Advantage or Trigger Man

To me, offense relies on creating triggers, great offenses pairs strong connective ball-movement, and driving with smart positioning, but it all starts with a trigger. Ball-movement usually results from triggering the defense, making everything afterwards relatively easier.

Take the infamous championship play that will draw attention for years to come, thanks to its ball and player-movement. Rightfully so, Mikal Bridges cuts to counter Julian Champagnie's rotation on Karl-Anthony Towns's pop, Landry Shamet and OG Anunoby snap drives to touch paint and spray, and Bridges executing another drive to find the corner. This play, however, begins by attacking Victor Wembanyama in coverage and weeding him out from the corner with a stretch big, opening up the floor.

Wembanyama gives a soft show before retreating back with Dylan Harper playing under coverage, allowing Jalen Brunson to attack the paint and draw other defenders. If I were to track a trigger man and action on this possession, I’d label Brunson, and I’d note the play-type as P&R Ball Handler.

In this play, Towns serves as the trigger man, given the post play and his delivery of the pass. We’d file this under the hub play-type, since the set exists to get Towns the ball in a passing position/action around him. Often the assist man can double as the trigger man, since breaking down or dissecting the defense, the way Towns does here through his passing, creates that role. Why I decided to track this, comes down to quantifying “hockey assists” or usage better than simply logging the player who attempts a score or potential assist, which I’ll still do. For example, say Brunson pump-fakes the three, drives it, and kicks it out to Bridges for three. Brunson earns the potential assist, Bridges gets logged for the scoring attempt, and Towns gets nothing for the initial play, despite serving as the trigger man. We’ll now be able to quantify who gets the chance to/creates the breakdown.

Transition

At first, I wanted to keep the tracking almost half-court exclusive, opting not to track anything in transition, but branching out just a bit more could benefit us. For me, this entails tagging transition chances spurred by defensive playmaking, defensive rebounding on twos versus threes, and made baskets. I look at this more as a study than anything instead of producing actionable insights.

Clearly, this play features a defensive playmaking transition rep, with OG Anunoby stealing the ball from Victor Wembanyama. Much like writing a theory on what I expected with organized offense, that can apply to types of transition. I expect to see high points per possession (PPP) off defensive playmaking reps, versus rebounding and made shots. Now, what about the difference between an opponent missing a layup, a two-point shot, or a three-point shot? This calls for going through the process, but I'll assume missed layups account for a higher PPP, due to the lack of defensive players back at the time of the initial offensive possession.

I'll definitely log blocks as their own category within defensive playmaking, but I mostly want to show the chaos the defense faces when a shot at the rim misses. Take this drive at the rim: the player cannot recover from behind the baseline after the shot, while two other Sixers crash the boards, leaving the Knicks with a 4-on-3 advantage down the other end.

I'll track a lot of the same variables in transition that are tracked in the half-court, scoring, potential assists, shot quality, shot-making, etc., to get a clearer picture of New York's offense this upcoming season. Paid subscribers will find this data included alongside the half-court tracking.

Help Defender(s)

I wanted to implement tracking help defenders in the pick-and-roll last season, but held off until a new season. The tracker currently gives us a read on point-of-attack play, logging teammate POA usage against each other. Putting a number to help defense should prove both revealing, and establish player roles, especially given New York’s reliance on it.

Pick-and-roll action begins with Stephon Castle handling, Wembanyama screening, Josh Hart guarding the ball at the point of attack, and Towns defending the screener in coverage. What matters most in logging the help, is the side Wembanyama/roller rolls toward, the weak side. The Knicks have two help defenders on that side of the floor in both Anunoby and Bridges. Worth noting, Hart should shade that direction, preventing Castle from driving right while Wembanyama rolls left. Allowing that would see Brunson as the primary help man, a far less desirable outcome for New York.

I’ll log both Anunoby and Bridges as help defenders on this play, but one will always serve as the low man, Bridges in this case. Notice how far he comes over compared to Anunoby, who may have ventured out too far, though that’s somewhat expected given Wembanyama’s strong roll gravity, along with the Knicks wanting to hit him early. This reflects typical pick-and-roll defense from New York in the series, going under on Castle at point of attack and playing level or a high drop with Towns, disrespecting Castle’s pull-up shot while protecting the lane.

New Offensive Tracker and Substack Info

Access to the offensive tracker, that has been viewed by both NBA coaches and scouts, comes with a paid subscription. Already a paid subscriber? Send a DM for a reminder and I’ll get the new tracker over to you. Otherwise, I’ll try to reach out directly to those I know are already subscribed.

Most content on this Substack will tend to lock a day or two after release, especially on large data driven articles. A significant amount of work goes into the data collection, and with this as a part-time endeavor alongside a part-time job, another writing role, and graduate school, making the most of my work and time is starting to matter more.

This article attaches to the stretch big study, read that first for context:

General Plays

Ray Action

Bigs with high above-the-break volume can run what’s referred to as "Ray" action. The play features a trailing big man utilizing a flare screen from a guard in order to take away any thought of a switch. If the defender tries to chase over the top of the screen, the big can curl or dive hard to the rim. If the defender go under the screen, the big pops to the perimeter to shoot.

In my opinion ray action is underutilized across the league. A trailing big man + flare concept introduces an element of surprise, and the set provides early versatility, allowing an offense to attack quickly out of the initial flare or transition into secondary actions.

Korver screen

Sometimes all it takes is a simple pin-down, and offenses have found numerous ways to incorporate it alongside a variety of counters. When a defender top-locks a shooter, that shooter can set a pin-down for the screener instead. This action is known as a “Korver screen,” made famous by Kyle Korver. In simple terms, a strong shooter, one the defense expects to receive a screen, sets a screen for a teammate instead, punishing the aggressive counter.

Norman Powell’s three-point threat makes him a target for a pin-down, enough of a threat that Ja’Kobe Walter opts to top-lock an incoming action, set up with Bam shading Powell. Powell reads it, and catches the center set in pin-down coverage, leaving Bam free to cut out to the perimeter.

Favorite Set Plays

Karl Anthony Towns | Horns Dive Exit | Roll-man

Excuse my bias, but this might rank as one of the best roll-man actions among stretch fives I’ve watched. The same-side exit screen while driving off the pick-and-roll makes it a strong design, and that’s not even the best part. Towns pops with all the room in the world, putting the opposing big in an tough coverage situation.

Tyler Kolek cuts out of the Horns alignment, taking an exit screen from Josh Hart. Towns fills that space out of the pick-and-roll, with the big in coverage, he can pop or roll into all the room Kolek vacated. The play continues to do well even when teams guard Towns with a wing or switch, giving him the opportunity to catch at the nail with a ton of space to operate and back down his defender.

Victor Wembanyama | Away Pop | Pin-down

The Spurs love running quick trailing actions for Wembanyama coming up the floor, he ranks among the leaders in the ray action discussed earlier. Another play they use for him in semi-transition is the away action.

Devin Vassell’s shooting ability makes pin-down actions not uncommon for him. Wembanyama sets an away screen, Vassell would cut off it, and shoot a three. But when defenders top-lock or front Vassell in the action, he can reject it, and once he does, the center often protects his cut, leaving Wembanyama wide open on the perimeter.

Chet Holmgren | Zoom Veer | Pin-down

Playing with two bigs carries benefits other than pure spacing, an extra screener, more off-ball opportunities, and added versatility in how the offense can attack.

Here we have delay zoom action flowing into a veer action, a handoff or ball-screen into a pin-down, and OKC takes full advantage of Isaiah Hartenstein’s screening ability alongside Chet. After Chet sets the pin-down, his defender can fall asleep, unaware another action is coming.

Joel Embiid | Double Drag | Spacing

Embiid’s three-point shooting defines itself through the roll-man archetype and his partnership with Tyrese Maxey. When the Sixers put both in positions to succeed, the offense can turn truly unstoppable.

The Sixers run double ball-screen drag action with Embiid spacing and Maxey handling. Philadelphia does a great job leveraging Maxey’s skill set by attacking high coverage. Noah Clowney plays high, Nic Claxton slides over on the help side, and the Sixers add a baseline cut and pin that I haven’t seen in this action before. Great pass by Maxey.

Nikola Jokić | Wedge Pop | Pin-down

The Nuggets show real creativity in how they use Jokić, working him in the post, using him as the hub, positioning him at the top of the key in delay, deploying him as a screen setter with optimal space, running off-screens for him. The possibilities never seem to end.

Denver runs Wedge action for Jokić, cutting him toward the block to post up. His versatility as a shooting big gives him the option to pop the action if the opposing center cheats under, looking to steal better post position. The best actions and players are the ones with counters to a counter.

Myles Turner | Gator | Screen Pop

Playing with other bigs as we saw can lead to creative actions. The empty pick-and-roll + pin-down is a classic way to use two screeners, known as Gator Option.

As the screen setter initiates the ball-screen on the empty side, the defender stunts at the ball and triggers help on the back side. That creates a pin-down opportunity on the weak side, manipulating the help defender. With AJ Green’s defender late chasing over the screen, the big hangs back just long enough for Turner’s pop to be open.

Bam Adebayo | Zipper Twirl/Down | Pin-down

One action worth adding to the general section, twirling pin-downs. The Heat, Spurs, and Nuggets all run different variations of this play with notable frequency.

An end-of-game sideline out-of-bounds play, Adebayo sets what looks like a zipper screen for a cutter running up the floor, then twirls and sets a pin-down for the big to cut for three. The misdirection in a typical screen the screener play is evident here.

Kristaps Porzingis | Ram Exit | Pin-down

Very similar to New York’s roll-man play for Towns. The Hawks run Ram Exit with two bigs on the floor, and as I mentioned earlier, the exit action working strong-side the drive makes it far easier to access.

The play starts with ram action to discourage high coverage off the ball-screen. The ram screen setter can then cut off an exit screen, either creating driving room or establishing themselves as a threat coming off the action.

Jock Landale | Flex ‘Bump’ | Pin-down

Teams have used their best perimeter shooters, along with other actions, to bait a look for the stretch five.

This action sets up a play for Corey Kispert to set a flex screen and come off a pin-down, known as flex screen-the-screener action. Instead, Landale “bumps” the flex screen, rejecting it from the shooter and taking Kispert’s pin-down himself.

Donovan Clingan | Hub | ISO

Shooting out of hub isolation punishes sinking centers effectively, and this ranks as another action common among stretch bigs who receive hub activity.

The Blazers run a couple of actions with the ball in Clingan’s hands, and Brook Lopez, his defender, reacts just slightly toward getting into coverage on a potential cut, leaving Clingan open for three.

Naz Reid | Horns Chest | Flare

A defining action for Minnesota for the past few years with both Reid and Towns having played with Rudy Gobert. Starting out in Horns alignment, Reid sets a ball-screen for the handler and flares off the opposite side.

The action exploits Reid’s defender getting pulled into coverage and forced to guard the flare, if no switch. Kevin Durant loses him for a split second before Reid flares off the big’s screen.

Brook Lopez | Stagger | Pin-down

Keeping it simple with a stagger off-screen into a pop never hurts. The Clippers can have players set the screen for Lopez, or Lopez himself can set one of the off-screens.

When Lopez sets the screen, notice how his defender shades the cut, which invites Lopez to pop back out for three.

Al Horford | Stagger Twirl | Pin-down

Popping off a stagger action shows up quite often, especially when the center serves as the last screener. I like this play better than the other stagger action because it of the increased deception through the twirl action.

Will Richard cuts through the stagger action, and the first screener sets up the pin-down. The Clippers play chase, and Horford’s defender gets into coverage, leaving Horford open on the perimeter.

Nikola Vučević | Wheel Spread | Roll-man

I detailed the spread action in the full post, this time we’ll see extra movement from the Bulls to open up a driving lane for the handler.

Coby White takes the ball-screen with a baseline cut and a cut from the wing to the corner strong-side(better known as wheel action), opens up driving room. The corner player, instead of going to the corner, pressures the dunker maintaining Vučević’s pop space.

Jaylin Williams | Guard-Guard Screening | Spacing

Williams’ shot diet revolved around other players with his focus on spacing and maintaining that space. A common set-up we see from OKC and many other teams that want to attack bad defensive players is guard-guard screening.

Isaiah Joe brings Jordan Poole into action executing a beautiful flip screen, Williams can play off that by sinking into the opposite wing while his defender gaps off Shai Gilgeous-Alexander’s drive. I love OKC’s spacing, having Cason Wallace in the dunker creating room on the perimeter.

Kel’el Ware | Driving Movement | Relocation

Miami built their offense around constant movement in opening driving lanes, and iso-drives. Their reliance on spacing magnified Ware’s best shooting skillset as a relocation shooter.

We have a full on clear out for Davion Mitchell, almost starting in a horizontal 1-4 low alignment. The Lakers bring extra help and this develops into a help beater situation with Adebayo posting up in the dunker and Pelle Larsson cutting through, this opens space on the perimeter for Ware.

Onyeka Okongwu | Stack P&R 45 | Relocation

The Atlanta Hawks utilize different stack ball-screen variations using Okongwu as a cutter or in the action as a screen setter

Jalen Johnson handles, and Okongwu cuts from the wing to the corner while the stack ball-screen takes place in the middle of the floor. Dyson Daniels slips the screen anticipating a switch and rolls into Okongwu's vacated space. Manufacturing space this way works great for drawing bigs into help. Even though Yang Hansen isn’t the primary help man, he helps against Daniels's cut, since Okongwu drags him down near the rim.

Sandro Mamukelashvili | BLOB Stagger | Pin-down

This play combines plenty of what we’ve seen with double-big looks and stagger action, using the traditional big as an extra screener with counters built into the pin-downs and the stagger play.

Ja’Kobe Walter twirls through the action while top-locked, releasing Mamukelashvili as he proceeds to cut across the stagger action. His defender trails the play, since Walter’s cut through distracted him.

Evan Mobley | Horns Rip | Screen Pop

The rip screen and pop has become a fairly common play, especially on special teams (SLOBs and BLOBs). On the rip screen, the center can stay back to protect the cut if the defense plays chase, leaving the big man open for three.

Isaiah Stewart stays back in coverage while Donovan Mitchell cuts off Mobley’s rip screen out of horns alignment. Positioning the opposite slot as the valve creates a way to exploit Stewart sitting back at just the right time. I like emptying out the corner, so if Mitchell wanted to flare off for three he can

Jay Huff | Touch Flare | Screen Pop

The Pacers run a lot of flare concepts with Huff setting the off-screen and proceeding to pop the action. Touch flares are one of their favorite sets as they can utilize 5-out space. Much like the last play, if the defenses chases that can put the center in a help position.

Pascal Siakam comes off the down screen and tosses the ball back to the handler, flaring off Huff’s flare screen. The movement may put his defender behind the ball causing a domino effect, where the center helps out.

Bobby Portis | Pin-in | Pin-down

Nothing beats a good old pin-in screen for beating help. Playing alongside heavy creators, surrounding players can’t just stand and watch, creative ways exist to beat all kinds of help.

Chet Holmgren sends help, and Pete Nance sets the help-beater, pinning in Lu Dort as he digs down to help the helper, leaving the corner open.

Quinten Post | Hammer, Load Wing | Pin-down

Probably my favorite play here, and no surprise it comes from the Golden State Warriors, who know how to run off-screens for shooters. All five players start on the wing; they start with a ball-screen on the opposite side it gets switched, but it draws the defense's attention enough to open up a weak-side action.

Quinten Post, Buddy Hield, and Will Richard bunch up on the wing, Hield breaks to cut, and Richard quickly sets a pin-down for Post. This almost mirrors a Korver action, since the pin-down is inverted. I could also see plays developing for a shooter like Hield in this scenario.

Wendell Carter Jr. | Wide | Screen Pop

Not a flashy play, and one that reminds us by now that defenses don’t respect Carter Jr. much on the perimeter, which explains why he ends up so open.

Jalen Suggs takes his pin-down, and the Wizards play chase, so the center gets into coverage to protect the cut first, leaving Carter Jr. open from three, something the Wizards accept doing rather than let Suggs come clean off the pin-down.

Kyle Filipowski | Pistol Stagger | Pin-down

Utah runs some of the best plays I've seen overall, so this is just one of many good ones. Quick-hitting Pistol action with two bigs on the floor.

Filipowski sets a stagger screen, then curls off Lauri Markkanen's pin-down. I love the layers in this play, Nurkić can hand back to the handler, the corner player can use the stagger screen, or, depending on the defense, Filipowski can set a Korver screen or a twirl pin for Markkanen.

Jalen Smith | BLOB Korver | Pin-down

Some of the most entertaining actions in this study happen on SLOB and BLOB plays. This one from Chicago stands out as a personal favorite. Whether the opponent expects Jalen Smith to screen remains unclear, but the wing screening for the big instead catches them off guard.

Patrick Williams screens the big while he’s in a pin-down coverage, Smith retreats back to catch and shoot. On the opposite side we see a rip screen, so there’s two simultaneous actions. The Bulls run this play for both Vučević and Smith.

Why?

The decision to manually track perimeter attempts originated immediately following Karl-Anthony Towns’ arrival in New York. Consolidating his shot data had me interested for more and dive into how his perimeter shooting contrasted with other versatile bigs. Unpacking his differences in play-type usage and evaluating shot selection became the primary catalysts for this study.

Towns and other players aside, this project sharpened my basketball analytics and video tracking skills. It forced me to return to data visualization via R, the construction of a comprehensive data spreadsheet, and the formulation of film-derived metrics.

Baseline

I tracked 25 stretch fives from the previous season, establishing a baseline threshold of 200-plus three-point attempts and 400 plus minutes at the center position. Only Joel Embiid, Jock Landale, and Kristaps Porziņģis received exemptions from this criteria due to a combination of historical production and injury-shortened seasons. The entire dataset originated from direct video tracking, no system or outside assistance, other than looking up three-point attempts and manually logging the data through Court Sketch. I used thirteen columns to log data in a detailed and organized fashion, as shown in the Google Sheet. The following report analyzes these core categories, demonstrating their connections and key takeaways. Certain tracking columns will carry heavier weight and command more analytical focus than others.

Catch-and-shoot threes dominate the stretch big landscape, making this kind of analysis on a single player group indirectly “manageable.” Tracking shooting guard threes, for instance, would introduce far greater variation across every variable, likely making groupings unattainable. The tighter study of centers makes the groupings you’ll see far more defined. That said, this reflects my own definition of the stretch big archetype, others may attempt different methods.

Findings Part I: Play-Types

Play-types form the backbone of this analysis. The play-type category breaks down into eleven sub-groups: Spacing, Roll-man, Trailing, Relocation, ISO (Isolation), Pin-down, Screen Pop, P&R (Pick and Roll) Handler, Flare, Miscellaneous, and Offensive Rebound. Rather than covering every one, I’ll focus on the most impactful and common play-types throughout.

Roll-man

The roll-man play-type has potential to elevate an offense to new heights, a center who can shoot above the break(ATB) or well beyond the arc forces defenses into difficult schematic decisions. As we see with Towns, the gravitational effect extends far beyond himself. Creating difficult coverage decisions, stress in rotations, unappealing cross-matches, and opening up the rest of the floor. The mere threat can make it the most impactful play-type among stretch fives.

Joel Embiid, Nikola Jokić, Brook Lopez, and Nikola Vučević all rank among the higher-usage bigs in roll-man frequency. These centers often draw the opposing center as their matchup: teams rarely defend them with power forwards, switchable wings, or nimble defenders in ball-screen situations, fearing the post-up or a mauling on the offensive glass. Players like Naz Reid, Bobby Portis, and Evan Mobley either split time at the four or draw cross-matches from wings more frequently, limiting their roll-man volume. Towns and Wembanyama, both full-time centers this season, carry that same caveat in certain situations.

Teams have worked to leverage the play-type through play-calling, placing their big in positions to maximize the pick-and-pop action. The Bulls, Knicks, Clippers, Thunder, and Nuggets stood out as the best at creating space for their roll-man through various plays. One of the simplest, spread pick-and-roll, clears the break of offensive players, putting the opposing five (x5) into coverage with no immediate rotation towards the popping big.

Vučević sets the ball-screen to pop right while Coby White drives left, leaving only one help defender on the weak-side rather than two.

My favorite way to manufacture space above the break, starts with cutting. It’s more deceptive than any set play and works within both freelance and conceptual offenses. Anyone on the floor can execute a cut, instantly making themselves a rim threat in the process, benefitting perimeter players who don’t shoot it well from deep.

Concept: If pick-and-roll or handoff takes place one pass away → cut from wing (45 cut)

Peyton Watson executes a 45 cut to eliminate a potential rotation out to Jokić, who draws the center into coverage through a freelanced dribble handoff with Jamal Murray.

As stated earlier, volume shooting and skill in this play-type reveal far more than surface-level three-point data. The ability to shoot ATB and demand gravity factors in just as heavily. Without a credible three-point threat, defenses key in on the handler rather than respect the popping big. Donovan Clingan illustrated that the best, while he produces at a solid rate as a pop big in both frequency and efficiency, his overall shooting talent doesn’t generate the kind of gravity Portland can leverage, in the way Jokić or Towns do for their respective offenses. For Clingan and others, we’ll see that it’s a reoccurring theme throughout many play-types despite substantial three-point volume.

Spacing

Many high-volume roll-man shooters don’t rank as high-volume spacers, and that makes plenty of sense. The skilled gravitational giants like Jokić, Embiid, and Towns see their defenders stick close off the ball, or they’re simply defended by the opposing center, so they’re more inclined to go toward the action rather than the corners. By extension, these bigs tend to position themselves ATB, or near the top of the key. As ultra-talented bigs who offer far more than just three-point shooting, seeing them space off-ball less comes as no surprise.

Jaylin Williams, Portis, and Reid lead the other side of this spectrum as elite spacers. As stated previously, these centers tend to share the floor with other bigs more often, while lacking in other dynamic areas of their game; subjecting them to heavier corner spacing volume, off-ball play and lower activity.

Advantage creation drives much of their spacing volume. All three played alongside elite creators, Williams with Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, Portis with Giannis Antetokounmpo, and Reid with Anthony Edwards and Julius Randle. Interestingly, Randle’s creation generated more shot attempts for Reid than Edwards did, 22% of Reid’s attempts came via Randle compared to just 12% from Edwards. I attribute that gap to Randle’s passing skill and paint gravity. Edwards operates more from the perimeter and, despite drawing double teams frequently, doesn’t consistently deliver the type of passes Randle does to register potential assists, or gets hockey assists.

Advantage creation alone doesn’t explain all of these looks. Spacers have the opportunity to exploit roll gravity and benefit from help defender manipulation. Portis capitalizes on the Bucks running double drag against high coverage, with Myles Turner setting the final screen and looking to roll into space.

As Turner rolls toward the basket, Jalen Duren executes his primary help assignment with Tobias Harris hedging. The play works exactly as designed, punishing high coverage and the single weak-side tagger to create an open three.

Spacing gravity travels as far as the shooter’s actual talent. Bam Adebayo fits my definition of another low-gravity shooter that teams gave open corner threes to, choosing instead to protect against the drive or the roll. This can be of significant concern heading into next season alongside Giannis. I have many questions about his ability to convert at the volume he’ll likely see, and the impact to Miami’s half-court offense if he’s forced to attempt large volumes. We’ll get into specifics later in the article.

A defensive tactic appearing frequently throughout this exercise is the peel switch: the center helps on a strong-side action while the point-of-attack defender peels off and switches onto the corner shooter. Teams deploy this far more often against lower-gravity stretch bigs in an effort to prioritize paint defense over the big’s perimeter threat.

Wendell Carter Jr., as a lower gravity shooter and corner spacer sees this tactic time and time again. Sandro Mamukelashvili helps off to smother a strong-side cut, prompting Immanuel Quickley to switch or “peel” onto Carter Jr. and contest the shot. Protect the rim with the center first and give up the three with the guard contesting.

Relocation

Unlike spacing, relocation frequency and efficiency spread widely across the twenty-five tracked players, exposing the volatility of this play-type. A relocation three-pointer, by my tracking definition, requires a player to travel to a separate section of the court. Examples include a wing-to-corner drift, a dunker-to-corner lift, or going from paint-to-break all within a half-court setting.

Dunker-to-corner leak outs represent a high-volume relocation sequence. Virtually every tracked center utilized this movement path, exploiting the dunker spot as the traditional space before clearing out to the perimeter. This sudden outward movement catches defenders off-guard or in help situations, creating shooting windows and separation.

Brook Lopez breaks for the right corner after the Lakers flood or overload Kawhi Leonard’s isolation. With all offensive players clearing out to give Leonard room to work, the Lakers bring help, Lopez reacts immediately finding a soft spot in the manufactured zone.

Portis and Jalen Smith stand out as clear elite performers in this play-type. Both have small-ball center stature and leverage their extra mobility to shoot on the move while relocating across the floor converting from multiple spots. Their versatility across different movement patterns and court locations makes them uniquely dangerous in this category.

Off-screens

Off-screens take into account pin-downs, flares, and screen pop actions, any play utilizing an off-screen. Some actions are niche and specific to certain players and teams, while others appeared consistently across the full sample. Much like relocation, this ranks as a movement-heavy play-type.

Read more about my favorite general actions for every stretch five in the study, including off-screen play:

Review of Play-types and Categorization

Each stretch big offers a unique profile: Nikola Jokić’s play-type diet looks nothing like Myles Turner’s, and Jock Landale’s output bears little resemblance to Bam Adebayo’s. Grouping them by shot tendencies, efficiency, and versatility can build tiers of play-styles across the board.

Venn diagrams don’t typically find their way into my work, but here the visual intersection of each player’s preferred and most efficient play-types makes a compelling case for making one. I included three categories: spacers, screening-action, and self-creators/movers.

Spacers — High-volume spacing bigs with little movement or involvement in action. Lack of efficiency in other play-types also pushes them into this category.

Screening-Action — High-volume bigs who leverage screens the most, whether through roll-man, pin-down, screen pops, and flares.

Self-Creators/Movers — Encompasses isolation and pick-and-roll handler threes, along with movement play-types like trailing and relocating. No sole movers or self-creators appear here, as bigs tend to perform better and have higher volumes in play-types that don’t demand heavy movement or ball-handling. Including it, however, allows me to identify hints within certain players.

A glimpse at my thought process in designing and placing each shooter into their respective category:

Left Intersection (Spacers + Self-creators/Movers) — Both Kel’el Ware and Jalen Smith carry play-type diets with over 12% relocation and trailing attempts each, the only two in the entire 25-player sample hitting those marks. With middling to high spacing volume and efficiency, both land in this category. Mamukelashvili skews heavily toward spacing, nearly earning a spot in the pure spacer category, but shoots a strong 43% in both trailing and relocation while taking an above-average amount of relocation threes. Okungwu ranks 4th in the sample as a trailer at 21% frequency, and while he doesn’t convert trailing threes well at 30%, he’s attempted only 35 roll-man threes, making this more of a volume case. Reid leans more toward self-creation than movement, a heavy spacer who dabbles in pick-and-roll handling chances (29 total) and isolations (17). More roll-man volume could have easily pushed him into middle-man territory.

Findings Part II: Movement

Analyzing and logging a player's shooting mechanics demands a level of intense focus, since information flashes by in such a small window of time. I did my best to break down and categorize six distinct types of lower-half body movements: step-ins, side steps, retreats, step-backs, jab steps, and standing or minimal movement.

Contrast of Step-ins and Standing Threes

I found that step-in threes are the most prevalent mechanism for generating lower-half load and creating power underneath the shot. But step-ins eat up time, and time can make or break a shot attempt with closeout defenders nearby. This creates an interesting trade-off, the extra power and load come at the cost of a later release. Contrast that with standing or minimal-movement threes, and it leads me to wonder if shooting without much load opens up more opportunities to actually get a shot off.

Joel Embiid is perhaps the greatest example of a step-in three merchant. I'd consider him a very heavy-load guy who takes his time getting into his shot, leaning on a ton of lower-body engagement and base establishment paired with a finesse release. He actively steps into shots, starting from a set distance to build his step-in load. No other stretch five in the study does anything remotely similar.

While there’s no strong correlation between three-point rate and step-in frequency, I want to display how much of an outlier Embiid is within the group, given the methodical nature in how he shoots three-pointers relative to everyone else. I’d love to see a case study trace his shot evolution and pinpoint where the slow-motion load originates. Does it have anything to do with his injury history? Or has he simply done it for so long that it's become a comfort thing? It’s one of the most intriguing finds I’ve noticed working on the project.

Compare Embiid’s shot to Jaylin Williams’, a lightning quick load time, far more reliance on his arms than his lower half, with no-dip threes sprinkled in that showcase his lack of need for an Embiid-style load. His quick trigger compensates for a less creative off-ball game, allowing Williams to capitalize playing alongside a gravity heavy superstar like SGA.

Mapping stationary frequency relative to ATB three-point attempts indicates that movement varies by location. We find that all stretch bigs, to an extent, load up more often ATB than when they space in the corner. Portis, Landale, and Carter Jr. specifically exhibit higher activity metrics ATB, where they look to establish a pre-catch load for upward lift. Jokić, Towns, Huff, and Wembanyama show a more uniform distribution of low movement across both locations, avoiding multiple movements and shoot from a more upright position consistently. It’s another reason why Williams’ pairing with SGA proves very positive, since he’s able to space from anywhere without much of a load up.

Trailing play types generate the highest frequency of step-in threes. These deep, trailing attempts demand a greater physical load-up to create the necessary lift.

Towns ranks as the highest-volume trailer among stretch bigs in the NBA, attempting 96 threes in this play-type. Okongwu is the closest with 81, followed by Vučević at 62 and Kel'el Ware at 38. Tracking and logging Towns across a two-season sample reveals a surprisingly niche play-type, highlighting an attribute I should not take for granted. This establishes Towns as a premium gravitational center. For more, read this year’s data analysis on Towns that isolates his trailing volume and discusses his mechanical breakdown behind his poor 30% conversion rate on trailing threes this season.

Side step threes

Similar to other movement profiles, these attempts occur almost strictly off the catch. Side-step variations create separation, while producing an immediate shooting load within confined spaces like the corners.

As a high-volume relocation big, Myles Turner gets a bulk of his perimeter volume via side-step (24%). His lateral displacement serves as an alternative load, driving energy into his lower-leg lift as he relocates from the right corner up to the wing. Al Horford, Jaylin Williams, Kel’el Ware and Sandro Mamukelashvili excel at creating separation in a similar fashion, though they utilize different avenues to achieve this effect other than relocation.

Within the spacing play-type, Al Horford and others use side-steps to create passing windows for the ball-handler, optimizing their floor space prior to their catch-and-shoot attempt by either moving up the line or deeper into the baseline corner. Subtly side-stepping to the corner can expand the closeout distance between the closeout/off-ball defender, making their recovery and contest a bit tougher. Side-step movement can serve as a differentiator, separating elite spacers from the average ones.

Wendell Carter Jr. provides an excellent example of a primary spacer who barley attempts side-step threes, exposing a limitation in his shooting skill. In comparison, Nikola Jokić, who operates almost entirely outside the spacer archetype, allows him to eschew these extra movements due to his vastly different offensive role and play-type usage.

Kel’el Ware epitomizes a spacing marvel by combining high-volume side-step shooting with lethal above-the-break execution. He buries 41% of these attempts and leads the field in side step ATB volume, displaying ability to craft his own passing windows while finding the shooting slot to shoot comfortably from deep range. His consistency mirrors perimeter guards or wings, and highlights versatility that exceeds his spacing peers.

Review of Movement and Categorization

Tracking the diverse lower-body mechanics of these players was a highly rewarding exercise. This niche-specific area of basketball can entirely evade evaluation, and escape even the most advanced eye. Isolating these movements required a repetitive review of individual shot attempts to be as precise as possible. Just like distinct play-types, no two front-court shooters share identical habits.

For me, this data raises a compelling developmental question: do these movements stem from pure instinct, or do they reflect intentional practice? Unlike guard or wing shooters, stretch fives can have highly volatile shot trajectories, with some shooters already equipped with a defined stroke while others remain in the early stages of development.

Self-creation and isolation play-types remain statistically negligible across stretch fives, limiting individual tracking data for isolation movements, like step-backs, jab steps, and step-in pull-ups. The dataset lacks the volume to classify any single player exclusively within a self-created pull-up category. In total, this big-man sample registered 413 pull-up three-point attempts, with Victor Wembanyama, Nikola Jokić, and Naz Reid owning 49% of that collective volume.

Minimal Movement - Players with stationary profiles who shoot with little lower-body loading mechanics. This metric incorporates ATB frequencies to account for the increased physical demands of deep-range attempts.

Heavy Load - Step-in volume shooters who rely on forward (step-ins) or lateral momentum (side steps) to generate consistent upward lift. Once again, we’re factoring in ATB distribution, isolating the area where bigs most frequently use these loading mechanisms.

Findings Part III: Distance, and Teammate Analysis

Distance

I’ve never used a ridge chart before, so I’m excited to display and explain one. By logging individual shot distances we can effectively mapped out the shape of each player’s three-point attempts by distance. Sharper peaks define the heaviest concentration of their perimeter diet, whereas flat lines show little to no volume at certain depths. Focusing on the very beginning of the visual immediately isolates corner usage at 23 feet.

These trends match our earlier data on player movement and play types. The distance data provides more evidence of a gap between the more active, above-the-break shooters and stationary corner players.

It’s possible that Kristaps Porziņģis establishes himself as an outlier in this dataset had he stayed healthy. He paces the group with 15 deep three-point attempts from 30-plus feet, practically doubling Brook Lopez's second-place mark of eight, whereas 10 total players do not register a shot from this distance. As observed with Towns and Ware, perimeter distance heavily influences offensive gravity, allowing Porziņģis to bend defenses via elite deep-range skill.

Volume Teammate Combos

Teammate frequency percentage calculates from the remaining roster data. In simple terms, this metric isolates how much a specific player potentially assists a big man's three-point attempts relative to the rest of his team. I had two main takeaways: the data highlights the perimeter synergy between Shai Gilgeous-Alexander and Jaylin Williams, which we discussed at length, but even more pronounced when you compare to his other teammate, Chet Holmgren. I’m not suggesting that Chet and SGA necessarily lack synergy, more-so that it’s interesting seeing SGA assist a bench big much more from three than a starter logging almost 400-500 more minutes together.

The Jamal Murray–Nikola Jokić combination never fails. Their tracking connection across Jokić’s three-point attempts presents a small window into an elite, high-usage duo, showcasing strong interaction across a multitude of play-types. Both stars possess the versatility to operate off the ball, relocate, and quickly re-engage to make reads for each other. The Nuggets can place both players off-ball and run action through them. Murray and Jokić align in Horns, two in the slot. Murray touches the ball and initiates flex action for Jokić on the opposite slot, screening for a cutter while taking a simultaneous pin-down. This play works beautifully against a defense like Detroit, where the Nuggets use Murray as the hub with Ausar Thompson defending. The fact that Murray and Jokić can occupy either position in the set showcases their interchangeable roles.

Data Analysis: Crafted Metrics

Through film analysis and comprehensive data collection I was able to yield two proprietary metrics: shot quality and shooting talent. Shot quality quantifies a player's spatial freedom by converting the shot-openness tracking into a comparative value. Shooting talent introduces greater complexity than the typical three-point percentage or volume, it combines volume and efficiency across the many play-types, movements, locations, and self-created looks, variables that traditional three-point percentage does not capture.

Shot Quality

Having tracked the New York Knicks’ half-court shot quality for a full season, I like to think I’ve built a strong system for defining shot openness, something I initially considered a volatile exercise. Shot openness doesn’t track difficulty; it instead determines whether the shot was open or not. A player can pull up from 40 feet and the shot can register as open. Openness, like the other variables, feeds into a larger system that accounts for difficulty separately.

The basics of my system:

Priority One: Release point. I mainly track at the release, the basketball must sit on the end of the fingertips toward the end of the shot. I freeze frame the video at that moment to determine contest distance and other details (see priority two), in order to log the contest as open, light or heavy.

Priority Two: Defender’s hand location. It sounds straightforward, but closeout defenders can make no attempt or are late to contest. In these scenarios, it’s common to penalize the defense and log the shot as open, even with a defender in the general vicinity. For an active contest, the hand must be timed with the intention of bothering the shot at the release point.

Coach Mike Jagacki made a great video on this subject recently. I highly suggest watching it if you want a detailed breakdown of a process similar to how I built my shot quality metric and assigned these contest labels.

Example

This sequence fails to meet the criteria for a contested shot. Although Kel’el Ware closes ground, frame-by-frame analysis at the point of release sees a poor and late contest: Ware’s contest arrives well after Towns begins his upward shooting motion. Towns fires the ball prior to Ware establishing defensive proximity with his hand, qualifying the attempt as an open look. I will only evaluate follow-through activity if a defender significantly impacts the shooter’s motion, which can potentially upgrade the contest.

I tagged every logged three-pointer as an Open, Light, or Heavy contest based on the release-point and hand-location rules. The formulas then execute the following calculations:

Raw Open% → Adjusted Open%: Since players have wildly different sample sizes, Raw Open% is shrunk toward the group average before it's “trusted” data:

The data model maintains a volume-weighted baseline average league open rate of 44.75% across all twenty-five players, alongside a sample size smoothing constraint (k = 50). k can be explained as a low-volume player's raw rate blended with 50 "fake" league-average attempts; a high-volume player’s would barely move. The model integrates Light and Heavy defensive contests by incorporating specific weighted values into the final calculation of the Openness Score:

A lightly contested shot counts for 65% of a fully open one, treating “light” as closer to open than to heavy. Heavy contests subtract from the score (-0.2) rather than contributing zero, penalizing heavily-contested shots instead of just not rewarding them.

Openness Score → Z-Score: Standardizing the adjusted openness metrics against the collective mean and standard deviation of the twenty-five player sample transforms raw numbers into comparative statistics.

Takeaways

Evaluating Wendell Carter Jr. and Donovan Clingan reveals that a high Shot Quality score does not automatically equal positive offensive impact. Instead, this metric merely tracks openness, and can point to how much cushion an opponent willingly gives up. Both Carter Jr. and Clingan hover near the top of the leaderboard because they lack meaningful shooting gravity. Opposing defenses do not close out aggressively enough, rather they smother drivers and stay in pick-and-roll coverage. This registers in the data as “elite openness,” when the film reveals it as a lack of defensive respect or gravity. Contrast that with elite shooters like Jokić or Towns, who see much lower openness scores. High-level shooters face hard closeouts and tighter coverage through actions/play-types, because defenses cannot afford to give multiple clean looks across many possessions to them.

This introduces an analytical paradox: to a degree, Shot Quality measures the space a defense willingly gives up, granting low-gravity big men the highest openness metrics in the dataset. Even when facing accurate and legitimate shooters (Okungwu, Vučević, Landale etc.), defensive big men may instinctively or intentionally get into help positions to contest drive attempts or muck up action. The value of rim protection, rebounding and providing other sources of help may outweigh the risk of a close out three-pointer from a stretch five. Modern NBA offenses incorporate incredible amounts of talent leading to unprecedented levels of efficiency, so playing defense has never been more difficult on a night to night basis. These offenses force defenses to accept trade-offs, and the rise of the stretch five perfectly exemplifies how some teams may pursue that.

Remember dunker-to-corner relocation? As the driver penetrates the defense, the defensive big, Goga Bitadze, helps off Okongwu to execute a standard help side contest. Despite Okongwu’s proven perimeter range, Bitadze prioritizes rim protection abandoning his assignment to contest the drive. This choice highlights ingrained defensive decision making, as most centers protect the rim in the help position before accounting for the perimeter.

This possession begs the question: why don’t defenses simply help off non-shooters or assign their rim-protecting big man to non-shooters or below-average shooters? Well, coaching staffs do deploy this exact adjustment across the league. That explains why centers may guard players like Dyson Daniels, Josh Hart, or Alex Caruso, allowing the rim protector to park near the paint without worrying about a stretch five dragging him out. The cross-matching tactic, however, introduces an entirely new set of trade-offs, reinforcing that today’s defense demands constant adjustment. My substack features extensive content exploring this exact strategic approach, particularly regarding how the New York Knicks navigated these matchups with Towns and Hart.

Among the bigs with lower shot quality are those that either play the four next to another center or deal with the cross-match on occasion. Defenses use these tactics specifically to neutralize the more dangerous perimeter shooters. Lower shot quality serves as a direct proxy for real defensive gravity (Jokić, Towns, Smith, Ware, Portis, and Wembanyama). That said, Evan Mobley occupies an interesting spot in this data since his low shot quality doesn’t actually reflect that kind of perimeter talent, for him it’s more about his positional role or individual shot selection.

Would you say this represents a “good shot” for Evan Mobley? Well, the film shows a cluster of shots like this one, leading to an overall poor shot quality:

A part of Mobley’s shooting trajectory stems from the management of his physical makeup. Possessing an elite length-profile within this 25-player list, his wingspan and hand size show on the film as a handsy, slow release shooter. His shooting profile can be traced back to his collegiate sample, where he logged just 40 three-point attempts. Although Mobley has scaled his perimeter volume over multiple NBA seasons, showing brief efficient variance across years three and four, his efficiency regressed below 30% in the previous season. This regression proves once more that perimeter production and developmental skill acquisition remain entirely non-linear, particularly for stretch bigs adapting to large perimeter volumes.

Shooting Talent

Perimeter shooting extends beyond raw three-point conversion rates. A single-season player taking 300 attempts at a 38% clip does not automatically indicate superior shooting talent relative to someone shooting 34%. Volume, shot-type, versatility, and range all dictate the parameters of my shooting talent metric. This index combines six variables, each isolating a separate area of shooting and proficiency, into a singular composite score.

Weighted Zone Efficiency
The metric integrates a player's ATB and corner three-point percentages via a non-uniform weighting system. ATB efficiency carries greater statistical weight within the formula due to increased variability and difficulty. ATB attempts usually blend an increased average depth, signify higher gravity, and lead to specialized play-types (roll-man, trailing).

Play-Type Versatility Score
The metric evaluates attempts and efficiency together, measuring how many of the 11 tracked play types a player is a legitimate threat from. Each category earns partial credit on a 0-to-1 scale based on how close a player’s volume and percentage land relative to the two benchmarks: 10 attempts and 37% shooting. A category with real volume and a strong conversion rate earns close to full credit, while one with just a handful of attempts earns almost nothing. Summing all 11 categories and dividing by 11 standardizes the final versatility score.

Movement Versatility Score
Using identical mathematical constraints from the play-type score, this metric tracks the physical execution across nine distinct movement profiles: Catch-and-Shoot, Pull-up, Shot-Fake, Face-up, Step-in, Retreating, Step-back, Side-step, and Jab Step. A player who can efficiently knock down shots off a variety of shot-types and loads score higher here than a one who relies on a single type.

Standing Bonus
A direct reward for high-volume, high-efficiency minimal movement catch-and-shoot threes, the “low-load” shot in a big man’s arsenal:

This ensures a player whose game is built around quick, standing shooting doesn’t get penalized for lacking movement variety, as long as he’s knocking those shots down at a decent rate.

Distance Bonus
Makes from farther away get progressively more credit, from 23 feet (baseline weight) up to 31 feet (35% more credit), scaled by how much of a player’s own shot diet comes from each distance. A player stretching defenses out to 29-31 feet gets rewarded more than someone whose volume is concentrated at the shorter distances.

Overall 3P%
Used as a whole-sample efficiency number, included as a check against all the more granular components.

Combine it
All six pieces get combined into a single weighted composite score:

Zone efficiency carries the most weight as accuracy still matters more than anything else, but the other five components exist specifically so a player isn’t purely rewarded for their shooting percentages. Versatility, range, and reliability off different play types and releases all factor in: two players can finish with the same three-point percentage and still have very different levels of shooting talent once these variables are accounted for.

Takeaways

Let’s compare a couple players so we understand what went into crafting this metric. We’ll go through a couple exercises between two players to illustrate this.

Nikola Jokić (#1, +2.34) vs. Joel Embiid (#18, -0.44)

Two of the league’s most skilled big men, who fueled one of the greatest positional rivalries of this generation, face a shooting comparison from the latest season. Understand that I’m not saying Joel Embiid is a poor shooter in any sense; he attempts a high volume of above-the-break threes and possesses the ability for deep-range shots. Embiid's low rating within my shooting metric stems entirely from deficiencies in versatility and slow load(movement and play-type) compared to the field. Jokić's movement value (0.85) swamps Embiid’s (0.67), and when you add on Jokić’s standing bonus (0.18) it dwarfs Embiid’s number (0.01) as well. As we touched on before, Embiid essentially avoids standing threes and does not attempt other alternative movements (heavy step-ins) or play-types (heavy roll-man) at any meaningful volume, whereas Jokić does them constantly and efficiently.

While Embiid has fantastic gravity beyond the arc, he occupies a separate tier when evaluated as a shooter across every action and movement pattern. His sub-optimal 32% clip ATB also doesn’t help his case, further tanking his rating within the metric.

Bobby Portis (#2, +1.67) vs. Bam Adebayo (#19, -0.70)

We’re perfectly set up for a realistic team situation, given that both front-court players now play alongside Giannis Antetokounmpo in Miami, a role that relies heavily on spacing. Portis perfectly fits the shooter profile designed for the pairing, boasting a 45.5% overall clip and 44.9% zone efficiency displaying elite shooting touch across the entire perimeter. His synergistic fit alongside Giannis should come as no surprise, given Milwaukee’s previous long-term commitment to him along with a stellar +6.3 net rating next to the star power-forward. The duo had an elite 121 offensive rating when sharing the floor for over 3,800 minutes across the last five seasons.

Bam Adebayo represents more of a question mark the Heat must answer in his own offensive synergy with Giannis: his 31.7% mark and matching zone efficiency should draw some concerns. Though it’s worth noting that both Adebayo’s movement versatility (0.71) and play-type versatility (0.51) metrics are promising. Bam projects as an ultra confident shooter, not hesitant to shoot and appearing quite malleable in how he’s utilized as a shooter, that will be of high importance with Giannis. Whether his efficiency scales up while taking on heavier spacing responsibilities remains to be seen, but for right now the film and data don’t him see him matching Portis’ perimeter talent.

Shot Quality + Shooting Talent

This visualization brings everything together, Shooting Talent against Shot Quality. Placing both variables side by side reveals the most advanced data this project can offer, identifying the best shooters in the sample while accounting for the contest pressure they faced.

BBall Index derives both Shot Quality and Shooting Talent values using a different methodology. However, there’s notable overlapping trends in how we both positioned specific players by our metrics. On both graphs, Wendell Carter Jr. remains the player with the worst shooting talent of the group while attempting the best shot quality. Evan Mobley lands in the same range as a low shot quality player with low talent level. The cluster of Williams, Okongwu, Mamukelashvili, Landale and Vučević present as high shot quality shooters with middling shooting talent compared to the pack. These players face better shot quality, leading to the conclusion that defenses live with the tradeoff of leaving this group open in exchange for their bigs stopping other actions.

We can now apply groupings based on the new data. Combining these two metrics reveal a level of shooting gravity and talent together, allowing us draw takeaways about their overall shooting skill.

One consistent takeaway I had from the film,: every center is different. Perimeter-shooting does not make the NBA a “cookie-cutter” league, differentiation exists, and those differences fuel diverse offensive systems and multiple styles of play. For skeptics criticizing modern league spacing, and the rise of three-point shooting, I encourage you to dig deeper.

For visualization R-codes on this project check out my GitHub

Credits:

Court Sketch created by Gabriel Guzman

Top and Bottom 10 table designs inspired by

Cover art created by

Assisted in acquiring extra video, Ben Pfeifer

Premise

If you don't already know by now, Mike Brown made a notable change to New York’s offense in Game 4 of the first round, allowing Karl-Anthony Towns more operation in the pinch-post as a hub. The article above does a great job painting this picture of New York's changing offense. I won't post everything from it, but here's the most important piece we'll use:

Notice the spike in "weave" series usage. That essentially describes the pinch-post/hub offense, and what we'll discuss today. The Knicks leaned on it heavily during the early season and sparingly throughout the rest of the year, but never fully shelved it. Brown "hiding" this type of offense tops the list of the biggest misconceptions this season, and plenty of the quotes seem to support that. Towns recently told the New York Times that “he'd asked for it [hub] all year.” Along with Mike Brown mentioning how they can expand on it come next season with a full training camp as if the Knicks have never attempted it.

Clearly, a disconnect exists. The data directly from the film shows that Towns ran pinch-post/hub plays multiple times during the season in fact, I counted each specific play in which this occurred with Towns defended by a center:

Quotes like these from Brown and Towns signal a change significant enough to warrant attention, and I have the answer. Within my tracking, I break the “weave” section of the playbook into two distinct categories: motion offense and set-play offense. The difference lies entirely in how the play gets initiated. That distinction matters here, while the core idea remains the same, Towns as the hub, the initiation and focus changed completely.

What Did Towns Ask For

Knicks offensive assistant coach Chris Jent provided some of the best context on this switch. Jent readily acknowledges that yes, the Knicks attempted to run the pinch-post/hub offense during the season:

What Jent refers to as the flow offense “based upon guard play,” I refer to as the 4-out 1-in motion offense or “weave”, and I’ve shown and broken it down plenty of times throughout the season including the full playbook of it.

Keep in mind that the flow offense relies on concepts, where players make their own reads based on the defense. Look at the center in these clips. While operating in the dunker, the center must read when to pop out, a decision that can trigger other actions once he catches the ball. So, there’s a variety of other actions that exist within the concept, as New York did not have a set-play hub action.

Jent trails off when he mentions Towns, almost as if he doesn't want to admit that pushback existed against this type of offense. I alluded to that during the season, because in March, the Knicks rolled out a whole new system built for Towns to succeed:

That can make things even more confusing. If Towns pushed for the hub offense during the season, why did he pushback against the motion system, enough to make the Knicks change the offense almost completely? I believe it comes down to indecision, he struggles deciding when he should come out of the dunker, and he faces a lot of thinking before he even receives the ball. Towns wants the hub without the thought process, and Jent would go on to explain the change for exactly that:

What does “wearing it out” look like?

The Knicks responded by stripping away the movement and handoffs when parking Towns at the elbow. They sometimes look to disguise the action with a brush screen, getting Dyson Daniels off Brunson so Atlanta can’t switch the off-screen action as easily, and had Towns start low, but the real difference resides in cutting out the extra movement simplifying Town’s outlook. Instead of wondering whether he'll receive the ball, he knows for certain it's coming his way.

Sometimes they don't even need to set a brush screen, Towns simply sets up at the elbow to receive the ball. Notice how this new setup can function as a perimeter isolation or post-up play for Towns, especially if he draws a smaller matchup and can punish that player by overwhelming him with size. Put yourself in Towns's shoes, and this change starts to make sense as one he asked for earlier. He receives the ball without extra movement, nobody forces him into a decision, and the play exists just for him, in a season that saw a lack of post-up and isolation chances. Picture the change as using the hub portion of the motion offense, throwing Towns the ball first before any action starts, running the offense through his catch rather than before it.

Mike Brown has a point, multiple ways exist to build off this type of offense. The Knicks could implement all the pinch-post actions that worked during the season within the motion system, while also giving Towns freedom to isolate and post up. We could see a more aggressive and set-up version of Towns next season, one whose field goal attempts don't get cut the way they did this year. This doesn’t mean to totally abandon the flow offense either, as they ran it in conjunction to the new set-up.

Extent of Production

Another misconception suggests that New York simply handed Towns the hub role and rode that to championship success. The scheme instead changed significantly during the Cleveland series and into the matchup against San Antonio. The main point stands that the Knicks have multiple ways to win basketball games that have nothing to do with optimizing Towns. Does optimizing him make things easier? Yes. Can the Knicks get away without it? Yes. Each opponent presents different weaknesses, and exploiting them in a variety of ways matters more at the end of the day.

The Knicks moved away from heavy play-calling, leaned into more freelanced offense, and incorporated help beaters down the stretch. That placed a heavier on-ball burden on Jalen Brunson against tougher defenses, but it ultimately led them to a championship in dominant fashion. For a deeper dive into New York’s less talked about offensive revision, check out the piece below:

Breaking the playoffs down by scheme gives an even closer look into their schematic adjustments, and can help curate a timeline:

Round 1 vs. ATL

• HCS (Half Court Set) Weave the signature action, climbed sharply from 18% to 31% by the end of the series. We’ve already layered this context as the new pinch post set up

• Horns barely played any role (nearly at 0%)

• HCS Delay spiked to 19% in the series’ final games. Brown installed the half-court Delay offense as a major addition in March.

• MO (Motion Offense/Flow) Weave stayed in the high-teens, and MO Delay wasn’t used at all.

Round 2 vs. PHI

• Horns explodes as the new primary action, opening at 30% and settling in the high teens to low-20s the rest of the series. Mostly looking for Mikal Bridges to attack drop coverage through Horns Out, read for more.

• MO Delay, which didn’t exist against Atlanta, suddenly appears and peaks at 22% in the series opener.

• HCS Weave collapses to single digits (as low as 3%), essentially swapped out for Horns offense. They ran the new pinch post offense set-up not nearly as much as Atlanta, instead opting for the motion offense.

Round 3 vs. CLE

• Horns remains as the dominant scheme, staying in the high-teens to high-20s

• MO Weave climbs back up into a stable 14-22%.

• HCS and MO Delay gradually fade out toward the end of the series (16% down to 0%).

• We see a lot of matchup hunting and help beater usage during this series

Finals vs. SAS

• Horns, which had been the backbone series since Round 2, completely dies off falling from 23% to literally 0% by the closeout game.

• HCS Weave climbs back to 19%, and MO Weave to 32% in Game 101, the single highest reading of any scheme metric across the entire postseason.

• A large part of this series centered on hunting San Antonio's centers on the perimeter and combating their unique tactic of creating a one-man zone, keeping their big anchored in the help area no matter what.

On the efficiency front, the motion flow offense truly shined in the postseason, with Delay and Weave usage picking up the slack where set plays fell short. Help beaters proved majorly successful, and the overall play-calling trend stayed the same, with organized offense posting a +0.10 PPP increase from general freelancing in the half-court.

Coverage Change

Mike Brown’s Knicks leaned heavily on higher coverages throughout the season rather than playing drop for most of the year. That started with getting level at the screen, specifically for Karl-Anthony Towns, who has spoken positively about this coverage, citing his ability to use his “god-given traits” (length, height and size) more effectively.

Worth noting, this quote comes from the 2024-2025 season, when Towns saw a lower usage in aggressive coverages. So why does this matter, and why did Brown consider it as their best approach?

Towns doesn’t protect the basket well, and that may be an understatement. He ranks among the worst bigs at rim protection, posting a -2.8% Rim FG% Differential in the 36th percentile at his position. He falters at squaring up incoming drivers, defending without fouling, and lacks technique in deep drop coverage, particularly retreating and guarding two players simultaneously.

Brown’s scheme reflects a clear awareness of those limitations, keeping Towns out of deep drop coverage situations where he’d need to guard both the handler and the roll man while protecting the rim. Instead, it keeps him engaged and accountable in coverage with a defined responsibility. I’d like to believe that playing level for much of the season improved his defensive acumen and overall focus on that end. Towns also deserves credit for embracing that role, defending the way he did this season while sacrificing touches to lean into the dirty work.

The regular season sharpened the knife for the playoffs, and no example illustrates that better than Game 2 against the Sixers, where lead handler Tyrese Maxey faced 20 aggressive coverages(!!). Playing this way throughout the season gave the rotation, the feel and communication necessary to execute high coverages more consistently. Across multiple series, teams need to oscillate between different coverages, sometimes within the same series, and New York’s preparation for that kind of shapeshifting showed. In the clip, Josh Hart serves as the tagger in the low man role, Miles McBride zones up both weak-side shooters, and Hart recovers back out. A reminder that the coverage doesn’t hinge on Towns, the screener’s defender, or the point-of-attack man, the helping backline does the heavy lifting. When you have a collection of talented defenders in Anunoby, Hart, Bridges, Alvarado, McBride, and Shamet, they make that job easier.

We’ve discussed Towns as the screener, but Mikal Bridges also benefits heavily from this coverage as a screen navigator. Since arriving in New York, he’s ranked poorly in that aspect while showing a much stronger aptitude off the ball. This coverage doesn’t just reduce his screen navigation burden, it places him in the optimal environment to thrive as a heavy rotation, chaos agent.

I’m not directly correlating the change in coverage to Bridges’ defensive playmaking rise, but the opportunity certainly increased, whether in a tagger role or zoning up.

The Gamble

Level/high coverage on ball-screens carries real risk, it invites open threes, and puts the defense at the mercy of who's shooting well that night. The Knicks caught some breaks this postseason; opponents simply missed shots they'd normally make. But luck doesn't tell the whole story. New York scouted and adjusted throughout multiple series, funneling drives toward weaker shooters and tightening up on the ones who could punish them. The mix of variance and strategy defined their defensive turnaround.

Game 4 against San Antonio put the danger of variance on full display: the Spurs caught fire from three early, capitalizing on aggressive tagging. Arguably, the Spurs stand as the greatest "final boss" you could've pictured for the Knicks when it came to this coverage. They present a unique challenge in Victor Wembanyama as a massive gravitational roller who commands enormous amounts of attention, but the same principle applies. Stop his roll, and you can hand San Antonio multiple open three-point looks in return.

The Knicks stifled the Spurs’ offense by keeping their big attached to Wembanyama as tightly as possible while limiting the tag, whether that meant gapping up on the handler or going under more ball-screens as the series progressed.

Aggressive coverage paid its biggest dividends against the Atlanta Hawks, while moving Brunson off CJ McCollum to guard Dyson Daniels, and getting rid of the cross-match. New York decided to sell out on Atlanta’s best shooters and funnel the ball toward their worst ones.

Notice the rise in aggressive coverage usage as the Atlanta series went on, it became a sure-fire way to dictate Atlanta's offense and exposed their most fatal flaw: not enough reliable perimeter threats in the rotation. That coverage tones down against Cleveland, where the Knicks face a more dangerous playmaker in James Harden. They blitzed 25 times across the first two games, surrendering 1.20 points per action, a really poor number. They opt to play more level, pulling back on forcing advantage basketball and relying on their point-attack defense with occasional tag responsibility.

Playing high on ball-handlers like Harden and Donovan Mitchell remains necessary to take away pull-up opportunities and walks into the lane. One idea I saw floated, and considered myself, was matching Towns on Mobley instead of Allen. That removes Harden’s favorite screener and turns Mobley into a pop big rather than a roller or spacer. With Allen sitting in the dunker, the Knicks can hedge or play level and defend the back end with far less complexity.

Mobley's lack of shooting touch and outside range severely hindered Cleveland's offense. Across the four games he attempted 21 threes, making just 6, rarely punishing New York's high coverage on ball-screens. Much like the Atlanta series, that kind of shooting performance and play-style gives aggressive coverages room to breathe. Nearly every Cleveland lineup combination struggled in this series, but the Mobley and Allen pairing yielded a -27 net rating, the lowest of any two-man combo logging more than 50 minutes together.

A key component paired with this defensive coverage has been their icing of ball-screens, implemented in late January. It assists Bridges as a screen navigator, directing the handler straight into the coverage with multiple help defenders ready to tag on a pop or roll. I broke this coverage down in more depth in a separate piece:

Conclusion

Brown’s tactical shift strengthened New York’s personnel in the long run, building their ability to handle different situations come playoff time while reinforcing defensive cohesion. Even watching them surrender open catch-and-shoot threes to the Washington Wizards or Brooklyn Nets throughout the season, the frustration fades once you recognize what they were aiming towards.

The physical toll this coverage demands also seemed largely absent, the Knicks earned extended rest through their own dominance, including a couple of sweeps, while logging fewer minutes per game from key defenders like Bridges, Hart, and Anunoby compared to the 2024-2025 run. Few teams at this stage of a championship run enter each series as fresh as New York did, contributing to them capturing the ultimate prize.

Mohamed Diawara

Negative: Shooting and Athleticism

Diawara played only two summer league games and struggled as a primary playmaker and handler, a role clearly outside his skillset, so the rough patches came as no surprise. Ultimately it amounted to a throwaway experience, and shouldn't factor into the broader perception of his future. Having said that, the lack of functional athleticism, along with his inconsistent shooting, can raise some concerns about his potential rotation playability. None of this comes as new information.

Positive: Driving Passing

Real upside exists in the connector-wing archetype for Diawara, playing off the catch and making decisions once near the rim. Pair that with a reliable jumper, and this skill set translates seamlessly to the big club, where he'll likely spend the bulk of his time playing off-ball. I dug into this more extensively in the Diawara piece: he currently lacks the lane creativity, strength, and athleticism to become a force on drives off the dribble, but he's built the foundation to beat the first defender and make plays for teammates. A strong shooting stroke that keeps defenders honest can go a long way toward unlocking that upside, so he still has work to do across multiple facets of his game.

Just last month I analyzed his season, so if you want to learn more about his play in detail, take a look:

Pacome Dadiet

Dadiet enters his 3rd season in the NBA without much NBA experience, because of that the front office could float him around as a potential trade candidate to clear room for one of the other rookies or a third-string center. However, his game warrants analysis, since he remains a relatively young player still improving, and summer league flashed that development.

Negative: Shooting

Dadiet's main focus for breaking into a rotation should center on his spot-up shooting, but that's always given him trouble in game reps. Rumors have circulated for the past couple years that the Knicks highly believe in his shooting ability, yet it hasn't materialized across a stretch of multiple games. I found that quite disappointing this time around, since his spot-up driving game looked well-polished throughout summer league. He showed quick first steps, long strides, and made positive decisions off the ball.

Positive: Cutting and Size

Dadiet's cutting has truly opened my eyes as he's sharpened his offensive IQ and made better use of his 6'8" frame. He talked about learning the ins-and-outs of cutting by speaking with veteran players, notably OG Anunoby and Mikal Bridges. He put that into action, both on scripted cuts, running certain plays with spacing principles, and cuts on his own accord. His level of feel in cutting situations matched both veteran players this summer.

I'm making a big deal about this for a reason: Dadiet's cutting will find an abundance of chances to surface in Mike Brown's offense. Take the play above, for example. It begins with a ball-screen and flows into a slash action (pop + handoff). The handler, in this case, looks to reverse the basketball into the motion system, which runs heavily through handoffs in the slot or on the sideline. When Dillon Jones (#1) goes to hand it off to Dadiet, Dadiet backdoors the defender on the overplay and finishes with a dunk. Had Jones handed it off, he could've looked to reverse back to the slot or attack the rim; had the defense denied the cut, Jones reverses back to the slot. That's how the conceptual offense works, so Dadiet will get multiple chances to make impactful plays by cutting in either corner in this type of offense.

Tyler Nickel

Nickel arrives as an established sharpshooter, and his shooting speaks for itself. He’s a threat on the perimeter every time he steps on the floor, marking a sharp contrast from the last two prospects. While we know Nickel can shoot, I wanted to zero in on what else he brings to the table, and he surprised me in various other skills, both offense and defense.

Negative: More on Offense

Nickel didn't show many glaring negatives this summer, the only real knock I can give is the offense outside of the three-point shooting, an area that can limit him offensively, including as an off-ball threat. He doesn’t possess a strong handle in traffic, and that likely keeps him from pressuring the rim along with the lack of burst. When defenders close out, he'll need to lean on his role as a connector or off the dribble shooter, both areas where I believe he can develop further than anything near the basket or in creating deep drives. Overall the three-point shooting should create enough of a floor to buoy him along-side other creators, for now.

Positive: Hard-Worker

While not athletically or laterally gifted, Nickel fights on the defensive side of the court giving solid point-of-attack reps, utilizing his 6’7” frame to contest shots near the basket, and tracking both ball and man off the ball. Nickel doesn’t lack for effort, and it fits within the mold of a championship caliber team. I still hold reservations about Nickel’s rotation viability against some of the best handlers and athletes, but his summer league showing impressed greatly.

Nickel’s motor lends the defensive upside to stay on the floor and provide elite-level spacing. That can shrinks his tradeoff dramatically. I love the Duncan Robinson comparison, because Robinson doesn't have big-time athleticism or lateral quickness either, yet this tall sharpshooter carves out a place on the floor off the ball, landing in the 99th percentile in off-ball chaser defense. He pours a lot of work into the defensive end to shrink his tradeoff, so if Nickel wants to get time on an NBA court he’s got the right idea.

Jack Kayil

I discussed and displayed video of Kayil's game the most on here. His possible upside and two-way ability make him the most intriguing prospect for New York. Kayil simply makes for a fun watch, since he’s highly active on the court, from handling to point-of-attack defense to creating for his teammates. Wherever he plays next season, I'll make sure to watch and catch you guys up on his performances.

Negative: Overzealous and Questionable Handle

No better way exists to describe Kayil's negatives, in my opinion. Whether it's shot selection, decision-making, or defensive errors, they all trace back to one root issue: an erratic eagerness to impose his will on the game. Now, does this definitively count as a bad thing? No. In fact, it shows that he’s an ultra-confident player who doesn't shy away from mistakes, and it might even drive him toward his ceiling. That said, he'll need to learn to reel it in a bit, since these aggressive decisions can compound throughout a single game. Not only that, but I have a level of concern with his handle among NBA-caliber players, as he relies heavily on his dominant hand (right) and can crumble under ball pressure.

Positive: Ball-screen Navigation + POA

Kayil shattered all my initial expectations of his point attack defense, displaying lock-down potential. He’s great at getting skinny, absorbs contact, and glues himself hip-to-hip with the ball-handler. Rather than dying on ball-screens, he utilizes his recovery tools, combining his elite positional size with lateral quickness. He’s capable of taking away the driver's angle and completely suffocating actions.

This season I worked on a project centered around meticulously dissecting New York’s offense, analyzing each half-court possession in full. The scoring player, potential assist man, shot type, shot location, self-created or assisted shots, and more. But typical box score or advanced stats don’t make this project unique. Tracking the offensive system does. Along the way, I logged every play-call and coverage faced. That data allows me to draw deep inferences about New York’s process to identify what they execute well and where they struggle. Organized offense sits at the top of that list. But first, what exactly is organized offense, and why does it matter?

Organized offense combines Play-Calling%, Help Beater%, Special Teams%, and for the Knicks specifically, Motion Offense%. In its essence, organized offense measures how often the team attacks with structure and intention rather than what we’ll refer to as “freelanced” offense. A structured offense creates advantages more reliably than a heavily freelanced one. When we hear “freelanced offense,” isolation-heavy play comes to mind, but that’s not always the case. Freelanced simply means the offense operates without a called play or structure.

Project

Abstract

To what extent does New York’s organized offense affect their overall scoring output? Does structured execution actually beat freelancing? On the surface, organized offense absolutely mattered for New York. The collected data shows the Knicks scored 1.04 points per possession (PPP) in organized half-court plays, compared to just 0.94 PPP freelancing. Expected values further prove that organized offense produces a superior offensive process. By utilizing expected points per possession (ePPP) and expected points per shot (ePPS), we can evaluate the quality of the offense regardless of whether the shot went in. Organized offense posted a stellar 1.08 ePPP against a 1.03 ePPP for freelancing. That reaffirms my pre-season thesis that structure or concepts outperform freelancing. However, data also reveals that freelancing still plays a crucial role, especially when factoring in New York’s high-end individual talent.

Methodology & Data Automation

The holy grail of this project is a comprehensive Google Sheet containing a full season of logging, calculations, and tracking mechanics. Taking on a project of this scale teaches you that preparation is everything. The objective was to automate as much of the data entry as possible, minimizing manual typing even when introducing custom variables.

The data framework was divided into two distinct categories:

Manually typed in

• Game, Date, Opponent, Quarter, and Lineup

• Attack, Alignment, and Set Name

• Main Pick-and-Roll Coverage

• Set to Chance (Did the set directly lead to an end of possession?)

• Scoring/Assist Player, Result, and Contests (Open, Light, Heavy or Blocked)

• Defensive Help Triggers (Did the defense bring help? How many defenders?)

Automated

• Lineup Tracking and Base Coverages

• Screener Coverage and Offensive Series Identification

• Shot Creation Type (Self-Created vs. Assisted)

• Help Counters and Help Faced Status

• Major Play-Type, Attack Type and Sub-Type, and Points Scored

• Expected Points Per Possession (ePPP) calculation

• Time (Time in Quarter, Half, Month)

• System Validation (Did they run something?)

To calculate Organized Offense%, the tracker requires a manual entry for the initial attack such as a Sideline Out-of-Bounds (SLOB), Baseline Out-of-Bounds (BLOB), half-court set, or freelance possession. The sheet then automatically sorts the input into organized or freelanced bins (attack type).

• Example: Half-Court Set → Organized Offense Bin

• Example: SLOB Freelance → Freelance Bin

Let’s run through each of these attacks within what makes up the organized offense:

Play-Calling / Sets

Coaches call plays to gain advantages and attack specific coverages. As the season goes along, recognizing a team's play-calling gets easier. Every team runs 'series' of offense that open plays and usually build off them through various actions. Think of it like multiple car models sold under one dealership.

In the video, the 'away' action opens the away series. From the initial away screen, they can run many other actions. OG Anunoby screens while Tyler Kolek tosses the ball to the big, and they create a weak-side advantage on the roll since the opposing center plays level coverage.

Plays can target specific coverages. In this case, the handoff and double screening action create a single tagger, enabling an attack against the five playing high on the ball-screen. They can target other coverages within the same series of offense.

New York loves running screen-the-screener action out of ‘away’ to target drop coverage bigs. Brunson takes the pin-down, the center drops off, and he either shoots a catch-and-shoot three or plays off the advantage. Here, the center sets a ball-screen to get him into the lane. The Knicks can also run stack pick-and-roll to target drop coverage. Any given series typically carries multiple layers designed to attack different coverage types.

Check out this year’s playbook for more along with the video:

Help Beaters

Help beaters beat help, plain and simple. Players can direct them on their own, or coaches can build them into the system through certain spacing principles or off-screens on isolations or post-ups. They're a smart way to gain advantages that weren't there before. Read one of my favorites that I've done on this page to learn more:

Special Teams

A fancy way of saying sideline out of bounds (SLOBs) and baseline out of bounds (BLOBs) plays. Each team leads their own attack out of these inbound points. Sometimes they get extra creative, or they run a play typical of their half-court offense.

Through manual tracking and automated data, everything sorts neatly into its own column or bin. The automation handles the calculations, removing the need to run numbers manually. The tracker generates percentages for each attack type and sub-type, including PPP. There’s much more beyond what’s shown here that we will get into.

Results and Discussion

Game-by-game, organized offense PPP completely outpaces freelanced offense for much of the season and dominates the postseason. Without going too deep in this piece, notice how the offense struggled to find its footing early in the playoffs, right up until the team deviated to another approach. Despite organized offense rates of 60 and 64 percent in Games 1 and 2 against Atlanta, what type of offense the Knicks ran mattered just as much as how often they ran it. The Hawks proved adept at stopping it, holding them to 0.94 PPP in Game 2, and a brutal 0.77 PPP in Game 3 on organized plays. I broke down Game 3’s poor performance in their set-play heavy offense here:

The “new” offense begins to fade out once the Knicks run into Cleveland and San Antonio’s defenses, forcing significant adjustments, which explains the large dip in organized offense and the relative rise in freelancing. Even while going 9-1 in that stretch, the offense continuously needed to adapt to different defenses.

Yes, this looks like a mess, overwhelming at first glance. Narrowing the focus down to quarters within games, we can identify which quarters see the highest rates of organized offense. Organized offense declines as games progress starting at 61% in the first quarter, 62% in the second, 59% in the third, and dropping to 53% in the fourth. This drop off seems to be consistent to what I tracked a bit last season, but not as low as a Tom Thibodeau offense.

The 3rd quarter is pretty negligible, there's no real reason for the drop in offense ran, and it isn't a notable drop-off. The 4th quarter tells a different story, since we know full well it’s Jalen Brunson’s game and the Knicks have him lead the offense from the moment he checks in to the end, if it's a close game. This can start as early as 6:30 or 7 minutes left in the quarter, which in turn lowers the rate of organized offense in the quarter. Now, is this a bad thing? I attempted to tackle this question mid-season definitely check that out, as it's still relevant:

For this post, if we want to look at why the rate of offense goes down, the data backs up our previous statement. Brunson ends more possessions in isolation as organized offense dips toward the end of games, a change that begins around the 4-minute mark. Looking at each quarter in totality, Brunson finishes far more of his scoring plays in isolation during the 4th quarter than any other frame. 38% of them as isolation possessions, compared to 25% in the 1st quarter, 28% in the 2nd, and 30% in the 3rd.

Looking at the data through the lens of game flow rather than game-by-game, freelance PPP overtakes organized offense PPP, particularly late game. That number doesn’t stem mainly from Brunson isolations, but rather from teams sending two at the ball.

For example, in Game 1 of the Eastern Conference Finals against the Cleveland Cavaliers, Cleveland blitzed an OG Anunoby ball-screen to prevent James Harden from being switched onto Brunson. Brunson immediately passed out of the trap, allowing Anunoby to attack a 2-on-1 situation. Even without a “help beater” present, Brunson’s gravity creates highly efficient, unstructured offense.

Whether operating out of a set or freelanced possession, New York's late-game offense remained elite down the stretch because the ball was in their superstar's hands.

To strip away turnovers and isolate pure shot quality, we can look at expected points per shot (ePPS). Much like standard PPP, organized offense heavily dominates early in the postseason. The Knicks successfully generated high-value rim looks during the first two rounds via their pinch-post sets, therefore spiking the expected value. Interestingly, regular-season ePPS values between organized and freelance plays oscillated dramatically during second halves. I can't say for sure why it differs from the first two quarters, but tracking whether this second-half difference remains the same will be a primary focus for next season.

Conclusion

The data comprehensively supports the hypothesis: the New York Knicks are optimized by a structured, conceptual, and organized framework. This philosophy fully materialized when they replaced Tom Thibodeau with Mike Brown. The numbers can even validate it as an actionable, data-driven decision since they performed better under structure or concept and ran more of an improved offense. This change was one of the factors that paved the way for a championship run.

While Brown built the foundation of an eventual champion, freelance basketball remains New York’s closing weapon. Late in games, during the most critical possessions of the season, freelanced offense performs just as effectively or even more. Whether executing a new system, letting Jalen Brunson dissect a double-team, or beating a defender in isolation, the Knicks possess an elite, dual-threat offensive identity to unleash on the best of opponents.

Huge shoutout to @Tim_NBA (on X/Twitter), the founder of BBall Index, and the creator of the offensive tracker used in the study. None of this is possible without his assistance and guidance.

The conversation has been louder than ever this season, particularly around players like Jaylen Brown, DeMar DeRozan, and Cam Thomas. At the center of it sits the hottest debate in basketball discourse: the eye test versus the numbers. Here’s my take: the eye test has quietly become a highlight machine. What often gets passed off as “watching film” is just watching great plays or highlights repackaged as analysis. True film study demands far more. It requires a genuine willingness to sit with the unglamorous moments and understand why things happen. While I have tremendous respect for creators who genuinely study the game through film, the broader, mainstream “eye test” has drifted far from actual film watching. A similar misconception has taken place within analytics circles, as there’s a growing misuse of data. Using lineup numbers, on/off splits, catch-all metrics for agendas, ignoring anything that goes against it, and treating it as objective. Basketball, like most things worth studying, are hard to make generalizations about at the end of the day. The game can get messy on a night-to-night basis, and trying to flatten that messiness into a single number is a trap I fell into myself when I was starting out.

To be clear, this debate is minor in the grand scheme of NBA fandom. A lot of people watch basketball purely for the joy of it, with no interest in team optimization or roster construction. That is perfectly fine, but this piece may not be for them. This is for those who care about how teams are built, maximized, and understood. Because the conversation across the league is changing rapidly, and the real answers lie where the film and the data meet.

Andre Drummond - Roster and Role Malpractice

I previously did a piece on Drummond and his skillset since the New York Knicks acquired him via free agency a few days ago, and I noticed that he’s a perfect example of analytical growth within the game and player optimization in the past decade.

Known as one of the best glass cleaners of his generation, Drummond earned two All-Star selections and even landed on an All-NBA team. Dominant on the boards, he was never an efficient scorer. Despite that, he consistently ranked near the top of the league in post-up chances, as the graph highlights, along with posting position highs in rim attempts and short midrange shots. That pattern stays the same almost every season from his second year in the league all the way through his time with the Brooklyn Nets in 2021-2022. Given the sizable volume and consistently underwhelming production on those opportunities over the years, it’s hard to make a case that he was ever a strong post-up player.

Watching Drummond’s post-up and isolation game was a tough watch, and the data backs that up. He tends to burrow his way to the rim on sheer strength alone. In the post, he barely uses footwork or pump fakes to compensate for his lack of verticality and explosiveness. A typical Drummond post-up follows a predictable script: catch the ball, throw up a quick hook, or drive headlong into the defense without much of a plan. A post up game that looks like Drummond’s will not net many points.

His favorite move is the fake dribble handoff, not bad by any means, but when it’s one of the few tools in a limited bag, it becomes predictable and loses its effectiveness. As the “eye test” crowd would say, Andre Drummond doesn’t carry much of a bag, or maybe a fanny pack at best.

The lack of post-up skill, while fairly obvious to the eye, looks even worse compounded by his lack of athleticism and finishing ability. Throughout his heavy post-up years, Drummond ranked in the 96th percentile in rim attempts per 75, yet finished in just the 34th percentile in rim field goal percentage. Among centers, he landed in the 82nd percentile in shots taken. That’s a massive volume of attempts going to a player who finishes wildly, lacks real creativity, and offers little as a passer out of those situations.

Actionable Insights

Drummond’s offensive struggles projected directly onto the catch-all metrics measuring his impact on that end, and the verdict across LEBRON, DARKO, and RAPM lands somewhere between middling and low.

The numbers and film make the case to scale down Drummond's post-up volume, surround him with players who carry the scoring load, and let him play center without a heavy shot diet. The lack of offensive talent around him never gave the Pistons a real chance, but the losing wasn't entirely circumstantial. Drummond spent years doing things he simply wasn't good at, and nobody stopped him. Beyond the post-up and isolation struggles, he never established himself as a reliable cutter or roll man either. In the end, Drummond was a rough offensive player handed an unnecessary scoring leash for far too long.

Orlando’s Front Court Duo - Contrast of Style

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Tale of Two Extremes

If you want a player who supplies the offensive glass and generates extra possessions, Drummond truly delivers. He ranks in the 96th percentile in offensive rebounds per 75, 99th overall in rebounds per 75, and the 94th percentile in defensive rebounding%. At 6’11” with an imposing frame, he moves centers around in the dunker spot with real force, very few bigs are built quite like Drummond. This move hands New York their duo of glass cleaners back. Once the 99th percentile defensive rebounding% big in Towns heads to the bench, another one checks in to replace him.

I hope that video might’ve tipped you off to something pretty significant. Drummond majorly struggles to finish at the rim, not just on put-backs, but in general. He ranked in the 1st percentile, near absolute worst, in rim finishing last season. This isn't a blip or a one-year thing either, he's sat in the 12th percentile in rim finishing since 2020. What Drummond does with the ball once he grabs the offensive rebound will matter, because missed shots at the rim are frustrating just as much as not collecting the offensive rebound altogether.

Shooting???

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Shot Selection and Mechanics

I want to start with Kayil’s shot mechanics, because they’re genuinely intriguing. He only shot 29% from three, but he took some ridiculous shots that we will see in the film. He owns a high release point, which gives him real variability when shooting through contests, in simple terms, it makes him a good bad-shot shooter. One flaw I’ve noticed is that his shooting hand doesn’t follow through consistently on release, whether that’s a byproduct of the shots he takes or just inconsistent form overall, he will need to clean that up. On balance, I view him as a strong shooter who needs some refinement and consistency.

Kayil fits the mold of a modern NBA guard. He hunts the pull-up three, shows no hesitation in his shot selection, can take step-backs, and clearly understands shot value. However, the downsides are just as obvious, questionable shot selection, including some incredibly deep attempts. It’s mainly the willingness to take those shots that intrigues me in the first place, as he plays without fear. His percentages naturally take a hit given this shot diet, compounded further by a number of grenades, low-percentage attempts forced near the end of the shot clock. On dribble pull-ups, he shot 49-for-185 (26.5%), an extremely low number even accounting for volume, but the shot diet behind it is wildly erratic as we’ve discussed.

I touched on this briefly on my platform; Kayil’s game could benefit from being scaled down a bit, and I don’t mean that as a knock. A shortened, more focused role would likely serve him better than the high volume of pull-up threes he currently takes. Trimming his shot diet could actually elevate his game, raising his three-point percentage by cutting out some of the chaotic shot selection. On catch-and-shoot threes, he made 56-for-176 (32%), not a great number, but a clear improvement over his pull-up volume. Once again, the shooting depth behind these attempts deserves consideration.

Can’t count out Kayil’s midrange pull-up game. Much like his three-point shot diet, the shot selection is rough at times, but he converts far more consistently on dribble pull-ups in the midrange, shooting 43% (43-for-99) on those attempts. That’s a solid number given his overall shot selection, especially considering he doesn’t get to the rim often, only 19.8% of his shots come near the basket. Kayil has a difficult shot diet to replicate at the NBA level, and he’ll need real tweaks and different offensive role to become a strong offensive player. He currently trades rim pressure for a heavy dose of long-distance shooting, notable given that he doesn’t quite excel at creating separation from his defender on his own. He leans heavily on ball-screens to get going, and switching bigs can give him real trouble.

Passing

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For me, Nickel carries concerns despite standing 6’7”. His point-of-attack defense looked borderline non-existent, and I say “non-existent”, mainly because Vanderbilt either hid him low or matched him onto another movement shooter, and for good reason. At the NBA level, holding up at the point of attack is important, since teams will drag weak defenders into actions and make them guard. He isn’t the most explosive athlete and struggles laterally at times. His size does help in a low-man role, where he protects the rim reasonably well and does a good job getting as vertical as possible. He reminds me a bit of Dalton Knecht in terms of size, though I’d argue Nickel grades out as the better off-ball defender as a low man and a chaser. He clearly competes hard and stays attentive boxing out his man well, even if his defensive rebound% says otherwise. In the SEC title game against Arkansas, Vanderbilt played him off Billy Richmond to bait his shooting, and Richmond simply out-athleticized him. That’s the part that worries me most heading to a league filled with elite athletes, can he keep up with them defensively? If he can, he not only has a future in a similar defensive role, but can stick in the league.

Prospect data via: The 5th Factor a site developed by David Lee

Offensive Takeaways

Three Point Shooting

Diawara’s offensive outlook and playability hinges largely on his shooting, given that he primarily plays the forward position. He arrived as a fairly unreliable shooter, though his free-throw mechanics looked workable. From 2021 to 2024, he played 38 games for Paris Basket in Betclic Élite, attempting just 33 threes and making 8, this is less than one three-point attempt per game over that span. That changed once he began to play with Cholet Basket, where he attempted 71 threes across 27 games, making 22 of them for 31% — not anything to be excited about, but a meaningful step in the right direction early in his career.

With New York, Diawara made 48 threes out of 130 attempts (37%). The larger subplot, and the more important context, lies in how opposing teams chose to defend him. Across 838 non-garbage-time possessions, a center defended Diawara on 97 of them, on top of the times teams simply ignored him on the perimeter entirely. So I went through every single one of his threes and uncovered something genuinely interesting. He shot 29-for-80 (36%) on open threes and 6-for-17 (36%) whenever a center sagged off him. Compare that to his numbers when defenders contested lightly, he shot 19-for-47 (40%), and 39% whenever teams defended traditionally. That stood out to me, given that the majority and myself included, assumed his shooting looked strong largely because he got so many open looks. NBA.com’s tracking will say that over 100 of his threes were wide open (defender six-plus feet away), which simply doesn’t make sense. Watch even 30 of his threes and you’ll see shots that are lightly contested.

So, watching the film, I no longer believe the contested-shot argument holds much weight. It’s more about confidence in the moments he’s left completely open, along with natural variance, both things that can improve with more reps and comfort. Why does his shooting matter so much? Simply put, the Knicks need him to be enough of a threat to open up plays like the one above. He sits weak-side in this pick-and-roll, and the Pelicans play high coverage on Brunson, the handler. Both weak-side defenders tag Hukporti’s roll, allowing Brunson to spray the ball out and gives both Bridges and Diawara a chance to make a play on the perimeter.

Part of the reason Diawara struggled to stay on the floor was that teams sat in gaps, tagged and sent hard help weak-side, and put their center on him to sag off, exactly what we saw in the Phoenix Suns clip. In this video, both Diawara and Mitchell Robinson share the floor, with Robinson sitting in the dunker spot and Jarrett Allen acting as the primary low man. That doesn’t matter, as Diawara’s defender becomes an extra weak-side help man, rotating extremely early to tag Landry Shamet’s pop or help Brunson’s drive, as Brunson looks to attack Sam Merrill. That’s how a lack of shooting, real or perceived by opponents, can ripple out and impact everyone else on the floor. The NBA shows no mercy, especially come playoff time, and nobody gets to hide. The best opposing coaches will find and magnify even the smallest weaknesses. Next time a defense tries this against him, the goal is for Diawara to make the shot, he has to build the reputation of a reliable shooter.

Not that it carries much weight for this season, but Diawara made just 5 of 18 pull-up threes. That shot remains a work in progress for someone who’s only taken on real three-point volume over the last two years. I still like the mechanics, there’s no slow load or release, and the trigger fires rather quickly. My only note is that the release sits a touch out in front, similar to how Mikal Bridges shot it early in his career, before making the well-documented adjustment we all know about. I’m not saying Diawara needs to make that same change, but the resemblance, long wingspan included, brings early Bridges mechanics to mind.

Malleable in the System

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2nd Apron and Cap stuff

I don’t pretend to know every intricacy of the second apron or the salary cap, but I do have a basic understanding of what New York faces on the cap front. For those unfamiliar, the second apron carries numerous restrictive penalties, teams typically look to avoid it entirely, or dip in briefly while contending before working their way back out.

The Knicks have just above $16.5 million in second apron space. That number matters given the players set to hit the market or those entering restricted free agency, notably Mohamed Diawara. So, before I answer questions, here are my own questions worth considering this offseason on the current roster when it comes to the second apron:

• How much of that space does Robinson eat up if the Knicks want to stay below it? Is that even possible?

• Does Diawara draw “real money” offers, and does that force New York’s hand?

• What does Landry Shamet want in a new contract?

• Does Jose Alvarado decline or accept his upcoming player option?

• What does the future hold for Ariel Hukporti and the rest of the 2024 draft class (Kevin McCullar, Pacome Dadiet, and Tyler Kolek)?

• Do the Knicks ultimately dip into the second apron?

I can’t answer these definitively, but I want to establish a general understanding of the situation New York faces this summer. Every team’s offseason looks different, these are the big questions shaping theirs.

How hopeful are you that the James Dolan apron comments are just him not being aware of how the penalties work/do you think if he doesn’t know and find out would he pay any bill required?

The recent Dolan quote:

Is Dolan saying the Knicks won’t go into the second apron next season? I don’t believe he is, he explicitly says later in the video that the “decision ultimately falls to Leon Rose.” But framing the second apron the way he did leaves me with two possible scenarios: Like you said, he’s either not fully tuned in to where the Knicks sit in their contention window, given they haven’t crossed the second apron yet, or the decision-makers genuinely believe the best path forward involves staying flexible by remaining below it at all times.

I’m hopeful it’s the former…

Any realistic way the Knicks can stay under the 2nd apron and be contenders?

In short — yes, the Knicks can absolutely contend while staying under the second apron, whether that means losing Mitchell Robinson, Landry Shamet, or both. I suspect this question stems from James Dolan’s recent comments on the radio. New York has the starting lineup intact along with Miles McBride, and potentially Jose Alvarado. They can make other moves as well, but that’s a very good seven to start out with as a team under the 2nd apron. In the end, what the Knicks have going for them this summer is continuity in their starting lineup. I’m not sure about anyone else, but it gives me a sense of ease regardless of what happens outside of that.

How serious do you think the Knicks are in staying under the 2nd apron and if they are serious, what moves could we possibly see?

I’d like to believe they want to go over it and capitalize on the current contention window with all starters practically in the primes of their career, why not go over the second apron for a year or two? If they go below the second apron, let’s say they lose Mitchell Robinson. They’d have to replace him either in the draft, free agency or trade, as well as acquire basic depth…We will get into more detail in other questions.

Notable Free Agents and Trade Targets

Any free agent or trade target the Knicks pursue will likely hinge on whether they choose to go above or below the second apron. If they go above it, they’re unlikely to chase anyone. If they stay below it and lose some pieces along the way, this decision could matter a great deal more.

If the Knicks lose Mitchell Robinson, what bigs in the draft or free agency would you most want to replace him with?

I’ll answer this question with the first part set aside for now, we’ll get to the draft section shortly. I’ll also add the word “trade” into the sentence. If the Knicks lose Mitchell Robinson, there are a few options on the table, but two names consistently stick out to me:

Day’Ron Sharpe

When you talk about a player who can replace him in some areas while offering more in others, Day’Ron Sharpe comes to mind. The only catch is having to pay him at the end of next season too, since he’d essentially be a one-year rental.

Among centers, he ranks in the 100th percentile in deflections per 100 and the 99th percentile in forced turnovers per 100. He also sits in the 92nd percentile in teammate missed offensive rebound percentage (TeamMiss%) and the 99th percentile in offensive rebound quality. He’s on the shorter side for a center at 6’9”-6’10”, doesn’t protect the rim particularly well, and fouls often, landing in the 5th percentile in relative personal fouls, yet still posts a +1.2 defensive DPM, a 1.6 DDARKO, and ranks in the 88th percentile in defensive EPM.

What appeals to me most is his passing skill. Having played in Jordi Fernandez’s offense, which carries concepts that shadow Brown’s system, Sharpe’s transition to a more talented roster should come extremely smooth. Fernandez tapped into that passing ability, helping Sharpe boost his potential assists per 100 from 7.9 last season to 10.2 this year, good for the 89th percentile. The strange problem with Sharpe is that while he passes well and avoids live-ball turnovers on passes (66th percentile), his non-pass turnovers rank in just the 9th percentile.

Goga Bitadze

Both Bitadze and Sharpe I’ve talked about for quite some time. They’re great offensive rebounders that defend leading to high impact outputs as back up, or medially used centers with low contractual obligations. Bitadze posts a 98th percentile offensive rebounding quality, with 85th percentile TeamMiss%. Unlike Sharpe he’s an excellent rim protecter with a -10% difference in FG% at the rim good for 79th percentile and a 6.5 block percentage in a 97th percentile. He’s also not much of a passer on offense, but rather an efficient roll-man and cutter. I believe he does have a level of touch stemming from how well he can finish, so I would have confidence in him fitting into Brown’s system.

How can New York execute both deals?

The Knicks currently carry extra salary in Tyler Kolek and Pacome Dadiet. Pairing those two together, and potentially staying under the second apron gives New York room to take on additional salary. With both Bitadze and Sharpe as rentals, I’d be surprised if either team demands a first-round pick of any kind. I project that a package of a couple second-rounders with the two players could land the Knicks a solid backup big in the form of either one.

What vet min guys are on your radar?

I wouldn’t mind seeing Jordan Clarkson return as I’ve grown to respect him. The in-season transformation at 34 years old, he’s not driven by ego, which allowed the Knicks to make the necessary adjustments with him and the rest of the bench all year. He knows what to expect from Mike Brown and already has chemistry with the core roster, which makes him an option I’d always consider and be down for.

I will throw out names in tiers. Unrestricted guys only, and no centers for the sake of talking about the second apron:

Safe Bets for Minimums

Mike Conley, Jordan McLaughlin, Aaron Holiday, Gabe Vincent, Cameron Payne - Veteran guard presence with regular season upside.

Bruce Brown Jr. - Energizer and handler reliving the days of 2023. New York has had a level of interest before, but he has not been the same player he once was…almost three years ago. He is 29 years old, and for a veteran minimum, might be worth another swing.

In limbo

Bones Hyland - versatile handler who plays with youth and energy. Hyland embodies what a regular-season player looks like. He can get buckets on his own, no doubt about that, but the rest of his game tends to be exposed under a playoff spotlight, his 16 minutes shrank to 11 once the postseason arrived. I’m curious how he gets valued coming off what was otherwise a revitalizing regular season.

Keon Ellis - He’s getting his own segment…

Matisse Thybulle - I still irrationally love the idea of Matisse Thybulle. The offense can get rough, and staying on the floor has been a challenge, I get that. But he’s the ultimate toolbox on defense. He’s Doctor Octopus out there, he’s got eight arms reaching in, causing chaos, making impossible plays look possible.

Javonte Green - Another player they’ve had interest in before. Shot his most threes of his career (3.0) and connected on 38% of them along with his disruptor style of defense.

The list is subject to change as the offseason goes on.

Any chance Keon Ellis signs a minimum deal with the Knicks? A year in NY could help him rebuild his value and set him up for a real payday in 2027.

Given what we’ve seen from him in Sacramento and Cleveland, I think there’s a real chance he lands a minimum deal. He’d make my list of guys worth taking a flyer on at the minimum. Ellis is limited by his inability to do much beyond defend and shoot threes. He offers little connectivity as a 6’4” guard, his passing numbers and ability to break down a defense are simply brutal. He ranks in the 1st percentile in box creation, the 5th percentile in assisted points per 75, and struggles making reads at the rim, sitting in the 6th percentile in rim assists per 100. He’s not generating enough offense for himself or others, whether attacking a closeout or driving (16th percentile in rim attempts per 75). As strong as he is defensively, bordering on great, he’s a black hole in every area that doesn’t involve a three-point shot.

Draft Notes

Not predictions of who we’ll pick (in the draft). I just wanna know your favorites and our current spots no trades.

Favorites in the draft for New York in tiers:

Tier 1: Time to pop more bottles/reaches

Ebuka Okorie - lead handler that pressures the rim heavy and doesn’t turn it over. One of the most underrated freshman players in the class.

Allen Graves - Projects as elite complimentary forward, and small ball big. Strong on the defensive end, racks up stocks with low turnover rates, and pulls down boards among the best.

Jayden Quaintance, Cameron Carr, Dailyn Swain and Labaron Philon

Tier includes prospects with high upside. All sit on the younger end, with the exception of Carr, who is nearly 22. Carr, Philon, Swain, and Okorie give the Knicks added ball-handling and athleticism, two areas of need. Graves and Quaintance both rank among my favorite front-court prospects, again offering plenty of upside.

Tier 2: Good picks in the range

Isaiah Evans - Elite, elite, elite shooter. Adds fun wing depth to what New York already has. Boarders on tier 1, however I have some concerns with his role in the NBA expanding further than a movement shooter. He did show solid growth throughout the season on drives and rim finishing.

Zuby Ejiofor, Joshua Jefferson, Christian Anderson, and Tarris Reed Jr.

Prospects in the projected draft range (24 to 31) that I like. I believe Christian Anderson would be an underrated acquisition for the Knicks. He spaces the floor with the best of them and can operate as an extra handler alongside Brunson, despite the size concerns — concerns I think this season has already debunked. Both Zuby and Reed rank among my favorite center prospects in this range. They’re older and on the shorter side, but NBA-ready and play with real ferocity. Jefferson has grown more appealing the more film I’ve watched on him, backed up by his strong analytical profile. He’s a legitimately sized wing with strong passing ability and real defensive chops, good enough to take a swing on even given his age (22).

Tier 3: Not my favorites, but I trust the front office

Sergio De Larrea - tall handler with a variety of offensive talent, potential draft-and-stash candidate…

Meleek Thomas, Koa Peat, Henri Veesaar, Karim Lopez, Chris Cenac Jr.

Veesaar and Cenac Jr. land in this tier as my less-favored big men compared to Reed and Zuby. Even if both carve out productive careers, my money is on Reed and Zuby over this pair. Cenac projects as too raw a prospect for me at 19 years old, he has a ton of work ahead of him despite possessing legitimate front-court size and athleticism. Veesaar’s offensive upside and translation to the NBA intrigue me far more, given his ability to stretch the floor and his strong touch. My concern with him lies on the defensive end, the risk of becoming a player like Quinten Post, who isn’t a bad player by any means, but leaves something to be desired defensively for a big who isn’t a star. It’s not my favorite type of big.

What would you say are the most important archetypes / roles for us to fill via the draft / FA? Assuming the starters, Miles Mcbride, Mitchell Robinson etc. are all back.

It would need to be some kind of creator if the Knicks retain everyone. New York managed without a bonafide one outside of Brunson for awhile, but the load on him isn’t going to get lighter. I wasn’t a big believer in needing another handler to win a championship, and I was right, but I do recognize the value of someone who can relieve pressure against playoff-caliber defenses. In a scenario where the Knicks go over the apron to re-sign Robinson, drafting a handler becomes the more realistic path. I wasn’t in favor of trading up in this draft given the depth of the talent pool, and adding multiple talent matters to me. But if the Knicks need an extra handler, trading down and grabbing someone like Labaron Philon or Ebuka Okorie would work just fine.

Fun

Would you trade Giannis for Josh Hart, Mikal Bridges, and a 1st rounder?

Money and asset-wise, this trade simply isn’t realistic. No, I would not pursue any Giannis trade. Gutting the roster after a championship isn’t worth it in my opinion. Giannis can land elsewhere, and the Knicks can beat him elsewhere with the same roster intact.

Assuming all the young guys are back, who do you envision having the biggest impact next season between Dadiet, Hukport, Diawara, and Kolek?

I doubt all of them stick around, but I would point to Tyler Kolek. If Alvarado leaves, Kolek likely takes over as the backup guard, and I do think there’s enough trust in Brown for him to handle those minutes. If Alvarado returns, that probably opens the door for Diawara and Dadiet to see some run in the rotation. I’d love to see Dadiet get a chance next season, just to find out what the Knicks actually have in a former first-round pick heading into Year 3.

For the Knicks, how would you balance/prioritize the various objectives of running it back, the 2nd apron, and developing guys like Kolek/Diawara/McCuller?

A good question to end on, and a fitting way to summarize my thoughts on a potential offseason heading into next year. I would 100% go over the second apron. There’s no better time in franchise history to do it. The Knicks just won a championship and have a core sitting in the prime of their careers, it’s time to push the chips in and run it back with this group for another year or two. As for development, we’ve already seen how Brown operates. He experiments constantly during the regular season to prepare for the postseason, and that includes carving out roles for guys on the roster. With a rookie likely joining the team alongside other young players, there should be room for meaningful minutes. This season proved as much, injuries forced several guys into larger roles regardless of plan. It’s a long season, and you need everyone, whether you’re in contention or not.

The Knicks can run one of the plays and adjust out of it based on the defense. If they run a STS action, it can turn into a Pinch Post play. If they run the Stagger action it can turn into a stack ball-screen.

It can morph into a lot of different actions. Stack Middle plays put up an elite mark of 1.29 PPP in 145 plays, due to that variation.