · 12 comments · Sean O Neill Mcpartlin

In it, Seán O’Neill McPartlin assesses whether “speculation” is a dominant factor in Ireland’s housing shortage.

His conclusion? It is not.

For the most part, O’Neill McPartlin makes his assertion by refuting the observations of Henry George - author of a famous treatise on the persistence of poverty alongside economic prosperity, attributing it predominantly to the rent-seeking behaviour that arises from private property ownership2.

Although O’Neill McPartlin narrows the focus of George’s observations for the article3, as he is largely seeking to refute George it is easy for the reader to come away with the impression that the supply of land and a property’s location are not particularly important factors determining the cost of housing.

Something about this impression - even if only implied - didn’t sit right with me. So, as O’Neill McPartlin set out to test whether speculation is a dominant factor in Ireland’s housing shortage, I am going to put some of his own observations about land and location to the test.

The value of a site

One of the core claims that O’Neill McPartlin makes in his article is that the cost of land as a proportion of the total cost of delivering a new dwelling has been decreasing, and is now relatively small - the corollary being that the cost of constructing the dwelling itself has increased.

To make this case, he cites two reports by the Society of Chartered Surveyors Ireland (SCSI)4 - one from 2023 and the other from 2025 - and a paper by the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI)5, concluding that land accounts for 10-25% of the cost of delivering of a new dwelling, be that a house or an apartment.

Contrast these figures with those of the Celtic Tiger era when, he claims, the cost of land was about half the cost of the development of a new property.

Notwithstanding methodological discrepancies with the SCSI reports6, I’m not going to argue about the cost of construction here. It has increased dramatically, particularly from 2019 to 2023, and is at an all time high according to the Central Statistics Office’s Capital Goods Price Index for Building and Construction.

Remember that O’Neill McPartlin is only discussing the delivery of new dwellings here though. That has important implications.

First of all, as these are the real costs incurred during actual developments around the country, the price of land as part of delivery is already mechanically low.

What do I mean by that?

You see, a developer has little to no control over many of the costs in delivering a home - they are taken as a given7. Where there is wriggle room is the cost of land and the developers margins. If the price of land goes down, the developers margin can increase. Conversely, if the price of land goes up, the developers margin decreases.

Assuming developers want to maintain a profit margin of approximately 10-15%, they are only going to be able to afford to develop on land priced at a value that allows them to maintain this profit margin and deliver a property that isn’t too expensive to sell on the market. Thus, the price of land represented in the SCSI reports is mechanically low. It doesn’t take into account developments that didn’t happen because the price of land was too high.

Secondly, as we’ve said, O’Neill McPartlin is only discussing new housing. An incredibly important and growing market. However, the vast majority of residential property sales in Ireland are existing properties.

To truly examine the impact of land and location on property values, we need to look beyond the market for newly built residential units.

To understand the contribution of land to the average value of a dwelling in Ireland, we can break a dwelling’s price into two components: the value of the capital - think the actual structure of the house - and the value of the site8.

When we do this, we see some very interesting patterns emerge.

The first is that, for the average residential property, the value of the site is a major component of a property’s price. In fact, it is often the primary determinant of the average property’s value.

The second is that, site value in Ireland has, historically, been far more volatile than the value of the property’s capital. As a result, changes in site value tend to drive changes in property values - the exceptions here being 2008, 2013 and 2022.

I think both of these observations make intuitive sense.

Imagine yourself as the buyer of a house. Of course you’re paying for the structure - you want something comfortable to live in after all. But a huge emphasis in your decision-making is on location.

You’ve identified your dream house, but the price is just too high. In fact, property prices in general are simply unaffordable. A crash ensues. Prices begin to decline. Within the space of a couple of years, your astronomically expensive dream house has halved in price. But the structure is more or less the same, aside for some wear and tear. In other words, the capital value of the property is relatively similar. So what has absorbed most of change in the property’s market value? The value of the site.

Now, that isn’t to say that the capital value of the average Irish property isn’t important either. In fact, in my own figures we see that it is.

Let’s take the initially slow but hastening rise in the capital value of the average property from 2010 onwards. There are likely two compounding factors for this.

The first is that, as newer dwellings are added to the pool of residential properties and older properties are depreciated or demolished, the “average” property comes increasingly to represent these newer dwellings.

Newer properties in Ireland are typically built to higher standards than their predecessors. The result of this is that newer houses literally contain more “capital”.

Triple-glazed windows, insulation, heat pumps and solar panels - all of these things make a house more valuable. They also make it more costly to deliver.

To reiterate, this is where I agree with O’Neill McPartlin. Construction costs have increased, arising from both inflation and higher building standards. That makes delivering new homes more expensive. But it doesn’t mean that the value of a site isn’t important - especially when we consider the entire residential market.

It’s also worth remembering that construction cost inflation has stabilised since 2024. True, we live in a world where construction costs are higher, but with more predictable hard costs, perhaps site value will again begin to dominate increases in property values9. In fact, as we can see above, in 2024 it already did.

A nation, dissected

O’Neill McPartlin also claims that neither residential nor agriculural land prices are rising. In both instances, the truth is more complex.

We can that changes in the median price of residentially zoned land have differed dramatically by region over the last 7 years. Prices in Dublin and the Mid-West are down when compared to 2018. But over the same period, prices in the West, South-West, Midlands and along the Border have skyrocketed.

Agriculturally zoned land has risen in price across the country in the last decade or so. True, the increases are not on the scale experienced during the 1970’s or Celtic Tiger - as O’Neill McPartlin points out - but a doubling in the cost of agricultural land in Dublin over a decade or so is hardly unremarkable.

Given the idea that construction costs are inhibiting the supply of residential property, it is also worth considering examining how construction costs have changed alongside the price of land.

As we have noted, the price of residential land in Dublin and the Mid-West is down on 2018. But the price of residential land in other areas - such as the South-West, and West - has grown far faster than the cost of construction. It is also clear that the price of residentially zoned land is far more volatile than the cost of construction.

The price of agricultural land outside of Dublin has grown in a relatively similar manner to the cost of construction. Interestingly though, the price of agricultural land in Dublin has grown much faster than the rest of the country - and the cost of construction. Of course, there is less agricultural land in Dublin, thus more competition. However, the spikiness we see in agricultural land prices in Dublin indicates to me that the market for agricultural land there isn’t just for farming…

Looking at the data behind these graphs, something else becomes obvious too - perhaps the most convincing evidence that location influences the value of a site.

Notwithstanding faster growth rates in other parts of the country, land in and around Dublin remains far more expensive.

It’s not that there’s something about the land in Dublin that makes it fundamentally more suitable to housing development than Tipperary. It’s just that the demand for land in Dublin is much higher - more people want to live there.

This is actually evident in the costs of development cited by O’Neill McPartlin too. Land has the second largest percentage deviation in cost between the least expensive (North-West) and most expensive (Greater Dublin Area) regions to build housing.

Rising Rents

An even more dramatic picture emerges when we examine rents - an area O’Neill McPartlin didn’t include in his article. However, rent-seeking behaviour is the core of Henry George’s thesis and is critical in understanding the role that location plays in housing.

In short: the closer you get to the Dublin, the more expensive the rent - a function of both location and income inequality. At the end of 2025, the average rent in Dublin was about 55% higher than outside Dublin.

This, to me, is clear evidence of the importance of land and location in the housing equation.

When we adjust nominal rents for changes in weekly earnings, we see evidence of George’s theory - that increases in earnings are absorbed by increases in rent.

In plain English: in 2008, the average rent was about 34% of gross monthly earnings. In 2025, that figure was 43%.

Properties withheld from their intended use

Moving away from prices, O’Neill McPartlin makes some claims about vacancy. Specifically, that vacancy levels in Dublin are ‘unusually low’ both compared to the rest of Ireland and other cities such as London, New York and Paris.

In effect, his thesis is as follows: areas with high demand, such as Dublin city, have lower levels of vacancy than areas with lower demand.

To understand the issue with O’Neill McPartlin’s claims here, we need to begin by examining the data he is using to substantiate his claims. Specifically he is using long-term vacancy data based on electricity consumption provided by the ESB. For a property to be considered vacant, it must have consumed less than 180kWh of electricity in each of at least four consecutive quarters10

A fantastic article by fellow Substacker highlights how this definition differs from how vacancy is defined in the Census:

HomeTruths

The Census Wasn’t Wrong. We Changed the Question.

The first two posts in this series were about figures that were embraced. The Housing Commission’s deficit and the SCSI’s cost of delivery are both built on assumption and estimates — headship rates Ireland has never produced, a survey of preferences, a developer margin struck as a flat percentage, component costs that swing threefold for no physical re…

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3 months ago · 5 likes · 8 comments · HomeTruths

For now though, let me simplify.

The vacancy rate based on ESB metered electricity consumption is an excellent measure of long-term vacancy - properties with no one residing in them most, if not all, of the time. However, the CSO includes properties that are for sale, under renovation or available for rent within its definition of vacancy11. This produces quite a large discrepancy - for the Dublin area alone, a difference of about 20,000 properties around the time of the 2022 Census.

The issue here is that O’Neill McPartlin makes his claims about Dublin having ‘unusually low’ levels of vacancy using a figure that pertains only to long-term vacancy. The figures for two of the three international cities used for comparison - Paris and New York - represent total vacancy, akin to the Census definition. Quite literally comparing apples and oranges.

Also, when O’Neill McPartlin says that ‘some level of vacancy is not just expected, but is desirable’ because vacant properties are what allow people to move, he is correct. However, he is using the wrong figures to substantiate how large that pool of properties is - the long-term vacancy figures do not represent the number of properties available for sale and rent.

Which vacancy figures should we trust then? It depends on the question we are trying to answer.

As I’ve said, for long term vacancy the ESB metered electricity consumption data is excellent. What about for determining the number of properties available for sale and rent on the market? In that instance, we might be better off going straight to the source and using the sale and rental reports compiled by Daft.ie. So what use are the Census vacancy figures?

Well, if we combine all three figures, something very interesting emerges. The discrepancy between the long-term vacancy figures indicates that there should have been up to 20,000 properties available to buy or rent in Dublin around the time of the 2022 Census.

But we know that wasn’t the case.

Figures from Daft.ie indicate that there were about 2,700 properties available for sale and 462 properties available to rent in Dublin around the time of the 2022 census - a total of 3,162. Where are the other 17,527 properties that the Census designated as vacant?

According to HomeTruths, these are most likely empty properties waiting to capitalise on rising prices without the friction of tenancies, landlords leaving a property vacant so they can re-let it at market rent under the Rent Pressure Zone legislation and, finally, short-term lets.

So it isn’t that these properties are being “withheld” from use in the strict sense that O’Neill McPartlin - and Henry George himself - likely defined it. So, I might be so bold as to adjust George’s definition to “withheld from intended use” - housing people. After all, AirBnB wasn’t around in the 19th century.

I think George would probably agree with me though when I say that short-term lets vastly outnumbering properties available to buy and rent during a time of rising homelessness is somewhat of a market - if not a societal - failure.

Towards the end of his article, O’Neill McPartlin quotes a Matt Yglesias article. The same article also includes the following quote: ‘unearthing a huge cache of unused homes in in-demand areas would have the same effect [reduce house price inflation and improve living standards]. Of course, we are very unlikely to find such a cache’12. It turns out there might just be such a cache, in Dublin anyways, hidden in plain sight.

Now that we understand the different definitions, let us come to the claim that areas with high demand have lower levels of vacancy than areas with lower demand.

If that were true, then we would expect to see lower levels of vacancy the closer we get to a city’s centre.

For Dublin, that certainly isn’t the case. In fact, some areas in Dublin City have amongst the highest vacancy rates in the country as measured by the Census, rising up to 20% of properties.

As HomeTruths points out, it is unlikely to be a coincidence that the highest vacancy rates are in exactly the same areas in which you’d expect to find the highest demand for short-term lets - the inner city, Ballsbridge, surrounding Croke Park and the 3 Arena, and along the beautiful and well-connected coast of Dún-Laoighaire..

Interestingly though, a similar but less extreme pattern emerges even if you use the long-term vacancy data as measured by metered electricity consumption. O’Neill McPartlin should have noticed that.

Of course, there are areas around the country with higher vacancy rates according to the Census - Ballybay (Urban) in Monaghan the highest at about 40%. But the fact that Dublin City Centre has areas with vacancy rates higher than parts of the rural North-West of the country is strong evidence against the assumption that areas with higher demand have lower levels of vacancy - especially when incentives make housing people the less profitable choice.

Land and location do matter

Dear Seán,

I hope, if you’re reading this, you don’t take it is as some sort of “gotcha” piece - rather, a contribution from someone similarly concerned with Ireland’s progress.

I think I have put forward a pretty compelling case that land and location do matter to the cost of housing, both directly - through the value of a site - and indirectly - through whether properties are utilised for their intended use.

To reiterate: I didn’t write this article because you said otherwise, per se. I also don’t disagree with you about the fact that construction costs are rising. On the contrary, in fact. I agree.

Instead, the reason I wrote this article was my perception of the overall impression of your piece. The aftertaste, as it were - that land and location were not particularly important.

I think a reader could be forgiven for thinking so too. Your article points one away from site value and towards construction costs.

In contrast, I think there is plenty of evidence to support how important a factor land and location are in the cost of housing. There is evidence in the regional variability of prices in delivering a new house. There is evidence in the proportion and volatility of a site’s value for the average Irish dwelling. There is evidence in the regional variability of the cost of residentially and agriculturally zoned land. There is evidence in rents. And finally, there is evidence in how properties are used for purposes other than their intended use, where incentives to do so are their strongest.

I hope this article helps contribute to an even more informed discussion on housing in Ireland, and to the work of Progress Ireland.

Warm regards,

Shane

References

Burns, J. (2026). ‘There were reports that the collisons gave us a million quid. I can tell you, it definitely wasn’t that’. [online] Irish independent. Available at: https://www.independent.ie/business/irish-business/there-were-reports-that-the-collisons-gave-us-a-million-quid.-i-can-tell-you-it-definitely-wasnt-that/a/156689874.html [Accessed 24 July 2026].

Central Statistics Office (CSO) (2022). Census 2022 and Vacant Dwellings FAQ. [online] Central Statistics Office (CSO). Available at: https://www.cso.ie/en/census/census2022/census2022andvacantdwellingsfaq/ [Accessed 28 July 2026].

Central Statistics Office (CSO) (2026). Residential Vacancy Based on Metered Electricity Consumption 2024. [online] Central Statistics Office (CSO). Available at: https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/fp/fp-rvmec/residentialvacancybasedonmeteredelectricityconsumption2024/ [Accessed 28 July 2026].

Flaherty, E., Gurdgiev, C., Lyons, R., Ó Siochrú, E. and Pike, J. (2022). Submission to the Commission on Taxation and Welfare on Introducing a Site Value Tax. [online] arXiv.org. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.12611 [Accessed 29 July 2026].

George, H. (1879). Progress and poverty. S.L.: Dover Pubns.

Government of Ireland (2011). S.I. No. 259/2011 - Building Regulations (Part L Amendment) Regulations 2011. [online] Irish Statute Book. Available at: https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2011/si/259/made/en/print [Accessed 29 July 2026].

HomeTruths (2026a). CSO - The Central Signal Office. [online] Substack. Available at: https://hometruths.housingsupply.ie/p/cso-the-central-signal-office?utm_source=profile&utm_medium=reader2 [Accessed 28 July 2026].

HomeTruths (2026b). Questions are the new answers. [online] Substack. Available at: https://hometruths.housingsupply.ie/p/questions-are-the-new-answers [Accessed 28 July 2026].

Lyons, R. (2026). Irish Rental Report Q3 2020. [online] Daft.ie. Available at: https://ww1.daft.ie/report?d_rd=1 [Accessed 28 July 2026].

McQuinn, K. (2024). Residential land prices for the Irish property market: An initial examination (ESRI Working Paper No. 778). [online] Available at: https://www.esri.ie/system/files/publications/wp778_0.pdf [Accessed 24 July 2026].

O’Neill McPartlin, S. (2026). Speculators are a red herring. [online] Substack. Available at: https://progressireland.substack.com/p/speculators-are-a-red-herring [Accessed 24 July 2026].

Society of Chartered Surveyors Ireland (2023). The Real Cost of New Housing Delivery 2023. [online] Available at: https://scsi.ie/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/scsi-real-cost-of-new-housing-delivery-2023-report.pdf [Accessed 24 July 2026].

Society of Chartered Surveyors Ireland (2025). The Real Costs of New Apartment Delivery 2025. [online] Available at: https://scsi.ie/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/scsi_realcostofnewapartmentdelivery2025_final.pdf [Accessed 24 July 2026].

Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland (SEAI) (2019). Nearly Zero Energy Building Standard. [online] Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland. Available at: https://www.seai.ie/plan-your-energy-journey/for-your-business/standards/nearly-zero-energy-building-standard [Accessed 29 July 2026].

VideoParliament Ireland (2026). Paul murphy: Exposes “shed sits” and corporate capture. Available at:

[online]. Youtube. [Accessed 24 July 2026].

Yglesias, M. (2022). Housing policy lessons from the microchip shortage. [online] Slowboring.com. Available at: https://www.slowboring.com/p/housing-policy-lessons-from-the-microchip [Accessed 28 July 2026].

If you’ve seen any of my notes recently, you may have noticed that I’ve been discussing wealth inequality quite a bit. For example, here’s a graph I posted about the distribution of net wealth in Ireland.

The data for this graph comes from latest iteration of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), which is carried out across the EU using a (relatively1) harmonised methodology.

In Ireland, the Central Statistics Office (CSO) carry out the survey. It is the survey on wealth and wealth inequality, carried out by the state body for statistics. All very official and rubber stamped then.

The only problem? It’s wrong.

Knowing your limits

You see, the HFCS is a survey - and surveys have limitations.

The first - and probably the most obvious to anyone who stops to think about it - is the under-reporting of wealth, be that accidentally or deliberately.

Suppose someone called to your door and asked you what assets you owned (this, by the way, is quite literally what happens). Sure, you could whip out your phone and look at your bank balance. But the value of your house? You know what you bought it for, but that was a long time ago. The value of your pension? Haven’t got a clue mate. The holiday house you own in Spain? Maybe we’ll keep that one to ourselves…

None of this is a surprise to the CSO. In fact, they specifically call it out.

There may be under-reporting of the value of some real or financial asset, deliberate or otherwise. Households found it particularly difficult to provide the value of certain assets such as self-employment business wealth. Therefore, the value of such assets is subject to high degrees of estimation.2

[Emphasis added by author]

The next limitation of a survey on wealth is to do with sampling. To understand it, let’s do a quick thought experiment: how likely is it that the wealthiest in Ireland will be asked about their finances as part of the HFCS?

Well, there are 11 billionaires in Ireland3 and about 1.8 million households4. That means there is a effectively a 0% chance that the CSO will ever knock on the doors of the disproportionately wealthy as part of the HFCS. That’s assuming they would cooperate even if they answered5.

This matters because the distribution of wealth is highly skewed6. Survey methodologies are simply going to miss the small number of people who own vast amounts of wealth.

Again, the CSO are well aware of this:

A key challenge in all countries that conduct the HFCS is that wealth distribution is highly skewed. A small proportion of households have substantial asset holdings, and these households may be insufficiently represented in the survey, either because they are not easily accessible or because they refuse to participate. For this reason, this report focuses mostly on indicators (such as medians) that are not affected by an insufficient coverage of the wealthiest households.7

[Emphasis added by author]

And in fairness to the CSO, they make an attempt to rectify this shortcoming using a technique called “oversampling”. In other words, the CSO try their best to ensure that the sample for the HFCS contains more high-wealth households than a random sample would contain8. The final CSO sample for HFCS 2023 was broken down as follows:

This process gave us a sampling distribution for the entire sample of 69% of all selected households in the bottom 80% of households (as measured by the affluence/deprivation index), and 31% of the sample for the top 20% of households as measured by the deprivation/affluence index.9

[Emphasis added by author]

A valiant effort, and probably the best that can be done using a survey technique10. However, with an overall response rate of only 35.3% and evidence that as wealth increases participation in wealth surveys decreases, the HFCS likely provides only a very blurry picture of wealth distribution in Ireland.

The missing rich

The problem being faced here is colloquially referred to as the “missing rich”.

Vermeulen (2014) was the first to write about this issue in relation to the HFCS. His solution to the problem was to merge data from the from the HFCS with “rich list” data11 and then “fill in” - or impute - the missing households in the distribution.

A very elegant and practical solution, and the one applied in the construction of the European Central Bank’s Distributional Wealth Accounts (DWA). Acknowledging the shortcomings of the HFCS, the DWA attempts to correct primarily for the issues outlined above: under-reporting and the missing rich.

Sounds good in theory, but once you dig into the detail of the DWA methodology there are some eyebrow raisers.

The first is related to the under-reporting of wealth. The DWA attempt to bridge the gap between the total amount of wealth reported in the HFCS and the total amount of wealth reported by the ECB as part of the Quarterly Sectoral Accounts (QSA) (think of the latter as national financial accounts based on macroeconomic data).

To do this the ECB effectively upscale - or “gross-up”, to use their own terminology - everyone’s wealth so that the total amount of wealth for each type of asset equates to what is reported in the QSA.

The way this is done has a critical assumption baked in. For a given asset, the amount each individual owns is scaled up by a constant proportion across the entire distribution of wealth12. In other words, they assume that the least wealthy and the most wealthy under-report their wealth to the same degree. This is an assumption of convenience for modelling, but it seems a shaky one13.

Next are the issues of how the QSA totals are chosen, and the distribution of the underlying asset being adjusted.

First, let’s look at the QSA totals for different asset classes. In the Irish case, there are 3 adjustments made to the QSA target values - the wealth totals for housing, debt securities & investment fund shares and non-financial business wealth.

The total for housing is provided by the Central Bank of Ireland, which constructs an estimate of housing wealth from housing stock and house price index figures provided by the Central Statistics Office. A relatively sound estimate that makes sense to compare to the HFCS total for housing wealth as it is independently calculated.

However, the totals for debt securities & investment fund shares and non-financial business wealth are estimated using the imputation method we discussed above for the missing rich. This is because, as noted in the DWA methodological note, there is an ‘absence of custodians’ in Ireland - i.e. financial institutions - who report independently to regulators on who is holding what financial assets14.

To simplify: the total wealth figure for these asset types in the DWA is extrapolated from their respective HFCS totals. This isn’t an independent benchmark - they are arrived at from the same HFCS figures they are being compared to.

This has significant implications for the transformation of the distribution of wealth. First, recall that the HFCS total for each asset class is transformed based on the ratio between the HFCS and QSA totals.

The ratio between the HFCS and Central Bank housing wealth totals is likely to be larger than the ratio between the HFCS and DWA totals for debt securities & investment fund shares and non-financial business wealth. This is because, in the case of the former, the Central Banks estimate of housing wealth is calculated independently, whereas in the latter instance, the DWA totals are simply derivations of the underlying HFCS totals merged with rich list observations. Therefore, the ratio between the two is likely to be smaller relative to the difference in housing wealth estimates, purely as a function of how it is calculated.

This is important because of how assets are distributed. Housing is the largest source of wealth for most households in Ireland, and is much more broadly distributed than financial assets. It is only for the least wealthy 30% and the wealthiest 10% that financial assets begin to approach the proportion of wealth held in housing.

Due to this and the fact that the “gross-up” is applied uniformly across the wealth distribution, the “middle to upper-middle class” - ranging from the 4th decile to the 9th - receive a significant bump in wealth relative to that received by both the least wealthy 30% and wealthiest 10% in the DWA.

Using some measures, this can give the impression that wealth is more equally distributed in the DWA than the HFCS. However, as we have seen, this is as much an artifact of the adjustments made in the DWA as it is reflective of the actual distribution of wealth. And, just as the CSO before them are aware of the limitations of the HFCS, the European Central Bank are aware of this too:

Because of the proportional adjustment, the Gini coefficient15 therefore remains stable at the instrument level, but not necessarily at higher aggregation levels. This means that inequality measures for total assets, total liabilities and total net wealth may change due to the proportional allocation, though not for each individual instrument16

[Emphasis added by author]

Finally, we come to the rich lists, critical because they are used both as observations themselves and to impute the other missing rich, as we have discussed. It’s easy to think of these as “facts” - exact representations of the wealthiest few. Yet, the reality is that the rich list used as part of the DWA is itself a survey17. So, all the methodological limitations we discussed earlier in relation to the HFCS apply here too.

And in the Irish case, once the HFCS is adjusted to include the missing rich the dataset is considered complete. The ECB do not consider that an adjustment needs to be made to the wealth of those on the rich list themselves, for example.

Whilst it might simplify modelling, I am unconvinced that this assumption reflects reality. Consider, for example, that Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman (2019) found that the likelihood of having hidden off-shore wealth increases dramatically amongst the wealthiest 1% and that, when taking into account this off-shore wealth, the concentration of wealth amongst the wealthiest 0.1% and 0.01% increases significantly. Albeit this study was conducted in Norway and Sweden, I see no reason why the same might not be found in Ireland.

Household wealth or individual wealth?

So far we’ve discussed the HFCS and the DWA, both of which are produced by European institutions for European nations. But there is another independent, highly cited and broad-ranging source of wealth inequality data: the World Inequality Database18.

The World Inequality Lab - who produce the World Inequality Database - is composed of about 40 people, and the wider network consists of more than 200 researchers investigating income and wealth inequality around the world. On the list include somewhat controversial economists such as Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, known for their agenda-upsetting work on inequality.

The methodology used is comprehensive - coming in at over 200 pages - but I want to draw attention to an important difference between the wealth distribution series produced by the World Inequality Database and those produced as part of the HFCS or DWA.

The HFCS and DWA represent net household wealth - that is, the net wealth owned by everyone in a household is attributable to that household. On the other hand, the World Inequality Database primarily uses what they refer to as an ‘equal-split’ measure, where household net wealth is split amongst either the head couple of a household or all adults living within in a household, depending on the data available for a particular country19.

The prominence of the World Inequality Database means that it is often cited alongside the HFCS and DWA. This could produce confusion because, as we will see, the numbers look so different.

Choices, choices, choices

I say all of this not because I have a particular horse in the race for which methodology is more accurate, but to highlight the uncertainty surrounding estimates of wealth inequality.

Take a look at this graph of the distribution of wealth using the various methodologies we’ve discussed so far. I’ve included the DWA, HFCS and World Inequality Database, as well as my own calculations using the methodology outlined in Chakraborty & Waltl (2018)20.

Though they all portray an unequal Ireland, some depictions are a lot less equal than others. Depending on the methodology, the concentration of wealth differs dramatically - the amount owned by the wealthiest 1% ranges anywhere from 10% to 22% of total net wealth.

So what?

Grand. There’s a lot of uncertainty. But does anyone actually care, or am I just being pedantic?

I think not. These numbers influence the stories we tell ourselves.

For example, here’s a post from Dan O’Brien, Chief Economist at the Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA) - an Irish think-tank - using DWA data to claim that wealth inequality in Ireland has fallen since 2013 and is much more equal than the Euro zone average. He also gets in a dig at Thomas Piketty too.

And he’s right. Using the DWA data, everything that Dan said is true. But Thomas Piketty’s assertions are based on completely different data. It’s quite literally comparing apples and oranges.

In Piketty’s world - which uses data from the World Inequality Database - wealth is much less equally distributed in Ireland, and since 2013 it has remained relatively stagnant21

The source we are exposed to influencing us is one thing. Even worse though is that the story we want to tell might influence the source we choose.

Ireland doesn’t have many think-tanks, and the IIEA is one of its most influential. During my time as an economist at the Department of Defence, I attended numerous events hosted by the IIEA with very senior representation from both the Irish and European bureaucracy. If addressing wealth inequality in Ireland seems like nuissance to any of those, they might lean towards Dan’s view of the world and the underlying DWA data to justify that stance.

As I’ve said, these numbers tell a story. Those stories influence thinking, and they influence policy. And policy influences livelihoods. In fact, it influences everything.

From guesswork to certainty

What to do about all this murkiness then? In Ireland, there’s no single source of truth on wealth, so are we fated to fumble around in the dark, effectively guessing at how much the wealthy really own.

No. It doesn’t have to be this way.

Rather than relying on limited surveys, we could instead adopt a wealth register - a factual database of how much wealth every household (or individual) actually owns. Sound far fetched? Well the Nordic countries - Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden - already do this22.

The idea is pretty simple. You have a register of actual assets and liabilities linked to a register of the population. That way every single asset and liability can be traced back to who owns it.

In the Swedish case, for example, there are 4 primary registers linked together - one each for Population, Real Estate, Jobs & Activities and Businesses. Each of these primary registers have other secondary registers attached to them. One such secondary register attached to the Population Register is a Wealth Register. This allows Sweden to compile information on wealth inequality based on actual administrative data. No more surveys. No more guesswork.

The trials and tribulations of wealth registers

Just because something is possible doesn’t make it easy, of course. There are several prerequisites that need to be in place and challenges addressed in order to successfully implement a wealth register.

First, is the supporting data infrastructure. Primarily, you need reliable administrative registers that can be connected by using unified identification numbers23. The good news is that Ireland is already well on its way to creating a comprehensive national data infrastructure.

True, there are gaps - most relevantly, the absence of a wealth register - but if we have a register for income, surely we can develop it for wealth?

That leads us neatly onto the second prerequisite: the legislative requirement. As noted by the European Central Bank (2024) there is an absence of institutions in Ireland who are obliged to report on financial assets, liabilities and their ownership. Ireland would need to give an entity the legal mandate to oblige financial institutions operating in Ireland to provide this data.

That sounds quite daunting. But we already do this for income. Why not wealth then?Why not hand Revenue this remit? Tánaiste Simon Harris has only just tasked them with collecting the Derelict Property Tax24 - a tax on a source of wealth - so why not just go the whole hog and allow them to collect data on all Irish wealth.

Maybe you think the whole thing sounds a bit too Big Brother though? It’s certainly true that public acceptance would be necessary to support the use of a wealth register, and the foundation of that is trusting in the confidentiality and privacy of data. Again though, we already trust Revenue with data on our income, so why not wealth too?

Possibly even crucial though is to communicate why a wealth register is necessary and how it can be used for the benefit of society. It isn’t for spying on the many, but instead to have informed conversations about just how much wealth the few really possess.

The biggest challenge of them all

You may remember earlier I cited Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman (2019). Let’s briefly recall their findings: the likelihood of having hidden off-shore wealth increases dramatically amongst the wealthiest 1% and, when taking into account this off-shore wealth, the concentration of wealth amongst the wealthiest 0.1% and 0.01% increases significantly. As I also said, these findings were based on data from Norway and Sweden - the same countries whose wealth registers I am lauding.

Ultimately, national wealth registers are not enough on their own. As long as there are tax havens and organisations providing tax evasion services, then we may never know the true extent of what the wealthiest possess. International cooperation and a concerted effort to eliminate tax evasion globally are the only way we can truly understand how concentrated wealth is at the very top.

“International cooperation on wealth registers? Good one”. It’s true. It does almost seem impossible - in today’s political climate more so than ever, perhaps? But, any obstacle to societal cooperation is ultimately manufactured - and if we made it, then so too can we unmake it. Measuring wealth inequality is no different. It’s messy, sure. But it’s also very possible.

References

Alstadsæter, A., Johannesen, N. and Zucman, G. (2019). Tax Evasion and Inequality. American Economic Review, 109(6), pp.2073–2103. doi:10.1257/aer.20172043.

Brennan, J. (2026). Ireland’s 11 billionaires are collectively wealthier than 85% of adults in State, says Oxfam. [online] The Irish Times. Available at: https://www.irishtimes.com/business/2026/01/19/irelands-11-billionaires-wealthier-than-85-of-adults-in-state-says-oxfam/.

Central Statistics Office (2017). National Data Identifiers. [online] Nationaldata.ie. Available at: https://www.nationaldata.ie/standards/nationaldataidentifiers/ [Accessed 8 July 2026].

Central Statistics Office (CSO) (2023). Private Households and Living Alone - CSO - Central Statistics Office. [online] www.cso.ie. Available at: https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-cpp3/censusofpopulation2022profile3-householdsfamiliesandchildcare/privatehouseholdsandlivingalone/.

Central Statistics Office (CSO) (2025). Household Finance and Consumption Survey 2023 - Central Statistics Office. [online] Www.cso.ie. Available at: https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-hfcs/householdfinanceandconsumptionsurvey2023/.

European Central Bank (2024). Experimental Distributional Wealth Accounts (DWA) for the household sector Methodological note. [online] Available at: https://data.ecb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2024-01/DWA%20Methodological%20note.pdf.

Harris, S. (2026). Time to end the scourge of dereliction. My plan will do this . [online] Substack.com. Available at: https://tanaistesimonharris.substack.com/p/time-to-end-the-scourge-of-dereliction [Accessed 7 July 2026].

Jäntti, M., Törmälehto, V.-M. and Marlier, E. (2013). The use of registers in the context of EU–SILC: challenges and opportunities. [online] Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Eric_Marlier/publication/283731859_The_use_of_registers_in_the_context_of_EU-SILC_Challenges_and_opportunities/links/564615fe08ae451880aa2f33/The-use-of-registers-in-the-context-of-EU-SILC-Challenges-and-opportunities.pdf.

Singh, R. (2023). Do the Wealthy Underreport their Income? Using General Election Filings to Study the Income-Wealth Relationship in India. [online] WID - World Inequality Database. Available at: https://wid.world/news-article/do-the-wealthy-underreport-their-income-using-general-election-filings-to-study-the-income-wealth-relationship-in-india/.

The Economist (2018). Family offices become financial titans. [online] The Economist. Available at: https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/12/15/family-offices-become-financial-titans [Accessed 6 July 2026].

Vermeulen, P. (2014). How Fat is the Top Tail of the Wealth Distribution? SSRN Electronic Journal, No. 1692. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2439164.

World Inequality Database (2023). WID - World Inequality Database. [online] WID - World Inequality Database. Available at: https://wid.world/ [Accessed 7 July 2026].

World Inequality Database (n.d.). Ireland. [online] WID - World Inequality Database. Available at: https://wid.world/country/IRELAND/ [Accessed 7 July 2026].

World Inequality Lab (2025). DISTRIBUTIONAL NATIONAL ACCOUNTS GUIDELINES Methods and Concepts used in the World Inequality Database. [online] Available at: https://wid.world/document/distributional-national-accounts-dina-guidelines-2025-methods-and-concepts-used-in-the-world-inequality-database/ [Accessed 7 July 2026].

There’s no doubt in the figures for the last two years, migration has played a part in housing. It’s impacted on our housing. And when one says that, one gets accused of dogwhistling. I’m not, it’s just a fact.1

Those were the words of Taoiseach Micheál Martin back in December 2025. A couple of weeks later, Tánaiste Simon Harris was doubling down on the same sentiments2.

Immigration is so often the scapegoat of choice for far-right groups. Worryingly though, it has suddenly reared its head in mainstream Irish politics and even some everyday conversations I have been having.

Rather than grapple with the moral case for immigration - which many have made far more articulately than I might do - let us instead cut straight to the core of this argument: would reducing immigration actually make houses more affordable?

How does immigration impact demand for housing?

The logic behind the “immigrants make houses more expensive” argument goes like this. Immigrants equate to an increase in the demand for housing. Increased demand results in higher prices.

People making this argument might point to a chart such as the one below. ‘Gotcha!’ they might say. ‘See! Net migration and the price of residential property have moved in the same direction for the past 2 decades.’ And it’s true - so is my race over before it’s even run?

Not quite. There is, of course, the smallest grain of truth in the argument.

It is absolutely true that a larger population demands more housing. It is also true that, in the short-term, housing supply is relatively “sticky”. Houses take time to build - a year can pass from obtaining planning permission to walking in the front door of your new home - so in the short-term it is quite easy for the demand for housing to quickly outstrip supply.

Migration is not the only driver of population growth though. Throughout Irish history, the contribution of migration to overall population growth has varied dramatically. In some decades, such as the 2000’s and 2020’s, migration has been a major driver of population growth. But in others - such as the 1990’s and 2010’s - its importance is far outweighed by natural growth. In some decades - such as the 1960’s and 1980’s - net migration was actually negative and population growth can be solely attributed to natural growth.

Thankfully we are yet to foster our own Xiaoping3 - it’s not too often you hear people calling for “solutions” to the “problem” of natural growth in Ireland. Perhaps then we can begin to surmise the true motives of those who frame immigrants as the cause of house price increases…

Housing demand is not only a function of population growth either. It is also a function of inequality. Those who earn more can afford more expensive properties. So maybe high-earning immigrants are squeezing low-earning Irish nationals even further out of the housing market?

Again, there is the smallest grain of truth to this argument. Are there nationalities who earn more than an Irish national on average? Yes - take Indians for example. But there are also nationalities who earn significantly less on average too - such as Ukrainians.

It's also worth noting that some nationalities are disproportionately represented in some of Ireland’s highest earning sectors.

For example, 14% of Indians are employed in the ICT sector. However, it is also true that other nationalities are disproportionately represented in some of Ireland’s lowest earning sectors - such as the 23% of Brazilians working in hospitality.

But still, let us suppose that immigrants are actually squeezing Irish nationals out of the housing market. We would expect to see better outcomes for non-nationals then, wouldn’t we?

Yet, we don’t.

Non-Irish nationals are more likely to be renting.

They are more likely to live in overcrowded conditions.

They are far more likely to spend unsustainable amounts of their disposable income on housing costs.

And finally: despite making up only 16% of the population4, non-nationals account for just over 50% of the adults in emergency accommodation5.

So sure, some high-earning immigrants are probably contributing in some small way to price pressures, competing for the most in-demand, expensive properties in the country. But the same can be said for the far larger number of high-earning Irish nationals.

In reality, many people who come to Ireland actually face worse housing outcomes than Irish nationals. If you’re worried about being pushed out of the housing market by high earners, your gripe shouldn’t be with immigrants - it should be with inequality.

How does immigration impact the supply of housing?

The “immigrants make housing more expensive” argument focuses exclusively on short-term housing demand - a half-baked analysis at best.

As we have said, population growth - both natural and due to migration - can result in the demand for housing outstripping housing supply in the short-term. But in the long run, population growth is a signal for the construction of housing.

Those positing that immigrants are driving rising house prices might point to the correlation between net migration and house prices we discussed at the beginning of the article. In retort I could point to a graph like this, that shows that as net migration increases so does the supply of housing.

Let us not forget how important non-Irish nationals are to the Irish economy either. In fact, 23% of people employed in the construction sector are non-nationals - literally helping to build the houses they are purportedly stealing.

Still not convinced?

Maybe you still aren’t buying it though. Maybe you look at the homelessness figures and think to yourself “Well, if they weren’t here they wouldn’t be homeless on Irish streets”. So let me put it beyond any doubt.

Last week, the UK Migration Advisory Committee published a report entitled Migration and housing costs: what does international evidence imply for the UK?.6 As the title suggests, 33 studies from around the world were systematically assessed to estimate the impact of immigration on the cost of housing.

Their findings? In countries with housing markets similar to the UK - a group which Ireland is specifically classified as belonging to in the report - a percentage point increase in the share of non-nationals in a population seems to equate, on average, to a 0.65% increase in house prices.

Let us do some quick math then. The share of the population in Ireland who were non-nationals in 2012 was about 12%7. Today, that share sits at about 16%. A 4 percentage point increase.

According to the above systematic review, house prices should have gone up by about 2.6% over the last 13 years. How much have house prices actually risen in that time? 159%. Yeah. It’s the immigrants.

If it isn’t illogical, it’s just racism

Making the economic case for immigration leaves a bad taste in my mouth. Yet the moral case doesn’t seem to be enough. Instead you have to reduce people to their economic contribution so that their presence - their existence even - can be justified.

But the economic case might not cut it either. The irrationality of blaming immigrants for the exorbitant cost of housing in Ireland is quite often driven by racism. If this article hasn’t convinced you, then it is very likely your perspective is built upon foundations I’m going to struggle to shake.

For those reading this who might have been misled though - be it by comments from our nation’s top bureaucrats, media coverage or right-wing commentators - I think you will now find the evidence incontrovertible.

In the wise words of , Associate Professor at the School of Social Policy, Social Work and Social Justice at University College Dublin:

Let’s direct our energy toward fixing the system, not blaming its newest participants.8

Reference list

BBC (2015). Explainer: What was China’s one-child policy? BBC News. [online] 29 Oct. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-34667551.

Byrne, M. (2025). We must look honestly at the data on housing and migration. [online] Irish Examiner. Available at: https://www.irishexaminer.com/opinion/commentanalysis/arid-41702981.html.

Central Statistics Office (CSO) (2012). Press Release Census 2011 Profile 6 Migration and Diversity - CSO - Central Statistics Office. [online] www.cso.ie. Available at: https://www.cso.ie/en/csolatestnews/pressreleases/2012pressreleases/pressreleasecensus2011profile6migrationanddiversity/.

Central Statistics Office (CSO) (2025a). Population and Migration Estimates, April 2025 - Central Statistics Office. [online] Www.cso.ie. Available at: https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-pme/populationandmigrationestimatesapril2025/.

Central Statistics Office (CSO) (2025b). Results and Analysis Distribution of Earnings by Nationality 2024 - Central Statistics Office. [online] Www.cso.ie. Available at: https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-den/distributionofearningsbynationality2024/resultsandanalysis/ [Accessed 20 Jun. 2026].

Coyne, E. (2025). ‘No doubt’ migration has played part in housing crisis and homelessness, says Taoiseach. [online] The Irish Times. Available at: https://www.irishtimes.com/politics/2025/12/23/no-doubt-migration-has-played-part-in-housing-crisis-and-homelessness-says-taoiseach/.

Department of Housing (2026). Monthly Homelessness Report April 2026. [online] gov.ie. Available at: https://www.gov.ie/en/department-of-housing-local-government-and-heritage/publications/monthly-homelessness-report-april-2026/.

Harris, S. (2026). Politicians of the centre cannot shirk the migration debate. I certainly won’t. [online] Substack.com. Available at: https://substack.com/home/post/p-184073729 [Accessed 20 Jun. 2026].

Mcginnity, F., Privalko, I., Russell, H., Curristan, S., Stapleton, A. and Laurence, J. (2022). ORIGIN AND INTEGRATION: HOUSING AND FAMILY AMONG MIGRANTS IN THE 2016 IRISH CENSUS. [online] Available at: https://www.esri.ie/system/files/publications/BKMNEXT422_0.pdf.

Rabensteiner, T., Sangwan, N. and Tasciotti, L. (2026). Migration and housing costs: what does international evidence imply for the UK? [online] Gov.uk. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/migration-and-housing-costs-what-does-international-evidence-imply-for-the-uk/migration-and-housing-costs-what-does-international-evidence-imply-for-the-uk-accessible.

Ireland is often seen as quite a progressive country. An oasis of peace and promise off the coast of Europe, brimming with optimism and opportunity.

Yet, social mobility is increasingly coming into question. A dearth of houses and soaring rents. Homelessness persistently rising. These issues wont be new to anyone living in Ireland. But sometimes the impact can be difficult to quantify - until now.

Trawling through Eurostat, I came across this remarkable dataset. It helps us to visualise the movement of people between income deciles over time.

For example, 61% of people in the lowest income decile will still find themselves there in 3 years time.

From this graph you can intuitively identify basins of attraction - areas where people are likely to gather over time, such as the 1st and 2nd income deciles.

We can visualise this “stickiness” in another way too by calculating the fluidity of income deciles.

Imagine the curve as a series of peaks and valleys. On a peak, there is more movement. In a valley, there is less. Suppose I placed a ball at the peak of the 3rd income decile. It’s very likely going to roll downhill in one of two directions - towards the lower income deciles, or the 4th income decile.

Once you’re in a valley, its much more difficult to get out of it.

Take the 1st and 2nd deciles. Making it out is quite literally an uphill battle. There’s something going on that is structurally suppressing the mobility of the lowest income households. This phenomenon is called a poverty trap.

How housing costs keep people trapped in poverty

The logic of a poverty trap is easy to understand. You’re on a lower income, struggling to make ends meet. You can’t afford to save. You can’t get a mortgage. You can’t absorb unexpected costs. The cards are stacked against you and you spend your life with your head barely above water, struggling to stay afloat.

There are many systemic mechanisms that keep people locked in poverty. Lower educational attainment. Healthcare costs. Labour market inequalities. But in Ireland, one of the most significant is surely housing costs.

The lowest earners are far more likely to spend unsustainable amounts of their income on housing.

At least if those costs were paying off a mortgage they would be building up a source of wealth and future stability. But in many cases they aren’t.

Renters are disproportionately low earners.

To summarise then: those who earn less also suffer the highest relative housing costs, keeping them trapped in a cycle of poverty. In a disproportionately high number of cases, those people are renting.

Breaking the cycle

The million-dollar question: how do we break the cycle?

- an Irish think tank - would have you believe that abundance is the golden ticket.

Progress Ireland

What abundance is not

Our monthly meetup is upstairs in Doheny and Nesbitts this evening, the 27th of May at 5.30-7pm. Drop by to chat policy with us…

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3 months ago · 16 likes · 4 comments · Sarah Scales

I agree with them for the most part, though I do think there’s more to it than that, as - Associate Professor at the School of Social Policy, Social Work and Social Justice at University College Dublin - summarises in this article.

The week in housing

Taking on the 'supply guys'

Many ‘hot button’ issues tend to degenerate into ‘culture ware’ politics, with both sides of the debate generally talking past each other. Housing politics has its own ‘culture war’ in the form of ‘supply skeptics’ versus ‘supply guys’. The latter argue that the core issue with our housing system is the supply/demand imbalance, and hence the solution is…

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a year ago · 8 likes · 3 comments · Michael Byrne

Supply is critical. But suppose all those new homes are build-to-let. We will still witness a level of rent-seeking and wealth extraction that keeps people poor.

Decommodifying land and housing are fundamental paradigm shifts that also need addressing if we are to truly break the cycle of poverty in Ireland.

I’ve been back in Galway City over the last couple of months and it has had me thinking about car dependence and congestion. Anyone familiar with the city will know the frustration of crawling along the Seamus Quirke Road or idling on the Quincentennial Bridge.

This congestion - and solutions to it - are a hot topic in Galway. A conversation doesn’t get far before someone is calling for “better” public transport infrastructure. Of course, such claims make intuitive sense. Better alternatives mean people are less likely to use their cars - or even own them. Data from the Central Statistics Office (CSO) backs this up.

The recent approval of the Galway City Bypass will be music to the ears of those who see it as key to improving mobility1. Others will be dismayed that further investment is being funneled into infrastructure for cars and away from more sustainable forms of transport, such as a proposed light rail spanning the city from east to west (Gluas2) or revitalising what is often perceived to be a poor city bus service.

But how bad is the bus service in Galway City exactly? Nowhere near as bad as I expected.

Such high service frequency means that most of Galway City is within very reasonable walking distance of a well serviced bus stop.

Of course, being close to a bus stop doesn’t mean it’s the bus stop you need. It also doesn’t mean the bus will turn up on time - or at all. Still though, the majority of Galway City’s inhabitants are quite close to what appears to be at least a decent bus service.

Yet car ownership in Galway City remains high - notably in some of the areas best served by public transport, such as Knocknacarra3 - and about 57% of trips in Galway are made using a car4. That means congestion.

There’s obviously something afoot. Is it that people simply think the bus service in Galway is worse than it actually is and bias their transport decisions in favour of the car? Or, is there some other set of factors at play?

Irrespective, the negative consequences of car dependence and congestion are being felt in many ways, from greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution to lost time and increased stress.

People demanding a better bus service for Galway City could also be piling on political pressure to sink further investment into a service that already seems to be reasonably adequate5. This could see investment misdirected towards the symptom of a problem rather than its cause.

Why then are there so many cars on the streets of Galway City? Why are people losing hours of their life sitting in traffic? To answer that, all we need to do is think about why we leave the house every day.

Why do we move?

If you’re like most, odds are the reason you walk out the door every day is to go to work, do the shopping, or “escort” someone to something - say dropping your kids to school or football training.

In fact, data from the National Transport Authority (NTA) suggests that about 70% of the time we leave the house we are doing one of those three things.

Let’s drill down into one of the areas with the highest rate of car ownership in Galway City - Knocknacarra - and see how accessible some of those everyday destinations are then.

If you live in Knocknacarra odds are you’re within a reasonable walking distance of some everyday destinations, such as a pre-school, primary school, secondary school or a GP. Proximity to other everyday destinations is much poorer though.

Of particular relevance are the inaccessibility of supermarkets and the cities employment hubs, given 50% of our journeys are to these destinations. Large parts of Knocknacarra are farther than a 15 minute walk to their nearest supermarket6 and everywhere is more than a 15 minute walk from the largest employment hubs in the city7.

Employment in Galway is concentrated in the city centre and eastern suburbs8. This is reflected in the travel patterns of those living in Knocknacarra. It’s the largest origin of trips9, and from it the most popular destinations are in the city centre and eastern suburbs.

Even though you might be close to a well serviced bus stop in Knocknacarra, if you’ve ever tried to cross Galway City by bus you’ll know just how painful a journey it can be. No wonder most seek refuge in the comfort of their own car.

At this point some will argue that the new Galway City Bypass will alleviate congestion crossing the city. And that’s probably true initially to a certain degree, though the induced demand created by the ring road would lead me to believe that congestion will likely worsen as a result in the long term1011.

I also wonder why we would persist with an urban development model that concentrates employment in particular areas of the city, forcing those on the west to travel over to the east? Why would we continue to put the car at the centre of our transport infrastructure? Especially when needing a car to get to work makes it much harder to walk past it in the driveway on the way to the shop.

Putting people at the hear of our cities

Instead, why not strive for a city altogether more livable. One where the places we go everyday - to work, to the shop, to drop and collect our children and so on - are easily accessible. A city designed for people and for living.

This is the vision of the 15-minute city - a term coined by Carlos Moreno in 20161213.

The essence of the concept is captured in its name:

The 15-minute city represents an urban model in which the essential needs of residents are accessible on foot or by bicycle within a short perimeter in high-density areas

Carlos Moreno, The 15-Minute City14

The aim is to bring working, education, leisure, services and nature closer together, making cities more livable, reducing their footprint and decreasing dependence on motorised transport, improving the lives of a city’s inhabitants and the environment alike.

Underpinning this vision are some key principles: density, diversity, and sustainable interconnectivity. Each plays a key role in realising a 15-minute city, so they are worth briefly considering to understand their importance.

Density

Density inherently promotes proximity. This has numerous benefits. We save time and the physical footprint of our cities is reduced. If things are closer together we are more likely to walk or cycle, doing the planet a favour whilst also promoting our own health. Getting people closer together is also an essential condition for establishing communities.

Diversity

We don’t just want monotonous high-rise apartment blocks though. Nor do we want sprawling housing estates or soulless business parks. No, a thriving public life requires a diversity of uses within the one area15 - we want to avoid concentration and homogoneity. Instead, we want people living, working, shopping, exercising and just simply hanging out all along the one street.

Sustainable Interconnectivity

People will still need to get from A to B of course. In the 15-minute city, the car is deprioritised. Of course there is a place for it, but it is considered secondary to more sustainable modes of transport such as walking, cycling and public transport.

Supporting the movement of people needs to be infrastructure that encourages the use of these forms of transport and discourages the use of the car. That means streets designed for people first, not cars. It means connecting all areas of a city with direct, separate, safe cycling infrastructure and frequent, reliable public transport. It also means making using a car more difficult.

From theory to practice

“That all sounds lovely in theory” you might say, “But what about in practice?”.

Fear not - the essence of the 15-minute city is alive and evident in many cities across the world.

Take Tokyo, one of the world’s most populous cities, yet simultaneously renowned for its livability (and the city from which I am currently writing)16.

When you think of Tokyo you might think of cramped city living and neon lights. Yet, at about 6,500 people per square kilometre Tokyo is far from the most densely populated city in the world. In fact, European capitals Madrid and Paris are actually more densely populated17. The level of density in Tokyo strikes a delicate balance that promotes livability.

For context, Tokyo is almost 4 times as densely populated as Galway City18. But density doesn’t mean cramped. Sure, the newer parts of Tokyo have a modernist feel with looming tower blocks, but much of Tokyo consists of dense, low-rise neighbourhoods. People still have plenty of space and privacy.

Alongside this density is a diversity of land-use. People eat, sleep, work and play all in relatively close proximity to each other.

The Zakkyo building - literally meaning ‘coexisting miscellany’ - is the epitome of this approach. These are thin, multi-storey buildings with a diverse range of tenants on every floor. You might find a restaurant on the first floor, an office on the fifth and a record shop on the eight.

As a result of this diverse land-use, density means anything but boring. In fact, the resultant atmosphere is quite the opposite - a thriving vibrancy where you feel anything can happen.

As so much of what you might need is nearby in Tokyo, many people walk or cycle - combined these account for 37% of all trips19. If you need to travel farther afield though, there is an excellent public transport system in place. That’s why 53% of trips made by Tokyoites are by public transport - and mostly by train. Only about 8% of trips in Tokyo are made using a car. In contrast, the modal share of cars in Galway City is about 7 times higher at 57%20

Another example of proximity in action is Houten, a mid-sized city in the Netherlands. This is a town that has had accessibility as its foundational principle since its planned expansion in the 1970’s21.

Despite growing from a village of 4,000 residents to a city of 50,000 in the space of 50 years, the city has been able to maintain excellent standards of accessibility and mobility. Density has been important to achieving this of course22. Even more so though has been the vision of the bike as the eminent mode of transport in the city23.

The entirety of Houten is linked with an expansive cycling network. Importantly, this network is separate from road traffic, with the car being relegated to navigating the city’s outskirts using a ring road.

This has two major impacts on the mobility decisions of the city’s residents. First of all, cycling is promoted by providing direct access to the city’s various neighbourhoods. As these are separate cycling paths and the car is relegated to the city’s ring road they are also incredibly safe.

Secondly, by forcing car users to take an indirect route to their destination, the time-cost of using a car is increased which, in turn, increases the relative attractiveness of taking the bike.

The success of these measures means that 34% of trips are taken by bike in Houten24. That’s in stark contrast to the 2% share of trips taken by bike in Galway City.

Carlos Moreno’s book The 15-Minute City cites plenty other examples of places adopting a more accessible, livable urbanism. Paris. Melbourne. 20-minute neighbourhoods are even an explicit part of the Scottish government’s planning framework25.

These are places shooting for density, diversity and interconnectivity not just in theory, but in practice.

Not all plain sailing

Of course, even in the worlds most accessible cities it isn’t all plain sailing. Commutes in Tokyo can apparently still take anywhere from 30 minutes to an hour if you’re commuting from the outer suburbs or across the city.

Even Houten, the poster child for the 15-minute city, falls short of the standards entailed in such a definition.

Just because these cities aren’t perfect doesn’t mean we can’t learn from them though. Even if they have fallen short of the definition of a true 15-minute city, in striving for such a lofty goal these cities are still incredibly accessible.

The next issue that arises is one of implementation. Tokyo has had density at the heart of its emergent development for a long time26, and the urbanism of Houten has developed iteratively over decades27.

You can’t just change a city’s layout overnight, never mind the behaviour and culture of a people living there. Working within existing cities provides constraints - both hard and soft - that can be difficult to navigate.

A particularly excellent paper by Monteiro et al. (2023) shows how we might begin to address the hard constraints at least. They modelled how the density of Coimbra - a sprawling Portuguese city of some 100,000 inhabitants - could be dramatically increased, resulting in improved accessibility and reducing the footprint of the city, freeing up space for the natural world to reclaim.

All this took was - as the title of the paper suggests - to “fill in the gaps” with about 600 or so buildings, most of them only 6 stories. Given the ubiquity of wide roads, private gardens and driveways, Galway City certainly has plenty of gaps to be filled.

It would be naive - deceptive even - to pretend all of this change wouldn’t come with some sort of cost. Cities aren’t just buildings - they’re the people who live there. Changing the way they are structured inherently impacts the communities and the lives of individuals.

In Houten, a participatory approach was critical to building consensus and ensuring that change was happening for communities and not to them:

‘The first thing, I think, is to know what people think and want. So, you have to have participation with the people and hear what they want.’

‘We took them on journeys, and showed them ways that they could discover would work. On the bike, and also by train, going to France, England and Germany. We took them to different places around Europe to show them where it works.’28

Of course, in the short-term some sacrifices will have to be made. Namely, less space as an individual. A citizen of Houten sums up this dilemma:

‘We wanted to create a social environment in which people have small amounts of property themselves, but there is a large amount of property that belongs to everybody together. And that is a very confrontational idea […]. Houten was developed as an idea in that mindset of the 1970s […]. It’s different because you’re starting from a fundamentally different place. You are not starting from “cars own this space”. You were starting from “people here”’29

As we can see though, the same citizen also hits upon some of the benefits. You might have less space as an individual, but through dense, diverse land-use and interconnectivity we have more space as communities.

What’s the plan, Galway?

Galway City Council has a plan to set all this straight then, right? To reduce congestion, increase accessibility, improve livability and reduce dependence on the car? Not exactly.

Sure, Galway City Council has produced some shiny new strategic planning documents over the last couple of years. The Galway Development Plan and Galway Transport Strategy certainly pay homage to the rhetoric of density, diversity and interconnectivity, but both reality and the documents themselves serve as stark contradictions.

Again, take Knocknacarra. Wander around this behemoth of housing estates and you’ll quickly see for yourself that this is not a dense, diverse neighbourhood. And despite the City Council apparently wanting to ‘develop a more urban compact form’15, new housing estates progressively edge outwards, expanding the city’s footprint. That’s no coincidence either - it’s literally part of the plan.

Another example is the recently approved Galway City bypass. This has been greenlit despite clear evidence of induced demand both globally and locally, the City Council apparently wishing to ‘integrate the principle of sustainability’ into its model of urban development16 and the fact that public consultation for the Galway City Transport Strategy specifically reported that citizens believed a bypass of the city was not necessary17.

Far from ideal then. But as we have seen from the above examples, that doesn’t mean all hope is lost. It will just take a lot of effort. All the best things do though.

Towards sustainable urban development

It’s a bleak Tuesday morning in the middle of winter. You slip out of bed at 6:30AM, careful not to wake your partner, and slump into your car in your vain daily attempt to beat the morning rush hour. After almost two hours crawling along a dual-carriage way you still barely make it in to the office for 9AM.

After a long day of meetings you sit back into your car and sigh - ahead of you another two hours of driving. If you’re lucky you’ll be home by 7PM. Is this really how we want to spend our lives?

Now imagine this. It’s the same morning and you still slip out of bed at 6:30AM, but you head out for a quick run around the local park. It’s still a freezing cold winter morning - not much we can do about that unfortunately - so you decide to drop in to the coffee shop next door to your house after your run and grab a coffee for yourself and your partner.

Delighted with the early morning generosity you and your partner…do what partners do. After a quick shower, it’s time to head downstairs and whip up some breakfast for your kids. At about 08:30 you all step out the front door. Your partner’s taking the bike today, but you’re going to take the kids on the bus - it is winter after all! Their school is about 5 minutes away, and you carry on for another 10 until you reach the office. You check your watch - 8:45AM. Not a bad start to the day at all.

Whilst I have used Galway as a case study in this article, the learning’s are applicable to any context. If this is a vision of the life you want to live in Ireland, then proximity, density, diversity and interconnectivity are key to realising it. Other cities around the world are already living this reality. Why not in Ireland too?

For both people and planet, it’s time we made proximity our priority. It’s time we adopted the model of the 15-minute city.

References

Almazan, J. and Studiolab (2022). Emergent Tokyo. ORO Editions.

Brinkhoff, T. (2021). Houten (Houten, Utrecht, Netherlands) - Population Statistics, Charts, Map, Location, Weather and Web Information. [online] Citypopulation.de. Available at: https://www.citypopulation.de/en/netherlands/utrecht/houten/BK02020__houten/ [Accessed 11 May 2026].

Bureau of Urban Development (n.d.). Current Status and Issues of Local Public Transportation. [online] documents/d/toshiseibi/pdf_bunyabetsu_kotsu_butsuryu_pdf_chiiki_koutsu_kentoukai01_2-1. Available at: https://www.toshiseibi.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/.

De Wagt, F. (2024). Evaluating the 15-Minute city: A comparative analysis of travel behaviours ,urban accessibility and sustainability within the Netherlands. [online] Available at: https://spinlab.vu.nl/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Evaluating-the-15-Minute-city.pdf#page7 [Accessed 11 May 2026].

Dr. Holger Frommert (2022). Map Ireland - Popultion density by administrative division. [online] Geo-ref.net. Available at: https://www.geo-ref.net/ph/irl.htm.

European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC) - with minor processing by Our World in Data (2025). Population density of the top 100 most populous cities [dataset]. Global Human Settlement Layer Dataset [original data].

Galway City Council (2023). Galway City Development Plan 2023-2029 | Galway City Council. [online] Galwaycity.ie. Available at: https://www.galwaycity.ie/services/planning/development-plan-2023-2029.

Galway City Council (2025). Galway Transport Strategy | Galway City Council. [online] Galwaycity.ie. Available at: https://www.galwaycity.ie/services/roads-and-transport/galway-transport-strategy.

Hickman, R., Lu, P. and Botermans, A. (2025). The discourse of cycling in Houten. Journal of Urban Design, [online] 30(5), pp.1–21. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/13574809.2024.2441133.

Jacobs, J. (1961). The Death and Life of Great American Cities. [online] New York: Random House. Available at: https://www.petkovstudio.com/bg/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/The-Death-and-Life-of-Great-American-Cities_Jane-Jacobs-Complete-book.pdf.

Mannion, T. (2026). Galway City Ring Road approved after decades of delays. [online] RTE.ie. doi:urn:epic:1567346.

Matthew Beedham (2024). Road widening and induced demand explained | TomTom Newsroom. [online] TomTom. Available at: https://www.tomtom.com/newsroom/explainers-and-insights/induced-demand-explained/.

Monteiro, J., Para, M., Sousa, N., Natividade-Jesus, E., Ostorero, C. and Coutinho-Rodrigues, J. (2023). Filling in the Spaces: Compactifying Cities towards Accessibility and Active Transport. ISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information, 12(3), p.120. doi:https://doi.org/10.3390/ijgi12030120.

Moreno, C. (2024). The 15-Minute City. Wiley.

Moreno, C., Allam, Z., Chabaud, D., Gall, C. and Pratlong, F. (2021). Introducing the ‘15-Minute City’: Sustainability, Resilience and Place Identity in Future Post-Pandemic Cities. Smart Cities, [online] 4(1), pp.93–111. doi:https://doi.org/10.3390/smartcities4010006.

National Transport Authority (2024). Light Rail Feasibility Study for Galway. [online] National Transport. Available at: https://www.nationaltransport.ie/publications/light-rail-feasibility-study-for-galway/.

National Transport Authority (2025). Galway Cordon Survey Report 2024. [online] National Transport. Available at: https://www.nationaltransport.ie/publications/galway-cordon-survey-report-2024/.

Reddit.com. (2026). Reddit - Please wait for verification. [online] Available at: https://www.reddit.com/r/AskIreland/comments/1p7wb22/does_anyone_feel_the_need_to_have_another_m50/ [Accessed 11 May 2026].

Scottish Government (2023). National Planning Framework 4. [online] Available at: https://www.gov.scot/binaries/content/documents/govscot/publications/strategy-plan/2023/02/national-planning-framework-4/documents/national-planning-framework-4-revised-draft/national-planning-framework-4-revised-draft/govscot%3Adocument/national-planning-framework-4.pdf.

What does your evening routine look like? Do you like to unwind after a long day by cooking a delicious meal? Perhaps it involves settling down in front of the television to watch an episode or two of your favourite show? Or maybe you like to curl up and read a few chapters of your favourite book?

No matter the activity, they all have one thing in common. Whether you’re chopping onions or perusing Ulysses, if you’re doing it at night you’re using artificial light.

Friend or foe?

It is hard to understate just how reliant we have become on artificial light. To put it in perspective, let us take a brief look at just a tiny portion of our evolutionary history1.

All humans are members of the homo genus, which emerged about 2.5 million years ago. Considered our most direct relative, homo erectus is believed to be the first species to use and control fire about 1 million years2, though its habitual use is a more recent phenomenon, beginning about 400,000 years ago3. We - homo sapiens - have been around for at least 300,000 years. Only about 200 years ago, the electric light bulb was invented4.

For most of our evolutionary history, we were at the whims of the daily light-dark cycle. The weather, the season and where we lived all impacted dramatically on the amount of light available for activity on a given day. The rest of the time we had only the moon and stars to light our way.

Now its hard to imagine our lives without artificial light. Be it from an LED, an incandescent bulb, or the humble candle, our modern way of life would, quite simply, be impossible without it. Artificial light has become so ubiquitous that we take it for granted. Not only that though, we take for granted that its impact is positive. Have you every stopped to wonder whether exposure to so much artificial light might have any negative impacts?

Marching to the rhythm of a dying star

If we could hear the inner workings of our bodies, we would hear a constant hum. Every organ, every cell is constantly cycling through different states of activity, each vital to what we experience as life. Think of it like an orchestra: every section has its role, perfectly timed to produce a beautiful symphony.

These cycles of states are what we call our circadian rhythms5, derived from the Latin circa diem - or “about a day”. There are many factors that influence our circadian rhythms, but light has the largest impact6. To see how this works, let’s go back in time about 2.5 million years and spend a day in the shoes of our ancient ancestors7.

When our ancestors awoke in the morning and the first rays of sunlight hit their eyes, it set off a cascade of events that rippled out across their biology8.

The early morning sun was absorbed by photoreceptors in the retina and the signal traveled along a high-speed neural pathway - the retinal-hypothalamic tract (RHT) - to the suprachiasmatic nucleus (SCN), a cluster of neurons in the hypothalamus.

If the body is an orchestra, the SCN is the conductor - the Master Clock that keeps everything in time. It essentially tells different parts of your body to begin transitioning into wakefulness. Our ancestors would simply have experienced this as waking up, but beneath the surface, a surge of activity was already underway.

Neural signals fire off, sending messages around the body. In the pineal gland, melatonin secretion is suppressed. Cortisol production begins in the adrenal glands. Heart rate, blood pressure and body temperature all elevate in preparation for the day ahead.

Throughout the day all of these variables ebb and flow. Consider the cycle of melatonin and cortisol. At peak wakefulness, melatonin levels are at their lowest, while cortisol peaks. As night approaches, the pattern reverses.

Each morning, exposure to sunlight synchronised - or entrained - our ancestors’ internal clocks. Human biology evolved around this daily cycle of light and dark. In other words, we did not decide to be active during the day. Rather, it is because the sun is in the sky that we have evolved to be active then9.

Modern vampires of the city

And so the story went for about 2.5 million years. True, we have regularly harnessed fire for the couple of hundred thousand years or so, but the illumination provided by a candle or from a hearth is but a fraction of what we are now capable of emitting from a single light bulb10.

Within about two centuries we have gone from reading by candlelight to this…

Our day is no longer defined by the rising and setting of the sun - we can extend it far into the darkness of the night. Relatedly, the transition from agricultural to industrial and now service economies means humans now spend less time outdoors in natural light, and more time than ever in settings that are artificially lit.

Some would argue that artificial light has been a magnificent invention. Far be it from me to say it is outrightly otherwise either. However, research is beginning to emerge that indicates it may be more pernicious than we first thought. We no longer abide by the daily cycle of light and dark alongside which our biology has evolved. That has consequences.

Messing with the metronome

The main way that artificial light - particularly at night - can affect us negatively is through circadian rhythm disruption. Specifically, artificial light can suppress the secretion of melatonin, disrupting your bodies primary signal that it is time to sleep11.

Suppose for example that your bodies natural circadian rhythm means that melatonin secretion increases in your body around 9PM and peaks around 11PM. Your ideal natural bedtime is somewhere within this window.

Now suppose you are exposed to artificial light - specifically, artificial light with some short, or blue, wavelengths12 - for a couple of hours before your bedtime. It is absorbed into your retinas and the signal is couriered to your SCN just as before, but now it stops dead in its tracks. “It’s obviously not as late as I thought it was” it thinks to itself. “Better tell them down in the pineal gland to hold off on the melatonin for a while”.

Melatonin secretion is now delayed. We might still try go to bed at the same time, as is our routine, but we will find it much harder to get to sleep. We will feel much more awake than we ought to. If we have to wake at the same time too - for work or school - then that means insufficient sleep.

Exposure to blue light at night can also have a direct impact on sleep. Many studies indicate that blue light reduces perceived tiredness13 - not exactly what we want when settling down for the night - and that exposure to blue light at night prior to sleep reduces subjective sleep quality14.

Interpreting perceptions - such as perceived sleep quality - are important, but they should also be taken with a pinch of salt. Fortunately though, several studies have demonstrated far more objective impacts of exposure to blue light at night on sleep using electroencephalogram (EEG) technology, which measures the brainwaves of research participants whilst they sleep.

Two such studies found that exposure to blue light at night decreased the densities of delta brainwaves - those associated with deep, dreamless sleep and recovery15. One of the studies also found that densities of beta brainwaves - those associated with being awake, alert and thinking - were higher when exposed to blue light at night16. Both studies also uncovered that these effects are dose dependent. In other words, the more blue light you are exposed to the more acute the effects seem to be.

It would be remiss of me to say that all studies concluded that exposure to blue light at night was detrimental to our sleep though. Some report not finding any significant effect17. There are many factors that have been noted in the literature as potentially limiting replication across studies, including the use of subjective measures of sleep, small sample sizes, variations in the spectra of light used, and confounding factors that weren’t controlled for in the experiment. There is also growing evidence that the effects of light on circadian rhythms and sleep varies significantly across individuals18.

I should be clear though that failure to prove a hypothesis that exposure to blue light at night negatively impacts sleep is not the same as confirming a hypothesis that it doesn’t negatively impact your sleep, or that exposure to blue light at night is beneficial for your sleep. As the old adage goes, absence of evidence is not the same as evidence of absence. And on that note, there was no study I read that indicated that exposure to artificial light at night improves sleep.

So, although there certainly seems to be some gaps in our understanding of the impacts of exposure to artificial light at night on our sleep, there also seems to be enough evidence to warrant erring on the side of caution - that exposure to artificial light at night should be minimised.

Your health is your wealth

Maybe you still have the attitude of “I’ll sleep when I die” or are asking “Why would I bother improving my sleep?”. To answer that, there are three avenues to explore.

The first is why we sleep, and the truth is we don’t really know19. Instead, what we can do though is conjecture about its purpose based on what happens when we sleep, and the benefits of sleeping well - or more specifically, what happens when we don’t.

As we experience sleep as a loss of consciousness, one would be forgiven for imagining that not much happens. This couldn’t be farther from the truth20. Your body and brain are actually incredibly active during sleep. In fact, the activity of the brain during Rapid Eye Movement (REM) - or “dream sleep” - is so similar to when we are awake, that it is impossible to differentiate between the two from brainwave activity alone21.

Sleep is broken into two broad categories, REM and Non-REM sleep, the latter of which is subdivided again into 3 stages - a transitionary period from wakefulness to sleep, light sleep and deep sleep.

It’s hard to isolate any particular stage of sleep and say firmly “this is what happens here”, as it is such a complex process. All stages of sleep and it’s idiosyncrasies have made it through to what we experience today - if something non-essential could have been cut, it’s likely to evolution would have seen it to the chopping block already.

Having said that, it’s possible to say - broadly speaking - that the Non-REM stages pertain to the physically restorative, regenerative benefits we associate with sleep. On the other hand, REM sleep seems to be related to emotional processing, as the amygdala - which is associated with the processing of emotions - becomes increasingly active during REM sleep22.

To think of these stages as distinct with unique benefits really is too simple though. For example, peak growth hormone secretion - essential for growth, cell production and regeneration - actually occurs during the REM sleep stage. No stage compensates for another in any way. They are all essential.

Sleep is vital to almost ‘every type of tissue and system in our bodies’23. So much so, that the impacts of not sleeping well are severe. Which leads us nicely down our next two avenues - the impacts of insufficient sleep.

Firstly, there are the acute impacts of insufficient sleep. That is, the immediate impacts of sleeping badly on the next day. Grogginess, like you were out drinking the night before. Less patience with your co-workers. Staring at that report for an hour but nothing seems to be going in. All in all, lethargically muddling through the day, eagerly awaiting its end. We all know the feeling.

Fortunately though, a bad nights sleep doesn’t stay with us forever. It’s nothing some good quality shut-eye the following night can’t remedy. What is far more malignant though is the accumulation of insufficient sleep.

In 2025 a comprehensive umbrella review - a review of other reviews - was published, outlining the impacts of habitual sleep deprivation on our physical and mental health24. The review considered 29 systematic reviews and meta-analyses published between 2008 and 2024, themselves each incorporating the results of dozens of studies. On aggregate, observations from millions of participants were considered as part of the review. The results were overwhelmingly clear.

Chronic sleep deprivation - defined as less than 7 hours of sleep per night - was found to increase one’s risk of death from any cause by 6-15%, the risk of stroke by 15-19% and the risk of developing hypertension by 10-61%. Reduced melatonin secretion and circadian disruption were found to increase the risk of prostate and breast cancer.

Sleep deprivation was also found to increase the likelihood of developing metabolic syndrome, with a 9% increase in the risk of developing diabetes and an incredible 45-55% increase in the risk of developing obesity. There was also a consistent relationship between sleep deprivation and increases in aggression, anxiety, depression and a general lowering of mood, as well as significant impacts on one’s ability to process emotional triggers.

The evidence is conclusive. Chronically insufficient sleep - not just in duration, but also in quality - is incredibly detrimental to your health and wellbeing. That’s probably why Matthew Walker - author of Why We Sleep - claims sleep to be ‘the single most effective thing you can do to reset your brain and body health’25. You’ll sleep when you die? Careful what you wish for.

Working with our biology

If there’s one lesson to be taken away from this, it’s that it’s very hard to outwit evolution. We are the culmination of billions of years of natural tinkering. True evolutionary change happens on a timescale far longer than we can comprehend. To think that we can introduce something as invasive as around-the-clock artificial light and not have it butt heads with the biological mechanisms within us so finely tuned by evolution is, at best, foolish.

What to do then? Work with our biology, of course.

What this looks like is quite simple. Try, as best as you can, to emulate our ancestors - to follow the daily cycle of the sunrise and sunset. When you wake, get as much natural light on your eyes as you can 26. Even if it’s an overcast day, don’t worry - sunlight is a lot more potent than you think.

Similarly, throughout the day accumulate as much natural light on your eyes as possible27. If you can’t get outside, simply working beside a window seems to go a long way28 . And if that’s not possible, artificial light which goes some way towards emulating sunlight also may have beneficial impacts on daytime wakefulness and perceived sleep quality29.

In the evening, as the sun is going down, we should also be transitioning to dimmer, higher wavelength light environments. Specifically, that means dimmer bulbs - if you have a dimmer switch, even better - warmer coloured bulbs, or if you’re anything like Ebenezer and I, candles.

The science does indicate that it seems to be better to limit the use of blue-light emitting devices several hours before bed30. Phones not only emit blue light, but what you consume whilst using them also seems to lead to poorer quality sleep31. My guess is that the same could be said for televisions.

Unfortunately, even eReaders seem to reduce sleep quality when compared to reading a print book32. You might think that reading at all may negatively impact sleep, however it actually seems to be the case that reading before bed improves sleep quality33 - subjectively at least. I’m not one to promote fads, but the trend of “going analogue” may actually be on to something when it comes to improving your sleep.

If you find old habits die hard though, there are still measures you can take to mitigate the impact that digital devices might have on your sleep. A 2023 study indicates that reducing the blue light emitting from your digital device - in other words, turning on “night light” - improves subjective sleep quality. Although the jury is till out on blue-light blocking glasses, there does appear to be some evidence supporting their use for improving sleep34. Every little helps.

Please don’t perceive the above as doctrinal - they are more reflective of the steps that I take to ensure I get as good a nights sleep as possible based on the scientific literature. I wish not to be perceived as pontificating on the matter, primarily because I am no expert, but also because individual context matters.

For a start, some people are simply less sensitive to light than others. For example, in one study 50% melatonin suppression was achieved for some individuals at 10 lux - about as bright as a full moon on a clear night. On the other hand, one individual required 400 lux to achieve the same level of melatonin suppression35. Those in the latter camp will be able to “consume” an evening light diet far greater than those in the former without it affecting their sleep.

Also, some people simply won’t be able to abide by “ideal” light conditions. Maybe you or your partner are shift workers. Perhaps you have impaired vision and require much more light in the evening to see what you’re doing. Or, maybe you have a medical condition that means you are extremely sensitive to natural light and can’t get out during the day.

Having said that, for most people I would reiterate what I said above: there was no study I read that indicated that exposure to artificial light at night improves sleep. I would encourage everyone then to consider how much natural light they get during the day, how artificial light they surround themselves with in the evening, and whether that balance can be improved in even the most marginal manner. Because it isn’t just about improving your sleep - it might just save your life.

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References

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Aulsebrook, A.E., Jones, T.M., Mulder, R.A. and Lesku, J.A. (2018). Impacts of artificial light at night on sleep: A review and prospectus. Journal of Experimental Zoology Part A: Ecological and Integrative Physiology, 329(8-9), pp.409–418. doi:https://doi.org/10.1002/jez.2189.

Chang, A.-M., Aeschbach, D., Duffy, J.F. and Czeisler, C.A. (2015). Evening use of light-emitting eReaders negatively affects sleep, circadian timing, and next-morning alertness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, [online] 112(4), pp.1232–1237. doi:https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1418490112.

Chellappa, S.L. (2020). Individual differences in light sensitivity affect sleep and circadian rhythms. Sleep, 44(2). doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/sleep/zsaa214.

Chellappa, S.L., Steiner, R., Oelhafen, P., Lang, D., Götz, T., Krebs, J. and Cajochen, C. (2013). Acute exposure to evening blue-enriched light impacts on human sleep. Journal of Sleep Research, 22(5), pp.573–580. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/jsr.12050.

Devlin, H. (2025). Humans made fire 350,000 years earlier than previously thought, discovery in Suffolk suggests. [online] the Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/science/2025/dec/10/man-made-fire-350000-years-earlier-than-previously-known-after-discovery-in-suffolk.

Finucane, E., O’Brien, A., Treweek, S., Newell, J., Das, K., Chapman, S., Wicks, P., Galvin, S., Healy, P., Biesty, L., Gillies, K., Noel-Storr, A., Gardner, H., O’Reilly, M.F. and Devane, D. (2021). Does reading a book in bed make a difference to sleep in comparison to not reading a book in bed? The People’s Trial—an online, pragmatic, randomised trial. Trials, [online] 22(1). doi:https://doi.org/10.1186/s13063-021-05831-3.

Harb, F., Hidalgo, M.P. and Martau, B. (2014). Lack of exposure to natural light in the workspace is associated with physiological, sleep and depressive symptoms. Chronobiology International, 32(3), pp.368–375. doi:https://doi.org/10.3109/07420528.2014.982757.

He, M., Chen, H., Li, S., Ru, T., Chen, Q. and Zhou, G. (2023). Evening prolonged relatively low melanopic equivalent daylight illuminance light exposure increases arousal before and during sleep without altering sleep structure. Journal of sleep research (Print), 33(4). doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/jsr.14113.

Huberman, A. (2021). Dr. Matthew Walker: The Science & Practice of Perfecting Your Sleep | Huberman Lab Podcast #31. YouTube. Available at:

Kimberly, B. and James R., P. (2009). AMBER LENSES TO BLOCK BLUE LIGHT AND IMPROVE SLEEP: A RANDOMIZED TRIAL. Chronobiology International, 26(8), pp.1602–1612. doi:https://doi.org/10.3109/07420520903523719.

Montanari, A., Wang, L., Birenboim, A. and Chaix, B. (2025). Circadian entrainment and circadian disruption: the impact of sunlight and artificial light at night on sleep stages in a 7-day sensor-based study (Preprint). doi:https://doi.org/10.2196/preprints.75898.

National Institute of General Medical Sciences (2023). Circadian Rhythms. [online] National Institute of General Medical Sciences (NIGMS). Available at: https://www.nigms.nih.gov/education/fact-sheets/Pages/circadian-rhythms.

National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (2024). Brain basics: Understanding sleep. [online] National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke. Available at: https://www.ninds.nih.gov/health-information/public-education/brain-basics/brain-basics-understanding-sleep.

Prayag, A., Münch, M., Aeschbach, D., Chellappa, S. and Gronfier, C. (2019). Light Modulation of Human Clocks, Wake, and Sleep. Clocks & Sleep, 1(1), pp.193–208. doi:https://doi.org/10.3390/clockssleep1010017.

Randjelović, P., Stojanović, N., Ilić, I. and Vučković, D. (2023). The effect of reducing blue light from smartphone screen on subjective quality of sleep among students. Chronobiology International, 40(3), pp.1–8. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/07420528.2023.2173606.

Roser, M. (2023). Technology over the Long Run. [online] Our World in Data. Available at: https://ourworldindata.org/technology-long-run.

Shah, A.S., Pant, M.R., Tulasiram Bommasamudram, Nayak, K.R., Spencer, Gallagher, C., K. Vaishali, Edwards, B.J., Tod, D., Davis, F. and Pullinger, S.A. (2025). Effects of Sleep Deprivation on Physical and Mental Health Outcomes: An Umbrella Review. American Journal of Lifestyle Medicine. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/15598276251346752.

Silvani, M.I., Werder, R. and Perret, C. (2022). The influence of blue light on sleep, performance and wellbeing in young adults: A systematic review. Frontiers in Physiology, [online] 13(943108). doi:https://doi.org/10.3389/fphys.2022.943108.

Viola, A.U., James, L.M., Schlangen, L.J. and Dijk, D. (2008). Blueenriched white light in the workplace improves selfreported alertness, performance and sleep quality. Scandinavian Journal of Work, Environment & Health, [online] 34(4), pp.297–306. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/40967721.

12

The final article in my series on the sustainability of Irish dairy and beef farming, though more accurately it has ventured into the sustainability of Irish agriculture more generally.

If you have read my previous articles on this topic, the findings of this one will hardly be surprising to you. As a result, I have tried to keep this one (relatively) short and sweet.

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times…

Since 2010, Teagasc have included a measure of economic viability in their annual National Farm Survey report series. Farms are classified under the headings “economically viable”, “economically sustainable” and “economically vulnerable”, which are defined as follows:

• Farms are considered economically viable if family farm income is sufficient to cover family labour (remunerated at the agricultural wage rate) and provide a 5% return on non-land assets

• Farms are considered economically sustainable if a farm is not economically viable, but a farmer and / or spouse is employed off-farm

• If a farm is neither considered economically viable or economically sustainable, then it is considered economically vulnerable

Before we move on, I have two brief comments to make on Teagasc’s definitions above.

First of all, it seems slightly strange to me that Teagasc equates economic sustainability with the supplementation of family farm income with off-farm income. In other words, a farm can be considered economically sustainable even if off-farm income is required to support the well-being of the farming family.

Teagasc’s definition of economic viability is more in line with what I would consider economically sustainable though, so this is more of a difference in semantics.

Secondly, the fluctuation in the classifications of economic performance - visible in the below graph - would indicate to me that these definitions are not particularly suitable for measuring the long-term economic sustainability of Irish farms.

For example, 28% of large farms were considered economically viable in 2023, which jumped to 43% in 2024. On paper such a leap might technically be possible when assessing the performance of a farm for a given year in isolation, but surely any reasonable measure of economic sustainability - or viability - must account for the fact that such dramatic fluctuations in viability are indicative of the inherent insecurity of farmers livelihoods, and should therefore be considered unsustainable.

Now that I have gotten that off my chest, let us examine the evolution of farms under Teagasc’s classifications.

The proportion of large farms considered economically viable by Teagasc has increased significantly, from 26% in 2010 to 43% in 2024. Although not as marked an increase, the proportion of small farms considered economically viable has also risen from 16% in 2015 to 19% in 2022.

Over the same period, there has also been a decrease in the proportion of large farms considered economically sustainable, and a notable decrease in the proportion of large farms considered economically vulnerable.

The years where both the National Farm Survey and Small Farm Survey were conducted - 2015 and 2020 - allow us to examine the classification of the entire farming population.

In 2015 about 21% of Irish farms were considered economically viable. Come 2020, that proportion had increased to about 29%. Although some might consider these proportions low, the trend appears positive.

However, it is also worth considering the totals underlying these proportions. Again taking 2015 and 2020, we can see that there are 9,422 additional farms classified as economically viable by Teagasc, 1,644 additional farms classified as economically sustainable, and 14,528 fewer economically vulnerable farms.

Taken at face value, those figures again seem positive. However, summing them equates to a net decrease in farms of 3,462.

This means that, between 2015 and 2020, about 3,462 farms had disappeared - either subsumed by larger farms or the land is no longer being farmed at all.

As is often the case then, two things seem to be true at once. Simultaneously the financial welfare of many farmers has improved, yet financial hardship - and associated problems, such as the absence of an heir - is likely the cause of many farmers having to abandon the family farm.

All of this aligns with the longer term trends we discussed in my previous article - a decline in the number of Irish farmers and the systemic concentration of land and income.

A dairy cash cow

Unsurprisingly, given the income distributions we discussed previously, dairy farming is by far the most economically viable farming system in Ireland. On the other hand, beef farming is much less financially rewarding, with the vast majority of farms either reliant on off-farm income or classified as economically vulnerable.

The geographic concentration of farming practices in Ireland means there is also a geographic concentration of prosperity.

Similar pattern are visible when examining family farm income. For example, successful dairy farms make far more than other farms…

…and are, on average, must less reliant on direct payments - or subsidisation - under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

A consequence of this is that farms in the regions where dairying is dominant - such as the South East and South West - not only have higher family farm incomes, but are also far less dependent on subsidisation than farms in other regions.

None of this is to say that I am against subsidisation of the agricultural sector per se. In fact the opposite is true - as I argue below, I believe that we should be willing to pay for a sustainable agricultural sector, be that through the market or through taxation. However, I also believe that if we are going to subsidise a sector, it should be an environmentally and socially sustainable one.

Dairy farm operators also have by far the lowest incidence of off-farm employment, with only 11% engaged in further employment in 2024. Contrast this with Cattle Rearing and Finishing farm operators, who are employed off-farm in 47% and 55% of cases (Dillon et al., 2025).

It is true, however, that the spouses of dairy farmers are employed off-farm at a rate much more in line with other farms. In fact, in 2024 the highest incidence of off-farm employment for the spouse of a farmer was on dairy farms, at 50% (Dillon et al., 2025).

However, the low rate of off farm-employment by dairy farm operators themselves is, to me, indicative that this source of off farm income is less of a necessity for the survival of the farm and instead an evidence of the spouses of farmers pursuing their own ambitions.

Under pressure

Rather than repeating the much longer arguments I put forward in my previous article, let me instead briefly summarise the implications of the above dynamics.

As I have argued, the current agricultural model in Ireland is characterised by concentration. Concentration in farm size, with small farms disappearing, subsumed by larger farmers. Concentration in income, with the incomes of most farms trailing far behind those of large, successful dairy farmers. Concentration in regional prosperity, with farms in the South and East fairing farm better than their counterparts in the North and West. The list goes on.

Extrapolate these trends out to the extremities of time and suddenly we have a monopolistic or oligopolistic structure controlling two critical aspects of Irish life - the land beneath our feet and the food we eat. I struggle to see how such dynamics - producing success to the successful - could be considered economically sustainable.

Why are we witnessing these dynamics though? Well, here is my (extremely generalised) hypothesis.

The economic system within which we go about our day-to-day is driven by profit maximisation and thus is predicated upon cost-minimisation. In other words, there is constantly a downward pressure on cost in order to maximise profit margin.

Rather than blaming some system in the abstract though, let us make this more personal. Think about when you go to do your weekly shop - would you rather pay more or less for you litre of milk or your sirloin steak? That’s what I thought.

The same goes for pretty much everything we buy. We want more, and we want to pay less for it. More recently, outsourcing to lower cost economies is the mechanism that has facilitated this, for the most part. It also has the convenient benefit of disconnecting the consumer from the producer of the good or service, alienating us from the poor conditions of workers or the low level of compensation they might receive.

The concentration evidenced in Irish agriculture is simply a localised manifestation of the downward pressure produced by our current economic system.

Now that is not to say that prices go always down. In fact the opposite is true. Our economic model specifically targets a stable inflation rate of about 2%. In apparent opposition to my hypothesis then, it is also true that milk and beef prices are higher now than they were 10 or 15 years ago (Statista, 2025; Bord Bia, 2026).

What is also important to remember though is that other costs involved in farming have also increased. Efficiency and scale become the critical factors then in turning a profit. Thus, over time, smaller farmers are squeezed out by larger farmers who have - amongst other things - the capacity to realise profit from the efficency of mass production. As a result, a large proportion of Irish farms - which are small - are loss-making and heavily dependent on subsidisation. Gradually, these farms are disappearing.

Fighting the tide

The current Irish dairy and beef farming systems are evidently economically unsustainable, with the livelihoods of both current farmers and prosperity of future generations threatened by the dynamics of concentration.

This is notwithstanding the fact that the fundamental link between the environment and the economy means that any system regarded as environmentally unsustainable is inherently economically unsustainable too.

At the root of this is the fact that, as John Gibbons aptly puts it, “food is in many regards too cheap” (Virgin Media News, 2022). Any sustainable agricultural system will require a fundamental, conscious shift in how we make economic decisions - ultimately, we will have to be willing to pay more for the food we eat.

This is even more important given we need to reduce agricultural output - as I have argued for - in order to realise an environmentally sustainable agricultural model. In other words, the price we pay should also account for the environmental damage not done by farming less intensively.

Is such an economic vision achievable though? Or, am I roaring into the howling gales of an economic system whose primary objective - profit maximisation - will overpower any change that opposes it?

Descending again from the abstract, let us return to the personal perspective. For example, would you, dear reader, be willing to go to your local supermarket and intentionally spend more on your groceries? Speaking for myself, certainly I am willing to pay a premium price for some products, but even that takes quite a conscious effort. Would I be willing to pay more for everything though? Maybe some day, but I am certainly a long way off that, particularly if I want such an instinct to completely replace a tendency towards thriftiness.

This raises an important question. Are thriftiness - searching for better value or a cheaper price - and the related obsession with “more” inherently human qualities? If so, would it be any surprise that an economic system that emphasises cost-minimisation emerged from such characteristics? Or, are these learned behaviours, reinforced by the incentives of the current economic system?

Either way, I remain hopeful. We are self-conscious animals. We can reflect on our behaviours and “unlearn” those that we perceive as negative. With time and effort, we can even overcome our instincts.

All that remains then is for the connection to be made that the current Irish beef and dairy farming systems are unsustainable. If you have read this series of articles, I think you might just agree.

References

Bord Bia (2026). Cattle Price Dashboard. [online] www.bordbia.ie. Available at: https://www.bordbia.ie/farmers-growers/prices-markets/cattle-trade-prices/cattle-price-dashboard/.

Dillon, E., Donnellan, T., Moran, B. and Lennon, J. (2025). Teagasc National Farm Survey 2024. [online] Teagasc. Available at: https://teagasc.ie/wp-content/uploads/uploads/media/website/publications/2025/NFSReport2024.pdf [Accessed 1 Dec. 2025].

Statista (2025). Ireland: Farm gate price of cow’s milk 2021. [online] Statista. Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1192350/farm-gate-price-cows-milk-ireland/ [Accessed 15 Jan. 2026].

Teagasc (n.d.). National Farm Survey Reports. [online] Teagasc. Available at: https://teagasc.ie/rural-economy/rural-economy/national-farm-survey/national-farm-survey-reports/ [Accessed 15 Jan. 2026].

Virgin Media News (2022). ‘Food is in many regards too cheap’ - John Gibbons on the Farming Producing Problem in Ireland. [online] www.youtube.com. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/shorts/YbOWSjV-SOg [Accessed 15 Jan. 2026].

Key Takeaways:

• Irish dairy and beef farming rest on deep cultural foundations, but decades of policy-driven intensification and marketisation since Ireland’s accession to the EEC have hollowed out the social structures that once sustained rural communities and small farmers.

• The current system systematically concentrates land, income and opportunity, with large dairy farms capturing a disproportionate share of agricultural income while other farms remain financially unviable and dependent on off-farm income.

• Farming employment, succession and regional balance are deteriorating, as farmers age, younger generations exit agriculture, and prosperity becomes geographically concentrated in the South and East, undermining the social fabric of rural Ireland.

• By eroding livelihoods, deepening inequality and degrading the environment, today’s Irish dairy and beef farming practices compromise both present wellbeing and the ability of future generations to meet their needs—and therefore cannot be considered socially sustainable.

Welcome back to my series assessing the sustainability of Irish dairy and beef farming.

In the first article, we examined environmental sustainability:

Today we are going to take a look at social sustainability.

To do so, I believe it is important to understand how cattle came to Ireland and became so synonymous with Irish agriculture.

A (very) brief history of cattle in Ireland

The arrival of cattle in Ireland (c. 4,000 BC - 1850’s AD)

Domesticated cattle were brought to Ireland some time during the Neolithic period, between 4,000 and 6,000 years ago (E. Estyn Evans, 1954; McCormick, 2014; Guiry et al., 2023). By the early medieval period - between 400 and 1,100 AD - cattle had become central to social and economic status in Ireland.

The archaeological record shows that, although mixed farming practices - from open pasture to closed forest canopy - lasted for millennia after the introduction of cattle, come the Iron Age, there was a shift towards the consistent practice of open-pasture cattle farming (Guiry et al., 2023). The Irish landscape was increasingly shaped by cattle husbandry, driving mass deforestation (Nairn, 2020; Guiry et al., 2023).

Not only were the locations of settlements increasingly dictated by cattle, but also the design and use of the settlements. Ringforts were structured specifically to protect animals, such as cattle, from raiders and wolves (Guiry et al., 2023), and Evans (1954) notes that cattle were often giving the shelter of the house during colder months.

Given the lack of written records until the arrival of Christianity in Ireland, as Evans (1954) and Guiry et al. 2023 note we don’t really understand why cattle became so important. Just that they were.

McCormick (2014) believes that Ireland’s temperate climate had at least something to do it. Such conditions are particularly suitable to pastoral farming, rather than arable - or crop - farming, as vegetation and grass grew consistently year round. McCormick (2014) recites several sources commenting on the quality of Irish pasture. For example, in the 1st Century AD one Pomponious Mela noted that ‘so luxuriant is the herbage, in quality both nutritious and savoury, that cattle eat their fill in a small part of the day, and if they are not restricted from feeding would have, by eating too long bust’.

This suitability to pastoral farming would seem to have led, in particular, to the reverence of the dairy cow during the early medieval period McCormick (2014). In fact, we can see just that reflected in early Brehon Law tracts referencing cattle ownership, in which bulls and “dry cows” were seen as less valuable than milk cows (Tovey, 2000; McCormick, 2014). Thus, we can infer that the principle value of the cow lay in its ability to provide milk. Dairy was a very important part of the Irish diet, and remains so to this day (Tovey, 2000).

As dairy products - such as milk and butter - were central to the Irish diet, they also served as an important “cash crop” for farmers (Tovey, 2000). Their exchange was used to pay land rents and trade for necessities that farmers could not produce themselves.

The wealth of mythology, folklore, and superstition in relation to cattle also point to their importance to Irish society and culture. Ireland’s most famous epic - An Táin Bó Cualinge - is the story of a cattle raid, for example. St. Brigid - one of Ireland’s most famous saints - is regarded as the patron saint of dairying and cowherding, and the protector of cattle (Evans, 1954). Many trees and flowers were held in superstition by the pastoral way of life. For example, the white leaves of the May Tree - or Hawthorn - were alleged to promise larger yields of milk (Evans, 1954). Evans (1954) also believes the abundance of “bog butter” uncovered is indicative of its role as an “offering” of some sort.

However, by the end of the early Medieval period, there appears to be evidence of a growth in arable farming, and a decline in the relative importance of cattle - though not a disappearance, of course (Evans, 1954; McCormick, 2014; Guiry et al. 2023).

Archaeological evidence suggests a growth in the diversity of crop types (McCormick, 2014; Guiry et al., 2023). The construction of raised raths in regions more suitable to arable farming became more prevalent, replacing ringforts - whose design was influenced significantly by the presence of livestock (McCormick, 2014; Guiry et al., 2023). There also appears to have been an increase in the construction of mills for processing grain around this time (McCormick, 2014; Guiry et al., 2023).

But why the sudden shift away from pastoral farming? McCormick (2014) and Guiry et al. (2023) suggest several compounding factors might have been at play.

Guiry et al. (2023) believe that the characteristics inherent in dairy-focussed pastoral farming - specifically the availability of pasture and the perishability of dairy produce - limited wealth accumulation. Thus, arable farming represented an opportunity to accumulate more wealth, as grain can be stored for years and therefore provides a more stable basis for silver-based commerce. With this came the decline of the economic importance of cattle.

More wealth for who, you might ask? According to McCormick (2014) this particular development represented a shift from subsistence and sufficiency farming to the accumulation of agriculture surplus - of abundance - in the psyche of the Irish political elite at the time.

Coinciding with and driven by this accumulation of agricultural surplus was a change in settlement patterns. There began the emergence of market towns - or ‘consumer communities’ as McCormick (2014) calls them. Such settlements represented a move away from self-sufficient communities engaged in reciprocal exchange, to market-based economies (McCormick, 2014; Guiry et al. 2023). As McCormick’s name for such settlements would imply, many inhabitants did not engage in agricultural production at all. Therefore, accompanying this settlement pattern shift was increased specialisation in and intensification of agricultural production.

All that was needed now was a lubricant to grease the wheels of exchange. The emergence of a silver-based economy saw to that, and correspondingly the exchange value of cattle declined (McCormick, 2014; Guiry et al. 2023).

These trends developed throughout the course of the later Medieval period and continued, according to Evans (1954), up to the 19th century with the persistent decline of the socio-economic importance of cattle up to the Great Famine (1845-1852), although traditional practices did survive in many parts of the country.

Evans (1954) believe that these developments were perpetuated - if not accelerated - by two primary factors. Firstly, the introduction of the potato and its replacing dairy produce - or bánbia, as they were referred to - as the staple of the Irish diet1. Secondly, the Plantation of Ulster (1609) and the Cromwellian Plantation (1649-1652) further drove the emergence of market towns and a money-based economy.

The emergence of the dairy cooperative movement (1850’s - 1970’s)

As a larger proportion of Irish farmers receded - rather, forced to recede - from farming, it became increasingly specialised. Evans (1954) notes that throughout the 18th century whole estates began to be dedicated to the production of dairy produce and increasingly sought profit through export. This practice particularly proliferated in the South of the country due at least in part, as Evans (1954) claims, to the favourable conditions for dairying there.

It is around this period we begin to see a geographical divide in dairy and beef farming, which we shall return to later in the article. For now, think larger dairying farms in the South and East of the country, and smaller beef farms in the North and West.

In response to the specialisation in dairy farming - which threatened the existence of the small farmer - the Irish cooperative movement emerged, with the first society being established in 1889 (Tovey, 2000).

According to Tovey (2000), the cooperatives began as a movement to promote the economic development of Irish agriculture and to protect Irish farmers from industrial capitalists and merchants. In essence, the cooperative movement sought to revive the spirit of meitheal in Irish farming - a system of mutual support, reciprocity and community unity.

However, the cooperative movement came to represent much more than that against the backdrop of the politically charged atmosphere of the late 19th and early 20th century according to Tovey (2000).

The cooperative movement became central to a vision for national development and the reorganisation of society. Central to their vision was the importance of rural Ireland. They were greatly concerned with the re-valuing of rural society - that the skills and culture of rural society would not be overlooked and allowed to diminish in a world becoming increasingly industrialised and urban.

However, such vision did not seek to ground Irish agriculture in the practices of the past. The cooperative movement were very much a “progressive” movement, promoting the technical improvement of Irish farming and modernisation of rural society in general too. Ultimately, they were supportive of industrialisation in agriculture driven by - and for - farmers, rather than an one spawning from the importation of industries with no indigenous links.

The cooperative movement spread quickly, with 70% of all creameries in the Republic of Ireland cooperatively owned by 1926 (Tovey, 2000). The cooperative ownership of creameries was seen as democratising access to the means of producing dairy - dairy farming was something that any farmer could aspire too as a result. Smaller landholders could remain in farming, equalising access to the rewards of dairying.

This aspirational vision of a community-based model where any farmer could aspire to dairy farming was to last until the 1970’s, when it would eventually butt heads with capitalist dogma.

Ireland’s accession to the EEC, the impact of the Common Agricultural Policy and the evolving role of the cooperatives (1970’s - Present)

The success of the cooperatives in particular meant that, prior to the 1970’s, Irish agriculture was dominated by smaller farms according to Gibbons (2025). However, since accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, farming has become an increasingly large-scale endeavour.

Upon entering the EEC, Irish agriculture came under the remit of Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Tovey (2000) believes that the focus of said policy was on increasing productivity. Particularly in dairying, this was accompanied by a cultural shift, with farms being managed as “businesses”. The financial perspective was preeminent, with farmers striving to maximise efficiency, output and, ultimately, profits.

Alongside this, according to Tovey (2000) there emerged an acceptance of a dualistic agricultural structure - that there would be winners and losers. This was in direct contrast to the egalitarian principles touted by the cooperative movement. Such a belief, accompanied by the drive for productivity gains, was used to justify subsidisation and concentration of investment in larger farmers, who were seen as more “technically progressive” and could produce more output.

For example, banks - seeking less risky investments - would favour large-scale commercial farmers with more regular cash flows (Tovey, 2000). Thus larger farmers, already better-off than smaller farmers, had easier access to capital which allowed them to invest further in their farm and expand production.

Driving these changes was that the needs of the agricultural sector were increasingly subordinated to the needs of the food industry (Tovey, 2000). Farmers were gradually redefined as inputs to the larger food industry and, as such, needed to become the type of supplier that the food industry wanted, or perish.

In dairying, cooperatives, who effectively had monopolistic control over milk processing in the 1970’s, began to see themselves as suppliers of milk, and they gave preference to larger, more productive farmers to satiate the food industry’s appetite.

The cooperatives were originally member-owned and functioned for the benefit of said members, as we have discussed. However, by the late 1970’s, many “members” of cooperatives were no longer dairy farmers or milk suppliers at all (Tovey, 2000). Cooperatives were being run as for-profit enterprises, and their ownership structures were increasingly reflecting that.

Come the 1980’s, the largest cooperatives were being floated on the Irish stock exchange - for example, Kerry Group in 1983 (Tovey, 2000). This laid the foundation for further erosion of the cooperative “member” - as it was traditionally understood. By 1996, the stake of “members” in Kerry Group had fallen below a majority holding for the first time. By 1998 about 60% of shares in Kerry Group were held by non-members, be they local shareholders or institutional investors.

The evolving relationship between the state, the agricultural sector and the food industry (1970’s - Present)

Although the Irish government and the agricultural sector have quite a cosy relationship nowadays, this was not always the case. In fact, the relationship between the National Farmers Association (NFA)2 - the largest agricultural representative association in Ireland - and the government was once all but friendly. For example, in 1967 then Taoiseach Jack Lynch threatened to have the NFA proscribed as a criminal organisation after months of demonstrations and unrest over agricultural rates (Gibbons, 2025).

Eventually though, the government yielded under the power of the NFA-turned-IFA. According to Gibbons (2025), the IFA were representative of about 40% of employees in Ireland during the 1960’s. Combined with the growing economic importance of the sector under the EEC’s CAP, by the end of the 20th century the IFA had leveraged their position to place themselves, as an Irish Farmers Journal (2015) article puts it, ‘at the centre of national decision making on agricultural policy’.

The closeness of the agricultural sector and the government has only increased since the abolition of the EU’s milk quotas in 2015. Removing the quotas represented a significant opportunity to stimulate economic growth in a post-financial crisis Ireland, and the government seized it with both hands. In 2010 it formally adopted an agri-food strategy to set out explicitly to expand the dairy sector - entitled ‘Food Harvest 2020’ - and it has never looked back (Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 2010; Läpple, Carter and Buckley, 2021; Gibbons, 2025).

Gibbon (2025) highlights numerous examples of the closeness of the relationship between the government and the agricultural sector:

• PR campaigns such as the Saoirse Ronan endorsed Origin Green programme launched by Bord Bia - a state agency - in 2012 to convince the public of the environmental sustainability of Irish agriculture3. Other attempts by Bord Bia to influence Irish consumers, include a proposal that a PR company be established to combat a ‘negative mainstream narrative’ in relation to the sustainability of Irish agriculture and the formulation of media campaigns with the objective of ‘win[ning] back vegetarians and vegans’.

• Taxation policy that directly subsidises agriculture by providing VAT exemptions on farming inputs such as animal feeds, fertilisers and agricultural diesel - something the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has recommended be removed, but whose advice has yet to be heeded.

• Ignoring or blatantly denying the environmental impact of certain agricultural practices, such as in 2023 when members of the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Agriculture, Food and the Marine dismissed the findings of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on the negative impact of fertiliser use on water quality as ‘unscientific’.

The omission of a single mention of a shift towards a more plant-based diet in the latest Climate Action Plan (CAP) (2025) and the recent renewal of the nitrates derogation for Irish agriculture - a ‘key priority’ for Minister for Agriculture Martin Heydon apparently (Cox, 2025) - serve to only further highlight the political support for “business-as-usual” in the agricultural sector.

Such a tightly-knit relationship between the government and the agricultural sector could easily be conveyed as the benevolent state’s keen concern for the small, rural farmer and their communities. Don’t be so easily fooled.

In the wake of protests in Dublin in 2019, Murphy, Cannon and Walsh (2022) found that beef farmers believe that large organisations - such as the Irish government and the IFA - do not represent the interests of small-scale, local farming communities.

Gibbons (2025) similarly asserts that the interests of the local farmer are usurped by those of the agri-food sector and its major players. In fact, he claims their lobbying power enables them to effectively write Irish agricultural policy.

Key Takeaways:

• Cattle have been central to Irish society for millennia, shaping land use, settlement patterns, diet, law and culture. Dairy production has been particularly revered historically.

• Over time, Irish agriculture shifted from subsistence pastoralism to surplus-driven, market-based production, weakening the social and economic role of cattle as wealth accumulation, commodification and urbanisation took hold from the end of the early medieval period onwards.

• The cooperative movement temporarily rebalanced power in favour of small farmers, democratising access to dairying and embedding agriculture in rural development, but this model was progressively dismantled after Ireland’s entry to the EEC in the 1970’s.

• Since the 1970s, policy, capital and state support have favoured scale, productivity and agri-food interests, concentrating ownership and decision-making, eroding farmer autonomy, and laying the foundations for today’s socially unsustainable dairy and beef system.

Where are we today?

That whistlestop tour of Irish agriculture, and dairy and beef farming in particular, bring us right up to today. Such a history has led to particular characteristics that we need to discuss further in order to determine the social sustainability of Irish dairy and beef farming. Namely the waning employment in dairy and beef farming, the concentration of success in Irish agriculture - particularly in dairy farming - and the social impact of the environmental damage being done by dairy and beef farming.

Waning employment in dairy and beef farming

Of course, measuring the social and cultural importance of anything is always going to be an extremely difficult and subjective task. Some might argue that we eat more food today than at any point in history, therefore the agricultural sector - or the agricultural way of life - are as socially and culturally relevant as ever, at least indirectly.

Another, more direct measure might the the number of people employed in agriculture4. This isn’t because whatever is of social and cultural importance is captured in the labour market, but instead that employment patterns paint a picture of how people spend their time, and ultimately that does have a bearing on society and culture.

As we’ve discussed above, at one point in Irish history almost the entire population would have been engaged in agriculture. However, that proportion has been steadily declining for quite some time. In the 1960’s about 40% of the labour force were employed in agriculture (Gibbons, 2025). Today, that figure stands at about 3.7%.

Although total employment today in the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector are down significantly compared to 1998, these figures have effectively stagnated since the mid 2000’s. So, we can conclude that - at a high-level - the declining relative importance of the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector as an employer is driven more so by comparative increases in employment in other sectors.

Totals obscure a more nuanced regional distribution. The importance of the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector as an employer is more pronounced outside of the Greater Dublin Area (GDA) particularly in the Border, Western and Southern regions of the country.

However, even in the areas where Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing are larger employers, the proportion of employment in said sector has fallen over the last decade or so.

Despite this, the total amount of employment in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing has actually increased in several regions.

Now, admittedly the above figures underestimate the true number of people who engage regularly in farm work. For example, the contribution of part-time labour is not accurately represented. Nor is the work of the wives of farmers which, according to Tovey (2000), is ‘notoriously underestimated’.

These figures also don’t include agricultural-adjacent employment - such as dairy and meat processing - which Dillon, Hennessy and Hynes (2010) note are significant employers, particularly in regional areas.

Nonetheless, it would still be fair to say that the number of people engaged in either direct or indirect employment in agriculture close to - if not at - an all time low. Why is that?

A critical factor has been the decreasing propensity of the children of farmers to take over the family farm. When writing in 2000, Tovey claimed that there was a trend towards educating children out of farming, and that dairy farming in particular was seen as a source of income with which to do this. It is also worth noting that dairy farm profits were increasingly being invested beyond the farm, in order to add to family wealth and financial security.

Dillon, Hennessy and Hynes (2010) similarly note the ageing of the average farm owner, and the increasing likelihood that the younger generation will choose not to take over the family farm.

The most recent Census of Agriculture confirms the hypothesis that farmers are ageing and that there is a diminishing younger cohort replacing them.

As a result, farmers are increasingly uncertain about the future of their farms. In the 2022 Small Farms Report - which accounts for 47,000 of the total 135,000 farms in Ireland - Dillon et al. (2024) found that only 56% of farmers aged over 60 had identified a successor for the farm. Of those, 22% believed that successor would not continue to farm, and 10% were unsure what the successor would do with the farm.

A key questions remains unanswered though - why are younger generations turning away from the agricultural way of life? Well, we will return to the economic sustainability of Irish agriculture in the next article, but as it is impossible to divorce social and economic sustainability, it is worth noting for now that many authors cite the financial difficulty of farming and the widening gap between agricultural and non-agricultural incomes as a critical drivers of this trend.

A related factor we will examine in this article though is the concentration of success in Irish agriculture, particularly in dairy farming.

Success to the successful

The dynamics in Irish agriculture can be described as what Donella Meadows (2008) would call the ‘success to the successful’ trap.

In such a system, the “winners”, so to speak, are systematically rewarded with the means to win again. This creates a reinforcing feedback loop by which - if it is allowed to proceed uninhibited - the “winners” eventually take all.

Such dynamics are evident in the structure of Irish farms. Consider, for example, that the number of Irish farms has fallen by about 21% (35,600 farms) since 1991 and correspondingly the average farm size has increased by about 28% (7.4 ha) (Central Statistics Office, 2021).

This concentration is even more evident when we consider the distribution of farm size. Since 2010 - a period during which the total number of farms decreased by 5,000 (3.4%) - the proportion of smaller farms, which I am defining as farms of less than 30 ha in size, has decreased from about 54% (about 75,500 farms) to 48% (about 65,000 farms5). In contrast, the proportion of farms larger than 50 ha in size has increased from about 22% (about 31,000 farms) to 28% (about 38,000 farms)

In short, there are increasingly less farms in Ireland and those that remain are getting larger.

This concentration of agricultural land use has meant that, although the total number of people employed in agriculture and the total number of farms have fallen since the 1990’s, agricultural output has been able to rise dramatically.

There have also been downsides though.

The most obvious is that income from increased agricultural output is distributed highly unequally, flowing disproportionately to larger farmers. Consider the distribution of dairy farm income by farm size from the National Farm Survey.

True, the largest absolute losses are incurred by the largest farm owners. However, the median income of a farm in excess of 100 ha in size is about 7-8 times larger than the income of a farm less than 20 ha in size. The income of the highest earning farm in excess of 100 ha in size is about 11 times that of the highest earning farm of less than 20 ha in size.

In general then, the larger the dairy farm, the more income that farm generates.

It is a similar story in beef farming6 too…

As Tovey (2000) points out, there has emerged a divide between large, successful dairy farmers and not just other dairy farmers or other large farmers, but all other farmers.

Dairy farms - accounting for only 17% of 88,000 farms covered in the National Farm Survey, which omits the 47,000 mainly beef and sheep farms covered by the Small Farms Survey - accrue a disproportionate slice of the agricultural pie, with 52% of farming income flowing to them in 2024.

A disproportionately high number of dairy farmers (46%) have incomes of more than €100,000. The only other farming type with any farms generating an income in excess of €100,000 is “Cattle Other”, and only 3% of said farms do so. These distributions would be even more unequal if they included the 48,000 mainly beef and sheep farms covered by the Small Farms Survey, all of which produce less than €8,000 worth of output per annum.

The inequality in income distribution is even more impactful when we consider the geographic distribution of farm types.

As I mentioned above, dairy farming is particular dominant in the south and east of the country.

Meanwhile, beef and sheep farming are more prevalent in the north and west - though there are exceptions of course, such as Kerry and Wicklow, where sheep farming is particularly prominent.

Of course, some degree of clustering in farming practices might be expected due to the characteristics of the land in a particular region. In the Irish case though, the prosperity of dairy farming means that the most lucrative type of farming is also regionally concentrated.

Whilst in the South and East of the country, farmers are more likely to thrive, farmers in the North and West are much more likely to suffer an altogether different fate, one marked by financial difficulty.

The geographic concentration of financial hardship in Irish agriculture means that those living in the North and West of the country - where the relative importance agricultural employment remains highest - are most at risk.

It is testament to the determination of these farmers and the importance of farming to their identity that they persist. As both Murphy, Cannon and Walsh (2022) and Gibbons (2025) point out, farmers continue to farm, even when it not longer makes financial sense, because they see it as a way of life.

Considering the above developments though, is it any surprise that Irish farmers feel their identity is being eroded - that their sense of self is under threat (Murphy, Cannon and Walsh, 2022). Facing the pressures of a system designed to subsume the small farm, the small farmer is - quite literally - facing extinction.

Irish dairy and beef farming are often portrayed as a success story, and in some ways this is true. However, the reality is that such a “success story” is the tale of the few. The many are unrepresented by such a narrative, and the organisations that promote it.

The social impact of environmental degradation

In my first article in this series I outlined the negative impacts that current Irish dairy and beef farming practices are having on the environment. I’m not going to rehash those here, but I am going to add a brief note on the social impact of environmental degradation.

It’s quite simple really. Current agricultural practices contribute to climate change, biodiversity loss, and the degradation of water quality. The long-term impact will be a decrease in the capacity of the land to yield for future generations of farmers the fruits their ancestors reap today.

These impacts spread beyond farmers too of course. Climate change, biodiversity loss, the quality of water - these effect everyone. Changing rainfall patterns and rising temperatures, for example, threaten the safety and security of everyone on the planet.

The inherent interconnection between natural and social systems - the environmental and social dimensions of sustainability - mean that an environmentally unsustainable agricultural system is also, fundamentally, a socially unsustainable system.

Key Takeaways:

• Employment and participation in dairy and beef farming have declined to historic lows, with farmers ageing, succession increasingly uncertain, and younger generations turning away from farming.

• Irish agriculture exhibits a clear “success to the successful” dynamic, where policy, capital and scale systematically favour larger farms—particularly dairy—while smaller beef and sheep farms are rendered economically marginal or unviable.

• Income, opportunity and hardship are increasingly concentrated geographically, with prosperous dairying clustered in the South and East, and financially vulnerable beef and sheep farming dominating the North and West.

• Environmental degradation caused by current dairy and beef systems directly undermines social wellbeing, threatening future farming livelihoods and collective human security. Environmentally unsustainable agriculture is inherently socially unsustainable.

Are Irish dairy and beef farming “socially sustainable”?

In my previous article I outlined several definitions of sustainability. As I noted, in all definitions there were commonalities.

Of particular relevance to the question of the “social sustainability” of Irish dairy and beef farming are that there exists thresholds - environmental limits and social foundations - beyond which we cannot pass, and that our actions today - to meet our own needs - cannot compromise the ability of future generations to meet their needs.

In order for Irish dairy and beef farming to be considered “socially sustainable”, I believe the following criteria need to be met at a minimum:

• Do current Irish dairy and beef farming practices provide a minimum standard of living to all farmers?

• Is the income generated in Irish dairy and beef farming equally distributed?

• Do current Irish dairy beef farming practices threaten the ability of future generations to meet their own needs?

As I’ve demonstrated above, many Irish dairy and beef farms are not financially viable. Even those considered “financially sustainable” require farm income to be supplemented with an off-farm source of income. Financial pressure means that the current generation are increasingly forced to abandon the family farm, and future generations are less and less likely to take it over. For many, the agricultural way of life is no longer considered viable.

The income generated in Irish agriculture is also extremely unequally distributed. For a start, income flows disproportionately to larger farms. Second of all, Irish dairy farms accrue a disproportionate portion of all agricultural income. Large, successful dairy farmers in particular represent a cross-section of these two characteristics, with incomes far greater than all other farmers in Ireland.

Finally, the environmental degradation caused by current Irish dairy and beef farming practices threatens the ability of future generations to provide for their own needs.

Ultimately, your opinion on the social sustainability of Irish dairy and beef farming will be shaped by your acceptance of a tendency towards monopoly and, thus, an acceptance of a dualistic agricultural structure - that there will be winners and losers, as it were. If you are comfortable with this, then you will likely disregard at least some - if not all - of the criteria I have outlined above.

I, however, do not believe that a tendency towards monopoly - or at least oligopoly - does represent a socially sustainable future for Irish dairy and beef farming. Or any economic sector, for that matter.

Can we achieve “socially sustainable” agriculture?

Poux and Albert (2018) demonstrated the technical feasibility of an environmentally and socially sustainable agricultural and food systems. Whether we can manifest such systems is an entirely different question.

To do so requires fundamental social and cultural shifts. Embracing a mindset of sufficiency, reimagining ourselves as nautre’s harmonious partner - not her masters - and adopting egalitarian principles in favour of an acceptance of winners and losers.

This shifts will require radical changes to existing provisioning systems, such that they prioritise equality in distribution, and mechanisms that penalise concentration, breaking us out of the ‘success to the succesful' trap.

Behind all of this is will need to be the political will to bring about these changes. To stand strong in the face of dissent from vested interests and place the needs of the many over the needs of the few.

Key Takeaways:

• Irish dairy and beef farming do not meet minimum social sustainability thresholds, as many farms are financially unviable, incomes are highly unequal, and environmental degradation threatens the ability of future generations to meet their needs.

• The current system depends on—and normalises—a dualistic structure of winners and losers, with income and opportunity concentrating among large dairy farms while smaller farms are systematically marginalised.

• Socially sustainable agriculture is technically feasible but politically constrained, requiring a decisive shift away from concentration and accumulation toward sufficiency and equity. The political will to challenge vested agri-food interests will be critical.

“You hate farmers”

It is quite easy to paint someone such as myself - arguing for a decrease in agricultural output, specifically in dairy and beef farming - as foe. The enemy of the farmer, opponent of the agricultural way of life and the bane of rural communities. I empathise with the instinct, but this could not be farther from the truth.

First of all, not all farmers are the same. As I have outlined above, large farmers are -for the most part - not doing too badly. It is the small farmer - a category to which the majority of Irish farmers belong - that I am concerned about.

The enemy of the small farmer are the existing agricultural and food systems. It is these very systems that are squeezing the small farmer, forcing them and their families to abandon a way of life that has often run in the family for generations.

Second of all, as about two-thirds of Irish land is dedicated to agricultural use, I recognise the important role that farmers can play as stewards of the land. [Note role of local farmers in communities]. However, I am in favour of an agricultural model that is both socially and environmentally just, which the current model is not.

What I am not in favour of is the following. The reckless abandon with which current Irish agricultural practices - in particular dairy farming - strive to grow output without any consideration for the environmental impact of their actions. The completely unequal distribution of income that characterises contemporary Irish agriculture, and the concentration of farm size that facilitates it. The usurpation of the needs of the small, local farmer by those of larger farmers, the food industry that they supply, and the supporting of this by a government speaking out both sides of its mouth - claiming to care for the wellbeing of small farmers whilst simultaneously watching them suffer.

The keen reader will notice a touch of irony in this article. Who am I, after all, to opine on dairy and beef farming? Whilst I have done my best to represent a variety of view points and included sources that attempt to capture the sentiment of small farmers, fundamentally I can only observe as an outsider. I am not a farmer myself, nor are my immediate family to any significant degree. Given that I have bashed the lack of representation of the small farmer, is it not ironic then that I purport to speak on their behalf - do I not risk perpetuating this lack of representation?

Firstly, I certainly do not claim to represent any interests but my own. Unabashedly, those interests are, primarily, for all to live a decent life within the planet’s ecological boundaries. Without being a farmer, I can still engage intellectually with question of whether Irish agriculture exhibits characteristics aligned with those interests.

Secondly, in changing the agricultural and food systems to align more with those interests, I would certainly not claim doctrinal supremacy. In fact, I believe that transformations to the these systems must have, at their core, the small farmer - of whom the majority of farmers are. Change should be led by farmers, so that it is enacted with and for them, not enforced upon them. As I have related above, that is the fundamental issue with the existing agricultural and food systems - that the needs of the few outweigh the needs of the many.

Of course, I recognise judging dairy and beef farming practices as environmentally and socially unsustainable is subjective, but this is unavoidable if I am have an opinion. I will allow myself such prescription in the face of the evidence from my investigations. Anyone who wishes to defend the status quo needs to provide evidence to the contrary.

Key Takeaways:

• Critiquing the system is not attacking farmers - the real pressure on small farmers comes from agricultural and food systems that concentrate land, income, and power, not from calls for reform or reduced output.

• Farmers can be essential land stewards, but the current systems are unjust. They drive environmental damage, deep inequality, and farm consolidation, all of which undermine rural communities rather than protecting them.

• Change must be farmer-led and centred on small farmers, with reforms designed with and for those most affected, rather than imposed by agri-food corporations or a state that prioritises the interests of the few.

References

Central Statistics Office (2021). Census of Agriculture 2020 - Preliminary Results - CSO - Central Statistics Office. [online] www.cso.ie. Available at: https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-coa/censusofagriculture2020-preliminaryresults/ [Accessed 3 Dec. 2025].

Cox, A. (2025). Three-year extension of nitrates derogation granted. [online] RTE.ie. doi:urn:epic:1547979.

Department for the Environment, Climate & Communications (2025). Climate Action Plan. [online] Available at: https://assets.gov.ie/static/documents/c491032e/DECC_Climate_Action_Plan_2025_Main_Report_-_Final_Web.pdf.

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (2010). Food Harvest 2020. [online] Gov.ie. Available at: https://assets.gov.ie/static/documents/food-harvest-2020.pdf.

Dillon, E., Donnellan, T., Moran, B. and Lennon, J. (2025). Teagasc National Farm Survey 2024. [online] Teagasc. Available at: https://teagasc.ie/wp-content/uploads/uploads/media/website/publications/2025/NFSReport2024.pdf [Accessed 1 Dec. 2025].

Dillon, E., Donnellan, T., Moran, B., Lennon, J. and Buckley, C. (2024). Teagasc National Farm Survey Small Farms Report 2022. [online] Available at: https://teagasc.ie/wp-content/uploads/media/website/publications/2024/NFS_Smallfarms_Report2022.pdf.

E. Estyn Evans (1954). DAIRYING IN IRELAND THROUGH THE AGES. International Journal of Dairy Technology, 7(4), pp.179–188. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0307.1954.tb00822.x.

Environmental Protection Agency (2024). EPA Prosecutes Arrabawn Co-Operative Society Limited (P0791-03). [online] Environmental Protection Agency. Available at: https://www.epa.ie/our-services/compliance--enforcement/whats-happening/prosecutions-and-penalties/prosecutions-2024/epa-prosecutes-arrabawn-co-operative-society-limited-p0791-03.php.

Gibbons, J. (2025). The Lie of the Land. Random House.

Guiry, E., Beglane, F., Szpak, P., McCormick, F., Teeter, M.A., Cheung, C. and Richards, M.P. (2023). Changing human-cattle relationships in Ireland: a 6000-year isotopic perspective. Antiquity, [online] 97(396), pp.1436–1452. doi:https://doi.org/10.15184/aqy.2023.163.

Irish Farmers Journal (2015). IFA launches ‘The Path to Power’ - a 60-year history of the organisation. [online] Irish Farmers Journal. Available at: https://www.farmersjournal.ie/news/news/ifa-launches-the-path-to-power-a-60-year-history-of-the-organisation-179444 [Accessed 16 Dec. 2025].

Läpple, D., Carter, C.A. and Buckley, C. (2021). EU milk quota abolition, dairy expansion, and greenhouse gas emissions. Agricultural Economics, 53(1). doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12666.

McCormick, F. (2014). Agriculture, settlement and society in Early Medieval Ireland. Quaternary International, 346, pp.119–130. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.quaint.2013.10.040.

Meadows, D.H. (2008). Thinking in Systems: A Primer. White River Junction, Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing.

Murphy, S.P., Cannon, S.M. and Walsh, L. (2022). Just transition frames: Recognition, representation, and distribution in Irish beef farming. Journal of Rural Studies, 94, pp.150–160. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2022.06.009.

Nairn, R. (2020). A brief history of Ireland’s native woodlands. [online] Coillte. Available at: https://www.coillte.ie/a-brief-history-of-irelands-native-woodlands/.

Poux, X. and Aubert, P.-M. (2018). An agroecological Europe in 2050: multifunctional agriculture for healthy eating. [online] Available at: https://www.iddri.org/sites/default/files/PDF/Publications/Catalogue%20Iddri/Etude/201809-ST0918EN-tyfa.pdf.

Tovey, H. (2000). Milk and modernity: dairying in contemporary Ireland. Research in Rural Sociology and Development, 18, pp.47–73. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/s1057-1922(00)80005-0.

Key Takeaways:

• Irish beef and dairy farming practices are not environmentally sustainable.

• Dairy and beef are comparatively GHG emission intensive sources of protein due to the enteric fermentation process inherent in cattle.

• Although reductions in the emission intensity - as measured by emissions by unit of food-stuff, for example - of dairy and beef are certainly possible, any potential reductions in overall GHG emissions will be eroded partially, if not entirely, by increases in dairy and beef output.

• Adopting an agroecological approach offers an opportunity to develop an environmentally sustainable food system.

• Such a system will require a decrease in food consumption, particularly animal-based sources of protein. As a result, dairy and beef farming output will have to fall and, thus, dairy and beef herd size.

• Dairy and beef can remain important parts of the diet in an environmentally sustainable food system - just in smaller quantities.

Increasingly, the sustainability of Irish agriculture is coming into question.

Agriculture accounts for the largest proportion of Ireland’s Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, and levels remain stubbornly high. The number of Irish farmers is steadily declining and disappearing with them could be a way of life once critical to rural society (Central Statistics Office, 2021). And finally, a huge proportion of Irish farms are no longer financially viable, with success increasingly concentrated amongst a cohort of larger farmers (Dillon et al., 2024; Dillon et al., 2025). Not to mention that - alongside the predominance of dairy and beef farming - all of these factors cast doubt on Irish food security.

Thus, an examination of the sustainability of Irish agriculture - and Irish dairy and beef farming in particular - is necessary.

Cattle are synonymous with Irish agriculture. According to the last Census of Agriculture, specialist dairy and beef farms accounted for 66% of all Irish farms (Central Statistics Office, 2021). As of December 2024, 55% of all Irish farm animals were cattle (Central Statistics Office, 2025).

Any investigation of Irish agriculture is inherently an investigation of dairy and beef farming.

Beginning with environmental sustainability, this is the first in a series of articles in which I will attempt to assess the sustainability of Irish dairy and beef farming. Subsequent articles will deal with the social and economic perspectives on sustainability.

Where do we stand on agricultural emissions?

There are several areas that dairy and beef farming impact on the environment - namely the climate, biodiversity and water quality. In this article, I am going to focus on the impact of dairy and beef farming on the climate.

The agricultural sector is by far and away the largest emitting sector in Ireland, account for approximately 38% of GHG emissions in 2024.

If we expand our understanding of agriculture beyond an “economic sector” to a more holistic one - the way that we use land - then the proportion of GHG emissions both directly and indirectly attributable to agriculture grows even larger, to over 40% in 20241.

The prevalence of dairy and beef farming in Ireland mean that overall agricultural emissions are closely tied to the fate of the dairy and beef sectors - the below figure illustrates just how closely.

Whilst overall herd size has fallen in comparison to 2005, it is also important to note that, although there remains over three times the amount of non-dairy cattle in Ireland, the dairy herd has grown in size dramatically.

This was no coincidence, as John Gibbons (2025) points out in his new book The Lie of the Land. The Irish Government officially adopted a strategy to expand the dairy sector around 2010 in order to stimulate economic growth following the financial crisis of 2008/09. The strategy sought to take advantage of the proposed end to the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Milk Quotas, which were abolished in 2015.

The policy has certainly worked. In both the years building up to and following the abolition of the milk quotas, the dairy herd grew dramatically. In contrast, there has been a contraction of the number of other - i.e. beef - cattle.

It is hardly surprising then that agricultural - and thus dairy and beef farming - emissions have remained stubbornly high, and are projected to fall short of the current target to reduce agricultural emissions by 25% based on 2018 levels.

I’m going to assume that you, dear reader, believe in climate science - the radiative forcing of GHGs, the resultant warming effect and so on - and thus believe we ought to do something about climate change. Consequently, it is clear that, if Ireland is to pull its weight in the climate battle then dairy and beef farming emissions will have to come down.

Before we investigate what can be done though, we first need to understand where GHG emissions come from in Irish dairy and beef farming.

Key Takeaways:

• Agriculture is the largest emitting sector in Ireland - even more so if you include the indirect emissions from changes in land-use to accommodate pasture for grazing cattle.

• The prevalence of dairy and beef farming in Ireland mean that the size of the cattle herd is correlated strongly with overall agricultural emissions.

• Although the dairy herd accounts for a smaller proportion of all the cattle in Ireland, this proportion is growing - and rapidly. Since 2010, there has been an explicit strategy to expand the Irish dairy herd to capitalise on the abolition of the EU CAP Milk Quotas in 2015.

• Ireland is projected to fall significantly short of its targeted agricultural emission reductions of 25% (based on 2018 levels).

Where do emissions from Irish dairy and beef farming come from?

Enteric fermentation - the process by which ruminant animals digest food - feed sources, manure management, fertiliser and energy use are amongst the key contributors to GHG emissions from dairy and beef farming. Many factors affect the contribution of each to a farm’s overall GHG emissions.

For example, in an Australian study, Dida, Garcia and Gonzalez (2025) found that the composition of GHG emissions on dairy farms depends on whether the farm operated a pastoral or confinement model.

Generally though, the largest contributor to GHG emissions on either dairy or beef farms is the process of enteric fermentation, which produces methane (Crosson et al., 2011; Herron, O’Brien and Shalloo, 2022; Džermeikaitė, Krištolaitytė and Ramūnas Antanaitis, 2024). The contribution of other potential sources depends on a particular farms fertiliser use, manure management practices and so on.

In the Irish case, emissions from enteric fermentation account for the vast majority of agricultural emissions - hardly surprising given that two thirds of Irish farms are specialise in cattle and 87% of Irish farm animals are ruminants2. The next largest categories are emissions from agricultural soils and manure management.

Emissions from agricultural soils are accounted for, mostly, by the application of nitrogen based fertilisers - be they natural or synthetic - to soils so that sufficient grass can grow to support the pastoral model of Irish dairy and beef farming. A by-product of this process is the release of nitrous oxide, a GHG with warming potential 273 times larger than that of carbon dioxide.

Emissions from manure management are typically higher on confinement-based farms. Given the primarily pastoral nature of Irish dairy and beef farming, it makes sense that manure management would represent a comparatively lower proportion of Irish agricultural GHG emissions.

The above represent only the emissions attributable directly to the agricultural sector - due to the classification system used by the EPA, emissions from Land-Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) are measured separately. In other words, the above emissions don’t reflect the totality of the impact that agriculture has on the way we use land.

Although the LULUCF “sector” is typically a carbon sink in other EU nations, in Ireland it is a source of emissions (National Economic and Social Council, 2023). In 2024, the vast majority of emissions from LULUCF came from grasslands and wetlands, which have been drained for peat extraction and grazing pastures3.

Key Takeaways:

• The majority of Irish dairy and beef farming emissions originate from the enteric fermentation process, with emissions from fertiliser use and manure management accounting for most of the remainder.

• The pastoral dairy and beef farming models practiced in Ireland have led to the draining of peatland for grazing pasture, which is a significant source of GHG emissions in Ireland.

Can we reduce emissions from Irish dairy and beef farming?

So now that we understand where agricultural emissions come from, what can we do about them?

Let us think about overall emissions from dairy and beef farming as a function of two elements - the emission intensity of production4 and the quantity of output. Reducing either of these will result in an overall decrease in GHG emissions, all else being equal.

Much of the academic literature focuses on the emission intensity of dairy and beef production, and there is certainly evidence that it can indeed be reduced:

• In a review article, Crosson et al. (2011) outline several mitigation practices that can reduce the emissions intensity of production. For example, they found that heavier beef cattle can result in a moderate reduction (5-6%) in GHG emissions per kilogram of beef. However, according to Džermeikaitė, Krištolaitytė and Ramūnas Antanaitis (2024), generally, heavier dairy cows have elevated maintenance needs, resulting in higher food consumption, which results in increased methane production.

• Crosson et al. (2011) also outline that shorter grazing periods for beef cattle can reduce emissions intensity, a finding which is supported by Murphy et al. (2017) and Pelton et al. (2024). However, for dairy cows the opposite seems to be true - longer grazing periods result in lower emissions intensity (Crosson et al., 2011; Läpple, Carter and Buckley, 2021).

• Crosson et al. (2011) also notes that improved manure management practices can reduce GHG emission intensity modestly.

• Džermeikaitė, Krištolaitytė and Ramūnas Antanaitis (2024) find that dairy cow emissions are highly correlated with cow health and feeding practices. Thus improving cow health and reducing feed quantities - but ensuring it is of a higher quality - could reduce emissions intensity per animal.

• Beauchemin et al. (2022) and Džermeikaitė, Krištolaitytė and Ramūnas Antanaitis (2024) note that there is some evidence for the heritability of methane-producing characteristics, thus selectively breeding for less methane intensive animals could provide a route to lower emission intensity.

• Yue et al. (2017) discovered that, in China, a significant amount of beef emissions arise from GHGs embodied in feed production. As such, they note that reduction in the use of fertiliser during feed production could significantly reduce the full lifecycle emissions intensity of beef production.

• Murphy et al. (2017) find that earlier slaughtering ages can reduce emissions intensity per kilogram of beef.

• Murphy et al. (2017) also find that beef produced from the dairy herd had significantly lower emissions intensity than suckler beef5, with potential reductions in emissions intensity of up to 35%.

• Pelton et al. (2024) note in a US-based study that a combination of mitigation measures could result in up to a 30% reduction in GHG emissions. The majority of this reduction (74%) is attributable to grazing, sequestration and storage practices, such as improved cover crops, prescribed grazing, forest restoration and silvopasture.

• Several studies also point to increasing animal productivity to reduce emission intensity (Crosson et al., 2011; Džermeikaitė, Krištolaitytė and Ramūnas Antanaitis, 2024), though Dida, Garcia and Gonzalez (2025) noted that the emissions intensity of Australian confinement dairy systems - which are more productive - was very similar to the emissions intensity of pastoral dairy systems.

Plenty of options then it seems. Before jumping to any conclusions though, some words of warning.

First of all, the relevance of any practice to the Irish context must be considered. For example, Crosson et al. (2011) find that improved manure management practices can reduce emissions intensity - albeit moderately - but it is important to remember that manure management accounts for only 12% of agricultural emission in Ireland. Thus, the mitigation potential of this practice is relatively limited.

Relatedly, and second of all, most of the practices outlined above don’t specifically target reductions in the methane output of the enteric fermentation process - the largest source of agricultural emissions in Ireland. Some of the articles reviewed note the potential of selective breeding or technology - such as feed additives - but there is very limited evidence that methane emissions from enteric fermentation can be reduced significantly in the short-to-medium term (Beauchemin et al., 2022). The uncertainty related to these proposals would also seem an entirely inappropriate gamble given the climate crisis. Hanging your hat on such innovations would seem, at best, wishful thinking.

This brings me to my third point, which is that, ultimately, beef and dairy are generally more emission intensive sources of protein than plant-based sources. The enteric fermentation process is inherent in cattle, and it seems like little can be done about it at the moment. As a result, any reduction in the emission intensity of dairy or beef production needs also to be considered in relation to the emission intensity of plant-based sources. Beef, as Ritchie (2020) notes, almost always has a higher GHG footprint when compared to other plant-based sources of protein.

The inefficiency here is even more stark when you consider that a vast quantity of the soy we grow - which can be used to make tofu, an incredibly efficient source of protein compared to beef - is used to feed animals. In the EU, about 67% of the oilseed and protein crops produced are fed to animals, with the majority being soy imported from South America (Poux and Aubert, 2018).

Finally, one also needs to consider the so-called “rebound effect” of improvements in emissions intensity, as well as the way emissions intensity itself is measured. For example, Murphy et al. (2017) note that the earlier slaughtering of beef cattle at a younger age results in lower emissions per kilogram of beef. However, by slaughtering at a younger age a farm can carry more animals, thus the emissions intensity per hectare increases dramatically.

In fact, Herron, O’Brien and Shalloo (2022) specifically note that using a product-based unit - such as emissions per kilogram of beef - can obfuscate the impact of increases in output, and suggest that emission intensity per hectare is a more useful measure. Though even here, attention must also be paid to the bigger picture.

This brings us neatly on to the second part of the overall GHG emissions equation - quantity of output.

Ultimately, any reduction in overall GHG emissions from improving the emission intensity of production will be eroded by increases in output. Läpple, Carter and Buckley (2021) modelled just such erosion in Irish dairy and beef farming from 2000 to 2017. They found that emissions over this period would have increased by 119% had efficiency gains6 of 34 percentage points not limited emission increases to only 85% - brilliant! Thus we can see that, despite significant improvement in the emission intensity of production, overall GHG emissions still rose due to an increase in output.

Fundamentally then, whilst reductions in the emission intensity of dairy and beef production are certainly possible, if the objective is to continue to expand output of beef and dairy products - and thus herd size - then any efficiency gains will be eroded partially, if not entirely. As John Gibbons (2025) points out, the goals of increasing dairy and beef output and reducing GHG emissions are fundamentally juxtaposed.

Key Takeaways:

• Overall emissions from dairy and beef farming should be thought of as a function of the emission intensity of production and the quantity of output.

• There are many ways that the emission intensity of production of dairy and beef could be reduced, though the suitability of some practices to the Irish context needs to be considered too.

• As the primary source of agricultural emission in Ireland is the enteric fermentation process, it is also the source with the largest mitigation potential. However, there is little evidence that the methane produced by this process can be reduced significantly in the short-to-medium term.

• Even the lowest emission intensity dairy and beef products are significantly more emission intensive than most plant-based sources of protein.

• Reductions in emissions intensity can result in a “rebound effect”, where overall emissions are not reduced as expected due to growth in other variables such as carrying capacity or output.

• Any potential reductions in overall GHG emissions from improvements in the emission intensity of dairy and beef farming will be eroded partially, if not entirely, by increases in dairy and beef output.

But…I thought Irish farming was “green”?

If you have seen Bord Bia’s advertisement from 2014 for its Origin Green programme launched in 2012, you would be forgiven for thinking that Irish farming is, in fact, quite environmentally sustainable.

In the ad, actor Saoirse Ronan7 waxes lyrical about Ireland being an unspoiled land, our ‘contract with nature’ and how Irish farmers have intuitively understood something that their contemporary peers are only just waking up to - environmental sustainability.

John Gibbons (2025) brands such campaigns as “greenwashing”. He believes that even the use of the colour green is nought but an attempt to subconsciously associate Irish agriculture with notions of sustainability and environmental-friendliness.

Gibbons (2025) also believes that Irish agriculture is nowhere near as “green” as those with vested interest would have you believe. He claims that Ireland is amongst the least “green” agricultural sectors in Europe. In contrast, Teagasc claim the opposite - that Irish agriculture is amongst the most emission efficient globally (Shalloo and Herron, 2024).

It is surprisingly hard to find data to settle these claims. However, one source that is noted for its consistency - cited by both the likes of Gibbons and Teagasc - is the Food and Agricultural Organization’s (FAO) Global Livestock Environmental Assessment Model (GLEAM) (2022). From the data compiled as part of this model, Ireland does indeed seem to be amongst the least intensive producers of dairy and beef when measured by emissions per kilogram of protein. However, when measured by emissions per square kilometre, Ireland appears to be amongst the most intensive producers of beef and dairy.

Still, the apparently low emission intensity per unit of Irish dairy or beef output is often used as justification for output expansion. In fact, as Duffy et al. (2025) note, those advocating for dairy and beef expansion say we must do so in the name of global food security.

The argument goes like this: if low emission intensity Irish dairy and beef don’t meet a growing demand for animal-sourced food products, then more emission intensive sources will rise to the occasion. Thus, if Ireland curtailed dairy or beef output to reduce its own emissions, global GHG emissions may still rise. This phenomenon is referred to as “emissions leakage”.

However, as Duffy et al. (2025) show, such logic is at odds with science. They find that only under a net-zero emissions scenario - which includes net reductions in methane emissions of 68%, implying significant decreases dairy and beef output - can Ireland achieve sustained diminishing contributions to global temperature rise.

They also point out that the idea that Ireland contributes to global food security is based on extremely shaky foundations.

Firstly, they note that approximately 90% of Irish animal-based food products are exported to higher-income countries, whilst only about 0.3% reaches low-income countries. This is because, ultimately, Irish dairy and beef are exported as premium products, seeking a premium price.

Relatedly, they also cite a study that has classified over half (57%) the world’s population as over-consuming, the vast majority of which live in higher-income countries - also the destination of Irish dairy and beef. The same study claimed that if this cohort reduced their food consumption, dietary emissions could be reduced by 32%.

Secondly, they note that arguments in higher-income countries - who have cumulatively higher inventories of GHG emissions historically - in favour of producing more dairy and beef fail to acknowledge that any increases in overall GHG emissions exacerbates climate change, which disproportionately impacts lower-income countries, worsening food security.

As such, increases in dairy and beef output in Ireland can actually be viewed as undermining food security. Irish beef and dairy - as we have noted, an emission intensive source of protein compared to plant-based sources - is exported to places that already eat too much, exacerbating climate change and worsening food security in lower-income countries.

Duffy et al. (2025) note that investment in the agricultural systems of lower-income nations is the most effective way to their reduce food insecurity. Reductions in food consumption and agricultural output - and therefore agricultural emissions - in higher-income countries such as Ireland can create headroom for lower-income countries to increases their agricultural output, improving their food security without undermining efforts to mitigate against climate change.

Once again, proponents of expanding Irish dairy and beef output attempt to square the circle - increasing output whilst simultaneously reducing GHG emissions. An impossible task.

Key Takeaways:

• Although there is some debate, Ireland does seem to be amongst the least emission intensive dairy and beef producers globally, when measured by emissions per kilogram of protein or emissions per unit of product. However, when measured by land-use Ireland has much more emission intensive dairy and beef farming practices.

• The low emission intensity (per unit of product) of Irish dairy and beef is often used to justify output expansion in order to meet growing global demand. Proponents of such ambitions frame their argument around the phenomenon of “emissions leakage”. They also claim that Ireland contributes to global food security.concept of

• However, research has shown that only under a net-zero emissions scenario - which includes net reductions in methane emissions, implying significant decreases dairy and beef output - can Ireland achieve sustained diminishing contributions to global temperature rise.

• Evidence also indicates that almost none of Irish dairy and beef output reaches lower income countries - those who are most food insecure. Instead, almost all of Irish dairy and beef exports are to higher income countries, where much of the population already over consume food.

• Agricultural emissions produced by higher income countries will exacerbate climate change, which will disproportionately impact lower income countries and further undermine food security.

• Reductions in food consumption and agricultural output - and therefore agricultural GHG emissions - in higher income countries such as Ireland can create headroom for lower income countries to expand agricultural output, improving their food security without undermining efforts to mitigate against climate change.

What does “environmentally sustainability” actually mean?

You might have noticed that, up until now, I have focussed primarily on the environmental impact of dairy and beef farming. Measuring these “trends”, as Dillon, Hennessy and Hynes (2010) say, is an essential aspect of determining environmental sustainability. However, as they also note, one needs a benchmark - or a condition variable - against which to compare trends to determine if environmental sustainability has been achieved. Thus far, I have had very little to say about the latter.

To do so, let us consider some definitions of “sustainability”:

• The most famous definition of sustainability comes from the UN’s Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future (1987), colloquially known as the Brundtland Report. In it, sustainable development is proposed as development that ‘meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’.

• To paraphrase some of my recent articles on the Planetary Boundaries and Kate Raworth’s Doughnut Economics frameworks, sustainability means living within the planets ecological boundaries whilst also ensuring that a minimum standard of living - a social foundation - is provided for all.

• An agroecological definition of sustainable food systems is similarly grounded in both ecological and social systems (Caporali, 2007; Poux and Aubert, 2018). Agroecology is a ‘holistic and integrated approach to farming that applies ecological principles and enhances the delicate relationship between plants, animals, humans and the environment. It aims to work towards a socially equitable food system that puts people at the heart of the decisions they make about how and what they produce and consume’ (United Nations University, 2025). Such a food system aims to maximise the use of ecological processes, shifting to a minimal or zero-input agricultural model so that balance can be maintained (Poux and Aubert, 2018).

• Finally, Teagasc (2025) also have their own definition of sustainability. They suggest that a sustainable approach to farming is one that ‘can be sustained into the foreseeable future’. They also specify that a sustainable approach to farming ‘will be even more efficient and productive in ten or twenty years than it is today’ and that it ‘will maintain and shape our countryside as a high-quality place in which to work and live’. Finally, they remind us that sustainability should be considered from an environmental, social and economic perspective.

Although the definitions differ in their detail, there are certainly common threads throughout.

First and foremost is the indivisible nature of the concepts underpinning sustainability. It is impossible to detach environmental, social and economic systems from each other, thus sustainability is a holistic concept grounded in a systemic perspective of the world8.

Second of all, the definitions outlined by the UN, the Planetary Boundary and Doughnut Economics frameworks, and agroecology all note the existence of thresholds or limits - be they explicit or implied. These thresholds exist in both time and space. There are environmental limits, beyond which the character of ecological processes will change dramatically. There are also social foundations, below which people do not reach a minimum standard of living. Finally, there is a temporal dimension. In other words, the way we act now has impacts extending out into the future. Thus we must act to fulfil the needs of the present ‘without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (Brundtland, 1987). Our present actions need to be consistent with the future we wish to see manifest - they are limited by our desired future impact.

Thirdly, the existence of limits has two implications. First, that we must live in harmony with the processes that govern those limits - as is emphasised by the concept of agroecology. Second, and that there exist must a state of sufficiency, where we have “enough”.

Notably, the definition of sustainability proposed by Teagasc necessitates that sustainable farming practices will be more productive in the future. This contrasts directly with the idea of sufficiency permeating the other definitions of sustainability. However, it remains consistent with Teagasc’s own objectives of growing agricultural output.

Key Takeaways:

• Sustainability is a multi-dimensional concept, often considered from an environmental, social and economic perspective. Detaching these perspectives is impossible, thus sustainability can be considered a holistic concept grounded in a systemic perspective of the world.

• Various definitions of sustainability highlight thresholds, be they ecological limits within which we need to stay or a social foundation above which we need to remain.

• There are two major implications to the existence of ecological and social thresholds. Firstly, that we must live in harmony with the processes that governs these thresholds or limits. Secondly, that there must exist a state of sufficiency, where we have “enough”.

Are Irish dairy and beef farming environmentally sustainable?

As I have said, I will return to the other dimensions of sustainability - namely the social and economic dimensions - in subsequent articles. For now let us focus on the environmental sustainability of Irish dairy and beef farming.

Specifically, let us answer the following question: are Irish dairy and beef farming environmentally sustainable?

Drawing on the definitions above, to answer that question I believe three criteria need to be met:

• Do current Irish dairy and beef farming practices operate within planetary boundaries?

• Do current Irish dairy and beef farming practices work in harmony with the ecological process that govern these boundaries?

• Could current Irish dairy and beef farming practices continue into the future without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs?

Unfortunately, the answer to all of these questions is no.

As Duffy et al. (2025) have modeled, a “business-as-usual” scenario - where current dairy and beef farming practices persist - results in an increased global warming trajectory.

Duffy et al. (2025) effectively answer all three questions simultaneously. They model a “business-as-usual” scenario - where current dairy and beef farming practices persist - resulting in an increased global warming trajectory.

Current Irish dairy and beef farming practices already operate beyond the planet’s capacity to process GHGs and “business-as-usual” will only exacerbate climate change, compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.

What many seem to forget is that this includes future generations of Irish farmers. The temperate conditions that allow for the pastoral model of farming practiced in Ireland will be significantly disrupted if current global warming trajectories are realised.

Therefore, practiced as they are now, Irish dairy and beef farming are unsustainable from an environmental perspective. In fact, in the long run, they are their own worst enemy.

Key Takeaways:

• Irish dairy and beef farming are environmentally unsustainable.

What about biodiversity and water quality?

At the outset I said I was going to focus on the climate, however it would be remiss of me not to even mention the impact of Irish dairy and beef farming on biodiversity and water quality.

Admittedly there is a dearth of data on biodiversity in Ireland, although this is improving thanks to the efforts of the National Biodiversity Data Centre. They conclude that of the 10% of the 31,000 species in Ireland that have been assessed, about 20% are threatened with extinction (National Biodiversity Data Centre, 2019). This rate is even higher for bees - a critical pollinator - with 33% of bee species on the brink of extinction (National Biodiversity Data Centre, 2019).

Irish dairy and beef farming are not solely to blame of course. However, given that about 67% of Irish land is used for agriculture (National Economic and Social Council, 2023), it has certainly been a key driver .

Yet, during my research, it was not uncommon to see arguments made in favour of the positive impact that dairy and beef farming have on biodiversity. For example, Hennessy et al. (2018) argue that diminishing the suckler beef herd could actually lead a loss of natural landscape features and biodiversity.

In some ways, such arguments have some substance. Given the scale of land-use by agriculture, undoubtedly improved farming practices can lead to improvements in biodiversity. The Protecting Farmland Pollinators (2023) project has shown just that. During the first four years of the project, all participating farms have been able to increase their pollinator score9.

Arable farms performed exceptionally well, as did dairy farms. This demonstrates that cattle farming - dairy farming in particular - can contribute positively to biodiversity if the correct practices are in place.

Improvements in pollinator scores are promising of course, but remember - growth is referential. Thus, it is important to remember that agriculture is generally considered to have been the primary driver of deforestation in Ireland, which has severely disrupted habitats and diminished Ireland’s biodiversity (Nairn, 2020; Guiry et al., 2023).

When you hear someone make the argument that decreases in the size of the cattle herd will somehow diminish biodiversity and disrupt Ireland’s “natural” landscape, point out to them that they have the story the wrong way around. Despite what Saoirse Ronan and Bord Bia might have to say about it, the green pastures we see today are not Ireland’s natural landscape. Following the last Ice Age, about 80% of Ireland was forested (Nairn, 2020). The landscape we see today and the related threats to biodiversity are very much the result of intensive deforestation, driven largely by agriculture.

Although Hennessy et al. (2018) don’t explicitly make the claim, they also allude to the fact that Irish cattle farming provides other public goods such as improved water quality.

For dairying anyways, such an argument has no legs to stand on. The intensive use of nitrogen-based fertilisers in Irish dairy farming has led to significantly elevated levels of nitrogen in our freshwater, entering the water cycle through run-off from the land (Environmental Protection Agency, 2025).

Although progress has been made to reduce the concentration of nitrogen in freshwater, data for the first half of 2025 indicates a reversal in this trend, with an increase in concentration on 2024.

Rivers in the south-east of the country have significantly higher concentrations of nitrogen than rivers in the north-west and midlands. It is no coincidence that these counties are also the most dairy farming intensive.

Excess nitrogen in water results in eutrophication, conditions under which oxygen depleting organisms such as algae flourish. This reduces the oxygen available for fish and other aquatic life to survive. Gibbons (2025) also points out that there is surprisingly little debate about the impact of the high concentrations of nitrogen in out water supply on human health.

Key Takeaways:

• Irish dairy and beef farming have had significantly negative effects on biodiversity and water quality in Ireland.

• Although cattle farming can play an important role in fostering biodiversity, it is also important to remember that agriculture has been a large driver of deforestation in Ireland

• The use of nitrogen-based fertilisers in Irish dairy farming has led to significantly elevated levels of nitrogen in our freshwater, particularly in the south-east of the country where dairying is more intensive.

What might environmentally sustainable dairy and beef farming look like in Ireland?

The typical response to questions on the environmental sustainability of Irish dairy and beef farming is to improve efficiency. In other words, to reduce the emissions intensity of production.

As we have discussed, such a response has two primary issues.

First of all, any potential reductions in overall GHGs from reducing the emissions intensity of production will be eroded partially, if not entirely, by increases in output.

Second of all - in the short-to-medium term anyways - there is little evidence that any technological solutions will be able to mitigate against the largest source of GHG emissions from dairy and beef farming - enteric fermentation. Given the scale of the climate crisis, the uncertainty related to these solutions would seem an entirely inappropriate gamble.

At the root of these problems are the facts that dairy and beef are, ultimately, emission intensive sources of protein, and that we - in Europe - overconsume on average10, and particularly overconsume animal-based food products. European consumption of protein is well in excess of nutritional needs, and protein from animal-based protein sources has risen significantly since the 1960’s, whereas protein from plant-based sources has stagnated (Poux and Aubert, 2018).

It is usually at this point in any debate regarding the future of Irish dairy and beef farming that things get pretty heated. That’s because, if Irish dairy and beef farming are to become environmentally sustainable, all of the evidence points towards a reduction in output. Reduced output means reduced herd size, and farmers don’t like that.

It is understandable why that is the case too. As Murphy, Cannon and Walsh (2022) point out, any threats to the future of Irish dairy and beef farming represent threats to the very identity of those farmers.

We will explore the social and economic sustainability of Irish dairy and beef farming in detail in future articles, but for the moment I do want to make one point on this - reducing dairy and beef farming output does not have to represent an existential threat to the agricultural way of life. In fact, as Gibbons (2025) points out, which the findings of Murphy, Cannon and Walsh (2022) support, outrage at the thought of reductions in herd size often come from large agri-food organisations or representative bodies - such as the Irish Farmers Association - with profit-driven motives. Farmers themselves believe that such organisations do not represent the interests of small-scale, local farming communities (Murphy, Cannon and Walsh, 2022).

The heatedness with which Irish dairy and beef farming are discussed often results in dichotomous positions such as either being “for” or “against” dairy and beef farming. This need not be the case - reducing the cattle herd size is not the same as no cattle at all.

Poux and Aubert (2018) modeled an agroecological food system for Europe - one that was capable of feeding the 530 million Europeans projected to exist by 2050. Such a model assumes several conditions, including reductions in food consumption, a more plant-based diet, and also a shift to “zero-input” farming. No more synthetic fertilisers. Goodbye feed concentrates.

Such a food system would have significant environmental benefits - improved biodiversity and water quality, as well as decreases in GHG emissions of up to 45%. It’s also important to note that there’s no technological optimism assumed here. All of these benefits can be achieved with existing practices and by, quite simply, producing less.

The impacts of such shifts on dairy and beef farming would be significant. Overall, there will be a significant de-intensification. Herd sizes would reduce. Managing for physical productivity - such as milk output per cow or per hectare - would become secondary. Instead, hardiness and the ability to consume a diverse diet become priorities.

It’s not all bad news though. Meat and dairy would remain important dietary components - something the authors say is important not only for a balanced diet, but also for cultural reasons.

Also, the style of ruminant agriculture promoted in the modeled food system is pastoral - the primary form of dairy and beef farming already practiced in Ireland. It’s the intensity of land-use that is the problem, necessitating the use of artificial fertilisers to augment grass growth.

The authors also assume a significant increase in “agroecological infrastructure” - think hedges, trees and so on - such that they cover 10% of grass and crop lands. As we have seen from the Protecting Farmland Pollinators (2019) programme, Irish cattle farming can certainly play a role in developing agroecological infrastructure and promoting biodiversity.

The ingredients for environmentally sustainable dairy and beef farming in Ireland already exist. What we need is a new recipe. The focus needs to shift from increasing productivity and efficiency - from “doing more with less” - to doing “enough” - producing a sufficient amount of food, not excessive amounts.

There also needs to be fundamental shift in our relationship with nature. We must adopt food systems that do not disrupt the carbon, nitrogen and water cycles, for example. No longer can we see ourselves as master of the natural world, but instead we must exist in harmony with the processes that govern planetary health. Failing to do so will only prove counter-intuitive in the long-run.

Key Takeaways:

• Adopting an agroecological approach offers an opportunity to develop an environmentally sustainable food system.

• Such a system will require a decrease in food consumption, particularly animal-based sources of protein. As a result, dairy and beef farming output will have to fall and, thus, dairy and beef herd size. However, dairy and beef can remain important parts of the diet - just in smaller quantities.

• The Irish pastoral farming model is already aligned with an agroecological approach, and farms can play a vital role in improving biodiversity across Ireland.

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I am working on a much longer piece at the moment but, to maintain the biweekly cadence of articles I have committed myself to, I have decided to perform a little thought experiment: Does the cultural dimension of “individualism” explain a nation’s propensity to utilise public transport?

It’s selfish to drive a car, right?

I will admit to having thought this myself. My intuition was that more collectivist societies - prioritising community and interdependence - would all huddle together hand-in-hand on busses and trains. Conversely then, I thought individualist societies - who might place greater value on personal freedom and autonomy - are inherently more selfish and thus would depend more upon private cars.

I’ve heard others express similar sentiment. For example, I have heard it claimed that in order for Ireland to transition towards a more sustainable transport model we must forgo the self-entitlement and selfishness that supposedly comes with owning a private car. Again, I would have thought the same - that a modicum of subjugation to the collective might be necessary.

How do these sentiments line up with the data though? Not that well it transpires.

From what I found, there appears to be effectively no correlation between the cultural dimension of ‘individualism’1 and the proportion of journeys taken by public transport.

What does explain public transport use then?

Of course, there are other factors at play in determining whether people utilise public transport. “Individualism” was never going to explain such a phenomenon in its entirety.

On that, I also took a quick look into whether income per capita might offer a stronger correlation. Nope.

However, income per capita is moderately associated with higher levels of convenient access to public transport across nations. Very strangely though, higher levels of convenient access to public transport are not particularly associated with higher levels of public transport use across nations.

To be clear, these findings should certainly not be considered rigorous2. This is Substack after all, not an academic journal. I did expect more evident correlations though.

My instinct is to question the “findings” of my analysis. It doesn’t quite ring true with my lived experience. The phenomenologist in me still thinks that “individualism” does play a role in determining transport modal share, however I am willing to revise my opinion and accept that it may not be as important a factor as I previously thought.

What makes me think that “individualism” would still determine public transport use? Aside from all the issues with this analysis that I have highlighted in Footnote 2, there are a couple of other reasons.

First of all, I think it is very likely that the cultural dimension of “individualism” captured in Geert Hofstede’s work - and thus the data I used - is not reflective of the “individualism” that I am referring to. Or that “individualism” is even the correct term for describing what I am referring to.

For example, as you may have noticed at the start of the article I conflate the spectrum of individualism-collectivism with a spectrum of selfishness-selflessness. Is that really a fair conflation? Listening to Geert Hofstede himself explain the interpretation of “individualism” and “collectivism” in his model indicates to me that using his data to measure the characteristics of “individualism” that I am referencing might not be entirely appropriate.

It is also worth noting that my definition of “collectivism” in this context is coloured heavily by the reasons that I choose public transport over private car use - climate change. There are two factors of note here. My understanding of “collectivism” has a planetary dimension - a relatedness to all living beings and the planet - that may not be captured adequately in Hofstede’s interpretation. In fact, in some ways this is more akin to the universalism that Hofstede associates with “individualists”. Also, I have connected the process by which I decide upon a mode of transport with my perception of collective wellbeing. Not everyone will make that leap.

Second of all, maybe what matters is not international differences in “individualism” (as I conceive it), but instead the distribution of “individualism” and “collectivism” within a particular nation.

However, it is also possible that a tendency towards individualistic or collectivistic traits has no bearing whatsoever on one’s decision to use public transport. Maybe it all comes down to the perceived relative costs and benefits of different modes, for example. Still, I find it difficult to imagine how the framing of those costs and benefits could not be influenced by context and, thus, one’s disposition.

So what does explain public transport use then? Food for thought.

Last time out we took a look at the planetary boundaries. Amongst other things, we learnt that we’ve breached 7 out of a total 9:

There’s a dimension that was missing from that discussion though - societal wellbeing.

If the planetary boundaries represents the ceiling above which we should not go beyond, then societal boundaries represents the foundation below which we cannot sink

Grab yourself a doughnut…

You may have heard of Kate Raworth’s (2017) ‘Doughnut Economics’ framework. It attempts to tie these two sets of boundaries - the planetary and the social - together.

The visualisation is sleek, the concept intuitive. The inner ring represents the ‘social foundation’, below which lies human deprivation. Exceeding the outer ring - the ‘ecological ceiling’ - results in planetary degradation. Between the social foundation and the ecological ceiling lies the goldilocks zone - the ‘safe and just space for humanity’.

The ecological boundaries are drawn directly from planetary boundaries research. Measures of the social foundation were initially extracted from 40+ reports submitted to the UN Rio+20 conference in 2012, but have since aligned increasingly with the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Raworth, 2025).

The latest iteration of Raworth’s framework proposes 21 dimensions, with 35 indicators to measure ecological overshoot and social shortfall (Fanning & Raworth, 2025).

So, how is humanity doing? Do we exist in that ‘safe and just operating space’, or have we overshot our ecological boundaries and fallen short of the social foundation? If you read my last article on the planetary boundaries, you can probably guess…

We have overshot the ecological ceiling across most dimensions1, and are falling short across all dimensions of the social foundation.

What about economic growth?

‘Hold on a second now. What about economic growth? That’s the most important measure of prosperity, right? Why bother with the “Doughnut” when we can just strive for economic growth.’

As I said, the latest iteration of Raworth’s “Doughnut” framework contains 35 indicators of ecological overshoot and social shortfall. Not a single one pertains directly to economic growth2.

However, it’s not that Raworth’s analysis omits economic growth per se. Instead she rejects economic growth as a useful goal altogether. In fact, this is the foundation upon which the entire “Doughnut” framework is founded3.

Yet to contemporary economists, politicians - even society, in its broadest sense - economic growth seems very important. There’s certainly an argument to be made that the overarching goal of the modern economy is to promote growth4.

But why? Why has economic growth become such a ubiquitous measure? Why is it seen as synonymous with the notions of “progress”, “wellbeing” or “welfare”?

To answer this question, Raworth (2017) paints a complex picture of development in economic practice and politics. To summarise, Simon Kuznets first developed measures of national income in the 1930s, which apparently proved useful for navigating the Great Depression in the US and managing the economy during the Second World War. In fact, they were so successful that, soon, economic growth was being viewed as a panacea for any social, economic or political issue of the day.

For example, Simon Kuznets also famously went on to hypothesise that as national incomes grow there would be an initial increase in income inequality, followed by a decrease. In other words, don’t worry about inequality, just keep growing the economy and it will all balance out in the long run. What a convenient “finding”5!

Raworth then goes on to hypothesise why the story of economic growth was so attractive. Undoubtedly there are many factors at play here, but she highlights one particularly interesting idea: that growth being “good” is a metaphor embedded deeply in Western culture6. It is undeniably an easier story to sell. Imagine a politician promoting a “steady-state economy” rather than “economic growth”.

Basically, according to Raworth, politicians rummaged through their economic toolbox, chose an undoubtedly useful tool, but also decided to throw out the rest of the toolbox.

The irony? The “inventor” of the first measure of national income - Kuznets himself - was all too aware of the limitations of assessing national welfare using a measure of national income (Kuznets, 1934). In a chapter entitled Uses and Abuses of National Income Measurements Kuznets lists some of these limitations, including:

• An inability to account for or value non-market goods or services, such as the environment or parental care;

• An inability to account for the distribution of income - id est income inequality - within or across nations;

• An inability to account for the ‘intensity and unpleasantness of effort’ going into the earning of income; and, most pertinent to our present discussion;

• A tendency towards confounding changes in national income with changes in national welfare.

That’s not to mention the fact that measures of national income pay no attention to the capital stock from which income is generated or who owns said capital, and that all forms of income are treated the same - productive investment is counted the same as consumption.

In the words of Kuznets himself:

The welfare of a nation can, therefore, scarcely be inferred from a measurement of national income…

Fundamentally, GDP is a measure of the flow of money through an economy. As Kuznets highlighted, it is not to be used as an indicator of national wellbeing.

Raworth’s carries this logic forward to argue that we cut out the middle-man - economic growth - and measure what we really care about. Hence, the measures of social foundation and ecological ceiling in the “Doughnut”.

She wouldn’t be the first to develop an alternative measure of human development or progress. Take the Human Development Index (HDI) produced by the UN. It supplements GNI per capita with measures related to education and life expectancy. Yet, for all that complication, the HDI is highly correlated with GDP per capita7.

Here’s another measure - Self-reported Life Satisfaction, measured by Oxford’s Wellbeing Research Centre - compared to GDP per capita. The same story emerges.

Fanning and Raworth (2025) find a similar correlation in their own work. From the period 2000 - 2022, real GDP almost doubled. Over that same period, the measures of social shortfall in the “Doughnut” framework have also improved, albeit at a much more marginal rate8.

Given these apparent correlations, why bother changing anything? If growing GDP is going to produce higher levels of wellbeing, life satisfaction, equality, or whatever measure of welfare you use, shouldn’t we just stick with what’s tried and tested?

Say it with me: correlation doesn’t equal causation. Growing GDP doesn’t necessarily cause increases in wellbeing - it’s just associated with it.

Certainly targeting the growth of a single indicator - especially one as simple as GDP - is convenient, particularly when improvements in society seem to co-occur. But should that mean that economic growth becomes our goal? Is it the most effective way to reach the social foundation?

If the actual goal is to improve social wellbeing would we not be better to aim directly for that instead? Raworth argues just that: set out explicitly to reach the ‘safe and just operating space’ - don’t just grow GDP and cross your fingers.

But…don’t doesn’t growth alleviate poverty?

To be clear, material deprivation is related to wellbeing. I don’t think I need to cite a scientific source to support that statement.

Although Raworth (2017) scolds the goal of economic growth in and of itself, she acknowledges the same:

In many low-income but high-growth countries…when that growth leads to investments in public services and infrastructure, its benefits to society are extremely clear. Across low- and middle income countries (where national income is less than $12,500 per person per year) a higher GDP tends to go hand-in-hand with greatly increased life expectancy at birth, far fewer children dying before the age of five, and many more children in school. Given that 80% of the world’s population live in such countries…significant GDP growth is very much needed and it is very likely coming. With sufficient international support these countries an seize the opportunity to leapfrog the wasteful and polluting technologies of the past. (p. 254)

A la the relationships between economics growth and the various measures of wellbeing highlighted above, effectively.

However, rather than setting perpetual economic growth as a target, Raworth instead includes a measure of income related to a societal poverty line9. The goal is explicit: to ensure that no one falls below the societal poverty line, as opposed to growing the size of the economy and assuming that material deprivation will diminish. To be more specific, she assumes a causal relationship between economic growth and reductions in material deprivation - and thus an increase in wellbeing - but that that relationship should be specifically leveraged to reduce poverty.

Effectively, she advocates for growth to a certain point in order to reduce material deprivation. After that point though, countries should focus on other goals.

What about those with higher incomes?

Wouldn’t everyone be better off having more money though, no matter how well-off they are? Well, it’s complicated…

The consensus - which aligns with intuition - seems to be that both relative and absolute income levels matter to wellbeing (Frank, 2012). This is counter to the infamous Easterlin Paradox, which states that only relative income matters.

The implications of this is that, technically, continued economic growth should produce continued improvements in wellbeing. In other words, nations - no matter how well-off - should continue to grow their economies.

However, the evidence also suggests that returns on income are diminishing. In other words, each additional amount of income one earns will result in progressively less additional wellbeing.

Relatedly, it’s also important to remember that income is not the only determinant of wellbeing. Take the trajectories of self-reported life satisfaction of some of the worlds highest income countries - including little old Ireland!

Despite tremendous growth in GDP per capita, self-reported life satisfaction has stagnated or fallen in these nations from 2011 to 202410. Clearly then, there are other factors involved in determining wellbeing, factors that even the hallowed economic growth cannot solve. Shocker!

Hence why, according to Raworth, there is a level of income that is enough. After that point, as I mentioned above, she believes that countries should target other goals - specifically, the ones she outlines in her “Doughnut” framework.

What about the environment?

Let’s briefly go over what we’ve discussed so far: Economic growth certainly is associated with, and in some instances - such as the reduction of material deprivation - causes improved wellbeing. However, targeting economic growth in the hope that benefits will trickle down to all of society is at best indirect, and at worst mistaken (Piketty, 2006). Instead, Raworth (2017) argues that we need to be much more explicit about the goal of reaching the social foundation.

That’s only half the story though. We have yet to discuss the outer boundary of the “Doughnut” - the ecological ceiling. Specifically, we have yet to discuss the relationship between economic growth and environmental degradation.

The evidence is conclusive at this stage. Economic growth - in its current form - has caused, is causing, and will cause more environmental degradation. To quote from a previous article:

Towards the end of 20th century though, scientists began to notice that we were drifting from these favourable environmental conditions [Holocene-like]. They also concluded that humanity was to blame. Since then, the evidence has mounted. We have been emitting too large a volume of greenhouse gasses for the planetary systems to handle. We have been consuming natural resources at a rate faster than they can be replenished. We have disrupted the nutrient flows that are so critical for fostering life.

In fact, practically every indicator of planetary health has deteriorated as humanity has “progressed”.

Unsurprisingly, Fanning and Raworth (2025) uncover similar findings. Over the same period noted in Figure 7 - where real GDP has almost doubled and social shortfall has contracted - ecological overshoot has increased.

This trend, alongside more detailed research by Fanning et al. (2022) on the development trajectories of nations would seem to indicate that further ecological overshoot is likely to manifest.

They found that, in general, nations tended to follow a path of transgressing environmental boundaries before achieving social thresholds…

… and a path of escalating ecological overshoot that yields diminishing returns in reducing social shortfall.

In other words, the way nations currently grow and develop degrades and destroys the environment.

Now, there are those who might point to a graph like this…

Or this…

…and they might say something along the following lines: “Economic growth can be decoupled from carbon emissions” or “Economic growth leads people to clean up the environment”.

In some ways they would be correct too. We have indeed achieved relative decoupling of global economic growth and global carbon emissions and, as we can see above in Figure 12, there are several countries who have achieved absolute decoupling between economic growth and their consumption-based carbon dioxide emisisons11.

Also, there does indeed appear to be some evidence of a so-called ‘Environmental Kuznets Curve’ across some measures of ecological health - an example of which can be seen in Figure 13.

These green shoots must be caveated though.

First of all, relative decoupling or even marginal absolute decoupling of carbon emissions from economic growth are simply not enough. Absolute decoupling at a dramatic rate is required.

Second of all, carbon dioxide is only one greenhouse gas - albeit the largest contributor to global warming. We need to achieve dramatic absolute decoupling of all greenhouse gas emissions from economic activity.

And finally, air pollution - and others measures that potentially exhibit some Kuznets Curve-like behaviour - or climate change pertain only to some measures of ecological health. All dimensions require our unwavering attention12.

To summarise: Economic growth is driving environmental degradation. Full stop. Whereas there may be an argument - though a weak one in my opinion - in favour of striving for economic growth in order to improving societal wellbeing, there is no such argument to be made for the relationship between economic growth - in its current form - and environmental health. In fact, as we have seen, the opposite is true.

Can we actually reach the the ‘safe and just operating space’?

I think the case is pretty strong then that economic growth - as it is currently conceived - is not going to lead us to the ‘safe and just operating space for humanity’. That’s not to say that economic growth is inherently “bad", it’s just that if we want to eradicate social shortfall and reign in ecological overshoot, if these are the actual goals, then we are going to have to be much more explicit in targeting them.

The question then arises though, whether there is any way we can reach the ‘safe and just operating space’ at all?

Rather unsurprisingly, Raworth (2017) thinks we can - her life’s work is predicated on that assumption after all. But she does cite several factors that will play a key role in whether we do or not:

• The size of the human population will need to stabilise;

• A far more equitable distribution of resources will be required;

• People will have to embrace a mindset of sufficiency, and abandon the pursuit of abundance;

• Dense urbanisation - supported by “clean” technology - will have to accelerate, and;

• Governance structures at every scale will have to be designed to deal with the nature of the challenges highlighted by the “Doughnut”

Quite a laundry list then.

More quantitative research - though there is a limited amount - has since gone on to confirm that it does indeed seem possible for humanity to reach the ‘safe and just operating space’, even if such as space could be a ‘vanishingly thin ring’ according to O’Neill et al. (2018).

Similarly to Raworth, O’Neill et al. (2018) argue that humanity will have to adopt a model of sufficiency in resource consumption. However, that alone won’t be enough. They argue that for such a space to be reached, provisioning systems13 must be fundamentally restructured so that the social foundation can be reached with a much lower level of resource use.

Schleiser et al. (2025) come to a similar conclusion. Theoretically, reaching the ‘safe and just operating space’ is possible, but many criteria must be met. Assuming a human population of 10.4 billion people, minimal consumption, ubiquitous adoption of an effectively vegan diet and completely defosilized energy systems seem to be a necessity.

How do we get there?

So we know that reaching the ‘safe and just operating space’ is theoretically possible. But how do we get there?

All we have to do is redesign governance structures, transform distribution systems to be more equitable, accelerate sustainable urbanisation, minimise consumption, overhaul food systems and defosilize energy systems. Easy.

Doing one of those on their own is quite the task. Might achieving all of them be insurmountable?

Quoting Schleiser et al., ‘Theoretical evidence that a ‘‘Doughnut’’ state exists is no evidence that it is possible to transition towards a “Doughnut” state'. That’s a rather depressing thought. Yet the difficulty in achieving the aforementioned changes at a collective level - and achieving them quickly - leads me to conclude that, whilst reaching the ‘safe and just operating space’ might be possible, it is unfortunately not probable.

For example, the UN - the multilateral institution - is supposedly the governance structure under which we address the existential issues highlighted by the "Doughnut”. Yet it is considered increasingly dysfunctional. The fact that we are only on track to achieve a small fraction (18%) of the measures outlined in the UN Sustainable Development Goals - which every member nation has committed to achieving by 2030 - is further evidence that our best attempt at international governance is at best faltering, if not failed.

Change will require overcoming an incredible amount of vested interest and inertia: What’s in it for the wealthy to redistribute their riches? Could you conceive of a world where you have enough? If you have more in that world than you do today, you’ve missed the point14. How many people do you know who follow a vegan diet? Would you consider it? What happens to all those in the agricultural sector who depend on the production of animal-based products for their livelihoods? Why would fossil-fuel companies want to accelerate the shift towards renewable energy15? Have you opted for an electric vehicle? Do you even need at a car at all?

Clearly, implementing the changes that Raworth and others advocate for will be extremely difficult. It’s one thing to wish for a better world. It’s something entirely different to bring that change to bear. A ray of hope remains though - we know it is possible.

A way forward?

The big takeaway from Raworth’s work is that economic growth is not a useful goal. It is not targeted enough in comprehensively reducing social shortfall and - in its current conception - drives environmental degradation.

Striving for economic growth creates a circular logic where growth itself is considered the yardstick of success. Growth for growths sake is striven for, even hailed. Growth becomes an end in itself.

But the economy is not an end itself, it is a means to an end. As such, Raworth argues that we measure what really matters - human and planetary wellbeing. She challenges us to become ‘growth agnostic’. If the flow of money through the economy grows whilst we reduce social shortfall and ecological overshoot, great! But the aim in itself should not be economic growth.

Whilst I have focussed on what I believe to be the key message of Raworth’s work, it is worth noting that her book Doughnut Economics: Seven Way to Think Like a 21st-Century Economist is much wider ranging in its critique.

There are some observations which I believe are excellent - such as her proposal to view the economy as a system embedded in a broader set of social and planetary systems:

However, in other areas I would be more critical. For example, she is overzealous in attacking what she calls ‘mainstream economics’. Effectively, as Schokkaert (2019) points out, Raworth seems to lay the blame for social shortfall and ecological overshoot at the door of “bad” economics.

The idealist in my gravitates instinctively towards such a paradigmatic criticism - but is it really a credible one? No doubt ideas can be powerful and misused, but it does seem an oversimplification to blame all our misgivings on “bad” - or the often conflated neoliberal - economics. Could one set of ideas really be to blame for all that has gone wrong in the world? For example, there is no neoliberal dogma that suggests everyone must consume animal-based diets yet, despite widespread awareness that they are bad for the planet, their popularity persists16.

Schokkaert (2019) also notes instances where, in her eagerness to denounce ‘mainstream economics’ she adopts questionable perspectives. For example, he highlights a particular instance where Raworth (2017, p. 3) lauds activists for plastering ‘accusatory posters’ all over the American Economic Association’s annual get-together in 2015, and occupying ‘sedate panel discussions’. Yet, the agenda for the conference actually included discussions on some of the very issues - such as inequality, public health and cognitive science - that Raworth cares most about, presented by some of those that Raworth celebrates throughout her book, such as Thomas Piketty and Richard Thaler.

Relatedly, Raworth (2017) also has a habit of classifying economists she considers interesting as ‘non-mainstream’, despite, as Schokkaert (2019) notes, several of those she considers to be in this category actually being central figures in contemporary economic theory, such as Thomas Piketty, Daniel Kahneman and Richard Thaler. Capital in the 21st Century, Thinking, Fast and Slow and Nudge are hardly to be considered obscure literature at this stage17.

I would also question the use of the categories of ‘mainstream’ and ‘non-mainstream’ altogether. It seems reductionist, given that the diffusion of ideas can often be modelled as an S-curve. All new ideas begin as what Raworth might consider non-mainstream. That doesn’t make them inherently good, in the same way that popular ideas aren’t inherently bad. Would Raworth be so disparaging of ‘mainstream economics’ if her “Doughnut” framework went on to become widely adopted? Given that she actually discusses S-curve trajectories in her book, this would seem an even greater oversight.

In her wide-ranging criticism of modern ‘mainstream economics’, Raworth risks throwing the baby out with the bath water in my opinion.

First of all, popular economic theory and practice has a lot to say about the issues that she is concerned about. For example, Noah Smith highlights that the Production Possibilities Frontier - a “mainstream” economic tool used to evaluate the trade off between two dimensions - could be and is used to measure the trade-off between economic output and environmental degradation. Yet it receives no mention in Raworth’s book.

More fundamentally though, in targeting all of ‘mainstream economics’, Raworth may be neglecting the very methods and isolating the very people by which the changes she advocates could come about. This is particularly important to note, given Raworth herself very little to say on that matter. She just says that things need to be done. Not how to do them.

To be clear, Raworth’s “Doughnut” framework is unashamedly normative. She literally states that she intended it to be so, outlining in her book that she believes a drift towards a positive - or descriptive - understanding of economics has been a negative development. I disagree with this perspective. I would agree with Schokkaert (2019) when he says that Raworth’s work is an important contribution to normative economic ideology, but I believe you also need to incorporate the descriptive perspective. That way, you can actually help to bring about the changes you so desire.

For example, Raworth paints a beautiful picture of the community-based, socially adaptable human as an alternative to the rational economic man. From a descriptive perspective, she is absolutely correct - we are not entirely financially motivated or self-interested. But in her desire to paint such a hopeful picture, she overlooks the fact that, sometimes, we are. She runs the risk of assuming that everyone cares about reducing social shortfall and ecological overshoot as much as she does.

You need goals - provided by the normative perspective - and an understanding of how to bring them about - provided by the descriptive perspective. It’s no good saying that free-riding is bad and that it must stop. You also need to suggest solutions18.

In her defence, I doubt Raworth would claim her book to be a panacea. She has also gone on to do significant amounts of work implementing the “Doughnut” framework through the Doughnut Economics Action Lab (DEAL). DEAL could probably be considered the descriptive element corresponding to the “Doughnut”, the normative framework that sets the goals.

And what a magnificent set of goals Raworth has outlined. What a challenge she has set us. You may not like her or agree with everything she says, but it is hard to deny that her ambition is admirable - for all to live a decent life within the planet’s boundaries. I believe that her “Doughnut” might just guide us there. To deface Emily Dickinson: hope is a sweet treat with a hole in its centre.

References

1. Fanning, A. L., O’Neill, D. W., Hickel, J and Roux, N. (2022). The social shortfall and ecological overshoot of nations. Nature Sustainability, 5 (1), pp. 26-36.

2. Fanning, A. L. and Raworth, K. (2025). Doughnut of social and planetary boundaries monitors a world out of balance. Nature. [online] https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-025-09385-1.

3. Frank, R. H. (2012). The Easterlin Paradox Revisited. Emotion, 12(6), pp. 1188-1191

4. Kuznets, S. (1934). National Income, 1929-1932, 73rd US Congress, 2nd Session, Document No. 124. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/natincome_1934/19340104_nationalinc.pdf

5. O’Neill, Daniel W., et al. A Good Life for All within Planetary Boundaries. Nature Sustainability, 1 (2), pp. 88–95, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-018-0021-4.

6. Piketty, T. (2006). Kuznets: Yesterday and Tomorrow. In: Understanding Poverty. Oxford University Press.

7. Raworth, K. (2017). Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-century economist. London: Random House Business Books.

8. Raworth, K (2025). The Evolving Doughnut, Doughnut Economics Action Lab. https://doi.org/10.64981/XGRX2738.

9. Schlesier, H., Malte Schäfer and Desing, H. (2024). Measuring the Doughnut: A good life for all is possible within planetary boundaries. Journal of Cleaner Production, 448(141447). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2024.141447.

10. Schokkaert, E. (2019). Review of Kate Raworth’s Doughnut Economics. London: Random House, 2017, 373 pp. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, [online] 12(1), pp.125–132. https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v12i1.412.

About a month ago a new report revealed that we have now breached 7 of the 9 Planetary Boundaries. Sounds pretty serious, right? Yet there was no coverage by the mainstream media in Ireland. As of writing I couldn’t find a single article in The Irish Times, Irish Independent, Irish Examiner, The Journal.ie or RTÉ.ie discussing the findings.

Let’s do some digging of our own then, shall we? Grab a cup of tea and find yourself a comfortable perch. This is a long one.

What are the Planetary Boundaries?

It was in 2009 a group of scientists first proposed the Planetary Boundaries framework. The framework defines a “Safe Operating Space” for humanity, so that we don’t push the Earth’s biophysical systems too far.

You’ve probably heard of the most famous of these systems - the atmosphere. It includes the layer of gasses surrounding Earth, which regulate temperature, block radiation, and drive weather and climate. The others are:

• The geosphere, which consists of the rocky interior and surface of Earth

• The biosphere, which refers to all living things on Earth and their interactions with one another and their environment

• The hydrosphere which includes all the water on Earth - both freshwater and saltwater - and its movement through the water cycle

• And finally, the cryosphere, which contains all of the ice on Earth

Of course, these systems all interact as part of a greater whole - the Earth System.

For each of these systems, the Planetary Boundaries framework defines a process. For example, in the atmospheric system, climate change is defined as a process.

Each process is then measured using a “control variable”. This basically just means some measure indicating the status of the process, from which the health of the overall system can be inferred. For example, we can estimate our impact on nutrient flows - which affect soil health and water quality - by measuring the amount of nitrogen used in agriculture.

Why is staying within the Planetary Boundaries so important?

Complex human civilisation seems to have emerged about 10,000 - 12,000 years ago. Around then humans seem to have gone from foraging to farming, during a period referred to as the "Neolithic Revolution”.

This transformation for humanity coincided with a geological transition. The last Ice Age ended and a new geological epoch began - the ‘Holocene’. The planetary conditions during this period have been critical in supporting the expansion of human civilisation.

Towards the end of 20th century though, scientists began to notice that we were drifting from these favourable environmental conditions. They also concluded that humanity was to blame. Since then, the evidence has mounted. We have been emitting too large a volume of greenhouse gasses for the planetary systems to handle. We have been consuming natural resources at a rate faster than they can be replenished. We have disrupted the nutrient flows that are so critical for fostering life.

In fact, practically every indicator of planetary health has deteriorated as humanity has “progressed”1.

Of course, changes to the Earth’s biophysical systems would happen naturally - just over much longer periods of time. The scale and speed of humanity’s impact on Earth’s systems has led scientists to anoint our time the ‘Anthropocene’ - an epoch where we have become a dominant ecological force.

I say all this because it provides context for why the Planetary Boundaries came about, and why they are so important. The boundaries are defined at levels that will maximise the duration of life-supporting, Holocene-like conditions on our planet. Going beyond the boundaries means we risk upsetting those conditions, decreasing the ability of the Earth to support life, and potentially bringing our time here to a premature end.

What happens if we cross a Planetary Boundary?

Two things.

Firstly, we reduce the Earth’s buffering capacity.

The Earth is a forgiving host. If she was hosting a dinner party, we are the guest who turned up late, drunk, and behaved belligerently throughout the meal. Despite the setbacks, our host has remained undeterred, resilient in the face of our brashness. She has been able to deflect and absorb any complications that might undermine her evening of splendour. But her patience is running out…

Take the Ocean, for example. It is one of the most crucial components of Earth’s system, playing the roles of climate stabiliser, resilience builder and life-support system.

One of its critical functions is excess heat uptake, absorbing approximately 90% of excess global heat, helping to regulate global temperatures2. Scientists believe that the Ocean’s capacity to absorb heat has likely delayed surface warming by about a decade.

But the ocean is heating up, and with it one of Earth’s largest buffering capacities may be disappearing. Our host might just be about to call us a taxi home…

The second issue with crossing the Planetary Boundaries are “tipping points”.

Back to the dinner party. After the meal you’ve started to sober up and your transgressions have become apparent. You sit there, wallowing in shame until…Aha! In an attempt at reconciliation you reach in between the other guests, smiling and nodding politely, and begin to pile plates up in your hand. The first couple of dishes hold steady, but as the stack gets higher it becomes less and less stable until…crash. The point at which the tower of dishes went from one equilibrium - a balanced stack - to another - a pile of crockery - is called a “tipping point”.

There are many so-called “tipping systems” amongst the planetary systems - that is those which can cross a tipping point3. Each of these have multiple potential tipping points.

One of the most famous tipping systems - and also considered one of the most likely to collapse - is the melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet.

The dynamics are simple. As global temperatures rises, the Greenland Ice Sheet melts and its surface elevation falls, which leads to more melting. This is called a positive feedback loop.

Scientists believe that below a critical elevation, this process leads to inevitable collapse even if global warming were to halt or reverse. In other words, once a certain amount of ice is melted, the feedback loop will become self-sustaining and accelerate. Melting ice will lead to more ice melting - at an accelerated rate. The threshold at which this acceleration would occur is called - you guessed it - a tipping point.

Why does this matter? Well, this vast ice sheet contains the equivalent of 7 metres worth of sea-level rise. Whilst it is believed the melt would likely play out over millennia, the tipping dynamic means that we will have “locked in” dramatic sea-level rise for future generations. It will be irreversible.

Sounds pretty bad right? And that’s before we talk about systemic risk and cascading effects…

Systems imply connection by definition. As we’ve alluded to above, the Earth is no exception - it consists of many smaller systems which interact as part of a greater whole4. So, when something goes wrong in one system, it ripples out across other systems, potentially causing cascades of disastrous effects.

Climate change is probably the most obvious example of this.

It is almost inevitable now that we are going to exceed 1.5°C of global warming relative to pre-industrial levels. Models indicate that this puts a number of Earth system tipping points at risk5. Because of the destabilising interactions between these systems, crossing a tipping point in one system is likely to cause other systems to tip. For example, global warming increases the likelihood of the Greenland Ice Sheet collapse, which would in turn destabilise sub-polar ocean currents, impacting the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) - a vital Earth system.

Oh…and that’s not to mention that these systems tipping potentially fuel further global warming6. Take the Greenland Ice Sheet. Melting ice sheets release methane and reveals less reflective surfaces - which absorb more heat from the sun - driving further warming.

The ripples aren’t just across one dimension of the planetary boundaries either. For example, disruption to the AMOC could impact rainfall patterns in the Amazon rainforest, potentially exacerbating rainforest dieback and biodiversity collapse7. And again, these feedback loops are reinforcing. Forest dieback reduces the Earth’s capacity to sequester greenhouse gasses, and also results in the release of carbon stored in trees into the atmosphere. Excellent.

We are also yet to touch on ripples into social systems8. Again, take the collapse of the AMOC. One of the direct impacts of that is likely to be dramatic cooling in Northern Europe. This direct impact then has consequences across our social systems, impacting areas such as food security, energy security and economic security.

Tipping points are very f*cking scary…

They certainly are.

Exceeding a tipping point means we irreparably change the behaviour of a system. It will shift from one equilibrium to another, spiralling out of control, causing chaos along the way.

Imagine rowing along a river on a peaceful summer’s day, not a care in the world. You whistle away to your favourite tune, and let the sound of the water lapping against the boat lull you into a state of bliss.

Suddenly, you ears prick. There’s a new noise, disturbing your serenity. It’s almost like the sound of static coming from a television, slowly raising in volume. You turn around and your stomach drops. You can see the current is stronger and that it’s accelerating you towards the horizon. What lies beyond? A long drop and a sudden stop.

Frantically, you turn around and begin rowing, every sinew in your body straining against the current. But it’s too late. You have crossed the tipping point. Nothing you can do will stop you going over that waterfall…

The Planetary Boundaries are proposed to keep us well away from these tipping points. We don’t know exactly where the they are, so the Planetary Boundaries framework adopts the “precautionary principle”. In short - stay well the f*ck away from the waterfall.

At least we’ve only crossed 7 then…

Are we f*cked?

In the words of the authors of the Planetary Health Check 2025 report: “Our planet’s vital signs are flashing red”. Undoubtedly we have crossed into extremely high-risk territory.

As we’ve said above, it’s almost inevitable now that we will exceed +1.5°C of global warming for at least several decades this century. Some studies indicate we have already entered that period. 2024 was confirmed as the warmest year on record with temperatures on average +1.55°C above pre-industrial levels9.

The most optimistic global warming scenario projects a mean global temperature increase of +1.9°C by 2100 - well in excess of the +1.5°C threshold agreed in the Paris Agreement in 2015. Unfortunately, under currently planned policies and actions, warming is anticipated to be much greater than that - somewhere in the range of +2.5°C to +2.9°C.

So are we f*cked? Well, kind of.

To be clear, the collective pressure we have already placed on the planet’s systems will have disastrous impacts on humanity.

For example, although data on natural disasters is patchy, there is a general consensus that climate change is making extreme weather events more frequent and intense - and that’s at current levels of warming10. Higher temperatures will likely only have more extreme effects.

Further warming of the magnitudes projected places many of Earth’s system’s tipping points at even greater risk. In the words of Johan Rockström: it’s time to “buckle up”.

However, we can still limit that impact. We can still minimise the duration that +1.5°C of warming is exceeded, and work to bring it back down as quickly as possible.

But that scenario would now require an almost immediate decrease in Greenhouse Gas emission, and we seem to be a long way from that…

Improbable then, but not impossible.

The problem with governing for climate change is that the change - for many - is abstract.

The risk is latent - the consequences are too far into the future, too detached from current actions.

There is a geographical disconnect, with those in wealthy nations alienated from the more immediate insecurity posed by climate change.

Also, compounding this, the link between a consumers actions and climate change is too obfuscated to represent an immediate priority.

It also doesn’t help that tipping points are illusive. There is so much uncertainty around the location of tipping points - ultimately, we don’t know exactly where they are. We are only just beginning to understand the dynamics of Earth’s systems. Worryingly, that means we could have already crossed some...

This uncertainty is compounded by our tendency towards linear extrapolation. We look at a trend and assume it will continue into the future. The problem with this - as we’ve discussed - is that many systems exhibit non-linear behaviour. Change seems slow, but before you know it you’ve crossed the tipping point, and the system accelerates irreversibly out of control.

Things are pretty bad…

…but they are also much better.

That was an awful lot negativity, but there are shoots of hope. For example, the proportion of electricity being generated from renewable sources is increasing at a rate faster than that of non-renewables…

…the share of cars being sold that are electric is growing rapidly…

…and, whilst there has been an average decline in wildlife populations, there are many species whose populations have increased…

So it’s not all doom and gloom. But we are running out of time. We need accelerating action in order to protect the planet’s wellbeing.

As systemic, runaway effects could undermine planetary health, it’s time we realise that tipping points are also part of the solution.

Not all tipping points are bad

Up to this point, you’d be forgiven for thinking that all tipping points are bad. But they aren’t.

As we saw above, the amount of electricity being generated from renewables has been growing and, even more importantly, at a faster rate than electricity generation from non-renewables.

Why has that happened? Simple really - falling renewable energy costs.

Once renewables didn’t just make sense environmentally but financially too, we hit a positive tipping point.

We can see a similar phenomenon in the uptake of electric cars. As the cost of an electric car relative to a non-electric car has fallen, electric car sales have surged (see figure above).

This progress didn’t happen by accident though. No, no. These are examples of a concerted effort to expedite technological adoption.

Take electric car sales in Norway. Though they did have favourable conditions for a rapid uptake of electric cars - such as a small, wealthy population and cheap renewable electricity - the Norwegian Government still introduced various policies to accelerate their uptake.

The impact of those policies has been phenomenal. We can see how, in the space of 14 years, Norway has gone from effectively no sales of electric cars in 2010, to electric cars accounting for 92% of all new car sales in 2024. The pattern of this rapid shift can be modelled as a so-called S-Curve.

Countries are at varying stages of electric car uptake. Nations such as India and the United States are only beginning their journey along the S-Curve, whereas China is much further along. Norway is an example to the rest though, that rapid adoption through targeted policy efforts is possible.

It’s worth bearing in mind that technological adoption following an S-Curve is not guaranteed - it can take effort to reach a tipping point. For example, in the EU electric car sales have stagnated, seemingly due to a lack of policy support11.

It’s clear that policy has a huge role to play in guiding all efforts away from practices that damage the Earth system - in reaching positive tipping points, such as cheaper renewables.

The stagnation of the EUs electric car uptake or the downward revision of renewable capacity development between now and 2030 due primarily to policy changes in the United States and China12 are a reminder of just how critical policy is to shift us along the S-Curve.

Designing policy to leverage tipping points

There are three major phases to technological adoption modelled as an S-Curve:

• Emergence or infancy, where a new technology enters the market

• Acceleration, where adoption of the technology becomes more widespread

• Maturity or stabilisation, where the technology has become dominant in the market

In the context of climate action, the goal of policy should be to leverage tipping points such that the S-Curve is compacted, be that through accelerated emergence or more rapid adoption.

One such tipping point is a cost-parity threshold between clean technologies and those that are carbon intensive. We have already seen this in effect above, when we discussed that renewable sources now cheaper than non-renewable alternatives. A combination of policy initiatives - R&D incentives, adoption subsidies, mandates and carbon taxes - can all accelerate the journey to cost-parity. After that, positive feedback loops begin to kick in, and the transition becomes self-sustaining. Adoption accelerates.

Policy intervention shouldn’t just be considered in isolation either. A recent paper highlights that positive tipping points in one sector - such as the transport, electricity generation or heating sectors - can ripple out across other sectors. In particular, the paper suggests that a zero emission vehicle mandate for electric cars could perhaps be a “super-leverage point”, with positive effects across other sectors. For example, increased deployment of batteries in electric cars could result in learning curves, making them cheaper and more effective for use in electric trucks and the electricity sector

Policy should also seek to leverage social networks. Malcom Gladwell has a whole book on social contagion called The Tipping Point illustrating the S-Curve of ideas, the power of positive feedback loops, and also the relative power of certain actors in a network. Thinking about the spread of climate technology and ideas in this way could be a powerful tool to implement targeted, effective policy. For example, there is evidence that seeing your neighbours install rooftop solar PV panels will increase the likelihood you go on to install solar PV panels13.

Emulating Earth…

What can be said about the social systems above is also true for natural systems. We need to work with the Earth’s systems, not against them.

Biomimetics is a fascinating field that seeks to do just that. An example of a biomimetic strategy I have recently become enamoured with is applied nucleation. In order to encourage forest restoration, small patches of trees and vegetation are planted, which act as “nuclei”, attracting animals that disperse seeds, and enabling forests to regrow outward from these centers. This process emulates forest recovery patterns visible in nature.

A side note: one of my favourite characteristics of this technique is that it encourages serendipity. As the patches grow and merge, they form a vibrant mosaic of vegetation that eventually closes into a continuous forest canopy - something that is often overlooked using plantation techniques (*cough* Coillte *cough*)

Working with systems, not against them

That was a long one. We’ve covered a lot of ground - the Planetary Boundaries framework, the Holocene, the Anthropocene, complex systems, tipping points, S-Curves, biomimetics…and so on. As the old saying goes - if you throw enough sh*t at the wall, some of it is bound to stick.

If there’s one message I want you to take away though, it’s that working with natural and social systems is the principle we need to follow if we are to reel in our impact on the planet’s health.

Sure, tipping points can bring about rapid, destructive change. But they are also reminder that positive change, when the correct levers are pulled, can happen quickly.

It’s nearly election time! Are you excited? Have you been following along avidly, munching away on popcorn, caught up up in the spectacle of it all? Or are you ready for the media circus to end, for journalists stop dragging up dirt and to move on to something a bit more…productive?

I confess I fall into the latter of those two categories. However, voting is important. Thus I want to do it in an informed way. To do that, let’s take some of the arguments against Connolly and Humphreys, and see if they hold any water…

I’m not voting for Catherine Connolly because…

…she is too divisive

A common criticism of Connolly is that she is too divisive a figure for the role of President, that her forthright nature - particularly on foreign policy - might be better suited to activism rather than diplomacy.

Undoubtedly she does have strong opinions on other nations and their leaders. For example, she is indeed quoted as having said that the US, England and France cannot be trusted.

Humphreys has attempted to target Connolly’s alleged divisiveness. During the second debate of the campaign she said that Connolly had spoken out against Irish allies - Germany, France, the UK and the US - and was adamant that she had never spoken out against Russia. Some have even alluded that she is “pro-Russia”.

The first part of this statement is, again, true. Connolly has indeed been vocal in her disdain for, what she believes to be, imperialist, militaristic policies. The latter half of this accusation is false however. She is - as she has adamantly protested - on record condemning Russia1.

Connolly insists that her vociferousness is influenced not by friendships or foeships, but instead by the principle of speaking truth to power. For example, in this Dáil Debate in 2022 Connolly condemned Russia military exercises in Irish waters. However, in the same statement, she also highlighted that no such outrage was expressed at NATO military exercises of a similar ilk taking place in Irish waters.

She probably has spoken more about Israel than Russia throughout her campaign, but she insists that this is not indicative of a soft-spot for Putin. Instead, she says it is to highlight the hypocrisy in the way that European Governments have dealt with the genocide in Palestine compared to the invasion of Ukraine - in particular how the language in condemning Russia was much clearer than that used to condemn Israel.

She has a point too. On the day that Russia invaded Ukraine, Taoiseach Micheál Martin held a televised address condemning the “outrageous and moral breach of the most fundamental principles of international law”. His language was clear - the “most severe package of sanctions we [the EU] have ever considered” was to be adopted, the invasion “cannot and will [would] not go unanswered”, and “Putin and those who support him will be held accountable”.

In contrast, then Taoiseach Leo Varadkar’s comments on Israel’s retaliation against Palestinians following the October 7th attacks in 2023 were much more qualified. He admitted he was “really concerned” about what was unfolding in Gaza, and that Israel’s actions represented “collective punishment”. However, he also felt the need to caveat those statements, remarking that "Israel has the right to defend itself”, that “Israel is a country that is surrounded by enemies, brutal savage groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, countries like Iran, often supported by Islamic fundamentalists and antisemites around the world” and that “Israel is under threat. They do have a right to defend themselves”, though he did affirm “they don’t have the right to breach international humanitarian law”.

Similar double standards have been again on display at the European Commission this week:

There is a pattern visible in Connolly’s supposedly controversial foreign policy opinions. When there is something to be damned, Connolly often points to hypocrisy, where those same condemners have kept their lips sealed on other issues. Understandably, this can be perceived as inflammatory - it bruises the ego of the condemner for a start. That doesn’t make her wrong though.

Connolly has also reminded would-be voters that allegations of divisiveness overlook her term as Leas-Cheann Comhairle, which required a majority vote - though admittedly a narrow margin - in the Dáil, and is a role that would surely have involved at least a degree of diplomatic nous.

…she denies the need to rearm Europe at a time of war

Connolly has been vocal of her concerns on increasing levels of defence spending and militarism globally, and particularly in the EU. There are those who might consider such a view naïve, given the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

The climax of Connolly’s opposition to rearmament came in remarks at an event in UCD. What she said was this:

We are increasing our spend all over Europe on the military-industrial complex…They are absolutely championing the cause of the military industrial complex in Germany as a booster for the economy. It seems to me there are some parallels with the ’30s. I don’t wish to depress you, but there is hope, and we have voices, and we can use them.

Some people have taken this as a very literal comparison, so let’s take a look…

Four years into the 1930’s, Germany was spending $15B on military expenditure. Four years into the 2020’s, Germany is spending $86B on military expenditure. Now, direct comparison’s aren’t really fair here. For a start, we aren’t taking into accounting the relative cost of military equipment in each decade. Secondly, Germany’s military build-up in the 1930’s was very much offence-oriented - as became apparent.

However, I don’t think we need to be so specific to discuss Connolly’s point. It’s pretty clear from the above quote that her concern is in relation to a general increase in military spending - that there are “parallels” to the 1930s, as opposed to direct comparisons. The trajectory of German military spending - a 50% increase since 2021 - is evidence of this parallel.

Connolly’s broader concern is a growing military-industrial complex. Indeed, military spending certainly is on the rise - in Germany, Europe and globally.

Since 2022 the EU has pumped out policy documentation related to security and defence2. Amongst the measures introduced in these documents is the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) regulation - a loan facility providing up to €150B in funding for defence investment. Similarly, as part of the budget for 2028-2034 the EU plans to increase spending on defence by a factor of five.

As I mentioned above, there are those that believe this increase is necessary, that consider Europe to be at war, and that argue underspending on defence since the 1980’s has left Europe vulnerable. These are valid points.

However, so too are Catherine Connolly’s. Militarism - and military spending - are both on the rise.

…she hangs around with the ‘wrong people’

People have several bones of contention with Connolly’s associations and judgement.

There was controversy over her hiring of a person who had served a prison sentence for a weapons charge. That was followed by outrage that she might have to reflect on her attitude towards rehabilitation when asked whether she would hire a convicted rapist.

I’ve discussed both of these issues at length in a previous article, but I will include summations of both here.

On the former…

…this person had served their prison sentence. That isn’t me condoning the possession of weapons. What about second chances though? Do we not believe in rehabilitation?

Connolly defended her on just such terms during the first debate of the week on The Week in Politics last Sunday:

I absolutely admire this person. This person was one of the small success stories of the prison system. Full rehabilitation. A change in her life completely…This person had done her time. Her privacy has been utterly transgressed.

…

The prejudice in society against those with former convictions underlies this story’s circulation. In each debate this week, Humphreys has attempted to capitalise on, as well as exemplified, this very prejudice. The mainstream media, who have dragged this person into public discourse, are reinforcing it further.

…and on the latter.

Philosophers have spent their whole lives grappling with these questions - of ethics and morality - yet the aforementioned [Humphreys and debate hosts] seem able to circumvent any qualms or contradiction. Maybe they are the great minds of our time? I’m not so sure though. Only Connolly seems able to acknowledge the fact that morality is ambiguous; that we are yet to come up with objective moral principles.

Connolly sums it up best:

I’d have to reflect on that, I’d have to think about that…As a woman, I react, so obviously I’d have to think about that. Of course, I would have to reflect.

She acknowledges her base instinct of, presumably, fear towards someone convicted of a sexual crime. Yet she is also able to acknowledge, in the context of her views on rehabilitation, that she may need to reflect on this.

A related controversy is whether Connolly actually broke any rules allowing someone with a past conviction into the Oireachtas. There is a medley of details on this, but to summarise it appears that this person was signed in on a day pass and that Garda vetting had not been completed whilst they had access to the Oireachtas - it was either ongoing or had not been initiated, depending on who you ask.

Humphreys and some TD’s have blasted Connolly over what they perceive to be a lapse in judgement. Others have defended her, and pointed out that a number of people convicted of IRA offences have served as public representatives as well as being employees of political parties.

Again, both sides have a point here. I think there is enough evidence that proceedings had at least a degree of opacity - a bending of the rules, if not a breaking.

Connolly’s association with Clare Daly and Mick Wallace has also been raised throughout the campaign. Connolly’s relationship with the two seems to have began in 2016 when they formed part of a technical group. I am aware that Daly and Wallace both hold opinions that are considered controversial, though admittedly I am not well versed on them. Coverage such as this indicates to me an outspokenness akin to Connolly’s - if not more forceful - which may not have gone down well at the European Commission.

Connolly has confessed to admiring Daly - and presumably Wallace - for their work as part of the aforementioned technical group. In the same interview though, she clarifies that she does not share all the views of everyone who she associates with. That seems pretty reasonable no? I still associate with loved ones who I vehemently disagree with on certain topics. Of course, there are some views and behaviours that might make a relationship incongruent, but, for the most part, are differences of opinion not expected, even healthy?

A particular fixation of the media has been Connolly’s 2018 trip to Syria with Daly and Wallace - though the 12 others on the trip don’t get as strong a mention. Connolly has insisted the trip was a “fact-finding” mission - as has been supported by others. During their trip they visited a Palestinian refugee camp in Yarmouk and also were given a tour of Aleppo by one Fares Al-Shehabi - a supporter of Assad and quite a despicable person. Connolly has since admitted that meeting Al-Shehabi was a mistake.

There was minor controversy over how the trip - which was paid for by Connolly’s Parliamentary Activities Allowance - was funded. “You paid for a trip to Syria with taxpayers money? How dare you!”. Of course, those making that argument would do well to remember that the taxpayer funded Connolly’s entire existence as a TD - salary and allowances. Those allowances are hers to use to support her work, ideally so that she will be better able to serve the public. That includes activities such as research and education. A fact-finding mission to a nation such as Syria, to absorb it in all of its complexity, counts as such an activity in my books.

…she is a naysayer

Connolly is often portrayed as a negative actor, a naysayer, someone who is a skeptical and critical of new ideas. How does that accusation hold up?

Connolly has opposed the development of an outer city bypass for quite some time in Galway3. The earliest reference I could find was 2011. She certainly expressed scepticism at the proposed bypass’s effectiveness in reducing congestion and was critical of the environmental impact further road development would have. However, she also proposed that Galway’s congestion problem could be solved through a combination of light-rail and a “smarter travel initiative”. If you were a supporter of the bypass then, sure, you might classify her as a naysayer. If you were a supporter of public and sustainable transport though, you might call her an advocate.

Connolly has also been critical of the Government’s handling of the housing crisis, blaming them for it, in effect. She has been sceptical of remedial policies, saying “we have a myriad of schemes which is like a jigsaw of pieces without an overall picture”. Again though, she also comes with solutions, insisting we need a “radical reset” of housing policy that aligns with the recommendations of the Housing Commission.

I’m not voting for Heather Humphreys because…

…she will be a ‘Puppet President’

Heather Humphreys’ long political career with Fine Gael and the now explicit backing of Micheál Martin mean that some fear she will be a “Puppet President”.

The ability of the President to interfere in the day-to-day running of the country is minimal - they can refer Bills to the Supreme Court for constitutionality. That’s about it.

The President can steer national discourse though. The worry is that Humphreys will be unable to put her head above the parapet and speak out on issues that might harm former political relationships. Her reluctance to acknowledge the failures of former Governments during her Presidential campaign may support that theory.

Having said that, it is also worth mentioning that President Michael D. Higgins was President of the Labour Party, who formed part of a coalition Government with Fine Gael, at the time he was elected. Whilst the Labour Party have not been in Government since since 2016, it is also true that President Higgins has had no problem calling out the failures of Government policy during his tenure.

…she failed to deliver in Government

The failures of previous Governments have been firmly laid before Humphreys during her campaign. She has been quick to remind audiences that they also got a lot right, focussing particularly on economic growth. No doubt the Irish economy has indeed grown significantly since Humphreys first served in the Dáil in 2011.

As it wouldn’t be wise to attribute this success solely to Humphreys, it also seems unfair to burden her with the entirety of the blame for failures too - rising homelessness and a deteriorating housing market for example.

Whilst she was a member of Governments that resided over those shortcomings, were they issues that she was really in a position to resolve? She was never Minister of Housing, for example.

Humphreys does also have some successes to her name too. For example, as Minister for Social Protection she was responsible for extending the Pandemic Unemployment Payment repeatedly - a measure deemed by many as essential in supporting Irish households and businesses throughout the pandemic.

That’s not to say her tenure was perfect, and ultimately, as a Government Minister, at least some accountability resides with you for the performance of the regime as whole. Still, it seems needlessly dichotomous to paint her as only a failure…

…she won’t get off the fence

Particularly in the early stages of the campaign, Humphreys was accused of being passive. Her tact has shifted somewhat, but her assertion has frequently come in the form of criticising Connolly. It remains unclear what exactly she stands for…

Her Presidential Campaign website is littered with buzz-words - “community”, “unity” and “opportunity” all feature. Not a massive differentiation between the rhetoric used by Connolly. But, whereas Connolly has asserted strong views throughout the campaign, Humphreys has been more withheld.

Humphreys has appeared to acquiesce to what she believes to be Irish “allies”, effectively refusing to comment negatively on any nation except Russia. For example, during a debate on Drivetime when asked whether she would condemn the US for supplying arms to Israel, she avoided answering the question by referring to German support of Ukraine during the ongoing invasion by Russia.

On housing, her responses have been similarly uncontroversial, if not bland. In case anyone had forgotten, she reminded the public that we needed to build more.

Some might consider her chameleonic approach a strength, an edge in the ambiguity of diplomacy. Others might find it hard to support someone so banal.

…she can’t speak Irish fluently

It’s well known that Humphreys doesn’t have fluent Irish. She had promised to learn it once upon a time, and has reaffirmed her commitment to do so during her Presidency. Whether she does or not though, should it matter?

Undeniably the day-to-day of the President will be conducted through English. In fact, many see it as the de facto primary language of the country. Yet it is also true that the Irish language is, constitutionally, the national and primary language of Ireland.

As far as I can tell, most Irish Presidents have been fluent in Irish. However, it is also worth noting that Mary Robinson, whom some consider one of Ireland’s most successful Presidents, had only limited Irish upon her election.

Who will I be voting for then?

The above is framed very negatively. Reasons to not vote for one candidate should not necessarily entail affirmative action for the other. Nonetheless, I do believe it a necessary exercise to consider the arguments being made against each candidate in order to come to an informed conclusion.

There’s no right or wrong answer here. Who you vote for to be Uachtarán na hÉireann will ultimately be shaped by what you think the role of the President should entail, and what you think the necessary characteristics are to carry out that role.

In my first article on the Irish Presidential election I said that, although the role of the Irish President may be largely symbolic, it was still important:

In fact as a symbol, I believe they are extremely important. They highlight the issues of the day to the Irish public and political establishment, calling attention to injustice and inequality, holding a mirror up to society. They can help to set a vision for a better Ireland, and a better world.

As such a symbol, I suggested that a President must demonstrate thoughtfulness, humility, and principled action, leading the Irish people by example.

Catherine Connolly is that candidate in my opinion.

Does that mean she is perfect? No. For example, she does appear to have at least bent rules signing someone who had yet to complete their Garda vetting into the Oireachtas. I can live with that though - for me, it falls below the threshold of something I consider truly ‘wrong’. I am also disappointed that climate change has not featured more heavily in her campaign.

However, Connolly is also the candidate with whom my views align the most. On foreign policy, though I am uncertain her liberalist perspectives and definition of Irish “neutrality” fully account for actualities, I admire it as a normative stance - fundamentally I am also a liberalist at heart. I agree with her that there needs to be a rethink of housing policy, rooted in the perspective that housing is is a right. Ironically, what was intended as a smear campaign - the hiring of a formerly convicted person and the follow on controversy from her comments on hypothetically hiring a rapist - demonstrated to me someone who is compassionate, conscious and unwavering in her principled scepticism.

Some might find that scepticism irritating, but I actually consider it her finest quality. Not only do I welcome a dose of healthy doubt - I think it is necessary.

Last week Israel and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire in Gaza. Hostage releases have begun. Donald Trump has announced that “the war is over”. He and other ‘Western’ leaders would have you believe that the genocide has stopped - even if Netanyahu seems less certain.

Despite the publicity campaigns claiming the dawning of a new era of peace, there are major concerns over whether the ceasefire will hold - or whether it has even begun. Israel has continued to kill Palestinians1. Hamas has been unable to return the remains of all dead Israeli hostages. And, as Trump undertook his victory lap in the Knesset, in-fighting between Hamas and other militant groups and gangs was flaring in Gaza.

An even larger question looms over Trump’s Peace Plan though - will it deliver a “lasting peace” for the Palestinian people?

Murky machinations

Trump’s “20-Point Peace Plan” is a bit of a misnomer. There is very little detail to support the implementation of the plan. A more accurate name might be “Trump’s 20 Principles for Peace”2.

It seems the specifics will be negotiated in a phased approach, the first of which began with the commencement of the ceasefire on Friday 10th October.

The primary terms of the ceasefire are for all Israeli and foreign hostages to be returned3, in exchange for 250 Palestinians serving life sentences, and 1,718 Gazan detainees.

Also part of this first phase Israeli troops have withdrawn to the white line indicated on the map below - leaving them in control of approximately 53% of Gaza.

What happens next is unclear. It seems that a 200-troop International Stabilisation Force (ISF) overseen by the US will be mobilised at some point. It is believed the force will include troops from Egypt, Qatar, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. The deployment of this force would seemingly trigger the withdrawal of the IDF to the dark grey line on the map above.

Beyond that the details are even more blurry.

Hamas has yet to commit to disarmament - something I doubt Israel and the US will overlook. Also, Hamas have yet to clarify if they are willing to withdraw from the political sphere altogether - another key issue for Israel and its supporters.

Apparently the Palestinians will be governed by a group of technocrats, with no association to Hamas. A “Board of Peace” - headed by Donald Trump and Tony Blair - is supposedly going to oversee this political reform in Gaza. Again, it is all very vague.

The plan also lacks clarification on what would trigger the withdrawal of Israeli troops to the so-called “security buffer zone”, an issue I am sure Hamas will want to iron out.

This lack of detail and the specific absence of a clear path to self-determination casts doubt on whether the Peace Plan will really deliver a “lasting peace” for the Palestinian people. Was it ever really meant to though?

Imperialism, rebranded

In 1979 Edward Said outlined his perspective on the so-called “Question of Palestine”. In the book by the same name, Said argues that the Zionist project is heavily influenced by, if not a direct offshoot of, European settler colonialism. As such, the erasure of the Palestinian people - both in a literal and metaphorical sense - is supported and justified by an “othering” of the Palestinians - a dehumanisation similarly experienced by native populations colonised by Europeans.

This imperialistic perspective - one that views the colonising Zionist as utterly superior to the Palestinian - implies that the coloniser is prioritised over the colonised, always.

Yet even that does not capture the truth of it. The word “prioritised” implies that rights of the Palestinians are at least weighed against the rights of the Israelis. No such calculus takes place. From the perspective of Zionism, the native Palestinians have no rights. No right to property ownership. No right to safety and security. No right to freedom. No right to exist.

The coloniser knows best. The coloniser is best. Their people deserve the land. They know how to shape it and the native population for the better. .

In fact, they are so knowledgeable, civilised and righteous that they can speak on the behalf of the colonised, to communicate their needs to the rest of the world. No need to consult the “savage”. Hence the seminal nature of Said’s The Question of Palestine. He was one of the first Palestinian authors to communicate the contemporary Palestinian experience to an English-speaking, “Western” audience.

It is difficult to ignore the echoes of Said’s imperialism in Trump’s Peace Plan and its surrounding fanfare.

Let’s start with the name of the plan. “Trump’s Peace Plan”. A “US Peace Plan for Gaza”. Interesting, isn’t it, how the US is represented in the title of a peace plan for a region beyond its borders. Remind me, against whom was genocide being committed? Why is the Plan not called the “Palestinian Peace Plan”, or even the “Palestinian-Israeli Peace Plan”?

Then let’s come to how the Plan was brokered. Surely both parties - the Israeli’s and the Palestinians - were represented at the negotiating table, right? Wrong. The Plan was developed by the US and Israel. It was then announced by the US and Israel. Finally, Hamas were told that if they did not accept the deal, that Israel would have the full backing of the US to “do what you would have to do”.

Next, the contents of the plan. No doubt it outlines the terms for an initial ceasefire. But in the longer-term outlook is extremely prescriptive in tone and formalises increased restrictions on the Palestinian people.

Point 19 in the Plan embodies imperialism at its “othering” worst:

While Gaza re-development advances and when the PA reform programme is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, which we recognise as the aspiration of the Palestinian people.

Let me translate: Once we have shaped Gaza and its people into a form acceptable and beneficial to us, then maybe we might let you have a state of your own.

Remember what I said above: the coloniser knows best after all.

And that brings us to Zionism and its supporters. When you hear the self-congratulatory echo chamber that was Trump and Netanyahu’s address to the Knesset, is it any surprise that such an imperialistic plan has emerged? Throughout their speech the future of the Palestinian people is still framed from the perspective of Israel’s security. Take a look at this picture of Rafah and ask yourself - who has more to fear?

Following Trump’s appearance in the Knesset world leaders gathered in Sharm el-Sheikh. Amongst them were those whose nations have supplied weapons used in Israeli genocide and sponsored the Zionist colonial project since its inception. Amidst the clamour of ego-stroking and flattery they seem to have forgotten their history.

Instead, everyone was just delighted with themselves. The Peace Plan was great. Trump was great. “Lasting peace” here we come!

Just as in the Knesset, the emphasis remained on Israel. Ursula von der Leyen - although absent - summed up the atmosphere in a post on X:

Of course, the return of any and all hostages is essential. But to not even mention the end of the slaughter of the Palestinian people…

Interestingly a joint statement by the leaders at Sharm el-Sheikh - including Trump -did seek “tolerance, dignity, and equal opportunity for every person” in the region. One of few places such sentiment was on display though. Only Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi spoke of Palestinian statehood and self-determination.

It was almost a forgone conclusion that not a single word would be uttered in relation to the ICC arrest warrant for Netanyahu or the ongoing ICJ investigation into Israel’s genocide against the Palestinian people. As Nesrine Malik says in her article in the Guardian:

And so now we have a crime without criminals, a genocide without génocidaires, a wretched population who, we are to believe, have been brought low by Hamas, and must be fed and watered while the world works out what to do with them. An entire history across Palestine of Israeli impunity and dominion, one of repetitive ethnic cleansing, military rule, expansion of settlements – and now explicit rejection of Palestinian self-determination – is erased, again.

“World leaders” - if you could call them that - are falling at the first hurdle. The façade is paper thin. Such disingenuity makes it hard to believe that concrete support for the Palestinian people will manifest.

Not a mention of the the 730,000 displaced Palestinians since October 2023. Never mind the millions of unofficial Palestinian refugees living across the world. Where are they return to? Almost all property in Gaza has been destroyed and the illegal occupation of the West Bank continues.

Who will be footing the bill for all this destruction? Israel and all its “Western” supporters, of course! Good one. Instead, it seems as if the Arab world will shoulder the costs of Israeli genocide.

Let’s be clear. None of this is particularly surprising. If Netanyahu, Trump or European leaders such as Starmer or Macron cared about the plight of the Palestinians, they would be falling over themselves to make reparations. They would bend over backwards to compensate the Palestinians for both their own and their nation’s roles in the genocide against the Palestinian people. But they don’t. Why would they highlight their complicity in genocide, implicating themselves in the investigation by the ICJ? Why invite “national embarrassment” by acknowledging that your nation’s history of colonialism and support for it was…hmmm, I don’t know…a bad thing?

Instead world leaders have lined up to claim credit for ending a genocide they have spent the last century enabling, sponsoring, funding and arming. They are happy to forget, content instead to sweep history under the rug. To treat the Palestinian people as an inconvenience, a bitter aftertaste of colonialism.

The genocide in Gaza is a reminder that we live in a world that preaches justice yet funds oppression.

Bravo! Encore!

To summarise then, I see Trump’s Peace Plan as a return to ‘business as usual’. Major world leaders will likely wash their hands of Palestine and her people. Policies under discussion to sanction Israel - such as Ireland’s Occupied Territories Bill - will probably be shelved. Mainstream media attention will dissipate. Slowly but surely the public’s attention will turn elsewhere, probably to more local concerns. Meanwhile, the slow war, the prolonged ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians, will continue.

That’s my cynical, pessimistic view. I am, of course, not Palestinian though. For me to discuss the fate of the Palestinians without representing their voice would be hypocritical. So, what do the Palestinian people think about the Peace Plan?

From the river to the sea…

No doubt that there was a level of tempered celebration amongst Palestinians at the announcement of a ceasefire. But they also remembered. They can still hear the screams of their dying loved ones beneath the rubble. The ringing of explosions are still deafening in their ears. Able to finally come up for breath, they remembered that they have no home to return to.

With this most momentary of respites has come a vacuum to be filled by a grief confronted:

The worst part in the last two years, is that while you are losing loved ones, your relatives, your friends, your neighbours, you are unable to allow yourself to grieve, or to feel the deep sadness and to process your human feelings.

Because your main focus is to try and stop what’s happening.

When our people and our families were being killed, the feeling was: how do you stop this? How do you bury your dead and how do you tend to your wounded?

But after the event, which I hope to be very soon, the main feeling will be grief, mourning, and a deep, deep sense of loss. Because what we’ve lost is huge.

Husam Zomlot, Head of the Palestinian Mission to the UK

Zayne Abudaka, co-founder of the Institute for Social and Economic Progress (ISEP) in Palestine, admits in a recent episode of the +972 Podcast that the reality of Gaza means Palestinians there are more focussed on their immediate safety and security, rather than the comparatively lofty ambitions of statehood and self-determination. Extermination would do that to a person I imagine.

Recorded prior to the ceasefire, Abudaka said that Gazans would support anything that ended the genocide, that all they wanted was for their basic needs to be met and for some unification with the rest of the Palestinian population in the West Bank.

Having said that, he also highlighted results from their research that show an increase in both support for and willingness to accept either a two-state or single-state solution amongst Palestinians in the West Bank. The same report also highlights that, although helplessness is pervasive and hopelessness is increasing, the Palestinian people still believe in their capability to liberate themselves.

This echoes the sentiment of an article by Ahmad Ibsaid in Al Jazeera. In it he reminds us that the Palestinians are captains of their own destiny. That it is their resilience that brought about the ceasefire, not the world leaders clambering over one another to praise Trump:

The ceasefire came because Palestinian steadfastness broke something the bombs could not touch, because the façade of Israeli victimhood crumbled under the weight of livestreamed atrocity, and because global public opinion turned against Israel despite every effort to manufacture consent for genocide. What it accomplished is written in civilian death rolls, not in security. That is what forced this ceasefire.

If that is not a message of hope, I don’t know what is.

Those of us who can afford to ponder such atrocities as genocide from afar have a duty to hold attention on Palestine. We cannot be sedated by the empty rhetoric of an imperialistic, colonial agenda masquerading as a so-called “Peace Plan”.

The Palestine people have a right to the liberties we so easily take for granted - security, safety, freedom and self-determination. We have a responsibility to support them whatever way we can in their struggle.

…from the sea to the river.

Highlights from the campaign trail and some thoughts on the meaning of it all…

Jim Gavin withdraws from the election

On Sunday night Jim Gavin withdrew from the Presidential Election. The decision came in the wake of a story by the Irish Independent on Saturday that revealed that he had failed to refund a former tenant €3,300 in 2009, despite being contact by said tenant on several occasions. Gavin admitted that he had “made a mistake that was not in keeping with my character and the standards I set myself”.

It seems that the public scrutiny of the Presidential Election proved a step too far for Gavin, and he alluded to this in his withdrawal statement: “I have also thought long and hard about the potential impact of the ongoing campaign on the wellbeing of my family and friends”.

I extend my sympathy to Gavin. Of course, no one should withhold a refund from a tenant. Having said that, there seems to have been some sort of difficulty ongoing in Gavin’s life at the time which may have impacted his decision-making. It doesn’t make it right, but it may make it understandable. The tenant in question also seems to think so.

Catherine Connolly hiring controversy

This was probably the most controversial topic of the week, and for all the wrong reasons.

Prior to the first debate of the week, it was reported that Connolly had hired a former Éirígí member whom had also served a prison sentence for a guns and ammunition charge. Is that such a bad thing?

Firstly, it is unclear whether this person was a member of Éirígí when they were hired by Connolly. Some sources say they were, others claim otherwise. Does it matter though? Admittedly, I don’t know much about Éirígí, but they are a registered political party in Ireland. Being a member isn’t a crime. It certainly doesn’t seem like a legitimate reason to be plastered all over newspapers and discussed at length on national television.

Secondly, this person had served their prison sentence. That isn’t me condoning the possession of weapons. What about second chances though? Do we not believe in rehabilitation?

Connolly defended her on just such terms during the first debate of the week on The Week in Politics last Sunday:

I absolutely admire this person. This person was one of the small success stories of the prison system. Full rehabilitation. A change in her life completely…This person had done her time. Her privacy has been utterly transgressed.

Humphreys and Gavin - the latter of whom’s comments I won’t be including as he has withdrawn - attacked Connolly over the hiring of this person. Humphreys said the following:

This person was sentenced by the special criminal court for firearms charges. That’s a very serious offence, not many people go in front of the special criminal court. But the point here is that we all know when you bring staff into the Houses of the Oireachtas they must have Garda clearance. They must be vetted.

I’ve highlighted in bold where Humphreys says her point allegedly begins. If the point only begins there though, what was the purpose of her opening remark? I discuss this in further detail below, but I’ll give you a hint. It rhymes with ‘shmaracter asmashination’.

Admittedly, I don’t know the rules of hiring staff and their attendance at the Houses of the Oireachtas. Some reporting seems to indicate Connolly broke rules by signing this person in to the Oireachtas, whilst other sources say she didn’t. Connolly insists that all due procedure was followed during the second debate. Given that An Garda Síochána were involved in the vetting process, I would be inclined to believe her.

This controversy continued into the week. On an interview on The Hard Shoulder Connolly was asked whether she would hire a convicted rapist. The main quote circulating is that Connolly said she would “have to think about that”. The full quote was actually:

I’d have to reflect on that, I’d have to think about that…As a woman, I react, so obviously I’d have to think about that. Of course, I would have to reflect.

Humphreys attempted to capitalise on this during the second debate of the week on Drivetime, saying it wouldn’t take her - or any woman in this country - time to reflect on whether they would hire a convicted rapist.

Connolly retorted that this was hypocritical coming from a former member of Government who had done very little for sexual abuse and violence1. She also defended her statement, saying that the question was posed in the context of rehabilitation:

That is absolutely disingenuous. This is a Government that sat on the SAVI report for 20 years, and when the review of the SAVI report was done the previous major author said nothing had changed in 21 years…the opposition has forced change every step of the way for violence against women…The question was asked in terms of rehabilitation. The word reflection on my part was on what does rehabilitation mean. Clearly somebody that comes out and is on a sexual offenders register is a danger.

Defence Spending, Neutrality and the Triple Lock

Defence spending, neutrality and the Triple Lock have been conflated the Presidential Election debates.

During the first debate of the week, Connolly was once again asked about her comments comparing Germany in the 1930s to present day Europe. She insisted that the parallels were in relation to a general increase in the level of militarism globally:

I made comments over in UCD in the context of my concerns over the similarities generally between the decade of the 30s and what’s happening now…the parallels are on the rise of militarism throughout the world as a method of bringing peace. It’s utterly contradictory…

Humphreys defended an increase in defence spending at a European level:

I don’t accept that [we are on a slippery slope towards militarism]. What I can say is Russia is the aggressor here…Catherine has spoken out against our allies. Against Germany. Against France., the UK and US. She has never spoken out against Russia

During the discussion Connolly also seemed to allude to an increase in militarism distracting from an even broader perspective on human suffering, and believes that Ireland has an important role to play in diplomatic relations due to our history and neutrality:

I think we have to reflect on what’s happening. There’s 165 million people displaced in the world and wars are ongoing. I think we are in a unique position - a post-colonial country. Famine, post-famine. And also the resolution of the conflict in the North…[We can] Build on our unique experience, no more than ever we need to reflect on where we are going as a country and our neutrality is our strongest defence…

On the removal of the Triple Lock, both candidates completely disagree. Humphreys believes it should go ahead, wondering why Ireland should need to ask another nations permission to send peacekeeping troops abroad:

Why should we have to ask Russia for permission, or China or the US to so send peacekeeping forces to any part of this world

Connolly, on the other hand, believes it is the structures of the UN that needs to be reformed, not Irish legislation:

I’m appalled at the comments ongoing without a mention of the UN, which was set up in 1948 to prevent future wars. We should be building up the structures of the UN

In the second debate of the week, these topics again reared there head. This time though, the role of the President in foreign policy was also discussed.

Humphreys was adamant that the condemnation of other nations was not the role of the President:

I think its important that we talk to our allies, that we have conversations with them…we have very close relations with the US…Of course, I condemn all acts of violence. I don’t agree with them…as President that ‘s not my role [to condemn other nations]. It’s not my role to condemn anybody…The issue of foreign policy is a matter for Government…

She also believes that no country should be excluded from the UN:

[Asked whether the US and Israel should be excluded from the UN] I don’t believe that you should exclude anybody from the UN…I believe we need to stop countries having a veto…

Finally, pushed on whether she would condemn the US for supplying arms to Israel, she avoided answering the question directly by referring to German support of Ukraine during the ongoing invasion by Russia:

I don’t condemn Germany for supplying defence mechanism for Ukraine…

Connolly, who has condemned nations such as the US, Israel, Germany and France, was asked whether such statements about ‘allies’ were productive:

It’s not a matter of allies. It’s a matter of calling out truth to power

Humphreys also suggested that Connolly’s combative nature would be unsuitable for the diplomatic nature of the Presidency, but Connolly remained resolute in her stance:

The normalisation of genocide is absolutely unacceptable to me and the majority of people in Ireland. Countries were pointed out by me that were very supportive of Israel and America’s role in it

Connolly was unsure about whether the US and Israel should be excluded from the UN, admitting she would need to reflect on it.

The Occupied Territories Bill

Heather Humphreys’ comments during the first Presidential Debate - where she wondered aloud whether the Occupied Territories Bill would make any difference -were raised in each of the debates this week. Humphreys acknowledged that she made those comments but reiterated her support for the Bill:

I made those comments…the Occupied Territories Bill is another lever. I support it. It shows solidarity with the Palestine people. What we need in Palestine and Gaza is peace.

Connolly was clear that any economic cost to the Irish economy would pale in comparison to the cost of genocide:

We need to look at the cost of genocide to humanity. The cost of genocide to the Palestinian People.

During the second debate of the week, both candidates were asked whether services should be included as part of the Bill. Humphreys completely avoided answering the question. Connolly was resolute that services must “absolutely” be included.

Díospóireacht trí Ghaeilge

San díospóireacht ar The Week in Politics d’iarr láithreoir Áine Lawlor ar na h-iarrthóirí ar chóirr go mbeadh aon díospóireacht trí Ghaeilge i mbun toghchánaíochta.

Tá Gaeilge líofa ag Connolly, agus bhí sí in ann a chuid fregreacht a dhéanamh tríd. Dúirt sí gur cheap sí ba chóirr, ar a laghad, díospóireacht amháin a bheith acú trí Ghaeilge:

Ga raibh maith agat as ocht an ceist. Is cúis díomá amach is amach nach bhfuil díospóireacht le bheith agam are TG4…is í an Ghaeilge príomh teanga na tíre, ba chóirr go mbeadh díospóireacht trí Ghaeilge ar a laghad uairr amháin

Rinne Humphreys iarracht a chuid freagra a dhéanamh trí Ghaelige, ach d’admhaigh sí nach raibh an mhuinín aicí an Ghaeilge a labhairt:

Ba mhaith liom a bheith ábalta níos mó Gaeilge a labhairt…I honestly would feel at a disadvantage because I wouldn’t have the confidence to speak but I commit to learn Irish…

A United Ireland

During the second debate of the week both candidates were quizzed on how they would deal with Unionists who wished to remain British citizens.

Humphreys believes that Unionists could be enticed by the opportunity a United Ireland presents, and emphasised that Unionist traditions would be respected in a United Ireland:

I would say to Unionists that I understand that there are one million people in Northern Ireland that identify as British citizens. I would say to them “look at me”. I am the perfect example of living in a country from a minority tradition…I would say to the Unionist community, I am a living example of an opportunity that I got in this country…we will respect your traditions…we must have trust, we have to work hard on that.

Connolly suggested that embracing the similarities between Unionists and Nationalists whilst accepting their differences could be a route to a United Ireland:

Value the differences, come together on the similarities…access to health, access to housing

As co-host of the Drivetime debate Sarah McInerney pointed out though, nothing either candidate said really addresses the fact that, fundamentally, some Unionists just want to be left alone.

Some thoughts…

…on a complete lack of discourse on climate change

What can I say about something that hasn’t been discussed? The global community’s most pressing issue, yet it has only been raised in passing once (by Connolly in reference to her comments criticising a lack of funding for climate change in Budget 2026).

…on a rehabilitation, forgiveness and a plurality of thought

I don’t usually read the news on a regular basis. I prefer instead to engage in long-form media - journal articles, books, documentaries. Following this Presidential Election campaign has been a stark reminder why.

Take the controversy surrounding Catherine Connolly hiring a person with a past conviction. Anyone griping about the ‘letter of the law’ and whether rules were broken when she was signed into the Oireachtas are blind to the sinister motivation behind this story’s emergence.

The prejudice in society against those with former convictions underlies this story’s circulation. In each debate this week, Humphreys has attempted to capitalise on, as well as exemplified, this very prejudice. The mainstream media, who have dragged this person into public discourse, are reinforcing it further. It’s disgusting. Do we believe in rehabilitation or not?

That’s actually quite a deep philosophical question though, isn’t it? Fundamentally, it is a question of forgiveness, and on human nature. That only speaks further to the ignorance of those using this context as a ‘gotcha’ against Connolly. Drivetime host Cormac Ó hEadhra cornered Connolly over the apparent contradiction between her stances on weapons charges and sexual crime charges. Host of The Hard Shoulder Kieran Cuddihy did the same, suggesting that questions of this ilk are not that hard to answer. Humphreys has attempted to use the philosophical ambiguity of this issue to her advantage at every opportunity.

Philosophers have spent their whole lives grappling with these questions - of ethics and morality - yet the aforementioned seem able circumvent any qualms or contradiction. Maybe they are the great minds of our time? I’m not so sure though. Only Connolly seems able to acknowledge the fact that morality is ambiguous; that we are yet to come up with objective moral principles.

Connolly sums it up best:

I’d have to reflect on that, I’d have to think about that…As a woman, I react, so obviously I’d have to think about that. Of course, I would have to reflect.

She acknowledges her base instinct of, presumably, fear towards someone convicted of a sexual crime. Yet she is also able to acknowledge, in the context of her views on rehabilitation, that she may need to reflect on this.

The inability to recognise a plurality of views borders on delusional. Anyone who believes they don’t hold contradictory views on rehabilitation, forgiveness and human nature are lying to themselves.

…on the President being ‘above politics’

Throughout the Presidential campaign every candidate has, in some form or another, said that the President is ‘above politics’. This is presumably in order to convey an understanding and respect for the non-partisan nature of the Presidency. It is also presumably to dismiss any concerns about a candidates historical political links. But is the President really ‘above politics’?

Candidates, when pushed on this, revert to the standard line that ‘the day-to-day running of the country is down to the Government of the day’. Grand. We know that. That doesn’t make the President above politics. When the President engages with other heads of state, is that not political? When, the President speaks out on the concerns of the people, as each candidate has insisted they will do, is that not political? When the President expresses a vision for a United Ireland - again, as all candidates have done - is that not political? It’s time to stop dancing around the fact that the Presidency is very much a political role.

…on neutrality

Humphreys repeatedly accused Connolly of attacking Irish allies during the week. What allies though? I thought we were a neutral country?

As Humphreys has accidentally alluded to though, of course we aren’t. We are donating vehicles and robots to Ukraine, not to Russia, for example.

In attempts to resolve this contradiction, the term ‘military non-alignment’ has been used to describe Ireland’s political stance. I do wonder though, are these terms inherently limited by their declaration of what we are ‘not for’. They become quite reactive then, needing qualification and clarification. Might it be more productive to declare what we are actually for instead?

…on liberalism vs. realism

Connolly is absolutely unwavering on her views on defence spending, European rearmament, and neutrality. She is very much grounded in the liberal school of international relations - one that believes that cooperation is the norm amongst nations, that international institutions such as the UN have the capability to instill peace, and that fundamentally rejects the idea that power politics is the only path to conflict resolution.

This view must square with the fact that Russia is actively invading Ukraine. How do you talk Putin down without the leverage of force?

I have empathy for Connolly on this. I grapple with these tensions every day. On the one hand, I believe in disarmament, in security policy that seeks to address the root causes of insecurity and conflict, in the power of multilateral institutions to broker peace and in the power of diplomacy. On the the other though, it is hard to deny the fact that military assistance - in other words, defence spending - has been necessary to support Ukraine against Russia, and that the invasion itself has been a reminder to Russia’s neighbours that invasion is very much a possibility.

…on party pieces

If you needed reminding of the strangeness and opportunism of election campaigns, look no further than the closing section of Drivetime’s debate, where the candidates were asked - in reference to a video of Connolly playing football and basketball with children - whether they had any ‘party pieces’.

Connolly was confused as to what was actually being asked. Humphreys then took the opportunity to remind us that her “best skillset is listening”…

I was delayed in writing this article, and there have been some significant updates that mean it is now outdated. Firstly, Jim Gavin has withdrawn from the Irish Presidential Election. Secondly, there has been a second debate. I have decided to post it anyways, mainly as a medium for me to consider the remaining two candidates - Humphreys and Connolly.

Why does anyone want to be the President of Ireland? Journalists trawling through metaphorical - or literal - bins to uncover your deepest secrets. Intense public scrutiny and shaming for mistakes that the average person would make without batting an eyelid. On the one hand I have deep sympathy for any candidate. On the other though, this is the life they chose…

The Presidential Debates are another element of the campaign circus that must be cause for some sleepless nights. The first debate covered a broad range of topics, from the genocide against the Palestinian people and Trump’s ‘20-point Peace Plan’, to European rearmament, immigration and housing. On their first time out, how did the would-be Presidents do?

Genocide, Palestinian Self-Determination, Hamas and the Occupied Territories Bill

Beginning the debate, host Kieran Cuddihy noted that Trump and Netanyahu had announced their 20-point peace plan in Gaza. He also reminded us that we have been here before1.

Catherine Connolly, although welcoming the news, was skeptical of any peace:

I welcome the signs of hope for a peace deal in in Palestine and in the Middle East. Although I have my doubts about that because I don’t think the Palestinian people saw the draft of what’s been talked about.

Later in the interview, the discussion returned to the genocide in Palestine, and in particular Palestinian self-determination and the role of Hamas in any peace deal.

Connolly reiterated her stance on Palestinian self-determination:

We need to allow the Palestinian people decide what type of country they want

Connolly didn’t actually comment directly on Hamas in the debate, but it is safe to assume that she believes they should be included in any peace process based on her recent comments acknowledging that - like it or not - Hamas are a part of Palestinian society.

Speaking specifically about Hamas, Heather Humphreys was hesitant about a role for them in the peace process and in a future Palestine:

It’s hard to see how there can [be a role for Hamas]…you have to talk to people but I don’t know…I’m not saying they can’t be part of it…it’s going to be very difficult because they are a proscribed terrorist organisation and…the EU have identified them as that…you have to give up the arms. You have to stop the fighting…

There was a moment when Humphreys wondered aloud whether the Occupied Territories Bill would make any difference. She backtracked quickly though, reiterating here support for the Bill.

Jim Gavin was clear on the need for a Palestinian voice in the peace process, but supported the Palestinian Authority’s view that Hamas would have no role in the future of Palestine2:

We’ve only got two states talking to each other. The Israelis, the US, Palestinians need to get involved in this…Let’s see what happens…The Palestinian Authority were very clear last week that Hamas will have no part, no shape or form in the new Palestinian state.

Similarly to Humphreys, Gavin also wobbled here. Connolly raised previous comments from Gavin where he stated that Israel had achieved it’s military objectives in Gaza. Connolly questioned after how many deaths said objectives had been achieved.

European Rearmament, the Military-Industrial Complex and Irish Defence Spending

Connolly expressed grave concern over European rearmament and what she perceives to be a growing military-industrial complex:

I’m extremely worried about the military-industrial complex that’s building up particularly in Europe. Germany just being one of the examples because they’ve actually said it very openly that that’s what their economy needs and it’s a boost to their economy.

Pushed further on this though, Connolly acknowledged that Russia poses a threat to European security, but urged a diplomatic solution:

Certainly, there’s certainly a threat posed by Russia. But in terms of meeting that threat, we we should be using diplomatic approaches. We should be trying for peace. We’re a neutral country and we should be using our voice small as we are. We should be using our voice to push for peace.

Gavin was more sympathetic to the need for rearmament, believing that Russia has left European nations with no choice but to increase defence spending:

There’s a war on the eastern border of Europe. Each country has a choice to make to defend their democracy, to defend their sovereignty. That is a given right. I’m sure the German government could be spending their money elsewhere in welfare but what choice do they have? What choice do Estonia have? Latvia have they need to protect our sovereignty.

Humphreys held a similar stance:

On Saturday night there were thousands of drones that bombarded a city in Ukraine and if it hadn’t been for the defences that Germany had put in there [in Ukraine] - four people were killed - thousands of people would have been killed. So the aggressor here is Russia and Europe has to defend itself. We really do.

Cuddihy wouldn’t let her get away quite so easily though.

Moving on to the dichotomy of European rearmament and Irish defence spending, he reminded Humphreys that her former party - Fine Gael - had resided over the deteriorating condition of the Irish Defence Forces. In a dynamic that was to be repeated throughout the debate, she avoided acknowledging any policy failures her former party might have suffered.

Instead, she emphasised her support for the Irish Defence Forces and the need to increase investment:

We’re very proud of our Defence Forces and what they have achieved, particularly on peacekeeping missions. Our defence forces certainly deserve all the support that the government can give them, there’s no doubt about that and I want to see them supported…there has been increased investment…over the years and we need more. It’s as simple as that. We need more.

As a former member of the Irish Defence Forces, it was hardly a surprise to hear Gavin call for investment in defence:

I’m here to support the Defence Commission in terms of investing in the people that I’m very proud of and the Irish people are very proud of, our Defence Forces. That they had the proper equipment when they’re overseas. In peacekeeping roles you need to have armor vehicles. You need to have mine clearing equipment. We need to invest in our people who are representing us. And I wore that proudly [the Irish Tricolor] or over my shoulder in peacekeeping missions and the government doing the right thing in this case in terms of the investment.

What was noteworthy however was Connolly’s position on defence spending. She acknowledged the neglect of the Irish Defence Forces and the need to improve conditions for soldiers. However, she did qualify that any increase in spending should be marginal, and that said increase needed to be considered against other societal issues:

…we have neglected our Defence Forces for a very long time…the Defence Forces, I think the title is very important. It it’s not an army, it’s a Defence Forces, and we’ve certainly neglected it. And we’ve had huge recruitment and retention problems…I have no difficulty improving the conditions for soldiers and for our Defence Forces and spending a little more money. But when we have to make choices and we can’t house our people, then that’s a discussion that we really need to be honest about and be open with the people to say ‘look at what we’re doing here’.

Despite the caveats, this stance might have surprised some viewers given Connolly’s earlier indictment of the European military-industrial complex. Cuddihy was quick to pick up on this, reminding Connolly that a German increase in defence spending could also be framed as a need to invest in a neglected defence force.

Immigration and the ‘Ireland is full’ Movement

The topic of immigration was broached through concern over the use of the Irish flag to intimidate immigrants, and a potential association with the ‘Ireland is full’ movement.

There has been some debate as to whether local councils should intervene and remove Irish flags if it they are suspected of being used in such a way. Humphreys and Gavin were asked their opinion on this, both of whom gave protracted eulogies about what the flag meant to them. I won’t be including their answers here for concision’s sake. To summarise: Humphreys failed to answer Cuddihy’s question on whether the flag should be taken down. Eventually, Gavin concluded that people can choose to do what they want with the Irish flag.

Cuddihy did manage to eventually steer the candidates onto what he portrayed as the underlying cause of anti-immigrant sentiment: that there exists communities who feel abandoned by the State, disenfranchised with the system and unrepresented by the political establishment.

Humphreys emphasised the important of inclusion:

…in communities where there’s division where we need to sit down and have those conversations. We need to speak to people and we need to to break down those preconceived notions those prejudices that are creeping into our society.

She delivered variations of the same message several times, before Cuddihy intervened with: “it does sound a little like you’re suggesting that all we need to do is explain to these people how they’re wrong”. He also again drove home the point that Humphreys was a member of successive governments that have overseen the rise of anti-immigrant sentiment in Ireland. Humphreys retorted that as Minister of Rural and Community Development she introduced programmes to improve social inclusion.

Similarly to Humphreys, Connolly expressed the need to ensure all communities were represented in any political dialogue. She did note, though, that she believed that communities spreading hatred towards immigrants were a small - but undeniably vocal - group:

…I think there are small group of people that are extraordinarily loud and vocal. I think that’s the first thing. And I think it does not reflect people in general in Ireland who are very welcoming…I think we have to find a way to deal with this issue in a way that tries to acknowledge what’s happening...the language of division and the language of saying the country is full is just abhorrent. It’s abhorrent to everything I stand for. However, a vacuum has arisen to a certain extent in Irish society…that vacuum has allowed for certain voices to be raised very loudly. Are they right? Absolutely not. How did it happen? It happened through a vacuum, I think, and difficulties building up over time. And I think as a presidential candidate, I’m fully aware of that. And we need to stop have a discourse about what’s happening…that’s part of leadership

Connolly then went on to emphasise the importance of inclusion through the example of her attendance at a celebration of Indian Independence Day. Connolly also criticised Direct Provision, reminding the audience that it was a temporary measure that has now been in place for 25 years.

Gavin was quizzed on the levels of immigration to Ireland, and whether it is sustainable:

[Immigration to Ireland] has [been high] and it’s reducing…I’ve said before in my opening remarks that there is division in this country and as President I will work with the communities listening to them and listen to to their concerns…I’ve been the chair of a task force in the northeast inner city bringing government agencies, bringing services, listening to the community to build a better life for them and let them live the best version of themselves…in terms of immigration…we have always been welcome welcoming to those people [referring specifically to economic migrants, it seems]…but what we do need is to have a robust but fair immigration system

Housing

Of course the housing crisis was going to be discussed.

Humphreys reminded us that we need to build more houses - just in case anyone had forgotten:

…it’s a disaster for the people that can’t get houses and you know, they’re putting their lives on hold and they’re putting off making decisions because they can’t get a house. I know that a lot of effort and a lot of money has gone in to build or to you know to try to solve this problem and the bottom line is we need to see results and we need to see more houses being built and this needs to happen. It needs to happen and it needs to happen now.

After being again reminded that she was a member of successive governments who have overseen a lacklustre response to the housing crisis, she initially attempted to deflect the question before acknowledging that they did not achieve what they had set out to do:

…the Government that I was part of did achieve many things…they did achieve many things and now we have a fast growing economy we have full employment but I have to accept that we didn’t achieve all that we should have achieved in housing. I agree with you. [Cuddihy: What did you achieve in housing?]. Well, there has been an increase in number of houses that were built over the years but it’s a complex target. It’s a complex problem and I have been in government with members of the Labour Party, members of Fianna Fáil, members of the Green Party and Independents and every Minister for Housing, in fairness, they did their best. They really really tried but we just did not achieve what we needed to achieve. So I accept that.

Gavin was also pressed on the failure of his advocating party - Fianna Fáil - to address problems in the housing market. Asked several times whether he had any qualms about representing Fianna Fáil despite their “abject failure on housing”, as Cuddihy put it, Gavin insisted that the role of the President is to continue to highlight the issue:

[The] President can keep highlighting the issues of society and the issue of housing will be the defining issue of our leaders in Government that we elected not the President. The President can keep a spotlight on it.

Cuddihy interjected, suggesting to Gavin that no one needed to be reminded out the housing crisis - especially the Government.

Followers of Connolly won’t be surprised to hear that she blames neoliberal economic policy for the housing crisis, and urged the Government to adopt the recommendations of the Housing Commission published in 2024:

I spent 17 years of my life at a City Council level and we built houses and we stopped building in 2009. Not a single public house was built by Galway City Council and very few by the County Council from 2009 onwards. The problem has arisen because we utterly based our solutions on the market, on a neoliberal ideology and when that failed we brought in various schemes to back up the market. We utterly failed to build public housing on public land which is part of the solution. Now we have a myriad of schemes which is like a jigsaw of pieces without an overall picture. It has become complex because of the various schemes but it’s actually quite simple in a sense that we need first of all to realize that it’s a fundamental human right to have a home. Secondly we need to look at what the Housing Commission said. The government set up a Housing Commission and amongst many recommendations…one of their conclusions before the recommendations was that we need a radical reset of housing policy. And then they went on to give the recommendations which have been utterly ignored by the government.

Connolly was reminded of the lack of builders though, to which she avoided a direct response

Crime in Dublin City Centre

On the Saturday night before the debate, Pittsburgh Steelers quarterback Skylar Thompson was assaulted in Temple Bar. Cuddihy wondered whether anyone could feel safe in Dublin City Centre if a “man-mountain” such as Thompson could be assaulted.

According to Humphreys, the answer is a greater Garda presence on the streets of the capital:

…it’s very concerning what has happened. It’s terrible. It’s terrible for that person…for that man that was attacked. And it’s wrong and it shouldn’t be happening…we need to have our streets safe. Tourists coming here need to know that it’s safe to come to this country…there there have been incidents obviously where people have been attacked and that is wrong. It’s wrong. I know that…we need…have Garda on the street but obviously we need more Garda on the street and that’s the reality of the situation and it’s terrible to think that somebody comes to this country, they visit this country and they find they’re attacked and it it’s not a good message…

Connolly came to a similar conclusion. Having said that she also seem to convey her comfort in walking Dublin City:

I walk everywhere in Dublin. I get a bus up from Galway every week on a Monday and I go back on a Thursday. When we were in the Convention Center, I walked from the Convention Center up to the top of Grafton Street. And during that period of time, I saw a complete lack of Garda presence on the ground. It has certainly improved, but it was building up over a number of years…I sat on a Joint Policing Committee for quite some time of my life and the biggest request was more community Garda on the ground. So obviously we haven’t enough community Garda. Part of it might be retention and recruitment, but the other part was a complete lack of understanding by the powers that be for the need for community Garda on the ground…

There was a moment of panic for Connolly as she commented that prisons were full. She was then asked repeatedly whether more prisons should be built. She seemed eventually to settle on the fact that prisons were needed, but that a more holistic solution needed to be implemented to reduce crime.

Gavin confidently reminded the audience of his work in the Northeast Inner City. He also believed that there needed to be an increase in Garda presence:

…because of my work in Dublin’s northeastern [inner] city. I’m very familiar with you. I’m very concerned of the local people who want more members of Garda on the ground. On on the taskforce that I chair independent...There are more [Garda] but there’s not enough. And I think what the President of Ireland can do is keep highlighting the these issues, keep keep close contact with communities, the most vulnerable in society.

A United Ireland

One of the final topics discussed was the prospect of a United Ireland, for which all candidates claimed to be a proponent.

Gavin said his focus would be on uniting people and communities, implying that the question of the border would be the concern of his predecessor:

I’m a Republican. I believe in the Constitution. I believe what the Constitution speaks about a United Ireland and I’m very proud of that. But I’m also conscious of the great work that’s been done since the Good Friday Agreement of 1998…in my presidency I will work to build on the former Presidents, the great work they they have done and reconciliation across the island of Ireland...For me it’s unification of people first and foremost. That’s the priority that I will bring to the government.

Connolly denied accusations that she has adopted a concern for a United Ireland for the sake of her Presidential campaign, and insisted she will use her voice for a United Ireland:

…back in 2020 I spoke in the Dáil on a United Ireland. I’ve spoken on it on other occasions and in parallel with that I’ve gone up to the North repeatedly in a personal capacity and then as Chair of the Irish Committee and I have met communities across the divide…Article 3 of the Constitution sets out the Constitutional requirements and I’ll certainly be a voice for that…I would hope that there would be United Ireland in my term as president…in terms of a border poll and in terms of that it’s up to the different entities, the three entities that will be involved. It’s very much political, but I will certainly use my voice as I’ve done in [the past] going up to Northern Ireland and meeting different communities to progress that

Similarly to Gavin and Connolly, Humphreys insisted she would campaign for a United Ireland. She was also asked what a flag for such a State might look like, and whether a new anthem would be required. At first it appeared that she would insist on the symbols of the Republic of Ireland, before saying that compromise would be required:

I will work with the flag…the flag is a symbol of unity…the flag, it clearly outlines the orange of unionism and the green of republicanism…that is so important with peace in with white in the middle…[on the anthem] there’s going to always have to be compromises. If you’re finding a new solution there will be compromises but that will be up to the Government.

Some thoughts on the role of the President…

How you feel the first Presidential Debate played out is likely shaped by what you view the role of the Irish President to be. Of course, they have a practical role to play, signing legislation into law, but many would consider the Irish President largely symbolic.

That doesn’t mean they aren’t important though. In fact as a symbol, I believe they are extremely important. They highlight the issues of the day to the Irish public and political establishment, calling attention to injustice and inequality, holding a mirror up to society. They can help to set a vision for a better Ireland, and a better world.

As such a symbol, a suitable candidate must demonstrate thoughtfulness, humility, and act on principle, leading the Irish people by example.

The Presidential Debates hosted in the run-up to the election are an opportunity for us to consider whether the candidates demonstrate these qualities. On their first outing, did they?

Let me make something abundantly clear - Israel is committing genocide against the Palestinian people. The evidence is undeniable. I also believe, though this is harder to prove, that the systematic ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian people has been ongoing since the Sykes-Picot Agreement and Balfour Declaration.

Having said that, I am reluctant to prescribe solutions to the ‘question of Palestine’, as Edward Said would put it.

Who am I to opine on such matters? I am not a Palestinian, an Arab or an Israeli. It feels wrong for me to prescribe solutions to problems I have only ever read about on the behalf of people I have never met. That doesn’t mean I don’t have opinions on suggested solutions, and it certainly doesn’t mean engaging in willful ignorance. But to pontificate on these matters seems inappropriate. The central voice in ending the persecution of the Palestinians people should be their own1.

What I do have a much more firm stance on is the role that Ireland has to play in ending genocide.

The report prepared by the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel, where they conclude that Israel is committing genocide, makes several recommendations to other states (p. 72):

The Commission recommends that all Member States:

(a) Employ all means reasonably available to them to prevent the commission of genocide in the Gaza Strip;

(b) Cease the transfer of arms and other equipment or items, including jet fuel, to the State of Israel or third States where there is reason to suspect their use in military operations that have involved or could involve the commission of genocide;

(c) Ensure individuals and corporations in their territories and within their jurisdiction are not involved in the commission of genocide, aiding and assisting the commission of genocide or incitement to commit genocide and investigate and prosecute those who may be implicated in these crimes under international law;

(d) Facilitate the investigations and domestic proceedings and take action (including imposing sanctions) against the State of Israel and against individuals or corporations that are involved in or facilitating the commission of genocide or incitement to commit genocide

Similar recommendations are outlined in the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), published in July 2024 (p. 76):

The Court considers that the duty of distinguishing dealings with Israel between its own territory and the Occupied Palestinian Territory encompasses, inter alia, the obligation to…abstain from entering into economic or trade dealings with Israel concerning the Occupied Palestinian Territory or parts thereof which may entrench its unlawful presence in the territory…and to take steps to prevent trade or investment relations that assist in the maintenance of the illegal situation created by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

From my perspective, the recommendations can be summarised as follows: do not, in any conceivable way, support the genocide being committed against the Palestinian people.

In Ireland, a political manifestation of support for the Palestinian people has been the Occupied Territories Bill. It was originally proposed in 2018 by Senator Frances Black, yet here we are in 2025 still mulling it over2.

I believe the Bill needs to be passed immediately, and must include services and exports3. I also believe that Ireland must engage in an economic campaign not just to sanction Israel, but to economically isolate it. In my opinion not doing so means we fail to comply with the above UN and ICJ recommendations. More importantly though, I believe failing to do so means we are abdicating our moral responsibility to do all we can to end the genocide against the Palestinian people.

That’s not to say that I think that passing the Occupied Territories Bill or such a campaign of economic isolation will be easy. So, despite my stance above - which is driven by principle - I want also want to do my best to understand the concerns people might have over passing the Occupied Territories Bill, and to investigate what a campaign of economic isolation against Israel might entail.

One of the main concerns - if not the only one - for those who fret about the passing of the Occupied Territories Bill is the economic impact it might have in Ireland. Let’s take a look at the potential economic impact…

How much trade does Ireland actually do with the Occupied Territories?

Supposing a version of the Occupied Territories Bill is passed which includes services and exports, the direct impacts of the bill will be related to trade with the Occupied Territories. To understand that impact, we need to understand the nature of trade between Ireland and the Occupied Territories.

Official Irish trade data with the Occupied Territories is difficult to come by. I could only find goods trade (i.e. no services trade) data for 2023 and 20244.

So what is the value of goods we import from the Occupied Territories? €90k in 2023 and €214k in 2024. We import mostly vegetables and fruit, or other food-related products such as vegetable oils. These are likely olives and olive oils - a recent report by over 80 organisations entitled Trading with Illegal Settlements states that olives and related goods account for approximately 14% of the Palestinian economy (p. 8).

What about exports? Interestingly the value of exports from Ireland to the Occupied Territories has fallen drastically from €2.17m in 2023 to about €272k in 2024. We export primarily medicinal and pharmaceutical products.

All in all then, goods trade between Ireland and the Occupied Territories amounted to about €2.26m in 2023 and €486k in 2024.

Where this becomes murkier though is that fact that goods produced in the Occupied Territories are often not declared as such5. As a result, some of Ireland’s trade with Israel is very likely from illegal settlements in the Occupied Territories. How much is difficult to determine, but research outlined in Trading with Illegal Settlements estimates that the “EU imports 15 times more in goods from illegal Israeli settlers than it does from Palestinian producers” (p. 23).

What about services?

As there is no official services trade data available, it is difficult to quantify the value of services trade between Ireland and the Occupied Territories.

Still, it can likely be assumed that there is some. Trading with Illegal Settlements lists many multinational corporations - such as eDreams, TUI, JCB, Siemens, Carrefour, Maersk, BNP Paribas, HSBC and Barclays - with operations in the Occupied Territories or who engage in activities that support the genocide against the Palestinian people, such as financing settlement-linked activity6. This report doesn’t even include organisations such as Microsoft, Amazon and Google who are enabling the genocide against the Palestinian people by providing services to the Israeli administration and Israeli Defence Forces 78.

Given the presence of many of these organisations in Ireland, almost undoubtedly trade in services that aids, assists, facilitates, normalises and profits from genocide occurs between Ireland and the Occupied Territories or Israel.

The real reason we haven’t passed the Occupied Territories Bill

The concerns regarding passing the Occupied Territories Bill fall into three broad categories: legality, effective enforcement and economic impacts.

The Joint Commission on Foreign Trade and Affairs concluded that the legal basis of the Occupied Territories Bill is sound. This includes services, which the Commission recommends be included in the Bill9.

As is outlined in the Commission’s report published in July 2025, whilst the effective enforcement of a full (meaning goods and services) Occupied Territories Bill may be challenging, it is certainly surmountable. The Commission notes that similar measures are already in place through an existing EU ban on trade in goods and services from Crimea since 2014, which Irish companies are already obliged to implement10.

What about economic concerns then? Notwithstanding the difficulty in identifying trade with the Occupied Territories, the value of it is likely not massive relative to the total value of Irish trade - for example, in 2023 Irish trade in goods equated to approximately €336.2bn. The direct economic impacts would not be that significant.

I say that only because it speaks to the actual economic concerns that some have over the passing of the Occupied Territories Bill, not because I think that a relatively small amount of trade is a legitimate reason not to pass the Occupied Territories Bill. What it highlights is the primary economic concern related to passing the Occupied Territories Bill: the repercussions we might face from the United States11.

How important is the United States to the Irish Economy?

The concern arises from two factors: the importance of the US to the Irish economy and the apparent US disgruntlement at Ireland even considering the Occupied Territories Bill. I will return to the latter, but for now let us focus on the importance of the US to the Irish economy.

To most it is hardly a surprise to learn of the importance of the US economy to Ireland. It accounts for a disproportionately high level of Irish trade, employment, enterprise earnings and onshore FDI position.

The importance of the US to the Irish economy is even more evident in particular sectors, such as ICT, pharmaceuticals and finance.

What isn’t captured above is the importance of US firms to the Irish tax base. According to the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council US multinationals account for about 75% of Corporation Tax receipts, which is the second largest source of revenue for the Irish government. The largest is Income Tax. As US firms are a significant employer in Ireland, we can infer that the indirect contributions of US firms to Income Tax receipts are also likely significant.

So we have established that the US is important to the Irish economy. Not exactly a revelation. Why do they care about the Occupied Territories Bill though?

What is the relationship between the US and Israel?

This section could be a whole article of its own. There are many books, articles, videos and films on this topic, written by people who know a lot more about it than I do. Nonetheless I will do my best to outline what I believe to be some the key points that illustrate the ‘special relationship’ between the US and Israel, and how it has developed12.

Following Ottoman defeat during the First World War, the US ultimately informally endorsed the Sykes-Picot Agreement - which carved up the Arab world and its people between Britain and France - and the Balfour Declaration - which set out the ambition to establish a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. This is despite then President Woodrow Wilson asserting at the Paris Peace Conference that “in colonial matters the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the claims of the imperial power” and assuring the Arab people “an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development”13.

It is was also despite the findings of the US-led King-Crane Commission, a fact-finding mission that surveyed the Arab people and their aspirations for the future. Included amongst their recommendations was the creation of a single Syrian state and major modifications to the Zionist project, limiting Jewish immigration. They believed that the Balfour Declaration’s promises to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine and to respect the rights of the Palestinian population were irreconcilable14. How their findings contrast with what has actually transpired.

Britain were the primary supporters of the Zionist project between the First and Second World Wars. However, the relationship between Britain and the Zionists soured as Britain sought to manage unrest amongst the Palestinian people and a growing Jewish nationalist movement. This deterioration climaxed with the publication of the 1939 White Paper by the British government, which capped Jewish immigration to Palestine15. From then onwards the US became the political centre of Zionism16.

The US endorsed the UN Partition Plan in 1947 which is considered the flash point for the civil war between Arabs and Jews in so-called Mandatory Palestine17. This plan called for the creation of a Jewish state which would occupy 55% of the Palestinian territory. This is despite the Jewish Zionist population owning a small fraction of the land18, and that same population accounting for only 30% of the total population in Mandatory Palestine19.

The civil war in Palestine transformed into the first Arab-Israeli war as the British mandate expired in 1948. Just as they were withdrawing, Israel declared independence. On the very same day, the US became the first nation to recognise the state of Israel20. The Palestinians are still waiting for the same courtesy to be shown to them.

By the time the first Arab-Israeli war was over, Israel occupied 78% of the Palestinian territory. A major victory for the Zionist movement. In contrast, 1948 is remembered as al-Nakba by the Palestinian people, a year in which 750,000 Palestinians were reduced to refugees21.

Although the US was more firm with Israel during the second Arab-Israeli war in 1956, from then onwards the US has effectively unconditionally supported Israel. This relationship was solidified by US support for Israel during the third Arab-Israeli war in 1967 - known as al-Naksa - since which Israel has occupied the West Bank and East Jerusalem, Gaza and the Golan Heights22. The US did support UN Resolution 242 in 1967 - which called for Israeli military withdrawal from the Occupied Territories - but since it has persistently used its UN Security Council to protect Israel. Evidence provided at an address at RUSI in 2014 illustrates this:

The US has vetoed 42 UN Security Council resolutions that are critical of Israel- it has only exercised its veto 83 times in total. And the resolutions that have been passed are being flouted.

A quick analysis of UN Security Council Veto Data indicates that the number of vetoes has now risen to 51.

This unconditional support has continued to the present day. During his first Presidency Donald Trump recognised the Golan Heights as part of Israel, making the US the first country apart from Israel to do so. Biden declared himself a Zionist in 2024. He simultaneously claimed that he has done “more for the Palestinian community than anybody”, yet his administration also vetoed UN Security Council resolutions demanding an unconditional ceasefire in the genocide ongoing in Gaza23.

Similar support has continued under Donald Trump during his second Presidency. According to Trading with Illegal Settlements one of his first acts was to rescind an executive order which authorised the US Secretaries of State and Treasury to “sanction those responsible for, or complicit in, threatening the peace, security, or stability of the West Bank, engaging in violence against civilians or destruction of civilian property”24. In June 2025 the US again vetoed a UN Security Council resolution demanding an unconditional ceasefire in Gaza. In August 2025 Trump said that it was “pretty much up to Israel” if it wanted to fully occupy Gaza.

This is just a brief history of events that illustrate the ‘special relationship’, if not alliance, between the US and Israel. The question of why this relationship exists remains though. Again, this could be a whole article in itself.

In this video Noam Chomsky suggests it’s the result of some combination of cultural factors - such as the deep rooted Christian beliefs in the US and a culture predicated on settler colonialism - as well as the geostrategic importance of Israel to the US, all of which is supported by a media regime that perpetuates a policy of support for Israel. In this lecture John J Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt argue that the Israel Lobby plays a significant role in influencing US foreign policy and shaping public discourse in favour of Israel. It is also hard to ignore the role that the “othering” of the Arab people - what Edward Said would refer to as ‘orientalism’ - might play in US imperialism.

There are probably plenty of other potential reasons why the ‘special relationship’ between the US and Israel exists. My opinion is that they likely all capture a dimension of the truth.

Irrespective of why the relationship exists though, as I’ve outlined above, it does. This explains why Occupied Territories Bill has upset some US politicians.

What is the US threatening?

In early August of this year, a group of 16 politicians urged the US treasury secretary to investigate whether the Occupied Territories Bill constituted a foreign boycott of Israel. It isn’t clear exactly what the repercussions of this might be, but according to the Journal, it could mean that “Ireland [is placed] on a purported boycott list, potentially suspending future US business deals in Dublin and elsewhere”.

The IIEA’s recent talk on this topic also offers different perspectives on the potential implications of passing the Occupied Territories Bill for US and Irish economic relations. These ranged from nothing at all to legal proceedings against US companies based in Ireland complying, or even perceived to be complying, with an alleged boycott of Israel.

Is the threat realistic?

In response to US concern about an Israeli boycott, it has been pointed out that the Occupied Territories Bill pertains only to the Occupied Territories. However, this view probably fails to acknowledge that the the Occupied Territories and Israel are seen as one and the same by the US. This was alluded to by Taoiseach Micheál Martin:

Our position is that it relates to the Occupied Territories, not to Israel. And that might be a point of difference in the US, because, in the US, people might look at it differently – but we have a very clear view of it here.

So if the Occupied Territories Bill was passed, would their actually be economic repercussions for Ireland? The short answer: who knows. As is illustrated by the importance of the US economy to the Irish economy, there is a risk. However, the likelihood of that risk manifesting and the impact it might are debated25.

Should a US reaction affect Ireland passing the Occupied Territories Bill?

Is it a risk worth taking though? I would like to answer that question in three parts.

First of all: do I believe any repercussions would actually materialise, and what impact do I think they might have? Ireland has been a supporter of Palestine at a political level for quite some time. For example, Ireland was the first EU Member State to declare that a solution to the conflict in the Middle East had to be based on a fully sovereign Palestinian State in 1980. Also, the Occupied Territories Bill - albeit a completely different version - was first proposed back in 2018.

That’s not to say Ireland’s support has been flawless - we only called on a solution involving a fully sovereign Palestine in 1980, we only recognised the state of Palestine in 2024 (we seem to have legally recognised the state of Israel in 1963), and we have been debating the Occupied Territories Bill for far too long.

Nonetheless, some level of Irish political support for Palestine has been evident - at least rhetorically - for quite some time. The US and US firms have known this.

Maybe the difference this time is that we are going beyond rhetoric though? Maybe. Having said that, the US maintains warm diplomatic and economic relations with other nations - such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia - which have crossed the threshold for a foreign boycott of Israel.

US politicians - particularly Democrats - also seem more forthcoming in their opposition of Israel. Of course the aforementioned letter urging the US treasury secretary to investigate the Occupied Territories Bill was signed by 16 members of congress, but that was only 16 of 435 members. In contrast, 180 Democrat members of congress signed a letter urging Israel not to annex the West Bank in September. Also, in July of this year a majority of Democrat senators voted to block arms deals to Israel. The motions to veto these arms deals ultimately failed, but such a significant shift in political opinion on Israel does not seem indicative of an environment that would overly scrutinise Ireland - and US companies operating there - for passing the Occupied Territories Bill.

Nonetheless, the frenzied, chaotic nature of Donald Trump’s policy-making is inherently difficult to predict. In fact, the Occupied Territories Bill could arguably be used as leverage by Trump in an attempt to reshore the operations and profits of large multinationals.

Despite that though, I remain unconvinced that economic repercussions will manifest on any significant scale. The firms we are talking about - Apple, Google and Meta, for example - have a lot of sway over US policy. They are here to make money, and aren’t going to give that up easily.

Secondly: Should the economic consequences matter? Should Irish economic entanglement with the US mean we abdicate our moral responsibility to a people being persecuted by a genocidal regime? Absolutely not, in my opinion. In fact, I believe we should be willing to pay to end genocide.

The moral principle that Ireland must support the Palestinian people is the sole reason we should immediately pass the Occupied Territories Bill, irrespective of the risk to the Irish economy. I understand what I am saying here means there is some risk that Irish people might lose their jobs. I certainly do not want this to happen. Nonetheless, that outcome is uncertain. What is guaranteed is the genocide of the Palestinian people.

Finally, if the moral argument doesn’t persuade you, let us consider the legal one. Below are some excerpts from the ICJ Advisory Opinion and the UN Commission of Inquiry relating to economic relations with Israel and the Occupied Territories:

…to abstain from treaty relations with Israel in all cases in which it purports to act on behalf of the Occupied Palestinian Territory or a part thereof on matters concerning the Occupied Palestinian Territory or a part of its territory… (ICJ Advisory Opinion, p. 76)

…to abstain from entering into economic or trade dealings with Israel concerning the Occupied Palestinian Territory or parts thereof which may entrench its unlawful presence in the territory… (ICJ Advisory Opinion, p. 76)

…to take steps to prevent trade or investment relations that assist in the maintenance of the illegal situation created by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory… (ICJ Advisory Opinion, p. 76)

…not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by Israel’s illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory… (ICJ Advisory Opinion, p. 76)

Employ all means reasonably available to them to prevent the commission of genocide in the Gaza Strip (UN Commission of Inquiry, p. 72)

Cease the transfer of arms and other equipment or items, including jet fuel, to the State of Israel or third States where there is reason to suspect their use in military operations that have involved or could involve the commission of genocide (UN Commission of Inquiry, P. 72)

Ensure individuals and corporations in their territories and within their jurisdiction are not involved in the commission of genocide, aiding and assisting the commission of genocide or incitement to commit genocide and investigate and prosecute those who may be implicated in these crimes under international law (UN Commission of Inquiry, P. 72)

As I mentioned at the start of the article, the essence of the recommendations by both the ICJ and UN Commission of Inquiry are clear to me: do not, in any conceivable way, support the genocide being committed against the Palestinian people.

The UN Commission of Inquiry reminds states of their responsibility under international law to prevent and punish genocide, even in the absence of an express order by the ICJ (see p. 69). They also emphasise that states have been under this obligation since 26th January 2024, when the ICJ put all States on notice of the plausibility of the State of Israel committing genocide (see p. 69-70).

So to summarise: I am unconvinced by worries regarding the economic impact of the Occupied Territories Bill. However, I acknowledge that it is a risk. Nonetheless, I believe Ireland has a moral responsibility to aid the Palestinian people in any conceivable way, and is also compelled to do so by international law.

Irish action may not have a major impact, but Irish inaction will certainly have none. We need to lead on principle on this issue, and set an example for other nations.

Is the Occupied Territories Bill enough?

What I view as the primary motivating factors in passing the Occupied Territories Bill - a moral responsibility and a legal obligation - make me wonder whether the Occupied Territories Bill is enough.

I would suggest it is fair to conclude that the entirety of the Israeli state apparatus is being directed towards the genocide against the Palestinian people. Let us consider some of the ICJ and UN Commission of Inquiry recommendations in that light.

…to abstain from entering into economic or trade dealings with Israel concerning the Occupied Palestinian Territory or parts thereof which may entrench its unlawful presence in the territory… (ICJ Advisory Opinion, p. 76)

How do we differentiate between economic or trade dealings with Israel concerning the Occupied Palestinian Territories and dealings that are not concerning the Occupied Territories if the state of Israel is committing genocide?

…to take steps to prevent trade or investment relations that assist in the maintenance of the illegal situation created by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory… (ICJ Advisory Opinion, p. 76)

Conceivably, couldn’t any trade with Israel be perceived as assisting and maintaining the genocide in the Occupied Territories?

Employ all means reasonably available to them to prevent the commission of genocide in the Gaza Strip (UN Commission of Inquiry, p. 72)

If we assume that boycotting trade with Israel might help prevent the genocide being committed against the Palestinian people, then shouldn’t this fall within what Ireland considers “all means reasonably available”?

The legal argument for implementing a campaign of trade isolation against Israel is less clear than that for passing a full Occupied Territories Bill, but I do believe there are grounds.

However, I would return again to the moral argument. Should we be contributing in any way to the economy of a genocidal political regime? I appreciate that there are many Israeli’s against the genocide in the Occupied Territories and that ceasing trade with Israel would affect these people as well as those who support the genocide. Again though, their potential suffering must be weighed against the guaranteed suffering of a people being persecuted by a genocidal regime.

Ask yourself this: if there was a chance that your money was contributing to the genocide of the Palestinian people, either directly or indirectly, would you want that to continue?

What would a boycott on trade with Israel mean?

Aside from the increased likelihood of repercussions from the United States, the direct economic impact of ceasing trade with Israel would be much more significant to the Irish economy than ceasing trade with the Occupied Territories.

Ireland imported €6.71bn worth of goods and services from Israel in 2023, and €3.82bn worth of goods in 2024 (as of writing services data was not available from the CSO for 2024). The majority of that trade is accounted for by two categories: electronics and research & development activities.

The specific electronics being imported seem to be predominantly ‘integrated circuits’, better known as mircochips.

It’s difficult to tell who exactly is importing these microchips, or whether they are being imported at all. However, it seems quite likely that Intel are responsible for a large part of this trade, either importing components from Israel for use in their Irish operations, or transferring goods internally between balance sheets to take advantage of Ireland’s tax regime.

The import of R&D services is similarly difficult to attribute. Historical examples of companies transferring intellectual property to Ireland in order to reduce their tax burden might suggest a similar arrangement here though.

Irish exports to Israel are of a similar magnitude, exporting €6.36bn worth of goods and services to Israel in 2023, and €1.46bn worth of goods in 2024 (again, as of writing services data was not available from the CSO for 2024).

The primary Irish exports are computer services and electronics. Similarly to imports, attribution is difficult. Having said that, the presence of technology firms such as Microsoft, Amazon and Google in Ireland and their links to Israeli Defence Forces operations might give us some indication of who is purchasing these services. Of course, these companies will also provide services to your every day Israeli.

The exported electronics seem to be primarily telecommunications products and computers. Based on the same data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity, it also appears that a significant chunk of ‘Other’ exports relate to the pharmaceutical sector.

Will Ireland boycott trade with Israel?

Do I think there is any possibility of a boycott on trade with Israel? No26.

Evidently, Ireland’s trade relationship with Israel is significant - it would be difficult to motivate people to unwind an entrenched relationship that produces so much money. It is also pertinent that trade between Ireland and Israel is in sectors seen as vitally important to the Irish economy: ICT and - to a lesser extent - pharmaceuticals27. It seems unlikely that the Irish government would implement policy that so directly harms the companies they have nurtured for so long.

It is also important to remember that many of these companies are US-owned. Backlash from Washington if Ireland was to boycott trade with Israel would be far more likely if we begin to target US multinationals.

Ironically, the US multinationals that Irish government policy has favoured for so long now seems to be limiting our autonomy, undermining our ability to take an independent, principled stance on human rights.

Conversely though, it is actually the US multinationals that might make an Irish boycott of Israeli trade significant. It might surprise you to learn that Ireland was the second largest destination for Israeli goods in 2023. Boycotting trade with Israel would have real consequences for the Israeli economy, and might just help put an end to genocide.

What can I do?

There is no clear timeline for the Irish government to pass the Occupied Territories Bill or a definitive indication as to whether the Bill will include services28. That is despite recommendations to do so by the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade.

As individuals we can still take action though:

• Sign a petition advocating for the government to pass the Occupied Territories Bill. Write to your local political representatives urging them to raise the issues of the Bill in the Dáil, and to consider some of the further steps discussed in this article. Attend protests to indicate your solidarity with the Palestinian people and apply pressure to the political establishment.

• Use your voice in any way possible to urge action on the genocide against the Palestinian people.

• Boycott companies that aid, assist, facilitate, normalise and profit from genocide29. Urge your employer to do the same.

• Donate money to charities working to support the Palestinian people.

• Learn as much as you can about the history of the Palestinian people, and the Arab people more broadly.

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This is a pretty scary graph. The data is taken from Ireland's Greenhouse Gas Emissions Projections 2024-2055 which was published in May of this year by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

Here is a quick breakdown of what you are looking at:

• The Orange Line represents actual and projected greenhouse gas emissions:

  • The With Existing Measures (WEM) scenario is based on policy measures implemented or committed to by the Government as at the end of 2023. As such, it would mainly reflect policy measures outlined in the Climate Action Plan (CAP) 2023.

  • The With Additional Measures (WAM) scenario is based on the policy measures included in the WEM scenario plus additional planned measures - primarily those in the Climate Action Plan (CAP) 20241 - which are considered realistically implementable by 2030.

• The Green Line represents Irelands commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 51% by the end of 2030, based on 2018 levels2.

That means you can consider the shaded orange area the range of projections that the EPA deems realistic, given the current commitments to climate mitigation policies by the Government.

It is encouraging that since the announcement of the first Climate Action Plan in 2021, Ireland’s greenhouse gas emissions have decreased each year. The projections provide for more unsettling reading. The long and the short of it? It seems as if Ireland is going to fall abysmally short of it’s committed emission reduction targets. In the words of Marvin Gaye, what’s going on?

Where do Irish greenhouse gasses come from?

The agriculture, transport and energy industries3 sectors account for the majority of greenhouse gas emissions in Ireland. In 2024 each sector accounted for 35.4%, 20.21% and 12.42% respectively - amounting to about 68% of total emissions. Reducing emissions in all economic sectors is important of course, but given the size of these sectors I am going to focus on them in this article.

How have greenhouse gas emissions in these 3 sectors fared since 2018 then? The good news is they have indeed declined. Not quickly enough though it seems.

Progress has been particularly strong in the energy industries sector, with a 32% decline. However, agriculture and transport have seen much smaller declines of 5% in emissions.

The projections out to 20304 follow a similar pattern - significant projected decreases in the energy industries sector, and much lower decreases in agriculture and transport. In fact, within the EPAs projected range of realistic possibilities for the agricultural sector is actually an increase in greenhouse gas emissions.

There will be a future article focussed solely on the decarbonisation of Ireland’s energy industry. Given it’s comparatively strong reduction in greenhouse gas emission though, I want to focus on the agriculture and transport sectors here. Specifically, why has progress been so slow, and why are projections so dismal?

Agricultural Emissions: Heard of the herd?

Buckle up, we are getting into contentious territory here!

It is probably unsurprising to most that the methane gas emitted by agricultural animals - or more cynically, livestock - directly accounts for the vast majority of agricultural greenhouse gas emissions5. The proportion of greenhouse gases attributable directly to animals increases even further if you account for the methane and nitrous oxide produced during the management of animal manure.

There are two ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from animals: reducing the number of animals and reducing the emission intensity of animals. The policy measures included in the CAPs scenarios deal primarily with the latter.

Greener Grazing

These measures are, of course, very important6. For example, the measures aiming to reduce the methane produced by the enteric fermentation process - such as improved feeds - and manure management are projected to have a significant impact, provided the WAM scenario materialises.

Ultimately though, no policy measure deals explicitly with the elephant - or the cow - in the room. Herd size.

Heaving Herds?

I was surprised to discover then that, despite no explicit measures to reduce agricultural animal numbers, cattle, sheep and pig herd sizes have all fallen since 2018.

Cattle and sheep are the biggest offenders when it comes to greenhouse gas emissions so it is encouraging that, without explicit policy measures, herd sizes have fallen.

However, whilst total cattle figures may be falling, the dairy herd is actually increasing, and doing so at a rate faster than the beef herd is contracting.

The EPA modelled a continuation of this trend under the WEM scenario, which resulted in agricultural greenhouse gas emissions growing even more than under the WEM scenario.

The climate impact of the agricultural sector is a politically contentious issue in Ireland. I would suggest that this is reflected in the policy focus on reducing the carbon intensity of animals, rather than the number of animals.

I empathise with farmers whose livelihoods are threatened by this conversation. However, I also empathise with the far larger number of people whose lives are and will be devastated by the impacts of climate change.

Transport Emissions: A Long Road Ahead

Road transportation accounts for almost all of the transport sectors greenhouse gas emissions - in 2024 it made up 95% of all emissions.

Emissions from road transport have fallen since 2018, and are projected to continue to do so.

If road transport emissions are decreasing then one of two things must be happening: either people are travelling less on the road, or the carbon intensity of their travelling is decreasing.

The Road Just As Travelled

Data on road traffic volumes helps us to answer that question.

Overall, the distance travelled by road vehicles has remained relatively stagnant between 2018 and 2023, with a small decrease of less than 1% in kilometres travelled. So, people aren’t travelling particularly less using road transportation.7

However, if we dig deeper into the data we see that the distance covered by private cars - which accounts for the vast majority of road traffic volume - has fallen by a larger magnitude of just over 2%. In contrast, the number of kilometers travelled by large public service vehicles (e.g. busses) has increased.

The increase in the number of kilometers travelled in busses is supported by data that illustrates the number of journeys using public transport has increased dramatically from 20198.

So people are starting to opt less for the car and for public transport instead it seems. If public transport journeys have increased so dramatically though, why isn’t the volume of travel by road decreasing? Unfortunately, there are more vehicles on the road.

In fact, the number of road vehicles has increased in approximately the same proportion as the decrease in the number of average kilometers travelled by each car9. So even though each vehicle is travelling less distance on average, that decrease is being negated by the increase in the total number of vehicles on the road.

Still, that means the average person is seemingly less reliant on road vehicles. There are probably numerous reasons for this - the ubiquity of work from home policies, improved accessibility to public transport, decreased relative cost of public transport and climate consciousness for example.

Electrifying Progress

What about the vehicles that remain on the road though - how carbon intensive is their mileage?

Well, petrol and diesel cars still dominate. However, a growing proportion - about 10% in 2024 - of road vehicles are either entirely electric or some form of electric hybrid. Not a huge quantity, but still significant - ultimately the carbon intensity of the road vehicles in Ireland is decreasing. Both the WEM and WAM scenarios assume that this trend will increase out to 2030.

The proportion of new vehicle registrations is increasingly either electric or hybrid electric vehicles, accounting for almost 4 in every 10 new registrations. However, progress here has flatlined since 2022 and even more worryingly the number of electric vehicle registrations actually decreased from 2023 to 2024.

To summarise: People are using road transportation just as much, but the carbon intensity of that transportation is decreasing seemingly due to a shift away from the private car towards public transport and the electrification of vehicles.

What about cycling and walking?

Data from the various bike sharing schemes across Ireland also seems indicative of a reliance on road transportation and public transport. The number of journeys completed using the bikes provided as part of these schemes is down on 2018, yet to recover following the Covid-19 pandemic.

Given the significant increase in public transport journeys since 2018, it would seem people would rather take the train or bus than cycle. This might indicate a relative increase in the appeal of public transport compared to cycling. Some reasons for this might include a decrease in the cost of public transport, improved accessibility and less exposure to the elements.

Population density plays a significant role here too. People living in more rural areas are more reliant on their car - which intuitively makes sense of course.

What is worrying though is that one of the key assumptions under the WAM scenario is that, by 2030, there will be a 50% increase in daily active travel journeys. Alongside a 130% increase in daily public transport journeys, this is seen as key to reduce total vehicle kilometers travelled. I am heartened by the public transport data to date - less so by the bike sharing scheme data10.

Slow Progress

Returning to the title of the article, is Ireland doing enough in the climate battle? No. There has been progress. But not enough. Climate change is a systemic threat, and underwhelming Irish efforts will only serve to worsen it’s impact on all of humanity. As a nation we need to do more.

At a high-level, we need some fundamental trends to accelerate if agricultural and transport emissions are to come down more rapidly:

• The number of agricultural animals in the country needs to decrease

• The carbon intensity of agricultural animals needs to decrease

• People need to use road transport less

• People need to use public transport more

• People who are buying vehicles need to buy electric or plug-in electric hybrid vehicles

Quite a daunting to-do list. Nothing insurmountable though. For example, China, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands and Sweden - 5 of the 10 countries with the largest electric car stocks - have all rapidly accelerated the sale of electric cars in short space of time.

There are so many areas to “green” and so many actions to achieve this “greening” planned11 that I wonder might the breadth of effort by counterproductive. By focussing on the ‘big hitters’ could Ireland reduce it’s emissions more effectively?

Another way to interpret the data in graph at the beginning of this article is that Ireland has achieved 24% of it’s emissions reduction target. If Ireland was to cut 50% of 2024 greenhouse gas emissions in the agriculture and transport sectors alone, that would equate to 66% of the remaining 76% of emissions. In other words, focussing solely on agricultural animal herd size and carbon intensity, sustainable transport use and electric vehicle roll-out could see Irish emissions decrease by almost 75% on 2018 levels12.

An even more intense focus in these sectors, or a focus on a handful of extremely impactful initiatives in the energy or residential sector could surely get us the rest of the way there?

What can I do?

Much of the focus in this article has been on government policy. Policy is extremely important, particularly in affecting structural change, but we also need to acknowledge our roles as individuals in mitigating Ireland’s climate impact13. The actions of every individual counts.

I would categorise some of steps we can take as individuals into 3 broad categories - our roles as a consumer, as an employee and as an advocate.

• As a consumer we can make choices that have less of an impact on the climate. All of these decisions act as a signal to the market, saying “Hey! I want more of this environmentally friendly product, and less of that environmentally damaging alternative”:

  • Eat less meat, or less of specific types of meat - the marginal impact of eliminating only red meat from your diet is actually much higher than the marginal impact of going from “no red meat” to a vegetarian diet14

  • Consider whether you really need to have a car - or multiple cars. Could more sustainable modes of transport cater for your day-to-day? Then you could supplement that with the use of car rental platforms such as GoCar for more awkward trips

  • If you need to have a car opt for a plug-in electric hybrid or fully electric car.

• As an employee we can encourage our employers to adopt climate mitigation policies, or we can work for organisations fighting the climate battle:

  • Ask your employer to adopt climate mitigation policies, such as investing in an electric vehicle fleet rather than one fueled by petrol or diesel

  • Work on some of the challenges posed by and prohibiting climate mitigation policy. For example, research the impact of herd size decrease on farmer’s livelihoods and investigate solutions to mitigate this impact

• As an advocate our voice doesn’t have to be limited to our employer:

  • Petition the Government to adopt more intense climate mitigation policies

  • Encourage your friends and family to be more conscious of the climate impact of their consumption habits

Of course there are plenty of other ways to reduce your individual emissions. But remember to focus on the ‘big hitters’, where your effort has the most marginal impact. Your diet and the way you travel are two of the largest, if not the largest, determinants of your emissions footprint.

Before you start reading, I would like to take a chance to thank you; to thank everyone who has read any of my writing thus far. I have received a lot of support, and I really appreciate it.

I would also like to ask a favour: if you find this post (or any of my others) interesting could you please share it? Restack it. Share it on LinkedIn. Tell someone about it. Dealers choice really.

I adore the process of researching and writing these articles, and would LOVE to do it (or some form of it) in the future for a living. If you would like to support me in realising that goal, then please share.

Lots of love,

Shane x

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Ah yes. Facial Recognition Technology and the inevitable, clichéd, paranoid (some might say) leap to the surveillance state and analogy to George Orwell’s 1984. Set in Oceania, “Big Brother is Watching You”. Always. Maybe soon too in Ireland?

Following the riots in Dublin City Centre back in November 2023, then Minister for Justice Helen McEntee announced that she had received approval to publish the General Scheme of the Garda Síochána (Recording Devices) (Amendment) Bill 2023, which will “allow An Garda Síochána use Facial Recognition Technology (FRT) in specific circumstances”1.

Since then, the Bill underwent pre-legislative scrutiny by the Oireachtas Justice Committee in February 20242. It is unclear where exactly the Bill sits now, but given that the Justice Committee compiled their report in February 20243, I would assume that it will be going to a vote in the Dáil relatively soon.

To be honest, I hadn’t really engaged with the fact that this had been announced. I don’t remember whether I had read about it and disregarded it, or whether I simply hadn’t heard about it at all. Nonetheless, I am writing about it now because I believe it to be an incredibly important issue, and there is limited time left for us to affect the implementation of the Bill.

Given the theme of “justice” here, it would seem apt to discuss the deployment of FRT in “courtroom” style. I will present arguments for the deployment of FRT, and then I will present arguments against the deployment of FRT.

First though, some background information…

What Is Facial Recognition Technology?

Facial Recognition Technology is a biometric application that can be used to identify or verify a persons identity by analysing their facial features. “Recognising” their face, as it were4.

“Is that how my iPhone opens when I look at it?”. Indeed it is.

“I always thought they just had tiny people in those gates at Passport Control, working the cameras”. Actually, no! That is FRT too!

If we already let FRT automatically tag our friends in the Photos app on our iPhones, then surely using it to solve crimes won’t do any harm? That, we shall see. But for now, how does FRT actually work?

How does Facial Recognition Technology Work?

Traditional FRT compared specific geometric features of faces in order to determine similarity. However, since then these systems have been superseded by Artificial Intelligence (AI) deep learning techniques5 - this specific field of AI techniques is generally referred to as “computer vision”.

The exact details of what these deep learning algorithms are and how they work is beyond the scope of this article, but the following quote sums up what you need to know to read this article6:

Recently, traditional FRT has been superseded by deep learning methods based on neural networks which are trained with large datasets and able to learn the relevant facial features from the data

Facial recognition technology in law enforcement: Regulating data analysis of another kind

In principle, the procedure by which FRT works is quite simple. An image is supplied to the AI application. This is then compared to some database of images or video footage. The model assesses the similarity of the face provided to faces in this database. Provided this similarity is past a certain threshold, a face is “recognised”.

How Can Facial Recognition Technology Be Used In Law Enforcement?

As we discussed above, the use of FRT is already widespread. However, what we are specifically concerned about here is the use of FRT in law enforcement.

Generally, there are considered two broad categories for the application of FRT in law enforcement7:

• Live FRT: FRT could be deployed on CCTV systems, body cameras etc… to actively analyse and identify people in real-time

• Retrospective FRT: Here, FRT is deployed after a crime has been committed in order to identify the perpetrator8

In the Irish case, the desire seems to be to deploy Retrospective FRT:

The draft Bill will provide for retrospective searching of images which are legally in the possession of An Garda Síochána, through the safe and ethical use of biometric identification

Minister McEntee receives Cabinet approval for draft Facial Recognition Technology Bill

Though it should be noted that a specific aim of the current Government is to introduce live FRT, in certain circumstances:

Introduce live FRT in cases of terrorism, national security, and missing persons, with strict safeguards.9

Programme for Government 2025

What could go wrong, ehy?

All Those In Favour of Facial Recognition Technology Say Aye…

Now that we have a general understanding of how FRT works and where it can be deployed in law enforcement, it is time to consider some of the benefits to doing so.

Simmler and Canova (2025) suggest the following framework to understand how FRT can be deployed in an investigation. It depicts, at a high level, the steps involved in a digital investigation:

As such, this framework can also be used to understand the positive impact that the deployment of FRT could have on an investigation.

FRT has implications in each stage of a digital investigation (as we shall discuss below), however its benefits are generally attributable to the “data analysis” stage. FRT is used to analyse images and videos to identify a perpetrator. FRT can do this much more quickly (and, some argue, more effectively) than a human operator.

The speed with which data analysis can be performed is what was highlighted by Helen McEntee:

We are already seeing Gardaí having to trawl through thousands of hours of CCTV – 12,000 hours in the case of the Dublin riots. Facial Recognition Technology will dramatically save time, speed up investigations and free up Garda resources for the high visibility policing we all want to see.

Reducing the amount of time it takes Gardaí to go through video footage will be of particular help where time is of the essence following a very serious crime being committed. It is in the interests of all parties, not least victims of crime, to have criminal investigations pursued as effectively and rapidly as possible.

Minister McEntee receives Cabinet approval for draft Facial Recognition Technology Bill

Obviously, it would seem quite an injustice for someone to evade a criminal conviction simply because of the manual labour involved in reviewing CCTV footage, or because they were missed on said footage10. Undoubtedly FRT could speed up (or make more effective) the process of suspect identification, and ultimately, the investigative process.

It is also important to note that the Pre-Legislative Scrutiny Report by the Joint Committee on Justice also states that image analysis and recognition software is already used by the Garda National Cyber Crime Bureau for cases related to child sexual abuse material. According to the report, the technology is more effective than human operators, is a necessity given the amount of material received, and is particularly useful in avoiding the potential traumatic impact on Garda personnel who must otherwise manually review the material.

Whilst the Amendment Bill doesn’t allow for Live FRT, given it is a goal of the current Government to introduce it (albeit only in certain situations), its benefits should also be considered.

Live FRT could allow for the real-time identification of perpetrators, and allow for it in way that would simply be unrealistic to achieve with human resources alone. Consider a perpetrator at large in a city. Live FRT would (theoretically) be able to easily and quickly identify the perpetrator using networked CCTV footage and body cameras. The human resources involved in achieving the same result could be much larger.

Related to human resources, as mentioned above by Helen McEntee, FRT will allow for Garda resources to be freed up for other policing duties. Interestingly, she specifically emphasises “high visibility policing”. Presumably this is because she believes that the visibility of Garda policing activities dissuades crime and creates a sense of security amongst the Irish population11.

It should be noted that the “benefits” to anything are, of course, socially constructed - they are coloured by ones social, cultural and philosophical frameworks. For example, a theoretical benefit to some of Live FRT might be the ability to identify and monitor people considered “suspicious”, or, relatedly, to monitor ex-convicts roaming around minding their own business (or scheming, depending on your persuasion). However, I am reluctant to consider this a benefit, as I consider this use-case a gross breach of privacy.

On that note, let us consider some of the potential drawbacks to the deployment of FRT in law enforcement…

All Those Opposed Say Nay…

The drawbacks of the deployment of FRT in law enforcement typically revolve around its impact on human rights. In that case, let us dust off the auld Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (some seem to forget about its existence). Given that Ireland is part of the EU, I will also use the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (from herein the “EU Charter”, as the full title is a bit of a mouthful).

As I mentioned earlier, even though the benefits of FRT are mainly realised in the “data analysis” section of an investigation, FRT has implications across all stages of an investigation. Figure 2 allows us to understand how data is processed in the context of a digital investigation. Let us return then to that process, and examine it through the lens of human rights.

In the deployment of FRT, the “data collection” phase would involve the gathering of media depicting faces (images, videos etc…) for analysis - in other words the gathering of personal data.

“Ah, but sure it’s only the personal data of a criminal”. Not exactly though.

On CCTV footage it isn’t just criminals who are visible. There’s Maureen doing her shopping. Why is Ian going into that hotel with that man who isn’t his husband?

Now, FRT doesn’t store little bits of information for gossip once it clocks off. In fact, some might argue that FRT makes it less likely for something like that to happen (a human might know Ian, for example). Nonetheless, it is important to realise that every use of FRT involves the processing of a significant amount of personal data, the vast majority of which has nothing to do with the investigation.

Article 12 of the UDHR states:

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 12, UDHR

Article 8 in the EU Charter deals specifically with data protection:

1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.

2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.

3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.

Article 8, EU Charter

Processing so much personal data that has nothing to do with the investigation seems a bit arbitrary to me, no? Will I be asked for consent every time I appear in CCTV footage that is used as part of an investigation? Of course, to know who I was, they would probably need to use FRT…

The use of FRT also implies that a database exists against which someone can be identified - it has to for the system to work. Will this database contain the personal information of all citizens? How will it be managed and kept secure?

This brings us on to “data analysis”. First of all, it is important to note that AI-powered RFT takes personal data (your image) and extracts “features” from that image to create biometric data that is used to identify you. This is an important distinction - not only does FRT process personal data, it creates biometric data. This means that whenever FRT is used, every piece of personal data has to be processed and a new biometric dataset is created. What happens to this dataset?

Also, when looking for a matching face in its database the FRT, in principle, considers every piece of biometric data within the database. What this means is that everyone whose biometric data exists in the database has their data processed for every investigation in which FRT is used. Put another way, your data - and therefore you - become involved in every investigation where FRT is used.

That also means there is some level of risk that you could become implicated in any criminal investigation where FRT is deployed. What I am referring to here is the probabilistic nature of FRT. FRT doesn’t generate an absolute match for your face based off some objective properties. Instead, it assesses the likelihood that a given face matches another.

In fairness, FRT systems can be quite accurate. The accuracy is strongly linked to the quality of the input image though. Grainy CCTV footage images? Maybe not the most ideal input. Think, even, how surprisingly often your iPhone doesn’t recognise you - particularly if you’re wearing sunglasses or a hat.

What happens when an FRT system deployed in law enforcement draws incorrect conclusions about someone? Say, incorrectly identifies you as the perpetrator of a crime? In technical terms, this is called a “false positive”. In real terms, this could mean wrongful accusation and false arrest. Seems like an infringement on human rights, no?

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 9, UDHR

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 12, UDHR

The Pre-Legislative Scrutiny Report highlights the deployment of FRT in Wales from 2019 to 2023. Over 508,000 faces were scanned, with an inaccuracy rate of 88% - over 3,000 individuals were incorrectly identified

“That’s just theoretical though, surely? No one would actually get falsely arrested?” Firstly, don’t call me Shirley. Secondly, no it is most certainly not just theoretical. This has already happened. Oh and by the way, those “false positives” often seem to be members of already marginalised groups12 . Fantastic, another human rights infringement…

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 2, UDHR

Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.

Article 21, EU Charter

Another type of inaccuracy is a “false negative”. In other words, where a perpetrators face is not recognised. This doesn’t seem to be as much of an issue though.

The “data exploitation” stage is where decisions are made. Similar ethical questions to the “data collection” stage need to be answered - for example, for how long is the biometric data used as part of the investigation stored? However, what is novel here is the human intervention. In theory, FRT recommendations are to be considered just another piece of evidence. In practice though, how much emphasis will we place on the output of an algorithm when deciding whether to arrest someone? Maybe more than we should…

The “data exploitation” stage also brings us to the context in which an FRT application could be deployed.

In Ireland, the draft Bill will allow for the deployment of retrospective FRT in the following circumstances:

(i) where a serious offence is suspected, as listed in the Schedule of the General Scheme;

(ii) the use of biometric identification is necessary and proportionate in that specific case;

(iii) each particular use of biometric identification is authorised in writing in advance by a Chief Superintendent and a record of that authorisation maintained.

Minister McEntee receives Cabinet approval for draft Facial Recognition Technology Bill

The serious offences listed in the Schedule of the General Scheme are:

• Abduction

• Aggravated Sexual Assault

• Aggravated Burglary

• Causing serious harm

• Homicide

• Rape

• Riot and Violent Disorder

• Robbery

• Child Sexual Abuse

Some of these seem reasonable, others less so. For example, “Riot and Violent Disorder”. What constitutes a riot, or violent disorder? One mans peaceful protest is another mans riot. What is important to note is that the meaning behind these words is socially constructed.

This is especially worrying when combined with the idea of “function creep” or “scope creep”. For example, in Austria FRT was initially to be used for serious crimes but was later reportedly used by police to identify protestors13.

The concern that this technology could be used to manufacture consent for the status quo seems a real one then - even in the “safe haven” of the EU - and isn’t just the paranoia of Orwellian thinking. The so-called “chilling effect” that this might have on society was noted by a group of Irish experts. Fear of repercussions could prevent people from attending peaceful protest; from freely expressing their opinions. I thought these traits to be encouraged in a liberal democracy…

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 19, UDHR

Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

Article 20, UDHR

Also, referring back to the proposed circumstances within which FRT could be deployed, what is considered “necessary” and “proportionate”? What about what is considered a “serious crime”? Could that change in the future? The cynic in me thinks this language is purposely vague.

The European AI Act is similarly ambiguous. Biometric systems are listed as prohibited. Great. However, deployment for law enforcement is listed as an exception. Oh, but wait - Live FRT is prohibited in publicly accessibly spaces for law enforcement. Excellent. Except when:

searching for missing persons, abduction victims, and people who have been human trafficked or sexually exploited;

preventing substantial and imminent threat to life, or foreseeable terrorist attack; or

identifying suspects in serious crimes (e.g., murder, rape, armed robbery, narcotic and illegal weapons trafficking, organised crime, and environmental crime, etc.).

High-level summary of the AI Act

Right…so except for pretty much most of policing activity?

Sometimes Maybe Good, Sometimes Maybe Shit

As the Pre-Legislative Scrutiny Report points out, there is a three-part test under human rights law, to establish whether restrictions imposed on human rights are lawful or whether they constitute a violation of rights: legality, necessity and proportionality, and legitimacy. Ultimately, I am unconvinced that the FRT Bill passes this test.

There are certainly potential benefits to deploying FRT in law enforcement. However, there are also many risks. These range from very practical issues, such as privacy and data protection, to the philosophical - furthering the creation of the modern panopticon. Creating a society where there is no way of knowing whether you are being watched at any given moment, so you have to live in the assumption that you are.

FRT is an example of “manufactured risk”. This is a term coined by Ulrich Beck, used to describe the risk associated with the process of modernisation itself. In other words, the deployment of FRT to solve a problem creates its own - potentially even greater - problems.

Having said that, with all my spouting about human rights someone would rightly point out Article 8 of the UDHR:

Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 8, UDHR

In other words, if a crime is committed against me, I have a fundamental right to “effective remedy”. Someone could argue that not deploying FRT when it is available to accelerate the investigative process infringes on this human right.

I am certainly not “for” making life easier for those who wish to do harm. However, what I would suggest is that we create conditions in society where there are less of those people.

FRT is being framed as a necessity for policing. It seems there is simply too much data involved in a modern digital investigation for investigators to deal with. I would argue there is another, more holistic approach to alleviate this pressure though - one that doesn’t involve introducing significant levels of risk.

Address the systemic causes of crime - inequality and poverty, for example. Why treat the symptom, when you can treat the cause.

Maybe I’m being paranoid though? “Sure, it’ll be grand” I can hear most saying. I suppose, that’s the problem with risk though, isn’t it? Once it’s realised, it’s too late.

If you also believe that the introduction of Facial Recognition Technology represents a risk to our civil liberties and human rights, please sign this petition by the Irish Council for Civil Liberties.

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Artificial Intelligence. Robots. The domain of science fiction once maybe. Now though, we exist in an epoch where the stuff of fantasy (or nightmares) materialises around us at a seemingly unfathomable rate. Todays headlines outshine the previous days miracle.

If these creations of science fiction are now manifest, then the question that the genre poses are as pertinent as ever. What exactly is is that we are creating? What is real (or fake)? What does it mean to be a human? Could a machine have a soul? Why do we create these, well, creations? Is creating them a good thing?

What are we creating?

In the creation of artificial intelligence and robots, we tend towards the emulation of humans. Once we have created, it is to the human that we compare. It is the convincingly human conversation of large language models that have convinced some that artificial general intelligence is already here.

The messianic figures leading the worlds largest technology companies speak of artificial general intelligence as if it is an inevitability, and who am I to correct them? I am less concerned with the accuracy of the prediction, and moreso with the goal. The goal to create artificial general intelligence that rivals, if not surpasses, human cognition.1

Suppose we achieved that goal. What is it that we have created? Have we created a human? Have we created an emulation of a human indistinguishable from the “real thing”? Or, have we created something entirely different?

What is real (or fake)?

If a human emulation - or an “artificial human“ - was indistinguishable from a “real human” what would be the difference between the two? This is the question at the core of Philip K. Dicks Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?. In that world there are several tests that are supposed to distinguish between the “androids” and humans. One of these tests for empathic response. In other words, the presence of empathy.

Empathic response is often cited as an intrinsic difference between the “artificial humans” of the future and “real humans”. From that perspective, you could almost consider it a defining characteristic of our species. Is it though?

What is empathy? There are many definitions, but they tend to revolve around a common theme - the ability to identify with or understand a persons feelings. Someone I know recently threw in the “demonstration of this understanding” as a requirement for presence of empathy (though I personally would dispute this). Let us examine these two components to the definition of empathy.

If empathy is the ability to identify with or understand a persons feelings, could it not be learned? Indeed, is it not something we do learn? Do we enter the world inherently understanding the perspectives of others? I am not so sure we do. Similarly, consider, for example, that actions have different meanings across different cultures. I do not have a pre-loaded understanding of how my actions will effect every human, or what their reaction means. All I have is the conceptual framework I use to navigate the world. The conceptual framework that I learned.

Suppose though that empathy is inherently human. Could it not be emulated? The current generation of large language models illustrate that it can. Now, one might protest that emulated empathy is not actual empathy. To that I would ask, what is the difference?

If an “artificial human” and a “real human” demonstrated the exact same response to a persons feelings, but one response was driven by empathy and the other emulated empathy, would it matter? Similarly, if two “real humans” demonstrate different response to a persons feelings, is there a correct response? Is one of the “real humans” less “human” than the other? Maybe one of the actions might be considered “inhumane”, but what does that mean? If the response was enacted by a “real human” then it is not in-humane; it is-humane.

Empathy, to me, seems shaky ground upon which to lay our claim to “humanity”.

Building on the theme of real-ness, let us consider what makes something human; what makes us alive. No one in their right mind would consider an amputee with a robotic leg anything other than a human. But suppose, in the future, it was possible to transplant a human brain to a mechanised exoskeleton. Is this still a “real human”? Is it an “artificial human” or a “fake human”? Or is it something else entirely?

If you imagined an exoskeleton, you may well have imagined a humanoid one. Consider now the same questions, but with the least humanoid exoskeleton you can imagine. In fact, let us remove the “material” from the question. In the film Her, the lead character falls in love with an entirely virtual, artificial general intelligence. Would you consider this artificial intelligence alive? Would you consider it an “artificial human”? Is their relationship real? Is the love the lead character feels for the sentience real? What about the hurt he feels at the connection “his” sentience has with other sentiences?

Being able to tell the difference between an “artificial human” and a “real human” implies that it is important to do so. That there is something sanctifying about what it means to be a “real human”. But is there? Is there a meaning to being human? Does it matter if we can tell the difference between an “artificial human” and a “real human”?

Suppose we could not tell the difference between the two. Our default disposition towards others would have to be somewhere on the spectrum of isolated skepticism - or even violence - towards others and complete trusting. Not exactly different to how we treat each other today. Would the discovery that your best friend is actually an “artificial human” undermine the authenticity of the connection between the two of you?

What does it mean to be human?

There is another intangible quality, similar to empathy, that is claimed is the essence of the human experience. Something that animates us beyond the physiological mechanics of our bodies: the Soul.

I would certainly not claim to know whether the soul exists. My question though is, what makes us think the soul is a uniquely human experience? In the anime series Pluto we see robots designed for the destruction of their “own kind” grapple with the nature of what they have done. One robot laments that he wishes to never return to the battlefield; that the memories of his actions haunt him at night. Surely this struggle, this regret, this pain, carried deeply within the robot, is evidence as good as any of soul?

One might point out that Pluto is just a cartoon; that we could just design artificial intelligence to not have soul. But if we do not know what something is, how do we design so that it is not? How do we know soul is not emergent? How would we know not to accidentally create soul?

Why are we creating the “artificial”?

Given the practically unanswerable nature of these questions and the ghosts of the future that lurk in the genre of science fiction, why have we continued to create the “artificial”? The manufactories where we create machines, we also manufacture risk.

Yet here we are, striving with great zeal towards the “artificial”, envisioning ourselves as playing God. Why? What plans do we have in store for our creations? The commercial drive of discovery in the world of artificial intelligence and robotics at the moment indicates to me that the primary motive is profit.

Of course, there are those who are simply curious; who cannot resist leaving some questions unanswered. Those who want to “do science” for the sake of it. There are also those who believe that the study of artificial intelligence may reveal to us the nature of our own intelligence. Maybe it will. However, my opinion remains that the current primary motivating factor is profit. Profit for those who manufacture the creations, and profit for those who use them.

To illustrate the latter, let us consider the process of creation, and what altering that process might mean. To create, work must be done. Some inputs must undergo some process of transformation to create an output. For a human, the process of transformation is key. The key to learning. The key to value, to actualisation, to fulfillment. The output is simply symbolic of the process of transformation. Consider this: is it the process of writing a book or the completed book that makes you a better writer?

The deployment of artificial intelligence and robotics tends to focus on the output. It tends to focus on getting to the output as quickly as possible. It wants skip straight to the book, ignoring the process of writing. From the perspective of the deploying company, this entails “efficiency”. Same output, less process of transformation. Less work. Less employees. Less costs. More profits.

Maybe there are situations where this is beneficial on the whole, I do not know. However, I am certain that without engaging in a process of transformation a human cannot learn. We cannot attain fulfillment. We cannot create. Our domain becomes one of pure consumption. The consumption of the outputs of automated processes. Is that really what we want?

Suppose it was what we wanted. Would it be the right thing to do? I am not suggesting that the current iterations of artificial intelligence and robots are sentient, but suppose we “accidentally” created colonies of “artificial humans” tirelessly working to sustain us. Would that not be, simply, slavery?2

I am also concerned that artificial intelligence and robots will be used to outsource human suffering. To alienate us from the consequences of our actions, similarly to what we have done with mass farming. Why worry about the plight of a non-human animal when we can pay to have it slaughtered and packaged out of sight, out of mind.

Why send humans to kill when we could send a robot? We already see this on a daily basis with the use of drones, missiles and other long-range weapons of destruction. The alienation from the consequences of our horrific, destructive actions.

What about the elderly, sick, or even those we deem to behave outside some arbitrary social norm? Will we ship them all off to be cared for by automatons and artificial intelligence? Is that any different to the idea of a nursing home? If these “artificial humans” were indistinguishable from “real human”, would it be any different?

Great, I am now depressed. What should I do?

Stop. Think. Ask “why?”. Why are we creating the “artificial”? What problems does it really solve? Just as importantly, what problems will it create? Is the potential for catastrophe worth the pursuit? When is enough? Some might say we can control ourselves. That we can stop before there are any truly negative consequences. “We can always just switch them off”3. Those people have never heard the tale of Icarus (or at least did not absorb its lesson).

Do I think we will stop? No. Does that mean the future is hopeless? Also no. The logical conclusion, for me, from this soul-searching, this private investigation, has been the need to understand and expand my ecological horizons. To embrace and understand the universe for the system that it is. If we go back in time far enough, everything shares a lineage, after all. All originate from the compressed gas at the heart of exploding stars. Everything is made of star-stuff. Everything is star-stuff.

I hope when you read this article you do not consider me holier than thou. I eat meat. I travel abroad on planes. Around me people suffer, be that in war or on the streets of my own city, and I do practically nothing. The list of my ecological transgressions is endless. But I want to do better. I want to do better now, so that in the future I can be better. So that we can be better.4

I believe that incorporating artificial intelligence into our ecological understanding could achieve profound positivities. If we can do it for the natural environment, can we not do it for the artificial environment? In fact, does the interconnectedness of the two not necessitate it? When economists talk of externalities, is the link between the natural and artificial world often not what is missing?

What is progress?

A friend of mine once said to me that progress is retrospective. We were very young, probably only about 10. It still shakes me to this day that something so profound was delivered to me at such a young age, from such a youthful source.

When we talk of artificial intelligence, we often talk of “progress”. Regularly the term is used as a synonym for development, for human action. We must remember though, that it is not now we can judge something as progressive. Arguably, it is not even for us to judge. It is only with time that we can judge something as progressive. It is for the future to decide.

Will future generations look back on what we do now, and call it progress?