The doctrine of the Trinity, when properly understood according to the teaching of Sacred Scripture and as affirmed by the Council of Nicaea in the original Nicene Creed, affirms that God the Father alone is unbegotten. The other two Persons in the Godhead do not possess the divine nature of themselves but receive it from another. When we say that the Son eternally proceeds from the Father, this means that the Father eternally communicates the Divine nature to the Son, and the Son eternally receives it from the Father. This is denied by so-called “social trinitarians,” who instead hold that all three Persons are unbegotten and have distinct minds and wills. One such example is Dr. William Lane Craig, who has often voiced his positions on this openly. According to him, when Scripture speaks of our Lord as the “only begotten Son,” this is in reference to Christ’s human nature, not his divine nature.

According to WLC, the doctrine of divine procession is not found in the New Testament, as supported by what he claims is a consensus of scholars. Yet, I will show why this claim about the New Testament is entirely wrong. Sacred Scripture does, in fact, teach that the Son and the Spirit receive the Divine nature in eternity from another.

Clarifications

1. To be clear, Dr. WLC affirms the divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit, contrary to what many have accused him of by misunderstanding his position. When he denies that the Son is eternally begotten, he doesn’t mean that the Son is merely a creature, as Arius would, but that He is true God though without receiving the divine nature from the Father.

2. My intent in this article is not to engage the supposed scholarship which WLC claims supports his position.

3. This article is primarily meant to be theological, not polemical. Thus, my arguments will presuppose axioms which are rejected by Dr. Craig, such as divine simplicity, though the majority of my audience accepts them. Nevertheless, there will be one argument which does not even need to presuppose it, which I will give near the end.

Is this in Scripture?

Temporal Missions of the Divine Persons

First, we can briefly cite the passages which express the temporal missions of the Persons. For those who don’t know, the divine missions are those effects and actions outside of God and in time which Sacred Scripture attributes to the Divine Persons. For example:

“If God were your Father, you would love me, for I proceeded and came forth from God; I came not of my own accord, but he sent me.”

John 8:42

This is the most common example in Scripture i.e. the Incarnation, as St. Thomas explains:

“Thus the Son is said to be sent by the Father into the world, inasmuch as He began to exist visibly in the world by taking our nature.”

Summa Theologiae I, q. 43, a. 1, resp.

Traditionally, the temporal missions were interpreted by the Fathers and later theologians as analogizing the eternal processions, even if Scripture doesn’t explicitly state this. Just as the Son is sent by the Father in time, so does He eternally proceed from Him.

While these very clear and undeniable verses about the temporal processions do not immediately show Craig’s position about the eternal processions to be wrong, we can build a very probable argument for the doctrine of the divine processions since the former perfectly align with the latter, showing perfect congruity.

1. First, the Father is never temporally sent in Scripture, just as He is eternally unbegotten. Thus, on the one hand, the Father is said to dwell in believers with the Son, which is an invisible temporal mission.

   “If a man loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our home with him.”

   John 14:23

   Notice how the Father is not sent here. Yet, this divine mission of indwelling believers is also said to belong to the Holy Spirit by His being sent from God.

   “Because you are his children, God sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts.”

   Galatians 4:6

2. Second, the Son is only said to be temporally sent by the Father and never by the Spirit, just as He eternally proceeds from the Father alone. We have already quoted this above, though here is another example.

   “For I have come down from heaven, not to do my own will but the will of him who sent me.”

   John 6:38

3. Third, the Holy Spirit is sent by the Father and the Son, just as He eternally proceeds from both. For example, Jesus affirms the temporal sending of the Spirit from the Father and Himself in John 15:26,

   “But when the Counselor comes, whom I shall send to you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father, he will bear witness to me.”

   John 15:26

Again, notice how perfectly well the temporal missions, traditionally understood as analogies of the eternal processions, actually align with such a doctrine. Yet, so far we have only given probable arguments. Is there any support for the divine processions which goes beyond probable arguments into the realm of demonstrative proofs? Yes.

Verses Which Prove Eternal Processions

First, we may start with John 5:26, which reads:

“For as the Father has life in Himself, so he has granted the Son also to have life in himself.”

John 5:26

Since the Father did not become incarnate, the “life” which He “has in Himself” is not a natural life but divine existence itself, which He has given to the Son. This already suffices to disprove Dr. Craig’s doctrine, not presupposing divine simplicity, since it affirms that the Son receives His existence from the Father. Yet, we can take it even further, since the divine nature is identical to God’s existence. Thus, this verse also teaches that the Son receives the divine nature from the Father, which is contrary to Dr. Craig’s social trinitarianism.

Second, we may quote from John 16:

“When the Spirit of truth comes… He will declare to you the things that are to come. He will glorify me, for He will take what is mine and declare it to you. All that the Father has is mine; therefore I said that He will take what is mine and declare it to you.”

John 16:13-15

Since part of the knowledge which the Spirit will declare to the Apostles is “the things that are to come,” this denotes divine knowledge. Either the Spirit always had such knowledge of future things in eternity, or He is not divine. Furthermore, Christ asserts that the Spirit “hears” and “takes” this knowledge from Him. Since God is simple and this knowledge is identical to the divine essence, then this passage teaches that the Spirit receives, not just the divine knowledge, but the divine nature from the Father and the Son, which is denied by Dr. Craig.

What if this wasn’t in Scripture?

Let’s say these verses were not in Scripture, could we still prove the doctrine of processions? Yes, though through theological reason, resting on the minor premise from natural reason that God is perfectly simple. As I said, this is denied by Dr. Craig, but I am presupposing it for this article.

First, Scripture explicitly teaches that the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are God. There are three Persons in God. This is already affirmed by Dr. Craig. Next, as St. Thomas says, following the words of St. Hilary:

“If there were two unbegotten, one of them would not be from the other; and thus they would not be distinguished by relative opposition, therefore they must be distinguished by diversity of nature.”

Summa Theologiae I, q. 33, a. 4, ad. 4.

The reasoning given here is quite simple, and is repeated constantly by the Thomistic commentators. If the Persons are going to be really distinct and not just nominally so, they must be distinguished in some manner. This must lie in the manner in which they receive the same nature, since otherwise they would be distinguished in the nature itself, which would be polytheism. As Fr. Matthias Scheeben explains:

“Therefore only one person can originally possess the nature of Himself; the two others must receive it from Him, and the Third Person, indeed, must receive it in a manner different from that of the Second; which would not be the case if He received the nature from the First Person alone, as does the Second; and so the Third Person receives it from both the First and the Second Person. Therefore the persons are not absolute, but relative persons; that is, the characteristic of the personality of each consists in the fact that each possesses the nature only in relation to the others, and consequently in common with them.”

Mysteries of Christianity, § 9, pp. 49.

Martin Chemnitz was a prominent Lutheran reformer in the second generation of the Reformation, often referred to as the “second Martin.” His most famous work is his Examination of the Council of Trent, an extensive attempt to refute the Council of Trent on every topic which divides Catholics and Lutherans. I have interacted with Chemnitz plenty of times in previous work by addressing two or three objections from him, though this article will be entirely devoted to reviewing and responding to his treatment on unwritten traditions. This section of Chemnitz’s work is often praised by modern Protestant apologists for what they claim is a good refutation of the Catholic notion of Sacred Tradition.

As I have consistently found with Martin Chemnitz, however, his citations of the Fathers tend to be misused, either in quoting them out of context, so that they do not even say what he claims they say, or quoting them and claiming it contradicts Catholic teaching, even though he is only misunderstanding what the Catholic position even is. As I will show in this video, he does both throughout his section on traditions.

First, I will begin by stating something positive about the work. Chemnitz and other Protestants are correct to point out that the word tradition can and is often used with different definitions, so Catholics should be careful to not equivocate on the word. For example, in 2 Thessalonians 3:6, St. Paul says:

“Now we command you, brethren, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you keep away from any brother who is living in idleness and not in accord with the tradition that you received from us.”

2 Thessalonians 3:6

St. Paul then goes on to recall his moral example, which he handed down (tradere). This is not relevant to the divide between Catholics and Protestants, so Catholics would do well to not quote these just because they mention the word “tradition.” Similarly, it is entirely true that the Fathers do not use the word tradition in the same sense every time. Chemnitz is entirely correct about this.

Unfortunately, what Chemnitz accuses us of is precisely what he himself is guilty of since, as we will see in the last kind of tradition, which he defines as those which cannot be proven from Scripture, he uses examples of certain claims of unwritten traditions, many of which are spurious and untrustworthy, as if these are the same kinds of traditions Catholics hold as authentic.

Before we begin, it would be important to explain the reason for why Catholic’s defend the existence of unwritten tradition. It’s true that there is no necessity to hold a priori that there must be revelation outside of Scripture (unwritten divine tradition) in the form of unwritten tradition, nor, against the Protestants, is there any reason that binds us to hold as an a priori principle that all of revelation will be in Scripture. As Franzelin says:

“The Holy Spirit could have so directed everything, that the complete body of the whole doctrine would be constituted even without the writer’s knowledge and in addition to their plan, but it can be shown by no argument that this happened thus, unless it were now supposed, what is in question, that God willed that the Scripture should be a unique font or at least a complete codex, from which the complete revelation must be recognized.”

On Divine Tradition, thesis 7.

Scripture could have certainly asserted such sufficiency about itself as a complete canon, but it certainly does not do so; at most, it asserts that every Scripture is sufficient for teaching and the perfection of good works (2 Tim 3:15ff), but it says nothing about its coverage of the full deposit of faith. Whether or not there are unwritten traditions belonging to divine revelation is to be assessed posteriorly. We receive the faith from the organ divinely ordained by God to transmit divine revelation authentically, and only then can we judge whether or not all of what we believe can be concluded from Scripture or not.

Cardinal Franzelin explains:

“That question is put to a second consideration, as it were, concerning another matter, namely how those things were preserved and propagated even unto us. Chiefly and primarily, it can be asked of the principle itself, whether Christ did indeed establish another mode, another organ apart from the Scriptures in which doctrine and decrees are conserved and propagated which were revealed by himself or revealed by the Holy Spirit through the Apostles just as safely… Where this will have been so proved it will be certain in itself, that all truths which were transmitted to us as revelation by this mode and this divinely established organ are the word of God.”

On Divine Tradition, thesis 3.

First Kind of Tradition

These simply pertain to what was also handed down in Scripture with the same words. Andrada says:

“It is most frequent to call the Sacrament of Baptism in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and other mysteries of faith of this sort, handed down in letters by the Apostles, most holy traditions. Concerning these, certainly, neither the Council of Trent nor the theologians are treating when they distinguish them from the Sacred Letters.”

Defensio Tridentinae Fidei Catholicae et Integerrimae, bk. 2, § 31.

Yet, we can address a quote from St. Basil which Chemnitz seems to imply is opposed to the Catholic view of Sacred Tradition because he seems to reject what is “unwritten” as belonging to faith. I don’t think that’s what St. Basil is really saying here. I think that, just as Catholics can learn that the Catholic notion of tradition is not intended every time the word “tradition” is used by the Fathers or Scripture, so also should Protestants be careful to not assume that the apparent rejection of what is “not written” is a rejection of traditions not contained in Scripture. In response to the Catholic theologian Lidanus, Chemnitz quotes St. Basil as saying the following:

“If the Lord is faithful in all He says, it is clearly a falling from faith and a sin of pride either to reject anything of the things that are written or to add anything unwritten.”

De fide, n. 1 (PG 31, 680).

Obviously, this is quoted with the implication that it denies any and all unwritten tradition. Yet, in context, this is what St. Basil is doing:

1. First, he says that different terms not found in Scripture can be used to express the faith in an orthodox sense, but that he will refrain from that for now and only use Biblical language.

   “As long as it was necessary to contend against the heresies that from time to time arose, I considered it appropriate… to employ at one time one form of expression and at another another, as the need of those who were spiritually diseased required. These expressions were often indeed unwritten, yet nevertheless not alien to the pious understanding that accords with Scripture, since the Apostle himself did not refuse to employ even Greek expressions for his own purpose. But now, for the common purpose shared by us and by you, I have judged it fitting to… declare what I have been taught from the God-inspired Scripture [and] refrain even from those names and expressions which, although not found in the very wording of the divine Scripture, nevertheless preserve the same meaning that lies within the Scripture.”

   De fide, n. 1 (PG 31, 677).

2. Next, St. Basil explains and rejects the expressions and words which are not only outside Scripture but also contrary to it.

   “But whatever expressions, besides introducing language foreign to Scripture, also introduce a meaning foreign to us, and which cannot be found proclaimed by the saints—these I entirely reject as strange and alien to the pious faith.”

   De fide, n. 1 (PG 31, 677).

3. It’s immediately after this that he says what Lidanus and Chemnitz cite. What he is rejecting is that faith properly assents to propositions with not only unwritten terms, but contrary terms. This is obvious since faith is assent on the basis of God revealing and thus cannot exist unless it is assenting to something God has actually revealed. In other words, something false cannot fall under faith. St. Basil says:

   “Faith, then, is an unhesitating assent to what has been heard, in the full assurance of the truth of what has been proclaimed by the grace of God… And if ‘The Lord is faithful in all His words,’ and ‘All His commandments are faithful, established forever and ever,’ then it is a manifest falling away from the faith and a charge of pride either to set aside anything that has been written or to introduce anything that has not been written.”

   De fide, n. 1 (PG 31, 680).

Thus, we see that St. Basil’s intention is not to affirm that there are no unwritten traditions.

Second Kind of Tradition

The second kind of tradition which Chemnitz claims to accept is the Biblical canon. He says:

“This tradition, by which the books of the Holy Scripture are given into our hands, we receive reverently; but this does not support the papalists, who are fighting for dogmas which cannot be proved by any testimony of Scripture. For by this tradition the church confesses that it is bound to that voice of doctrine which sounds forth in the Scripture, and when it passes on this tradition, it teaches that posterity also is bound to the Scripture.”

Examination of the Council of Trent, vol. 1, Second Topic, Section II, n. 2.

This is an odd assertion since, even though he denies that such is the case, it’s plainly obvious that the inspiration of most books cannot be proven from Scripture. As we will see, Chemnitz rejects in the eighth kind of tradition those which “cannot be proved by any testimony of Scripture.” Well, that Matthew, Mark, Luke, John, 2 Peter, the epistle of St. Jude, Esther, and many other books are inspired would absolutely fall into this category of “cannot be proved by any testimony of Scripture.” For example, that 2 Peter is inspired cannot be proven from Scripture from a formal testimony or a virtual conclusion. Nevertheless, this is not contradictory since Protestants affirm this testimony of the Church on the canon is not what obliges to divine faith anyway.

Thus, Chemnitz unfortunately butchers the meaning of St. Augustine when he famously said:

“In fact I would not believe the gospel if the authority of the Catholic Church did not move me.”

Against the Epistle of Manichaeus, 5 (6) (PL 42, 176).

I have written an article on this saying of St. Augustine where I go over the way classical Lutherans, Reformed, and Anglicans tried to reinterpret what he is saying. In it, I show that St. Augustine’s epistemology was precisely Catholic by citing from the full section of the work, as well as from other works where St. Augustine argues similarly against the Manichaeans. Nevertheless, I can directly address Chemnitz’s arguments here.

Chemnitz claims that all St. Augustine means is the following:

“By the witness of the church, therefore, he was moved to read the Gospel and to believe that the divinely revealed doctrine is contained in it.”

Examination of the Council of Trent, vol. 1, Second Topic, Section II, n. 2.

For most of the prominent Protestants divines — such as William Whitaker, Johann Gerhard, Girolamo Zanchi, Robert Baron, to name a few — the Church introduces one to Scripture, but when it comes to having divine faith in the fact that this or that book is inspired by God, this is only achieved by recognizing the internal marks of Scripture and its external efficacy. I also have an article on that Protestant view, which was extremely common among the Reformed, Lutherans, and Anglicans. Anyway, this was their way of reading and reinterpreting St. Augustine — that he only meant that the Church moved him to read Scripture, after which he recognized its inspiration from itself. The thing is, as I demonstrate in my article on this (linked above), St. Augustine’s epistemology is precisely what the Catholic Church claims for herself. First, note that for St. Augustine, the Church is not, like for the Lutherans, wherever the sacraments are being properly administered and where the Gospel is being rightly preached. He explicitly denies this, saying you could have all of these — you could even have the faith of the life giving Trinity — and this is not enough to be the Catholic Church:

“Outside the Catholic Church one can have everything except salvation: one can have honor, one can have sacraments, one can sing alleluia, one can respond amen, one can hold the Gospel, one can have and preach faith in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit – but nowhere except in the Catholic Church can one find salvation.”

Sermon to the People of Caesarea, n. 6 (CSEL 53, 174-75).

So when he says “the Catholic Church,” he means a visible, institutionally-bound Church. With regards to his epistemology, he begins by listing the motives of credibility, even prior to speaking about Scripture, of which he says:

“But with you [Manichaeans], where there is none of these [motives of credibility] to attract or keep me, the promise of truth is the only thing that comes into play. Now if the truth is so clearly proved as to leave no possibility of doubt, it must be set before all the things that keep me in the Catholic Church; but if there is only a promise without any fulfillment, no one shall move me from the faith which binds my mind with ties so many and so strong to the Christian religion.”

Against the Epistle of Manichaeus, ch. 4 (5) (PL 42, 175).

Notice that the motives of credibility for the Catholic Church are sufficient to bind his mind to a firm and immoveable assent. Next, when he explains why he receives the Acts of the Apostles, he does not say it’s because of its internal criteria, or because the Catholic Church merely introduced it to him, but because he “must” believe it if he is to accept the Gospel:

“And who the successor of Judas was we read in the Acts of the Apostles; which book I must needs believe if I believe the gospel, since both writings alike Catholic authority commends to me.”

Against the Epistle of Manichaeus, ch. 5 (6) (PL 42, 177).

Next, Chemnitz asks:

“But does he, after he has come to faith in the Gospel, promise that he would believe the church more than the Gospel if the church should decree or teach something which is either against the Gospel or which cannot be proved by any testimony of Scripture? This certainly he does not say.”

Examination of the Council of Trent, vol. 1, Second Topic, Section II, n. 2.

Obviously, we don’t believe the Church can ever oppose Scripture. Regardless, St. Augustine did affirm the infallibility of the whole Church, and he certainly affirms that she can bind to the assent of faith to things which cannot be proven from Scripture. First, regarding his own interpretation and understanding of Scripture, St. Augustine affirms that it is bound by the faith he receives from the Church. He says:

“Heresies arise when good Scriptures are not rightly understood, and when that in them which is not rightly understood is rashly and boldly asserted. And so, dearly beloved, we ought to… hold this rule of soundness: that we rejoice as in food in that which we have been able to understand, according to the faith with which we are imbued; and what we have not yet been able to understand, that we lay aside doubting, and defer the understanding of it for a time; that is, even if we do not yet know what it is, that still we doubt not in the least that it is good and true… Also from me… far be vain presumption, if my conversation would be sound in the house of God, which is the Church of the living God, the pillar and foundation of the truth.”

Tractate 18 on John, n. 1 (PL 35, 1536).

He also writes that the plain passages of Scripture and the Church’s doctrine are the rule of faith from which no man can depart when interpreting Scripture:

“Let it be permitted to anyone, indeed, to disclose in whatever other way—provided it be according to the rule of faith—all the other things concerning the prophet Jonah which are veiled in mysteries.”
Letter 102, n. 37 (PL 33, 385).

“When we perceive something in Scripture that the writer perhaps did not mean, we nevertheless ought not to perceive what would depart from the rule of faith.”
Sermon 107, n. 3 (PL 38, 63-64).

[But where does this rule of faith come from?]

“When, therefore, careful attention shows that it is uncertain how the text should be punctuated or pronounced, one should consult the rule of faith, which he has received from the clearer passages of Scripture and from the authority of the Church.”
On Christian Doctrine, bk. 3, ch. 2 (PL 34, 65-66).

Not only did St. Augustine hold that the Church’s doctrines are the rule and standard over the interpretation of Scripture, but he affirms there are dogmas which cannot be proven from Scripture which nevertheless belong to faith because the universal Church teaches them, such as the validity of infant baptism. For more on St. Augustine’s teaching on the rule of faith, check out this article.

Chemnitz then claim that St. Augustine attributes his rejection of Manichaeus is due to his name not being found in Scripture:

“In that same place he says that because he believes the Gospel, he cannot believe Manichaeus, because he does not read anything there about the apostleship of Manichaeus.”

Examination of the Council of Trent, vol. 1, Second Topic, Section II, n. 2.

This is true, but Chemnitz seems to imply that this negates the Church as a rule of faith. St. Augustine does say:

“But far be it that I should not believe the gospel; for believing it, I find no way of believing you too. For the names of the apostles, as there recorded, do not include the name of Manichæus. And who the successor of Judas was we read in the Acts of the Apostles; which book I must needs believe if I believe the gospel, since both writings alike Catholic authority commends to me. The same book contains the well-known narrative of the calling and apostleship of Paul. Read me now, if you can, in the gospel where Manichæus is called an apostle, or in any other book in which I have professed to believe.”

Against the Epistle of Manichaeus, ch. 5 (6) (PL 42, 177).

Nevertheless, he also says that he, as an a priori judgement, rejects Manichaeus because the Catholic Church rejects him. Here is the full quote.

“I do not believe Manichæus to be an apostle of Christ… Perhaps you will read the gospel to me, and will attempt to find there a testimony to Manichæus. But should you meet with a person not yet believing the gospel, how would you reply to him were he to say, I do not believe? For my part, I should not believe the gospel except as moved by the authority of the Catholic Church. So when those on whose authority I have consented to believe in the gospel tell me not to believe in Manichæus, how can I but consent? Take your choice. If you say, Believe the Catholics: their advice to me is to put no faith in you; so that, believing them, I am precluded from believing you;—If you say, Do not believe the Catholics: you cannot fairly use the gospel in bringing me to faith in Manichæus; since I believed the gospel because the Catholics preached it. To convince me, then, you must put aside the gospel. If you keep to the gospel, I will keep to those who commanded me to believe the gospel; and, in obedience to them, I will not believe you at all.”

Against the Epistle of Manichaeus, ch. 5 (6) (PL 42, 176).

Obviously, the Church and Scripture are both operating here as a rule of faith. I recommend people read the first several chapters of this work to clearly see that Protestants have so often twisted and misinterpreted the words of St. Augustine. Please, go read this work yourself, or at least the first few sections.

Chemnitz then addresses the common objection which accuses the Protestants of arbitrariness in accepting the canon from the early Church but not other traditions. Chemnitz responds:

“There is a very great difference between the primitive church, which was at the time of the apostles and of apostolic men testifying with regard to the books of Holy Scripture, and the papal church, which is foisting its fictions as apostolic traditions on us without proof. Where the fathers describe this tradition concerning the books of the Scripture, they prove it from the testimonies of the primitive church. If they had done the same thing with an equal degree of certainty also with regard to other traditions of which they make mention somewhere, then it would indeed be true that they should be received with the same right.”

Examination of the Council of Trent, vol. 1, Second Topic, Section II, n. 3.

It’s clear here that Chemnitz’s view of tradition, which is common to how Dr. Gavin Ortlund argues, is different than the Catholic view. For Catholics, the consensus of the Church on faith at any age is a certain sign of authentic tradition, even if in a previous age there were doubts or disagreements. Thus, St. Augustine says:

“They speak disparagingly of us, we can bear it; let them not disparage the rule of faith, not disparage the truth; let them not speak against holy Church… Someone who goes wrong in the discussion of other questions that have not been thoroughly canvassed, not yet firmly settled by the Church’s full authority, is to be tolerated. Error in that case is to be tolerated; it should not go so far, though, as to strive to shake the very foundation of the Church.”

Sermon 294, 21 (20) (PL 38, 1348).

For Chemnitz, his appeal to tradition aims at achieving a kind of historical probability that the canon attested to in the second and third century is the canon of the Apostles. Yet, this does not work. It’s quite obvious that there were many opinions in the early Church, such as Christ being older than He really was, millennialism, and even the claim that the Apostles instituted the Lenten fast — which were claimed to belong to apostolic tradition. Protestants need to provide a reason for why the canon tradition is a priori reliable and trustworthy. Practically, this also doesn’t work since the early Church often doubted the inspiration of Esther, 2 Peter, Jude, Hebrews, and more books which Protestants now accept.

If I may digress for a second, this critique can be made more even for the Reformed. Consider the view of the Reformed Puritan Richard Baxter. He says:

“The Tradition of infallible Church History telleth us, which Books they are which were written by men inspired by the Holy Ghost.

[A little later, he says]:

If we should err about the authority of a particular Book, it would not overthrow our Faith. It is not necessary to salvation, to believe this particular Text to be Divine.”
Cases of Conscience, q. 148.

Ok, well, it is common Reformed doctrine that the universal Church may err on matters which do not pertain to salvation. Thus, if knowing that a particular text is inspired is not essential to salvation, then why, according to Baxter himself, is the Church infallible regarding its canon?

Finally, some Protestants say that just because we impose the necessity of the Church as a rule of faith for believing in the canon, this does not immediately bring us to the Catholic Church, since others like Eastern Orthodoxy also claim infallibility for themselves.

Yet, Catholics do not make this claim, which is just inserted by Dr. Cooper. Obviously, we are doing a general apologetic against Sola Scriptura; we don’t think this excludes all other options.

Third Kind of Tradition

The third kind of tradition pertains to symbols or creeds handed down by the Church. Chemnitz claims that the reason that men like Tertullian appeals to these against the heretics is simply due to his proximity to the Apostles granting historical certainty.

“And because at that time the truth of apostolic teaching and of the Christian faith flourished chiefly in those churches which had been founded by apostles, so that they still faithfully kept and preserved the true stock for propagating the religion, therefore it was certainly most appropriate to consider the order and agreement of these churches in the doctrine.”

Examination of the Council of Trent, vol. 1, Second Topic, Section III, n. 7.

Yet, what Chemnitz does not quote is that Tertullian’s appeal to the tradition of the Church goes beyond mere historical proximity to the Apostles. He actually does appeal to the infallibility of the Church by referencing the often cited Bible verse by Catholics: that the Spirit of truth will lead the Church into all truth.

“Come now – suppose that all were mistaken; suppose the Apostle was deceived in giving testimony to certain things; suppose the Holy Spirit had no regard to guide [the Church] into truth – though He was sent by Christ for this very purpose, and was requested of the Father to be the teacher of truth; suppose the steward of God, the vicar of Christ, neglected his duty, allowing the Churches meanwhile to understand and believe differently from what he himself proclaimed through the Apostles – is it really believable that so many, and such great ones, could all have erred into one and the same faith? Among many events, the outcome is not the same: if there had been error in the Churches’ doctrine, variation ought to have appeared. But that which is found to be one and the same among many is not error, but tradition.”

Prescription Against Heretics, n. 28 (PL 2, 40AB).

His logic here is great. He is certainly making a historical argument, but he is doing so by setting aside what he takes for granted: that the Church will have the truth because of the Spirit of truth.

This is reflected earlier when Tertullian takes the doctrine of the Church as an a priori correct rule for interpreting Scripture:

“But even if a discussion from the Scriptures should not turn out in such a way as to place both sides (us and heretics) on a par, (yet) the natural order of things would require that this point should be first proposed, which is now the only one which we must discuss: ‘With whom lies that very faith to which the Scriptures belong. From what and through whom, and when, and to whom, has been handed down that rule, by which men become Christians?’ For wherever it shall be manifest that the true Christian rule and faith shall be, there will likewise be the true Scriptures and expositions thereof, and all the Christian traditions.”

Prescription Against Heretics, n. 19 (PL 2, 31).

Then, Chemnitz addresses this famous quote from St. Irenaeus:

“For how should it be if the apostles had not left us writings? Would it not be necessary, [in that case,] to follow the course of the tradition which they handed down to those to whom they did commit the Churches? To which course many nations of those barbarians who believe in Christ do assent, having salvation written in their hearts by the Spirit, without paper or ink [...] Those who, in the absence of written documents, have believed this faith, are barbarians, so far as regards our language; but as regards doctrine, manner, and tenor of life, they are, because of faith, very wise indeed; and they do please God, ordering their conversation in all righteousness, chastity, and wisdom."
Against Heresies, bk. 3, ch. 4, n. 1-2 (PG 7, 855-56).

Chemnitz claims however that this does not challenge Protestants since St. Irenaeus does not list any “tradition” which cannot be proven from Scripture:

“They both enumerate the points which they prove from tradition; they are the very articles of faith which make up the Apostles’ Creed. There is no doubt that these are taught in the Scripture in many clear passages. Therefore they do not bring forward or prove any other dogma of faith from tradition beside those which are contained in the Scripture; but they set forth and prove also from tradition those very same dogmas which are found in the Scripture.”

Examination of the Council of Trent, vol. 1, Second Topic, Section III, n. 9.

Yet, this doesn’t work for two reasons. First, just because St. Irenaeus doesn’t list dogmas not found in Scripture, this does not mean he denied the existence of such traditions. In fact, in the full quote, he lists the oneness of God and his authorship over creation, the Incarnation, Christ’s death and resurrection, and the final judgement; he does not list baptism, the Eucharist, Christ’s ascension, and more, so he is clearly not trying exhaustively list all dogmas.

Furthermore, St. Irenaeus never mentions or hints that this is due to his historical proximity to the apostolic age, yet says that tradition suffices for men to assent and believe. If he admits Scripture could be dispensed with and the Church’s doctrinal paradigm can continue, then could he really hold it as the only rule of faith?

Fourth Kind of Tradition

This fourth type of tradition concerns those which, though called a “tradition” by the Fathers, is only an interpretive tradition i.e. it is handing down an interpretation of Scripture, not something really distinct from it which cannot be proven from it. That the fathers sometimes call certain interpretations traditions is conceded, but this does not help his point. As quoted above in St. Augustine and Tertullian, many Fathers explicitly say that the Church’s doctrine is a rule of faith by which Scripture must be interpreted. In many cases, these Fathers seem to deny the right of private judgement to believers and demand that they simply believe according to the Church’s tradition, which contradicts Sola Scriptura since it makes the Church the rule of interpreting Scripture.

Origen affirms this several times. To cite just one place:

But whenever [heretics[ bring forward the canonical Scriptures… we must not believe them, nor depart from the original and ecclesiastical tradition, nor believe otherwise than as it has been handed down to us through the succession of the Church of God… For the truth is like lightning coming out of the East and appearing even to the West – such is the truth of the Church of God. From her alone the sound has gone out into all the earth, and their words to the ends of the world; and the one true truth of God runs swiftly.”

Commentary on Matthew, n. 46 (PG 13, 1667-68; GCS 38, 95-95).

St. Cyril of Alexandria also affirms that the doctrines of the Church are the rule of faith by which believers must abide to interpret Scripture:

“For to be very zealous in searching out the meaning of difficult passages in Scripture, must, I think, reflect much honour both on those who have this desire, and also on those who listen to them attentively. Our Lord Jesus Christ, then, said that He ‘sanctified Himself for our sakes’, that we also may ‘be sanctified in truth.’ In what sense He is sanctified, being Himself by Nature holy, in order that we may be sanctified also, let us then, adhering to the doctrines of the Church, and not starting aside from the right rule of faith, so far as we can, carefully consider.”

Commentary on John, bk. 11, ch. 10 (PG 74, 545).

St. Vincent of Lerins says:

“How are they to distinguish truth from falsehood in the sacred Scriptures? […] They must interpret the sacred Canon according to the traditions of the Universal Church and in keeping with the rules of Catholic doctrine…”

Commonitorium, ch. 27, n. 70.

St. John of Damascus says:

“He that believes not according to the tradition of the Catholic Church, or who has intercourse with the devil through strange works, is an unbeliever.”

On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 4, ch. 10 (PG 94, 1128A).

Fifth Kind of Tradition

The fifth type of tradition is that which is deduced from Scripture after much theological reasoning. Obviously the existence of such tradition is affirmed, and Chemnitz is correct in saying that we should be careful to think the Fathers are always referring to completely unwritten traditions when they could just mean this fifth kind. Yet, I would simply remind the reader that several Fathers explicitly affirm that the Church’s doctrine is the rule of faith of Scripture’s interpretation, contradicting Sola Scriptura, even if not all of them provide a passage in which they affirm unwritten traditions. Chemnitz here falls into the opposite error, claiming that St. Augustine did not affirm any tradition which could not be proven from Scripture; on the contrary, St. Augustine actually does, contradicting Chemnitz’s position. We may respond to this several ways with countless citations, but I will limit myself to two examples. First, we can show that, in principle, St. Augustine asserts his readiness to affirm doctrines which could not be proven from Scripture. In his work On Heresies, he considers denying the efficacy of offerings for the dead a heresy.

“The Aerians are named after a certain Aerius, who, although he was a presbyter, is said to have grieved because he could not be made a bishop. Falling then into the heresy of the Arians, he also added some doctrines of his own.¹² He said that it is not proper to offer sacrifices for the dead.”

On Heresies, ch. 53 (PL 42, 39-40).

At the end of the work, he is clear that these heresies should be rejected by the Catholic faithful on the simple ground that the Church does rejects them, even if the faithful do not understand why they are wrong.

“For what the Catholic Church thinks against these doctrines – which you thought should be explained by me – is asked unnecessarily, since it is sufficient to know that the Church is opposed to them, and that no one ought to accept any of them into the faith. But how the truth which stands against them should be asserted and defended goes beyond the limits of this work. Still, it greatly helps a faithful heart to know what ought not to be believed, even if it cannot refute it by argument. Therefore every Catholic Christian ought not to believe these things.”

On Heresies, ch. 88 (PL 42, 50).

In his work On the Care for the Dead, he says that making offerings for the dead is supported from 2 Maccabees, clarifying that even if it were not in Scripture, the practice has the authority of the universal Church behind it.

“In the books of the Maccabees we read of sacrifice offered for the dead. Howbeit even if it were nowhere at all read in the Old Scriptures, not small is the authority, which in this usage is clear, of the whole Church, namely, that in the prayers of the priest which are offered to the Lord God at His altar, the Commendation of the dead has also its place.”

On the care for the dead, n. 3 (PL 40, 593).

To put all this together, we can show that St. Augustine affirms that doctrines and practices not mentioned in Scripture ought to be affirmed if the universal Church affirms them. What type of affirmation? Faith, since to reject these constitutes heresy, and he is clear to specify that a believer does not even need to personally understand why.

As a second example, we may see St. Augustine’s treatment of the validity of baptisms administered by heretics. For the doctor of grace, that heretics can validly baptize is proven from the universal custom of the Church.

St. Cyprian had erred on this question, so St. Augustine affirms that he is not bound a priori to follow him in this error since St. Cyprian’s writings are not inspired Scripture. Notice that he does not say that St. Cyprian’s opinion contradicted Scripture, but simply that St. Cyprian’s writings were subject to testing and examination. On the other hand, as to why he personally cannot accept St. Cyprian’s actual opinion, this is due to the fact that the Church does not accept it.

“I am not bound by the authority of that epistle, because I do not hold the letters of Cyprian as canonical, but I consider them in the light of the canonical Scriptures; and whatever in them agrees with the authority of the divine Scriptures, I accept [accipio] with his praise; but whatever does not agree, I reject with his peace. I do not accept [non accipio], I say, what the blessed Cyprian held concerning the rebaptizing of heretics and schismatics, because the Church does not accept it, for which Church the blessed Cyprian shed his blood.”

Against Cresconium, bk. 2, ch. 32 (40) (PL 43, 490).

In On the Unity of the Church, he is clear that men are bound to believe the doctrine of the universal Church on rebaptism since Scripture does not answer this question:

“Let the heretic now say, ‘How do you gather me in?’ I quickly respond, ‘Just as the Church for which Christ advances his evidence gathers him in.’ … Perhaps you say to me here, ‘read to me then how Christ ordered those to be gathered in who wanted to pass from heresy to the Church.’ Neither I nor you reads this openly or clearly… But now since we do not find in the Scriptures that some passed from the heretics to the Church and were gathered in like I say or like you say… Christ offers the evidence of his Church… In which way then that the Church gathers them in throughout all nations beginning from Jerusalem, in that way you are gathered in when all doubts and delays have been removed. If you don’t want this, you struggle not with me or any other man who wishes to gather you in in this way, but most harmfully with the Savior himself against your own salvation, you who doesn’t wish to believe, you should be gathered in in the way the Church gathers you in, which he whom you say it is execrable not to believe commends with his own evidence.”

On the Unity of the Church, ch. 22 (63) (PL 43, 437-8).

In his work on heresies, he considers the Donatists heretics for opposing the universal Church on this question.

“They even dare to rebaptize Catholics, and by this act they further confirmed themselves heretics; since the Catholic Church throughout the world had decreed that even in heretics, baptism once given should not be annulled. The leader of this heresy is said to have been Donatus…”

On Heresies, ch. 69 (PL 42, 43).

Recall what we already cited from the end of this work: St. Augustine says one is to give a simple assent to these doctrines and reject the heresies opposed to them simply because the Church teaches thus, even if a believer does not understand why such is the case. Again, this already contradicts the Protestant rule of faith which grants believers the right of private judgement regarding the teaching of the Church. Yet, we can prove that, not only did St. Augustine hold the Church as the rule of faith for interpreting Scripture, but also affirmed unwritten traditions belonging to faith, as we have already been doing from the citations above from Against Cresconium and On the Unity of the Church.

Martin Chemnitz provides two worthy objections. First, he claims St. Augustine is not affirming that the doctrine of whether or not heretics must be rebaptized cannot be proven from Scripture, but only that a distinct and explicit example that a heretic was rebaptized or admitted without baptism cannot be found in Scripture.

We may respond as follows. It is true that in On the Unity of the Church he uses the word example, as we cited above. Yet, St. Augustine does not go from saying that no example exists to arguing for it as a conclusion from Scripture; in other words: he does not say that even if no explicit recorded example exists, we can nevertheless prove the general law from Scripture. Rather, he immediately goes to the Church, implying that this is not a case of merely lacking an explicit example, but also lacking a sufficient foundation in Scripture for settling the question with deductions. He does the same in Against Cresconium; he says no example can be found and goes immediately to the Church’s practice as the solution:

“Therefore, even though no example of this matter can be brought forward from the canonical Scriptures, yet the truth of those same Scriptures is upheld by us when we do that which has now pleased the whole Church, which the authority of those Scriptures commends. For since holy Scripture cannot deceive, whoever fears being led astray by the obscurity of this question should consult that same Church, which holy Scripture clearly shows without any ambiguity.”

Against Cresconium, bk. 1, ch. 33 (39) (PL 43, 465-6).

We can further respond, as St. Robert Bellarmine does, that in his work On Baptism, St. Augustine is clear that this custom of not rebaptizing heretics is a unwritten tradition. Thus, though he sometimes uses the term example, and sometimes uses the word tradition, there is no practical difference for him.

“For at that time, the question of Baptism had not yet been carefully examined; yet the Church maintained the most beneficial custom of correcting what was wrong in schismatics and heretics, not repeating what had been rightly given; of healing what was wounded, not tending what was healthy. I believe this custom comes from apostolic tradition (just as there are many things which are not found in their writings nor in the later councils, and yet, because they are observed throughout the whole Church, they are believed to have been handed down and commended only by the Apostles themselves).”

On Baptism, bk. 2, ch. 7 (12) (PL 43, 133).

“The Apostles themselves, however, gave no explicit command on this matter; but that custom which was opposed to Cyprian is to be believed to have had its origin in their tradition, just as there are many things which the whole Church observes and which, therefore, are rightly believed to have been commanded by the Apostles, even though they are not found in their writings.”

On Baptism, bk. 5, ch. 31 (PL 43, 192).

In the same work, he explicitly says that the law of not rebaptizing is asserted on the basis of the universal Church’s teaching. He says:

“Wherefore the holy Cyprian… abundantly shows that he was most willing to correct his own opinion, if any one should prove to him that it is as certain that the baptism of Christ can be given by those who have strayed from the fold, as that it could not be lost when they strayed; on which subject we have already said much. Nor should we ourselves venture to assert anything of the kind, were we not supported by the unanimous authority of the whole Church, to which he himself would unquestionably have yielded.”

On Baptism, bk. 2, ch. 4 (5) (PL 43, 129).

We have thus provided ample evidence to show that the anti-Donatist position could not be sufficiently proven from Scripture according to St. Augustine.

Next, Chemnitz deceitfully claims that St. Augustine actually does provide Biblical support for the validity of heretical baptisms and that he did not think this was a purely unwritten tradition.

“I shall copy certain passages from this disputation of Augustine, which will show that he by no means followed a tradition or custom which cannot be proved by any testimony of Scripture. In On Baptism, Bk. 1, ch. 7, Augustine says: ‘Lest I seem to operate with human arguments, I shall produce certain proofs from the Gospel.”

Examination of the Council of Trent, vol. 1, Second Topic, Section V, n. 5.

Yet, Chemnitz leaves out what St. Augustine actually cites. He does not give arguments to demonstrate the validity of baptism administered by those outside of the Church, but simply demonstrates how God’s gifts in general can exist outside of the Church. He does this by citing Matthew 12:30, “He that is not with me is against me; and he that gathers not with me scatters abroad,” and Luke 9:50, “Forbid him not: for he that is not against us is for us. For there is no man which shall do a miracle in my name, that can lightly speak evil of me.” According to him, both statements must be affirmed as true without contradiction, which demands that some goods can exist outside of the Church. He does not say that this demonstrates against the Donatist position since he does not seek to prove that baptism is one of these gifts.

Next, Chemnitz notes that St. Augustine, in book II, chapter 14, cites John 13:10, “He who is washed has no need of washing a second time.” Yet, again, St. Augustine does not use this at all to prove that baptism administered by schismatics is valid, but that one who is truly baptized should not be rebaptized, which even the Donatists admitted.

For the sake of time, I will not cover every passage, though I recommend reading St. Robert Bellarmine’s response to Martin Chemnitz in his work On the Word of God, bk. 4, ch. 7, as well as Andrada’s response in bk. 2, section 31. I will link both works below; they both show Chemnitz’s misleading and partial citations of St. Augustine.

Next, Chemnitz gives examples of how the ancient Fathers often called certain doctrines which were not in Scripture in so many words and syllables but could be proven from them by the name of “tradition,” such as that Christ is of one substance with the Father. This is to be conceded since, as we already said above, the word tradition was not used univocally by the Fathers, nor even by later Catholic authors. Yet, as we have pointed out above, many Fathers explicitly say that such traditions held by the Church are rules of faith for all, and that such interpretation of Scripture ought to supersede heretics who also appeal to Scriptures. This is not just my argument, but is also employed by Andrada in response to Chemnitz.

“Yet a little earlier we demonstrated that the arguments of Irenaeus and Tertullian are of such a kind that, although those things which Chemnitz assumes are granted, nevertheless he by no means effects what he desires. For when those most excellent men were refuting [heretics]... they employed the force of traditions to overthrow those whom they struck in vain with the divine Letters, because of the supreme temerity of men. Certainly, nothing could be imagined more inept than this method of fighting on the part of most prudent men, if traditions, light and empty in themselves, necessarily had to be examined by the weights of the Sacred Letters, which those madmen partly despised, and partly eluded according to their own arbitrament and lust.”

Defensio Tridentinae Fidei Catholicae et Integerrimae, bk. 2, § 31.

When the Arians rejected that the word homoousios is not in Scripture, Chemnitz points out that Fathers did not claim the existence of unwritten traditions but simply asserted that the term could be deduced from Scripture. This argumentation is just sloppy; it’s rhetorically great, since it aims to create a division between how the Fathers and Catholics argue, but it doesn’t work. Why would we expect the Fathers to appeal to unwritten tradition for something we concede can be proven from Scripture?

Sixth Kind of Tradition

The sixth kind concerns the consent of the Fathers. Here, Chemnitz makes a bunch of citations of the Fathers affirming how Scripture is used to judge the writings of other men. For example, to cite one out of many, Chemnitz cites St. Augustine as follows:

“And in On the Gift of Perseverance , ch. 21, he says: ‘I would want nobody to embrace all my statements in such a way that he will follow me except in those things in which he has seen that I do not err. For this reason I now write my books of retractions, to show that I also have not followed myself in all things.’”

Examination of the Council of Trent, vol. 1, Second Topic, Section VI, n. 6.

I am not sure why he goes on about this with so many quotes since Catholics agree. In fact, Melchoir Cano, O.P., a theologian at Trent, when simply addressing the Catholic view of Tradition actually cites that famous letter from St. Augustine, affirming how the writings of the Fathers, and even bishops, can and should be tested with Scripture.

“In all these places, Augustine consistently says the same thing: that apart from the sacred authors who wrote the canonical books, all others should be read in such a way that, although they may possess holiness and learning, what they assert is not necessarily true merely because they believed it themselves – but because it can persuade us either by the testimony of the sacred authors or by a probable argument. Consequently, it is permitted to disagree with them, and while preserving the honor due to them as men, to correct or reject something in their writings. Now, if we believe that this testimony of Saint Augustine, so consistent and repeated in many places, is true, it must be acknowledged that no argument from the saints can be taken as certain for confirming the dogmas of faith or theology.”

De locis theologicis, lib. VII, cap. 1.

What St. Augustine never does, nor do I believe a Church Father does, is encourage believers to test the doctrines of the universal Church.

Chemnitz says:

“In this way, then, the fathers themselves treated the writings of other fathers and in this way they also wanted their own to be read and received. This opinion we freely approve, embrace, and follow. But our adversaries, the papalists, when they can bring forth certain statements from the fathers for the protection of their superstitions and somehow throw them together contrary to those things which are shown from the Scriptures, want us, without judgment and refusal, to depart from the Scripture and to assent to the statements quoted by them from the fathers, even though they are not proved by any testimony of Scripture.”

Examination of the Council of Trent, vol. 1, Second Topic, Section VI, n. 8.

Such a statement is absurdly false. If one reads through the Tridentine-era authors, they unanimously deny with Protestants and with the Fathers themselves that the writings of the latter (the Fathers) are to be accepted “without judgement and refusal.” Read Cano, O.P., St. Canisius, Andrada, de Valentia, S.J., St. Bellarmine, S.J., Wiggers, Juenin, and more. Just as the Fathers affirm their own writings should be judged by Scripture, so did the Catholics in the 16th century, contrary to Chemnitz’s claims. The difference is that authentic tradition is identified to what is held universally as belonging to faith, which many Fathers explicitly affirm is to be accepted without judgement, since it is not their own private opinion or interpretation, but the faith of the Church. This is where Catholics and the Fathers agree, from which Chemnitz and Protestants depart. As Andrada responds:

“If you understand this of individual Fathers, you think rightly with Augustine and with us. But if you mean the common and perpetual consent of the Fathers, which is the matter under discussion, you surely do a great disservice to those most holy heroes, since the authority of individuals is not to be compared with the universal chorus of the Fathers. ‘For whatever,’ says Vincent of Lérins, ‘not one or two only, but all the Fathers equally, with one and the same sense, with the same consent, openly, frequently, and perseveringly are known to have held, written, and taught, let him understand that this also is to be believed by him without any doubt.’”

Defensio Tridentinae Fidei Catholicae et Integerrimae, bk. 2, § 31.

Seventh Kind of Tradition

The seventh kind of unwritten tradition concerns rites in the Church. As an example, he quotes Tertullian, who says:

“We take also, in congregations before daybreak, and from the hand of none but the presidents, the sacrament of the Eucharist, which the Lord both commanded to be eaten at meal-times, and enjoined to be taken by all alike. As often as the anniversary comes round, we make offerings for the dead as birthday honours. We count fasting or kneeling in worship on the Lord’s day to be unlawful… we trace upon the forehead the sign [of the cross]. If, for these and other such rules, you insist upon having positive Scripture injunction, you will find none. Tradition will be held forth to you as the originator of them, custom as their strengthener, and faith as their observer.”

On the Crown, ch. 3-4 (PL 2, 79-80).

Here, it would be helpful to articulate the Catholic view on these matters. Some rites and customs do not pertain to divine law and could have a merely human institution, such as the observance of Lent, while others do, such as infant baptism or invoking the saints in prayer. At the same time, it is important to note that universal practice, because of the infallibility of the Church, guarantees the validity and licitness of a practice, but does not, in itself, establish that the practice was explicitly instituted in the first century, regardless of historical claims made by theologians. Thus, Fr. Charles De Smedt, S.J. (d. 1911) wrote:

“I shall never rely on the general assertions of the Fathers of the fourth century, and still less of later times, with regard to primitive institutions. The Fathers are authoritative witnesses to dogmatic tradition for the time and region in which they lived; but as such they possess no special authority concerning historical tradition. I have elsewhere provided sufficiently striking examples to show that one cannot place blind confidence in their affirmations, even the most categorical, in matters of scholarship.”

“L’Organisation Des Églises Chréstiennes” in Revue des questions historiques, 1888, t. II, p. 331.

Thus, we can consider something like Lent under two aspects. Just because it is universally practiced at any age does not mean it was instituted by the Apostles, but it does mean that it is free of error. Now, to determine whether it has explicit apostolic institution or not would require a different method, namely, a historical survey of the earliest voices. Furthermore, it is not required that something like the bodily assumption of Mary be preached explicitly and publicly by the apostles; one could certainly adopt this position on the historical specifics of how and when it was preached, but one is not bound by it. The assumption of Mary has been revealed by God, but it does not follow that this has to be explicitly recorded in Scripture or the oral apostolic preaching. It could be contained in Scripture as a virtual conclusion or in the spiritual sense. For more, check out Scheeben’s 1.1, ch. 3, § 21. Ironically, this also cuts against the idea that pre-Vatican 2 Catholics thought all of the Church’s doctrines went back to the Apostles in an explicit manner since Scheeben himself says the Assumption was not explicitly revealed.

Now, as for critiquing Protestants, it should be noted that several practices became universal which the Protestants later rejected. For example, several Lutherans accept that Christ’s presence in the Eucharist persists after liturgy if taken to the sick, but do not do so for other reasons post-liturgy. Yet, the practice of reserving the Eucharist for reasons other than taking it to the sick immediately after liturgy was universal and ancient. The same is the case with the invocation of the saints and the use of communion in one kind during Lenten liturgies. Obviously, there is no strict necessity that these go back to the apostles explicitly. Yet, notice the difference between St. Augustine’s attitude towards these and Chemnitz’s attitude, who says that these must be tested by Scripture. St. Augustine says:

“I answer, therefore, that if the authority of Scripture has decided which of these methods is right, there is no room for doubting that we should do according to that which is written; and our discussion must be occupied with a question, not of duty, but of interpretation as to the meaning of the divine institution. In like manner, if the universal Church follows any one of these methods, there is no room for doubt as to our duty; for it would be the height of arrogant madness to discuss whether or not we should comply with it. But the question which you propose is not decided either by Scripture or by universal practice. It must therefore be referred to the third class — as pertaining, namely, to things which are different in different places and countries.”

Letter 54, 6 ( 5) (PL 33, 202-3).

Eighth Kind of Tradition

Finally, the eighth kind of tradition concerns those doctrines which cannot be proven from Scripture but are nevertheless asserted as dogma. I will begin by saying that several Fathers, from what I’ve been able to read from them, do not explicitly affirm the existence of this eighth kind of tradition. Yet, even if I were to grant that they denied it, which I don’t, remember that this would not place them in the Protestant paradigm of epistemology, for what one Catholic thinks cannot be proven from Scripture, another Catholic might disagree and claim that it can, both assenting by faith to the teaching of the Church.

Anyway, regarding these kinds of traditions, Chemnitz says:

“Let it be observed first of all how dangerous it is for the church, and how destructive for the faith, to receive and venerate traditions concerning dogmas which cannot be proved with any testimony of Scripture with the same devotion and reverence as those things which are handed down and proved with sure and clear testimonies of the Scripture. For above we have shown extensively that, even while the apostles themselves were still living in the flesh, in their absence the purity of the doctrine was not always preserved faithfully in the churches through unwritten traditions, as the churches of the Corinthians and Galatians show. False prophets also, while the apostles were yet alive, invented many corruptions under this pretense and name, that they had been handed down orally by the apostles, as we have shown above.”

Examination of the Council of Trent, vol. 1, Second Topic, Section VIII, n. 5.

Chemnitz’s objection can seem very reasonable at first glance and is thus often repeated by Protestants, not only back then, such as by Gerhard, but also in the modern day, such as Dr. Gavin Ortlund. Thus, they’ll point to examples like how St. Irenaeus claimed that Christ died as an older man due to what he thought was handed down orally from the apostles. Such an objection, however, so often repeated, is a strawman.

The Catholic claim is not that every doctrine which cannot be proven from Scripture is therefore to be received as apostolic tradition. Just because Catholics acknowledge that some doctrines belonging to the faith cannot be demonstrated from Scripture alone, it does not follow that every doctrine imposed upon us which lacks scriptural proof is to be accepted. The mere fact that two propositions share this characteristic does not make them equivalent.

As explained by countless Catholic theologians before and after Trent, the Catholic position does not simply accept what this or that Church Father happens to claim is an apostolic tradition. Rather, the sufficient criteria is whether a given teaching has been received by the Church as part of the Catholic faith. The sufficient criterion is not identified through building up a historical probability that such and such a doctrine was taught, but through universal preaching. This rests on the Catholic conviction that the Holy Spirit preserves the universal Church from error. Thus, Cardinal Hosius responds to the Lutheran Johanns Brenz,

“Brentius later asks how it is possible to know whether any tradition is Apostolic. Does the authority or testimony of one or another Church writer suffice for us? He cites that Eusebius writes about Papias, who recorded, in a somewhat fabulous and foreign manner, as if derived from the living Apostolic tradition, whence even the Chiliasts borrowed their error; Eusebius warns by this example that we should not rashly believe traditions which are usually proposed in the name of the Apostles and the elders. The answer to Brentius’s question is very easy. For if anything is imposed upon us in the name of Apostolic tradition, which not only is not received by the Church, and whose use is not approved, but was immediately disputed from the beginning – whether Papias produced it, or any other Church writer at length – no matter how authoritative, it should be regarded rather as a fable than as something belonging to Apostolic tradition.”

Confutatio prolegomenon Brentii, 2nd ed. Coloniae: Maternus Cholinus, 1560, lib. 4, pp. 405-6.

On this rule, Melchoir Cano, O.P., writing before Chemnitz, says:

“If a dogma of faith has been held in absolute agreement by the Fathers from the beginning, and its opposite is rejected as heretical, though it is not contained in the Sacred Scriptures, then it is possessed by the Church through apostolic tradition. Examples include the perpetual virginity of the Blessed Mary, Christ’s descent into hell to rescue Adam and the other fathers held there, the exact number of the Gospels, and other matters.”

De locis theologicis, lib. III, cap. 4.

Note, again, the emphasis on universality.

Furthermore, it is not necessary for us to have an unbroken record of such a consensus, nor is it necessary for that consensus to exist from the beginning. As Fr. Scheeben explains, it is not essential for the integrity of Tradition that the Church always possess a universal consensus on the truth but only that she never positively denies it.

“Negatively, the Church must on the one hand never, neither in her entirety nor in the organs defining the faith of the whole, be able to declare decisively something to be apostolic Tradition that is not such, or that contradicts the real apostolic Tradition… the universality of Tradition requires unconditionally and for any given era that the whole living Tradition in all its organs never falsify or deny the deposit; it does however allow that a part of the deposit may be falsified or denied by a part of the Church that does not define the faith of the whole, or else that temporarily it may actually be attested neither by the entire community nor by a decisive part with complete firmness and certainty but is only habitually held.”

Dogmatiks, 1.1, ch. 4, § 22.

The Walenburch brothers of the 17th century write:

“For some tradition to be Apostolic, it receives no detriment from the fact that at some time in the Catholic Church there was doubt about it. For just as such doubt does not prevent certain books of Scripture, about which there was once doubt, from being held as Canonical: so doubt in past time does not prevent, concerning this or that tradition, that it be truly Apostolic. It should suffice for us if we are certain with equal certainty about the unwritten Word of God as about the written.”

Examination of the Principles of Faith, 3rd exam., § 5, n. 64.

Johannes Wiggers writes:

“When the whole Church holds something as a dogma of faith and it is not found expressed in the sacred letters, it is necessary to say and confess that it is had from the tradition of the Apostles. This is clear, because the whole Church cannot err so as to propose as divinely revealed and to be believed with Catholic faith what is not such… We do not deny, however, that some revealed articles have at times been less recognized as such, and are afterwards elucidated and declared as such through the Church’s investigation and definition.”

Commentaria de virtutibus theologicis, q. 1, De Ecclesia, dub. 3.

This is also the teaching of St. Augustine:

“Let them not disparage the rule of faith, not disparage the truth; let them not speak against holy Church... This matter is fundamental. Someone who goes wrong in the discussion of other questions that have not been thoroughly canvassed, not yet firmly settled by the Church’s full authority, is to be tolerated. Error in that case is to be tolerated; it should not go so far, though, as to strive to shake the very foundation of the Church.”
Sermon 294, 21 (20) (PL 38, 1348).

As we can see, the Catholic view of tradition is much more humble, conservative, and reasonable than Protestants give it credit for, since Catholics do not simply accept anything that is claimed to be tradition, but only what is held by the universal Church.

One of the examples Martin Chemnitz gives of this eighth kind of tradition is millenarianism, which was proposed by St. Papias who claimed it was apostolic tradition. For a great treatment of this case study, read Cardinal Franzelin’s De Divina Traditione, thesis 26. Essentially, even though many early fathers held to it, some even claiming it was preached by the apostles, this was certainly not unanimous. For example, St. Justin Martyr wrote to Trypho:

“I admitted to you formerly, that I and many others are of this opinion that such will take place, as you assuredly are aware; but, on the other hand, I signified to you that many who belong to the pure and pious faith, and are true Christians, think otherwise.”

Dialogue with Trypho, ch. 80 (PG 6, 664).

Unfortunately, most, if not all, of Chemnitz’s critiques fall into this misunderstanding. For example, in further trying to show the supposed danger of unwritten tradition, he points to how early heretics claimed to have been close to the apostles so as to acquire authority. Chemnitz writes:

“Clement says in Stromata, bk. 7, that Basilides had boasted that he had had as his teacher a certain Glaucias, who was an interpreter of Peter; that Valentinus had heard Theudas, a man close to Paul; that the Marcionites boasted that they had had disciples of Matthias as their teachers and that they held and taught the doctrine delivered by them.”

Examination of the Council of Trent, vol. 1, Second Topic, Section VIII, n. 5.

Again, these are irrelevant since, as affirmed by Catholic theologians even at the time of Chemnitz, we do not identify authentic tradition by following whoever claims to have proximity to the Apostles, but by what the whole Church holds.

This is basically what the rest of the section consists of, so it would be a waste of time to go through it all. Chemnitz points to several examples of individual fathers following or promoting a certain doctrine not contained in Scripture without addressing the true teaching of Catholics.

In fact, as I was preparing for this video, I read through my notes from this which I wrote almost a year ago and found this comment I left. Chemnitz says:

“By these clear examples it is shown sufficiently, I think, that one should not at once simply agree, when the fathers assert without sure proofs that something is an apostolic tradition; for that they ascribed many old customs which had a different origin to the traditions of the apostles in order that they might have greater authority the examples show… Nor does it suffice if one of the fathers says that it is a tradition which has come from the apostles. For we have shown by a number of examples that also those which bore this title and cloak were often false.”

Examination of the Council of Trent, vol. 1, Second Topic, Section VIII, n. 8, 12.

In my notes, I simply wrote: “We 100% agree here, Chemnitz,” since this misunderstands what the Tridentine authors were saying about traditions, as I have shown from Cardinal Hosius and other authors. As Andrada says:

“But since Chemnitz here heaps together innumerable opinions of the ancients, in order to persuade us that very many false and empty things were commended by the ancient Fathers under the title of traditions, which partly proceeded from apocryphal monuments and partly from the ravings of heretics – such as the things which Clement of Alexandria handed down concerning the Gospel announced to sacrilegious souls in Tartarus, and concerning Christ teaching mortals for one year only, which Irenaeus attributes to heretics, and the things which that same most holy Martyr said concerning Christ being crucified at almost the fiftieth year of His age, according to the sentence of John and of the elders – I do not deny that there is need of a certain rule, as the same Chemnitz says, to which whatever is proposed under the name of tradition may be referred. This rule, indeed, is the consent of the whole Church, which we know, from the many and various opinions of our forefathers, to have approved and preserved only those which were most removed from every suspicion of counterfeit falsehood.”

Defensio Tridentinae Fidei Catholicae et Integerrimae, bk. 2, § 31.

Chemnitz uses the often quoted words from St. Jerome:

“The sword is also brought against the mountains that exalt themselves against the knowledge of God, and against the grain, wine, and oil with which, as though by food, drink, and refreshment, the assemblies of heretics flatter deceived peoples... The sword of God also strikes down those other things which they invent and fabricate of their own accord, apart from the authority and testimony of the Scriptures, as though by apostolic tradition.”

Commentary on Haggai (PL 25, 1398).

This passage is directed against the supposed traditions of heretics, not the universal Church. Let’s ask a reasonable question: is St. Jerome explaining here that no divine revelation is found outside of Scripture, which is what Chemnitz’s thesis is? Obviously, the words sound Protestant, but the context is clearly a rejection of inventing one’s own doctrines.

Ironically, upholding unwritten traditions as having equal weight with Scripture appears explicitly in many Church Fathers. Most importantly, they explicitly limit these to the traditions of the Church, implying the whole body, not what this or that man, group, or region claims. We have already cited St. Augustine extensively, who always identifies authentic tradition by what the whole Church holds.

St. Epiphanius affirms that not all Divine revelation is written but that God revealed some things only orally which are preserved by tradition. These too are “unbreakable” and “incapable of being abolished.”

“The church is bound to keep this custom [of praying for dead] because she has received a tradition from the fathers. And who can violate a mother’s precept or a father’s law? As the words of Solomon tell us, ‘Hear, my son, the words of thy father, and reject not the precepts of thy mother’ (Prov. 1:8) showing that the Father – God, that is – and the Only-begotten and the Holy Spirit taught both in writing and in unwritten form, while our mother, the Church, had statutes established within her, unbreakable, incapable of being abolished.”

Against Heresies, 75, n. 9 (PG 42, 516).

Chemnitz objects that St. Epiphanius does not believe praying for the dead is apostolic because he says the Church received it “from the fathers.”

Response: He only means that the Church in his day immediately received it from the Fathers before her day as occurs via “active Tradition” or “preservative Tradition.” It’s no different than when Protestants say they received the canonical books from the early Church: they are not denying that the Apostles initially passed them on, but only affirming that the medium by which they received them. He is clear, however, that the origin of this Tradition is God: “God… taught both in writing and in unwritten form, while our mother, the Church” acts as one who preserves these.

St. John Chrysostom also affirms this eighth type of tradition. Commenting on 2 Thessalonians 2:15, “So then, brothers and sisters, stand firm and hold fast to the traditions we passed on to you, whether by word of mouth or by letter,” he says:

“From this it is clear that not everything was handed down in writing, but much also orally; and in the same way, these [oral teachings] are trustworthy, so that we also consider the tradition of the Church worthy of belief.”

Homily 4 on Second Thessalonians, n. 2 (PG 62, 488).

Personally, 2 Thess. 2:15 isn’t my go-to verse to defend Sacred Tradition. The common Protestant answer is that:

1. 2 Thessalonians was written before many New Testament books (including some Gospels) had been written, so that the entire content of what is now the New Testament was not yet in writing and still only oral. Response: This is true.

2. Everything for faith was eventually written down. Response: Protestants can never prove this.

But what concerns us here is that St. John Chrysostom contradicts Sola Scriptura because he affirms:

1. “Much” was handed down orally that was not written.
   An objection here might be that St. John only speaks of traditions that explain Scripture, such as the Apostle’s Creed, but that do not differ in content.
   Response: St. John Chrysostom doesn’t say this, so this would be an assumption.
   He also explicitly considers offering the Eucharist for the dead as something the Apostles handed down, which is obviously not in Scripture:

“Not in vain did the Apostles order that remembrance should be made of the dead in the dreadful Mysteries. They know that great gain results to them, great benefit; for when the whole people stands with uplifted hands, a priestly assembly, and that awful Sacrifice lies displayed, how shall we not prevail with God by our entreaties for them? And this we do for those who have departed in faith.”

Homily 3 on Philippians, n. 4 (PG 62, 204).

1. Thus, he did affirm extra-biblical Apostolic tradition and revelation.

2. The “tradition of the Church” is “credible”/“reliable”/“worthy of belief” (ἀξιόπιστον) “in the same way” as Scripture.
   
   This challenges Sola Scriptura because since Scripture is the sole rule of faith, the Church’s tradition and authority cannot produce Divine faith, which is the same faith that Scripture produces (“in the same way”). But, to be more explicit, we can cite a few sources. Hieronymus Kromayer (Lutheran) says:

“Even if apostolic traditions were granted to exist, yet they could not produce any faith with full certainty.”

Theological Disputation on Traditions (Ergasia), § 3, Leipzig, 1665.

1. David Hollatz (d. 1713), another Lutheran, says the exact opposite of St. Chrysostom:

“Whatever is to be received with that affection of piety with which the written word of God is received, it must be most certain and infallible, so that it can beget divine faith, and be believed with divine faith… But from where can we be infallibly certain concerning unwritten traditions, that they are from God? From Scripture? But they are not written. From the testimony of the church? But this itself is not infallible, since its authority, being human, cannot beget divine faith.”

Examen theologicum acroamaticum, Prolegomena, ch. 3, q. 51.

1. So does Abraham Calovius (d. 1686):

“But we utterly deny that the declaration or tradition of the Church can generate divine faith in someone’s soul, whether as the principal or sole ground of belief upon which faith relies. For divine faith rests solely on the word of God or divine revelation, since we believe nothing by divine faith except what and insofar as God Himself has revealed it.”

Demonstration of the Articles of Faith of the Augsburg Confession, IV, 24.

Even William Whitaker concedes that this is not compatible with the Protestant view, though claims St. Chrysostom is contradicting himself:

“Unless those many things of which Chrysostom speaks be founded upon the authority of scripture, he contradicts himself, as shall afterwards be made clear in the defence of our side. But Chrysostom says that both these classes are equally deserving of credit. And afterwards he says, ‘It is a tradition; let that suffice.’ I answer: It was an inconsiderate word, and unworthy of so great a father.”

A Disputation on Holy Scripture, q. 6, ch. 12.

For more on the Catholic view of tradition, I primarily recommend Cardinal Franzelin’s De Divina Traditione, which can be found in English and Latin.

Pray for the conversion of Protestants and Lutherans through the intercession of St. Robert Bellarmine and Cardinal Franzelin.

One of the most critical errors in apologetics is the neglection of distinguishing between different modes of knowledge. Understanding this made many things “click” for me; it made many of the seemingly good arguments from Protestants lose their rhetorical value and allowed me to more properly format arguments against those outside of the Church. Making…

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Respectfully, I think this is a messy critique which misses what is going on at the Reformation and what the precise claim of the Reformers was.

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I have already made a video extensively citing examples of communion in one kind starting in the 3rd century, through Tertullian, Ss. Jerome, Basil, etc, such as the widespread practice of private communion at home with the Eucharistic bread only. These are usually dismissed as “extraordinary instances,” but this only shows that the Fathers did not actually agree with the Reformers.

Remember, the Reformers (specifically the Lutheran orthodox) said that communion in one kind can NEVER happen. Johann Adam Scherzer, for example, said that if someone cannot receive wine, “[he] should be kept away from the whole, than that he should not receive the whole” (Anti-Bellarmine, disp. 11, th. 6, obj. 9).

To demonstrate that the Catholic Church “contradicts” the Fathers on communion in both kinds (which is Dr. Cooper’s internal critique), one needs to show that the Fathers of any age unanimously (at least morally) taught that it was a matter of faith to hold that both kinds must be received. Certainly, no consensus ever existed. On the contrary, we know they often did make the exception and allowed Christians to receive only one kind, which shows they did not agree with the Lutherans that this is a divine precept (to receive both).

Dr. Cooper conflates the ordinary liturgical practice with what Catholics mean by a “consensus on the Fathers.” For more, I recommend reading St. Robert Bellarmine who has a really good response to Martin Chemnitz.

Here is a helpful example. It was truly a unanimous practice to preserve the Eucharist after the liturgy and treat the elements as consecrated. The Reformed (to my knowledge) unanimously deny this is the case, and the Lutherans (from my reading of Chemnitz and Gerhard) admit that Christ’s presence persists but only for taking the Eucharist to the sick. The early Church affirmed Christ’s presence in the Eucharist in the Catholic sense; they preserved it even for reasons which were not for the sick and nevertheless affirmed its lasting consecration (Ss. Irenaeus, Ambrose, Jerome, to name a few). The Catholic view of tradition tells us that this practice/belief (that Christ is still present post-liturgy) must be valid and true (since the universal church cannot err), but it does not establish a precept i.e. just because the whole Church often preserved the Eucharist, it does not mean we actually have to do it; it just means we can do so validly and licitly; it also means this is a certain rule which Protestants contradicted (from a Catholic POV).

Even if communion in both kinds was the universal practice (which it was not), this would not suffice to say the Tridentine Church is in contradiction, since this would only tell us it is valid (duh, so does Scripture). There would need to be a unanimous testimony from the Fathers of, let’s say, the fourth century (or any century), that communion in both kinds is the only way and that to oppose this is heresy; a testimony which does not exist and is even contradicted.

Protestants have long appealed to St. Augustine of Hippo as if he stood squarely in their camp, quoting him with confidence, even triumph. Yet, one of the most cited quotations by Catholic apologists against the Reformers from St. Augustine goes like this:

“In fact I would not believe the gospel if the authority of the Catholic Church did not move me.”

Against the Epistle of Manichaeus, 5 (6) (PL 42, 176).

This one line from St. Augustine appears, at least at face value, to be directly opposed to the entire Protestant view of authority. Yet, in nearly every major Protestant treatment of Scripture from the time of the Protestant Reformation onward, these words are not so much refuted as reinterpreted — presented as fully compatible with the Reformers and merely misused by Roman theologians. However, when read in its original context and set alongside Augustine’s broader teaching on the Christian rule of faith, one finds not ambiguity but a clear articulation of the Roman Catholic view of epistemology, namely, that the Catholic Church serves as the proximate rule of faith. To many Protestant listeners, this may seem like a bold claim, but with careful attention, the coherence of this position becomes evident. I promise I will not disappoint you, but will instead demonstrate how absent Protestant epistemology was from the mind of the great bishop of Hippo.

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First, we need to understand the Catholic view of epistemology before we demonstrate that it is precisely what St. Augustine taught and practiced.

Catholic Epistemology

The Catholic view of epistemology begins with divine revelation, which is the communication of truths, or mysteries, from God to humanity. These truths require divine faith, an assent not based on deduction or intrinsic evidence, but on God’s authority as the revealer. Faith resembles scientific knowledge in its firmness, yet differs fundamentally because it relies on extrinsic evidence rather than direct observation or reasoning. While human faith may depend on testimony or documents, divine faith is irrevocable, grounded in God’s perfection and inability to deceive. This supernatural assent is made possible by the grace of the Holy Spirit, which moves the individual to believe the truths revealed by God. Essentially, both human and divine faith share the genus of assent based on authority, but differ in species due to their formal object: one trusts human witnesses, the other trusts God Himself.

For most people, divine revelation is received mediately through God’s messengers, unlike the immediate revelation given to figures such as Abraham, Moses, and the Apostles. Catholics hold that the preaching of the Apostles and the teaching of the Magisterium are necessary conditions (conditione sine qua non) for an individual to assent to revealed truths, though they are not the formal motive of belief—the ultimate motive is always God. The Apostles could propose new revelations, whereas the Magisterium only preserves and clarifies these revelations for future generations. This framework ensures that while the Church is involved in communicating revelation, it does not replace God as the source of divine faith.

Here, a Protestant might object and say that this introduces the Church into the formal motive of our assent, preventing us from having divine faith. Yet, this misunderstands what a necessary condition is and confuses it with the motive for assent, which is God alone. Here is an example by Fr. Charles René Billuart, O.P., on how something beautiful is not loved on basis of its proposal, but that it cannot be loved unless it has been proposed:

“The proposition of the things revealed by the Church stands in relation to faith as the proposal of goodness stands in relation to love; for just as the will cannot love an object unless it is proposed and known, so the intellect cannot believe unless the things revealed are proposed to it. But the proposal of goodness in relation to the will and love is not its formal object, but only the application of the object and a condition without which not.”

Summa Summae S. Thomae, sive Compendium Theologiae, t. III, dist. I, art. II (Leodii: Everardum Kints, 1754), pg. 7.

Another example of a necessary condition is the role of obscurity in faith. The mysteries we assent to, such as the Holy Trinity, remain obscure because we lack the perfect vision we will have in heaven; if we possessed such vision, faith would be impossible. Thus, obscurity is required for faith, yet it is not the reason we assent—we believe only because God has revealed.

Finally, since this revelation is mediate, God must provide concurrent aid to the preaching of His legates to authenticate it before men as coming from God. Otherwise, it would be irrational and sinful, namely the sin of credulity, to assent to their preaching. While some internal marks of the message may provide some degree of certitude that the preaching is divine, such as the sublimity of the Gospel and the beauty of the Catholic religion, the more concrete marks are external. Fr. Scheeben writes:

“In order for us to be able to accept a truth in faith by dint of the motive of faith, it is necessary not only that this truth in fact is revealed by God through His external word, or that the word proposed to us as coming from God really does come from God too, but also that this revealed character of a truth, or this divine origin of a word is completely certain to us… However, in order for this certainty that God has spoken be a true and genuine certainty, it must be a reasonable one. And in order for it to be a reasonable one, it must be based on reasonable motives (called motiva credibilitatis) or distinguishing marks (criteria) through which a given word is proved before the tribunal of reason to be a real word of God and claims the faith due to the latter. In this way, however, it takes the form of reasonable consciousness of the internal trustworthiness of the external human proposal of the word of God and the external trustworthiness of the word of God itself.”

Dogmatik, 1.2, ch. 6, §42.

Even on the motives of credibility, we will see that St. Augustine lists essentially the same motives listed by Vatican I 1500 years later.

To summarize the Catholic view, I will quote Fr. Billuart, O.P:

“When the truthfulness of the messenger is not certain, his credentials are examined; when that is established, the king’s letters are accepted because of the truthfulness of the messenger. But the contents of the king’s letters are believed not because of the truthfulness of the messenger but because of the truthfulness of the king… Apply this to the case: The Church proposes that this and that are revealed by God. The truthfulness and infallibility of the Church are known to us from her notes and motives of credibility, on account of which it is accepted and believed that these things are revealed in Scripture or Tradition; but the things revealed themselves contained in Scripture or Tradition are believed because of the authority and veracity of God revealing. Hence you see that the knowledge of the truthfulness of the Church, although it is confirmed by Scripture, nevertheless does not necessarily depend upon it; for when the Church was being born, there was no Scripture, and yet the truthfulness of the Church was known and certain, but it was first obtained from her notes and motives of credibility, although we do not deny that it is confirmed by Scripture.”

Summa Summae S. Thomae, sive Compendium Theologiae, t. III, dist. I, art. II (Leodii: Everardum Kints, 1754), pg. 9.

Protestant Epistemology

Protestant epistemology is different in that the Church is not a rule of faith.

The Church’s testimony, as defined above, can produce only human faith according to Protestants, not divine faith. Its role is rather to bear authoritative witness to the Scriptures, through which Christians receive divine faith, since Scripture is self-authenticating. I explain and critique that position here. Take special note of this, since it will be explicitly contradicted by St. Augustine once we get to his teaching.

The Westminster Confession of Faith says:

“We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to an high and reverent esteem of the holy Scripture; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man’s salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts.”

Westminster Confession of Faith, ch. 1, 5.

The Lutheran theologian Jerome Kromayer (d. 1670) says:

“To such persons (i.e. pagans and unbelievers), however, the authority of the Church can contribute something, and can generate a human faith, which afterward is accustomed to serve as a kind of pedagogy toward conceiving divine faith from the sacred text itself, as we have taught above.”

Theological Disputation on Traditions, mem. II, § 18, Leipzig, 1665.

Abraham Calovius (d. 1686) says:

“We do not deny that the testimony of the Church contributes to producing human faith concerning the divine Scriptures, though it is neither the sole nor the principal cause, nor is it absolutely required for someone to believe with human faith that the sacred books contain the word of God. For one may come across a sacred text and, upon considering its divine contents and its plainly unique style of speech, be led to believe that it contains the very word of God, even if perhaps it has not been presented to him as such, much less commended by the Church as divine Scripture.”

Demonstration of the Articles of Faith of the Augsburg Confession, IV, 24.

Thus, the Protestant reading of Augustine takes him to mean that the testimony of the Church merely introduced him to Scripture while he was still an unbelieving Manichaean and produced a strong yet merely human faith in the Gospel. Then, after conceiving faith from the text itself, he accepted Scripture with divine faith in itself due to its self-authentication.

St. Augustine’s Epistemology

First, what does St. Augustine even mean by the term “Church”? Contrary to the Protestant view, it is not simply any place where the Gospel is rightly preached and the sacraments rightly administered. In fact, he explicitly rejects that:

“Outside the Catholic Church one can have everything except salvation: one can have honor, one can have sacraments, one can sing alleluia, one can respond amen, one can hold the Gospel, one can have and preach faith in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit – but nowhere except in the Catholic Church can one find salvation.”

Sermon to the People of Caesarea, n. 6 (CSEL 53, 174-75).

Instead, he envisions a visible church with institutional bounds. He explains that the Donatist schismatics, though outwardly resembling the true Church as a branch resembles its original tree, are not actually part of the true Church, which he calls the vine:

“For even a branch that has been cut off from the vine retains the same outward form. But what use is that shape if it is not living from the root? Come, brother, if you wish to be engrafted in the vine. It is grievous when we see you thus lying cut off. Number the priests from the See of Peter. And, in that order of fathers, see whom succeeded whom. This is the Rock which the proud gates of hades do not conquer.” (cf. Mt 16:18)

Psalm against the party of the Donatists (PL 43, 30).

This is especially useful for us since it clarifies what St. Augustine means when he attributes such great authority to “the Church”. Finally, we can analyze the relevant texts to demonstrate that he absolutely contradicts Protestant epistemology.

The quote in question comes from his work replying to the fundamental epistle of Manichaeus, the founder of Manichaeism who had died 80 years before Augustine was born. St. Augustine summarizes their heresy like this:

“They affirm that Christ existed, as our Scripture says, and that [he] came for souls, not bodies. He did not exist in real flesh but appeared to deceive human senses, pretending to die and rise again. They deny the God who gave the Law through Moses and spoke in the Hebrew prophets is the true God, calling him one of the princes of darkness… They claim that the promise of Jesus Christ concerning the Holy Spirit is fulfilled in their Manichaean heresiarch.”

On Heresies, ch. 46 (PL 42, 38).

A very similar work of St. Augustine is On the Profit of Believing, written six years before his response to the epistle of Manichaeus. I will inject several quotes from that work as I make my case, for it also shows St. Augustine’s epistemology quite well. Ultimately, I invite each of my readers to go read these yourself so you may be edified.

In these works, Augustine consistently brings up the critique Manichaeans make against the Church, namely, that the Church demands faith in these mysteries before one understands how they interconnect in one perfect system of religion. St. Augustine reverses the critique, for the Manichaeans promised knowledge about the world and true religion, which they could not provide, and then demanded faith without authority.

This underscores a consistent and central theme to the theology of St. Augustine: faith precedes understanding, yet it seeks it over time:

“What then we understand, we owe to reason; what we believe, to authority.”

On the Profit of Believing, n. 25 (PL 42, 83).

For St. Augustine, the Catholic faith is first assented to on the basis of authority, even when understanding is not yet present; in time, however, that understanding may emerge and itself become an additional motive of credibility. In a similar way, a new convert believes in the mysteries of the faith without yet perceiving how they interconnect within the Church’s coherent and beautiful synthesis. With growth in study and reflection, one gradually comes to see how particular doctrines harmonize with the whole. This is something I myself experienced, yet one does not suspend the assent of faith until one has understood, according to St. Augustine. He says:

“All heretics … promise to those whom they attract, that they will give them a reason concerning the most obscure matters: and on this account they chiefly charge the Catholic Church, that they who come to her are enjoined to believe; but they make it their boast, that they impose not a yoke of believing, but open a fount of teaching.”

On the Profit of Believing, n. 21 (PL 42, 79).

And:

“Rightly therefore has it been ordained by the majesty of the Catholic system of teaching, that they who approach unto religion be before all things persuaded to have faith.”

On the Profit of Believing, n. 29 (PL 42, 86).

From what we have described thus far, St. Augustine’s assertion that the Catholic Church demands faith of those who join her is not immediately opposed to Protestants. The question is:

• Is the Church demanding faith as a mere prerequisite for entering her, since her testimony only produces human faith, though believers receive divine faith once they encounter Scripture itself? (Protestant view)

• Or, is the Church the conditione sine qua non for St. Augustine, that rule of faith both before one enters the Church and after? (Catholic view)

St. Augustine begins his argument by explaining that the Catholic Church possesses certain motives of credibility for which she can be believed when she demands faith. He says that the faithful are not universally wise with a perfect understanding of all the mysteries, but are united by a common simple faith:

“In the Catholic Church, to leave aside the most profound wisdom, the knowledge of which few spiritual people attain in this life… the rest of the crowd is made most secure not by the liveliness of understanding, but by the simplicity of faith. Therefore, if I set aside this wisdom, which you do not believe exists in the Catholic Church, there are many other things in its bosom that hold me most justly.”

Against the Epistle of Manichaeus, ch. 4 (5) (PL 42, 175).

He then explains what these things are, which we call the motives of credibility:

“The agreement of peoples and nations holds me. The authority begun with miracles, nourished with hope, increased with love, and strengthened with age holds me in the Catholic Church. The succession of priests from the very see (ab ipsa sede) of the apostle Peter, to whom after his resurrection the Lord entrusted the feeding of his sheep, right up to the present episcopacy holds me in the Catholic Church. Finally, the name ‘Catholic’ holds me in the Catholic Church. It was not without reason that this Church alone, among so many heresies, obtained this name so that, though all heretics want to be called Catholic, no heretic would dare to point out his own basilica or house to some stranger who asked where the Catholic Church was to be found.”

Against the Epistle of Manichaeus, ch. 4 (5) (PL 42, 175).

In his other work, another motive he lists is the ability of the Catholic religion to change entire populations and cultures, granting sinful men full of vice the grace to seek virtue:

“Habits have so great power to hold possession of men’s minds, that even what in them are evil, which usually takes place through excess of lusts, we can sooner disapprove of and hate, than abandon or change. Do you think that little has been done for the benefit of man, that not some few very learned men maintain by argument, but also an unlearned crowd of males and females in so many and different nations both believe and set forth, that we are to worship as God nothing of earth…? That abstinence is extended even unto the slenderest food of bread and water, and fastings not only for the day, but also continued through several days together; that chastity is carried even unto the contempt of marriage and family; that patience even unto the setting light by crosses and flames; that liberality even unto the distribution of estates unto the poor; that, lastly, the contempt of this whole world even unto the desire of death? Few do these things, yet fewer do them well and wisely: but whole nations approve, nations hear, nations favor, nations, lastly, love. Nations admit their own weakness that they cannot do these things, and that not without the mind being carried forward unto God, nor without certain sparks of virtue.”

On the Profit of Believing, n. 35 (PL 42, 90-91).

Ironically, the motives listed by St. Augustine are the same ones listed by Vatican 1:

“To the Catholic Church alone belong all those things, so many and so marvellous, which have been divinely ordained to make for the manifest credibility of the Christian faith. What is more, the Church herself by reason of her astonishing propagation, her outstanding holiness and her inexhaustible fertility in every kind of goodness, by her catholic unity and her unconquerable stability, is a kind of great and perpetual motive of credibility and an incontrovertible evidence of her own divine mission. So it comes about that, like a standard lifted up for the nations, she both invites to herself those who have not yet believed, and likewise assures her sons and daughters that the faith they profess rests on the firmest of foundations.”

Vatican I, Sess. 3, ch. 3, n. 11-12.

After listing these, before even discussing any articles of faith, Augustine affirms that these motives authenticate the Catholic Church and produce faith in her teachings, which Protestants reject:

“But with you [Manichaeans], where there is none of these things to attract or keep me, the promise of truth is the only thing that comes into play.  Now if the truth is so clearly proved as to leave no possibility of doubt, it must be set before all the things that keep me in the Catholic Church; but if there is only a promise without any fulfillment, no one shall move me from the faith which binds my mind with ties so many and so strong to the Christian religion.”

Against the Epistle of Manichaeus, ch. 4 (5) (PL 42, 175).1

Again, St. Augustine says that these motives alone are sufficient for identifying the divinity of the Catholic religion and that “no one shall move me from the faith which binds my mind.” He hasn’t talked about Scripture or its self-authentication yet, but only the marks of the visible, institutional Church.

Augustine calls these motives of credibility, which are concurrent with the preaching of the Church, the “help of God” which authenticates the Catholic Church as a divine legate:

“This has been brought to pass by the Divine Providence, through the prophecies of the Prophets, through the manhood and teaching of Christ, through the journeys of the Apostles, through the insults, crosses, blood, of the Martyrs, through the praiseworthy life of the Saints, and, in all these, according as times were seasonable, through miracles worthy of so great matters and virtues. When therefore we see so great help of God, so great progress and fruit, shall we doubt to hide ourselves in the bosom of that Church, which even unto the confession of the human race from [the] apostolic chair through successions of Bishops, has held the summit of authority. To be unwilling to grant to her the first place, is either surely the height of impiety, or is headlong arrogance?”

On the Profit of Believing, n. 35 (PL 42, 91).2

We finally get to the famous quote. In context, St. Augustine says that the Manichaeans cannot even try to prove that Manichaeus was an apostle from Scripture since the same authority through which He believed the Scriptures also commands him to reject Manichaeism:

“I do not believe Manichæus to be an apostle of Christ… Now you are at a loss what to say or do; for you promised to give knowledge of the truth, and here you are forcing me to believe what I have no knowledge of. Perhaps you will read the gospel to me, and will attempt to find there a testimony to Manichæus. But should you meet with a person not yet believing the gospel, how would you reply to him were he to say, I do not believe?  For my part, I should not believe the gospel except as moved by the authority of the Catholic Church. So when those on whose authority I have consented to believe in the gospel tell me not to believe in Manichæus, how can I but consent?  Take your choice. If you say, Believe the Catholics:  their advice to me is to put no faith in you; so that, believing them, I am precluded from believing you;—If you say, Do not believe the Catholics:  you cannot fairly use the gospel in bringing me to faith in Manichæus; since I believed the gospel because the Catholics preached it. To convince me, then, you must put aside the gospel. If you keep to the gospel, I will keep to those who commanded me to believe the gospel; and, in obedience to them, I will not believe you at all.”

Against the Epistle of Manichaeus, ch. 5 (6) (PL 42, 176).

So, what is the Protestant reading of this? The Lutheran Martin Chemnitz (d. 1586) says:

“By the witness of the church, therefore, he was moved to read the Gospel and to believe that the divinely revealed doctrine is contained in it.”

Examination of the Council of Trent, vol. 1, 2nd topic, sect. 2.

David Hollaz (d. 1713) says:

“Augustine’s meaning is not that on account of the authority of the church he believed with divine faith and unshakable assent that sacred scripture had proceeded from God, but he speaks of a motive of credibility, by which he was moved and induced to read sacred scripture, as if to say: ‘If I had not been induced I would neither have read scripture, nor would it have worked assent in me: but after I read scripture attentively, it itself, with the concurrence of the Holy Spirit, by its own illuminating power, testified of itself in my heart.’”

Examen theologicum acroamaticum, Prolegomena, ch. 3, q. 33.

Girolamo Zanchi (d. 1590) similarly comments on this passage:

“Is there any one of us who did not come to the Gospel in the same way? Why did we believe that this is the Word of God? Because of the testimony and authority of the Church… Nevertheless, the testimony of the Church does not suffice for this true knowledge of Scripture… For by this testimony alone no one can be brought to believe truly or to recognize that Scripture is God-breathed. But it is useful for two things: first, that we may lend our ears to it and hear the Word which it brings; secondly, that we may conceive some good opinion of this Word, even if not a firm faith, that it is the Word of God.”

De Sacra Scriptura, q. 2, prop. 8.

Yet, if one actually reads St. Augustine, this is not at all what he says. As cited above, St. Augustine explicitly says that, due to the motives of credibility, “no one shall move me from the faith which binds [his] mind.” He never once affirms Scripture as self-authenticating, nor does he say the Church merely introduced him to Scripture. This is completely absent in St. Augustine.

Why would he say that he is bound to listen to the institutional Catholic Church in rejecting Manichaeans? I will read it again:

“So when those on whose authority I have consented to believe in the gospel tell me not to believe in Manichæus, how can I but consent?  […]If you say, Believe the Catholics:  their advice to me is to put no faith in you; so that, believing them, I am precluded from believing you;—If you say, Do not believe the Catholics:  you cannot fairly use the gospel in bringing me to faith in Manichæus; since I believed the gospel because the Catholics preached it.”

Against the Epistle of Manichaeus, ch. 5 (6) (PL 42, 176).

Does this sound like merely being introduced to Scripture? Obviously not. Another interesting point is that, though Manichaeism is obviously incompatible with even “mere” Christianity, this is not the reason St. Augustine gives for rejecting the Manichaean heresy; his argument is that, a priori and excluding private judgement of the Manichaean religion, he ought to reject them because the Church, which, again, has institutional boundaries, rejects them.

Yet, we can keep reading so that this becomes even more clear.

“But if haply you should succeed in finding in the gospel an incontrovertible testimony to the apostleship of Manichæus, you will weaken my regard for the authority of the Catholics who bid me not to believe you; and the effect of that will be, that I shall no longer be able to believe the gospel either, for it was through the Catholics that I got my faith in it; and so, whatever you bring from the gospel will no longer have any weight with me. Wherefore, if no clear proof of the apostleship of Manichæus is found in the gospel, I will believe the Catholics rather than you.  But if you read thence some passage clearly in favor of Manichæus, I will believe neither them nor you: not them, for they lied to me about you; nor you, for you quote to me that Scripture which I had believed on the authority of those liars.”

Against the Epistle of Manichaeus, ch. 5 (6) (PL 42, 176).

Clearly, the notion of Scripture as self-authenticating is absent for Augustine, for he says that he believed the Gospels on the testimony of the Church. This is no different than if the Church were to proclaim as dogma tomorrow that Jesus was not really born in Bethlehem but in Athens. Obviously, this proposition explicitly opposes the same Scriptures which the Church proposes to us.

Another claim by Protestants is that Augustine was merely speaking of himself while yet an unbeliever. As a Christian, Protestants claim Augustine believed Scripture by its own self-authentication without the authority of the Church. William Bucanus (d. 1603) says:

“This Augustine speaketh of himself, as yet not converted unto the faith. Neither is it any marvel that those which are not as yet converted are moved with the consent of the Church and the authority of men. Therefore his meaning is, that the Church is, as it were, an introduction whereby we are prepared to give credit to the Scripture.”

Institutiones Theologicae, loc. IV, n. 25.

Louis Le Blanc (d. 1675) says:

“[Augustine] speaks in the person of one who is being introduced to the faith, and begins to have some persuasion of the divine truth of the Gospel. For the common consent and testimony of the Church is ordinarily the first incentive by which we are induced to give some credence to Scripture.”

Theological Thesis, On the Authority of Scripture, pt. 2, n. 18.

This is, again, incorrect, for St. Augustine affirms that even today, as a believer, he accepts the book of Acts on the authority of the Church:

“But far be it that I should not believe the gospel; for believing it, I find no way of believing you too. For the names of the apostles, as there recorded, do not include the name of Manichæus. And who the successor of Judas was we read in the Acts of the Apostles; which book I must needs believe if I believe the gospel, since both writings alike Catholic authority commends to me. The same book contains the well-known narrative of the calling and apostleship of Paul. Read me now, if you can, in the gospel where Manichæus is called an apostle, or in any other book in which I have professed to believe.”

Against the Epistle of Manichaeus, ch. 5 (6) (PL 42, 177).

The Anglican theologian William Whitaker (d. 1595) absolutely blunders this, as he omits the actual reason which Augustine gives for believing the book of Acts, saying:

“Stapleton’s fourth reason is, because Augustine in this chapter says of the Acts of the Apostles, ‘I must needs believe this book.’ Therefore (says Stapleton) he speaks of himself as he then was, namely, as a catholic. I answer, that this is no reason. For whether he speak of himself as a catholic or as a Manichean, it was needful by all means that he should believe this book, inasmuch as it is the word of God: for all alike must needs either receive or reject the Gospels and the Acts together.”

A Disputation on Holy Scripture, q. 3, ch. 8.

Stapleton responds:

“As if the question here were whether Augustine had to believe the Gospel and the Acts of the Apostles! That is not what is being asked in this place, but whether he believed each book as a Catholic on account of the authority of the Church. You have maintained up to now that he believed the Gospel indeed on account of the authority of the Church—but while he was still a Manichaean, not after he was a Catholic. We maintain that he believed the Gospel on account of the authority of the Church when he was already a Catholic. And so that I might prove this, I brought forward another passage of his concerning the Acts of the Apostles, of which he says in the present tense: ‘I must believe this book if I believe the Gospel, since the same Catholic authority commends both writings to me alike.’ Since you cannot escape the fact that Augustine is speaking here of himself as a Catholic, you answer in the most foolish manner that it was necessary for him to believe it whether as a Manichaean or as a Catholic, whether he is speaking of himself as a Manichaean or as a Catholic. Thus you do not answer the point under debate, but you wish to seem to be doing something else, and you pass over as though indifferent and irrelevant the very matter placed in dispute, taking either side as though it were all the same. While you were giving this answer, where was your judgment? Where was your mind?”

Authoritatis Ecclesiasticae de Scripturae Approbatione, lib. II, cap. 8, Antwerp: Ioannem Keerbergium, 1592, pg. 460-61.

In fact, not only does St. Augustine affirm this about the authority of the Church regarding his faith in the Bible itself, but even about the articles of faith in the whole Christian life. He writes the following in the end of his work on heresies:

“For what the Catholic Church thinks against these doctrines – which you thought should be explained by me – is asked unnecessarily, since it is sufficient to know that the Church is opposed to them, and that no one ought to accept any of them into the faith. But how the truth which stands against them should be asserted and defended goes beyond the limits of this work. Still, it greatly helps a faithful heart to know what ought not to be believed, even if it cannot refute it by argument. Therefore every Catholic Christian ought not to believe these things.”

On Heresies, ch. 88 (PL 42, 50).

Objections

Yet, the Protestants are not without objection. They usually point to chapter fourteen of the same work and claim St. Augustine speaks there about the internal illumination of the Spirit by which Scripture is accepted as self-authenticating. He says against the Manichaeans:

“What do you think that we should do but abandon those [the Manichaens] who invite us to certain knowledge and afterward command us to believe uncertainties? We should instead follow those [the Catholics] who invite us first to believe what we cannot as yet see in order that, having been strengthened by faith, we may merit to understand what we believe, when it is no longer human beings but God himself who interiorly enlightens and strengthens our mind.”

Against the Epistle of Manichaeus, ch. 14 (17) (PL 42, 183).

William Whitaker argues thus:

“[Augustine] himself in the fourteenth chapter of this book says that we, when we believe and are become strong in faith, understand what we believe not now by the help of men, but by God himself internally confirming and illuminating our minds. The faithful, therefore, do not believe merely on account of the church’s authority.”

A Disputation on Holy Scripture, q. 3, ch. 8.

Abraham Calovius, the Lutheran, argues in the same way.

This argument is absurd for many reasons. First, if anyone has paid attention to Augustine’s words throughout his anti-Manichaean works, he consistently distinguishes between faith and understanding, which is clearly the distinction he is making here. He does not say God illuminates us so that we may recognize and believe Scripture’s self-authenticating testimony, which is the Protestant view. On the contrary, he says God illuminates us by granting us understanding after we have already believed.

Second, he explicitly says that the illumination of God comes after faith to help us understand, unlike Protestants who hold that the testimony of the Church produces only a human faith which prepares us for divine faith from the testimony of the Spirit. Again, he says:

"We should instead follow those [the Catholics] who invite us first to believe what we cannot as yet see in order that, having been strengthened by faith, we may merit to understand what we believe, when it is no longer human beings but God himself who interiorly enlightens and strengthens our mind.”

Against the Epistle of Manichaeus, ch. 4 (17) (PL 42, 183).

This understanding comes after belief. No Catholic denies that the Spirit helps us understand Scripture and our faith by grace, yet our faith itself is prior to that.

Thomas Stapleton replies to Whitaker:

“This passage of Augustine teaches nothing except that one must begin with faith if one is afterwards to understand (which is the Catholic doctrine), not first understand in order afterwards to believe (which was the discipline—or rather the empty promise—of the Manichaeas). The whole context clearly teaches this… Thus he teaches that we are led to faith first by the ministry of men—that is, the Church—though not without the Holy Spirit also teaching inwardly; but the beginnings of faith are received by the testimony of the Church. Then, once we have believed, by the merit and gift of faith we become stronger and more perceptive in understanding the things we believe. And God Himself often supplies this clearer and brighter understanding of what we believe without human teaching or preaching… In these very words of Augustine your Calvin has similarly abused this passage in this very controversy, and you, blind, have followed your blind leader, and both of you have fallen into the ditch of error.”

Authoritatis Ecclesiasticae de Scripturae Approbatione, lib. II, cap. 8, Antwerp: Ioannem Keerbergium, 1592, pg. 467.

Another passage comes from his Confessions. Here, Protestants often claim St. Augustine is teaching the self-authentication of Scripture, yet, again, he is only talking about understanding through the guidance of the Holy Spirit. It reads:

“Let me hear and understand (intelligam) how in the beginning Thou made the heaven and the earth. Moses wrote this; he wrote and departed — passed hence from You to You. Nor now is he before me; for if he were I would hold him, and ask him, and would adjure him by You that he would open unto me these things, and I would lend the ears of my body to the sounds bursting forth from his mouth. And should he speak in the Hebrew tongue, in vain would it beat on my senses, nor would anything touch my mind; but if in Latin, I should know what he said. But whence should I know whether he said what was true? But if I knew this even, should I know it from him? Verily within me, within in the chamber of my thought, Truth, neither Hebrew, nor Greek, nor Latin, nor barbarian, without the organs of voice and tongue, without the sound of syllables, would say, He speaks the truth, and I, immediately assured of it, confidently would say unto that man of Yours, You speak the truth. As, then, I cannot inquire of him, I beseech You — You, O Truth, full of whom he spoke truth — You, my God, I beseech, forgive my sins; and do Thou, who gave to that Your servant to speak these things, grant to me also to understand (intelligere) them.”

Confessions, bk. 11, ch. 3, n. 5 (PL 32, 811).

There are a couple of problems with claiming this teaches self-authentication.

1. First, he never mentions belief or faith here, which is what concerns us. Protestants claim they can believe with divine faith that such and such a book is inspired through the inward testimony of the Spirit. St. Augustine instead speaks of understanding, both in the beginning of the paragraph: “Let me hear and understand how in the beginning Thou made the heaven and the earth,” and in the end: “my God… who gave to that Your servant to speak these things, grant to me also to understand them.” This is nothing else than him affirming, as he usually does, that men are helped by God to understand Scripture. Again, no Catholic is opposed to this. Yet, this is not what produces faith, since remember that for St. Augustine, understanding, even if guided by God, is the result of reason and is distinct from faith:

   “What then we understand, we owe to reason; what we believe, to authority.”

   On the Profit of Believing, n. 25 (PL 42, 83).

   Ironically, for both of the objections so far, these actually oppose the Protestant principle of private judgement for articles of faith. For St. Augustine, God grants us understanding, but this is not assented to, whereas Protestants hold that one must be able to assent, since they reject the Church as the medium for divine faith.

2. Second, if taken literally, even Protestants would reject this, since he would be affirming an internal voice whispering to him the truth. Protestants instead generally hold that the marks and efficacy of Scripture allow the believer to conclude that Scripture is divine, yet Augustine says nothing of marks or efficacy here.

Conclusion

To conclude this article, I will quote St. Augustine’s explanation of Catholic epistemology: Christ appeared and his miracles authenticated Him as a divine legate, acquiring authority before men. He then established a universal Church with her own marks to serve as motives of credibility since He would no longer be on Earth, yet He desired that the nations receive His teaching through her voice:

"Therefore, he, bringing a remedy that would heal the most corrupt morals, established his authority through miracles, earned belief through authority, drew a multitude through faith, secured longevity through the multitude, and strengthened religion through longevity — so that neither the most foolish novelty of heretics, working by deceit, nor even the long-standing errors of the gentiles, violently opposing it, could in any way shake it… with all attention, all desires, with groans, and tears, call upon God to free you from the evil of error, if a blessed life is dear to you. This will be easier if you willingly obey His precepts, which He wished to be established with such authority in the Catholic Church.”

On the Profit of Believing, n. 32 - 33 (PL 42, 88).

The Filioque states that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one principle. This is directly suggested by Christ in the Last Supper.

“I have yet many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now. When the Spirit of truth comes, He will guide you into all the truth; for He will not speak on his own authority, but whatever He hears he will speak, and He will declare to you the things that are to come. He will glorify me, for he will take what is mine and declare it to you. All that the Father has is mine; therefore I said that He will take what is mine and declare it to you.”

John 16:12-25

Fr. Martin Jugie, A.A. was an Augustinian priest and oriental scholar who spent most of his life conducting Eastern studies and scholarship. He comments on this passage:

“Christ speaks figuratively and in a human way. He says that the Holy Spirit will teach the Apostles all truth, namely all the truth that will be useful and necessary for them to fulfill the mission received from Christ; but the Spirit does not have this knowledge from himself, but will hear and receive it from another. Moreover, he will hear and receive it first from the Son, and thus he will glorify the Son, because he will teach and announce the things he has heard and received from the Son. For by announcing future things, which only God can do, he will certainly glorify him, by the very fact demonstrating that he is the true Son of God. The glory of the disciple is the glory of the master.”

On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, ch. 2, art. 3.

One immediate objection we can address is from Photius of Constantinople, regarded as a saint by the Eastern Orthodox, who proposed several objections to this in the ninth century. He claims that Christ here only speaks of giving the Spirit knowledge of the things to come, but not communicating the divine nature.

Yet, the knowledge received by the Spirit from Christ is divine knowledge, for Christ says: “He will not speak on his own authority, but whatever He hears he will speak, and He will declare to you the things that are to come.” Either the Spirit always had such knowledge, or He is not divine. Since this knowledge is identical to the divine essence, Christ is precisely teaching the Filioque under a different concept, namely the communication of divine knowledge.

Furthermore, Christ is not speaking as man, as if He were explaining that the Spirit will relay to the Apostles whatever He prays for, but He is speaking as God: “All that the Father has is mine; therefore I said that He will take what is mine and declare it to you.” This imitates His common way of speaking regarding His own procession from the Father: “My doctrine is not mine, but his who sent me” (John 7:16); “What things I have heard from Him, these I speak in the world” (John 8:26); “I have not spoken from myself... Therefore the things which I speak, just as the Father said to me, so I speak” (John 12:49-50).

“And hence it is that by receiving from the Son, the Holy Spirit by that very fact receives from the Father, because the things of the Son are from the Father. The Father and the Son possess these things indivisibly. But since the text deals with divine knowledge, which in reality is one with the divine essence, therefore the Holy Spirit receives the divine essence both from the Father and from the Son indivisibly, that is: he eternally proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one principle.”

On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, ch. 2, art. 3.

Thus, in the creed given by St. Epiphanius to catechumens, he writes:

“He is the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of God, the perfect Spirit, the Paraclete Spirit, uncreated, proceeding from the Father, receiving from the Son, in whom we believe.”

Ancoratus, 122 (PG 43, 235).

He had stated this earlier in the work:

“The Spirit proceeds from the Father and receives from the Son... If Christ is believed to be God from God from the Father, the Spirit is also from Christ or from both, as Christ says: Who proceeds from the Father; and: He will receive of mine.”

Ancoratus, 7, 67 (PG 43; 28, 137).

St. Athanasius similarly wrote:

“The Son says: ‘What I have heard from the Father, these things I speak in the world'.’ But the Spirit also receives from the Son: ‘He will receive of mine, he says, and will announce to you…’ Since therefore the Spirit has the same order and the same nature towards the Son as the Son has towards the Father, by what reason, I ask, will he who contends that the Holy Spirit is a created thing, not necessarily think the same about the Son?”

Epist. I ad Serapionem 1, 2 (PG 26, 580).

St. Ambrose traces this order as well. The Son receives from the Father and the Spirit proceeds, that is, receives the divine nature through what St. Ambrose calls the unity of nature:

“What the Son received from the Father through the unity of nature, the Holy Spirit received from the Son through the same unity; because what the Spirit speaks is of the Son; what the Son gave is of the Father.”

On the Holy Spirit, bk. 2, ch. 12 (PL 16, 803B).

Didymus of Alexandria says that the Spirit will not speak of Himself because He is inseparable from Christ’s and the Father’s will, since He is from both of them:

“He will not speak of himself; that is: not without me and without my and the Father’s judgment, because he is inseparable from my and the Father’s will, because he is not from himself, but is from the Father and me; for this very thing that he subsists and speaks, is to him from the Father and me.”

On the Holy Spirit, ch. 34 (PG 39, 1063).

Another argument from Photius against such a reading is that it would force Christ to contradict Himself, since He says n John 15:26, “But when the Helper comes, Whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father, He will bear witness about me.” Photius writes:

“But one will say, when the Saviour mystically instructed His disciples, he truly said, the Spirit will receive of Mine and will proclaim Him to you. Who cannot see that you appeal to the word of the Savior, not in order to find an advocate for your doctrine, but in order to fashion brutal and insolent attacks against the Master Himself, for you break out into insolent contradiction with Him, Who is the ineffable source of truth, because of your reckless tongue? In fact, however, the Creator and Sustainer of the race teaches that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and in no way delivers to us the doctrine that He also proceeds from Himself.”

Mystagogy, 20, (PG 102, 300).

This argument does not work since affirmative propositions are not exclusively negative. If I say that I am the son of my father, I am not denying that I am the son of my mother. If I say that I visited the bank on Monday, I am not denying that I visited the store. It is true, as Photius says, that in that verse, Christ does not deliver a teaching on the Spirit’s procession from Him, but it does not follow that this negates such a fact.

There is one final objection that is worth noting. Photius claims that since Christ said that the Spirit will receive from “what is mine” and not “from me”, He meant to denote the Spirit receiving from a principle distinct from Him yet belonging to Him, namely the Father.

“The Saviour did not say, ‘He will receive from me’, rather, ‘He will receive from all that which is mine.’ There is a great and profound difference between the words ‘from that which is mine’ and ‘from me.’ The expression ‘from me’ indicates the speaker of the phrase. But doubtless, another person is meant than the speaker. What other hypostasis, from whom the Spirit is said to receive, could be meant other than the Father? Because it cannot be — as has been recently contended against God — that He receives from the Son, and it certainly cannot be from the Spirit who Himself does the receiving! Do you see how you have not even reached the level of a child? For even schoolboys who have just begun attending school know the expression ‘from me’ indicates him who speaks, whilst the phrase ‘from that which is mine’ means another person, bound intimately in union to the speaker, but doubtless a different person than the one speaking.”

Mystagogy, 22, (PG 102, 301).

Such a reading introduces a tautology in the words of our Lord, since, instead of saying, “All that the Father has is mine; therefore I said that He will take what is mine and declare it to you,” He would be saying, “All that the Father has is my Father’s; therefore I said that he will take what is my Father’s and declare it to you.”

Even the 13th century Orthodox writer Nicephorus Blemmydes noted at the second synod of Nymphaeum, held in the year 1250, that:

“To say that the expression ‘from what is Mine’ means ‘from the Father’ — for this was advanced at that time in order to answer the objection — must be rejected as a forced interpretation.”

Curriculum vitae, n. 23, Lipzieg, 1896., p. 79.

Evangelizing the Chinese people raised two main issues related to Chinese culture and tradition. The more uncomplicated one pertains to the name used for God in Chinese. Tiānzhǔ, which means “Lord of Heaven,” was first used by the missionaries who arrived in China, though they did not know it was also applied to idols within Taoism or Buddhism. This, however, was not a sufficient reason to not use the title, since Deus and Theos were adopted by the Apostles when evangelizing pagan Greeks and Romans. Fr. Ricci even adopted this title in his work called The true meaning of the Lord of Heaven, published in 1603 in Beijing. Written for the educated class, Fr. Ricci writes regarding the nature of the true God, creation, the origin of the soul, morals, and salvation history. In fact, this was the first issue later addressed by Pope Clement XI in his 1704 response to the missionaries. The holy father approved the title “Lord of Heaven”, though he did not permit others.

The more controversial issue, after which this event is named, pertains to the actual rites practiced by the Chinese people. Upon encountering Chinese culture, missionaries discovered a rich tradition of rituals and ceremonies done in honor for not only the living but also their deceased. The most venerated figure among them was the philosopher Confucius, whose teachings provided the foundation for Chinese government, ethics, and culture. Regarding him, Fr. Ricci wrote:

“Among all the philosophers, the greatest is called Confucius of China. I find that he was born into this world 551 years before the coming of Christ our Savior to earth, and that he lived for more than seventy years in such a way that, by his example no less than by his writings and conversations, he encouraged everyone to pursue virtue. As a result of this manner of life, he attained such esteem among the Chinese that they believe all mortals who have excelled in virtue anywhere on earth were surpassed by him in holiness of life. And indeed, if one considers the sayings and deeds attributed to him, we shall admit that he yields to few of our pagan philosophers, and even surpasses many of them… Nor do learned men alone honor him, but even the kings themselves have, throughout so many past centuries, revered him in the manner due to a mortal, not as though he were some deity. They declare that, in doing so, they are showing their gratitude for the teaching they received from him.”

On the Expedition to China undertaken by the Society of Jesus, Cologne, 1617, p. 32.

This controversy never concerned religions like Buddhism or Taoism. Yet, the rites performed in Chinese culture obviously had an external religious aesthetic when judged by the common eye, so the question naturally arose: did these rites offer worship to Confucius and other creatures which is due to God alone and His saints? In the former, this would be idolatrous. In the latter case, it would be impious to venerate and invoke those for whom we do not possess even a probable hope of salvation.

Even if one grants that the Chinese rites were idolatrous, it should be noted that the Jesuits never permitted these among converts known as such. It was not their intention to please men and gain easy conversions by allowing the Chinese to maintain idolatrous practices.

As Msgr. Charles Maigrot, who himself opposed the Chinese rites, wrote to Pope Innocent XII in 1693:

“When I speak of idolatry, I do not wish to give the understanding that there are in China missionaries engaging in gross and shameful idolatry or permitting others to engage in it; for one could not affirm this without enormous calumny.”

(Letter to Pope Innocent XII)

He sent this letter together with a decree to the pope. In the decree, he criticized the Chinese rites and requested a papal response, nevertheless concluding with the following words:

“By what we are now saying and decreeing we do not intend to find fault with those who previously thought otherwise, and followed a practice different from the one we have ordered for the future. It should not seem strange if in matters of this kind all missionaries did not hold the same one opinion, and each took up the practice which in the Lord seemed to him more in accordance with the truth. But now let us all try to agree, so that speaking unanimously we may show the Church not spotted or wrinkled, but as it is, holy and immaculate.”

Edict of Charles Maigrot in 100 Roman documents concerning the Chinese rites controversy (1645-1941), San Francisco, 1992, p. 10.

On the other hand, those missionaries who permitted these rites among Chinese converts spent a great amount of time studying Chinese culture, their books, rites, and conversing with the literati, the highly educated social class skilled in Confucianism who labored across various jobs. These rites were also offered for the living, further implicating their non-religious character. An anonymous work called The true opinion of the Chinese concerning the tablet inscribed to Confucius and his ancestors attributes the following to Fr. Ricci:

“Nor do they therefore think that the dead come to eat these things, or that they have need of them; rather, they say that they do this because they know no other way by which to show the love and gratitude they bear toward them. Since they recognize no divinity in these dead persons, nor do they ask anything of them, nor hope for anything from them, all this is entirely free from idolatry… They make offerings to [Confucius] with great solemnity in order to show appreciation for the good doctrine that he left them in his books, through which their officials attained their offices and ranks; and they do so without even reciting any prayer to him, nor asking him for anything, as we have said concerning their dead.”
Vera Sinensium sententia de tabella Confucio, Rome, 1700, p. 43-44.

This is not to say that the Jesuits were so naive as to permit all things that were not properly idolatrous, for they were aware of the risk of mixing in superstition and other false beliefs into the Chinese rites. Thus, they not only took good and proper care to instruct converts on the Catholic teaching of the state of the dead, but also occasionally forbid them from participating in other rites which could proximately lead to idolatry, such as the burning of incense in front of the tablet to Confucius.

We can go earlier than this, however, to 1643. Fr. Jean-Baptiste Morales, O.P. was sent to Rome by the Dominicans to raise concerns about the Jesuit methodology in evangelizing the Chinese, concerns shared by the Franciscans as well. He brought with him a series of questions concerning the Jesuits’ evangelistic methods, seeking the Holy See’s judgment on them, to which Rome responded favorably. The Jesuits, however, suspected that the true nature of the Chinese rites and their own mission had been misrepresented. Thus, they sent to Rome Fr. Martino Martini, S.J. to plead the case for the Jesuits.

Three years later, Pope Alexander VII’s sacred congregation responded positively to the Jesuit appeal. Noteworthy is the congregations comments on the Chinese rites done to honor Confucius and the dead. In response to the third question regarding Confucius, the Holy See replied:

“The question: May Christian scholars perform the ceremony for the receiving of degrees, that takes place in a hall of Confucius? There is no sacrifice, no minister from an idolatrous sect. Nothing at all is arranged by idolaters. Students and philosophers come together to acknowledge Confucius as their teacher. From the time when they were first begun, these rites were admittedly civil and political, just for civil honor. All who are to receive degrees proceed together into a hall of Confucius. Waiting for them there are chancellors, doctors, and examiners. There before the name of the philosopher they all bow together and perform the ceremonies that are customary among the Chinese. They do not offer anything at all. They do the same things all students do for their teachers while they are alive. So, after acknowledging Confucius as their teacher, they receive their degrees from the chancellors, and depart. Besides, that hall of Confucius is a gymnasium. It is not properly a so-called temple. It is closed to everybody except students.

According to what was explained above, the Sacred Congregation ruled that the aforesaid ceremonies should be permitted to Chinese Christians. The celebration seems to be merely civil and political.”

The Congregation of the Holy Office, March 23, 1656 to China missionaries. in 100 Roman documents concerning the Chinese rites controversy (1645-1941), San Francisco, 1992, p. 5.

Then regarding the Chinese rites done for the dead, it was asked:

“The question: Could Christians be allowed the ceremonies which philosophers propose for the deceased as long as nothing superstitious is involved? Another question: Could Christians perform permissible ceremonies together with pagan relatives? Still another: Could Christians be present even when pagans perform superstitious actions, especially if they profess the Catholic faith? They would not be cooperating, nor endorsing what the pagans do. But it would surely be noticed, if blood relatives were absent. It would cause enmity and hatred. The Chinese do not think that souls of the deceased are gods. They do not hope or ask anything from them.”

The Congregation of the Holy Office, March 23, 1656 to China missionaries. in 100 Roman documents concerning the Chinese rites controversy (1645-1941), San Francisco, 1992, p. 5-6.

It then describes the different ways the Chinese honor their deceased in a ritualistic yet non-religious way. One way is for the family to set up an altar in the home with either the deceased’s image or a tablet with his or her name, along with incense, flowers, and candles. Visitors show respect by bowing, kneeling, and offering incense and candles while mourning. Twice a year, wealthier families gather in ancestor halls where tablets bearing the names and details of deceased relatives are displayed. They honor their ancestors with offerings such as food, wine, candles, and incense, while poorer families often keep the tablets at home and do not perform these ceremonies. Finally, at least once a year, relatives visit the graves of their ancestors in the mountains to clean and maintain them. They mourn through weeping, bowing, and making food and wine offerings, then share a meal together afterward. Regarding this, the Holy See wrote:

“According to what has been proposed above, the Sacred Congregation has judged that one may tolerate Chinese converts practicing these ceremonies with regard to their dead, even in company with pagans, nevertheless removing all superstition; indeed, while the pagans perform superstitious actions, they may still be present with them, especially after having professed their faith, when there is no danger of perversion and if they cannot otherwise avoid resentments and enmities.”

The Congregation of the Holy Office, March 23, 1656 to China missionaries. in 100 Roman documents concerning the Chinese rites controversy (1645-1941), San Francisco, 1992, p. 6.

About a decade later in 1665, persecutions resulted in the movement of missionaries around China. In one particular instance, 23 of them, namely Jesuits, Franciscans, and Dominicans, winded up living in the same house. In the final days of 1667 up until the end of January 1668, in attempt to unite missionary efforts, the missionaries there produced several joint articles of agreement. This is known as the “Canton Conferences,” named after the city they were in. The long-deliberated 42nd article is quite interesting. It reads:

“Concerning the ceremonies by which the Chinese venerate their master Confucius and the dead, the responses of the Sacred Congregation of the Holy and Universal Inquisition approved by Our Most Holy Lord Alexander VII in 1656 must be followed entirely: because they are founded upon a very probable opinion, against which no contrary evidence can be opposed; and, given this probability, the door of salvation must not be closed to the innumerable Chinese who would be kept away from the Christian religion if they were forbidden to do things which they can licitly and in good faith do, and which they would be forced not to omit without most grave inconveniences.”

100 Roman documents concerning the Chinese rites controversy (1645-1941), San Francisco, 1992, p. viii.

The Jesuits were able to realize much agreement from the religious orders which were previously against their methods. The head of the Dominicans in the Canton house was Fr. Dominique Fernandez Navarrete, O.P., who had received permission from his major superior to sign the agreement with the other orders. Yet, in 1669, Fr. Navarrete escaped and arrived in Rome about three years later, after which he sought to contradict and destroy the agreement reached by the religious orders in Canton. Being highly critical of the Jesuits, he wrote two works in which he disapproved of their methods. He also requested that the Holy See reexamine the case and intervene.

In 1693, Fr. Charles Maigrot of the Society of Foreign Missions and François Pallu, M.E.P. entered China. The former had been made apostolic vicar in the province of Fuchien. For those under his authority, he forbade the Chinese converts from partaking in their Chinese rites, writing:

“We declare that the questions proposed to the Supreme Pontiff, Alexander VII, regarding the principal points of controversy between the workers in this mission, are in many respects misleading. Therefore, the missionaries cannot rely on the answers given by the Apostolic See. As the circumstances were explained, the answers were correct and prudent. But the explanation was not clear. These answers would permit the worship of Confucius and the ancestors that is customary among the Chinese.”

100 Roman documents concerning the Chinese rites controversy (1645-1941), San Francisco, 1992, p. 20.

Maigrot also forbid the titles of “Heaven” and “Supreme Emperor” from being used to name God:

“Leaving out the European names which cannot be expressed in Chinese except in some barbarism, we decree that God should be called Tien Chu [Tianzhu, Lord of Heaven], a name established by long usages. Two other Chinese words—Tien [Tian, Heaven], and Xang Ti [Shangdi, Emperor supreme]—should be avoided completely. Let no one say that what the Chinese understand by these words—Tien and Xang Ti—is the God whom we Christians worship.”

100 Roman documents concerning the Chinese rites controversy (1645-1941), San Francisco, 1992, p. 9.

As suggested by his letter, his aim was to get the Holy See to reexamine the issue. Years later, several clergy were commissioned to analyze Maigrot’s propositions. One of them, Fr. Philippe de Saint-Nicolas, agreed that the Chinese should not participate in the ceremonies honoring Confucius, yet believed the titles of Heaven and Supreme Emperor were fine. He wrote:

“The Holy Office always considers that the more probable and safer side must be followed, especially in matters of this kind… Indeed, even if there were equal probability on both sides, I still believe that, following the practice of the holy Fathers, these rites should not be permitted to Christians, according to the word of the Apostle: ‘Abstain from every appearance of evil.’”

As support against the Jesuits grew, the Chinese emperor himself always supported them. Thus, with his help, they produced a work in 1700 titled A brief account of the matters1 to defend their case. In the letters accompanying these dispatches, they took care to declare that they had addressed themselves to the emperor only in order to learn from him, as head of letters and sovereign legislator of China, the true meaning of Chinese laws and customs; and while expressing their conviction, strengthened by this important testimony, concerning the purely civil character of the rites which they judged should still be tolerated, they nevertheless protested their sincere efforts gradually to replace them with the ceremonies of the Church. Others reproached the Jesuits for having carried before the tribunal of a pagan prince a cause which belonged only to the Holy See to judge: the reproach is not fair, for they asked Kang-hi only for testimony, not for a decision.

In 1704, Pope Clement responded forbidding the two aforementioned names and permitting “Lord of Heaven.” He forbade converts from actively participating in the Chinese rites yet permitted passive presence:

“Christians should not be permitted to perform the oblations, rites and ceremonies customarily performed in honor of ancestors, as they were reported in the questions. They should not be permitted to perform them, to serve at or be present at them. Either with pagans or separately… All these things are inseparable from superstition, according to what was reported in the questions. They should not be allowed to Christians. Even if beforehand they declare openly or secretly that they are not performing them as a religious, but only as a civil or political honor toward the dead, and that they are not asking or hoping for anything from them. These answers should not be taken as condemning merely material presence or participation. It could happen that Christians sometimes are present this way at superstitious actions, with pagans doing superstitious things, Christians giving no approval, either openly or covertly, to what they are doing, and refraining altogether from active participation. Otherwise, hatred and hostility cannot be avoided. Christians, though, should profess their faith, and take care not to lose their faith.”

100 Roman documents concerning the Chinese rites controversy (1645-1941), San Francisco, 1992, p. 22.

Much more was decreed, effectively rejecting the Jesuit methods that had been practiced up to that point, as discussed in the cited book. In any case, the vast majority of the empire’s 300,000 Christians were required to abandon a secular custom they had long regarded as entirely legitimate. By doing so, they would have to confront deeply entrenched prejudices and break with some of their countrymen’s most sacred traditions. As a result, they had to prepare themselves for severe persecution, the loss of their property, and perhaps even their lives.

To manage this change without at the same time ruining the mission, Pope Clement XI chose Charles-Thomas Maillard de Tournon. Emperor Kang-hi first greeted him warmly at the capital, though he changed his attitude as soon as he understood that one of the aims of his mission was to suppress the practice of the national rites among Chinese Christians. The emperor ordered all missionaries, under penalty of expulsion, to come and request from him a diploma granting permission to preach the Gospel, and that he granted it only to those who promised not to oppose the rites. Many missionaries felt impelled to receive this diploma to avoid the destruction of the mission.

In 1715, Pope Clement XI issued the constitution Ex illa die to end disputes over the Chinese Rites, reaffirming earlier prohibitions and demanding strict obedience from missionaries. The controversy continued, however, leading Pope Benedict XIV to revisit the issue and formally condemn the permissions previously granted by Mgr. Mezzabarba, declaring them null and void because they allowed practices Rome considered superstitious. Benedict XIV further required missionaries to swear an oath promising both their own obedience and that of their converts to the papal decrees. Although these decisions were seen as severe, missionaries ultimately submitted to them, and some noted that the remaining Christian communities consisted largely of poorer Christians from poorer backgrounds were better able to adjust, since they faced fewer social expectations and could afford to live more simply than their wealthier counterparts who unfortunately often abandoned the faith.

One of the most commonly used arguments against the Catholic Church in the Reformation was called the “papal circle.” Protestant theologians realized that, on the one hand, when Catholic authors wrote disputations on Scripture, they would claim Protestants could not have the certainty of faith about the canon without the infallible magisterium. On the other hand, when they treated the Church, they would prove the infallibility and authority of the Church from Scripture. Thus, Gerhard writes:

“Ask the papacy why the church’s witness is a mark of certain faith. They will answer… ‘Because it is guided by the Holy Spirit, and thus it cannot err in its decrees.’ Ask further how they know it is guided by the Spirit. They will answer that Christ promised this [in Scripture]. But if, then, this authority of the church is to be proved to me from Scripture, then Scripture’s authority must necessarily authoritative for me already beforehand, otherwise you would be proving an uncertainty with something equally uncertain.”

On Sacred Scripture, ch. 2, § 26.

This was repeated often by Protestants across all traditions.1 However, there was actually a Protestant from the Aberdeen school who wrote a dedicated work on the “papal circle”: Dr. Robert Baron. He writes:

“Papists believe the infallibility of the Church in testifying on account of the authority of the Word of GOD believed with divine faith – and this with divine faith; and conversely, they believe the authority of the Word on account of the Church’s infallibility in testifying believed with divine faith – and this also with divine faith. Here therefore there is a progression from the authority of the Word of GOD believed with divine faith to that same authority of the Word believed with divine faith, and hence it is a progression from the same to the same in the same manner of knowing.”

Theological Disputation on the Formal Object of Faith, Aberdeen, 1627, pt. 1, section 8, § 2.

His first work received a response from the Jesuit priest Fr. George Turnebull, S.J., to which Baron responded with yet a second work on the issue, which itself received a final response from Fr. Turnebull. Though I found Turnebull’s first response to be quite prolific in responding to Baron, I will mostly rely on the Thomistic school, with which I most acquainted, to explain how the “papal circle” is escaped, though most Catholic theologians present the solution in more or less the same manner.

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Important Clarifications

1. The first thing worth clarifying are the terms. By divine faith, we mean assent of the intellect to a certain truth on the basis of God revealing. This can be done either through private and immediate revelation or mediate. Thus, even the Apostles’ preaching produced divine faith since they were divine messengers or legates:

   “When you received the word of God, which you heard from us, you accepted it not as the word of men, but as what it really is, the word of God.”

   1 Thess. 2:13

2. Second, the formal object of faith is the authority of God revealing. It is not God’s truthfulness, though this is known by natural reason, but His act of revelation.

3. Third, the material objects of faith are those things which are believed i.e. the articles of faith, such as the Trinity or Mary’s virgin birth.

4. Fourth, the rule of faith is that divinely ordained instrument which is able to communicate divine revelation and oblige to the assent of faith by virtue of itself (simpliciter). For example, Protestants hold Scripture to be the only rule of faith and Catholics hold Scripture, Tradition, and the Magisterium as a rule of faith. Lesser authorities only bind the conscience to assent secundum quid, only insofar as one has judged them to agree with the rule of faith. Thus, Protestants accept their church’s official non-infallible teaching, such as the Lutheran Formula of Concord, because they have judged it to agree with Scripture, but not because the Westminster Confession can itself bind the conscience. As Robert Baron explains:

   “Pastors and Bishops gathered together, and defining controversies of faith, are not to be heard and followed simply and in all things, but only then when their decrees, and decisions do not conflict with the Word of God.”

   Apology for the Discussion on the Formal Object of Faith, Aberdeen, 1631, tr. 5, Auth. Dup., ch. 1, n. 2, p. 214-15.

   The rule of faith is not the formal object, but it is used by God as an instrument to propose the material objects of faith and it applies the formal object. Thus Christ tells the Apostles: “He who hears you hears Me, he who rejects you rejects Me.” (Luke 10:16) Robert Baron actually explains this well:

   “Whence our faith is not resolved into the rule itself, but into the formal object of faith, that is, into the authority of God revealing applied to that rule. For if you ask why I receive Sacred Scripture as the rule of my faith, I will respond: because it is the Word of God, and because it was handed down to us by God to regulate and direct our faith. But if you ask why I believe this or that dogma proposed in Scripture, I will respond: because it was revealed by God, who is the First Truth, in that rule or through that rule.”

   Apology for the Discussion on the Formal Object of Faith, Aberdeen, 1631, tr. 2, § 1, Auth. Dup., n. 5, p. 85.

5. Finally, remember that divine revelation and divine inspiration are two distinct things, since a divine legate can bring authentic revelation in his own words. Instead, inspiration is when God moves the human author so that the resulting text has God as its primary author. Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. writes:

   “Inspiration does not involve the divine manifestation of any given truth but, rather, only designates a divine instinct or divine motion enabling one to infallibly judge and write down even facts that are already naturally known. Thus, Matthew is said to have written in the Gospel, under God’s inspiration, the facts of Christ’s life, which he already knew naturally from sight without revelation. Thus, we understand the term supernatural revelation to mean a divine action manifesting a truth previously hidden from us and beyond the order of nature.”

   De Revelatione, vol. 1, ch. 4, art. 1, § 1.

   This distinction, though affirmed in principle, was actually butchered almost unanimously by Protestant theologians in the age of polemics and even by some Catholics. This will be relevant later.

The Motives of Credibility

While it is true that Catholic theologians point to Scripture to defend the prerogatives of the Church, this is not their only answer, for they likewise affirm that the Church is discerned as a divine legate through the motives of credibility. These motives are marks which confirm the message of the divine messenger to be from God; they allow men to attain reasonable certainty of God’s approval of such a legate and allow men to assent to this legate’s teachings with prudence. The reason for this is that, since such marks could only have God as their cause, the message accompanied by miracles must be authentic; otherwise God would be the promoter of falsehood, which is impossible. Thus, the healed blind man in John 9 says: “Never since the world began has it been heard that anyone opened the eyes of a man born blind. If this man were not from God, he could do nothing.” Nicodemus in John 3 told Jesus: “Rabbi, we know that you are a teacher come from God, for no one can do these signs that you do unless God is with him.” In Acts 16, after noticing the miraculous release of all prisoners and even the holiness of St. Paul’s character, the jailer immediately asked, “Sirs, what must I do to be saved?”

These motives are not limited to miracles, though it is not the intent of this article to provide a comprehensive list or prove they uniquely vindicate the Catholic Church since this question is regarding a matter of principles, not of fact.

Such a line of argumentation is obviously necessary for those who are not Christian and don’t already accept the Scriptures. Thus, St. Augustine, after listing some motives of credibility for the Catholic Church, rhetorically asks Manichaeans:

“But should you meet with a person not yet believing the gospel, how would you reply to him were he to say, I do not believe? For my part, I should not believe the gospel except as moved by the authority of the Catholic Church.”

Against the Epistle of Manichaeus, ch. 5 (6) (PL 42, 176).

The most essential error of Robert Barron was the unfounded and unnecessary claim that one must first have divine faith in the infallibility of the Church before anything she proposes could be assented to. He states this several times. For example, in his first work:

“The testimony of the Church cannot be an adequate and sufficient foundation of Divine faith as long as its infallibility is unknown to us, or as long as we are not certain of its reliability. Therefore, we must first be certain of its reliability – and that by Divine faith – before, on account of its reliability, we firmly believe by faith that any part of the Word of God, or the entire Word of God, is of Divine authority.”

Theological Disputation on the Formal Object of Faith, Aberdeen, 1627, pt. 2, q. 1, § 5.

Similarly, in his second work:

“It must be held that no Word of God, whether written or unwritten, is a suitable foundation for our faith, so long as its authority is not established with certainty — and that certainty being the certainty of faith. It is therefore necessary that we believe by divine faith that that tradition is truly divine, before we believe on account of that tradition that Scripture is the Word of God.”

Apology for the Discussion on the Formal Object of Faith, Aberdeen, 1631, tr. 9, Auth. Dup., ch. 2, n. 1, p. 622.

This is similarly repeated by Matt Hedges, a contemporary Protestant apologist who has recently written on this issue.

“Faith cannot rest upon the Church’s testimony unless it is first believed that the Church is divine and infallible, having been given the assistance of the Holy Spirit.”

Matt Hedges, Roman Catholics Don’t Have a First Principle of Faith.

Catholics do not deny that non-Catholics who enter the Church and assent to her teachings have certainty about her reliability, but this is first discerned at the level of natural demonstration, not faith. As St. Thomas Aquinas explains:

“Certitude can mean two things. The first concerns firmness of adherence, and with reference to this, faith is more certain than any understanding [of principles] and scientific knowledge. For the first truth, which causes the assent of faith, is a more powerful cause than the light of reason, which causes the assent of understanding or scientific knowledge. The second concerns the evidence of that to which assent is given. Here, faith does not have certainty, but scientific knowledge and understanding do. It is because of this, too, that understanding has no discursive thought.”

De Veritate, q. 14, a. 1, rep. 7

The Holy Spirit moves man to assent to the proposed revelation on the basis of God revealing, bridging the certitude attained from natural reasoning regarding the prudence of believing to the actual believing, which is supernatural.

The problem with Baron’s objection fourfold.

1. First, this is not necessary by the very nature of the thing, for the assent of faith must be rational. This condition is met by the certitude attained from the motives of credibility which remove fear of error.

2. Second, if this were true, it would lead to an absurd conclusion, since it would require that men already have divine faith either in God’s infallibility (for immediate revelation) or in any legate (in mediate revelation), making an initial act of faith impossible. Thus, John of St. Thomas says:

   “Hence, to one asking why we believe this, we respond: because God says it, who is First Truth. But if it is further asked how it is known that God is First Truth and cannot be deceived, this does not pertain to believing but to knowing. For believing rests in the testimony on account of which it believes…”

   Cursus theologici in secundam secundae D. Thomae, tom. 6 (2-2), disp. I, art. 1, n. 23.

   If the Protestant concedes men can have both only a natural certitude of God’s existence and veracity, there is no reason to deny this for mediate revelation.

3. Third, Protestant authors do not apply this epistemological standard. Thus, Louis Le Blanc says that the motives sufficed to assent to the teachings of the Apostles without mentioning a requirement to first believe in their infallibility.

   “From the miracles of the Apostles and Christ it was evident that faith should be given to their words. And to those who are illuminated by the light of faith it is evident that the divine mysteries must be believed, on account of the authority of God speaking and approving his word to them by illustrious marks and criteria. And they manifestly judge that whatever things are brought forth from the Word of God are worthy of belief: because they see that those things are confirmed by God, who is the first and highest truth.”

   Theological Thesis, On Faith, n. 25.

4. Fourth, this is not the teaching of Sacred Scripture. As one out of countless examples, take Exodus 4:

   “Moses answered, ‘But behold, they will not believe me or listen to my voice, for they will say, ‘The Lord did not appear to you.’ [God tells Moses to perform certain signs] Aaron spoke all the words that the Lord had spoken to Moses and did the signs in the sight of the people. And the people believed.”

   Exodus 4:1-31

   Here, the Israelites assented to Moses as a divine legate after attaining certitude of God’s confirmation through the motives.

This itself suffices to refute the pretended “papal” circle, since we begin with the motives of credibility, discern the Church as a divine legate, and assent to her teachings, such as the inspiration of the canonical books. As Fr. Billuart, O.P. says:

“We believe the authority of the Church not only because of revelation, but also and primarily because of the notes of the Church itself and the motives of credibility. Hence from this side there is no circle… The knowledge of the truthfulness of the Church, although it is confirmed by Scripture, nevertheless does not necessarily depend upon it; for [before Scripture] the truthfulness of the Church was known and certain, but it was first obtained from her notes and motives of credibility, although we do not deny that it is confirmed by Scripture.”

Summa Summae S. Thomae, sive Compendium Theologiae, t. III, dist. I, art. II (Leodii: Everardum Kints, 1754), pg. 8-9.

Objection From Baron

However, Baron objects and claims Catholic theologians deny that the motives of credibility suffice for the assent of faith to be certain and that, therefore, this does not escape the circle. He does so in the part of his work in which he addresses on what divine faith rests upon.

"Nor does this faith rest upon what are commonly called the ‘motives of credibility’… The papists themselves acknowledge this… [such as] Becanus who says that these motives make it possible to believe something prudently — but not to believe infallibly.”

Theological Disputation on the Formal Object of Faith, Aberdeen, 1627, pt. 2, q. 1, § 8.

Yet, such a reading of our authors is absurd. The motives of credibility are not the formal object — faith does not formally rest on them; to that extent, Baron is correct. Yet he misunderstands the role which we attribute to them, since they are a condition without which faith would be irrational. Fr. George Turnebull rightly responds:

“Becanus does not deny what you imagine he denies — that the common motives of Faith make it possible to believe something infallibly, at least in the exercised act — but only, after distinguishing a twofold judgment of credibility of the revealed things (one prior to the assent of divine faith and proper to prior prudence, the other elicited from divine faith itself by the authority of God), he consequently distinguishes a twofold credibility of the material object: one presented to prior prudence through miracles and other motives; the other which is attained by faith itself as already infallible in the formal act from the authority of the witnessing God.”

The Catholic quadrature of the imaginary circle, on the formal object and the rule of faith, ch. 12.

If we read Becanus himself, we see that Turnebull’s reading is exactly correct.

“It is to be noted that the material object of faith – namely, what is believed – becomes credible in two ways. First, through miracles and similar motives, which make it able to be believed prudently. Second, through the revelation of the First Truth, which makes it able to be believed infallibly. Therefore, there can be a twofold judgment of the intellect. One: ‘I judge that this object can be prudently believed.’ The other: ‘I judge that this object can be infallibly believed.’ The former is natural and evident; the latter is supernatural and obscure.”

Summa theologiae scholasticae, II-II (tom. 3), Lyon, 1644, ch. 1, q. 2, §8, p. 12-13.

Similarly, he explains that the recognition of the motives of credibility by the intellect provide natural certitude of the mysteries, but that the infallible certitude of faith is only attained when the will subsequently moves the intellect to assent.

“It is one thing for the mysteries of faith that are proposed to be credible, and another thing for them to be true. Therefore, although the intellect, because of the preceding motives and arguments, clearly knows that the mysteries are credible, it is nevertheless not thereby sufficiently determined to believe that they are true.

A similar case occurs when two contrary opinions are proposed, both of which have strong authorities and plausible arguments in their favor. Then the intellect, because of such motives, clearly recognizes both opinions to be probable and credible, and yet from this it cannot decisively judge that this one is true and that one false, but rather it remains, as it were, suspended in doubt. Therefore this determination, in such a case, must come from the will.”

Summa theologiae scholasticae, II-II (tom. 3), Lyon, 1644, ch. 8, q. 5, §5, p. 203-4.

Clearly, this is not a denial of the sufficiency of the motives for faith for believing something infallibly, as Baron claims. Instead, they are insufficient insofar as their mere recognition is not itself faith; they are sufficient insofar as they meet the condition for the subsequent act of faith to be rational, which is actually produced when God’s grace moves the will to move the intellect to assent.

Matt Hedges makes a similar mistake in claiming that one of our eminent authors, Fr. Matthias Joseph Scheeben, requires the infallibility of the Church to be believed absolutely before any proposition from her is believed, as if he conceded the unnecessary standard of Robert Baron which claims that the motives of credibility are insufficient for the first act of faith. In his article, Hedges quotes Scheeben saying the following:

"Nevertheless, in order for the visible activity of the Church in her public teaching to influence faith in an appropriate way, the invisible authenticity and authority present in that activity in its supernatural divine character must be known by way of divine faith… because as an altogether invisible ordinance of God it cannot be the object of direct perception or insight, and again, because it too is directly and formally affirmed in every act of Catholic faith as the rule thereof.”

Dogmatiks, 1.2, ch. 6, §42, n. 776.

Yet this is only a partial quote and is cut short since, immediately after, Scheeben affirms the following, contrary to Matt’s claim:

“It can, however, without any circular reasoning, be believed also by divine faith in a twofold way: first, on account of the virtual divine testimony that is given to human awareness and to the Church’s testimony about her supernatural authority through the motives of credibility that accompany her; and secondly, on account of the formal divine testimony contained in the original divine institution of that authority; the existence and divine character of this testimony is assured partly already in a historical way by the human testimony of the Church alone, but completely by the motives of credibility that accompany and divinely authenticate this human testimony.”

Dogmatiks, 1.2, ch. 6, §42, n. 776.

Revelation and Inspiration

More can actually be said here, since Robert Baron also falls into the error of other Protestants who conflated inspiration and revelation. The classical Protestant position is that divinely inspired Scripture self-authenticates its own inspiration by God because it contains internal marks and possesses a special efficacy through which men, with the help of the Holy Spirit, conclude that a certain book is inspired by God and then assent to such a fact with faith. I recently debated this topic on Capturing Catholicism and have written about it here.

It was common for Catholic theologians to concede that the authority of Scripture as containing authentic divine revelation could be discerned by men outside the Church. The reason for this is that Scripture itself contains internal marks of sublimity, harmony, and holiness which provide certitude that the doctrine is from God. This is further confirmed by the general Christian history, since it has attained authority among all nations. This is specifically mentioned by St. Augustine and other medievals like St. Thomas Aquinas2 and Bl. Scotus3. These motives of credibility can hypothetically be discerned in abstract from the Church, as is often done in apologetics against non-Christians. These marks, however, provide certitude that the Christian religion, and even what we call “Scripture”, contains authentic divine revelation, but it is wrong to conclude with the Protestants that these necessitate inspiration.

Here, many Protestants thought that Catholic theologians were conceding the Protestant view. Thus, Robert Baron wrote regarding Francisco Suarez:

“The most subtle Suarez doubtless saw in the former part of his response an abyss of inexplicable difficulties, and therefore in the latter part he acknowledges the truth of our opinion, and embraces it. For first he says in general that God through the very rule of faith renders us certain of the divine and infallible authority of that rule. This must necessarily be said: for otherwise, as I have often advised, either we will proceed to infinity believing this rule on account of that one, and that one on account of another, and so to infinity; or we will return into a Circle, believing this rule on account of that one, and in turn that rule on account of this one.”

Apology for the Discussion on the Formal Object of Faith, Aberdeen, 1631, tr. 8, Auth. Dup., ch. 7, n. 4, p. 556.

Yet, Baron here conflates the divine authority of Scripture as revelation with its inspiration. The eminent doctor Suarez says:

“Although a human being cannot bear witness concerning himself, God nevertheless can, because of His infinite authority. And thus the rule of faith also, insofar as it is a special instrument through which God speaks, can sometimes bear witness, and possesses within itself something distinctive from divine providence and ordinance by which it becomes evidently credible that it is such a rule of faith and has divine assistance. This is seen in Scripture, for example, in the harmony of the Prophets with events, and similarly in other things.”

De Fide, disp. 5, § 2, n. 4.

Similarly, Francis Turretin says regarding St. Robert Bellarmine:

“That the Scripture makes itself known to us is proved… by the testimony of our opponents who prove the inspiration of the Scriptures by its own marks; Bellarmine says, ‘Nothing is better known, nothing more certain than the sacred Scriptures contained in the writings of the prophets and apostles, so that he must be in the highest degree foolish who refuses to believe in them’ (VD 1.2, p. 24).”

Institutes of Elenctic Theology, vol. 1, 2nd Topic, q. 6, n. 11.

Yet, in both scenarios, what is commended is the authority of Scripture, not its inspiration. Even Matt Hedges, who has recently made use of Robert Baron, confuses these two, accusing Giovanni Perrone, S.J., a more recent author, of altogether denying Scripture’s self-evidencing authority as revelation without the Church:

“Having rejected the self-evidencing power of Scripture as divine revelation, Perrone has substituted the Roman Church in its place, and thereby trapped himself in the Papal circle, which he pathetically attempts to respond to…”

Matt Hedges, Roman Catholics Don’t Have a First Principle of Faith.

Yet Matt ought to have read Perrone more carefully, for in the section he had just quoted from Perrone, it’s clear that Perrone is primarily concerned with the inspiration of the books. Matt’s translation in his article renders Perrone saying that the recipients of the New Testament books could not know if the “teaching” was divine, prompting Hedges to think Perrone was denying revelation’s ability to self-attest through its marks: “although these books were divine in themselves and contained divine teaching, this was not evident to those who received them.”

Yet, the original Italian uses the word “dettato”, which means dictation, not doctrine, evidently denoting the true position: simply receiving a book with divine revelation and internal marks does not make it evident that it is inspired (dictated) by God. The full quote says:

“Since although these books in themselves were divine and contained the divine dictation, yet this was not evident to those who received them.”

Il protestantesimo e la regola di fede, Vol. II [Rome, 1853], pp. 60.

In fact, Perrone is clear elsewhere that what is in dispute is not the revelation of Scripture but specifically its inspiration.

“Internal arguments are indeed very useful for demonstrating, in a general way and against unbelievers, the divine origin of revelation, since they are reducible to those motives of credibility which we ourselves have extensively presented and defended. But in the present controversy, in which we contend with heretics – and especially with Protestants – concerning the inspiration, in particular, of the individual canonical books and of every part of those books, such arguments do not fully settle the matter.”

Tract. de Locis Theologicis, pt. 2, cap. 2, n. 144.

This is precisely what Franzelin notes. These internal marks serve to prove revelation, not inspiration. A weighty argument could be made to support and defend inspiration, but it does not prove it, as Protestants seem to say.

“From this Protestant teaching about internal criteria what Catholic apologists customarily cite against unbelievers – the sanctity, sublimity, and purity of the doctrine in the Scriptures, compared with the character, time, and circumstances of the sacred writers, and other internal criteria – is very different. For apologists deal first with revelation, not with the inspiration of the books.”

Tractatus Dogmaticus de Divinis Scripturis, th. 5.

A Second “Papal Circle”

Baron claims Catholics do not have divine faith since we make the Church the formal object of our faith. His reason for this accusation is that Catholics answer the question of why we believe with the testimony of the Church.

“On account of the infallible testimony of the Church, the Papists believe not only those things revealed in the Word of GOD, but also the divine revelation itself and the authority of the Word of GOD. Therefore the testimony of the Church is the formal object of faith rather than divine revelation. The reasoning of this conclusion is clear because the formal object of faith is defined as: that on account of which we believe and by which one can answer the question ‘Why do you believe?’ But this definition applies more to the testimony of the Church than to divine revelation, since the Papists believe only revealed things on account of divine revelation, whereas on account of the testimony of the Church, they believe both revealed things and revelation itself.”

Theological Disputation on the Formal Object of Faith, Aberdeen, 1627,pt. 1, section 3, § 4.

This objection is quite sloppy, as George Turnebull points out, for the question “Why do you believe?” can be answered differently on account of different reasons.4 Thus, when our Lord says to, “Believe me that I am in the Father and the Father is in me, or else believe on account of the works themselves,” (John 14:11), He is not saying to assent to His divinity and procession from the Father with His miracles as the formal object, but that His works serve as a dispositive cause, rendering the assent of faith rational and removing fear and doubt about His veracity. Yet, Baron’s objection would require us to reject Christ’s words, which denote the motives of credibility as a kind of reason for believing. Turnebull responds:

“The question ‘Why’ or ‘On account of what’ can be answered through all the genera of causes. Thus to the question ‘Why do you believe?’ I can respond not only through the objective reason for believing as applied through revelation — namely, through the authority of God — but also through many other principles of belief: through a pious affection to believe because I will, through the efficacy of grace granting both to will and to accomplish the work of faith, because God inspired it, through the prior judgment of prudence concerning the entire credibility of revealed things, because prudent discernment founded on the rules of belief so dictated. Finally, you yourself in 2 p. tuae disp., q. 8, § 4, at length noticed that the words ‘on account of’ are ambiguous, and sometimes denotes the effective cause of assent, sometimes the objective one. Why, then, did you choose to obscure with such semantic ambiguity something that is in itself plain, in assigning the primary definition of it?”

The Catholic quadrature of the imaginary circle, on the formal object and the rule of faith, ch. 2.

Baron’s second objection is thus:

“The Papists believe all those things proposed for belief in the Word of GOD because they have been revealed by GOD; but they believe them to have been revealed by GOD on account of the testimony of the Church, because the Church testifies that they have been revealed by GOD.”

Theological Disputation on the Formal Object of Faith, Aberdeen, 1627, pt. 1, section 3, § 4.

Here, a second vicious circle seems to arise, for the Catholic response to why we believe the authority of the Church is that God has revealed it. When asked why we believe God has revealed it, we respond that the Church teaches thus. Here, the answer to both questions exists in two different genera of causality. When we say ‘because God has revealed it’, we are giving the formal cause for our assent; when we say ‘because the Church teaches’, we are giving the instrumental cause.

John of St. Thomas explains this well. The proposition of the Church causes the formal object, God revealing, to be apprehended, but it causes and applies this under the genus of a condition, instrument, and sign of revelation. The formal object, God revealing, causes us to believe the infallibility of the Church under the genus of formal cause.

“The proposition of the Church made by the Prophets or their successors, and the testimony of God speaking through them as through an instrument and organ — stand as two causes of different genera, which are mutually causes of each other, in order that it be established for us and that legitimate faith be distinguished from supposed faith… It is therefore clear that from the Holy Spirit proceeds the infallibility of the testimony revealing and the infallibility of the Church proposing through her ministers, successors of the Apostles… Thus both causes are from God, and each has infallibility in a different genus: the Church as proposing and applying as an instrument and organ of God speaking; divine testimony as the formal reason and first authority proposing.”

Cursus theologici in secundam secundae D. Thomae, tom. 6 (2-2), disp. I, art. 2, dub. 1, n. 3-4.

This principle is called the interdependence of causes and it exists in the world around us. Thus, when asked why a certain painting was painted, we respond that this was to display it in a museum. When asked why it is displayed in a museum, we responded that this is because it was painted. When asked why we exercise, we respond that this is to be healthy. When asked why we are healthy, we respond that this is because we exercise. Simply put, the efficient cause is itself caused by the final cause insofar as the final cause gives the reason for the efficient cause to exist. The final cause is caused by the efficient cause since the latter completes the former. Here, each cause exists in its own genus and thus the circle is not formally so. For more on this, read St. Thomas Aquinas’s commentary on 5.2 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange’s O.P. work On the Order of Things.

In the words of Fr. Lagrange, the Church applies revelation and God revealing asserts the Church; the condition applies the formal object and the formal object asserts the condition. This is no different than if a Protestant explains that He believes Scripture because God has revealed it and He believes God has revealed it because Scripture teaches thus.

Furthermore, this only concerns the internal paradigm, but remember the universal starting point is concerned with the motives of credibility. Thus, Perrone explains:

“First, as a kind of preamble, the existence of a Church divinely instituted is accepted through those same motives of credibility by which the existence of divine revelation is established; then, once this Church has been clearly recognized and verified, it is believed as an article of faith that this same Church was founded by God Himself and possesses all the prerogatives which it professes to have received from Christ. Finally, on the basis of its infallible authority and testimony, the other things which it proposes as divinely revealed are believed. Among these, the canonical Scripture, written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, occupies a principal place.”

Tract. de Locis Theologicis, pt. 2, cap. 2, n. 150.

The Content of Revelation and The Fact of Revelation

To the answer of why we believe that God has revealed something, though we can answer that this is “because the Church teaches” as the instrumental reason, the formal reason is that revelation is believed on account of itself. Thus, the assent of faith to the fact that “Abraham is the Father of Isaac” in Scripture, which is a rule of faith, implies the assent that God has revealed this. Similarly, the assent of faith to the fact that Mary was assumed into heaven in the testimony of the Church, which is a rule of faith, implies the assent that God has revealed this. A further proposition saying “God has revealed this” is not required, lest we have an infinite regress. As an analogy, consider how light, which is like revelation, makes things visible to the eyes; these things seen are the material objects. Yet, another light is not necessary to see that first light, since it is seen in itself. Thus, Turnebull replies:

“Among propositions credible with divine faith, some are those to which God’s authority as the objective reason for believing is not applied except through the mediating bond, as it were, of a temporal revelation — thus we believe God to be Triune because God revealed it; while others are those to which the same divine authority applies itself immediately and without any other mediating bond — such as that God revealed this or that.”

The Catholic quadrature of the imaginary circle, on the formal object and the rule of faith, ch. 2.

This is generally unanimously agreed upon on both sides. Johannes Wiggers writes:

“We believe by faith — for example, that God is three and one, and likewise that God has testified this. For this does not happen in such a way that God subsequently, by a distinct act, reveals the latter; but by first revealing that he is three and one, he simultaneously shows by that very same revelation that he is revealing it — and the revelation itself, so to speak, reveals itself… And thus in such cases an infinite regress is avoided.”

Commentaria de virtutibus theologicis, q. 1, art. 1, conclusion 3.

John of St. Thomas writes:

“The formal reason of faith, or divine testimony, is not attained by a distinct act and assent from that by which the things testified and revealed are attained, but by the same act—just as by the same act of vision we attain light and color, and in general whatever is attained under some formal reason along with the very reason itself.”

Cursus theologici in secundam secundae D. Thomae, tom. 6 (2-2), disp. I, art. 2, § 2 n. 6.

Finally, Fr. Lagrange, O.P. explains this well. Since the formal motive which moves us to assent is not simply the authority of God but specifically “because God has revealed it”, this already implies an assent to not only the material object — such as “God is a Trinity” — but also the fact that God has revealed the Trinity. He writes:

“The single formal motive of faith is the First Truth actually bearing witness—that is, the authority of God actually speaking. If the motive were the authority of God, in first act, independent of active revelation, by virtue of this motive, our faith would be hypothetically infallible but not categorically so. We would always implicitly think: ‘If this is in fact revealed by God, then it is infallibly true.’ The Thomists hold that nothing created can pertain to the formal motive of a theological virtue. However, active revelation guarantees that it is a question of an uncreated action of God who reveals.”

De Revelatione, vol. 1, ch. 14, art. 2, §1.

Certitude Concerning Scripture

One final objection is worth noting. Baron claims that since Catholic authors deny that Protestants can have certitude about Scripture, they make the Church the formal object.

“We therefore justly charge our adversaries with prevarication and open contradiction: because at one time they assert that divine revelation is believed on account of itself and not on account of the testimony of the Church, while at another time they affirm that it ought to be believed on account of the testimony of the Church alone—since (as they maintain) we cannot know with certainty whether that revelation is divine or not except from the testimony of the Church.”

Theological Disputation on the Formal Object of Faith, Aberdeen, 1627, pt. 1, section 5, § 1.

Matt Hedges also argues similarly:

“The testimony of the Church with respect to our faith in the inspiration and divine authority of Scripture is either informative by way of ministerial authority (which we grant), or it is certificative and produces firm faith about the inspiration and divine authority of Scripture. If it is the former, this is granted by the Reformed, and the Papists have no grounds on this account to object that our faith is uncertain and doubtful since we do not believe in the infallibility of the Church. They may then put their polemics to rest. However, if they confess the latter point that the Church’s proposal is what makes our faith certain, then it is more than just a necessary condition for them, but something that shows the intellect the truth in the object, and moves it towards assent, i.e. the motive and reason of divine faith.”

Matt Hedges, Roman Catholics Don’t Have a First Principle of Faith.

These points are also poorly made, since, just as the question, ‘why do you believe’ can be answered with multiple causes, so also ‘what makes your faith certain.’ Note how easily this objection can be reversed on Baron. It is true that formal certitude belongs to the revelation of God, Who does not deceive. Yet, the Catholic contention is that Protestants limit the assent of faith to those things contained in Scripture. Since the inspiration of this or that book is not generally revealed for Protestants, they assent to the fact of inspiration without a proposition from some rule of faith. There is no strict necessity that it be the Church herself but simply some rule of faith proposing this, since the formal motive is always the same but the rule of faith can vary.

For instance, the Westminster Confession does not attribute our certainty of Scripture to God revealing but to the inward motion of the Holy Spirit:

“Our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority [of Scripture] is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts.”

Westminster Confession, ch. 1, n. 5.

Yet, if we were to take such a simplistic reading, we would be forced to pit Robert Baron and Matt Hedges against this Reformed confession. Robert Baron says:

“Whether the Faith by which we believe Scripture to be the Word of God rests upon the internal Testimony of the Holy Spirit as its principal foundation. The answer is NEGATIVE… The formal object of faith is the principal cause and as it were the source of all the certainty of faith. But this internal testimony of the Spirit… is the principal effective cause of the assent of faith.”

Theological Disputation on the Formal Object of Faith, Aberdeen, 1627, pt. 2, q. 3, § 2-4.

Obviously, Baron is not in opposition with the Westminster Confession, since the persuasion spoken of from the grace of the Holy Spirit denotes the principle which brings such a firm faith about, not what faith formally rests upon. The point of this is to show how overly-simplistic and sloppy it is to argue that certitude and the reason of belief can only mean one thing. When Catholics deny Protestants the ability to have certainty in the inspiration of Scripture, this is because it is not revealed to them.

4

The Jesuit Fr. Vitus Ebermann, S.J. makes this same point against Johannes Musaeus (Lutheran):

“In common speech a condition without which something cannot be is often signified just as much as a proper cause, as in that most famous saying of St. Augustine: ‘I believe the Gospel because of, or on account of, the authority of the Church.’ […] For nothing is more common than that the particles ‘because,’ ‘on account of,’ and ‘for which reason’ are used interchangeably when we mean either a cause or a condition without which something cannot be. For often the difference between them is very obscure, because the predicate most characteristic of a cause — namely, that it is necessary for the existence of the effect and that the effect depends upon it — is also common to a condition without which something cannot be. Confusion regarding what is most evident in the principal term easily leads to complete equivocation and makes it absolutely difficult to distinguish them from one another. Therefore it is an enormous and blatant calumny that he attributes to Valentia—and indeed to all Catholics—that we really hold the proposition of the Church to be the formal and ultimate motive for believing. For, as is clear from what has been said above, we all with one voice declare that it is nothing more than a condition applying to us the ancient revelation made by the Prophets and Apostles.”

Antimusaeus, de fide divina, Würzburg, 1661, disp. 2, quaest. 5, §.5, pp. 62-63.

Recently, Ethan Muse (Catholic) debated Sean Luke (Anglican) on the miracle of Our Lady of Fatima. One of Sean’s arguments was that this apparition could not be divine and good because it contradicts his reading of the epistle to the Hebrews. The Catholic contention, following the ministry of our Lord, is that this order of thinking should be reversed, and that manifest miracles performed by a divine legate should supersede whatever apparent contradiction one perceives between prior revelation and new revelation. This is precisely what Christ expected of those who heard His preaching, such as the Pharisees who perceived Him to be breaking the Sabbath or committing blasphemy for making Himself equal to God.

“If I am not doing the works of my Father, then do not believe me; but if I do them, even though you do not believe me, believe the works.”

John 10:37-38

This is also clear when Christ heals the paralytic. The Pharisees perceived a contradiction in Christ’s claim to forgive sins, yet He performed a miracle and expected them to believe Him without necessarily understanding or internally recognizing how to resolve the apparent contradiction.

“The scribes said to themselves, ‘This man is blaspheming.” But Jesus, knowing their thoughts, said, ‘Why do you think evil in your hearts? For which is easier, to say, ‘Your sins are forgiven,’ or to say, ‘Rise and walk’? But that you may know that the Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins’ —he then said to the paralytic—’Rise, pick up your bed and go home.’ And he rose and went home. When the crowds saw it, they were afraid, and they glorified God, who had given such authority to men.”

Matthew 9:3-7

The reasoning for this is simple. If a man claiming to speak in God’s names performs certain signs which, upon close examination, are found to be genuine miracles and effects proper to God alone, then I can be certain that whatever incongruity I perceive in his preaching stems from a defect in my understanding of the previous revelation.

Note that we never said that previous divine revelation is useless or that it can never be used, but that these are not sufficient criteria to reject miracles, especially when the miracles are manifestly evident. Otherwise, you contradict the very ministry of Christ. Thus, it’s quite sloppy for Redeemed Zoomer to accuse us of “believing signs and wonders over God’s word.”

He also accuses us of saying that the Bible is impossible to interpret, yet we’ve said no such thing. Theological conclusions made by the individual, in general, even if concluded from Sacred Tradition, should not supersede manifest miracles if they are attached to a preacher.

He claims that since Mormons also claim to have miracles, we should just become Mormon, yet notice how sloppy this strawman is. Our position is not, nor was this ever said by Ethan in the debate, that we should automatically accept anything that looks like a miraculous sign or mere claims about miracles. Thus, one can read, and should read, the fantastic treatment of miracles given by St. Thomas Aquinas, summarized by Fr. Garrigou Lagrange in his second volume of On Divine Revelation. One can also read the treatment by Fr. Charles Rene Billaurt, O.P. here, another great Dominican theologian. Obviously, as will become clear to anyone who reads through these, Catholic theology does not encourage, as RZ claims, a “culture of illiteracy.” Instead, these treatments synthesize natural reason and Scripture beautifully, penetrating deeply into the history of divine revelation and God’s consistent paradigm in communicating revelation mediately.

His description of our position as “tallying up miracles to reach theological conclusions” is even more sloppy. Does RZ not know what a theological conclusion is?

A theological conclusion is deduced from a revealed premise and a premise from natural reason, such as that Christ is risible, since He is perfect man, which is revealed, and risibility is a property of man. Thus, the Pharisees had a false theological conclusion when they held that healing the sick on the Sabbath was against the Law of keeping the Sabbath day holy.

Thus, I’d like to present a brief treatment of miracles, as presented by Fr. Garrigou Lagrange, O.P. in the second volume of On Divine Revelation. Honestly, go and read this fantastic work yourself. Most of the time, I find that the utter beauty and coherence of Catholic theology, as articulated by theologians such as Fr. Lagrange and Fr. Matthias Joseph Scheeben, crushes most of the “classical Protestant” arguments one encounters online. I will never be able to articulate their genius in a video/article, so I will have achieved my goal if my viewers read more and watch my videos less.

Motives of Credibility

Miracles fall within the broader category of the motives of credibility, which are concurrent signs and aids that accompany God’s divine legates. They serve as God’s visible seal to the world in approval of a messenger’s message. Thus, Hebrews 2:3-4 says,

“[This salvation] was confirmed unto us by them that heard Him, God also testifying with them, both by signs and wonders, by various works of power and by gifts of the Holy Spirit, according to his own will.”

Hebrews 2:3-4

Mark 16 says:

“And they went out and preached everywhere, while the Lord worked with them and confirmed the message by accompanying signs.”

Mark 16:20

The motives of credibility are conditions without which the assent of faith cannot be rational. Thus, if a man claims to come in the name of God and men assented to his preaching without reason, they would be committing the sin of credulity for irrationally assenting. Remember that miracles are not the only motives of credibility, though that is the focus for this article.

“However, in order that the obedience of our faith be nevertheless in harmony with reason [cf. Rom 12:1], God willed that exterior proofs of His revelation, viz., divine facts, especially miracles and prophesies, should be joined to the interior helps of the Holy Spirit; as they manifestly display the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God, they are the most certain signs of the divine revelation adapted to the intelligence of all men.”
First Vatican Council, Dei Filius, ch. 3 (Denzinger, no. 3009).

Here, I’d like to emphasize that miracles are “certain signs … adapted to the intelligence of all men.” These indirectly demonstrate the truth to men who can naturally conclude the concurrence of God and assent without fear of error. St. Thomas Aquinas says:

“God enables man to work miracles for two reasons. First and principally, in confirmation of the doctrine that a man teaches. For since those things which are of faith surpass human reason, they cannot be proved by human arguments, but need to be proved by the argument of Divine power: so that when a man does works that God alone can do, we may believe that what he says is from God: just as when a man is the bearer of letters sealed with the king’s ring, it is to be believed that what they contain expresses the king’s will.”

ST III, q. 43, a. 1, resp.

Yet, on the one hand, experience tells us that not every sign is a divine miracle, such as street magic tricks. Scripture also warns of certain wonders being performed by false prophets.

“For false christs and false prophets will arise and perform great signs and wonders, so as to lead astray, if possible, even the elect.”

Matthew 24:24

Believers are also warned to test the spirits:

“Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God: because many false prophets are gone out into the world.”

1 John 4:1

In fact, everyone knows that Pharaoh’s magicians performed certain signs that had the outward appearance of miracles but were not really so.

On the other hand, it’s abundantly clear in Scripture that authentic miracles are sufficient for the rationality of faith, so that God Himself expects men to assent to the teachings of His divine legates simply after they have done miracles, even if these men have not received previous divine revelation. Thus, God tells Moses:

“Then Moses answered, ‘But behold, they will not believe me or listen to my voice, for they will say, ‘The Lord did not appear to you.’’ The Lord said to him, ‘throw the staff in your hand on the ground.’ So he threw it on the ground, and it became a serpent. But the Lord said to Moses, ‘Put out your hand and catch it by the tail’—so he put out his hand and caught it, and it became a staff in his hand— ‘that they may believe that the Lord, the God of their fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, has appeared to you.’ Again, the Lord said to him, ‘Put your hand inside your cloak.’ And he put his hand inside his cloak, and when he took it out, behold, his hand was leprous like snow. Then God said, ‘Put your hand back inside your cloak.’ So he put his hand back inside his cloak, and when he took it out, behold, it was restored like the rest of his flesh. ‘If they will not believe you or listen to the first sign, they may believe the latter sign.’”

Exodus 4:1-9

Fr. Garrigou Lagrange, O.P. explains1 that, just as man uses scientific knowledge to arrive at the existence of God the Creator, so can he naturally discern effects that only God can perform:

“Common sense (or natural reason) knows that certain effects are proper effects of God and, hence, exceed all the powers of nature, even those that are unknown. For example, only the Author of life can return a corpse to life, illuminate someone born blind, and heal those who are sick with incurable diseases. Only the Author of matter can suddenly multiply a material substance or instantaneously convert it into another… In all such cases, common sense declares: The finger of God is at work here… Natural intelligence perceives being in sensible things, just as sight perceives color; thus, common sense knows that contingent being depends upon the Necessary Being and vaguely discerns the proper effects of the First Being. Therefore, in order to discern miracles, supernatural faith is not needed; rather, natural intelligence, which by its very nature exceeds the senses, suffices.”

On Divine Revelation, ch. 19, art. 3, §4.

This is precisely what we see in Scripture. For example, Nicodemus reveals that the Pharisees knew Jesus was a divine legate because of His miracles:

“Rabbi, we know that you are a teacher come from God, for no one can do these signs that you do unless God is with him.”

John 3:2

In fact, when the Pharisees made the absurd accusation that Christ was casting out demons instead of recognizing His authenticity as a divine legate, He said:

“Every sin and blasphemy will be forgiven people, but the blasphemy against the Spirit will not be forgiven.”

Matthew 12:31

So what’s going on here? Is it possible to identify authentic miracles or not? Not only does God expect men to recognize them and believe because of them, as we saw above, but simple men do, in fact, recognize them.

“And many of them said, ‘He hath a devil, and is mad; why listen to Him?’ Others said, 'These are not the words of him that hath a devil. Can a devil open the eyes of the blind?’”

John 10:20-21

Thus, in John 9 and the healing of the blind man, the blind man criticizes the Pharisees for refusing to acknowledge the authentic status of Christ as a divine legate:

“[The Pharisees said]: ‘We know that God has spoken to Moses, but as for this man, we do not know where he comes from.’ The man answered, ‘Why, this is an amazing thing! You do not know where he comes from, and yet he opened my eyes… Never since the world began has it been heard that anyone opened the eyes of a man born blind. If this man were not from God, he could do nothing.’”

John 9:29-33

Division of Miracles

Before we treat how one can identify genuine miracles, we should briefly explain the different kinds of miracles. Note that the different kinds of miracles, as well as how one identifies an authentic miracle, are only being described systematically with the help of divine revelation and theology. Yet, obviously, this systematic treatment is not necessary. Remember that miracles are “adapted to the intelligence of all men” and can thus be identified with common sense. Thus, when I cite Scripture, such as the healing of the blind man or Christ’s expectations that the Pharisees recognize that demons cannot cast out demons, I am only citing Scripture as a historical testimony showing that simple men in Israel were able to identify true miracles, and were even expected to do so, without the help of systematic theology.

As St. Thomas says,

“Something is called a miracle in comparison with the power of nature, which it exceeds. Thus, the more the power of nature is exceeded, the greater is the miracle in question.”

Summa Theologiae I, q. 105, a. 8.

1. Miracles of the highest degree are those which are supernaturale quoad substantiam, or supernatural in their very essence. These exceed the power of nature in themselves, in that nature never produces this effect in any manner. For example, the glorification of the human body or when two material bodies occupy the same space. The reason for this is that a material substance can not remain distinct from another without having its own proper location except by the divine power; nature can never do this.

   By sensory knowledge and common sense, man can know that nature can never do this, and so if he witnesses these, the only thing that remains is to inquire whether it is a true and genuine miracle or only an apparent one, which we will treat later.

   
   Another example is transubstantiation, since it is only by the divine power that accidents can remain without a substance, though this is not a visible sign used for confirming divine revelation.
   

2. Miracles of the second degree are supernatural quantum ad subiectum in quo fit; they exceed the power of nature according to the subject in which they are done. All this means is that while nature does produce such effect, and thus it is not supernatural in essence, nature never produces this effect in this subject.
   
   For example, the raising of the dead and returning sight to the blind belong in this category. The reason for this is that although nature gives life, it does not give life to the dead, and although nature gives men the faculty of seeing, it does not give blind men the faculty of seeing.
   
   These too are obviously known through common sense and life experience, as the healed blind man says:

   “Never since the world began has it been heard that anyone opened the eyes of a man born blind. If this man were not from God, he could do nothing.”

   John 9:32-33

3. The third category consists of miracles which are merely supernaturale quoad modum, or in the mode by which they are brought about. Nature does produce such an effect in such subjects, but never like this. For example, when a man with a bad fever recovers immediately, or in the conversion of water into wine: although men do naturally recover from fevers and water can be transformed into wine, these processes never occur instantaneously. We see this when Christ heals St. Peter’s mother in law.

Moral Circumstances

There are moral circumstances surrounding the miracle which serve as criteria for determining if it is genuinely a work of God or not. There are several criteria listed by St. Thomas and Fr. Lagrange, O.P., so I will just list a few. Go read the full section yourself!

1. First one may examine why a certain sign is done, according to the stated purpose by the messenger. Christ performed miracles to bring men to God the Creator, but Pharaoh’s magicians performed signs attempting to show that their gods2 were just as powerful as the God of the Hebrews. Hence, Christ refused to perform a miracle to feed Herod’s vain curiosity. Simon Magus performed signs but claimed to do these for his own glory:

   “There was a man named Simon, who had previously practiced magic in the city and amazed the people of Samaria, saying that he himself was somebody great.”
   Acts 8:9

2. Secondly, we may look at what is done. Do you seriously think the man whose ear Christ restored in the garden of Gethsemane is going to wonder whether he had been healed by God or by demons? Putting aside the fact that demons cannot heal cut-off ears, this miracle is identified as good by anyone with common sense, even if illiterate.

3. We may also examine how a man performs such signs. Recall that Moses was commissioned by God to preach and perform miracles in His name and with His authority. Similarly, Christ also claims to preach in the name of the Lord.

   “The works that I do in the name of my Father, they give testimony of me. . . . But if I do, though you will not believe me, believe the works.”

   John 10:25, 28

   Pharaoh’s magicians are said to perform signs “with their enchantments” (Ex. 7:11, 22; 8:7), whereas Moses does so while specifically claiming to speak on behalf of God.

Physical Circumstances

Physical circumstances are the attributes intrinsic to the sign performed. Again, as opposed to the claims by Redeemed Zoomer, we don’t simply accept just anything that looks like a miracle. This is why I gave the division of miracles earlier. Whereas an immediate recovery from a terrible fever does not naturally occur, we know that men do progressively recover from fevers. Thus, if a man claims he is going to perform a miracle of healing and says, “Wait two weeks and this sick man will slowly get better thanks to my prayers,” this is obviously not a miracle. Pope Benedict XIV actually explains the example of healing quite well:

“In order for a healing to be counted as being miraculous, the following conditions are needed: (1) the sickness must be grave and either impossible or difficult to cure; (2) [the sickness] should not be in its final stage so as shortly afterwards it should decline [in vigor]; (3) medicines must either not be employed or, if employed, they should be useless; (4) the healing must be sudden; (5) the healing must be perfect; (6) no purging or crisis must precede it, (7) and the sickness that was taken away must not return.”

Doctrina de servorum Dei beatificatione et beatorum canonizatione, bk. 4, pt. 1, ch. 8.

Why Miracles Give Certainty

Physical certitude is had by the mediation of the senses and is based on the necessity of the laws of nature. Thus, St. Thomas had physical certitude that Christ was alive when he touched His wounds.

Moral certitude is based on habitual human conduct. Thus, I may have moral certitude that my father is not lying about the death of my brother, since there is no reason to think otherwise.

As we saw above, Scripture calls miracles God’s confirmation of a doctrine. This is also knowable through natural inference. Thus, as St. Thomas states, God cannot produce a miracle in confirmation of a false doctrine:

“It cannot happen that someone who announces a false teaching would perform true miracles, which can only be brought about by the divine power, for were matters otherwise, God would be the witness to falsehood, which is impossible.”

Quodlibet II, q. 4, a. 1, ad 4.

This is precisely why miracles serve as utterly certain motives of credibility for a divine legate:. Fr. Lagrange, O.P. says:

“If a prophet proposing a doctrine as something revealed by God, while performing a miracle in confirmation of this revelation, did not truly receive this doctrine as something revealed by God, it would follow that God would be the witness to falsehood. Now, this inference is absurd. Therefore, the antecedent is also absurd. Hence, when miracles are performed in confirmation of some revealed doctrine, they are utterly certain signs of revelation.”

On Divine Revelation, vol. 2, ch. 19, art. 4, §3.

Finally, it’s important to note that there must be some sort of connection between the miracle and the doctrine, either implicitly or explicitly. For example, if a Catholic or Protestant ask Christ for a healing miracle and God performs it, this doesn’t implicitly suggest that one ecclesial community is uniquely true over the other; it only implies that Christ and His claims are true. However, a miraculous healing performed by invoking the Blessed Virgin Mary implies against a low Mariology and the notion that invoking the saints is idolatry, Otherwise, God would be the Author of error and deception by supporting idolatry with miracles. Similarly, an exorcism performed by a Protestant pastor would not validate Protestantism, but an exorcism done through the intercession of the Virgin Mary implicitly excludes the Protestant position that invoking the saints is idolatry.

There could also be an explicit connection between a miracle and a doctrine. For example, the casting out of demons by the Apostles and by other disciples serve different purposes. Although both authenticate Christ’s ministry, the Apostles alone were commissioned as divine legates to preach in the very name of Christ and demand faith. Thus, the miracles done by the apostles also authenticated their claims of being God’s envoys.

Objections

1. We should judge the doctrine of the preacher with previous revelation even if they have genuine miracles.

Response: First, it should be granted that a genuine miracle will never be performed by someone who calls for belief in a doctrine that directly contradicts an explicit article of faith. If someone were to preach, for instance, that Christ did not rise from the dead or that Isaac is not the son of Abraham, any supposed signs accompanying such claims would, upon examination, prove to be false. The key distinction, however, is that theological conclusions drawn by men, conclusions which I deny belong to faith since they are deduced by a human medium, should not be used to dismiss signs a priori. This is precisely the error the Pharisees fell into when they concluded that Christ violated the Sabbath by healing or committed blasphemy by forgiving sins.

It seems entirely obvious from Christ’s ministry that genuine miracles are sufficient to demand faith in a preacher’s message despite perceived contradictions. Obviously we are not saying anything that looks like a sign or wonder should be accepted, but only what has been identified as a genuine miracle, as we explained above, and as we see in the raising of Lazarus, or the healing of the blind.

Nevertheless, we may demonstrate the absurdity of this objection in two ways.

1. Major: A sign identified as being a genuine miracle is sufficient to produce faith for men who have not received any previous divine revelation.

   Minor: But if such a sign were not sufficient to produce faith in those who have received prior divine revelation, such that the doctrine must instead be judged independently, then it would likewise be insufficient for those without prior revelation.

   Conclusion: Therefore, a sign recognized as a genuine miracle is sufficient to produce faith even in those who have received prior divine revelation, despite any perceived contradictions.

   
   Proof of the major: Not only do Sean Luke and Redeemed Zoomer concede this, but they are forced to do so. Otherwise there would be an infinite regress or, if there was a first (mediate) revelation, it could not be assented to when promulgated by divine legates.

   Proof of the minor: For a sign to render the assent of faith rational, it must be recognized, at least with moral certitude, as a genuine miracle, that is, as an effect proper to God alone. Now if a man who already possesses prior revelation were required to judge such a sign by that prior revelation before assenting, two absurdities would follow. (1) First, he would be subjecting a manifest work of God, known as such, to a higher tribunal, thereby effectively testing God Himself speaking through a divine legate, which is impious. (2) Second, it would follow that even a genuine miracle is not sufficient to produce faith, which directly contradicts the necessary major premise.

2. An even greater absurdity would follow from this. If perceived consistency with prior revelation is indispensably required for every act of faith, then it would render impossible any genuinely new divine revelation, since such a proposition could not be derived, even virtually/implicitly, from previously revealed premises. For example, the fact that the Epistle to Philemon is divinely inspired is not virtually contained in any prior proposition of revelation, yet it is nevertheless assented to by faith.

   
   If one concedes that not every proposition from a legate requires perceived consistency, but insists instead that only the legate’s initial preaching must be tested for such consistency in order to establish his credibility, an additional difficulty arises. Mere consistency with prior revelation does not positively establish authenticity; it can at most show non-contradiction. But non-contradiction is compatible with falsehood. Hence, per this view, a false preacher could perform an apparent miracle (which would not, in fact, be a true miracle) and propose a doctrine consistent with prior revelation, thereby securing initial credibility, only subsequently to introduce error.

   Thus, the criterion collapses into insufficiency: it either excludes genuine development of revelation or fails to secure the authenticity it was meant to guarantee.

2. Jesus rebukes the Pharisees for seeking signs.

“Then some of the scribes and Pharisees answered Him, saying, ‘Teacher, we wish to see a sign from you.’ But He answered them, ‘An evil and adulterous generation seeks for a sign, but no sign will be given to it except the sign of the prophet Jonah.’”

Matthew 12:38-39

Response:

1. This is irrelevant since the question is whether genuine miracles are sufficient for the act of faith, not whether Christ should have performed miracles.

2. We do not claim that miracles are the only motives of credibility, nor do we claim they are indispensable. As St. Thomas says:

   “Now, such a wondrous conversion of the world to the Christian faith is a most indubitable proof that such signs did take place, so that there is no need to repeat them when they are so evidently apparent from their effect. For it would be the most wondrous sign of all if, without any wondrous signs, the world were persuaded by simple and lowly men to believe things so arduous, to accomplish things so difficult, and to hope for things so sublime. (Although even in our time God does not cease to work miracles through his saints in confirmation of the faith.)”

   Summa Contra Gentiles, bk. 1, ch. 6.

3. Christ’s signs fulfilled prophecy and had theological significance for Jews, such as the multiplication of loafs. Therefore, the mere miracles do not suffice.

Response: First, this doesn’t entail that Christ’s miracles would not be sufficient for faith to a Gentile who did not perceive the theological significance in His miracles.

Second, even Jews occasionally abstract Christ’s signs to deduce that He is a divine legate with divine sanction without mentioning theological consistency or significance. Nicodemus said:

“Rabbi, we know that you are a teacher come from God, for no one can do these signs that you do unless God is with him.”

John 3:2

The blind man who was healed said:

“Never since the world began has it been heard that anyone opened the eyes of a man born blind. If this man were not from God, he could do nothing.”

John 9:32-33

One of the most controversial topics during the Reformation was the Catholic Mass. The Reformers did not reject that the Eucharist could be called a sacrifice in some sense, but they denied it was a proper sacrifice of propitiation.

In this article, after explaining the Protestant view, I’m going to show how it obviously departs from the teaching of Sacred Scripture and even the most beloved Church Fathers of the Protestants.

Sacrifice

In a proper sacrifice, there is the victim (what is offered), the priest (who offers), and the oblation, which offers the immolated victim to God

“We may thus define sacrifice as the external oblation to God by an authorized minister of a sense-perceptible object, either through its destruction or at least its real transformation, in acknowledgement of God’s supreme dominion and for the appeasing of His wrath.”1

This is why we say the sacrifice of the Cross and the sacrifice of the Mass are essentially the same. The priest is the same and the victim is the same. The Catholic priest only offers the Mass in participation with Christ, but the true priest is Christ Himself. St. John Chrysostom says:

“What then? Do not we offer every day? We offer indeed, but making a remembrance of His death, and this [remembrance] is one and not many. How is it one, and not many? Inasmuch as that [Sacrifice] was once for all offered, [and] carried into the Holy of Holies. This is a figure of that [sacrifice] and this remembrance of that. For we always offer the same, not one sheep now and tomorrow another, but always the same thing: so that the sacrifice is one. And yet by this reasoning, since the offering is made in many places, are there many Christs? But Christ is one everywhere, being complete here and complete there also, one Body. As then while offered in many places, He is one body and not many bodies; so also [He is] one sacrifice. He is our High Priest, who offered the sacrifice that cleanses us. That we offer now also, which was then offered, which cannot be exhausted. This is done in remembrance of what was then done. For (says He) ‘do this in remembrance of Me.’ It is not another sacrifice, as the High Priest, but we offer always the same, or rather we perform a remembrance of a Sacrifice.”

Homily 17 on Hebrews, n. 3 (PG 63, 131).

This is made possible through the Resurrection. If I give you a goat and you sacrifice it on Monday, it is impossible for you to sacrifice the same goat next Monday. You could sacrifice a goat that looks just like the first one, but it would be an essentially different sacrifice. If you instead sacrifice the goat on Tuesday, it is the very same sacrifice you would have offered on Monday. Thus, we see that the time and date of a sacrifice do not pertain to its essence. It makes no difference therefore that Christ offered Himself 2000 years ago and is now offered in the Mass — the priest and victim are the same.

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Propitiation renders God favorable towards men so that He bestows certain gifts upon them. What’s important to note is that, unlike the reception of the sacraments, the Mass does not bestow sanctifying grace ex opere operato, though, unfortunately, this was a common accusation of the Protestants for generations. Rev. Wilhelm Wilmers, S.J. writes:

“By the fruits of the sacrifice of the Mass we understand the effects which it produces or us, inasmuch as it is a sacrifice of atonement and impetration: (a) not only supernatural graces, but also natural favors ; (b) remission of sins, and of the punishment due to them. What Christ merited for us by His death on the cross is applied to us in the holy sacrifice of the Mass.

The efficacy of the Mass is of itself infinite, since the gift offered is of infinite dignity. Its fruits, however, are not appropriated by those for whom it is offered in an infinite, but only in a finite degree. For, on the one hand, God intended that the Holy Sacrifice should be constantly offered, and should therefore constantly produce new fruits; and, on the other hand, as in the sacraments, its fruits are applied according to the disposition and actual devotion of those who assist, or of those for whom it is offered.”

Handbook of the Christian religion, 1891, p. 348.2

The Protestant Doctrine

Protestants reject that Christ is offered to the Father in the Mass as a proper sacrifice of propitiation.

The Westminster Confession says:

“In this sacrament Christ is not offered up to his Father, nor any real sacrifice made at all for remission of sins of the quick or dead, but only a commemoration of that one offering up of himself, by himself, upon the cross, once for all, and a spiritual oblation of all possible praise unto God for the same; so that the Popish sacrifice of the mass, as they call it, is most abominably injurious to Christ’s one only sacrifice, the alone propitiation for all the sins of the elect.”

WCF, ch. 29, n. 2.

The Lutheran Formula of Concord says:

“We unanimously reject and condemn … the papistic sacrifice of the Mass for the sins of the living and the dead.”

Epitome, VII, n. 21-23.

Instead, the Mass, as understood by Lutherans, is not itself efficacious but serves to consecrate the elements and deliver them for the confirmation of faith.

“The Mass was instituted that the faith of those who use the Sacrament should remember what benefits it receives through Christ, and cheer and comfort the anxious conscience. For to remember Christ is to remember His benefits, and to realize that they are truly offered unto us.”

Augsburg Confession, art. XXIV, n. 30-31.

Peter Martyr, one of the earliest Reformed theologians, affirms that the only propitiatory sacrifice occurred on calvary:

“A sacrifice undoubtedly is a voluntary and religious action, instituted by God, that we should offer that which is ours unto him to his glory, and whereby we may the more straitly be coupled unto him in holy society… Certain sacrifices be propitiatory, and others of thanksgiving. In the first kind God is become merciful unto men through the power thereof. But of this sort we have only one. Forsomuch as by the only death of Christ, the eternal father is reconciled unto us, and by the merit of his one only oblation the elect have their sins forgiven them. But in the other kind of sacrifice we give thanks unto God, we celebrate his name, and to our power, we are obedient unto his will.”

Of the Mass, n. 11.

Regarding the Mass, Peter Martyr allows it to be considered a sacrifice in different senses, but not properly and propitiatory.

“In the supper of the Lord, there may be four oblations. The first is of the bread and wine, which was brought in by the people… Secondly there is a thanksgiving which in the holy scriptures is called a Sacrifice of praise. Thirdly the Communicants do offer themselves unto God to be governed and mortified… Fourthly, as touching the memorial of the death of Christ which was the true sacrifice, by a figurative speech, the Eucharist or Supper of the Lord taketh his name of that thing which it represents and is called a sacrifice.”

Of the Mass, n. 15.

David Hollaz, summarizing the Lutheran view, affirms that the Eucharist is received primarily for the certainty of the remission of our sins:

“He who receives the body and blood of the Lord can most firmly resolve that the evangelical promise pertains to him individually. For he receives here and now the body of Christ, offered to him individually, the Lord himself saying: ‘Take, eat, this is my body given for you.’ Then, through justifying grace God remits the sins of the reborn and imputes the righteousness of Christ: Which justifying grace and remission of sins are sealed by the sacrament of the supper. For when we receive that very body of Christ which was given to death for us, and that very blood which was shed for us for the remission of sins, in the sacrament of the supper, we are thereby made most certain that the remission of sins, procured by the giving of the body and the shedding of the blood of Christ, has been granted and applied to us who believe in Christ.”

Examen theologicum acroamaticum, pt. 3, §. 2, ch. 5, q. 20.

He, like the Reformed, affirms that it is not properly called a sacrifice.

“We do not deny that the mass, or the celebration of the eucharist, can improperly be called a sacrifice; because 1) it is a work which is done so that we may adhere to God in holy society, 2) it is not the last part of the worship of the N.T., 3) formerly, when the eucharist was celebrated, gifts were wont to be offered, which would go to the use of the ministers of the church and the poor: 4) conjoined with the Holy Supper. The administration of the supper with prayers and thanksgivings is instituted in memory of the sacrifice of Christ offered on the altar of the cross.”

Examen theologicum acroamaticum, pt. 3, §. 2, ch. 5, q. 21.

Another Lutheran theologian, Peter Haberkorn, states:

“The Papists are in fundamental error in maintaining that the Holy Eucharist is a supreme, propitiatory, and impetratory sacrifice, truly and properly so called—not only to be offered for the sins, penalties, satisfactions, and other necessities of the faithful living, but also for the dead in Christ who are not yet fully purified.”

Hexas disputationum antiwalenburchicarum, disp. 6, pg. 33.

The Institution of the Eucharist

Against the Protestant view, Christ teaches that His Body and Blood are given (offered) to God as a sacrifice of propitiation in the Mass. Because the victim is Christ Himself, who is substantially present in the consecrated elements, this argument assumes transubstantiation, though that is not absolutely required for the Biblical exegesis right now.

The argument is quite simple, as the Walenburchs say:

“Since Christ speaks of a present breaking and pouring out, and does not merely say ‘this is given to you,’ but rather ‘this is given for you,’ these words must refer not only to the future sacrifice on the Cross but also to the present sacrifice in the Mass.”

Special Treatises, VI, pt. 6, ch. 4, n. 1

Let us break down the argument more precisely. According to Christ,

1. His Body and Blood are offered to the Father under the appearance of bread and wine

2. This offering occurs in the present during the Last Supper and during every Mass celebrated, not only at the Cross.

3. This is a proper sacrifice of propitiation.

Remember that this is opposed to the Protestant doctrine, which we explained earlier and can be summarized like this:

“In this sacrament Christ is not offered up to his Father, nor any real sacrifice made at all for remission of sins of the quick or dead, but only a commemoration of that one offering up of himself, by himself, upon the cross, once for all, and a spiritual oblation of all possible praise unto God for the same; so that the Popish sacrifice of the mass, as they call it, is most abominably injurious to Christ’s one only sacrifice, the alone propitiation for all the sins of the elect.”

WCF, ch. 29, n. 2.

To prove our argument, we can go directly to the Gospels.

Matthew 26:27-28,

“He took the cup, gave thanks, and gave to them, saying, ‘All of you drink it, for this is my blood of the new covenant, which is poured out [ἐκχυννόμενον] for many for the remission of sins.’”

Here, Christ says that His blood is, in the present tense — ekchynnómenon — poured out for the remission of sins. Already, our three points are proven.

1. His Body and Blood are offered to the Father under the appearance of bread and wine.
   This is obvious since he grabbed the elements, named them His Body and Blood, and said that they are offered. Interestingly, against the Protestants, the Eucharist is not said to be received for the remission of sins, or as they explain it, so that we may be further confirmed in the remission of sins and strengthened in faith. It is given, offered, poured out for the remission of sins. Thus, the Catholic teaching hides in plain sight, whereas the Protestant teaching misreads the text.

   That this offering is made to God is obvious since Christ would not offer it to anything created. Furthermore, St. Paul confirms that the Eucharist is offered to God, as opposed to the sacrifices of the Gentiles to demons:

“No, I imply that what pagans sacrifice they offer to demons and not to God. I do not want you to be participants with demons. You cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of demons. You cannot partake of the table of the Lord and the table of demons.”

1 Corinthians 10:20-21

1. This offering occurs in the present during the Last Supper and during every Mass celebrated, not only at the Cross.
   According to the Greek, this offering occurs in the present during the Last Supper and during every Mass celebrated, not only at the Cross. As we will see in other Gospels, Christ commands to “Do this”, which necessarily means that “this” will produce the same effect.

2. This is a proper sacrifice of propitiation.

   To “pour blood out for the remission of sins” is only nominally distinct from a sacrifice.

   1. Lev 17:11, “For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it for you on the altar to make atonement for your souls, for it is the blood that makes atonement by the life.”

If we look at the other synoptic Gospels, we find the same teaching.

Mark 14:24,

“He said to them, ‘This is my blood of the new covenant, which is poured out [ἐκχυννόμενον] for many.’”

Again, the present-tense offering is affirmed and the purpose is stated, namely, “for many.”

Luke 22:19-20 also mentions the offering of the bread

“He took bread, and when he had given thanks, he broke, and gave it to them, saying, ‘This is my body which is given [διδόμενον] for you. Do this in memory of me.’ Likewise, he took the cup after supper, saying, ‘This cup is the new covenant in my blood, which is poured out [ἐκχυννόμενον] for you.’”

When speaking of the body, Christ says it is given in the present tense for the Apostles, not only to them: didómenon. Regarding His blood, it is poured out in the present tense during the Last Supper for the Apostles, not drunk or received for the remission of sins: ekchynnómenon.

Again, contrary to the Protestant doctrine, Christ teaches that the Eucharist was, in that very moment, offered for many for sins. This is nothing else than the sacrifice of the Mass.

St. Paul, relaying the narrative two decades later, uses the same present tense:

“When he had given thanks, he broke it and said, ‘Take, eat. This is my body, which is broken for you.’”

1 Corinthians 11:24

Objection 1. Present-Tense Verses Denoting a Future Event

The first objection is that there are other places in Scripture in which the Greek denotes the present tense but clearly foretell a future event.

Matthew 6:30 says,

“The grass of the field, which today is alive and tomorrow is thrown into the oven…”

As Fr. Christian Pesch, S.J. says:

“The phrase ‘the grass which tomorrow is cast into the oven’ (Matt 6:30) proves nothing, because there the matter is not of something that will happen at some future time, but of something that always happens: grass flourishes one day and is cast into the oven the next.

Praelectiones Dogmaticae, vol. 6, tract. 4, sectio 3, art. 1, prop. 86, n. 870.

Matthew 26:2 also speaks in the present tense:

“You know that after two days the Passover comes, and the Son of Man is being handed over [παραδίδοται] to be crucified.”

The Greek word paradídotai is in the present tense yet obviously represents a future event.

Matthew 26:24 similarly says:3

“The Son of Man goes, even as it is written of Him…”

To this, the Walenburchs respond:

“While we admit that Scripture often uses the present tense to refer to future events, what conclusion should we draw from this? Is it not more certain that, in most cases, the present tense in Scripture means the present rather than the future? By what necessity, then, are we compelled to believe that the words ‘given’, ‘broken’ and ‘poured out’ should not be understood as referring to a present action?”

Special Treatises, VI, pt. 6, ch. 5, n. 2.

Yet, we can respond further by pointing out that the Gospel of Luke speaks of the cup being poured out for sins, not the blood in the cup, and since there was no cup present on Calvary, this is not speaking of a future event but only the present. They say:

“Moreover, in Luke, we find: ‘This cup is the new covenant in my blood, which is poured out for you.’ The phrase ‘is poured out’ does not modify ‘blood’ but ‘cup’ (as the Greek text confirms: τῦτο τὸ ποτήριον ἐκχυνόμθμον). If Luke had intended to exclude the present effusion that occurred in the Supper, he would not have written: ‘This cup, which is poured out.’ For the cup itself was not poured out on the Cross; rather, the blood was poured out as it was in the cup.”

Special Treatises, VI, pt. 6, ch. 5, n. 2.

Thus, even the English Standard Version (ESV) is worded like this:

“This cup that is poured out for you is the new covenant in my blood.”

Cardinal Franzelin summarizes this well:

“In Luke the pouring out is evidently predicated of the blood formally as it is in the chalice. For the form of the words does not say ‘blood is being poured out or will be poured out,’ but rather ‘this chalice is being poured out.’ This most well-known metonymic locution does not merely signify that what is contained in the chalice is to be poured out elsewhere, such as on the Cross; it signifies that it is poured out insofar as it is placed in the chalice — that is, in this state, formally as it is in the chalice. In the sacrifice of the Cross, that very blood which was in the chalice was indeed shed, but on the Cross the chalice was not shed, because the blood was not shed there formally as contained in the chalice and in that sacramental state in which it was in the chalice. It is therefore evident that the form of expression as it appears in Luke — ‘this chalice which is being poured out’ — signifies the pouring out of the blood formally insofar as it is placed in and contained in the chalice. Since the meaning of the words must necessarily be the same in all three Evangelists, it follows from what has been demonstrated that also in Matthew and Mark the participle ‘εκχυνομενον’ is referred to the blood formally as it is placed in the sacramental state.”

Treatise on the Sacrament and Sacrifice of the Most Holy Eucharist, pt. 2, thesis 11.

Objection 2. The Latin Liturgy Translation and Ancient Fathers

Doctrine of the Fathers

Philipp Melanchthon, a prominent Lutheran, states that the

“We are not ignorant that the Mass is called by the Fathers a sacrifice; but they do not mean that the Mass confers grace ex opere operato, and that, when applied on behalf of others, it merits for them the remission of sins, of guilt and punishment. Where are such monstrous stories to be found in the Fathers? But they openly testify that they are speaking of thanksgiving. Accordingly they call it a eucharist.”

Apology to the Augsburg Confession, art. xxiv, n. 66.

As a point of correction (as often needs to happen with Melanchthon), Catholics do not hold that the Mass confers grace ex opere operato.

It seems to me that this claim was made by him often:

“They who perform masses with a view to offering Christ for the living and the dead, thinking thereby that the more often it is repeated the better it is, are in impious error. And these errors for the most part are to be attributed to St. Thomas. For he taught that a mass is beneficial for others beside the one who eats it.”

Loci communes, Participation in the Lord’s Supper.

St. Augustine is the most clear. He teaches that the offering of the altar is a propitiation for the remission of sins of the souls who died and are not damned but are not yet in heaven.

“It is not to everyone that these services are profitable. And why are they not profitable to all, except because of the different kinds of lives that men lead in the body? When, then, sacrifices either of the altar or of alms are offered on behalf of all the baptized dead, they are thank-offerings for the very good, they are propitiatory (propitiationes) offerings for the not very bad, and in the case of the very bad, even though they do not assist the dead, they are a species of consolation to the living. And where they are profitable, their benefit consists either in obtaining a full remission of sins, or at least in making the condemnation more tolerable.”

Enchiridion, n. 109-110 (PL 40, 283).

In his Confessions, he prays for his deceased mother St. Monica, who had died 10 years before, and states confidence that she was already forgiven because, instead of worrying about decorative burial arrangements, she asked that the sacrifice of the altar be offered for her. Notice that for St. Augustine the Mass is the very same sacrifice as the one on the Cross.

“I know that she forgave her debtors their debts; do Thou also forgive her debts, whatever she contracted during so many years since the water of salvation. Forgive her, O Lord, forgive her, I beseech You; enter not into judgment with her… And I believe You have already done that which I ask You… For she, when the day of her dissolution was near at hand, took no thought to have her body sumptuously covered, or embalmed with spices; nor did she desire her paternal burial-place. These things she entrusted not to us, but only desired to have her name remembered at Your altar, which she had served without the omission of a single day; whence she knew that the holy sacrifice was dispensed, by which the handwriting that was against us is blotted out; by which the enemy was triumphed over, who, summing up our offenses, and searching for something to bring against us, found nothing in Him in whom we conquer.”

Confessions, bk. 9, ch. 13 (PL 32, 778).

The classical Protestants were not totally opposed to the idea of infallibility extending beyond Scripture. Though I’ve encountered different examples among the Reformed and Anglicans in being open to other infallible organs (e.g. infallible councils and traditions), Richard Field comes out on top with the highest view of ecclesial infallibility, essentially matching our view.

My intent here is to show that the real and central dividing issue is whether anything besides Scripture can bind to the assent of faith by virtue of its own testimony (the rule of faith) and not so much about infallibility. Obviously, Richard Field was still a Protestant despite holding (as we will see) such a high view of ecclesial infallibility.

Also, I do not encourage the reading of heretical works by Catholic faithful. This article cites a Protestant work as necessary to state my point.

Traditionally, Protestants grant to either the invisible or visible Church infallibility on the articles essential to salvation (necessitas medii) only, as opposed to Catholics who defend the Church’s infallibility on all matters of faith, regardless of its proximity or utility to salvation. We do not find that distinction with Field. To explain the Catholic view, I will cite the eminent theologian Fr. Matthias Joseph Scheeben.

For ease, I have broken this down into three theses.

Thesis 1: First, for Catholics, the visible Church always positively holds the most essential truths. Scheeben says:

“The most essential and most necessary truths must always be expressly and effectively attested and propagated in the Church and by the Church, if not by all members of the learning or even of the teaching Church, then still at least by the notorious testimony of the decisive organs.”

Dogmatik, vol. 1.1, ch. 4, § 22.

Thesis 2: The visible Church may be ignorant of some virtual truths. Scheeben says:

“Notwithstanding the essential integrity, continuity, and universality of the ecclesial Tradition, it therefore still remains possible that: temporarily a part of the deposit not only may not be expressly known and acknowledged in the entire body of the Church, but also may not be attested expressly and effectively in a sufficiently firm way by the authoritative organs, without the thread of Tradition being broken as a result.”

Dogmatik, vol. 1.1, ch. 4, § 22.

Such was (or at least seems to be) the case during the first four centuries of the patristic age regarding the Virgin Mary’s sinlessness and assumption, for example.

Thesis 3: The visible Church cannot err in any truth stubbornly (i.e. de fide). In other words, the Church will never universally hold something false as dogma, even if it may hold something false by way of opinion or speculation. Scheeben says:

“Never, neither in her entirety nor in the organs defining the faith of the whole, be able to declare decisively something to be apostolic Tradition that is not such, or that contradicts the real apostolic Tradition, because after all otherwise the testimony that actually came to the fore in one way or the other would no longer be infallible.”

Dogmatik, vol. 1.1, ch. 4, § 22.

Richard Field’s View

To conclude, I will cite Field himself and label each thesis in his quote.

“[2] The whole present Church may be ignorant of some things and err in them; but that [1] in matters necessary to be known and believed expressly, it cannot err; and that [3] it cannot err in any the least thing with pertinacity [stubbornness], such and so great as is found in heretics.”

Of the Church, bk. 4, ch. 5.

Again, this shows that infallibility, per se, is not what divides Catholics and Protestants. While it is definitely true that Field’s views are extremely rare, it is equally true that they do not disqualify one from being Protestant. As Field says against us, the Church is not a rule of faith for him:

“Our adversaries fall into two dangerous errors: the first, that the authority of the Church is regula fidei… the rule of our faith…”

Of the Church, bk. 4, ch. 6.

Some of the most difficult things to defend in Catholic apologetics against Protestants are the Marian dogmas, due to how little Scripture says about them explicitly and their controversial history in the Church prior to consensus and formal dogmatic definition. Here, I have in mind Mary’s sinlessness, Immaculate Conception, and Bodily Assumption.

It’s rather unfortunate, however, that many attempt to defend these dogmas by repeating certain arguments and overextending how much force they really carry. We ought to remember to be self-aware about the true weight a certain argument carries and whether it can serve as demonstrative proof or only a probable argument. Claiming the argument is stronger than it really is risks scandalizing those outside of the faith, for they will think we hold to these from weak reasons.

St. Thomas Aquinas writes:

“Certain probable arguments may be given for the practice and help of the faithful, but not for the conviction of our opponents, because the very insufficiency of these arguments would rather confirm them in their error if they thought that we assented to the truth of faith on account of such weak reasonings.”

Summa Contra Gentiles, bk. 1, ch. 9.

Similarly, St. Augustine says:

“Now it is a disgraceful and dangerous thing, and one that must be especially avoided, that a non-believer should hear a Christian speaking on such matters as if according to the Scriptures, and talking such nonsense that, seeing him completely mistaken, he can scarcely keep from laughing. The problem is not so much that an individual is mocked for being in error, but that our authors are thought by outsiders to have held such foolish views, and thus — causing great harm to those whose salvation we seek — are rejected and criticized as unlearned.”

On the Literal Sense of Genesis, bk. 1, ch. 19, n. 39 (PL 34, 261).

Here, I want to analyze certain arguments that are often repeated in defense of the Marian dogmas but should not be presented as having a clear, undeniable meaning which proves the doctrine. Furthermore, Protestants should realize that even the theologians of the Church admit the limitations of these verses.

Luke 1:28, “Hail, Full of Grace!”

Catholics often point to the greeting of St. Gabriel to Mary and unfortunately frame it as demonstrative proof for Mary’s immaculate conception and sinlessness.

“And the angel being come in, said unto her: Hail, full of grace, the Lord is with thee: blessed art thou among women.”

They point to the fact that the Greek for “full of grace” is in the past perfect tense which implies a perpetual perfect sanctity, but there are two problems with this argument.

First, the Greek word does not directly translate to “full of grace.” As Fr. Martin Jugie, A.A. notes:

“How should we translate κεχαριτωμένη (kecharitōmenē)? Our Latin version says gratia plena—full of grace. And by grace we commonly understand habitual grace, sanctifying grace: Mary is filled with sanctifying grace; she possesses it in abundance. This translation is not incorrect—there is indeed that meaning at the root of the Greek participle kecharitōmenē. However, we do not think this is the direct meaning. The grace (χάρις) referred to here directly is divine favor, and we would render κεχαριτωμένη as: ‘entirely surrounded by, wholly invested with divine favor,’ ‘completely pleasing to God.’ Translated into contemporary theological language, the expression does indeed amount to “filled with sanctifying grace,” that grace theologians aptly call gratia gratum faciens—the grace that makes one pleasing to God. But directly, it concerns objective grace, the favor by which God surrounds His creature. This divine favor, this love of God, is not an empty expression: it brings about, it produces in the human soul—or in the angel who is its object—that supernatural adornment, that divine beauty, which modern theologians call sanctifying grace, and which the Greek Fathers call divinization (θέωσις).”

The Immaculate Conception in Holy Scripture and the Eastern Tradition, pg. 47.

In other words, this grace primarily refers to an extrinsic favor of God, which suggests and is the basis, not only her Immaculate Conception but all of her privileges. It’s worthy to note that to be highly favored is Mary’s title, not her description which is truly unique, though this again doesn’t exactly tell you any explicit Marian dogma, it merely suggests it. As St. Thomas says:

“The angel did not say, ‘hail, Mary,’ but hail, full of grace… the blessed Virgin was superior to any of the angels in the fullness of grace, and as an indication of this the angel showed reverence to her by calling her: full of grace. This is as if he said: I show you reverence because you excel me in the fullness of grace…”

On the Ave Maria.

Second, even the theological committee commissioned to investigate and prepare the definition of the Immaculate Conception prior to its solemn declaration said on this verse:

“Conclusion III. The words of the Angel in St. Luke (Chapter I, verse 28): ‘Hail, full of grace, the Lord is with thee; blessed art thou among women,’ do not, in themselves, have sufficient strength to prove the prerogative of the Blessed Virgin that is under discussion.

The expression ‘full of grace’ does not, in itself, prove the point—because the statement would still be true even if it did not extend to all times. Nor does a comparison with the words of St. John (Chapter I, verse 14), where Christ the Lord is said to be ‘full of grace,’ help sufficiently, for two reasons:

Because in the original Greek text the words are different: for the Blessed Virgin it says κεχαριτωμένη (kecharitōmenē), and for the Lord πλήρης χάριτος (plērēs charitos);

Because even the expression πλήρης χάριτος is also used of St. Stephen in the Acts of the Apostles (Chapter VI, verse 8, according to the more probable reading, which the Vulgate follows). Therefore, its meaning clearly varies according to the subject to whom it is applied, and does not have an absolute meaning.

Nor do the words ‘blessed art thou among women’ have such force on their own, since one can compare them with the words from the Book of Judith (Chapter XIII, verse 23): ‘Blessed art thou, daughter, by the Most High God above all women on earth.’”

La solenne definizione del dogma dell’ immacolato concepimento di Maria Santissima, vol. 1, Rome, 1904, pp. 799.

It’s important to note that the committee does not say the verse does not teach her privilege, as if that was not the angel’s intention, but that it is not clear. Thus, it would be more accurate to say this verse highly suggests Marian privileges, but that no specific privilege can be drawn forth with immediate clearness.

Genesis 3:15, The “Woman”

In Genesis 3:15, God lays down punishments for the serpent after he deceived Adam and Eve. He says:

“I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your offspring and her offspring; he shall bruise your head, and you shall bruise his heel.”

Genesis 3:15

Here, the Latin Vulgate contains the feminine ipsa, indicating that the woman will crush the head of the serpent and not her seed. As a result, many Catholics usually argue that Mary crushed the serpent’s head by being conceived without original sin, but this does not follow.

It is true that in popular Catholic piety, going back even to some of the Church Fathers, both Eastern and Western, the crushing of the serpent’s head by the woman represents Mary’s unique and exalted participation in the salvation of the world. It’s also true that, in the original Hebrew and Septuagint Greek texts of the Old Testament, the correct text contains a masculine pronoun (“he”) instead of the feminine mistranslation in the Vulgate, expressing the serpent’s defeat by the man (the “seed” of the “woman”) instead of the woman herself.

What’s false is the claim that this mistranslation served as the basis for the dogma’s Scriptural support. Instead, while Genesis 3:15 does teach Mary’s sinless conception, it does so in a totally different way. First, Ineffabilis Deus, explicitly says Christ crushes the head of the serpent and Mary does so in union with Him. It never claims she does so directly by referencing the Biblical verse.

“[The] most Blessed Mother, the Virgin Mary, was prophetically indicated; and, at the same time, the very enmity of both against the evil one was significantly expressed. Hence, just as Christ, the Mediator between God and man, assumed human nature, blotted the handwriting of the decree that stood against us, and fastened it triumphantly to the cross, so the most holy Virgin, united with him by a most intimate and indissoluble bond, was, with him and through him, eternally at enmity with the evil serpent, and most completely triumphed over him, and thus crushed his head with her immaculate foot.”
Ineffabilis Deus.

Second, the same committee investigating the Immaculate Conception admits this, so Protestants should not be criticizing the Church for having been “misled” by a mistranslation.

“Conclusion I. A solid argument for the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin cannot be drawn from the words of Genesis (Ch. III, v. 15): ‘She shall crush thy head.’ The first reason is that it cannot be considered free from controversy whether the text should read ipsa (‘she’) rather than ipse (‘he’). For the reading ipsa is opposed not only by the original text of both the Hebrew and Samaritan versions, but also by all the ancient translations—including the Old Latin—and by all the Greek Fathers, and even the Latin Fathers up to the middle of the fourth century. The Vulgate itself, in which such a reading appears to originate, contains manuscripts that disagree on the matter. Therefore, one cannot invoke in support of this reading the Tridentine decree on the Vulgate, either because it is not certain that this reading is indeed from the Vulgate, or because the Tridentine decree does not require the rejection of the original texts.”
La solenne definizione del dogma dell’ immacolato concepimento di Maria Santissima, vol. 1, Rome, 1904, pp. 796.

Instead, Catholic theologians note that (1) Mary is mentioned with Christ and not included in the devil’s seed and that (2) she shares the same enmity of Christ with Satan. In other words, the serpent is clearly Satan, and his seed refers either to sin itself or to sinners; yet the woman, Mary, is presented as distinct from his seed. Furthermore, whatever enmity Christ has with the devil’s kingdom is shared by Mary with the devil. Again:

“I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your offspring and her offspring; he shall bruise your head, and you shall bruise his heel.”

Genesis 3:15

If Mary was ever touched by original sin, or any effect of the fall which is opposed to God such as personal sin, then there would not be a perfect enmity between her and the devil, for she would have some degree of friendship with him. Thus, Scheeben writes:

“Mary together with Christ are contrasted to the devil as a human couple with whom he will indeed be at enmity but whom he will not conquer as he did the first pair; instead he is to be conquered by them; and even if (according to the original text) the conquering of the devil is ascribed above all to Christ as the work of His own power, nevertheless in the enmity generally the Woman is placed first, because and insofar as the devil’s victory, just as it was won over the woman first and was mediated by the woman in its spread, so too was to be thwarted with respect to the Woman first and generally defeated precisely through her mediation. Together with Christ, such an invincible and victorious enmity, by which the devil was to be punished for leading human beings astray and specifically was to be shamed for deceiving the woman, obviously excludes however the possibility that Mary ever had any fellowship whatsoever with the devil or was subject to his dominion; rather it demands that Mary with Christ was always excluded from the kingdom of the devil from the first moment of her existence.”

Dogmatik, vol. 5, part 2, ch. 5, § 279b.

Consensus of the Fathers?

Finally, Catholics sometimes claim a consensus of the Fathers where one does not exist. If anyone has studied the topic of Mary’s sinlessness for even a short while, it’s clear that many Fathers (e.g. Origen, Ss. Basil, Chrysostom, etc) imputed sin to our Lady. For more on this, read this. Thus, Catholics should be careful in making historical claims regarding this dogma.

Nevertheless, a few things must be noted.

1. Catholic theologians have never claimed that every teaching which now holds the authority of dogma has always existed as such.
   
   As the Walenburchs say,

   “For some tradition to be Apostolic, it receives no detriment from the fact that at some time in the Catholic Church there was doubt about it. For just as such doubt does not prevent certain books of Scripture, about which there was once doubt, from being held as Canonical: so doubt in past time does not prevent, concerning this or that tradition, that it be truly Apostolic. It should suffice for us if we are certain with equal certainty about the unwritten Word of God as about the written.”

   Examination of the Principles of Faith, 3rd exam., § 5, n. 64.

   Protestants may not like this, but this is exactly the mind of St. Augustine,

   “Let them not disparage the rule of faith, not disparage the truth; let them not speak against holy Church… Someone who goes wrong in the discussion of other questions that have not been thoroughly canvassed, not yet firmly settled by the Church’s full authority, is to be tolerated. Error in that case is to be tolerated; it should not go so far, though, as to strive to shake the very foundation of the Church.”

   Sermon 294, 21 (20) (PL 38, 1348).

   In fact, Mary’s sinlessness has been specifically identified many times by Catholic theologians as a teaching which was previously left up to opinion but, as the Church came to a consensus on this point, it became obligatory for all to believe. As Cardinal John de Lugo, S.J. (d. 1660) writes:

   “As to the immunity of the Blessed Virgin from all venial sin throughout her whole life… in order to propose this truth to us, the Church examined and consulted Scripture and Apostolic doctrine no less than in the case of any other dogma which she defines… Therefore, since the Church, from the most excellent dignity of the Mother of God revealed by God, persuaded herself of this and believed that this privilege was contained in that dignity, it follows that the Apostles themselves – who believed the same dignity of the Mother of God from divine revelation and penetrated her excellence more clearly – could believe that immunity no less.”

   De virtute fidei divinae, 2nd ed., disp. 3, n. 73, (Lyons: Philippe Bord, Laurent Arnaud, and Claude Rigaud, 1656), 142.

2. The Protestant may object that since doctrines like the sinlessness of Mary and her bodily assumption are not essential to salvation, they should not be dogmatized. This also has many issues:

   1. First, the Church Fathers do not make this distinction and instead extend heresy beyond the essentials. For example, Ss. Jerome and Augustine explicitly considered it a heresy to deny the perpetual virginity of Mary, as opposed to Protestants who may affirm it as a pious doctrine not belonging to faith. St. Jerome says:

      “I have never spared heretics, and I have done my best to make the enemies of the Church my own. Helvidius wrote against the perpetual virginity of Saint Mary.”

      Dialogue Against the Pelagians, Prologue, n. 2 (PL 23, 497A).

      St. Augustine says:

      “The Helvidians, having arisen from Helvidius, so oppose the virginity of Mary that they contend that she, after Christ, also bore other children by her husband Joseph.”

      On Heresies, ch. 84 (PL 42, 46).

      These same fathers affirm that a heretic is one who does not assent to the teachings of the Church. Thus, when a consensus on the sinlessness of Mary did arise, we can safely assume the stance they would have taken against Protestants who do not think matters not essential to salvation should not be forced as dogma.

   2. The reasoning provided, namely, that it should not be an article of faith because it is not essential to salvation, implies a gravely erroneous view of faith. Faith is assent on the basis of God revealing. One does not have divine faith in some things because they are essential to salvation, but, instead, one assents because God has spoken it. When it becomes certain that God has revealed it — and in this case it would be implicitly but not explicitly in Scripture/Tradition — one should assent regardless of how important it is. For example, I believe in the Incarnation just as much as I believe that Jared was the Father of Enoch (Genesis 5:18), even if the latter is not essential for my salvation. As Cardinal Franzelin says,

      “There is one reasoning on account of which the formal object of faith is believed and whereby it is constituted in all revealed truths. This is certainly the authority of God speaking, or the speech of God being sufficiently proposed. Moreover, the reasoning of belief is not claimed from the greater dignity, the innate necessity and the connection with the ultimate end of a truth which must be believed. Therefore all these pertain to properties of the material object or of a thing which is believed, not to the motive and reasoning on account of which it is believed. Therefore the distinction conveyed by Protestants following Hunnius and George Calixtus among fundamental articles and non fundamental articles, or ἀδιάφορα is absurd. For it is stated in that distinction, that a consensus in non fundamental articles is indifferent and unnecessary, to the extent that articles of this kind, no matter how much they are proposed with respect to the sound integrity of faith and ecclesiastical communion, one should be allowed not only to not believe them, but even to deny them on account of the inherent lesser dignity and necessity in the matter itself.”

      On Divine Tradition, thesis 23.

In summary, there is no problem in conceding that the consensus on this came later, even if many earlier Fathers erred on this question and others did not.

The thesis of this article is that St. Augustine of Hippo rejected the Protestant view of judging articles of faith. We will first explain the Catholic objection and then show it in St. Augustine. Regardless of your religion, subscribe to support my Substack.

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Private judgement is a controversial topic which many on both sides often misunderstand, so some explanation is unavoidable in order to identify the real question. Catholics should not simply reject private judgement since everyday life requires the constant use of private judgement, even in spiritual matters. When I examine myself before confession or the Eucharist, I use private judgement. When I watch a Trent Horn video, I use private judgement to determine if what he says is consistent with the teaching of the Church and Scripture. When I read a controversial passage of Scripture and check different commentaries to determine its true meaning, I use private judgement. In fact, all men use private judgement when looking at the created world to conclude that one God exists, reasoning from effect (creation) to cause (one, all-powerful and simple God). Catholics use private judgement to examine the motives of credibility to determine where the authentic preaching of divine revelation is to be found (it’s found in the Catholic Church). Similarly, the Jews and Gentiles of the first century did the same with Christ and the apostles.

John 10:19-21 is a perfect example of using private judgement to discern whether someone is an authentic legate/messenger or not by his motives of credibility, both internal and external. This is necessary since most men receive mediate revelation from God’s messengers (e.g. Prophets, Apostles) instead of immediate revelation from God Himself (e.g. Moses).

“There was a division therefore again among the Jews for these sayings. And many of them said, ‘He hath a devil, and is mad; why hear ye him?’ Others said, ‘These are not the words of him that hath a devil. Can a devil open the eyes of the blind?’”

John 10:19-21

Obviously, men were able to judge the nature of Christ’s miracles and conclude that these signs are not works of a demon but only of an authentic divine messenger.

“The Father that sent Me giveth testimony of Me…. The Father who abideth in Me, He doeth the works. Believe you not that I am in the Father and the Father in me? Otherwise believe for the very works’ sake.”

John 8:18

What miracles and other motives of credibility do is establish certitude that such a messenger is commissioned by God and his teachings are worthy of faith. Otherwise, without such motives, simply believing any self-proclaimed messenger is imprudent, unreasonable, and is to commit the sin of credulity. Scheeben says:

“In order for faith to be reasonable, it must be based on reasonable motives (called motiva credibilitatis) or distinguishing marks (criteria) through which a given word is proved before the tribunal of reason to be a real word of God and claims the faith due to the latter.”

Dogmatik, vol. 1, part. 2, ch. 6, §42.

Yet, this judgement is still at the natural level and the articles of faith (or propositions) of the messenger are not themselves being judged. Just as man is able to naturally conclude that one God exists, so can he conclude that such works attached to a certain messenger, whether miracles or other signs (e.g. the miraculous growth of the Catholic Church despite obstacles and its invincible fecundity) are works that only the one God can bring about (see above in John 10) and conclude that God speaks through this messenger (be it Christ as man, the Apostles, or the Church).

While St. Augustine held this view of the motives of credibility, that is not the purpose of this article, so I will simply assume it and ask the reader to grant this point for the sake of argument. I will post a video/article on St. Augustine’s full epistemology in the coming weeks. For now, here is one of many quotes from the bishop of Hippo on the motives of credibility on authenticating the Church:1

“Although there were no prior testimonies about Christ and the Church, who could fail to be moved to believe when suddenly divine light shines upon humanity, as we see that, abandoning false gods and smashing their idols everywhere, overthrowing temples or converting them to other uses, and eradicating from human custom the most ancient vain rites, all call upon the one true God? […] And the Church, spreading through all nations, grew so that even against the Catholic faith no perverse sect, no form of error, could rise without desiring to glory in Christ’s name; which indeed would not have been allowed to flourish on earth if the very contradiction exercised no healthy discipline.”

De fide rerum quae non videntur, ch. 7, n. 10 (PL 40, 179-80).

The Real Problem with Private Judgement

Private judgement is not rejected altogether. Instead, Thomists (and St. Augustine) reject privately judging articles of faith, so that theological conclusions deduced through private judgement are not worthy of faith. The contrary position of assenting with divine faith to propositions deduced by private judgement is held by Protestants and is necessary to them, since they deny an ongoing organ that serves as the rule of faith which applies and proposes divine revelation.

Johann Gerhard says:

“Articles of faith… are either principles revealed by God or conclusions deduced from them.”

Method of Theological Study, Pt. 2, § 2, ch. 1.

Francis Turretin says:

“Q. Are the doctrines of faith and practice to be proved only by the express word of God? May they not also be legitimately proved by consequences drawn from Scripture?

A. We affirm the latter… Mixed syllogisms […] do not cease to be of faith.”

Institutes of Elenctic Theology, vol. 1, q. 12.

Note here that what I reject from Turretin is NOT that doctrines may “be legitimately proved by consequences drawn from Scripture”; of course I affirm one can form firm and certain theological conclusions and arguments — we do this all the time, as did the Church fathers.

What I reject (Thomists and St. Augustine) is that these conclusions are worthy of faith.

What is Faith?

Faith, as one of the three theological virtues, is assent on the basis of God revealing. If one assents to a proposition because it was deduced, it is no longer faith since human knowledge has entered the formal motive for assent: “I believe this because I have deduced it from the Word of God.” Again, divine faith is a theological virtue; since the formal object determines the species of the act, nothing created can enter the formal object of a theological virtue.

For Catholics, the Magisterium (which began with the Apostles themselves) is the selected vehicle by which we receive revelation, either through the ordinary and universal or extraordinary magisterium (solemn definition by pope or ecumenical council). I understand this could use more explanation and could even be debated, but my point here is not to prove the Catholic view—only to explain it briefly and show that St. Augustine held it. In time, I will make more content explaining this in detail.

Explicit propositions do not require private judgement. Thus, assenting to Scripture when it says “Isaac begat Jacob” is NOT an exercise of private judgement and not what is in contention here. Similarly, assenting to the divinity of Christ from Titus 2:13 requires no private judgement since this is said explicitly:

“[…] waiting for our blessed hope, the appearing of the glory of our great God and Savior Jesus Christ.”

Titus 2:13

In like manner, Catholics do not use private judgement to assent to explicit definitions of the Church e.g. “Mary was bodily assumed into heaven at the end of her earthly life.”

Instead, the theological conclusion of Christ’s two wills is not explicitly stated in Scripture but is instead virtually contained. Remember, we are not saying that these conclusions bear no weight, but that by the very nature of what divine faith is, they cannot be assented to, since the medium of knowledge of the proposition is human reasoning and enters into the formal motive for assenting, making it impossible for a true act of faith to take place.

St. Augustine’s Rejection of Faith in Theological Conclusions

To summarize thus far, the rule of faith for Catholics is found in the explicit statements of Scripture and dogmas of the Church. Private judgement may be used for firm theological arguments, but these are not de fide prior to the definition of the Church.

This final section is pretty simple. First, St. Augustine affirms this exact thing regarding the rule of faith:

“When, therefore, careful attention shows that it is uncertain how the text should be punctuated or pronounced, one should consult the rule of faith, which he has received from the clearer passages of Scripture and from the authority of the Church—about which we have spoken sufficiently when discussing things in the first book.”

On Christian Doctrine, bk. 3, ch. 2 (PL 34, 65-66).

Next, one should note his constant distinction between understanding (intelligere) and faith. For St. Augustine, faith precedes and seeks (theological) understanding. Catholics first assent to the mysteries and then comprehend them over time.

“For true religion cannot in any way be rightly entered upon unless those things are believed which each person will afterward attain and comprehend, if he has conducted himself well and proved worthy—and indeed, not at all without a certain weighty authority commanding it.”

On the Profit of Believing, ch. 9, n. 21 (PL 42, 79).

Yet he is clear that this understanding is not assented to by faith.

“What then we understand (intelligimus), we owe to reason; what we believe, to authority.”

On the Profit of Believing, n. 25 (PL 42, 83).

Again, theological conclusions are not assented to only on the basis of authority but also due to human understanding, which is incompatible with what faith actually is: “I believe Y because I have deduced it from X, which God revealed.”

St. Augustine also makes this distinction in his work Against the Fundamental Epistle of Manichaeus, noting that the Catholic Church possesses a profound wisdom of understanding, though only a few spiritual men attain it in this life, while most of the faithful believe even without understanding. Clearly, he is not merely distinguishing between faith and the comprehension of mysteries by natural reason, since he affirms that there are, in fact, some who do understand.

“In the Catholic Church, to leave aside the most profound wisdom, the knowledge of which few spiritual people attain in this life… the rest of the crowd is made most secure not by the liveliness of understanding (intelligendi), but by the simplicity of faith. Therefore, if I set aside this wisdom, which you do not believe exists in the Catholic Church, there are many other things in its bosom that hold me most justly.” [He then lists some of the motives of credibility]

Against the Epistle of Manichaeus, ch. 4 (5) (PL 42, 175).

He later explains this more clearly, saying that Catholics first assent to these truths and that God then grants understanding through interior illumination, which, again, is not of faith, according to him:

“We should instead follow those [the Catholics] who invite us first to believe what we cannot as yet see in order that, having been strengthened by faith, we may merit to understand (intelligere) what we believe, when it is no longer human beings but God himself who interiorly enlightens and strengthens our mind.”

Against the Epistle of Manichaeus, ch. 14 (17) (PL 42, 183).

He repeats this point in his Confessions, asking God to help him understand Scripture:

“Let me hear and understand (intelligam) how in the beginning Thou made the heaven and the earth. Moses wrote this; he wrote and departed — passed hence from You to You. Nor now is he before me; for if he were I would hold him, and ask him, and would adjure him by You that he would open unto me these things, and I would lend the ears of my body to the sounds bursting forth from his mouth. And should he speak in the Hebrew tongue, in vain would it beat on my senses, nor would anything touch my mind; but if in Latin, I should know what he said. But whence should I know whether he said what was true? But if I knew this even, should I know it from him? Verily within me, within in the chamber of my thought, Truth, neither Hebrew, nor Greek, nor Latin, nor barbarian, without the organs of voice and tongue, without the sound of syllables, would say, He speaks the truth, and I, immediately assured of it, confidently would say unto that man of Yours, You speak the truth. As, then, I cannot inquire of him, I beseech You — You, O Truth, full of whom he spoke truth — You, my God, I beseech, forgive my sins; and do Thou, who gave to that Your servant to speak these things, grant to me also to understand (intelligere) them.”

Confessions, bk. 11, ch. 3, n. 5 (PL 32, 811).

To conclude, I will simply repeat what he says in On the Profit of Believing, as it illuminates the many passages of him in which he says that God helps believers understand Scripture through reasoning:

“What then we understand (intelligimus), we owe to reason; what we believe, to authority.”

On the Profit of Believing, n. 25 (PL 42, 83).2

This is nothing else than the Thomistic doctrine.

I must say one last thing to anyone reading and preparing to respond: remember that the point of this article was not to defend the Catholic view but only to explain it and then demonstrate it in St. Augustine.

God bless.

To understand the Catholic view of epistemology, we need to start with divine revelation, which is the communication of truths, called mysteries, from God to men. These mysteries are owed the assent of divine faith because God has revealed them. I don’t accept the Trinity because I have deduced it but because God has revealed it. Faith is similar to scientific knowledge in that it is firm, but dissimilar in that it is based on extrinsic evidence, not intrinsic evidence.

For example, if I eat beans and drink milk for lunch, and later conclude that my stomach ache was caused by mixing these foods, I have made a certain and firm scientific judgement based on the intrinsic evidence that I possess, namely, my lunch. This is not faith since I accept the fact that my lunch caused my stomach pains based on deduction. For something like the date of my birth, however, I only have extrinsic evidence, namely the testimony of my parents and my birth certificate, and thus, I have human faith in such a fact. Divine faith, unlike human faith, is irrevocable, since it is assent on the basis of God the revealing, who cannot deceive or be deceived. Thus, if we take faith in general as a genus, which is assent on the basis of authority, what differentiates the two species of human and divine faith is the formal object: one is the assent because of human testimony and the other is assent because of divine testimony. Because this assent of divine faith is supernatural, it is only made possible by the grace of the Holy Spirit, inwardly moving man to assent to the external proposition of God’s revelation.

However, most men receive divine revelation mediately — unlike Abraham, Moses, the Prophets, and the Apostles who received divine revelation immediately from God. This means that divine revelation comes to us through divine legates — messengers commissioned by God to preach in His name and demand the assent of faith. For Catholics, the proposition of mysteries by the Apostles and the Magisterium after the Apostles are a condition without which (conditione sine qua non) the assent of faith could not take place; God can be said to reveal the Incarnation to the apostles, but if they do not come and preach it to me, I cannot assent. Thus, the difference between the Apostles and the Magisterium is that the Apostles could propose new revelation, whereas the Magisterium can only preserve and explicate the revelation of the Apostles, making explicit what was previous implicit; nevertheless, they are both conditions for the assent of faith.

Here, a Protestant might object and say that this introduces the Church into the formal motive of our assent, preventing us from having divine faith. Yet, this misunderstands what a necessary condition is and confuses it with the motive for assent, which is God alone. Here is an example by Fr. Charles René Billuart, O.P., on how something beautiful is not loved on basis of its proposal, but that it cannot be loved unless it has been proposed:

“The proposition of the things revealed by the Church stands in relation to faith as the proposal of goodness stands in relation to love; for just as the will cannot love an object unless it is proposed and known, so the intellect cannot believe unless the things revealed are proposed to it. But the proposal of goodness in relation to the will and love is not its formal object, but only the application of the object and a condition without which not.”

Summa Summae S. Thomae, sive Compendium Theologiae, t. III, dist. I, art. II (Leodii: Everardum Kints, 1754), pg. 7.

Another example of a necessary condition is the role of obscurity in faith. The mysteries we assent to, such as the Holy Trinity, remain obscure because we lack the perfect vision we will have in heaven; if we possessed such vision, faith would be impossible. Thus, obscurity is required for faith, yet it is not the reason we assent—we believe only because God has revealed.

Finally, since this revelation is mediate, God must provide concurrent aid to the preaching of His legates to authenticate it before men as coming from God. Otherwise, it would be irrational and sinful, namely the sin of credulity, to assent to their preaching. While some internal marks of the message may provide some degree of certitude that the preaching is divine, such as the sublimity of the Gospel and the beauty of the Catholic religion, the more concrete marks are external. Fr. Scheeben writes:

“In order for us to be able to accept a truth in faith by dint of the motive of faith, it is necessary not only that this truth in fact is revealed by God through His external word, or that the word proposed to us as coming from God really does come from God too, but also that this revealed character of a truth, or this divine origin of a word is completely certain to us. For only on this twofold condition is it possible for God’s authority and trustworthiness to move us to accept that truth and for us to let ourselves be moved reasonably thereby to accept it decisively and completely. Hence Innocent XI condemned the proposition (Inter damn. 21): ‘The assent to the faith, supernatural and useful to salvation, is based on only a probable knowledge of revelation and even on the fear with which one fears that God has not spoken’ [DH 2121]. However, in order for this certainty that God has spoken be a true and genuine certainty, it must be a reasonable one. And in order for it to be a reasonable one, it must be based on reasonable motives (called motiva credibilitatis) or distinguishing marks (criteria) through which a given word is proved before the tribunal of reason to be a real word of God and claims the faith due to the latter. In this way, however, it takes the form of reasonable consciousness of the internal trustworthiness of the external human proposal of the word of God and the external trustworthiness of the word of God itself.”

Dogmatik, 1.2, ch. 6, §42.

To summarize the Catholic view, I will quote Fr. Billuart, O.P:

“When the truthfulness of the messenger is not certain, his credentials are examined; when that is established, the king’s letters are accepted because of the truthfulness of the messenger. But the contents of the king’s letters are believed not because of the truthfulness of the messenger but because of the truthfulness of the king… Apply this to the case: The Church proposes that this and that are revealed by God. The truthfulness and infallibility of the Church are known to us from her notes and motives of credibility, on account of which it is accepted and believed that these things are revealed in Scripture or Tradition; but the things revealed themselves contained in Scripture or Tradition are believed because of the authority and veracity of God revealing. Hence you see that the knowledge of the truthfulness of the Church, although it is confirmed by Scripture, nevertheless does not necessarily depend upon it; for when the Church was being born, there was no Scripture, and yet the truthfulness of the Church was known and certain, but it was first obtained from her notes and motives of credibility, although we do not deny that it is confirmed by Scripture.”

Summa Summae S. Thomae, sive Compendium Theologiae, t. III, dist. I, art. II (Leodii: Everardum Kints, 1754), pg. 9.

Icon veneration is one of the most controversial topics in the sphere of online apologetics. Eastern Orthodox apologists (not all of them) swear that the Apostles were kissing icons of Photius in the first century; Catholics usually appeal to “doctrinal development” to make the really hard historical problems go away; Protestants love to use this topic as an epistemic breathalyzer to cure their ecclesial anxiety, assuring themselves that this council obviously erred and therefore there is no infallible magisterium. Thus, this meme gets circulated around often:

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These discussions are, in my opinion, often frustrating. When thinking about this issue a few months ago, I realized a fundamental issue in Gavin Ortlund’s argument, as well as the way many Eastern Orthodox and Catholic apologists respond. In this article, I am defending the following thesis: Nicaea 2 does not demand the assent of faith to the claim that icon veneration is explicitly apostolic and, therefore, even if we concede that it does not explicitly go back to the apostles, the Church’s claims of infallibility are not challenged. I appreciate the Protestants, Catholics, and Orthodox who do a lot of work on this and are in an honest quest for the truth; my intent here is not to discredit your historical research. On my end, I simply want to provide clarity on the epistemic aspect of this conversation by thinking through the issue logically and how the Catholic view of the magisterium fits into this, since Protestants claim Nicaea 2 disproves it.

In my humble opinion, I am yet to see an approach to defending Nicaea 2 that is consistent with the Catholic and Orthodox view of the magisterium. I humbly ask for your open mind to my meager work.

First, I need to explain a few points.

Clarification #1: I am not an Iconoclast

This should go without saying, but apparently a few Eastern Orthodox apologists have accused me of being one for not insisting that icon veneration is the fifth Gospel after John.

Clarification #2: What is Doctrinal Development?

Often times, this term is thrown around and no one knows what it means. The development of doctrine is simply the use of theological reasoning to deduce theological conclusions from explicit theological premises. To explicate something means to take something implicit and make it explicit. Therefore, although Scripture does not explicitly teach that Jesus has two wills — there is no verse that explicitly says this — the explicit proposition of Christ having a Divine will and a human will follows from the propositions that “Christ has a Divine nature and a perfect human nature” and “volition is a faculty belonging to a rational nature”; here we have explicated the two wills of Christ from two other premises. This is the reasoning followed at the Third Council of Constantinople, as St. Robert Bellarmine explains:

“Similarly when the Sixth Council defined that there existed two wills in Christ, the divine and the human, it deduced the conclusion from the Scriptures in which it is said that Christ is perfect God and perfect man.”

De Verbo Dei, bk. 3, ch. 10.

When we conclude from the revealed principle of the Incarnation that the Godman can now be depicted in His humanity, this is doctrinal development. When we articulate a theological argument in which we conclude that icons can be venerated from the same principle by which we venerate holy objects and relics, this is doctrinal development. Every time we take what is implied in something and make it explicit, we are developing an established explicit principle into another explicit principle that was only implicit before.

Thus, I am being very specific when I say that icon veneration is not “explicitly” apostolic. I don’t think the apostles instituted outward acts of affection as a universal rite in the first century. Obviously, icon veneration must be at least virtually apostolic and in perfect continuity with the previous principles and practices, such as the veneration of relics and saints.

Clarification #3: The History of Icon Veneration and Second Nicaea

1. For the sake of argument, let’s grant in this article that Protestant apologists like Dr. Gavin Ortlund are correct that icon veneration does not go back to the Apostles but was emerged within the culture of the Church in the 6th century and onwards.

2. I also fully grant that the bishops at Nicaea 2 truly thought this practice went back to the apostles in its very form. Here is where Protestants get their biggest polemical slam dunk: if icon veneration does not really extend back to the apostles, as conceded in the first point (1), and the bishops at Nicaea 2 thought it did, then they claim we have a problem.

3. Here, we are specifically concerned with veneration, not only the making of images. All sides concede the early Church used images for at least didactic and decorative purposes.

Clarification #4: What Really Matters in This Controversy

This one is most important. Why do Protestants (e.g. Dr. Gavin Ortlund, Dr. James White) bring this issue up so much? Is it because they want to disprove magisterial infallibility? Sure, but we need to be more specific: it is because they want to disprove the claim that the magisterium is a rule of faith and therefore Scripture alone should be the rule of faith. This is what Sola Scriptura is, after all: that Scripture alone binds the conscience to the assent of faith and the authority of the Church and ecclesiastical tradition are powerful guides that cannot bind the conscience in and of themselves. Thus, the Westminster Larger Catechism says:

“The Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament are the Word of God, the only rule of faith and obedience.”

Westminster Larger Chatechism, q. 3.

For more on this, see this video.

If Protestants want to claim Nicaea 2 disproves that the Church can be rule of our faith like Scripture, they need to demonstrate that the Church erred in acting as a rule of faith — that the Church erred by binding the mind of believers to assent to falsehood. If a Church council errs in a statement that is not dogma, then why would that disprove the Church is a rule of faith?

One may object, “Who cares? If the bishops at Nicaea 2 all thought icon veneration was apostolic, it means the Church is not infallible.” Here, I would simply remind the objector that we say the Church is infallible in matters of faith and morals, not thoughts or opinion. Someone might say that this is cope and seeks to escape the obvious truth: “What difference does it make if we hold to something false by opinion or by Divine faith? If we’re wrong, it still means the Church erred. Period.” But this is obviously an ignorant and false misunderstanding of the purpose of why Christ instituted a magisterium. Remember that faith is the proper response to Divine revelation. One does not assent to revealed truths by opinion but by faith. If the whole Church were to offer the assent of divine faith to a falsehood, it would be intellectual idolatry, since only Divine truth is owed faith, thus invalidating the Church’s claims to infallibility.

Remember that Christ commissioned the Church to teach his own doctrine, promising His perpetual presence and the charism of truth in doing so, so that the Church’s teaching will always be reflective of the Truth when it proposes with the authority and in the name of Christ.

“Jesus said to them, ‘All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me. Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you. And behold, I am with you always, to the end of the age.”

Matthew 28:18-20

And:

“I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Helper, to be with you forever, even the Spirit of truth. He will teach you all things and bring to your remembrance all that I have said to you.”

John 14:16-26

And:

“When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth, for he will not speak on his own authority, but whatever he hears He will speak, and He will declare to you the things that are to come. He will glorify me, for He will take what is mine and declare it to you.”

John 16:13-14

Again, the proper response to the teaching of Jesus Christ, proposed by the Apostles and the Church, is the assent of divine faith, not merely some opinion, approval, or human faith.

Human or historical faith is assent, not on the basis of God revealing, but on a human witness. Such is the faith we have from certain early writers who say that St. Thomas the Apostle went to India, or that St. John the Apostle was thrown in a cauldron of boiling water and wasn’t burned. If I had a 2000 year old manuscript of a first century Christian saying that the Apostles bowed to icons, I would only have historical or human faith in such a claim. Even if I had an infallible certainty that this note in my hand was true, I would still only have historical faith, not divine faith. Craig Truglia and Jay Dyer could time travel, snap a picture of the first century churches venerating icons, and show it to me; I would no longer have human faith but an absolute certainty that icon veneration is explicitly apostolic, since I am now seeing the truth for myself and no longer depending on a witness. Guess what? I still wouldn’t have divine faith in this claim since it is not revealed or proposed by the Church.

It is this distinction that really makes the Protestant argument against magisterial infallibility from Nicaea 2 fall flat on its face. The council does not demand that I assent to its historical claims with divine faith. Simply talking about infallibility without understanding the purpose of infallibility in the Church is a problem. Infallibility doesn’t exist so that everyone in the Church is going to hold the same and correct opinion, but so that the Church doesn’t commit intellectual idolatry and assent to something on the basis of God revealing which is actually false.

If I may digress for a moment, it is this that really captures the beauty of having a magisterium. As Scheeben describes faith:

“The believer, prompted by grace, strives to conform his judgment to God’s judgment through submission to God’s authority and trust in His truthfulness and to unite his conviction to God’s infallible insight as closely and as firmly as possible and to found it thereon; and the support of grace makes it possible for him to accomplish this union in such a way that the most intimate communion, interpenetration, and affinity comes about between the believer’s knowledge and God’s knowledge, so that therefore the divine force and dignity of the latter is transplanted to the former and shapes it into a commencement and anticipation of eternal life.”

Dogmatik, vol. 1, pt. 2, ch. 6, §39.

Faith is the preparation for the beatific vision and through it we participate in the knowledge of God without yet seeing and knowing what we apprehend. Thus, faith, which apprehends the speech of God, is most sacred due to the dignity of divine revelation. Simply holding an erroneous historical opinion, even universally, is irrelevant to what Catholics really hold about the purpose of the magisterium.

Thus, as the meme suggests, do we "contradict Nicaea 2" if we affirm development? Yes, we contradict the historical claims and arguments; we must do so piously since the bishops present were nevertheless princes in Christ's Church.

Do we contradict the dogmas themselves? Are we heretics? No, because nothing in Nicaea 2 demands that I assent, with divine faith, to specifically the historical claim that such a practice is explicitly apostolic, only that it is licit, not idolatry, etc.

To better explain my point, let me emphasize and repeat the following:

1. In my reading of the historical data, I don’t believe icon veneration is apostolic. I hold this as a historical opinion, NOT divine faith.

2. If new historical evidence was discovered, which I am more than open to, and it becomes clear that icon veneration is explicitly apostolic, I WOULD STILL ONLY HAVE A HISTORICAL OPINION that the apostles venerated icons, since historical evidence does not produce Divine faith in the fact itself, only the testimony of God or the Church does, according to Catholics and Orthodox.

3. So one could disagree with me on the historical question, but I am being perfectly consistent with what faith is, dogma, infallibility, etc. Even if an Eastern Orthodox holds icon veneration is historically apostolic, he has no rational grounds to hold this by Divine faith and simply has to concede my point in principle.

What is required for belief by Nicaea 2?

The dogmatic definition is the following:

“We therefore decree with all care and precision that venerable and holy images, made in colors or mosaic or other fitting materials, in the same way as the figure of the honorable and life-giving cross, are to be dedicated in the holy churches of God, on sacred vessels and vestments, on walls and panels, in houses and in the streets - [namely] the image of our Lord and God and Savior Jesus Christ, of our immaculate Lady the holy Theotokos, and of the honorable angels and all the holy and sacred men. For it is to the extent that they are constantly seen through depiction in images that those who behold them [the images] are spurred to remember and yearn for their prototypes. They are to be accorded greeting and the veneration of honor, not indeed the true worship corresponding to our faith, which pertains to the divine nature alone, but in the same way as this is accorded to the figure of the honorable and life-giving cross, to the holy gospels, and to other sacred offerings. In their honor an offering of incensation and lights is to be made, in accordance with the pious custom of the men of old. For the honor paid to the image passes over to the prototype, and whoever venerates the image venerates in it the hypostasis of the one who is represented.”

The Acts of the Second Council of Nicaea (787): Translated with an Introduction and Notes, Translated Texts for Historians 68 (Liverpool, England: Liverpool University Press, 2018), 564-5.

The Dictionary of Catholic Theology interprets it as follows:

“The definition properly so-called comprises three decisions:

a. The first concerns the use of holy images. They must be admitted as one admits the cross (παραπλησίως, paraplēsiōs, “similarly”). The images in question are those of Our Lord, of the Blessed Virgin, of the angels and of the saints…
b. The second decision concerns the cult of images. A cult is due to them, but well understood and contained within just limits. The council aims above all to distinguish it from that which is due to God. The great accusation of the iconoclasts was in fact that the Church rendered to images divine honors...
c. The third decision legitimates certain marks of honor addressed to images, such as incensing them and putting lights near them. The whole is crowned by the great principle of relative honor, enunciated by Saint Basil, and which characterizes the kind of cult which befits images. As for the sanction which accompanies the definition, it falls on those who reject the use and the cult of images, because this is to incriminate the Church for things which, although not necessary, are however good and legitimate, and to accuse of error her who is instructed and guarded by the spirit of truth.”

Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, 1908, vol. 7, pt. 1, col. 810-811.

Fr. Richard Price says:

“Nicaea II decrees that images are to be set up in churches and also in houses and streets and are to receive the ‘veneration of honour’. What is laid down is not a ‘dogma’ in our sense of the word but a pious practice to be approved and followed; here ‘decree’ is a better translation of horos than ‘definition’.”

The Acts of the Second Council of Nicaea (787): Translated with an Introduction and Notes, Translated Texts for Historians 68 (Liverpool, England: Liverpool University Press, 2018), 548.

Then the council says (all in The Acts of the Second Council of Nicaea (787): Translated with an Introduction and Notes, Translated Texts for Historians 68 (Liverpool, England: Liverpool University Press, 2018), 577):

“We follow the ancient legislation of the catholic church, we observe the decrees of the fathers.”

This vague statements is not proposed for belief but is merely a declaration.

“We anathematize those who either add anything or remove anything from the church. We anathematize the intrusive innovation of the accusers of Christians.”

Here, again, the iconoclasts are condemned, but there is no demand of assent that icon veneration explicitly goes back to the first century.

“We accept the sacred images. We subject those who do not believe accordingly to anathema. To those who apply to the sacred images the sayings in divine scripture against idols anathema!”

Here is precisely my point. The council teaches icons are not idols and icon veneration is not idolatry. This is precisely how later dogmaticians read the council regarding what is actually dogmatized.

“To those who do not kiss the holy and venerable images anathema!”

Contextually, this refers to the iconoclasts who rejected icon veneration as idolatrous. Obviously, a Protestant who converts has to assent that icon veneration is not idolatrous. This doesn’t mean one has to adopt a private devotion of icon veneration.

“To those who say it was someone other than Christ our God who rescued us from idols anathema! To those who dare to say that the catholic church ever accepted idols anathema!”

These would be claims defending the indefectibility of the Church and not a claim at historicity.

How was Nicaea 2 Understood?

1. Martín Pérez de Ayala (d. 1566), a 16th century Catholic bishop who wrote polemically against the Reformers, claims, like Nicaea 2, that icon veneration is apostolic.

   “Hence you clearly see that the use and veneration of images have been practiced in the Church universally from the time of the apostles. [...] In truth, if the worship and veneration of images are performed piously and sincerely, this institution is holy and valid; it was introduced by apostolic tradition and affirmed by the universal use of the Church, with the consent of celebrated and general synods, both in the East and the West.”
   De divinis traditionibus (Paris: A. Parvus, 1549), fol. 157.

   Yet he is clear that what the faithful are actually bound to hold and cannot oppose is that the images are venerated licitly, not that the practice is apostolic:

   “We have thus shown not only that the use of images is praiseworthy, but also that they should be venerated, based on the antiquity of tradition, the consensus of the universal Church, and the authority of the holy Fathers. These are the principles every Christian must hold who does not wish to be condemned with the Felicians and barbarian iconoclasts. No one may oppose this teaching against the authority of the Church.”
   De divinis traditionibus (Paris: A. Parvus, 1549), fol. 158.

2. Cardinal Stanisław Hozjusz (d. 1579) says tradition was used in councils to attain the true sense of doctrine: “at the Second Council of Nicaea, that the Church rightly uses images.” (Confutatio prolegomenon Brentii, 2nd ed. Coloniae: Maternus Cholinus, 1560, lib. 4, pp. 401.)

3. St. Robert Bellarmine (d. 1621) says the council teaches it is licit to venerate them but not with latria:

   “For that council, to which all Catholics assented, taught that sacred images are indeed owed their own veneration, but not greater than that due to the life-giving Cross; that no sacrifice is to be offered to them; and that they are not to be adored with the worship of latria, which is proper to God alone. Let the synod be read, and the impostures will immediately vanish.”

   Appendix To The Treatise On The Veneration of Images, ch. 2.

4. Gaspar Juénin (d. 1713), in his guide written for seminarians on the theological sources says:

   “The Second Council of Nicaea, in Action 6, tome 4, uses tradition in order to define against the Iconoclasts that the veneration which the Church shows to sacred images is pious.”

   De locis theologicis, diss. 4, q. 2, ch. 2.

5. Joseph Pohle (d. 1922): In his Mariology, he has an appendix on the veneration of relics, saints, and images. His theses for the veneration of images are:

   1. “Thesis I: Holy images must not be worshipped [with latria] (De fide)”

   2. “The veneration of holy images is not a positive command, but the Church is free either to introduce and encourage, or to limit and even to prohibit it where there is danger of serious abuse, as there might be, for example, in a country whose inhabitants were but just converted from idolatry.”

   3. “Thesis II: The pious veneration of holy images is licit and useful (De fide)”

   
   Note that he does not list as a dogma that icon veneration is apostolic, even less does he ever list it as being de fide.

6. Christian Pesch, S.J. (d. 1925):

   1. “The Veneration of Sacred Images is Pious and Lawful. A Matter of Faith.”
      Praelectiones Dogmaticae vol. III, tract. III, prop. LV., says:

   2. “The cult (veneration) of images, since it is not something necessary for salvation, can vary according to different conditions of times and places. For example, if there were in some region newly converted people who were in danger of relapsing into idolatry, the Church could prohibit the veneration of images in that region. On the other hand, if the Church sees that the veneration of images promotes the piety of the faithful, it will encourage this veneration. This is a matter belonging to ecclesiastical discipline and subject to the governance instituted by Christ.”
      Praelectiones Dogmaticae vol. III, tract. III, n. 688.
      

7. Protopresbyter Michael Ivanovich Pomazansky (d. 1988), an Eastern Orthodox dogmatician, writes in his work:

   “It is natural to suppose that in the earliest period in the history of Christianity the first need was that people be drawn away from pagan idol worship, and only later could there be brought into being the idea of the fulness of the forms for glorifying God and His saints; and among these forms there is a place for a glorification in colors, in sacred images.”
   Orthodox dogmatic theology, n. 9.1

   I understand someone who is Eastern Orthodox might object and say he disagrees with with him on the scholarship and historical data, but this misses the point. My point in citing him is that he does not feel as if the council defines as dogma the historical claim that icon veneration is explicitly apostolic, otherwise he would not so freely make this historical claim.

8. Fr. Andrew Louth, a Russian Orthodox priest and scholar says:

   “On occasions when, one might have thought, it would be of value to employ such a notion [of development], it is striking that Orthodox theologians do not do so. A couple of examples spring to mind - the doctrine of icons and the distinction between essence and energies in the Godhead. It would seem obvious to an historian that neither the eighth-century doctrine of the necessity of making and venerating icons nor the fourteenth-century Palamite distinction between essence and energies can really be found in the fourth-century Fathers - especially, in both cases, St Basil the Great - to whom appeal is generally made, yet I know of no Orthodox theologian who calls on the category of authentic development to justify the later doctrine. Development does not seem to be perceived as an available category for Orthodox theology.”

   Orthodoxy and Western Culture, St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2005, p. 47.

9. Kalistos Ware (d. 2022), an Eastern Orthodox Metropolitan and Theologian:

   “It was only by slow degrees that the use of icons became established in the Church. Reacting against their pagan environment, the first Christians were anxious to stress above all the exclusively spiritual character of their worship, and they sought to avoid anything that might savour of idolatry: ‘God is a Spirit, and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth.’”

   A History of Christian Doctrine, edited by Hubert Cunliffe-Jones [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980], pp. 191.

   And:

   “If men paid such respect as this to the image of the [emperor], should they not show equal reverence to the image of Christ the heavenly King? It was an obvious and natural inference, but it was not an inference that was made at once. In fact, [kissing] was shown towards the relics of the saints and the Cross before it began to be shown towards the icon of Christ. Not until the period following Justinian – during the years 550-650 – did the veneration of icons in churches and private homes become widely accepted in the devotional life of eastern Christians.”

   A History of Christian Doctrine, edited by Hubert Cunliffe-Jones [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980], pp. 192.

Objections

Objection 1: The bishops at Nicaea 2 would have kicked you out through door if you claimed icon veneration was not apostolic but a later development

Yes, so what? History is messy and ugly. The Protestant must admit that there is still nothing in Nicaea 2 that demands the assent of faith to the claim that it is apostolic.

Objection 2: If you would have asked a bishop at Nicaea 2 whether you must be believe icon veneration is apostolic, he would have said “yes”!

Throughout the article, I’ve been careful to always say “explicitly apostolic.” Of course icon veneration is implicitly consistent with the apostolic deposit, just like Eucharistic adoration. I don’t claim icon veneration contradicts or is not contained at least virtually in the apostolic practice. Many Eastern Orthodox apologists do a good job at showing how icon veneration is consistent with Scripture and relic veneration, not knowing they are appealing to doctrinal development.

But even if a bishop at Nicaea 2 thinks I need to assent to the claim that icon veneration is historically and explicitly apostolic, so what? He would have said so being grumpy about the iconoclasts, but Catholics are bound by what the Church proposes for belief, not what a bishop thinks the Church proposes for belief. Ultimately, anyone analyzing the decrees would be forced to concede that the council does not dogmatize the claim that icon veneration is explicitly and historically apostolic.

Objection 3: The decrees of Nicaea 2 appeal to tradition as its defense for the dogma.

This objection concedes that the defense (claim of apostolicity) is distinct from the dogma itself and thus concedes it is not actually dogma itself. The proposition that icon veneration is licit and not idolatry is true whether or not the apostles practiced it in the first century.

Thus, if an Orthodox wishes to call me an iconoclast, they have to prove where it is defined as dogma that icon veneration is historically apostolic. Ironically, not even their own bishops and scholars consider this dogma, but only that it is licit, useful, and not idolatry.

Objection 4: It’s likely that the bishops at Nicaea 2 were so deceived that they really did give the assent of faith to the claim that veneration is apostolic. Therefore the faith of the Church can err.

There were about 300 bishops at Nicaea 2 and millions of Christians around the world.

Objection 5: Bishops returning to the Church had to confess: “Anathema to those who say that the making of images is a diabolical invention and not a tradition of our holy Fathers.” Therefore…

1. It is true that making images is not a diabolical invention, as even many Reformed Protestants admit, who at least allow for images of a Lamb in stained glass to be made.

2. It is also true that image making is a tradition of the Fathers; this is a historical fact, which we know through the catacombs and the writings of even many Church Fathers who mention the images of saints in their tombs (e.g St. Augustine, St. Gregory, etc).

It took me a while to realize this but it makes a lot of sense once the concepts are properly understood. Protestants usually respond that "no singular tradition owns the Fathers" to when Catholics claim complete unanimity of opinion in the Fathers.

Both of these are false extremes which have a proper and true mean at the center: faith and catholicity.

It is true that, regarding theological conclusions and opinions, Protestants have much precedent in the Fathers to use as a firehose against Catholics: pre-Augustine Fathers did not articulate purgatory as the Church later would; plenty of Fathers opined that Mary sinned at the Cross or in John 2; denial of the deuterocanon.

But according to the constant declaration of the Fathers themselves, these are just that: their own opinion which may be rejected by others, prior to a judgement by the universal Church.

St. Chrysostom did not hold his view that Mary sinned by *faith*, nor did St. Jerome deny the deuterocanon by *faith*. All of them say that the teaching of the Church ought to be received by irrevocable assent and they accuse of heresy those who depart from the teaching of the Church on any matter, not merely the "essentials for salvation."

On the contrary, the practice of preserving the Eucharist beyond the liturgy and belief in Christ's lasting presence was universal, against the Reformed view. The practice of invoking the saints was universal, which is against the Lutherans, Reformed, and many Anglicans.

While Protestants have historical precedence in the form of opinions before the Church pronounced dogma, they do not have continuity *in matters of faith*, since there is no point in history where they can point to the *belief* of the universal Church and say: modern Catholic dogma contradicts this.

The Fathers did not have a unanimous theological opinion on things, but they stressed the importance of unity in faith, something Protestants do not have.

If modern Catholic theologians don't agree on many things, why would we expect the Fathers to agree on everything before a consensus arises and it becomes de fide? Here, Catholics simply follow St. Augustine in affirming that the Church can require assent at a later age on something that previously was allowed freedom of opinion:
“They speak disparagingly of us, we can bear it; let them not disparage the rule of faith, not disparage the truth; let them not speak against holy Church... This matter is fundamental. Someone who goes wrong in the discussion of other questions that have not been thoroughly canvassed, not yet firmly settled by the Church's full authority, is to be tolerated. Error in that case is to be tolerated; it should not go so far, though, as to strive to shake the very foundation of the Church.”
Sermon 294, 21 (20) (PL 38, 1348).

Fr. Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. begins his treatment of the theological virtues by specifying that theological virtues and their acts “are specifically proportioned to their formal object.” (Reality, ch. 50). What does this mean? Consider the genus of faith and its various species: human faith and divine faith, for example. What makes faith to be “specifically” (“the species of”) divine faith and not human? The answer is its formal object — whatever it is that makes it divine and not human. Faith in general (genus) is assent on the basis of a witness; human faith is assent on the basis of merely human testimony; divine faith is assent on the basis of God revealing. As the material object (what makes up the faith), faith has anything revealed by God.

“Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the object, it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of which we are speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it is revealed by God. Hence the mean on which faith is based is the Divine Truth. If, however, we consider materially the things to which faith assents, they include not only God, but also many other things, which, nevertheless, do not come under the assent of faith, except as bearing some relation to God.”

Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, resp.

It’s important to note here that, for Thomists, nothing human can enter the formal motive of faith. Thus, the miracles performed by divine legates or their infallible propositions of revelation do not enter the formal object but are merely necessary conditions without which (conditione sine qua non) we could not assent since we receive mediate revelation through messengers and not immediately from God. For example, obscurity is a necessary condition for faith but it is not the formal object — when man attains to the beatific vision, he can no longer have faith since obscurity in the mysteries of God will cease and he will see entirely:

“For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know fully, even as I have been fully known.”

1 Corinthians 13:12

There is also the principle of the act of faith, namely, the habit (virtue) of faith and actual grace which moves the will to move the intellect to assent:

“Since man, by assenting to matters of faith, is raised above his nature, this must needs accrue to him from some supernatural principle moving him inwardly; and this is God. Therefore faith, as regards the assent which is the chief act of faith, is from God moving man inwardly by grace.”

Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 6, a. 1, resp.

Because faith is essentially supernatural, it is more certain than natural modes of knowledge, whether first principles or science, if considered simply (according to its cause - divine truth):

“[C]ertitude can be looked at in two ways. First, on the part of its cause, and thus a thing which has a more certain cause, is itself more certain. On this way faith is more certain than those three virtues, because it is founded on the Divine truth, whereas the aforesaid three virtues are based on human reason. Secondly, certitude may be considered on the part of the subject, and thus the more a man’s intellect lays hold of a thing, the more certain it is. On this way, faith is less certain, because matters of faith are above the human intellect, whereas the objects of the aforesaid three virtues are not. Since, however, a thing is judged simply with regard to its cause, but relatively, with respect to a disposition on the part of the subject, it follows that faith is more certain simply, while the others are more certain relatively, i.e. for us.”

Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 4, a. 8, resp.

For Thomists, faith believes both God and His revelation by one simple act, just as the eye sees both light and color by one simple act of vision.

“If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then two things can be observed in the object of faith, as stated above (II-II:1:1). One of these is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of faith is ‘to believe in a God’; because, as stated above (II-II:1:1) nothing is proposed to our belief, except in as much as it is referred to God. The other is the formal aspect of the object, for it is the medium on account of which we assent to such and such a point of faith; and thus an act of faith is ‘to believe God,’ since, as stated above (II-II:1:1) the formal object of faith is the First Truth, to Which man gives his adhesion, so as to assent to Its sake to whatever he believes.”

Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 2, a. 2, resp.

As Cardinal Cajetan, O.P. says:

“Divine revelation is both that by which (quo) and that which (quod) I believe. Just as unity is of itself one without further appeal, so divine revelation, by which all else is revealed, is accepted for its own sake and not by a second revelation. One and the same act accepts the truth spoken about God and the truthfulness of God who speaks.”
In lllam lIIae, q. 1, a. 1, no. 11.

And:

“This acceptance of the first truth as revealing, and not that acquired faith by which I believe John the Apostle, or Paul the Apostle, or the one Church, is the ultimate court of appeal. The infused habit of faith makes us adhere to God as the reason for believing each and every revealed truth. ‘He that believeth in the Son of God hath the testimony of God in himself.’”
In lllam lIIae, q. 2, a. 2.

The Catholic Church teaches as dogma that the Blessed Virgin Mary never committed sin throughout her life. Yet, the testimony of the early Church on this privilege of Mary is not univocal and consistent.

The earliest Fathers do not explicitly state this privilege. Instead, their statements vary in clarity, sometimes only implying Mary’s sinlessness, and sometimes even contradicting it.

The “Inscription of Abercius”, a second century epitaph attributed to a bishop of Hieropolis, figuratively depicts Christ as a “pure fish” and Mary as the “holy virgin”:

“Faith everywhere led me forward, and everywhere provided food: a fish from a spring, very great, pure, which a holy virgin grasped (or drew).”

Writing in the early third century, St. Hippolytus compares Mary to the incorruptible woods used to make the ark of the covenant which he says did not experience corruption from sin:

“The ark of imperishable wood was the Savior himself, for in this way his incorruptible and imperishable tabernacle, which has not produced any sinful corruption, was represented… The Lord was free from sin, [made] from ‘imperishable woods’ in his humanity, namely, from the virgin and the Holy Spirit, covered inside and out with the purest gold of God’s Word.”

In Psalmos XXII (PG 10, 610).

Yet, it is unclear if Hippolytus meant this comparison to apply distributively, so that Mary too would be incorruptible and unable to produce sin, or only collectively, referring to her virginal birth by the Holy Spirit.

Eusebius of Caeserea calls Mary the “all-holy Virgin” (παναγίαν Παρθένον) (De Eccl. Theol. III, 6 (PG 24, 1033B)), an honorable title which, if taken strictly, certainly implies her freedom from sin, though it is impossible to know if Eusebius himself actually held to the privilege.

The comments of the Fathers in this period are also bizarre. Origen interpreted St. Simeon’s prophecy of Mary’s heart being pierced in Luke 2:35 as her being scandalized at the Passion of Christ. Although he does impute sin onto her, it’s noteworthy that, for Origen, this was the only sin of Mary that Christ had to die for. Besides her scandal at the cross, Mary had no other sin.

“Why do we think that the mother of the Lord was immune from scandal when the apostles were scandalized? If she did not suffer scandal at the Lord’s Passion, then Jesus did not die for her sins. But, if ‘all have sinned and lack God’s glory, but are justified by his grace and redeemed,’ then Mary too was scandalized at that time.”

Homily XVII on Luke, n. 6 (PG 13, 1845).

St. Basil the Great, writing about a century later, adopts Origen’s reading, saying:

“The Lord was bound to taste of death for every man – to become a propitiation for the world and to justify all men by His own blood. Even you yourself, who hast been taught from on high the things concerning the Lord, shall be reached by some doubt. This is the sword. That the thoughts of many hearts may be revealed. He indicates that after the offense at the Cross of Christ a certain swift healing shall come from the Lord to the disciples and to Mary herself, confirming their heart in faith in Him.”

Letter 260, n. 9 (PG 32, 968).

In the same century, the Syrian poet St. Ephrem offers an even more perplexing testimony on this question. In his well-known Nisibine Hymn 27, he praises the unique purity of Christ and Mary:

“You alone and Your mother, more than all, are very fair. There is no blemish on You, O my Lord, and no spots on Your mother.”

Carmina Nisibena. 27, n. 8 Edited by Gustav Bickell. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1866, p. 122. (CSCO 219, 76).

This quote is often used to show that St. Ephrem held Mary to be sinless. Opposed to this, however, are his comments on John 2, where he says that Christ reprimanded Mary at the wedding of Cana for her “doubt about Him” and “having been hasty”:

“She learned from him therefore that he was about to perform a sign there. When he reprimanded her because she was in doubt about him, ‘she said to the servants, Whatever my son tells you, do’ (John 2:5).”

Saint Ephrem’s Commentary on Tatian’s Diatessaron, 5, 2, ed. and trans. Carmel McCarthy, Journal of Semitic Studies Supplement 2, Oxford 1993, pp. 95.

“Mary hastened to be a servant of his will therefore instead of the apostles, but since it was not her place either to give orders or to anticipate his word, he reproved her for having been hasty.”

Saint Ephrem’s Commentary on Tatian’s Diatessaron, 5, 5, ed. and trans. Carmel McCarthy, Journal of Semitic Studies Supplement 2, Oxford 1993, pp. 96.

St. Ephrem never addresses or explains this contradiction, though it is a common view among oriental scholars that the latter work does not always reflect his views since it was assembled by his disciples.1

St. Irenaeus, 200 years before St. Ephrem and commenting on the same passage from John 2, says that Christ corrected Mary’s “untimely haste” (bk. 3, ch. 16, n. 7), though it is unclear if he considered such haste to be a sin.

Severian of Gabala takes a more explicitly negative reading of this verse, saying that Christ,

“reproached His mother for still considering Him merely a man — the One who is Lord of all humanity. He spoke to her in such a way not because she asked Him, but because she treated Him as if He were only human… He rebukes His mother for an unnecessary and inappropriate suggestion, as God cannot be hastened.”

Homily in Honor of St. Martyr Acacius, (CPG 4245:316).

St. John Chrysostom similarly saw in this verse a certain rebuke on behalf of Christ:

“Therefore, He rebuked her, saying, ‘What is this between me and you, woman?’ (John 2:4) – to instruct her, so that she would not do the same in the future. Although He certainly wanted both Himself and His mother to be respected, He cared much more for the salvation of her soul and the benefit of humanity, for whom He took on flesh.”

Homily 21 on John, n. 2-3 (PG 59, 130).

Elsewhere, he comments that Mary showed “excessive vanity” and “madness” in public:

“He responded, ‘Who is My mother, and who are My brothers?‘ (Mt 12:48). He did not say this out of shame for His mother or to disown her — for if He had been ashamed, He would not have come through her womb — but to show that no benefit comes to her from this, unless she fulfills all that is required. What she tried to do now was from excessive vanity. She wanted to show the crowd that she had authority and could command her son, not yet thinking of Him in a truly great way. Therefore, she came at the wrong time. Notice the madness of both them and her. She should have entered and listened with the crowds, or, if they would not allow it, waited until He had finished His speech and then approached.”

Homily 44 on Matthew, n. 1 (PG 57, 464-465).

Yet, concurrent with the Eastern tradition of negatively interpreting St. Simeon’s temple prophecy and our Lord’s address to Mary at Cana is a rich tradition of comparing our Lady to Eve, praising Mary for her triumph where Eve failed. It is probably easier to count the number of Fathers who don’t speak of Mary as a new and better fulfillment of Eve than those who do, due to how common it is.

St. Ephrem the Syrian said:

“Behold the world; two eyes are placed in it; Eve was the blind, left eye; the right, shining eye is Mary.”

Hymns on the Church, CSCO 199, 37, 5, p. 90.

“Eve, the mother of all the living, was the source of death for all the living. But Mary, the new vine, blossomed in place of the old vine, Eve, and the new life, Christ, dwelt in her, so that when death, at the pasture, approached confidently as usual, the destructive life of death would be hidden in the mortal fruit.”

Sermon on Our Lord 3 (CSCO 271, 4).

St. Zeno of Verona, writing in the West during the fourth century, wrote:

“You restored Eve in Mary. You renewed Adam in Christ.”
Tractatus Liber I, Tract. 2: De fide, spe, et charitate 9 (PL 11, 278).

St. Jerome wrote:

“Death came through Eve, but life has come through Mary.”

Epistola XXII, 21 Ad. Eustochium, Paulae Filiam (PL 22, 408).

By these comments, the Fathers meant to explain Mary’s role in redemption history and were not primarily concerned with the privilege of which we now speak. Undoubtedly, however, this image of the second and new Eve calls for and demands a sinless mother if she is to truly be better than Eve.

This time period was not without explicit affirmations of Mary’s sinlessness. We should keep in mind, however, that these testimonies do not claim Mary’s sinlessness to be some dogmatic fact, just as the testimonies we’ve seen denying Mary’s sinlessness. This was not yet a settled matter and thus, as with many other theological questions, a variety of opinions were permitted.

St. Ambrose prays that he be accepted in his fallen flesh so that he may be like Mary, a virgin free from all sin:

“Accept me in the flesh that fell in Adam. Accept me, not from Sarah, but from Mary: so that I [my flesh] may be an incorrupt virgin, but a virgin through grace free from all stain of sin.”

Expositio in psalmum David CXVIII XXII, 29-30 (CSEL 62, 504).

Commenting on Isaiah 19:1, in which the Lord is said to come on a swift cloud, Ambrose says:

“He also came in a swift cloud, incarnate from the Virgin; for the prophet saw Him coming like a cloud from the East. (Is 19:1) And rightly did he say ‘swift cloud’: one not weighed down by earthly faults. Behold the cloud upon which the Holy Spirit descended, and the power of the Most High overshadowed her.”
Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam X, 42 (PL 15, 1814A-B; CSEL 32, 467).

St. Ambrose also commended Mary to women as someone who “knew no error”, “error” being a common synonym for sin in St. Ambrose’s corpus:2

“For just as sin began with women, so too good things are inaugurated by women, so that women also, laying aside womanly works, may renounce weakness, and that the soul — which has no sex —may, like Mary who knows no error, imitate chastity with devout zeal.”

Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam II, 28 (PL 15, 1562B; CSEL 32, 56).

According to the bishop of Milan, Mary possessed,

“the perfection of all virtues”
De virginibus II, 2 (PL 16, 209AD).

Interestingly enough, St. Ambrose elsewhere affirms many times that Christ alone never committed sin.

“He is rightly called ‘exalted’ because He alone was not caught in the nets of sin. All were within the nets — and indeed still are — for no one is without sin, except Jesus alone, who, not knowing sin, was made sin for us by the Father.”
Commentary on Psalm 118 6.21, (CSEL 62: 118–119).

And elsewhere:

“Who is pure from defilement? No one at all, even if his life on earth lasted just one day... no one can be free from sin.”
Prayer of Job and David 1.7.22 (CSEL 32/2: 225).

Here, however, there is no contradiction. Obviously, when St. Ambrose exempts Christ alone from sin and affirms that no man lives on earth without sin, his concern is the affirmation of the general law. I’ve told atheists and non-Christians exactly what St. Ambrose says in real life conversations before — namely, that Christ alone never sinned and that all men sin — without feeling the need to stop and exempt Mary.

This is insightful since the affirmation that Christ alone was without sin is universal in the Fathers, though their intent is to express the law, the necessity for repentance and God’s grace, and produce humility. They are not concerned with proposing, as an article of faith, that every person has, in fact committed sin.3

It’s certainly true that many (if not most) of these early authors did not explicitly affirm Mary’s sinlessness. But their affirmation of the general law of sin does not mean they explicitly opposed Mary’s sinlessness, since we have those like St. Ambrose who explicitly affirm that Mary never sinned and that Christ alone never sinned.

St. Epiphanius speaks of Mary as being “all beautiful” (Pan. 79, n. 7; PG 42, 752B) and “filled with grace in every way” (Pan. 78, n. 25; PG 42, 737).

Against the Marcionites who denied the goodness of the flesh, St. Epiphanius appeals to Mary’s sinlessness as a counterexample: since St. Paul says that “flesh and blood shall not inherit the kingdom,” this cannot mean all flesh, for the Virgin Mary—undefiled and free from the works of the flesh—certainly inherits heaven.

“And let no one seize hold of the holy apostle’s words, ‘Flesh and blood shall not inherit the kingdom of God’; he is not censuring all flesh… How can the holy Mary not inherit the kingdom of heaven, flesh and all, when she did not commit fornication or uncleanness or adultery or do any of the intolerable deeds of the flesh, but remained undefiled?”

Panarion XLII, 12 (PG 41, 777 B).

In the fifth century, the poet Prudentius sets Mary in opposition to the serpent, Satan, and that she,

“deemed worthy to bear God conquers every venom.”

Hymnus ante cibum (PL 59, 806-7; CCSL 126:15-16).

He does not explain his words, but the sense of Mary’s sinlessness cannot be far. If sin is a certain venom inflicted by Satan, Mary is said to conquer all of it.

St. Jerome describes Mary as having a perpetual glow. Does this brightness represent her holiness? He says the eastern gate of the temple represents our Lady who is “always closed and radiant.” By “always closed”, he undoubtedly means to say that she was a perpetual virgin. By “radiant”, did he mean to signify her holiness?

“This is the eastern gate [Mary], as Ezekiel says (cf. Ezek. 44:1–2), always closed and radiant, and containing within itself, or bringing forth from itself, the Holy of Holies — through which the Sun of Justice, our High Priest according to the order of Melchizedek, enters and goes forth.”
Epistola XLVIII, 21 (PL 22, 510).

In his commentary on Isaiah 19, St. Jerome interprets the swift cloud by which the Lord comes as either the body of the Blessed Virgin Mary — preserving its virginity — or Christ’s human body, conceived virginally by the Holy Spirit and not by the seed of man.

“‘The Lord ascends upon a light cloud’ (Is 19:1) — meaning the body of the holy Virgin Mary, unburdened by any weight of human seed—or, indeed, His own body conceived of the Holy Spirit.”
Comm. in Isaiam 19:1 (PL 24, 250C).

Commenting on Psalm 77:14, he repeats this explanation of Isaiah 19:1 but adds that the cloud is more “certainly” the Virgin Mary, and that her very person was always bright and never in darkness.

“‘He led them with a cloud by day.‘ (Ps. 77:14) ‘See, the Lord is riding on a swift cloud on his way to Egypt.’ (Is 19:1) We must think of that swift cloud as befitting either the body of the Savior, because His body was light, not weighted down by any sin; or certainly holy Mary who was heavy with child by no human seed. Behold the Lord has entered the Egypt of this world on a swift cloud, the Virgin. ‘He led them with a cloud by day.’ Beautifully said, by day, for the cloud was never in darkness, but always in light.”
In Ps. 77 (PL 26, 1049BC), in The Homilies of Saint Jerome, vol. 1, trans. Sr. Marie Liguori Ewald, I.H.M., The Fathers of the Church 48 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1964), 88.

St. Augustine, when confronted by Pelagius on the question of Mary and sin, allowed for the privilege for the honor due to the Lord.

“[A]nd also the mother of our Lord and Savior. ‘Piety demands’, he [Pelagius] says, ‘that we admit that she was without sin.’ Let us then leave aside the holy Virgin Mary; on account of the honor due to the Lord, I do not want to raise here any question about her when we are dealing with sins. After all, how do we know what wealth of grace was given to her in order to conquer sin completely, since she merited to conceive and bear the one who certainly had no sin?”

De natura et gratia XXXVI (42) (CSEL 60, 263-264).

St. Augustine allows for Mary’s freedom from sin as a theological conclusion, but obviously he did not appeal to an explicit and universal Church tradition on this point — something he frequently did for other issues.

We see similar development in the East. St. Jacob of Serugh says that Mary was free from sin due to her dignity as the Mother of God, following the same reasoning later medieval theologians would:

“From her childhood, she stood firm in unblemished uprightness; she walked in the way without offenses. Her original nature was preserved with a will for good things because there were always tokens of virginity in her body and holy things in her soul… Because she became the mother of the Son of God, I saw and firmly believed that she is the only woman in the world who is entirely pure.”
Homily 1, from On the Mother of God. Translated by Mary Hansbury, St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1998, p. 24.

For St. Jacob, Mary was the holiest woman in the world, which is why she was chosen as the Mother of God.

“If there were another, purer and gentler than she, in this one He would dwell and that one renounce so as not to dwell in her. And if there were a soul more splendid and holy, rather than her, He would choose this one and forsake that one.”
Homily 1 in On the Mother of God. Translated by Mary Hansbury, St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1998, p. 22-3.

Around the time of St. Augustine, an anonymous clergyman in Africa addressed a sermon to other clergymen in which he interprets the wedding of Cana as the marital union of mankind with Satan. For the author, Mary was present at the wedding but did not participate in the sin of the human race:

“Christ came to the wedding. But then the soul, which was already connected to God, was transformed into an adulterous spouse by the fruit of fornication that delighted it, and feasted with a corrupt company. Listen to Paul, who is once again alarmed by the bonds of this evil connection: ‘I fear,’ he says, ‘that just as the serpent’s cunning deceived Eve, your souls will be turned away from the simplicity and purity that is in Christ Jesus our Lord.’ So while the soul and the devil were being excessively exuberant during a foolish meal, after Jesus had been invited, they lacked wine. But the mother of Christ, who shrank from accompanying the shameful meal, who remained a virgin not only in body but also in spirit, took part, invited because of her belonging to the same (human) race, not because of her participation in the misdeed—in the universality of being born, not of sinning— she who refers to Christ, she who is not an unclean person who refers to the unclean.”

Serm. De Evangelio Ubi Dominus De Aqua Vinum Fecit, 2 in Revue Bénédictine, vol. 42, 1930, p. 10; (PL 47, 1144B).

Around this period, the image of a lily flower sprouting among thorns becomes a popular description of the Virgin Mary, emphasizing her unique sanctity. Sedulius Caelius, a poet, wrote:

“And just as from sharp thorns
A soft rose arises, bearing no harm,
Yet outshines its mother with its beauty—

So from the sacred line of Eve came Mary,
And the new Virgin would atone
For the sin of the ancient one.”
Paschale carmen, lib. 2, lines 28-31; C.S.E.L., 10, 46.

In the East, Chrysippus of Jerusalem speaks similarly as he addresses Mary, saying:

“A foolish people is your kindred, while you are naturally a blameless offspring; your rose springs forth from a field overgrown with thorns.”
In sanctam Mariam deiparam, n. 2; Patrologia Orientalis, Vol. 19, 338-339.

Oecumenius, in the sixth century, says that Mary,

“[…] has nothing in common with the world and the evils in it, but wholly sublime, wholly worthy of heaven, even though she sprang from our mortal nature and being. For the Virgin is of the same substance as we are.”
Commentary on Apocalypsis, VI, 19, 2 in Commentary on the Apocalypse, trans. John N. Suggit, vol. 112 of The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 107.

As with Ss. Ambrose and Jerome, Oecumenius interprets the “swift cloud” of Isaiah 19:1 as referring to supreme Mary’s sanctity:

“He calls the angels a cloud on account of the height and loftiness of their nature and worth, or perhaps he calls the God-bearer a cloud on which he is riding, thus giving honor to his human mother. Isaiah also foresees this when he says, ‘Behold, the Lord is seated on a swift cloud’ […] ‘swift’ because it is pure, blameless, and not weighed down by a single sin.”
Commentary on Apocalypsis, VIII, 17, 1-2 in Commentary on the Apocalypse, trans. John N. Suggit, vol. 112 of The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 131-2.

Bishop Theoteknos of Livias calls Mary the “blameless one” in his homily on her assumption:

“But joy filled her at His resurrection from the dead… and his ascension… and at the thought that the flesh that had come forth from her own womb, without seed, now sits enthroned with the Father; and this joy is great, and gladness has taken hold of the blameless one.”
An Encomium on the Assumption of the Holy Mother of God II. Cited from On the Dormition of Mary. Translated by Brian E. Daley, S.J., St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1998, p. 72.

Venantius Fortunatus, also in the sixth century, does not speak explicitly, though his poetry sufficiently relates his mind on Mary:

“O excellent virgin, surpassing all mothers…
You shine as the ark, a strong container of the two-edged sword...
Leader of the virgin assembly, first among the second sex…
Work of the potter, fairer than all vessels,
Shining mass of the new creation…
Holding gifts of beauty beyond all humans.
Thus surpassing roses in redness, lilies in whiteness,
A new flower from the earth, which heaven guards on high.”
Miscellanea VIII, 7 (PL 88, 281).

This language is common and prevalent among the Fathers of this age. This rich and flattering praise towards Mary suggests and implies her sinlessness: if she is truly the “first among the second sex” then she must be better than Eve and free from sin; if she is truly “fairer than all vessels” and with “gifts of beauty beyond all humans”, it is certainly fitting that she be sinless, though it is usually impossible to be absolutely sure whether Venantius or any individual Church Father explicitly affirmed it from this language alone.

As the centuries pass, any notion of imputing sin onto Mary vanishes, with only her perfect sanctity remaining as the prevailing opinion. Yet, we must remember that even unanimity of opinion does not constitute dogma if it is not taught firmly as revealed and belonging to the faith.

Thus, several Catholic theologians acknowledged that since Mary’s sinlessness was dogma at one age after not previously being dogma in a prior age, this is a clear example of the development of doctrine. This is the rule the Church has always followed, as explained by St. Augustine:

“Let them not disparage the rule of faith, not disparage the truth; let them not speak against holy Church… Someone who goes wrong in the discussion of other questions that have not been thoroughly canvassed, not yet firmly settled by the Church’s full authority, is to be tolerated. Error in that case is to be tolerated; it should not go so far, though, as to strive to shake the very foundation of the Church.”

Sermon 294, 21 (20) (PL 38, 1348).

Similarly, the Walenburchs:

“For some tradition to be Apostolic, it receives no detriment from the fact that at some time in the Catholic Church there was doubt about it. For just as such doubt does not prevent certain books of Scripture, about which there was once doubt, from being held as Canonical: so doubt in past time does not prevent, concerning this or that tradition, that it be truly Apostolic. It should suffice for us if we are certain with equal certainty about the unwritten Word of God as about the written.”

Examination of the Principles of Faith, 3rd exam., § 5, n. 64.

This is not, as many Protestant apologists think, a contradiction. Though it is truly unfortunate that great Fathers like St. John Chrysostom erred on this question, remember that they never propose their opinion as belonging to faith. Let’s not forget that before St. Augustine, many erred on things like the nature of purgatory and original sin. Even if no one had denied Mary’s sinlessness in the early Church, and if they all said what St. Augustine said, namely that Mary may be exempted from sin due to honor of the Lord, without affirming it as necessary to faith, it still would have been nothing more than a common or certain theological conclusion at the time, not dogma.

This is the way Catholic theologians have always described the rules for identifying Sacred Tradition. We don’t simply look at majority voices or the earliest testimonies so that we can possess some sort of historical probability of a doctrine being apostolic. Instead, something must be taught as belonging to faith. As St. Vincent of Lérins says:

“Yet in the investigation of this ancient consent of the holy Fathers we are to bestow our pains not on every minor question of the Divine Law, but only, at all events especially, where the Rule of Faith is concerned.”

Commonitorium, ch. 28, n. 71.

One such example of identifying this as a development of dogma is Juan Martínez de Ripalda, S.J. (d. 1648), a seventeenth century Jesuit:

“There are now more truths of faith than there were in the Apostle’s day, – such as that the Blessed Virgin was free from all actual sin…”

De fide, disp. 8, sect. 2, n. 20.

Cardinal Journet explains this well, showing how Mary’s prerogatives are implicitly contained in the sense of the early Church:

“This is what is called the initial faith of the Church, the sensus ecclesiae, concerning the mystery of the Blessed Virgin, this ‘instinct,’ of the Church bears upon a primary datum, which truly and really contains, though in an implicit and unformulated state, everything that will later be defined concerning the Blessed Virgin's privileges. Hence the magisterium of the Church, in defining dogmas such as the Immaculate Conception and Assumption, can say that, ‘The Church has always believed,’ or ‘has always been convinced of’ them. It is somewhat as when you listen to a difficult question being debated, without being able to agree fully with either side; but when someone comes along who is able to distinguish the truth from error and thus solve the problem, you exclaim—and without any falsehood—‘That is just what I always believed.’”

The Dogma of the Immaculate Conception, pg. 22-24.

Jesus Christ instituted the Church to be a kingdom of holiness. She is a supernatural society and her mission is the salvation of souls. For her to accomplish her mission as a supernatural society, it is fitting that Christ provide her the means to such an end.

Thus, whatever is essential for a merely natural society to succeed, the Church must also possess in the supernatural order to procure the salvation of souls. When viewed from this angle, it becomes clear that the Catholic Church’s sacramental system is objectively and truly holy, for the entire society that is the Church possesses the means to make her members holy.

This [article] is not a demonstrative proof for the seven sacraments. I’ve made videos on matrimony and confirmation as a sacrament. Instead, this is an argument from fittingness that makes the Catholic Church’s doctrine of the sacraments shine forth as objectively more beautiful than what is held by those opposed to seven sacraments, such as Protestants.

For Protestants, the primary end of the sacraments is generally the remission of sins and the confirmation of such remission. Thus, Gerhard says:

“Only those Sacraments whose matter flowed from the side of Christ on the cross are truly and properly called New Testament Sacraments, because the power of the Sacraments is ordered to take away sins.”
Confessio Cath. Lib. 2, Part. 2, Art. XI, cap. iii.

Thus, one can see why they would reject matrimony, for example, for its contraction does not directly remit sins or confirm their remission. For Catholics, a sacrament confers grace, which conforms the believer to Christ by allowing him to partake of the divine nature.

The Old Testament Types

The Old Covenant foreshadowed and prefigured the sacraments of the New Law in various ways.

For the two chief sacraments, circumcision prefigured baptism and the various sacrifices, especially the Passover lamb, signified the Eucharist. The Old Law also prescribed the confession of sins, which prefigured the sacrament of penance, as we read in Leviticus:

“When a man realizes his guilt in any of these and confesses the sin he has committed, he shall bring to the Lord as his compensation for the sin that he has committed, a female from the flock, a lamb or a goat, for a sin offering. And the priest shall make atonement for him for his sin.”

Leviticus 5:5-6

We also read in Numbers:

“When a man or woman commits any of the sins that people commit by breaking faith with the Lord, and that person realizes his guilt, he shall confess his sin that he has committed. And he shall make full restitution for his wrong, adding a fifth to it and giving it to him to whom he did the wrong.”

Numbers 5:6-7

Holy orders was prefigured by the Aaronic priesthood in that three-fold hierarchy of high priest, priest, and Levite which, following the Fathers of the Church, these themselves prefigured the three offices of the New Testament. As St Jerome says:

“The traditions handed down by the apostles were taken by them from the Old Testament. Bishops, presbyters and deacons occupy in the church the same positions as those which were occupied by Aaron, his sons, and the Levites in the temple.”

Letter 146 to Evangelus, n. 2 (PL 22, 1195).

Finally, matrimony was not instituted as a sacrament of the Old Law but as a sacrament of nature in the Garden, available to even the heathens, though obviously it did not confer grace.

However, one will notice that there was no fixed sacrament or rite in the Old Law corresponding to the sacraments of confirmation and anointing of the sick. Now, no direct explanation is given for this in the New Testament, but St. Thomas explains the reason like this:

“In the sacrament of Confirmation we receive the fulness of the Holy Ghost in order to be strengthened; while in Extreme Unction man is prepared for the immediate attainment of glory; and neither of these two purposes was becoming to the Old Testament. Consequently, nothing in the old Law could correspond to these sacraments.”

Summa Theologiae, III, q. 65, a. 1, ad. 4.

The Perfect Fittingness of The Seven Sacraments

Before we can better comprehend why there are seven sacraments, we need to understand what a sacrament is in the New Law. In the New Law, the sacraments are signs of sacred things that confer grace instituted by Christ and instituted in order to signify such an effect. As opposed to the Old Covenant, the sacraments of the New Law confer grace ex opere operato, or from the work done. While they do require necessary dispositions, such as faith and repentance, these dispositions are not the cause of the grace received. The sacraments of the Old Law did not confer grace but merely signified it. St. Thomas says:

“It cannot be said that the sacraments of the Old Law conferred sanctifying grace of themselves, i.e. by their own power: since thus Christ’s Passion would not have been necessary, according to Galatians 2:21: ‘If justice be by the Law, then Christ died in vain.’ [..Nevertheless the Fathers of old were justified by faith in Christ’s Passion, just as we are. And the sacraments of the old Law were a kind of protestation of that faith, inasmuch as they signified Christ’s Passion and its effects. It is therefore manifest that the sacraments of the Old Law were not endowed with any power by which they conduced to the bestowal of justifying grace: and they merely signified faith by which men were justified.”

Summa Theologiae, III, q. 62, a. 6, resp.

On the contrary, whenever the sacraments of the New Testament appear, they are described to positively confer grace. It is this property of the New Law sacraments that illuminates the septimal enumeration of these rites.

The Church as a Supernatural Society

Since these were instituted for the spiritual life, it is fitting that they reflect the needs of the bodily life. In our bodily life, as St. Thomas points out, perfection is attained in a two-fold way, namely, man in himself and his society, since, by nature, man is a social animal. Similarly, in the spiritual life, perfection is attained in individual believers and in the Church.

Regarding the perfection of the bodily life, men are born, they grow and mature, and receive nourishment for strength and to preserve life. In the Catholic Church, the three sacraments that corresponds to these three are baptism, confirmation, and the Eucharist, as St. Thomas explains:

The life of the body is perfected ‘directly,’ in three ways. First, by generation whereby a man begins to be and to live: and corresponding to this in the spiritual life there is Baptism, which is a spiritual regeneration, according to Titus 3:5: ‘By the laver of regeneration,’ etc. Secondly, by growth whereby a man is brought to perfect size and strength: and corresponding to this in the spiritual life there is Confirmation, in which the Holy Ghost is given to strengthen us. Wherefore the disciples who were already baptized were bidden thus: ‘Stay you in the city till you be endued with power from on high’ (Luke 24:49). Thirdly, by nourishment, whereby life and strength are preserved to man; and corresponding to this in the spiritual life there is the Eucharist. Wherefore it is said (John 6:54): ‘Except you eat of the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you.’”

Summa Theologiae, III, q. 65, a. 1, resp.

Just as man cannot grow or eat if he has not yet been born, neither can he be confirmed or receive the Eucharist prior to baptism. Thus, the Catechism says:

“Holy Baptism is the basis of the whole Christian life, the gateway to life in the Spirit, and the door which gives access to the other sacraments.”

CCC 1213

After man is born, he needs to not only be nourished but also grow and mature, and this pertains to the Eucharist and confirmation.

Furthermore, just as man is subject to infirmity in the body, so can his soul become ill due to sin. This is where St. Thomas recognizes the role of penance and anointing of the sick: the former restores health to the soul and the latter also restores strength, preparing man for death and glory.

Thus far, we have explained how five of the sacraments correspond to man’s bodily life in himself, but we still need to explain what are called the sacraments of service. St. Thomas explains these thus:

“In regard to the whole community, man is perfected in two ways. First, by receiving power to rule the community and to exercise public acts: and corresponding to this in the spiritual life there is the sacrament of order, according to the saying of Hebrews 7:27, that priests offer sacrifices not for themselves only, but also for the people. Secondly in regard to natural propagation. This is accomplished by Matrimony both in the corporal and in the spiritual life: since it is not only a sacrament but also a function of nature.”

Summa Theologiae, III, q. 65, a. 1, resp.

As we can see, Christ instituted a true society of holiness with means that fit the ends. It is this doctrine and synthesis of the seven sacraments that truly makes the Catholic Church have the mark of holiness. Not only does she possess the superabundant means to make men holy, but those who faithfully use these means do, in fact, become exceptionally holy, as is evident by the heroic lives of Catholic saints. In Catholicism, it is well said that we have received “grace upon grace.” After receiving these sacraments and examining the role they play, we learn that Christ has left for us a font of grace to sanctify every aspect of our lives. Not only is our spiritual birth in baptism its own source and font of grace, but also the confessional, our own marriage, and the holy office that the clergy hold.

By baptism, man is born into the spiritual life and enters the supernatural society of the Church. In confirmation, he is strengthened in the gifts received in baptism, his spiritual birth, and thus is said to mature spiritually. These two, the Apostle Paul calls “fundamentals” to the Christian religion in Hebrews 6. However, one cannot preserve life and good health without food, and thus the Eucharist nourishes us so as to preserve us from death. If we fall, we not only have restoration in the sacrament of penance, but also healing in extreme unction, where sins are sins remitted and we receive strength to keep the faith and avoid sins before death, helping us overcome any anxiety we may have of death. Regarding the higher levels of the society — its rulers and its most fundamental unit — these too are sanctified. Clergymen receive the grace of orders to carry out their mission to administer the sacraments, preach, teach, and rule over the faithful. Thus St. Paul extorts St. Timothy that he received a special grace at and through his ordination for the fulfillment of his duties:

“Until I come, devote yourself to the public reading of Scripture, to exhortation, to teaching. Do not neglect the gift you have, which was given you by prophecy when the council of elders laid their hands on you.”

1 Tim 4:13-14

In matrimony, the very origin of life is sanctified so that spouses bear an efficacious image of Christ and the Church by which they grow in holiness, sanctify one another, and receive grace to rule their household and raise their children in the faith.

This sacramental system is objectively holy, since it sanctifies every aspect of the Christian life. As a result, the Church herself is subjectively holy, since Christ has deposited within her this objective system of sanctification, fully justifying our weekly confession that the Catholic Church is holy.

Protestants, who deny an infallible magisterium instituted by Christ, since they cannot prove the inspiration of the sacred books from sacred tradition, lest however they should have to have recourse to purely human tradition, took refuge principally in internal criteria, on account of which they want Scripture to be αὐτο πιστον… How vain these arguments are for proving the inspiration of the sacred books scarcely needs exposition. For if they are taken individually, they can be applied to many non-inspired books. If they are taken together, they cannot be applied to all inspired books.

De inspirtione Sacrae Scripturae, lib. 2, cap. 7, art. 2, n. 591

The classical (and most common) Protestant position on the canon is that Scripture authenticates itself. In this article, I want to critique that doctrine and show it is inconsistent with the nature of faith.

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For the assent of faith to take place, something must be proposed, it must be assented to on the basis of God revealing, and the Holy Spirit must produce this assent by grace; in more scholastic terms, we call these the material object assented to, the formal object or motive of assent, and the supernatural principle producing the assent.

Thus, we may consider the example of when the Apostles in the first century proposed to gentiles that Jesus is God after their message had been authenticated by miracles.

• The proposition or material object is the divinity of Christ — the fact that He is God.

• The formal object is that the assent of these gentiles was due to God’s revelation: “when you received the word of God, which you heard from us, you accepted it not as the word of men but as what it really is, the word of God, which is at work in you believers.”

• The supernatural principle is the grace of God producing this act of faith.

For the question of the canon, we’re asking whether Protestants can assent to the fact of inspiration for the books of the Bible on the basis of God revealing. Catholic theologians argue that they cannot because they lack a proposition for the fact of inspiration. Before getting into the argument, I must clarify a few things.

Clarification #1

The fact of inspiration — whether this or that book is inspired — is distinct from the revelation proposed in each book of the Bible. Anyone, including Protestants, can use the historical method and the witness of early Christians to attain a rational certainty that the Gospel of Matthew is a reliable witness to Jesus Christ and His teachings, and therefore give the assent of faith to whatever Jesus proposes for belief in this book. All of this is possible without knowing that Matthew is inspired, which is what concerns us here.

Thus, believing what Matthew says is distinct from believing the fact of Matthew’s inspiration. Just as men in the first century saw the Apostles’ miracles, attained a certainty that they were authentic legates of God, and therefore assented to their propositions, so can one attain certainty that Matthew is an authentic witness and assent to its propositions. But where no proposition is given for the fact of inspiration, there is nothing to assent to for the fact of inspiration, even if the message itself can be assented to.

Clarification #2

Catholics do not, and should not, claim that Protestants have no means of attaining a strong historical certainty for what the canonical and inspired books are. On the contrary, they can achieve a great amount of historical certainty concerning the canon. What we claim is that they cannot make the assent of faith to the fact of inspiration for a book, which they claim they can make.

Clarification #3

The difference between Catholics and Protestants is not whether there is a tradition of the canon outside of Scripture. David Hollaz, a Lutheran, says:

“By historical traditions are enumerated the canonical books of Holy Scripture, guarded by the church in an uninterrupted series of times and with a certain succession of connection, and faithfully transmitted to posterity.”

Examen theologicum acroamaticum, Prolegomena, ch. 3, q. 51.

Girolamo Zanchi, Reformed, says:

“[The] prophets and apostles […] delivered to the posterity by a continuing and perpetual tradition which are canonical and which are not canonical books.”

Confession of Christian Religion, ch. 1, n. 6.

The distinction is that the testimony of the Church, according to Protestants, can only produce human faith in the fact of inspiration. For example, when the primitive Church in the first several centuries testifies that Matthew is inspired, this tradition does not produce Divine faith in the proposition that Matthew is inspired. Zanchi says:

“[By the testimony of the Church] alone no one can be brought to believe truly or to recognize that Scripture is God-breathed… [From it] we may conceive some good opinion of this Word, even if not a firm faith, that it is the Word of God.”

De Sacra Scriptura, q. 2, prop. 8.

David Hollaz says:

“The testimony of the church is indeed a remarkable motive of credibility, by which we are led to know and believe with human faith the divinity of scripture.”

Examen theologicum acroamaticum, Prolegomena, ch. 3, q. 33.

Thus, while Protestants accept the role of tradition in discerning the canon, they themselves agree with what I said above: this only produces human faith and a degree of certitude, not divine faith in the fact of inspiration.

Clarification #4

When I say the fact of inspiration is not proposed to Protestants, I mean this for each book, not all. Obviously I concede that many Biblical books, even if only considered as historically reliable, testify that other books are inspired. Thus, Jesus says in Mark 12 that God spoke through David in Psalm 110. However, this is not the case for every book, since there is nothing proposing that Matthew, John, Hebrews, Philemon, Jude, and many other books are inspired.

The Protestant Position

My fundamental contention against the Protestant position is that, even if they claim they can have Divine faith in the fact of inspiration for the canonical books, I argue that they cannot since the fact of inspiration is not proposed to them and hence they have nothing to assent to when it comes to the whether this or that book is inspired.

Protestants commonly taught that the fact of inspiration is testified internally through the Holy Spirit. However, this must be explained in detail so as to avoid confusion, avoid strawmanning, and so that my rebuttal is easier to understand.

First, it’s important to note that Protestants in both the Lutheran and Reformed traditions reject that the fact of inspiration is known through an immediate internal testimony since this would posit private revelation for every Christian. Thus, they reject what was known at the time as “enthusiasm”, which was held by radical Reformation groups.

Christian Dreier, a Lutheran, says:

“The Enthusiasts, as they are condemned in our church books, taught that a person could have inner revelation of the Spirit without the Bible and without the Word.”

Gründliche Erörterung Etzlicher schwerer Theologischer Fragen (Thorough Dialogue) (Königsberg: Reusner, 1651), pp. 5.

Moïse Amyraut, Reformed, says:

“An inward voice of the Holy Spirit sounding in our minds with these or similar words: ‘Believe, for this book is divine,’ should be asserted is forbidden by most weighty reasons. For, first, it is difficult to determine how such a voice would differ from enthusiasm.”

Theological theses on The Testimony By Which The Holy Spirit Seals the Divinity of the Scriptures in the Minds of Human Beings, pt. 1, n. 15.

So while this internal testimony would hypothetically suffice for divine faith in the fact of inspiration — if the Spirit did internally propose to each believer that “This book is inspired” — it is not what Protestants teach anyway.

Instead, Protestants claim they can have divine faith in the fact of inspiration through mediate illumination. David Hollaz explains this well:

“Enthusiasts boast of immediate illuminations of the Holy Spirit; but the constant opinion of the Lutherans is that the Holy Spirit testifies to the divinity of scripture through a mediate illumination of the mind.”

Examen theologicum acroamaticum, Prolegomena, ch. 3, q. 32.

For Protestants, Scripture contains internal marks and produces external effects by which a believer concludes that a certain book is divinely inspired. Hollaz says:

“By the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit here is understood the supernatural act of the Holy Spirit, through the word of God attentively read, or perceived by hearing, by His divine power communicated to the sacred scripture illuminating the heart of man, and bending it to the obedience of faith, so that the illuminated man truly feels from internal spiritual motions that the word proposed to him has proceeded from God Himself.”

Examen theologicum acroamaticum, Prolegomena, ch. 3, q. 32.

Notice this: Hollaz himself makes the distinction that I am making. What a Biblical book proposes is one thing — “the word proposed to him” — and the fact that this word is inspired is another thing — “has proceeded from God Himself.”

“Whenever the divine word of the law and the gospel is attentively read or listened to, a docile man truly feels its heart-turning power, and concludes that God is speaking with him from the internal, supernatural acts and motions of the heart. Those acts are on the part of the intellect: the dawning light of supernatural knowledge, and an inspired holy thought; on the part of the will, the spiritual motions are: sorrow for sins, a desire to learn and to profit, a pious affection.”

Examen theologicum acroamaticum, Prolegomena, ch. 3, q. 32.

In the same section, Hollaz also says that man, having felt the effect of Scripture, such as repentance and other things, is illuminated “so that he clearly recognizes the divine inspiration of the scriptures.”

Zanchi speaks similarly,

“The Holy Spirit illuminates the mind of the man reading or hearing Scripture so that he sees and feels that God is speaking in the Scriptures, not a man... For by this Spirit we not only recognize that Scripture itself is truly God-breathed, but we also in fact feel that in this Scripture there is a most certain power of the most high God at work, by which we feel ourselves most sweetly drawn to love this Scripture.”

De Sacra Scriptura, q. 2, prop. 8.

William Whitaker says:

“The books themselves prove themselves by their own testimony. The purity, the truth, the wonderful character impressed upon these writings, prove, at least to all those that have the Holy Spirit, that they emanated from God and his holy inspiration. For it is only they who have received the Holy Spirit that can hear, recognize, and understand his voice.”

A Disputation on Holy Scripture, q. 6, ch. 9.

To summarize the Protestant position, I would simply repeat this line from Hollaz: “man truly feels its heart-turning power, and concludes that God is speaking with him from the internal, supernatural acts and motions of the heart.” Thus, as we can see, Protestants use the language of “recognize”, “conclude”, and “feel” regarding how the fact of inspiration is apprehended. Their view then is that the fact of inspiration is proven from the effect that is recognized and which it produces, just as one would use reasoning to prove a cause from its effect. This is admitted by them. Hollaz says:

“The divine dignity of scripture is proven by the supernatural effect of the Holy Spirit, who operates efficaciously through scripture, illuminating, converting, regenerating, and renewing. But if you ask: Is that Spirit divine, or malignant? Then from the effect, which is divine and salutary, we regress to proving that the Spirit testifying internally of the divine origin of scripture is divine, most holy, and most good.”

Examen theologicum acroamaticum, Prolegomena, ch. 3, q. 32.

Francis Turretin, Reformed, says regarding the fact of inspiration:

“We properly prove a cause from its effects”

Institutes of Elenctic Theology, vol. 1, 2nd Topic, q. 6, n. 18.

Amyraut says:

“We proceed by reasoning from effect to cause; nor does the movement of our inquiry stop at this, that Scripture is divine because it is persuaded to us. But since the matter appears to us doubtful – whether that persuasion is legitimate and divine or not – we examine it, test it, and contemplate it, and at last from its unusual and extraordinary greatness we infer that it proceeds from something other than a created, that is, a weak cause. And thus our faith finally rests on the apprehension of truth and on the perception of the divinity of the efficient cause, which appears to us in the greatness of the effect.”

Theological theses on The Testimony By Which The Holy Spirit Seals the Divinity of the Scriptures in the Minds of Human Beings, pt. 1, n. 18.

The Problem With Protestant View

As I said originally, for the assent of faith to take place, something must be proposed, it must be assented to on the basis of God revealing, and the Holy Spirit must produce this assent by grace. Protestants here lack the proposition for the fact of inspiration for many books, such as Matthew, John, Philemon, etc., and thus have nothing to assent to, making their assent to the fact of inspiration inconsistent with the nature of faith.

The problem with reasoning from an effect to its cause, as we saw described by Protestants, is twofold.

First, it is impossible for this type of reasoning to produce faith because it concludes a supernatural fact without theological principles. Theological conclusions, which Protestants give the assent of faith to, must have a theological principle as its foundation. For example, in “Christ is perfect God and perfect man. But volition is a faculty of a rational nature. Therefore Christ has a human and divine will.” the revealed principle is that Christ is perfect God and man, which we find proposed in Scripture.

The effects and marks of Scripture are not a revealed principle, and thus to make a theological conclusion from these marks is irrational.

Second, it is impossible for these to even serve as a revealed principle since no necessary connection exists between these marks and the fact of inspiration. Cardinal Franzelin says:

“The external effect of the inspiration of which we speak is nothing other than the writing itself and the written book. But in these there is no intrinsic mark which of itself manifests inspiration as a necessary cause.”

De Divinis Scripturis, § 1, cap. 2, thesis 6.

This is obvious since there are many non-inspired books that share these marks and effects with inspired books, and there are many inspired books that lack many of the marks and effects. For example, if I walk past a zealous street preacher who speaks with sublimity and his preaching moves me to repentance, not only do I not conclude he is inspired, but I definitely don’t give the assent of faith that he is inspired. Why would we do the same with Scripture?

This makes a theological conclusion from these effects impossible and therefore makes the assent of faith to the fact of inspiration impossible. Instead of faith in inspiration, such reasoning produces a scientific judgement, which cannot apprehend a supernatural first principle like the fact of inspiration. Remember, first principles in the supernatural order must be apprehended by faith from authority and do not fall under scientific examination, which is produced through reasoning.

Thus, Fr. Christian Pesch, S.J. says:

“But concerning the internal taste by which certain Protestants say they can distinguish with certainty inspired books from non-inspired ones, just as concerning the testimony of the Holy Spirit which they assert, there seems no need to speak. For that taste is produced neither by all nor by inspired books alone… [I]f indeed that testimony of the Holy Spirit is not conceived as true revelation, but as a certain instinct or motion of the mind, this does not suffice that the inspiration of Scripture be believed with divine faith, as it must be believed.”

De inspirtione Sacrae Scripturae, lib. 2, cap. 7, art. 2, n. 597.

Objections

Objection 1: While other non-inspired works can produce similar effects and contain similar marks, the Spirit helps identify and confirm which book is actually inspired.

Reply: Nothing new is said here. Is such identification of an inspired book given by private revelation? This is denied by Protestants. Does it illumine the mind to infallibly recognize which book is truly inspired? This, as already said, cannot produce Divine faith in the fact of inspiration but only some sort of scientific judgement, which is not sufficient for inspiration.

Objection 2: There is no distinct proposition for the fact of inspiration. The object of assent is Scripture itself.

Reply: This confuses what Scripture proposes and the fact of inspiration. When I read the Gospel of John and assent to the Divinity of Christ, I am assenting to the Gospel of John, which proposes that Jesus is God. This is distinct from assenting to the fact of inspiration for John, which is necessary if I want to say “I believe that John is inspired Scripture.” If “John is inspired” is not proposed, then there is nothing to assent to.

To affirm that one believes something that is not revealed is absurd and contrary to the nature of Divine faith. If it is revealed, where is it found?

Objection 3: Moses could recognize God was speaking to him without receiving a revelation.

Reply: First, God did explicitly reveal His identity and it’s only after this that Moses hid his face. Thus there really was a revelation of God’s identity.

“God called to him out of the bush, ‘Moses, Moses!’ And he said, ‘Here I am.’ Then he said, ‘Do not come near; take your sandals off your feet, for the place on which you are standing is holy ground.’ And he said, ‘I am the God of your father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.’ And Moses hid his face, for he was afraid to look at God.

Exodus 3:4-6

Second, before God revealed His identity, Moses could at best have rational certitude about who was speaking, not divine faith, even if he could give divine faith to whatever the burning bush proposed.

Objection 4: John 10:27

My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me.

Reply:

1. Jesus explains that to “hear” His voice is to believe His teaching when he says that the Jews there were not His sheep due to their unbelief: “You do not believe because you are not among my sheep.” (John 10:26). Thus, this has nothing to do with recognizing divine inspiration.

2. Since to hear means to believe, and nothing is proposed regarding the fact of inspiration, then there is nothing to assent to.

Objection 5: 1 Thessalonians 1:5-6

For we know, brothers loved by God, that he has chosen you, because our gospel came to you not only in word, but also in power and in the Holy Spirit and with full conviction.

Hollaz argues thus:

“Paul’s gospel was not a bare, empty, and fruitless speech, but a speech joined with the power of the Holy Spirit, who had illuminated, converted, and endowed them with faith. Wherefore, the principal reason moving a man to receive the gospel of Christ as truly divine is the power of the Holy Spirit, united by an individual bond with the word of God read or heard.”

Examen theologicum acroamaticum, Prolegomena, ch. 3, q. 32.

Reply: Nothing here suggests the internal testimony of the Spirit. We do not deny that the grace of the Spirit is necessary for acts of faith, hope, and love, but we deny that one can assent to the fact of inspiration for a particular book without it being proposed by a divine authority. This verse is irrelevant in proving that.

1. “In power and the Holy Spirit” refers to miracles and the grace of conversion which makes the assent of faith possible, which is not the same thing that the Protestants argue for regarding the internal testimony confirming that such a book is inspired.
   
   Such is the reading of Ambrosiaster (PL 17, 443A), Haymo of Halberstadt (PL 117, 766B), Hervé de Bourg-Dieu (PL 181, 1358D-59A), St. Bruno the Carthusian (PL 153, 399C), St. Thomas Aquinas (Sup. I ad Thess., c. 1, l. 1, n. 13.2), and others.

2. St. Paul immediately follows this with “You know what kind of men we proved to be among you for your sake. And you became imitators of us and of the Lord, for you received the word in much affliction, with the joy of the Holy Spirit.”

   
   Thus, St. Paul primarily has in mind his own good moral character and how it served as an influential example in their conversion.

Objection 6: 1 Thessalonians 2:13

And we also thank God constantly for this, that when you received the word of God, which you heard from us, you accepted it not as the word of men but as what it really is, the word of God, which is at work in you believers.

Hollaz argues thus:

“To receive the word from the mouth of the apostles as the word of God, is to receive that word as having proceeded from God, or as having been preached by the inspiration of God. But the reason is the same for scripture divinely inspired, and for the doctrine preached by the apostles from divine inspiration… [J]ust as the Thessalonians were moved by the supernatural operation of God to believe that the speech of the apostles was not of men, but of God its author: so even now the hearts of men are moved by the supernatural operation of God to believe that Holy Scripture is truly divine, or has proceeded from God.”

Examen theologicum acroamaticum, Prolegomena, ch. 3, q. 32.

Reply: It is absolutely absurd and sophisticated to suggest that men will be “moved to believe” something that is not proposed to them but that they have concluded. St. Paul is simply saying they received his preaching as divine revelation and not a mere human testimony. This is the reading of Ambrosiaster (PL 17, 445D), St. Augustine (PL 42, 1072; PL 33, 848-49; PL 35, 1919), and Peter Lombard (PL 192, 294D-95A).

For example, here is St. Augustine on 2 Thessalonians 2:13,

“There are countless other like sayings in the Scriptures respecting the word of God, which is disseminated in the sounds of many and diverse languages through the hearts and mouths of men; and which is therefore called the word of God, because the doctrine that is delivered is not human, but divine.”

On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 11 (PL 42, 1072).

That the word of God is “at work in” believers also doesn’t mean that by this efficacy man concludes the preaching is inspired. When I read and meditate on Scripture, I grow in virtue, and thus the word of God is said to work in me. This is not what Protestants are claiming: that because Scripture works with efficacy in man, the man can conclude that it is inspired. The same can happen from a zealous preacher: I don’t therefore conclude his sermon is inspired.

Objection 7: Repentance produced from hearing the Gospel

Hollaz uses examples like Acts 2 and the Jews who were “cut to the heart” from St. Peter’s sermon as evidence of the testimony of the Spirit.

“These supernatural acts of the intellect and motions of the will, by the force of their dependence on God, incline the intellect to give assent to the divine word more validly than the living voice of a man worthy of faith, commemorating a matter difficult to believe, moves the intellect to assent to the deed done. For just as they were excited by the Holy Spirit through the word of the law and the gospel: so they argue God to be their author; just as elsewhere every effect testifies of its cause.”

Examen theologicum acroamaticum, Prolegomena, ch. 3, q. 32.

Reply: This is faulty reasoning, as was already stated.

1. One can be cut to the heart by a non-inspired sermon. Obviously one doesn’t conclude it’s inspired and assents to the fact of inspiration.

2. There are inspired books that don’t produce this effect.