After the CPC was established, both through the study of Marxism and revolutionary practice, Party leaders started having a clearer understanding of the international and domestic conditions. Remember, when the CPC was first established, they had little experience to draw from and their theories were still very much under the influence of the Soviet experience. In 1922, the CPC accepted Lenin’s formulation on both the national and colonial questions. The Central Committee released a proposal on China which analyzed China’s history and present as a semi-feudal state, which was under the authority of international imperialism and feudal warlords and bureaucrats domestically. This was the initial formulation which was developed by the Second Congress.1

Chen Duxiu introduced the concept of semi-colonialism in his article in 1923. He argued that revolutions in semi-colonial countries possess two dimensions: an external revolution against imperialism and an internal democratic revolution against feudalism. The Third Congress referred to the “democratic revolution” as a “national revolution” and that the tasks for revolutionaries in semi-colonial China were fundamentally different from the bourgeois revolutions that had occurred in Europe. That same year, Mao Zedong also referred to China as semi-colonial2. He wrote:

“We know that the politics of semi-colonial China is characterized by the fact that the militarists and the foreign powers have banded together to impose a twofold oppression on the people of the whole country... To use the strength of the people to overthrow the militarists and foreign imperialism, with which the former are in collusion to accomplish their treasonable acts, is the historic mission of the Chinese people.”

In 1926, Cai Hesen used the phrase “semi-colonial, semi-feudal China” in his seminal work, The Historical Development of the Communist Party of China,3 which was the summary of his report to international communists. He argued similarly that China’s conditions were different from those of Europe and that the Communist Party of China therefore faced an entirely different set of historical tasks and responsibilities.

In China, imperialist penetration gave rise to entirely new classes that didn’t exist before. The comprador class emerged and developed alongside the commercial and later industrial bourgeoisie. Alongside the development of native Chinese industry, a modern proletariat also emerged. According to Cai Hesen, sections of the old ruling class acquired revolutionary tendencies as imperialism displaced their former position and brought economic collapse.

Before the Opium War of 1839-1842, the Qīng government still possessed considerable authority and legitimacy. The peasantry and the petty-bourgeois literati generally held the ruling class in high esteem. However, after the Opium Wars, and especially after the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, this political credibility collapsed.

Three factors need to be considered in the decline of the Qing dynasty. First was the opium trade, which drained the circulation of silver and created economic hardship. Due to imperialist aggression, the government was forced to compensate by increasing taxes, which increased their economic hardship. Finally, corruption became rampant, and officials were collaborating with foreign interests, which further led to loss of public trust in the state.

While China is being gutted internally, the Qing dynasty is also repeatedly losing on the military and diplomatic fronts, leading to more loss of sovereignty and territory. Qing dynasty was seen as a government incapable of protecting the nation.

Three major rebellions were attempted to save China after the Opium Wars.

The first was the Taiping Rebellion. Mostly made up of poor and bankrupt peasants, but the imperialist powers sided with the Qing government, the rebellion failed. The second was the Boxer Rebellion, which was also made up of impoverished and bankrupt peasants. It also failed. Their failure demonstrated to Chinese Communists that though peasants were capable of resisting and rebelling and winning BEFORE imperialism, they now were unable to defeat the new combined domestic exploitation and foreign domination. The comprador class sided with imperialism and remained a reactionary force. The peasantry, capable of spontaneous rebellions, lacked political leadership which would lead them to success in this particular historical period of double oppression.

The third was the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, which involved the peasants, the bourgeoisie, and the emerging proletariat and was led by revolutionary nationalists under Sun Yat-sen. According to Cai Hesen, the revolution was too focused on military fighting and did not do mass political propaganda and mass mobilization. Since the Wuchang Uprising itself had only a limited connection to the broader masses, political power was eventually transferred to the Beiyang warlords.

The lessons summed up were that the bourgeoisie was weak, the peasantry lacked leadership, and the proletariat had not yet developed sufficient political consciousness. The petty bourgeoisie were incapable of leading the revolution because they did not understand the masses nor were they able to correctly identify the enemies. However, the Chinese revolutionary trajectory entered a new stage in 1919 with the May Fourth Movement, where workers displayed their newly acquired consciousness. This eventually led to the formation of the CPC, which led to them trying to understand and theorize the historical lessons and guiding strategy. However, Cai Hesen says:

Numerous spontaneous strikes occurred in Hong Kong, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Hubei, some successful and some unsuccessful. The scope of spontaneous strikes expanded significantly in 1920. According to Japanese statistics, there were 47 strikes between 1920 and 1921, involving 76,000 participants; by 1921-1922, there were 37 strikes with 44,000 participants. However, these strikes were spontaneous and widespread. During this period of spontaneous strikes, the working class began to form rudimentary worker organizations. In 1919, there were 26 trade unions in Guangdong. After the successful strike by machine workers in Hong Kong in 1921, the number of trade unions in the south, especially in Guangzhou, increased from 26 to 100, but these were still nascent occupational groups. From the above figures and facts, it is evident that the working class before the founding of this Party had progressed from a state of ignorance to awareness, from inaction to action, and indeed, very intense and courageous action. This phenomenon is the main one in the context of the founding of this Party….The May Fourth Movement was a student-led anti-imperialist movement, but dockworkers and Japanese cotton mill workers in Shanghai participated. They participated in the anti-imperialist movement as a political strike, but their participation at this time, without the leadership and guidance of their own party, was not as meaningful or powerful as the current May Thirtieth Movement. The workers’ participation in this strike was driven by a momentary patriotic fervor. On the one hand, they hated oppression and aggression; on the other hand, they were manipulated by students and politicians, and their participation was “caused by the approach of politicians’ cliques or a small group of worker leaders.” Therefore, objectively, this strike was meaningful. However, subjectively, it lacked class consciousness and was guided by a political party. This proves that the Chinese working class had embarked on the path of anti-imperialist political struggle, which is of great significance in the history of the development of the Chinese working class and in the emergence of the Party. Because the working class’s spontaneous engagement in political struggle necessitates the leadership of a political party, this is the third phenomenon surrounding the emergence of our Party.

In 1927, the failure of the National Revolution made the CPC re-evaluate their understandings. The Party faced a critical situation after the defeat of the National Revolution, the Shanghai Massacre, and the White Terror. Party membership fell from 57,000 members to around 10,000.

The defeat of the National Revolution in the summer of 1927 raised a series of new questions. What kind of political power did Chiang Kai-shek’s regime represent? Had the nature of Chinese society fundamentally changed? Was China still semi-colonial and semi-feudal?

The national bourgeoisie had shown that it was incapable of carrying the democratic revolution through to the end because it allied with landlords and imperialism while fearing the revolutionary mobilization of the workers and peasants.

Identifying the nature of Chinese society was crucial in guiding revolution because further strategy had to be based on which forces they were fighting against and what kind of revolution was necessary.

The public and even sections of the Party held widely differing views: China remained feudal, or it was now capitalist. Others said it was post-capitalist

The Sixth National Congress of the CPC in 1928 concluded that China remained semi-colonial and that the remnants of semi-feudalism had not been eliminated. Therefore, the Chinese revolution remained a bourgeois-democratic revolution.

In February 1929, the CPC formally provided a comprehensive formulation of the concepts of “semi-colonialism” and “semi-feudalism.”

Yet this wasn’t the end. One faction argued that because the Guomindang (Kuomintang) represented the bourgeoisie, China had already become capitalist and the proletariat should move directly toward socialist revolution. Another faction argued that because Chiang Kai-shek represented the bourgeoisie, the struggle should be directed simultaneously against semi-feudalism, semi-colonialism, and the bourgeoisie all at once, rather than completing one stage and then the next.

Both positions exaggerated the degree of capitalist development in China and misunderstood the class nature of the regime.

The controversy concerning the nature of Chinese society would continue for nearly a decade.

CPC leadership, after applying their understanding of Marxism-Leninism to concrete conditions in China, argued that imperialism had undermined China’s traditional rural economy and at the same time had stimulated certain capitalist development. However, imperialism was colluding with feudal forces which stifled national capital and preserved semi-feudal relations because they facilitated imperial domination.

In December 1939, The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party, authored by Mao Zedong with Zhang Wentian and Li Weihan, presented the most systematic analysis of Chinese society to date. It argued that China had undergone two historical transformations simultaneously. The first was the transformation from a completely feudal society into a semi-feudal society. The second was the transformation from an independent sovereign state into a semi-colonial society. Both historical processes were initiated by foreign capitalist penetration.

Foreign capital destroyed the pre-existing economy and promoted the commodity economy in both rural and urban areas, creating the conditions for the emergence of the Chinese bourgeoisie. However, because imperialism controlled China’s economic and political life, the national bourgeoisie could not develop organically with the expansion of the commodity economy.

The national bourgeoisie was marginalized by foreign capital since it had special privileges and could not overcome the existing semi-feudal order. So then modern Chinese society did not develop into a capitalist society. It was a semi-feudal society with a weak capitalist economy that coexisted with a semi-feudal economy: modern urban centers coexisted with stagnant rural areas, advanced regions with deeply backward ones.

Most importantly, the intention of the imperialist powers was never to transform feudal China into a capitalist China. Rather, it was to transform China into a colonial and semi-colonial country subordinate to imperialism. The development of Chinese capitalism and the emergence of semi-feudal society were by-products of this process to keep China subordinate to imperialism.

As Marx and Engels argued, capitalism creates the subordination of rural areas to urban areas, of the East to the West, and of peasant nations to bourgeois nations. Over the previous century, the imperialist powers employed military, political, economic, cultural, and diplomatic means to dominate China.

They outlined several defining characteristics of Chinese society:4

(1) The foundations of the self-sufficient natural economy of feudal times have been destroyed, but the exploitation of the peasantry by the landlord class, which is the basis of the system of feudal exploitation, not only remains intact but, linked as it is with exploitation by comprador and usurer capital, clearly dominates China’s social and economic life.

(2) National capitalism has developed to a certain extent and has played a considerable part in China’s political and cultural life but it has not become the principal pattern in China’s social economy, it is flabby and is mostly associated with foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism in varying degrees.

(3) The autocratic rule of the emperors and nobility has been overthrown, and in its place there have arisen first the warlord-bureaucrat rule of the landlord class and then the joint dictatorship of the landlord class and the big bourgeoisie. In the occupied areas there is the rule of Japanese imperialism and its puppets.

(4) Imperialism controls not only China’s vital financial and economic arteries but also her political and military power. In the occupied areas everything is in the hands of Japanese imperialism.

(5) China’s economic, political and cultural development is very uneven, because she has been under the complete or partial domination of many imperialist powers, because she has actually been in a state of disunity for a long time, and because her territory is immense.

(6) Under the twofold oppression of imperialism and feudalism and especially as a result of the large-scale invasion of Japanese imperialism, the Chinese people, and particularly the peasants, have become more and more impoverished and have even been pauperized in large numbers, living in hunger and cold and without any political rights. The poverty and lack of freedom among the Chinese people are on a scale seldom found elsewhere.

All of this added up to China being a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, NOT a capitalist country, nor a country with semi-feudal semi-colonial which had a bourgeois revolution in charge either.

After a decade, through struggle and re-investigation and correcting (and over-correcting) tendencies from left to right, this was the guiding formulation.

If China was a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society, then what kind of revolution did it require?

For next time…

So, a prominent opposition figure, Nika Gvaramia, was interviewed on August 15th, 2026, on opposition media. It was on the 34th anniversary of the war (August 14th) between the Abkhaz and the Georgians. Gvaramia was one of the refugees whom Abkhazians ethnically cleansed after Georgia lost the war; hence, why he was invited to speak on the anniversary.

In this interview, he made very bold comments regarding Abkhazia—a disputed territory of Georgia. He pointed to Pashinyan as a model for what Georgia should do. This explicitness about decentering the trauma around Abkhazia in politics requires audacity to say in Georgia. Ironically, the reason no one can speak logically and constructively about Abkhazia is because of people like Gvaramia and his political followers who have created heavy-handed mechanisms to discipline Georgians who dare to broach the subject. He is now trying to reorder political priorities and convince his followers, who are still functioning within this paradigm of maximalist nationalism with categorical red lines, by saying regaining Abkhazia will be a spillover effect from focusing on geopolitical economy first.

However, what’s important to note is that though some people were won over by his use of the language of trauma and memory around Abkhazia, and others are angry with him about his proposal to drop Abkhazia from the immediate political agenda, he’s really just repackaging his political plan for Georgia, situating it within a discussion of the Abkhazian question and adding emotional and psychological language of trauma and memory.

Besides the lack of novelty in his repackaged political plan, what is novel is that he has concluded that emotionally intransigent, hawkish politics is now maladaptive. His only real shift in thinking is that he now thinks that current global politics rewards pragmatism more than maximalist nationalist fever dreams as the starting point.

Below is a summary of Gvaramia’s interview (italicized), with my own commentary and analysis interspersed. I always say the Georgian opposition is stuck in the 1990s/early 2000s Western bravado period, and I think reading his analysis will show you what I mean!

This is a very rough post—I hope to write a more thorough analysis of the Middle Corridor, the dialogue, and plans around it. Many striking things are missing from Gvaramia’s dialogue: discussion of China; more substantial discussion on Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia; how seriously anyone should take any plan that Trump comes up with (regarding TRIPP); no actual economic development plan; no social policies besides positive discrimination; Georgian Dream’s own understanding of the Middle Corridor; etc. I hope to write more on all this later and much more rigorously.

Abkhazia used to be a place where Georgians, Abkhaz, Armenians, and other ethnicities lived together. The Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was part of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. But then in the early 1990s, after the dissolution of the USSR, a civil war began, which Georgia lost. This led to 250,000+ Georgians being ethnically cleansed from Abkhazia and becoming refugees. Abkhazia’s secession was supported by Russia, and then further legitimized by Russia in 2008 (as punishment for the August 2008 war between Russia, Ossetians, and Georgia) when it acknowledged Abkhazia’s independence. Currently, only four countries (including Russia) recognize Abkhazia’s independence; two countries will most likely withdraw their recognition: Venezuela and Syria. The discourse in Georgia is that Abkhazia is Russian-occupied Georgia. A lot of Georgian politics, which is consistently determined by attitudes towards Russia, is partially fueled by losing Abkhazia and another territory, South Ossetia.

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For Gvaramia to bring this up is quite audacious and a big gamble. But he’s channeling his version of “Pashinyan.”

He spoke to Formula TV and went on about traumatic memory, which he said blocks development.

Pashinyan “defeated traumas and did it in a very short period of time, which is difficult.” Pashinyan was able to remove the entire Karabakh question from politics and removed Mount Ararat from official visuals (Ararat, located in current-day Turkey, is what Armenians consider their lost land; the symbol is very sacred, encompassing the genocide, national aspirations, the past, and so on). He did this to pave the way for relations with Turkey and a path to the EU, and to not be dependent on Russia. Gvaramia said Abkhazia ties Georgia to Russia, much like Armenia’s disputed territory tied it to Russia, despite different circumstances. The Karabakh clan, or class, was a huge burden on Pashinyan; they had political hegemony, and this class of people was tied to dark money. Pashinyan, by confronting and giving back the disputed territory, attacked this class head-on and won.

(Nagorno-Karabakh, an autonomous region in Soviet Azerbaijan with a majority Armenian population, was where a war was fought at the end of the USSR but was never annexed to Armenia itself.)

Gvaramia went on to describe the traumas surrounding Abkhazia.

His trauma was thinking that Abkhazians should never be talked to, never forgiven, and only conquered militarily, and he said how his trauma, despite being wrong, was natural and understandable. He said Georgian Dream has forged a different response to this trauma, which is to breed fear into people about war and remind them of war and death. He also acknowledges that people do not want war because the 2008 war is still in our near memory, complete with horrific videos and photos; still, it’s “terrorism” what the government is doing. He thinks Georgian Dream scares everyone every day about war, “transferring their traumas into being afraid of war” instead of making them forget their traumatic memories.

Despite him saying that his own version of trauma was wrong, he believes Georgian Dream’s version was worse.

He said we must accept people as they are, which is that they are concerned about Abkhazia but they also don’t want war. That people don’t want war is a fact. Especially, he says, the new generation doesn’t get why there should be war and is raised much more pacifistically. Therefore, we must look for a solution that is not war.

Despite the bitterness of defeat that exists, he says the “mainstream narrative that we can only get Abkhazia back through war” is essentially wrong.

Gvaramia then creates a new concept of losing Abkhazia: not as losing territory, but losing Abkhazia redefined as not remembering Abkhazia.

He believes that Abkhazians will return to Georgia when “it’s interesting for them…when they can live a better life and that’s associated with EU membership. I’m absolutely certain…Russia-Ukraine war, when Russians are completely isolated and can’t leave their own borders, Abkhazians will abandon Russians because they aren’t exactly in love with them.

Abkhazians will want EU membership, an EU passport, visa-free travel, economic development, and protection of minorities, “which right-wing liberals don’t like: positive discrimination, and the [EU] does it a little bit like Soviet-style positive discrimination.” Gvaramia says that Abkhazians need institutional guarantees that they will live peacefully. He also said Abkhazians love money and that they’ll welcome money for reconstruction since the territory is in ruins.

(He indirectly acknowledges the Soviet Union had positive discrimination and guarantees to ethnic minorities to be safe and protected, and that actually kept people living together peacefully. He also positions himself as not a right-wing liberal but a liberal who’s willing to have laws protecting minorities. Note: liberal is a catch-all term meaning anyone who’s pro-Western. Their ideology can range from fascist to social democrat; however, they discipline all of their other political thinking by putting being accepted into NATO/EU at the top; therefore, they are all “liberals.”)

He says that the key to all this is Georgia becoming the key to the Middle Corridor. “This region is becoming alive,” and now Central Asia is trapped by Iran, China, and Russia, and the Middle Corridor will liberate it. “We are the key to Europe to replace Russia and China.” There is a new 21st-century economic order being formed, and Georgia should become indispensable to it. He says the fear is that the EU will continue to rely on Turkey and not include Georgia, and only by becoming an EU member can we outcompete Turkey. There should be a port built on the Black Sea at Anaklia, and controlled by “Americans, British, and EU for like a century.” He mentions building the Ochamchire port in the future, which should interest Abkhazians to be part of this larger Middle Corridor which will directly benefit them.

Gvaramia then says, “There is nothing the West protects stronger than private property, not interntional treaties, not security committments, not the charters of alliances… This is a society where the founding blocks are private property.”

(This is hilarious because it’s true, and he knows it’s true, but he welcomes it.)

He then says this port can’t be built because Bidzina Ivanishvili (founder and financier of the ruling party Georgian Dream) would interfere, and asks: “You think investors will risk [being taken to Georgian courts] being judged by Murusidze [a Georgian judge]?”

(In a way, this is acknowledging that the entire intent of Western institutions building courts in countries like Georgia is to protect foreign investors, not to serve the Georgian population fairly.)

He says if Georgia has EU membership, Georgia will no longer be speaking to Azerbaijan—or anyone—as Georgia, but will be negotiating with the EU. Imagine what kind of wealth the Middle Corridor will bring to Georgia, but Bidzina Ivanishvili will want that wealth for himself, so Western powers will have to rely on Turkey until then. However, Georgia has favorability because Turkey is not European; they’re not “the quality of Europe.” Georgians are blatantly European. Even Georgian Dream voters are pro-European. He also says Georgian Dream doesn’t care about Abkhazia. They only want Abkhazia for criminal activities; they want an uncontrolled zone where they make money, the same kind of money Bidzina makes but at a higher cost in Georgia. The Engur HPP: Abkhazians pay nothing for their power, and they get more power than they need, so the rest is going to crypto farming.

(The Engur Hydropower Plant is the only cooperation between Abkhazia and Georgia. The dam is on Georgia-controlled territory, and the power station and generators are in Abkhazia. The allocation is that 40% of electricity goes to Abkhazia and 60% to Georgia.)

He admits the mainstream narrative is that starting a war to take back occupied territories is the only way to get Abkhazia back. Then he says Georgian Dream is cruelly abusing trauma and drumming up fears of war. But he uses the word “mainstream,” which means it’s not some marginal outlook. This is very typical of his (and the opposition’s) contradictions: Ukraine and Iran, both right in the region, have been or are at war while admitting that the mainstream narrative is that only through military exploits can Abkhazia be returned. People, he mentions as a fact, don’t want war, yet somehow, all the anti-war rhetoric from Georgian Dream is incongruent with reality and sinister.

Gvaramia is essentially laying out a plan for why the current Georgian government needs to be ousted, as they impede this beautiful future that awaits us if Georgia gets EU membership, if this translates into the EU/US/UK putting Georgia as the indispensable part of their entry into Central Asia, bypassing Russia, Iran, and Chinese infrastructure. Abkhazia is solved through EU membership and political-economic restructuring, temporarily forgotten only to be enticed by a prosperous Georgia. Gvaramia is looking to Pashinyan because Pashinyan broke with older ruling norms in Armenia, and now is vying to become a more important transit route through relations with Azerbaijan, the US, and the EU—a transit route that could in the future make Georgia less important: the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). Gvaramia is seeing in Pashinyan how flexibility and a rejection of hawkish ethno-nationalist entrenched politics, which might have been a more strategic option in another time, is now an obstacle, and is seeking to emulate that for Georgia. This means being pragmatic about reducing the importance of certain political questions, i.e., Abkhazia, for the time being, to reap benefits in the future.

If Georgian Dream had said something similar about Abkhazia, there would have been tens of thousands of people in opposition protesting, saying Georgian Dream is giving Abkhazia away, further proof of Russian capture and betrayal of Georgia. But because he’s in opposition, there has been remarkably little engagement with his proposal—there were a few vocal outcries, but nothing compared to the outrage Georgia is accustomed to. The government channel posted Gvaramia’s quote about Abkhazia, and it also garnered little attention there.

What’s important to remember is that Nika Gvaramia is stuck in the early 1990s and early 2000s, when the West was riding high. He’s unable to see that, since then, many of the countries around Georgia have been making their own moves, while the EU/US/UK have experienced relative decline. He has updated some things tactically by watching Pashinyan, but he is still unable to update his understanding of the broader global seismic shifts taking place.

He is watching Russia lose influence in Armenia, and he seems certain that the end is near for Russia. But he is unable to see the shocks that Western hegemony is also facing. He is unable to fully account for China’s rise or take stock of Turkey’s increasing strategic autonomy. He is essentially all-in on the idea that the US/EU/UK will successfully defeat the challenges to their hegemony.

Georgian Dream, by contrast, is hedging its bets. They don’t seem to be certain about when or how the current reshuffling of global power will resolve itself, or who will ultimately emerge as the winners. Their approach is to preserve room for maneuver until the balance of power becomes clearer.

More importantly, neither side has a serious plan for industrial policy, labor protections, economic development, social policy, or social cohesion. The opposition’s underlying assumption seems to be that EU membership itself will provide these things, that membership will substitute for having a domestic development strategy.

The idea that Georgia will be indispensable when the EU and everyone else is trying to create routes where every country is dispensable—he doesn’t seem to grasp this. His harping on Georgia’s “Europeanness” over Turkey’s “non-Europeanness” is outdated. He believes if Georgia is in the EU, then the “port will be in EU territory” and therefore there is more incentive for the EU/US to build it and protect it. He thinks Europeanness is a way to distinguish Georgia from Turkey, since that’s the only competitive advantage he can think of for why the EU would accept Georgia but not Turkey. Gvaramia is far too concentrated on identity politics; he is unable to grasp that Turkey doesn’t need to perform Europeanness—they are a pole in themselves and are too big and important not to be taken into consideration. Erdoğan recently said to Al Jazeera: “Europe has not accepted Turkey in its ranks for 53 years and is not thinking of accepting it in the coming period either. The EU is not a priority for us. We keep telling the EU, you are the ones who will lose, not Turkey.”

Gvaramia, in October 2025, enraptured by Pashinyan, declared similar ideas about Abkhazia being reintegrated into Georgia if Georgia becomes EU territory. He comically said there will be permanent peace because “American troops will be stationed 500 meters from Tbilisi and there will be an American interest, which by its nature excludes the development of any armed conflict in its vicinity.” This was before the US started a war with Iran and Iran retaliated against countries with US bases. Literally not having US bases is what would make the Middle Corridor safer and more viable—but Gvaramia is stuck in the 1990s/early 2000s.

Last weekend, I was a guest speaker at the Scoil Chois Claí 2026 in Ireland, organized by Trademark Belfast, specifically on the island of Árainn Mhór. Scoil Chois Claí is Irish for “hedge school,” a term derived from the hedge schools founded along hedges during the British colonial period, where Irish communities provided their own education. In the school’s own words, which I love:

The schools offered instruction through Irish in Maths, Philosophy, Latin, and Greek. Robert Peel, the British Prime Minister, said: “I do not wish to see children in Ireland educated like…the young peasants of Kerry who run about in rags with Cicero or Virgil under their arms.”

The last speaker explained the hedge schools and the importance of the Irish language—more on that towards the end of the post!

I flew into Belfast, and a very sweet driver, Terry, the brother of one of the organizers, picked me up and two other speakers. We drove for hours and stopped in Derry to eat and look around a bit for the history. We found this cottage-like, Grandma-kitchenesque cafe, where I took this chance to eat my favorite thing ever: Irish scones. Stuffed with raisins, warm and buttery, topped with more butter and jam. My only regret is that I didn’t eat more than one. The car ride was wonderful because I got to chat about Latin America, specifically the FARC and other left-wing guerrilla peace processes in Colombia, with Mariela Kohon. The Irish also participated in that peace process as advisors; the Colombian 2016 Peace Agreement was modelled after the Good Friday Agreement. Throughout this conversation, I realized how much I had not kept up with Latin American events, something I thought I knew — my education needed updating. Mariela was telling me how Cuba has paid such a high price for solidarity with others. I didn’t even know that Cuba was put on the State Sponsor of Terrorism list by the US (the last time they were put on) because they had hosted the peace process between the guerrillas and the Colombian government. In 2021, before leaving office, Trump and Pompeo redesignated Cuba as a state sponsor of terror when it refused to extradite guerrillas of the National Liberation Army (ELN), now wanted by the Colombian government for a 2019 attack, since the ELN were negotiators. Colombia had signed a protocol stating that ELN negotiators would be guaranteed safe return to Colombia during the peace process, and then tried to undermine it with the US. Norway was also a co-guarantor and agreed with Cuba not to undermine the peace process. It’s no surprise Norway was not listed as a state sponsor, but Cuba was. Cuba refused to betray the Colombian peace process to save itself and was punished.

Gustavo Petro, who was elected in Colombia in 2022, has demanded that Cuba be removed from the state-terror list. While Obama had removed Cuba in 2015, Trump put it back on. Biden and Blinken could have undone it but chose not to, despite the demand from President Petro.

It’s hard to swallow so much injustice towards Cuba, especially how much they’ve been punished for their solidarity. The images of their doctors who have served the poorest and most remote people being thrown out by cowardly governments this year stay fresh in my mind. The fact that they only have power now, after months of blackouts, because an oil delivery was made by a Russian oil tanker. It pales in comparison to the support the Soviet Union used to give Cuba. Francisco Dominguez on the Latin American panel, mentioned how, for example, in 1984, while sugar cost 7 cents per pound, the Soviets were paying 40 cents per pound in solidarity with Cuba. Some figures I pulled up beyond that: in 1982, the world price was 5.48 cents per lb, and the USSR paid 47 cents per lb. It insulated Cuba from market volatility. This sugar was for exchange in oil, purchased at below-market rates.

Francisco also had great stories he told throughout the weekend. He is a Chilean who fled to the UK decades ago during the fascist Pinochet coup and is now the head of the Venezuela Solidarity Campaign in the UK, as well as the head of the research group on Latin America at Middlesex University. One of my favourite stories he told, which I made him tell me twice, was when Fidel was visiting Chile in the 1970s, and he was supposed to stay for a few days but ended up staying for weeks, going all over Chile, meeting with everyone. During a huge rally where tens of thousands of people had gathered in Santiago, he said (what I remember): “At a certain point in any revolutionary process, fascists and revolutionaries fight to win the support of the middle layers of the population. How do you think the battle over the middle layers is going in Chile?” and the crowds go crazy, applauding affirmatively. Castro says, “Allow me to disagree with the masses.” I start cracking up hysterically at this point, Castro’s charm, even when he’s disagreeable, and Francisco’s rendition. “The battle for the petty bourgeois is not going well.” The next day, all the bourgeois press say “Fidel calls for winning over the middle class.” Francisco and I also discussed the friendship between Gabriel García Márquez and Fidel Castro. Francisco asks me if I have read the description of Fidel by Márquez. I don’t recall it, but I must’ve read it before. Francisco likes the last part, which reveals how Castro was so human and vulnerable as well as being great. Márquez writes:

On seeing him very overburdened with the weight of so many distant destinies, I asked him what it was that he most wished to do in this world, and he immediately answered me: “Stand on a corner.”

We did arrive on the island via ferry after the drive. The ferry ride added to the sense of adventure and importance. The smell of the sea and the wind blowing, surrounded by different-sized land masses in the water, I tied my scarf around my head to block out the wind and meditated on the beauty and how lucky I was to be there. While we were being driven to the hotel, our generous host at the school told us this was the highest density of Irish speakers in Ireland, over 70%. This island hosts Irish language schools to re-learn Irish. Learning Irish is now very popular. A few hours after we settled in our little hotel with the friendliest woman — in Ireland, I have yet to meet anyone who’s not the friendliest person in the world — we arrived at the school venue.

The room was decked out in two huge Cuban flags behind the stage and one giant Palestinian flag across the entire room. There were also Irish Republic flags and the Starry Plough. The school opened with the Cuban ambassador giving a speech; it is the 100th anniversary of Fidel Castro this year. August 13 is his birthday, and there will be a huge celebration in Cuba - god willing. The ambassador was a very jovial man who came to the island with his family. It was followed by the crew from the United States, from Cooperation Jackson, Community Movement Builders in Atlanta (got a reunion with Atlanta where I used to live), and Native Roots Network in California. Most of these groups do a lot of back-to-the-land politics, carving up physical spaces in the US and building networks. They all stressed that without a larger political orientation, only focusing on farming and “liberation” of land was not enough. I was there at the beginning of Cooperation Jackson when it was starting, before I had left the US, and to see how large they have grown is quite remarkable. Unfortunately, the man behind the project and also my mentor, Kali Akuno, was unable to attend due to health problems. He had to raise funds via crowdfunding because the US has such an atrocious healthcare system.

I would start my next two days with a “fry,” which is what they call an Irish breakfast filled with sausages, ham, blood pudding, eggs, large potato taters, and toast. The fry, scones, fish and chips, and later I had seafood chowder —since it’s rare for me to eat these since we don’t have them in Georgia (for the most part), I was savoring every moment.

I kicked off the second day by making my greetings in Irish; I was so nervous about pronunciation. The stalwart organizer Stiofán Ó Nualláin recorded the sentences, but I also decided to find an online portal and hear others pronounce it. Much to my despair, apparently, there are competing pronunciations according to region. Then I started panicking: well, which region of Irish do the people in the audience understand? The pronunciation of the island region is very different. I asked someone at breakfast for “good morning” and then depended on the recording to cobble together the next sentence. Thankfully, a lot of the sounds are in Georgian. I’ve been studying Chinese for the last seven months, and I thought the least I could do was say a few words in Irish for Irish people who have been dispossessed of their language and value it so much! Everyone was very encouraging about my Irish.

I discussed how the anti-communist memory regime in the EU shapes the possibilities available to us and delineates our struggles within liberal democracy. How the rejection of the USSR entirely leaves the left incoherent and vulnerable and normalizes fascism. I’ll have a larger paper on this soon, so everyone can read it!

Then there was the Latin American panel. Francisco said that the US sanctions against Venezuela had killed 40,000 people in 2017 alone. For reference, Pinochet assassinated 5,000 people. The military junta in Argentina killed 32,000 and so on. The US killed more people than the right-wing military dictatorships in a couple of years. He talked about the pink tide that was initiated by Hugo Chávez in Latin America in the early 2000s and has lifted over 100 million people out of poverty. I kept thinking how the US government had killed over 4.5 million and displaced 38 million people in the Middle East since the War on Terror, which started around the time of the Pink Tide. It blows my mind how the US is the good guy in the mainstream world view, and Venezuela was the poster child for a “failed” state and dictatorship for decades.

Venezuela was self-sufficient in food by 2021, when it used to import 70% of its food before. In 2019-2020, Venezuela had dire inflation, but by 2021, it was down to single digits. The US is waging a war on multipolarity - wants Venezuela obedient to US interests. Venezuela’s demands are 1) safe return of Maduro, 2) lift sanctions, and 3) remove the naval fleet. Francisco also talked about how in January 2026, the US bombed four cities, assassinated guards, and killed Cubans as well. They have no case against Maduro. Barry Pollock, who was Julian Assange’s lawyer, is representing Maduro. Delcy Rodríguez was unanimously endorsed internally. The US threatened a second strike, the worst possible scenario, which would hit oil production. The government is buying time and is trying to maintain control over oil.

Mariela spoke about the Monroe Doctrine, which was against Europe, but the new one is against China. In Colombia, over 6,000 activists were assassinated for decades. In Colombia, calling for peace was seen as supporting terrorism. The peace process created space to organize. It was also part of the feminist peace process, where Black and Indigenous people took part, affirming their place since they have been discriminated against. In 2018, the far-right government tried to stop the peace process and sabotage it. But the peace process opened up space and brought the first progressive government to Colombia in hundreds of years. Don’t forget how Colombia was the center of counter-insurgency and paramilitary violence for the US. Those trained at the School of the Americas in the state of Georgia, USA (where I also used to go, which always landed around my birthday), and protested when I lived in Atlanta. The truth commission, which operated from 2018 to 2022 as part of the peace process, acknowledged that 9.5 million people were affected over the decades. 8 million people were displaced. 450,000 people were killed, 80% civilians. 121,000 people were disappeared. For example, random civilians were baited with job offers or something else, then taken out and murdered, put into uniforms, and then the paramilitaries would claim a reward for killing “leftist militants.” Colombia was a frontline for violence, but now peace has become a domestic and also an international policy for Colombia. There might be criticism that it did not go far enough, but this is huge for Colombia in such a short amount of time.

Then we stayed for a workshop on Ireland’s industry and the period in the 1950s, which is often overlooked, with the attempt to industrialize and follow a different model that’s not so FDI-driven as Ireland is now. Paddy Bresnihan was great. The book is titled From the Bog to the Cloud: Dependency and Eco-Modernity in Ireland. I will get the PDF of the book and will report back once I read it. You can watch Paddy’s talk for the Ditch here. Then we went to see the Palestine talk down the road on this beautiful island. We got a report back on Palestinian resistance and also the court battles in the UK over the heinous attempts to criminalize Palestinian protests and label everything as antisemitism. There seems to be some decent progress being made on that front. Unfortunately, I did not take extensive notes on these sessions, which I regret now since my memory isn’t as great as I ALWAYS assume.

We returned to the auditorium, which ended with the Belfast Dabke group performing Dabke, opened by Mustafa Alsaidi, who told us about his father and brother being murdered by Israel, and then with the Irish, who learned Dabke as a form of solidarity with Palestinians, performed in front of the Cuban flags. We all got very emotional. Writing about it now brings tears again. I thought of the British comedy skit I saw once, how the Brits characterize the Irish as “trying to save everyone,” and it felt that way in the best possible way. Their solidarity is awe-inspiring.

One of the participants kindly offered a few of us to go see the lighthouse on the island. It was gorgeous. There were cliffs everywhere with a very anxious ocean beating the rocks with waves after waves. In my mind, I have always imagined Ireland to be like this, with beautiful cliffs and lighthouses. The five of us who went took photos, bonded, and hiked around. We even jumped a fence to exit the lighthouse property, which apparently is also now an Airbnb.

We got back and then walked down to the beach and passed a sauna. After you dive into the cold ocean, you can warm yourself up in the sauna. Some of the participants had done the plunge. I might have done it if I had known earlier. We walked to the outdoor amphitheater, where we got some of the history of the island. Unfortunately, I missed a lot of it and was shaking from how cold it was, though every Irish person was reassuring me that this is the best it gets, this is the height of summer. I wore a winter coat, and they were wearing shorts and short-sleeved shirts. The weather was a huge topic since everyone commented on how wonderful the weather was. It was sunny and cool with little wind; it was an average day in spring in Georgia, but it’s clear this is considered great there. Many of us from warmer climates laughed. The only thing I remember is how the island was forced to depopulate after being sold, and many of the Irish went to Michigan, where the last Irish speaker from Árainn Mhór died in the 1970s.

Hanging out on the second night at this pub by the seashore. It’s dark and moody inside, with lots of happy people drinking, contrasted with this view of the beach framed by the windows, completely lit up by the late setting sun. Young musicians played Irish music for us. One guy at a nearby table, people who wasn’t with out school, felt moved and took out his box accoridan to play with them. I went outside to hang out with the real ones who thought it was great weather. It was 9 pm and bright outside. I was freezing, so I mostly listened at first. Of course, there were jokes after jokes between all of them. Many would come up with all sincerity and earnestness, wanting to learn about Georgia, and I was happy to oblige.

I also learned that the pejorative “Tories” came from the island of Tory, which meant a lawless person in Ireland. It became common usage and was then adopted towards the Tories. It comes from the Irish word tóraidhe (modern Irish tóraí). Tory Island was close to our island, Árainn Mhór. Then, one of the people from Donegal was sharing how the Irish islanders have a certain mentality. A “king” was chosen by elections on Tory Island, who died in 2018—yes, they elected a king. Then he told us how a child from the island had once written an essay in school saying, “Ireland is the island of Tory.” We all burst out laughing.

The third day, Max Ajl opened the morning session and ended our school day with anti-imperialist ecology. He differentiated the Global South and Global North roles, including the kinds of activism for each. “Northern Face Struggle” versus the “Southern Face Struggle.” The southern struggle for national liberation is about: political sovereignty, exit from monopoly control, sovereign planning, and agrarian reform. The northern face of this struggle involves the decommodification of necessary services, improvements in quality, and ecological lighting across sectors such as health, infrastructure, consumer goods, agriculture, and energy. It also includes anti-imperialism, demilitarization, and climate debt.

He was followed by Ciaran Mac Giolla Bhéin from Conradh na Gaeilge, who spoke about the Irish language revival and its connection to progressive, often revolutionary politics. He was kind enough to give me his speech in written form so I could understand better (I have a hard time following all the Irish accents :)))

Main points are listed here:

- In the middle of the 19th century, Irish was the 14th most spoken language in Europe with over 5 million speakers. By the end of the 19th century, it was devastated by mass migration, starvation, and colonialism.

- The first revival of the Irish language was at the turn of the 20th century. The second revival was in the middle of the 20th century. The Irish built their own schools, constructed houses, and built community and social networks through the language.

- The Northern state rolled back a lot of the limited progress on Irish. The language was viewed as “anti-British counter-culture dominated by Republican separatists.” Elected officials were imprisoned for speaking Irish in chambers, activists were arrested for erecting Irish language signs, and Irish was removed from the school curriculum.

- The Irish language revival could not exist in isolation without efforts to rebuild all the destruction around them.

- The hedge schools—like the one we had now—were set up to spread education by the community.

- The schools that began with only 9 pupils had grown to 20,000 in 50 years, and they demanded that Belfast City Hall enact the Irish Language Act.

“Many of these campaigns and activists consciously located the question of rights for Irish speakers and the revival of Irish in general not within a narrow, constraining cultural prism but as part of a broader decoloniality and liberatory agenda, as something that had the potential to go beyond the task of reviving a language but looked at reviving a nation and liberating people through what Paulo Freire described as how ‘knowledge of an alienated culture and the oppressive reality in which it originates is exposed’ leading to transforming action,” Ciaran’s own words

While Thatcher said, “There is no society,” the Irish in the North have demonstrated at every turn that there is a society.

The Irish language and the communities built around it are in an upsurge today, while many other institutions on the left are in freefall. Ciaran said, “In the Irish context, the language has been the agent for permanent revolution: against British colonialism, against southern neo-colonialism, against partition, against post-conflict voices prioritizing accommodation over change.”

I was thinking how language for Georgians is so important for us. Georgian language was also part of the revolutionary process at the turn of the 20th century. The few schools that did exist under the Russian Empire would constantly demote Georgian language or take it out of the school curriculum. The resistance to Georgian language and history being attacked was always a source of strikes and protests at the Spiritual Seminary in Tbilisi, where most revolutionaries came from. Georgia has been conquered by empire after empire over thousands of years, but when it comes to cruelty toward a language, none matched what the British did to Irish.

Then we all said our goodbyes. I was driven to Belfast by another lovely organizer of the event, a young new member, Naoise. I later found out went to school with Kneecap. He is part of the new young Republican socialist Irish generation! We talked a lot about the recent debates on Western Marxism and left academics. I also met a young Polish guy who rode back with us; he was a socialist living in London. He and I talked a lot about memory politics and Eastern Europe. He told me his parents had favorable views on socialism, and currently, his mother worked in a factory near their house in Poland under horrible working conditions. Another person I spent some time getting to know was arrested just for holding a sign in London during a protest outside the court against Palestine Action. I had also met a local Irish politician who was incredibly funny with self-deprecating humor. He made it his mission to keep me entertained whenever I looked like I was dozing off. I wished I had more time to speak with everyone longer!

I was unable to tour Belfast with a walking tour or black cab tours, but I did make it to the James Connolly Center and did a tour. It’s rich in detail, and then I looked through his book on socialism and nationalism at the library. Definitely need to finish reading that.

I walked to Milltown Cemetery to visit Bobby Sands’ grave. When I saw the entire Republican section of the cemetery and read the signs for Socialist Ireland and all the children—16- to 19-year-old martyrs of Ireland—next to the grave of Bobby, I started crying. I couldn’t stop. Thankfully, no one was around. I kicked myself for not bringing flowers! I left a rolled cigarette for Bobby Sands and left. I remember him smoking a lot in the film Hunger when he talks to the priest. I walked around Falls Road a bit, looking at murals. I ate some seafood chowder, which was perfection, complete with black bread, which was even better than the Slavic black breads I usually love and eat.

The next day, I made my insane journey back to Georgia, which required three planes to get back, flying all night. It was a small price to pay to be able to go to Ireland. I came back with a long reading list and new friends. I have attended many conferences, and most never really moved me that much, but I was so impressed with the level of organization of this conference, and how all the panels were just excellent and complemented each other. The gorgeous setting was indispensable. Most of all, I think attracting the kindest and most energetic people from Ireland to attend also really makes it so nourishing.1

Socialist schools or conferences should be like this: the people, the land, the food, the weather, the culture, the pastimes, the traditions, the history of resistance, the humor, solidarity with others, the wide-ranging speakers, the language, and the politics. All of these things reinforce each other to make for a multi-sensory, complex, multi-dimensional experience.

Wonderful way to honor and continue traditional Irish hedge schools!

Go raibh maith agaibh!

To a socialist Ireland!

As promised, I am translating a short, incisive book on the Middle East by the Soviet Georgian political scientist Abon Tsistiashvili. It examines two contrasting approaches to conflict resolution in the region. What compelled me to share this work is its sharp critique of U.S. imperialism and Israel, while offering an alternative path (proposed by the Soviets) to resolving the conflict. This analysis—and the alternative approach it presents—remains highly relevant today.

This is the fourth installment - chapter three. Tsistiashvili argues the June 1967 war was not a spontaneous eruption but the culmination of years of Israeli expansionism backed by the U.S.

I’ll be posting each chapter as I complete the translation on my Substack. If you’d like to support this effort, consider becoming a paid subscriber! Your backing helps me dedicate more time to bringing overlooked Soviet Georgian books to you in English.

Note on the translation: Wherever you see “A. TS.” in the text, it refers to the author himself, Abon Tsistiashvili. I have translated the works cited in the footnotes, while also leaving the original Georgian or Russian citations, since many of the books and journals referenced are not available in English.

Chapter Three: Boomerang of Aggression

Unrealized goals. The aggression launched against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan on June 5, 1967, was a logical continuation of the constant growth of the expansionism of the Israeli ruling class, a direct result of the country’s dependence on imperialism, primarily American imperialism. Israel launched the war against the Arab countries unexpectedly. It was short-lived, almost lightning-fast. However, the so-called “Six-Day War” was prepared in advance for several years, not only by Tel Aviv. It was planned in close coordination with Washington. The United States provided it morally and materially.

True, the main goal of Washington and Tel Aviv—the overthrow of the progressive regime in the region—remained unattainable. The aggressors and their patrons failed to achieve one strategic objective they had set for themselves: to sever the friendly ties between the Arab countries and the Soviet state. However, Israel did capture the territories of three Arab countries in the Six‑Day War (June 5–11, 1967), namely: the entire Sinai Peninsula (56,000 sq. km), the West Bank of the Jordan River (5,500 sq. km), the Gaza Strip (258 sq. km), the Golan Heights (approximately 1,000 sq. km), and the eastern part of Jerusalem—a total of over 60,000 sq. km. In doing so, Israel completed the occupation of all the territory that had been allocated for the creation of an Arab state by a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. The Palestinian Arab people were deprived of their homeland; they were left displaced and uprooted.1

Here, it is necessary to consider the key factors that contributed to the temporary success of Israeli aggression.

1. The plans for attacking the Arab countries were built on the use of surprise and a lightning strike. From a military‑strategic standpoint, the aggressor’s advantage in a “blitzkrieg” becomes obvious when we consider that Cairo and Damascus are 400 and 200 kilometers from Tel Aviv, respectively—that is, a 20‑minute and 10‑minute flight for modern aircraft—while the distance from Tel Aviv to Jordan’s western border is a mere 17 kilometers. From this, it is clear that in Middle Eastern conditions, the attacking side gains clear advantages of a strategic nature.

The order to attack Egypt was given on June 5 at six o’clock in the morning Greenwich time. According to The Jerusalem Post, the military operations unfolded as follows:

“At about eight o’clock on Monday morning, June 5, the Israeli Air Force was ready to take off. Virtually every Israeli aircraft capable of flying and carrying bombs and machine guns took to the air that morning. Within a few hours, Israel was able to report the destruction of 400 Egyptian aircraft. On the ground, every Egyptian aircraft was burned. The destruction of most of the Jordanian and Syrian air forces occurred within a short time. In the words of the French newspaper Le Figaro, after Israel succeeded in putting the enemy’s air force out of action, it proceeded to the second phase—the ground offensive, using the advantage of surprise attack. The army in Sinai was left virtually without air cover. This proved fatal for Egypt’s tanks, which were maneuvering in the desert and were under constant aerial attack. After Egypt, Israel’s entire military machine turned against Jordan, and then against Syria. The assumption that these countries (Egypt, Jordan, and Syria) could be separated and made to face the full military might of the aggressor in isolation from one another was justified solely by the strategy of the blitzkrieg.”2

2. According to the Israeli press, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan—with a combined population of 47 million—had armed forces numbering 210,000, 65,000, and 50,000 respectively, while Israel, with a population of just 2.7 million, fielded a mobilized army of nearly 300,000 men ready for combat.3

3. Israel waged the war with completely unjustified brutality, employing, for instance, napalm against the Egyptian army, which, deprived of air support and protection and with virtually no natural shelter in the desert, was left extremely vulnerable.

4. Arab communists who later analyzed the reasons for the defeat in the June 1967 war noted that the Egyptian armed forces, in particular, possessed first-class, modern military equipment that could have been used effectively to counter Israeli aggression. But this did not happen. Why? Because the weapons were used ineptly, the military leadership was poor, and there were suspicious and treacherous elements at work.4

In this regard, it is worth noting the group of generals and senior officers who had gathered around the Vice-President of Egypt, Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer. They opposed the progressive socio-economic transformations carried out by Nasser. The goals of the revolution were alien to them, and consequently, they could not serve as staunch defenders of it. The English writer James Aldridge, who possessed a deep knowledge of Egyptian reality, accurately observed that:

“A large group of right-wing officers led by Amer wanted to use Egypt’s defeat in the war to overthrow Nasser, seize the idea of the Arab revolution, and fundamentally change Egypt’s foreign policy to reconcile with the United States.”5

It was they who represented the potential “fifth column” in Egypt that the aggressors and their imperialist patrons were counting on.

One particular detail is interesting. Two weeks before the start of the Israeli aggression, President Nasser visited a military airfield. The following day, all the Cairo newspapers published accounts of the president’s conversation with the pilots. In the accompanying photographs, many of the pilots were pictured in their flight suits, holding their helmets. Eyewitnesses note that every fifteen minutes, a pilot would rise and excuse himself to take his shift in the air. Yet on the morning of June 5, when the Israeli attack began, there was absolutely no one on duty at the airfield.6

It was no coincidence that the Egyptian army could not adequately resist the aggressor and left a large number of first-class combat vehicles operational on the battlefield. In total, the Israeli army captured or destroyed 800 Egyptian tanks, 300 of which were either fully or partially operational. It was precisely the fault of the aforementioned right-wing officers that several Egyptian strongholds were abandoned to the enemy without offering any resistance. It is also no coincidence that Israel captured 21 Egyptian generals and more than three thousand officers on the Sinai Peninsula. Compounding these failures was a complete lack of coordination between the Arab armies.

In contrast, Israel possessed a well-functioning military machine. The Arab states’ underestimation of Israel’s capabilities also played to the aggressor’s advantage.

5. The material basis for Israel’s June 1967 aggression was the enormous financial, economic, and military assistance provided by the United States. It is not surprising, therefore, that before launching the aggression, Israel was able to assemble a well-armed and trained army of 300,000 men. Crucially, Tel Aviv was confident in Washington’s benevolent attitude toward Israel’s expansionist aspirations. The Israeli government, writes the noted American historian and Arabist Desmond Stewart, knew that when Israel launched its aggression, it

“would find support in Washington circles if the war went well, and if things went badly at the front, there was a guarantee that in conditions of extreme danger the American M-6 military fleet would come to its aid.”

It is also known that some time before the start of the June War, about a thousand American volunteers with various military specialties arrived in Israel, two hundred of whom took direct part in military operations against the Arab countries.7

A few days before the start of the war, Washington made a direct demonstration of military power aimed at Egypt. On June 3, the American aircraft carrier Intrepid passed through the Suez Canal, and the Sixth Fleet was put on combat alert.

On the pages of the Zionist magazine Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, Packard, who served as Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Nixon administration, articulated a new credo:

“We must give or sell them (the Israelis—A.TS.) the weapons necessary to enable them to carry the great burden that we have imposed on them.”8

What this “burden” entailed and how the Zionists “worked it” were later revealed by M. Begin, the leader of the Likud bloc, in an interview with the American television network ABC on May 22, 1977.

“For six years (referring to the period from 1967 to 1973—A.TS.), when our country occupied positions on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, we helped your country a little, saving you from new losses of personnel in the armed forces. At that time, you were participating in the Vietnam War, and we forced the Soviet Union to send its ships loaded with weapons and ammunition to the Gulf of Tonkin via the Cape of Good Hope—the longest sea route possible—thereby increasing delivery times by a full 16 days. And so it continued for six years. You can calculate how much weaponry and military equipment was kept out of the enemy’s hands.”

In other words, the Israeli aggression of 1967, which closed the Suez Canal for six years, was also, in effect, an aggression against Vietnam—carried out in the service of Tel Aviv’s overseas protectors.

Six months after the end of the war, the Israeli newspaper Ma’ariv wrote:

“It has become clear to the United States that it has no better and more loyal partner than Israel.”

The role of Israel was fully appreciated in America. The American weekly U.S. News and World Report commented on this in September 1967:

“Israel has taken on the role of the United States in the Middle East.”9

Yet the goals and objectives of Israel and its imperialist patrons were not fully realized. They failed in their attempt to overthrow the progressive regimes in Egypt and Syria.

Supporting a Friend. Immediately after the outbreak of the armed conflict against the Arab states, the Soviet Union adopted a principled and consistent stance against Israeli aggression. It decisively defended the sovereign rights of the Arab peoples who had been subjected to Israeli attack. Together with the Soviet Union, six socialist countries severed diplomatic relations with Israel. The “Statement of the Communist and Workers’ Parties and Governments of the Socialist Countries” of June 9, 1967, contained a direct warning that “In the event of continued Israeli aggression, extreme measures would be taken.”10 Furthermore, the resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU of June 21, 1967, “On the Policy of the Soviet Union in Relation to Israeli Aggression in the Middle East,” provided a political assessment of the conflict. It emphasized that “Israeli aggression is the result of a conspiracy of the most reactionary forces of international imperialism, primarily the United States,” and constitutes “another link in the common chain of policies of the belligerent imperialist circles”11 seeking to hinder historical progress.

The Soviet government succeeded in securing a ceasefire decision by the United Nations Security Council. On November 22, 1967, the Security Council adopted Resolution No. 242. Despite the vagueness of a number of the resolution’s formulations, its cornerstone remains the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories.12

Regarding the stance of the Soviet Union, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser later said:

“When we remember the friends who stood by us during the dark days of our trials and tribulations in 1967, we say that the first such friend, the most precious to us and the most worthy of our boundless gratitude, was the Soviet Union. On June 11, 1967, I received a letter from the leaders of the Soviet Union, which stated that we should not lose hope, that the Soviet Union would help us in every way, supply us with free weapons, and compensate us for what we lost in the battles in Sinai. This assistance became the cornerstone of the restoration of our armed forces.”13

Ultimately, something occurred in the Arab countries that was not only absent from the West’s plans but, on the contrary, directly contradicted them: the standing of the Soviet Union in the Arab East was strengthened, while the prestige and influence of the imperialist countries, primarily the United States, declined. Many Arab states severed diplomatic relations with the United States and Britain.14 The oil-exporting Arab countries temporarily halted oil supplies to the United States, Britain, and certain other Western countries that supported Israel.

From the very beginning of the crisis, the United States effectively supported Israel’s occupation of Arab lands and took no steps to accelerate the withdrawal of its troops. Washington’s strategy was, on the one hand, to continue exerting military pressure on Arab countries through Israel, and on the other, to exploit the Arab peoples’ desire for peace for its own selfish purposes. Resorting to blackmail through war while speculating on peace—such was the consistent approach of American diplomacy. At the same time, efforts were made to convince Nasser of the possibility of achieving a separate “peace” with Israel through American mediation. But the Egyptian leader resolutely rejected it.

“The problem of eliminating the consequences of Israeli aggression cannot be reduced to the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Sinai alone.”

Nasser declared on April 25, 1968, to the applause of students, teachers, and other representatives of the Egyptian intelligentsia gathered in the largest hall of Cairo University.

“If that were the only issue, the result could be achieved tomorrow through concessions... But here the issue concerns our fate, the fate of all Arabs. The liberation of Sinai would require the acceptance of American-Israeli conditions, the surrender of Jerusalem, the West Bank of Jordan, and other Arab territories to Israel. Eliminating the consequences of aggression is much greater than the liberation of Sinai.”

After a burst of applause, Nasser continued:

“The issue is this: Will we remain an independent, sovereign state, or will we find ourselves in a sphere of influence? Are we prepared to give up our freedom? Our achievements?”

“Never! Never!” cried voices from the hall. “We will never agree to sit down with Israel at the negotiating table to solve the problems that Washington and Tel Aviv want.” 15

While imperialist circles employed political, economic, and military methods to exert influence on the Arabs, the Soviet Union provided comprehensive assistance to the Arab countries to help them withstand and repel the military provocations of Israel and the imperialists behind it. Suffice it to say that by the beginning of 1972, 137 industrial facilities had been built and were operating in Egypt with Soviet support. Through the development of cooperation, entirely new branches of industry were created—machine building, instrument making, and chemical and pharmaceutical production. The symbol of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation became the Aswan High Dam.

The immense significance of Soviet assistance to the Arabs was clearly demonstrated during the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973.

As early as April 1970, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir was forced to admit:

“Russia has compensated him (Gamal Abdel Nasser—A.TS.) for everything he lost in the war (of June 1967—A.TS.).”16

Mohamed Hassanein Heikal stated on May 21, 1971:

“The Soviet Union is the only source of our military strength. I declare frankly and directly that if it (the Soviet Union—A.TS.) were not there, we would have no choice but to accept the conditions of the victors.”17

The Soviet Union established air bridges with Egypt and Syria, swiftly replenishing their armies’ losses in armaments and providing them with everything necessary to fight the aggressor. The whole world witnessed that the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces, equipped with Soviet-made weapons, could successfully defend the vital interests of their peoples. It was thanks to Soviet weaponry that the Egyptian and Syrian armies dispelled the myth of the “invincibility” of the Israeli military machine during the October 1973 offensive.

Former Egyptian Prime Minister Aziz Sidqi acknowledged:

“The successes we achieved in October 1973 would not have been possible without Soviet weapons and Soviet support. I can confirm this, since I participated in the preparation of all the agreements concluded in this area and I know how eager the Soviet Union was to help.”18

The activities of Soviet military advisors, who worked in Egypt for several years, played a significant role in strengthening the Egyptian Armed Forces. Initially sent at the request of President G. Nasser, and later with the confirmation of President A. Sadat, the Soviet military advisors helped the Egyptian army master modern combat equipment. During the course of Soviet-Egyptian negotiations in October 1970, A. Sadat stated:

“Based on the desire and will of our people, the armed forces, the Arab Socialist Union, and the leadership of the government, I might even request an increase in this personnel.”19

Nevertheless, in July 1979, the same A. Sadat raised the issue of prematurely ending the Soviet military specialists’ mission in Egypt. This was a result of the shift in Egypt’s foreign policy orientation following the death of G. Nasser, and the activation of right-wing, pro-imperialist forces in Egypt and the Arab world in general. All of which suited Washington and Tel Aviv perfectly.

No slanderous accusations directed at Soviet military advisors, later made by the reactionary press organs of Egypt and several Arab countries, can diminish the significant and crucial role of Soviet military specialists in strengthening the Egyptian Armed Forces.

Referring to the fundamentally new role of the Soviet military advisors, M. Heikal wrote that the Soviet Union

“Became the first European country to send its military personnel to an African country not for its colonization and plunder, as every European country had done until recently, but in order to help this Afro-Asian country in its struggle against imperialism and colonialism.”

Heikal’s admission is also interesting because he belongs not only to the ranks of well-known Arab political figures who are well-versed in the matter, but also to a man who, by his own words, was never a communist and was not bound by any particular friendship with the Soviet Union.

The United States did not limit itself to merely providing material support for Israel’s aggression during the October 1973 war. The United States supplied Israel with $2.2 billion in emergency aid.20 It declared its strategic forces combat-ready as a threat against the Soviet Union, which was supporting the actions of the Arab states.

Particular emphasis should be placed on the fact that Soviet military assistance to Egypt, Syria, and other Arab countries was provided on the principles of full equality, without any interference in their internal affairs. Unlike the United States and other capitalist countries, the Soviet Union never used military or other aid as an instrument of political or economic pressure. After Israel’s 1967 aggression, military assistance to Egypt and Syria was multifaceted and highly effective. It served as an important complement to Soviet foreign‑policy measures in support of Egypt and Syria, and it thwarted Israel’s plans to perpetuate its military superiority over the Arabs. In this regard, it suffices to mention the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Egypt (May 1971), as well as the conclusion of a similar treaty between the Soviet Union and Iraq in April 1972. In later years, certain Egyptian figures portrayed the 1971 treaty as if it had been imposed on Egypt by the Soviet Union, despite the well‑known statement made by President Anwar Sadat in the Egyptian National Assembly on May 2, 1971:

“We wanted this treaty, and we signed it… I sought to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union for the sake of our future and the future of our generations… Our relations with the Soviet Union will always remain relations between two honest friends.”

The Surprises and Consequences of the October 1973 War.

The Israeli leadership’s course toward annexation of the Arab territories occupied in 1967, combined with its rejection of any form of constructive approach to resolving the Arab‑Israeli conflict, led to a new military explosion in October 1973. The beginning, course, and political consequences of the October War sharply distinguish it from all previous wars fought between Israel and the Arab countries.

Relying on the support of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the Arab states dispelled the myth of the “invincibility of the Israeli army” during the October 1973 War.

The course of the military operations in October 1973 unfolded differently from that of the 1967 war. The armed forces of Egypt and Syria delivered a series of serious blows to the aggressor, which suffered heavy losses in tanks, aircraft, and personnel. Specifically, Israel lost 900 tanks (40% of its total tank strength) and 250 combat aircraft (50% of its total aircraft strength).21 The following statistics are also revealing: during the 1965 war against Egypt, Israel lost 189 men killed over a few days, and had one pilot captured. During the 1967 Six‑Day War, Israel lost 973 men, while the Egyptians captured 14 Israeli prisoners. During the October 1973 military operations, according to official data, Israel lost 2,838 military personnel killed (of whom 25% were officers), 8,800 soldiers were wounded, and 500 soldiers and officers were captured.22

Even these official, reduced figures are quite high for a country of three million. By the admission of the American journalist James Reston, Israel’s human losses were expressed in the following ratio: one for every 494 inhabitants, whereas Egypt’s ratio was one for every 6,000 inhabitants.23 The total damage to Israel’s economy over the 18–29 days of the war was estimated at 17 billion dollars.

The Geneva Peace Conference. The Disengagement Agreement.

In the early 1970s, the Soviet Union actively utilized the context of détente to advance the cause of a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East crisis. As a political mechanism for achieving such a settlement, it envisaged the Geneva Peace Conference, which opened in December 1973 under the co‑chairmanship of the Soviet Union and the United States, with the participation of all interested parties. This was the first peace conference on the Middle East in the entire 25‑year period of the Arab‑Israeli military confrontation.24

At the conference, the Soviet Union put forward and defended a realistic, well‑founded program for ensuring a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

The significance of convening the Geneva Conference lay, above all, in the fact that it created a political mechanism of collective measures by all interested parties for the purpose of developing a comprehensive solution to the Middle East problems, with the key element of such a settlement being a clear and defined timeframe for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab countries occupied in 1967. It was also to ensure respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of all Middle Eastern states, and to defend the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

The period following the October 1973 conflict once again, and even more clearly, revealed the existence of two diametrically opposed approaches to resolving the Middle East problem: the first was the line of the United States, aimed at prolonging the normalization of the situation in the region, creating obstacles to a radical solution of the Middle East problem, replacing it with partial, separate agreements, thwarting the resolution of the Palestinian issue, removing the Soviet Union from participating in settling the Middle East crisis, and weakening its positions in the region; the second was the line of the Soviet Union, which envisaged a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict with the participation of all interested parties, including the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Of course, partial measures in themselves—such as the withdrawal of Israeli occupiers from one part or another of the occupied Arab territory and its return to the Arabs—are beneficial, but only if they represent a step toward a genuine peaceful settlement.

Precisely that goal was not served by the Israel‑Egypt agreements on the disengagement of forces in the Sinai Peninsula, brokered by the United States on January 18, 1974, and September 4, 1975.

An analysis of these agreements shows that they served, first and foremost, the interests of Israel and the United States. For example, Article 2 of the September 4, 1975, agreement required both sides to refrain from the use or threat of force and to avoid resorting to military blockade in their mutual relations. In reality, this signified that the signed agreement neutralized Egypt, cutting it off from further struggle for a just settlement of the Middle East problem. An agreement was reached on a new deployment of Egyptian and Israeli forces. Egypt undertook to allow non‑military cargo destined for or coming from Israel to pass through the Suez Canal. Israel returned to Egypt part of the occupied territory in the Sinai Peninsula, including the oil‑rich Abu Rudeis area, as well as two mountain passes—Mitla and Gidi.

The limited scale of Israel’s territorial “concessions” to Egypt can be judged by the fact that after the withdrawal of forces under the agreement, up to 90 percent of the Sinai Peninsula remained under Israeli occupation indefinitely.

As a result of the Sinai agreement, Egypt was neutralized, and Israel’s military pressure shifted to Syria and Jordan. This significantly altered the situation in the Middle East. Egypt had the largest army in the Middle East. Under the agreement, this army was unable to take part in military action against Israel. Consequently, Syria and Jordan remained Israel’s potential adversaries.

Thus, based on the analysis of the Sinai agreement, we can draw the following conclusions: it removed Egypt from military confrontation with Israel and pitted it against all other Arab countries; it strengthened the process of isolating Cairo and dismantling the Arab anti‑Israeli coalition. At the same time, it gave impetus to Sadat’s new separate deals. The agreement allowed Israeli cargo to be transported through the Suez Canal while Israel continues to occupy Arab territories, including 87 percent of the captured Sinai Peninsula, as well as the Golan Heights and part of Jerusalem. The agreement envisages renunciation of military means of resolving the issue, even though this is a fundamental legal right of peoples to liberate territories seized by an aggressor. The agreement has no time limit, it provides for the presence of Americans in Sinai, and finally, it does not even address the core problem of a Middle East settlement—the problem of the Palestinian Arab people.

Thus, the Sinai agreement was a new maneuver aimed at substituting a cardinal solution to the main issues of settling the Middle East conflict with partial, separate steps on a bilateral basis.

United States diplomacy never aimed to resolve the cardinal problems of settling the Middle East conflict. This became particularly evident during the course of Kissinger’s numerous “shuttle operations” in the Middle East. From October 1973 to September 1, 1975, he traveled to the Middle East 12 times. During this period, he visited Tel Aviv and Cairo more than 20 times. At that time, he directed the work of the State Department not so much from Washington as from his personal Boeing aircraft or from the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. The American Secretary of State spent many hours on negotiations over Middle East problems, but instead of resolving them fundamentally, he trapped these problems in the dead end of separate deals.

The course of events shows that peace in this region cannot and will not exist until the root causes of the Middle East conflict are eliminated: Israel’s occupation of Arab territories, the denial of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arab people, and the continuation of a state of war. Proceeding from this, the Soviet Union, on September 2, 1976, addressed all parties directly involved in the Middle East conflict and all participants in the Geneva Peace Conference with an appeal to resume its work. The Soviet Union proposed the following agenda for the conference:

1. The withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied in 1967;

2. The realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arab people, including the right to self‑determination and to establish their own state;

3. Ensuring the right to independent existence and security of all states directly involved in the conflict: the Arab states neighboring Israel, on the one hand, and the State of Israel, on the other, along with providing appropriate international guarantees for them;

4. The termination of the state of war between the respective Arab states and Israel.

Such an agenda covers all the key aspects of a Middle East settlement. It takes into account the legitimate rights and interests of all parties directly involved in the conflict—the Arab states, the Palestinian Arab people, and the State of Israel.

However, due to the hypocritical and duplicitous position taken by the United States, the Geneva Conference was unable even to begin discussing the tasks set before it.25

The true motives and reasons behind the US line regarding the Geneva Conference became clear later, when the facts emerged of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s abandonment of the course of cooperation with the Soviet Union—a course he had embarked upon after the death of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (September 28, 1970).

Yesterday, the Catholicos-Patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church died at the age of 93. He was in power since 1977, which was the beginning of the end of the USSR. He played a huge role in the transition period after the collapse of the USSR, and his influence has lasted this long. His almost 50-year leadership was a symbol of the decline of socialism and the ascension of capitalism—coinciding with the heyday of neoliberalism and neoconservatism.

It’s quite coincidental that both the Ayatollah Khamenei and the Patriarch died weeks apart. While the Ayatollah Khamenei was murdered and martyred a few weeks ago, Ilia died in a hospital. I was shocked to even find a photo of them together.

The post-Soviet condition for Georgia was defined by a certain set of assumptions, the end of history, and the triumph of liberalism. This included a single US superpower, the expansion of liberal institutions (EU, NATO), the belief in a rules-based order, and the idea that history was moving in a generally predictable direction. I have discussed this set of assumptions extensively and most recently here. One of the unravelings of the EU/NATO in Georgia has been their incredibly reckless foreign policy impositions on Georgia after the Russian invasion.

It’s also quite befitting and cosmic that yesterday Etienne Davignon, the only person still alive, who is 93 years old, was ruled to face trial for the murder of the Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba. As Al Jazeera notes, “If the trial goes ahead, Davignon would be the first Belgian official to face the courts in 65 years since the prime minister was killed and his body was dissolved in acid.” While this kind of justice seems like the antithesis of justice, which has been sought for 65 years, what’s important is that Etienne Davignon was the foundational architect of the EU’s common foreign policy and security.

The butcher of Congo and Lumumba is the architect of EU foreign policy. No wonder the EU has been a genocide cheerleader and a US lackey. This potential trial is now heavier with symbolism; the EU’s foreign policy is on trial.

While the death of Patriarch Ilia II symbolically closes the post-socialist chapter in Georgia. Georgia, which is filled with opposition forces who refuse to see eye-to-eye with the new reality. Those who want to go back to the old world of liberal institution building, working towards a “roadmap” to membership in the EU/NATO, vowing to be the best technocrats. Some of them, quite happy either in private or daring to voice it publicly at the death of the Patriarch, since the Church has most authority and trust in Georgia, and they side with the Georgian government, are unaware that their “condition,” the petri dish hospitable to liberalism, is dying.

Even if Moldova or Ukraine (most unconvincingly) plays the perfect protagonist to the perfect script of EU candidates, it’s hollowing out. It is on the decline, no matter how much the Georgian Euroatlantic opposition attempts to resuscitate it by repositioning Georgia as an Iranian hub and ally, trying to sell this narrative to the US so that America will add Georgia to its enemy list and impose sanctions to remove the current government.

Under Saakashvili, Georgia sent troops to Afghanistan and Iraq and hosted US torture black sites. Under Georgian Dream, the government is accused of being in cahoots with Iran. The Iranian Foreign Minister wished health to the Patriarch yesterday, while Georgian Dream sent condolences for the Ayatollah’s death and the death of schoolgirls. All the while, Georgia must balance their bigger ally, Israel, which never misses an opportunity to publicly criticize the government for the slightest diplomatic gesture toward Iran.

Ayatollah Khamenei’s martyrdom closes a chapter for Iran: the isolated, the sanctioned, the villain of “axis of evil” fantasies. The leadership, many martyred, have shown more bravery and vision than anyone else in the genocider clown shows of the US and Europe. Americans started the war on Iran with the bombing of schoolgirls. How fated is the US defeat when it starts the war by killing girls, when its soft propaganda on Iran has been about liberating women? There is something profound and moving about Iran’s leaders who come out publicly, walk the streets, and give interviews, knowing that they may all be dead men walking and their families. While you see Netanyahu and Trump as cowards in their little protected spaces, Trump, in his gaudy opulence, mostly orders the killing of women and children. I don’t think that kind of impression is easily wiped away from our memories, though the propaganda to make us forget is working overtime. The Iranian diaspora showing how vulgar, inhumane, and disturbing they are has also become crystal clear. A lot of these old narratives about Iran are being turned upside down.

Most importantly, Iran has started the decolonization of the Middle East. The machinery of US-Israeli domination worked like this: a country hosts military bases, those bases are used to destroy a neighboring country (and/or crush their own people’s opposition to the puppet government), that destroyed country then hosts new bases to take out the next target hostile to US and Israeli interests. This domino effect, set in motion by Anwar Sadat’s betrayal, brought nearly the entire Middle East under their control. Until now.

I have been surveying the last 2500 years of Georgia’s history these past two weeks, and what it gave me is confidence in time, in endurance. There is comfort in knowing that worse things lasted far longer, yet these empires, these cruelties, do have an end and will have an end. Every winter has its end.

Israel, the United States, and most of all the birth of both of these—savage European imperialism—will be on trial one way or another. They will face justice, and they will end. It’s hard to see it now, with just these light sketches of a changing world. There is also the potential for the re-establishment of US/EU hegemonies here and there, but the trajectory is on the decline. They will end. We have time. Historical and revolutionary confidence.

Here is my new article in Baffler, I’m only including an excerpt, read the rest on their site!

Baffler Article

The post-Cold War consensus is done. In the 2000s, Georgia was hailed as a “beacon” by the West, which was riding a wave of uncontested neoliberal and neoconservative power. The current has broken. Politically divided, inward-looking, and doubtful of the same “end of history” narrative it once exported, the West itself is now divided. A new Georgian government would be facing a weary, cynical West struggling with its own domestic issues and a growing multipolar world, rather than the self-assured, missionary West of Bush and Blair.

Today, the West must not just command but also compete. The Georgian opposition’s exclusive focus on Euro-Atlantic integration appears to be both tactically narrow-minded and nostalgic in light of this new reality. It disregards a wide range of possible business alliances, diplomacy, and new foreign policy like neutrality which could safeguard Georgia in these transitional and unstable times. Ultimately, Georgia’s opposition political class—and their Western enablers—is trapped in a nostalgic loop, stuck in the liberal triumphalism of the 1990s. For years, they have systematically vilified any deviation from full Western integration, successfully tarring calls for neutrality or even the word sovereigntyitself as coded language for a pro-Russian stance. They have weaponized a binary worldview to such an extent that they have now become the least equipped to adapt to a changed world. Their entire political identity is built on an idea that has outlived its moment.

Several months ago, my friend Salome Topuria completed her groundbreaking dissertation on (lack of) industrial policy in post-Soviet Georgia, titled “The Political Economy of Unevenness and Industrial Policy in the Post-Soviet Context: The Case of Georgia.” I shared the news here and on 𝕏 at the time.

Having been in China for the past few months—focusing on a semester of Chinese language study—my capacity to advance ongoing projects has been limited. Please be patient with me: )

Yet Salome’s work is too important to wait.

Her dissertation is monumental. It is the first rigorous materialist analysis of post-Soviet Georgian economics that thoroughly examines the role of the IMF and international financial institutions. Pioneering in its detail and scope it explains how wealth was accumulated, how a rentier capitalist class was formed, who was responsible, and traces the entire process with exceptional clarity.

I believe this is essential reading for anyone in Georgia, and for everyone who studies or writes about the country.

I’m proud to offer you Part I of this vital work.

Note: This is part one summary of her very long dissertation. Summaries are limited because they are summaries, hopefully she will release her dissertation soon so everyone can read it firsthand. The first 100 pages or so of the dissertation are about the research methods and theories used in the dissertation. I will skip those parts and focus on her findings. Blocked or pulled quotes are all straight from her dissertation.

Salome Topuria’s research analyzes the political economy of post-Soviet Georgia (1991-2022) to understand why transformative industrial policy was absent from its development programs. It employs a historical materialist framework, drawing on theories of uneven and combined development, to examine the interplay between global forces and domestic class formation. The study aims to demonstrate how this interplay constrained state policy, favoring a rentier economic model over industrial development, thereby reflecting deeper social realities and power structures.

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Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic Period

Salome briefly outlines the industrialization of Soviet Georgia, driven by state planning and electrification. It began in the 1920s with reviving old plants and building new light industries, but quickly shifted focus to heavy industry and technological upgrades despite domestic political opposition.

The First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932) accelerated this, making industrialization a Union-wide imperative for economic and military catch-up. This period saw rapid expansion, the virtual elimination of unemployment, and the development of strategic industrial clusters (e.g., around Chiatura manganese). World War II further boosted Georgia’s industrial role, with factories converting to war production and the establishment of key facilities like the Tbilisi Aircraft Factory.

Post-war industrialization deepened and diversified into automotive, electric locomotive, and shipbuilding sectors. This was supported by massive investment in vocational education, scientific research (e.g., the Georgian Academy of Sciences), and infrastructure like the Tbilisi Metro (1966).

By the late Soviet period, Georgia had a complex industrial landscape, ranked 8th among USSR republics, with a mix of heavy industry, specialized manufacturing, and a dominant food/light industry sector, all built on the foundation laid during the intensive industrialization drive from the 1920s onward. See footnote for list of industries.1

Georgia’s industrialization was built within the USSR’s vast central planning system, directed by Gosplan. This system managed an immense, integrated economy—coordinating the production, cost, and distribution of over 20 million products across all republics. While reforms like the sovnarkhoz in 1957 attempted some decentralization, the core structure created deep administrative and supply-chain linkages between Georgia and other Soviet republics. This chapter focuses on the administrative and fiscal organization of industrial enterprises within the Soviet system.

Soviet industry was administered through a system of three types of ministries: all-union, union-republic, and republic. All-union ministries in Moscow controlled strategic sectors like heavy industry and defense, while union-republic ministries (e.g., food, light manufacturing) had limited local autonomy. Republic ministries handled purely local matters. This structure meant that large, strategic plants in Georgia were on the all-union balance sheet, fiscally accountable to the central government, and deeply embedded in inter-republic supply chains—importing raw materials and exporting finished goods across the USSR.

Consequently, the vast majority of Georgian manufacturing was classified as all-union or union-republic, specializing in areas like machine-building. This made Georgia’s economy highly dependent on centralized planning and inter-republic trade. In contrast, the Baltic states developed more republic-level manufacturing, allowing them to retain more tax revenue locally and rely less on external inputs.

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon) was established in 1949 to foster economic cooperation and integration among socialist states. While the Soviet Union pursued a policy of general self-sufficiency, Comecon facilitated vital intra-bloc trade, aiding the industrialization of Central and Eastern Europe. The organization, however, reflected significant asymmetries, with more advanced members like Czechoslovakia and the GDR focusing on capital-intensive industries.

As a member, the Georgian SSR was integrated into these socialist trade and value chains, and it also engaged in limited trade beyond the bloc. A critical feature of this system was that foreign exchange earnings from Georgian exports were directed to the all-union budget, not retained locally.

The key point is that Georgia’s intensive industrialization was an integral part of a single, unified Soviet economic system, where planning, supply chains, and funding were centralized. This system functioned effectively as long as the USSR existed, with Georgian industries operating as specialized components within a larger whole. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union meant the catastrophic collapse of this very system itself—breaking the centralized planning apparatus, severing the intricate inter-republic supply and production links, and dissolving the fiscal and administrative structures that had directed and sustained all economic activity. The industry was not simply cut off from an external entity; the internal framework that constituted its operational reality ceased to exist.

Post-Soviet Free Fall

The dissolution of the USSR created a complex debt settlement issue for the former republics. The Soviet debt was managed by the G7 nations, which made new loans conditional on the republics first reaching an agreement to service the inherited Soviet debt.

A critical turning point was the “zero-option” agreement” in 1993. G7 advocated for one party to take responsibility for the debt. Russia agreed to take sole responsibility for servicing the entire Soviet debt. They would become the legal successor to the Soviet Union. In exchange, Russia claimed exclusive ownership of all Soviet overseas assets (like embassy buildings) and financial reserves (like gold and diamond funds).

The other former republics, including Georgia, accepted this agreement. In doing so, they were released from direct debt responsibility but forfeited their legal claims to shares of the Soviet Union’s external physical and financial assets. For Georgia, this meant losing its claim to 1.62% of all Soviet overseas property and reserves. According to the text, this translated to a total loss of roughly $13 billion, which included the lost value of citizen savings, pension deposits, and the foreign assets of Georgian industrial enterprises.

The text notes that while Georgian officials like Roman Gotsiridze blamed Russian reformers for this outcome, the role of the IMF and G7 in structuring these negotiations is presented as a significant, often overlooked, factor. Their insistence on a single debtor and the conditional linkage of debt settlement to new funding shaped the agreement that left Georgia and other republics materially dispossessed.

Both ideas to forgive the debt and give grants (and stabilization fund) instead of conditional loans were thrown out by G7, IMF and World Bank. Only post-war Bosnia and East Germany received financial backing meant to stabilize their economy.

Furthermore, policymakers and economists normally regarded persistent hyperinflation in the FSU as a direct consequence of former Soviet elites and (supposedly) their innate rent-seeking behaviors. Thus they proposed that reducing the size of the government and minimizing the state’s involvement in the economy would be an effective method for curbing inflation (Marangos, 2002).

The policies of rapid mass privatization, deregulation and marketization—a condition for receiving loans—implemented in an economy with no domestic savings or capital markets. The text highlights the unprecedented scale of this task with a key quote from Gevorkyan:

“in the UK it was estimated that roughly 20 large companies had been privatized over a ten year period and in Mexico there were 150 entities privatized in six years...Hungary had approximately 2,000, Poland anywhere from 7,500 to 8,400 enterprises, and Russia approximately 50,000 enterprises (and comparable numbers for others) that were to be privatized in a timeframe of a few short years”.

Salome argues that Georgia’s deindustrialization and the emergence of its oligarchic system were direct results of the Western-prescribed “Shock Therapy” and the conditionalities of international financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank. This directly challenges the mainstream discourse which labels oligarchical or neopatrimonial governance as a “Soviet artifact.” Georgia’s “voucher privatization” led citizens to sell their shares for immediate survival, facilitating a massive concentration of assets.

Unlike the Marshall Plan, which rebuilt Western Europe, the shock therapy agenda provided insufficient stabilization funds, denied meaningful debt relief, and made financial aid conditional on implementing these destructive reforms. The result was not a successful transition to a market economy, but a deliberate dismantling of the existing industrial base, which created profound “capitalist unevenness.” This process concentrated wealth, entrenched oligarchic power, and made economies like Georgia’s permanently dependent and deindustrialized, a direct outcome of the prescribed reforms rather than merely the Soviet Union’s collapse.

Georgia’s post-1989 economic, political, social, and geopolitical realities were shaped by the collapse of the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the US hegemony on the other hand. In terms of global economy, neoliberal regime of accumulation had been flagged triumphant, and institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank operated as its vanguards. They would persist pushing economic liberalization polices on Georgia, conditioning its economic development and policymaking space for many years to come. Suffice it to say that not only were these reforms ignorant of domestic historical-political contexts, or the excessive social costs the FSU societies had to bear, but they generated a prefect environment for the emergence of – what would later be dubbed as – oligarchs.

Zviad Gamsakhurdia

Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a key figure in Georgia’s anti-Soviet independence movement, was elected the country’s first president in May 1991 with overwhelming popularity. His administration quickly faced immense challenges: regional separatist conflicts, pressure from armed paramilitary groups, political infighting, and severe economic hardship.

A significant but often overlooked aspect of his brief rule was his government’s cautious and strategic approach to economic policy. While not opposing a market economy, Gamsakhurdia and his team, particularly Prime Minister Besarion Gugushvili, were highly critical of the rapid “Shock Therapy” reforms promoted by the West. They advocated for a state-centric model, gradual privatization, price controls on essential goods, and the preservation of domestic industry and technological capabilities to build a self-sufficient economy. This approach aimed to prevent asset-stripping by old elites and protect the population during the transition.

He proposed a three-tier price system, allowing for mixed and free prices on luxury products, while the state would continue to set fixed prices on public transport, postal and telephone services, electricity, public utilities, primary consumer goods, and medicines.

This economic caution created a major rift with the domestic opposition, which demanded faster, more comprehensive liberalization and privatization. Western media and political actors amplified this criticism, framing Gamsakhurdia’s reluctance to adopt full Shock Therapy as authoritarian “democratic backsliding” and a betrayal of economic reform.

‘He [Gamsakhurdia] underlined that privatization had to be circumspect “to ensure the participation of the majority of the population in co-ownership of the property created by their own labor, and not to concentrate this property in the hands of only the wealthy members of society” (ibid., p.4, own translation). Furthermore, in numerous public interviews PM Gugushvili argued against the rushed economic transition of the country: “Moderation is needed. It is impossible to promise that privatization will be implemented in one or two years.[...] Economic processes are gradual and cannot be artificially accelerated…

The coup that overthrew Gamsakhurdia in January 1992 was the result of a confluence of factors: intense domestic political conflict, the violence of paramilitary groups, the aftermath of the Moscow August Coup, and escalating ethnic tensions. However, the text emphasizes that a core element of this conflict was a clash over economic vision—between a government seeking a controlled, sovereign transition and opposition forces (both domestic and international) pushing for immediate and radical neoliberal reforms. His overthrow eliminated a potential alternative path where Georgia refused shock therapy and Georgia could have set a precedent and therefore posed a risk to “global capital.”

An article titled “Soviet turmoil; Georgia Opponents Charge Republic Is Led by Dictator” (NYT, 1991), quoted prominent opposition leaders such as Nodar Natadze and Irina Sarishvili, who compared Gamsakhurdia to Saddam Hussein. The article claimed: “Opposition leaders accused Mr. Gamsakhurdia of preserving a socialist system under his personal control” and that “[...] the President refused to allow private land ownership or make way for a free economy”. Another article “The Soviet Transition; Dissident Is Seized In Soviet Georgia” (Whitney, 1991, passage 9, para. 1), cites Tengiz Sigua, a former Gamsakhurdia Prime Minister54 who argues: “He must resign [...] Then we can have rapid land reform, privatization and can guarantee human rights.” In this peculiar way, Zviad Gamsakhurdia was declared a dictator for betraying market economy orthodoxy and not following economic liberalization principles more rigidly.

IMF

Georgia’s economy experienced a catastrophic and multifaceted collapse following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the most severe downturn among all former Soviet republics. By 1995, GDP per capita had plummeted 74% from its 1989 level, and industrial output fell by over 80%. This deindustrialization was rapid and comprehensive: technology-intensive factories, light manufacturing plants, and entire agricultural sectors (like tea and citrus) collapsed due to the severing of Soviet supply chains, the loss of subsidized energy, and the opening to global competition. Hyperinflation spiraled to 15,600% in 1994, and poverty rates skyrocketed. The Gini coefficient, which measures inequality increased by 50%.

Energy-intensive heavy industries like steel and locomotive manufacturing, alongside extensive light manufacturing such as textiles and footwear, all of which depended entirely on subsidized inputs and protected trade within the USSR and Comecon. The sudden severing of these supply chains and subsidies triggered immediate deindustrialization, as energy prices soared by 500% and rendered Georgian industry non-competitive. This led to the rapid shutdown of factories across all sectors—from major plants like Rustavi Azot and the Tbilisi Electric Locomotive Factory to countless textile and shoe manufacturers—and the closure of associated research centers.

The social and economic consequences were profound: employment plummeted from 2.76 million in 1990 to 1.73 million by 1995, with over 110,000 jobs lost in light manufacturing alone. Simultaneously, agricultural reforms failed, as new small landowners lacked capital, and the removal of state subsidies combined with trade liberalization destroyed key export sectors like tea and citrus, causing production to fall by over 90%. This systemic unraveling prompted mass unemployment, a migration back to subsistence farming, and significant emigration, culminating in a 25% population decline after 1994.

The catastrophic economic collapse in Georgia was not merely a passive result of the USSR’s dissolution, but was actively caused and accelerated by the specific policies demanded by the IMF and World Bank upon Georgia’s membership in 1992. These institutions instructed Georgia to remain in the ruble zone while simultaneously implementing rapid price liberalization. This created a disastrous contradiction: Georgia imported hyperinflation from Russia’s own Shock Therapy (with inflation reaching 15,600% in 1994) while having no sovereign monetary control to counteract it. The IMF was aware this rapid integration would cause “severe repercussions,” yet refused to modify its approach. Instead, it insisted on brutal austerity, demanding budget cuts and the elimination of subsidies for a population already in freefall, arguing that avoiding deficit spending was a “fallacy.” Furthermore, the IMF’s own recommended solution—the introduction of a temporary coupon currency—backfired, creating an unstable monetary terrain that would later become a vehicle for financial speculation and elite wealth accumulation.

Western institutions transformed Georgia’s inherited structural vulnerabilities into an immediate humanitarian catastrophe, actively dismantling its productive economy and shifting it toward a deindustrialized and dependent transit role.

The Fund praised Georgia’s new role as a transit economy due to its strategic location and trading history. This role would substantially influence Georgia’s economic structures for years.

Shevardnadze

The period of Eduard Shevardnadze’s return marked Georgia’s definitive alignment with Western-prescribed neoliberal reforms, which deepened the economic crisis and established the mechanisms for elite wealth accumulation.

Shevardnadze, a former Soviet foreign minister celebrated in the West, returned to Georgia in chaos in March 1992. His administration immediately committed to a foreign capital-driven development model, symbolized by a pre-return visit to the U.S. to secure investment for ports, oil terminals, and tourism.

Under the mandatory “Shock Therapy” reforms imposed by the IMF and World Bank, Georgia’s post-Soviet economic restructuring prioritized privatization and financial deregulation. An IMF pre-membership review in 1992 commended the establishment of a privatization committee but insisted on “more decisive actions” to transfer the productive base to private ownership, arguing that only free market price signals could ensure effective reforms. Facing sustained pressure from international institutions and with support from domestic elites, Georgia launched a comprehensive privatization program in 1993. This program utilized multiple methods, including auctions, tenders, leases, management buyouts, and voucher privatization. The process was actively supported by experts from the EU’s TACIS program alongside the IMF and World Bank. By the mid-1990s, subsidies to large state enterprises were severed, a legal framework for private business was created, and plans to privatize the electricity sector were drafted. While the privatization of small enterprises was largely complete—with 9,667 units sold—reforms for medium and large-scale enterprises progressed more slowly, prompting donors to demand a “second stage” of accelerated reform. Ultimately, from 1995 to 2002, a total of 14,751 units were privatized in the country.

The period following the introduction of the coupon as Georgia’s sole legal tender in 1993 was marked by a catastrophic hyperinflationary spiral, with monthly inflation reaching 60-70% and the currency in circulation increasing 152-fold within a year. The coupon’s value collapsed from 700 per US dollar in March 1993 to 5 million per dollar by mid-1994, destroying its credibility. This led to rapid dollarization, with most transactions shifting to rubles or US dollars, and foreign currency deposits dominating the banking system. The IMF attributed the hyperinflation to uncontrolled credit expansion by the National Bank of Georgia (NBG), which issued massive loans to subsidize basic goods, finance budget deficits, and support agriculture. The government defended this as necessary to alleviate social hardship. In March 1994, Georgia sought an IMF loan, which was granted in December under the Systemic Transformation Facility after agreeing to strict conditions, including ending deficit financing, cutting subsidies, and reducing public spending. While this narrative is often presented as the official account of Georgia’s early reforms, Salome suggests that the interplay of the collapsing coupon, IMF-mandated privatization, and financial liberalization under Shevardnadze created the foundational mechanisms for the emergence of powerful new capitalist factions in the country.

How were capitalists formed in Georgia??

The text details how the prescribed economic transition facilitated the formation of a specific “political capitalist” elite in Georgia, not through market competition but through the direct exploitation of state resources and policy chaos. This process unfolded through three interconnected mechanisms under Eduard Shevardnadze’s administration.

First, the NBG Credit Scheme and Coupon Speculation served as a primary engine for primitive accumulation. The National Bank of Georgia (NBG), under pressure to finance subsidies, issued massive, loosely conditioned credits.

The procedure was as follows: an approved individual from the State Council of Georgia or the government would meet with the NBG President to verbally agree on the credit amount, claims the study. Later, this individual would register a firm or a private commercial bank at the Ministry of Justice. The following day, they would receive the agreed upon credit note from the NBG. Credits did not include definite conditions or require the recipient to specify the purpose.

These were directed, with state approval, to a network of newly registered commercial banks and trading firms owned by political insiders and intelligentsia. These entities used the loans—issued in a rapidly hyperinflating local coupon—to purchase valuable domestic assets (like gold and wine) for pennies, export them for hard currency, and rarely repay the debt.

Some of these credits ended up cashed out in the Russian banks, subsequently, Georgia’s debt to Russia increased during this period. However, in most instances, NBG credits were used domestically and seldom resulted in the importation of goods to Georgia. On the contrary, these credits were utilized for procuring products intended for export. Especially following the introduction of the coupon, companies started to engage in wholesale trade. For example, upon receiving the NBG credit, it was converted into coupons to purchase stocks of domestic products such as gold, other precious metals, wine, and spirits from state-owned factories. These products were sold either in Russia or elsewhere usually for American dollars. In this way millions of USD were made using the drastically devalued coupon, exchange rate of which (vis-à-vis USD) was plummeting not on monthly or weekly, but on hourly basis.

Due to severe shortages of cash and goods, the Georgian government arranged a barter trade with Turkmenistan to secure natural gas in 1992. However, Georgia could not gather the agreed-upon volume of goods for exchange. This failure resulted in increased trade debt and led Turkmenistan to cut off the gas supply, triggering an energy crisis in Georgia.

This deliberate scheme, enabled by IMF-encouraged financial deregulation that allowed virtually anyone to open a bank, transferred public wealth into private foreign bank accounts.

The minutes from the April 1992 meeting between the IMF Executive Board and the Georgian delegation disclose the Fund’s stringent expectations regarding financial deregulation and privatization: “[…] as old institutions are dismantled and new ones are developed to replace them […] a more accelerated pace of privatization could be initiated in those sectors in which rudimentary private sector participation already exists, such as the agriculture and finance sectors. In the case of the latter, the large number of private banks could form the nucleus of the banking infrastructure under a carefully developed legal and supervisory framework. Technical assistance from the Fund in this area could build on this foundation”

With minimal capital requirements of only $200, 87 new commercial banks were registered in 1992-1993 alone. These banks were often ephemeral entities created expressly to access and appropriate credit from the National Bank of Georgia (NBG). They engaged in opaque, unrestricted operations, including issuing loans to themselves or their subsidiaries, effectively creating “money out of thin air” as Revaz Shavishviii notes. A concentrated group of well-connected individuals used these banks to profit from the hyperinflating currency, directly harming the wider population.

The text further suggests complicity between the state and this new financial elite. An investigation indicates that certain commercial banks were likely tipped off in advance about the introduction of the new coupon currency in April 1993, leading to a massive surge in credit withdrawals—30 billion rubles’ worth—in the ten days prior. Despite early parliamentary recognition of these irregularities, public criticism was deliberately misdirected. Blame was placed on the NBG’s “Soviet-style” policies, while the foundational role of the IMF’s Shock Therapy reforms in prescribing this deregulated, predatory environment remained unchallenged.

The financial deregulation mandated by the IMF’s Shock Therapy also led to the emergence of highly speculative institutions like the Caucasus Stock Exchange (CSE). This “stock exchange boom” saw nearly 400 broker firms operate, and the head of the Economic Crime Division stated that 90% of all National Bank of Georgia (NBG) credits were diverted to the CSE. Companies that received state-backed credits for importing essential goods instead funneled the money to brokers, who converted it into hard currency, leading to massive “currency hoarding.” This speculative system was deeply tied to the state; a key figure was the Deputy Prime Minister overseeing economic reforms, who had previously directed the CSE and later defaulted on depositors through his private investment company.

In a 1994 interview, former NBG President Demur Dvalishvili defended his policy of directing credits to support domestic industry, arguing that the collapse of local production was a root cause of hyperinflation. He explicitly stated his opposition to the IMF’s Shock Therapy, favoring a “social model” akin to post-war Germany’s approach, and suggested he was being scapegoated. The IMF, however, criticized his interventionist stance, insisting that industrial development is beyond the scope of the central bank and the commercial banks should decide, not the state in local industry based on their own cost-benefit analysis.

The conventional narrative blaming Dvalishvili’s “Soviet-style” policies for the hyperinflation is deficient The real drivers were the IMF induced policies where hundreds of deregulated commercial banks and connected speculators exploited the monetary chaos, aided by Shevardnadze’s administration which lobbied for them.

Second, the Privatization Process, aggressively pushed by the IMF and World Bank as a condition for loans, provided another avenue for asset stripping.

By the time active privatization reforms resumed in Georgia in 1994 wealth had been concentrated. In the meantime, general population had been stripped of their savings (loss of bank deposits in 1991-1994), jobs, and homes (internally displaced people from Abkhazia and other conflict regions reached around 280,000 people). Following the Shock Therapy model, voucher privatization was introduced in 1995 and it involved distributing property to the public via the free allocation of shares in companies.

The process was rushed and administratively flawed. Amidst severe socioeconomic crisis—where the population had lost savings, jobs, and homes—vouchers nominally valued at $30 were sold by desperate citizens for as little as $5 in informal markets.

The nominal value of a voucher was eventually set at USD 30 and more than 1 billion shares were issued. Unlike the Polish and Czechoslovak cases, vouchers were immediately transferable in most FSU countries. Due to the prevailing socioeconomic hardships in Georgia, millions of vouchers ended up traded in informal markets, with the majority of ‘free’ shares sold for 5 USD. Individuals sold their vouchers at various locations, including street corners, subway stops, and kiosks around the Tbilisi Railway Station.

These vouchers were then consolidated by speculators and resold at specialized auctions, where state enterprises were ultimately purchased at an average of only 12% of their original value. This allowed well-connected groups—particularly former “red directors” and beneficiaries of the earlier NBG credit scheme—to acquire industrial assets at a fraction of their worth. The outcome was extreme wealth inequality: by 1996, the top 1% owned one-third of national wealth. The new owners, lacking incentive or capability to sustain production, typically opted for asset-stripping, dismantling factories and selling machinery as scrap metal, rather than investing in long-term operations.

In this situation, the state’s involvement in rescuing important industries would have been essential; however, the new development model and the accumulation regime did not allow for such intervention. Consequently, with few exceptions such as the Tbilisi Aviation Factory No. 31, where either management or employees preserved production, heavy machinery and infrastructure was dismantled at most factories and sold as scrap metal.

A critical “banking revolution” in 1994, a direct outcome of the Shock Therapy reforms. Upon IMF insistence, Georgia’s three-tier banking system was restructured into a two-tier system. This mandated the privatization or merger of five key state commercial banks: Industry Bank, Savings Bank, Eximbank, Agro Industrial Bank, and Social Investments Bank. Investigations revealed that the new owners of these banks were all closely linked to President Eduard Shevardnadze’s inner circle.

Third, Eduard Shevardnadze’s Direct Patronage was the linchpin. Eduard Shevardnadze played the central role in engineering Georgia’s oligarchic system, acting as a bridge between his Soviet nomenklatura past and his portrayal as a pro-Western liberal democrat. While not amassing vast personal wealth, he directly enriched his inner circle, granting his family control over strategic sectors like oil, aviation, telecommunications, and key industries, while also distributing privilege through state schemes like the NBG credits to former elites and cultural figures. Crucially, he institutionalized corruption as a mechanism of control, deliberately creating a web of contradictory rules and administrative uncertainty to generate a “sustainable demand for corruption.” This top-down system of patronage granted material benefits to selected networks, which in turn helped integrate and control broader social groups, transforming corruption from an elite project into a democratized practice that ensured the state’s reproduction through informal patronage rather than formal governance.

Georgia’s Peculiar Corruption and Lack of Industrial Policy

Salome argues that systemic corruption in Georgia under Shevardnadze was a structural outcome of the country’s peripheral position in the global capitalist system, not merely a cultural or Soviet legacy. Due to its asymmetric integration into the international division of labor, Georgia lacked productive capabilities, fiscal resources, and policy autonomy. With formal mechanisms for development and legitimation inaccessible, the state turned to informal institutions—corruption and patronage—as a substitute hegemonic project to maintain stability and avoid collapse. This structural reliance on corruption was intensified by external shocks, notably the 1998 Russian financial crisis, which crushed Georgia’s exports and remittances, further undermining the formal economy. Thus, corruption is framed not primarily as a matter of individual agency or intent, but as a structural imperative imposed by uneven and combined development under neoliberal capitalism, simultaneously serving as a tool of rule and a major obstacle to industrial policy.

Why Georgia failed to develop an industrial policy after the Soviet collapse, is framed the issue through the interplay of domestic and international stakeholders. According to the framework of Grummiller and Raza (2019), five groups are key for industrial policy: political elites, state bureaucracy, capitalist groups, civil society, and international organizations. In Georgia’s case, the alignment of the most powerful actors created a structural blockade against industrialization.

The primary obstacle was the global regime of accumulation, enforced by international organizations like the IMF and World Bank, which provided no incentives for industrialization in peripheral economies like Georgia. Instead, the Shock Therapy reforms promoted financial deregulation and privatization, which—amid a collapsed productive base—fostered the rise of rentier political capitalists. This new elite class was “political” because its wealth originated from state resources and connections, and “rentier” because it profited from speculation, trade, and asset-stripping rather than productive investment.

The major capital factions that emerged—in finance, energy, and import-wholesale trade—are deeply interlinked with global capital and have no interest in domestic industrialization. Their economic power allows them to lobby for favorable tax and monetary policies that conflict with the needs of industrial development. In many cases, the line between political elites and capitalist groups is blurred, as individuals often occupy both roles, creating a fused interest group opposed to transformative industrial policy.

While a smaller faction of domestic manufacturers (e.g., the Union of Georgian Industrialists) did emerge and even resisted certain integration policies like WTO accession, its scale and political leverage were too weak to counterbalance the dominant rentier-political capitalist bloc.

This disinterest was not incidental but systemic: the global neoliberal regime provided no incentives for industrialization, while the domestic rentier political capitalists, born from shock therapy reforms, profited from speculative and import-oriented activities rather than production. Their merged interests with international capital actively opposed policies that would foster domestic industry. The remaining two stakeholders—state bureaucracy and civil society—are noted as becoming fully “captured” in the subsequent phase, under the more ideological and dominant paradigm of the “Washington Consensus as a neoliberal manifesto,” which further entrenched this anti-industrial framework.

The “Anti-crisis plan for macroeconomic stabilization and structural changes 1994‑1995” served as Georgia’s foundational commitment to the neoliberal transition prescribed by international institutions. While formally presented as a recovery strategy for the post‑Soviet and war‑induced crisis, its core function was to lock Georgia into the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the IMF, World Bank, and other Western organizations. President Shevardnadze explicitly framed the plan as externally validated, stating that it had been approved by these institutions and that he had received personal praise from the World Bank for Georgia’s accelerated privatization. Thus, the plan was less a domestically crafted recovery roadmap and more a public guarantee to the international community that Georgia would not deviate from the neoliberal path.

The 1994-1995 plan outlined a development model based on Georgia’s comparative advantages: its geopolitical location as a transit corridor, subtropical agriculture, raw materials, and hydropower. It explicitly identified cheap skilled labor as a key advantage, without proposing a strategy to move beyond low-wage dependence. While aligned with Shock Therapy principles, the plan retained a moderate tone, emphasizing a social orientation, a regulatory role for the state, and the goal of achieving prosperity through the market, not merely establishing a market economy. It had a regional focus, aiming to rebuild industrial value chains with former Soviet states through bilateral trade and pledged support for reviving domestic industry and agriculture. Notably, it promised future state strategies to boost productive capacity and self-sufficiency and introduced an indicative planning system to guide economic policy. Thus, the plan contained a contradiction: it served as a guarantee of Georgia’s neoliberal commitment to international creditors while simultaneously expressing a domestic, state-mediated vision for recovery and industrial revival.

The 2001 Socio-Economic Development Program marked a decisive turn toward a more explicitly neoliberal and externally oriented development model compared to the 1994-1995 plan. Its language emphasized attracting foreign direct investment and deepening partnerships with international financial institutions, reflecting Georgia’s recent WTO accession and the heightened pressure to liberalize. The plan strategically positioned Georgia as an energy transit corridor, championing cross-border pipeline projects like Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum (BTE), which were heavily promoted by the U.S. and financed by the World Bank and EBRD. This vision cast Georgia as a vital link in the “Great Silk Route,” integrating it into the global economy primarily as a rentier transit state. While the document listed broad sectoral priorities, including industry and agriculture, its core focus on energy transit and global integration, backed by international capital, solidified a development path dependent on foreign capital and rentier income, systematically marginalizing a meaningful industrial strategy and locking the country into a peripheral role in the global division of labor.

Georgia’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) starkly illustrates how international financial institutions directly overrode domestic industrial interests to enforce a liberal trade regime. Under significant pressure from the IMF and World Bank, and with negotiations steered by USAID and EU experts, Georgia was compelled to adopt very low tariff rates (0%, 5%, 12%) as a condition for receiving crucial standby credits. This policy directly harmed the coalition of domestic manufacturers, represented by the Georgian Union of Industrialists, who lobbied for protective tariffs (up to 30%) to shield local production from import competition. Their protests were explicitly overruled by World Bank officials, revealing a structural power imbalance where credit access was used as leverage—a form of “credit blackmail”—to impose policies favoring global capital and import-oriented domestic capital. In response, industrialists formed the political party “‘Industry will save Georgia’, entering parliament to advocate for protectionism.

Ukleba reports that the Georgian delegation held multiple meetings in Geneva to present its case and seek approval for higher tariffs from the Commission. However, the World Bank representatives, namely Cyril Muller (who later became World Bank Vice President for Europe and Central Asia), stipulated: “the decision was reached together with the IMF, an increase in tariffs will not be allowed”, reveals the Georgian negotiator.

The 2001 Socio-Economic Development Plan marked Georgia’s full embrace of an externally driven, neoliberal, and rentier economic model, prioritizing foreign capital and energy transit corridors. However, it contained a defining contradiction: within its highly liberal framework, it formally endorsed an “Industrial Policy Concept for Georgia”—the sole official industrial strategy ever drafted. This document, though never implemented and lacking transformative measures, symbolized a lingering discursive commitment to domestic production within the state bureaucracy.

This inconsistency reveals that under Shevardnadze, economic neoliberalization advanced without full ideological saturation. The state’s actions were dictated by the need to secure IMF and World Bank credit, but its institutions were not yet fully reconstituted around a “neoliberal manifesto.” Shevardnadze’s regime relied on “democratized corruption”—a patronage system that enriched elites and maintained control but could not deliver the systematic deregulation, tax reform, and institutional restructuring required to deeply entrench neoliberal governance. Thus, while the economic blueprint became fully aligned with global capital, the political and ideological transformation remained incomplete, leaving a fragile space for alternative visions within the state apparatus—a space that would soon be closed in the next phase of radical reform.

Stay tuned for Part II, “Phase Two of Uneven Capitalist Development in post-Soviet Georgia Compradorisation of the State”

This was a debate between a socially conservative leftist (or a conservative who’s economically leftist) and someone who is a leftist, self-identified socialist.

Here is the link to the debate:

Moderator (64 Project):
What is your motivation for debating here?

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
When I heard it was Giorgi—and he is from the academic sphere—I thought we could have a higher-calibre debate. That’s my motivation.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
I’ve liked 64 Project debates before, and I think it’s good to have these kinds of discussions. I am a socialist. During the Namakhvani Dam protests, they called us Russian agents. On Post TV, they said we were UNM [United National Movement]. However, Nukri was in solidarity with us back then. I would like to debate that kind of opponent.

(One-Minute Introductions)

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
I am a historian. I am a conservative. I am also a leftist on many economic and social issues. Most importantly, I am anti-liberal. You’ve said that I agree with everything the government does, but I do not agree with their liberal parts. I agree with the direction it’s headed: anti-liberalism.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
I know it’s generally weird for people to listen to leftist thoughts. I think this liberal-conservative dichotomy is a problem for humanity. It takes away from real issues. The real problem is that the 1% controls the world and wants us to go to war. This is why we should invigorate socialist thought.

---

Topic 1: Political Crisis & The “Deep State”

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
On the “Deep State”—the way you asked the question made it sound like a conspiracy theory. Trump actively uses the term. In academic circles, look at Noam Chomsky’s “Manufacturing Consent,” which was even translated into Georgian by the US embassy. We see NGOs, Radio Liberty, NED, and USAID, which have tried to foment a coup against the government. There’s a 2016 book that also discusses the deep state. Mike Lofgren’s book, “The Deep State: The Fall of the Constitution and the Rise of a Shadow Government” talks about a “hybrid collusion industry” that operates without the consent of the people.
You might dismiss this as a Republican talking point, but there is a Democrat, Alfred McCoy, who wrote “Dark State.” There are organizations that specialize in the overthrow of governments. This isn’t a conspiracy; it’s a concept discussed in academia.
I just heard on The Guardian that Boris Johnson was given $1 million by the British defense forces to ruin the peace process between Ukraine and Russia. The pressure for a “second front” is related to this. There has been pressure on the Georgian government for years.
It started on “Gavrilov’s Night.” This was an attempt to bring back liberal hegemony. Two demands united then: one was an internal demand for the old elites to return to power, and the other was an external demand to drag Georgian society into the Ukraine-Russia conflict. We have heard many times from Ukrainians, and indirectly from US Ambassador Degnan, she was directed to push for aggressive politics against Russia. When the conflict happened between the Georgian government and the ambassador, the main emphasis was to bring back the liberal elites and involve Georgia in the Ukraine conflict.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
I do not discount the Deep State. I’m not that type of figure. The deep state exists, but it’s a difficult thing to categorize. Using it can easily become conspiratorial. Maybe the deep state was involved here or there, or maybe it wasn’t. We aren’t debating its existence. I must speak about my own position.
I do not think we have a “Russian government” in Georgia. I think the Georgian Dream government is trying to find an alternative place for itself within the Western alliance. The government was not happy with the subordinate function it was offered.

The rhetoric was to mimic Estonia—to volunteer and sanction Russia. I am unequivocally against Georgia joining Russian sanctions; it was irrational. It was inappropriate to frame the topic as, “You must sanction the same way Central European nations do.”

The problem lies in the function. The Georgian Dream project is one of politically authoritarian capitalism—deregulated, authoritarian capitalism. What does this mean? It’s Aliyev-like. The West talks to Aliyev very normally. It’s a system where one party wins 80% of the vote and the rest are rudimentary, like the Iago-type parties.

The goal is the maximum exploitation of natural resources and workers, which is what we see now in Chiatura. The government went to Chiatura and told the people they “aren’t needy enough,” that they must endure even more austerity. The people protested, some sewed their mouths shut, and Post TV attacked them, asking “what strikes?” and claiming they are being organized from the outside.

Why am I against GD? Sure, they could pivot towards Russia and China. But this isn’t about a “Russian government.” This is about GD negotiating a new place for itself within the West, to get them to agree to a “Bidzina Capitalism” in this country. This system is about stealing from pensioners, exploiting workers, and then hiding behind rhetoric about sovereignty and family values.
It’s good that we have liberals and conservatives watching because labelling the government as “Russian” actually makes things easier for them. They want that narrative. They want a system that serves only Bidzina’s money and capital. Sometimes I laugh when I hear the government use words like “decolonization.” Their vision is for Georgia to be an exploitative transit route between Europe and China.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
Giorgi talked about social problems but ignored the question of sovereignty. Economic oppression is related to it. For example, take the Frontera issue. An American company wasn’t paying its workers, and two people committed suicide. The Georgian government won a lawsuit against them. Then Senator Ted Cruz wrote an article claiming Georgia was experiencing democratic backsliding. After that, the Georgian government brought Frontera back.
We can’t talk about social issues without mentioning sovereignty. Look at this neocolonial setup: the Bank of Georgia’s owners are in the UK. A share of TBC bank was also part of Soros’s portfolio. They made 1.504 Billion in profit in 2024. They won’t allow you to have sovereignty; they won’t allow you to bring in a Chinese bank that would give out loans with 3-5% interest. People would have room to breathe if a Chinese bank was here.

There is a financial elite tied to the West that builds NGOs, a revolutionary class, and political parties here to stage a revolution.

When I started working for POST TV in 2019 I got a list of things we couldn’t talk about. The US embassy directly intervened and we were directed not to talk about the USA directly.

When we do not talk about sovereignty, we can’t talk about social issues.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
I agree with a huge part of what you said. But you try to make it seem like the government is fighting back against this system. The people who own these resources... You bring up Frontera, a US company. But with the Namakhvani Dam, the government worked with a foreign government to pressure its own citizens for the foreign company’s profit. The people fought against this and faced police violence. The idea that the Georgian government is defending our sovereignty is unequivocally false.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
In the USSR, the nationalization of Chiatura couldn’t even happen until 1935. Do you want to nationalize Chiatura in a period where we don’t even have full sovereignty?

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
Georgian Dream wants to exploit these people. The future they are promising is one of even more exploitation.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
In foreign policy, with China, there is potential.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
When a dam project comes, what are the conditions? If the minimum wage is 20 Lari? If you have “yellow unions,” which we know exist—connected to the Gvirgvliani crime—and people like Petriashvili are working to break up strikes... The question is, who is supposed to use our resources?
I am not against Chinese capital. It’s silly to only allow Western capital. But under what conditions are they here? If they are here to build a casino, let’s talk about casinos. If they are going to build a dam, let’s talk about the dam. If they are going to build a road, let’s talk about the road.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
Why is it illegitimate for the left to participate in protests with the opposition: The current political forces... there is no other power that can take over the government besides the opposition. These are the same people who took everything away—labor inspections, the labor code. Look at the EU’s 12 demands. None had anything to do with economics. One of them was that civil society needs to be involved in all policy-making. None of this movement is social in its essence.

I am saying this not to criticize the government for being liberal—I think a big part of it is still liberal—but to talk about the tendency, the direction in which it is arching.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
We disagree on the tendency. I believe this will be aggressive, authoritarian capitalism.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
If we speak from a socialist point of view, this will be capitalism. They will be capitalist. Whatever forwards it.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
Yes, of course. I think there will be a dominant party that controls everything.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
You are speaking of a regime. What kind of regime? When I was in the Ministry of Education, I was never invited. Liberals control education. Liberals control the entire cultural sphere. Theaters are financed by banks that tell them to protest. The cultural sphere is under liberal hegemony, both culturally and financially.

During Saakashvili’s time, if you said something anti-government in an academic field, they would arrest your brother or someone. This is not a regime. Precisely because it is not a total regime, these kinds of revolutionary processes can still happen. If it were a regime, they would have dismantled the protests swiftly.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
From 2013, the police weren’t so dominant. It was a non-police regime where blackmail was used. The tendency now is towards the consolidation of capital and the consolidation of power. Bidzina wants something like Aliyev.
Look at the education system over 12 years. If conservative tendencies prevail in education, I think they will raise another generation of people who don’t care about Chiatura, because that’s what contemporary conservatism does globally. Name a conservative who is against the deep state and Trump. If they exist, show me! This is about the consolidation of power, not a connection to Russia. Let’s see what happens globally; I think the world is heading towards war.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
Your description... because laws have become more strict, this is part of a police regime?

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
When the evictions were happening, I was one of the organizers. Now, I can’t even make declarations like “we must fight against this” anymore. The government is enacting laws on behalf of the usurers. As a citizen, I feel I need to resist, but under these new laws, I am in danger of being jailed. I don’t know if someone like Khareba will decide my fate. Even declaring resistance is being criminalized.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
The police system, the response to the coup attempt... we had a lightweight police system, and of course, this is a response to the attempt at overthrowing the government. Once this threat is neutralized, things will change.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
What about Chiatura? Temo Gvelesiani is my friend who is in prison, and he just had a kid. He wasn’t even there at the fight. They took four leaders to prison. The police sent a provocateur. Their wives are crying; this is to silence the people on the outside.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
I don’t know these details. Regarding the mine, the mine is being subsidized now. The government didn’t sacrifice Chiatura. It was against the neoliberal logic; they took this step to keep an unprofitable mine working to save jobs.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
This is a positive step?? What social politics?

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
They are subsidizing the factory when production is losing profit, just to keep jobs.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
These people are being fired from their jobs. They appointed a new manager. I don’t want to appeal to the fact that he is Russian—I don’t like that argument—but they brought in a Russian specialist in being a goon and roughing people up. The operation was to make the situation even worse for these people and then impose more austerity on them.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
What is happening in Chiatura is very different from the October 4th events. I agree with all the demands of the leftists there. On October 4th, the powers there...

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
The problem with the way you describe it is that you place the government outside of the problem. But the reality is, the government is side-by-side with the corporation, oppressing these workers together. You mention the demands of Chiatura... I feel bad even talking about it. I have had all kinds of problems but still I am shocked. Men my age have had strokes, and they are sewing their mouths shut. They keep saying they want to meet the government. And your TV, Post TV, and Imedi label them as “German communists” or whatever.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
In this “hot civil war” environment, these actors are organizing a revolution. When some people show up in Chiatura, the government believes this is just a continuation of the same process. Sometimes they are wrong, and I completely agree with you that Chiatura was not that kind of process.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
You think they didn’t know this was a different process in Chiatura? Maybe you don’t know. They knew who these people were and that all of Chiatura were their voters. They arrested them anyway.

Moderator:
From a leftist perspective, the “Sazmau” march (March at the Public Broadcasting) has been going on for a year, talking about “Fire the oligarchy” and being against the Georgian government. We need to talk about freedom of speech, which has become more repressive. More laws will be adopted soon: restrictions on face masks, a third refusal to comply with police becomes a criminal offense, you can’t block roads without a minimum number of people...

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
On Russia, I said my piece. I wasn’t able to actively participate in these leftist discussions recently. I am a leftist, and a lot of new people have emerged lately—enough that 100 people can become members and do voluntary work. This is good.
In my opinion, these protests should have stopped a long time ago. Even before the 4th of October, when ambiguous political forces... I cannot take responsibility for everyone. On the 4th of October, there were people present that I respect, but I said that this is unacctepable. When I heard that people took the 4th of October seriously (he laughs), I was amazed. I think they should have separated themselves from it. I don’t think those who stood there are betraying the leftist cause.

Moderator:
Can you talk about the reasons for the crisis?

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
I also feel like I didn’t do everything right. People I respect let Murtaz Zodelava (UNM) speak on the podium, to say what the police told him to say. There are two theories about that day, if it was a setup or not. Many of us are unhappy with the government. I was not on the side of boycotting the elections. There is torture of people. Second, there are titushky working with the police; they pay them. As a citizen of Georgia, this gives me anxiety. How can I resist this without supporting Murtaz Zodelava?

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
I wanted to ask about the Ukraine-Russia proxy war. Without this context, nothing makes sense.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
What do you mean? This is a Russian invasion, in which the West is also involved, on the side of Ukraine. I don’t want the Ukrainian state to be totally destroyed.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
If it’s a proxy war, this is a threat. Do you fear a second front opening in Georgia?

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
Because of everything we said—marginalization, torture, exploitation—we must just swallow this?

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
Should we help these dangers, these political parties who want this war? Should we?

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
No, we should never support any of them, no matter the circumstances.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
In order to defeat these political forces, what should be done? This is my logic.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
This isn’t about Georgia going to war. The Russian side, which even Trump has now joined.


Nukri Shoshiashvili:
No. The political forces that were trying to “Ukrainize” Georgia... There was a law, the agent law, a transparency law. You cannot legally bring money here to overthrow the government. You can describe things emotionally; I can too. How many Ukrainians are dying? It’s an existential fight. They had rights that Western countries don’t even have.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
You are painting a picture that there was a power here already prepared for militarism. I found the war aesthetic very anxiety-inducing. This masked man followed another man and split his head open.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
When you get a directive to disperse the protest, say there will always be excessive force, what about when someone stabbed a policeman?

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
That is unacceptable.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
The level of aggressiveness shown from one side was met with the same level from the other side.

Moderator:
I understand the dangers. But when the government labels the entire opposition side with one word, as enemies—”everyone who is against me”—it’s a problem.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
There are parties that didn’t do this storming and they are in parliament. For years, the politics of disagreement was produced by them. Everything was “Russian.” This was so consensus that we ended up with this dynamic. Post TV didn’t exist before this dynamic existed. Post TV’s stance is: if you declare war against me, I will declare war against you.

Today is a rare day where I am in a liberal space, discussing. This doesn’t happen.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
Me too! This is interesting. I say thank you again.

Moderator:
We want to create this kind of practice to host debates. 64 is in media, we were investigated by the part of an anti-corruption bureau. We fear these kinds of spaces won’t exist soon. I will not--

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
Why do you say you will be closed? Just show them your financial reports and you won’t be closed.

Moderator:
I cannot speak about that.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
I don’t want a consensus politics. We want to have a politics against all the things I just said were a problem.
Here’s a concrete example: Petre Mamradze was calling me a Natsi (pejorative term for UNM members). Your TV was calling me a Natsi, all of us are Natsis. I don’t have a place to speak my mind. Invite me to Post TV so I can speak.

---

Topic 2: Sovereignty

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
Sovereignty has dimensions. The territorial dimension, which Russia is violating. The economic dimension, which our neighbors and others are violating. And third, the political-spiritual dimension, which we are slowly getting back.
If we don’t have the third, we can’t get the first two.

Moderator:
Who is endangering sovereignty?

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
I just named the three. The political-spiritual dimension was dominated by liberalism, maintained by Western institutions.
Giorgi probbaly knows Gerard Sussman, who wrote Democratic Myths. He talks about Soros, Freedom House, NED, etc., taking away sovereignty from countries.
When Giorgi said GD had the ability to take back education... they didn’t have the ability. There were spheres they didn’t control, like education. Leftists who now protest the courts today... during Saakashvili, workers always lost their cases. Now it’s reversed. It’s illogical to protest these kinds of courts from a leftist point of view.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
I don’t think it’s about relativism. Every government influences others; it’s not symmetric. Look at the influence of the Israeli lobby in the US. The issue of Abkhazia and Ossetia is a real problem. How do we solve this? We can’t solve it by just aggressively screaming “Russia is an occupant.”
With the Namakhvani Dam, the Georgian state, together with the Turkish state, used the police to oppress its own citizens.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
Conservatism is using this. Conservatism is a political ideology close to religiosity. Manu Chao has a song, “Neverending Sadness.” It says, “the wind still blows from Washington.” It still blows from Washington, even though conservatives are in charge there now. Conservatism comes from the Euro-Atlantic space, the Anglo-Saxon space. It’s about periphery, exploitation, etc.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
Conservatism here was a reaction. In Georgia, it was a totalitarianism of liberalism. If you were not a liberal, you were marginalized; your social career was over. It was a reaction to gender and sex issues, a reaction to the feeling that “they” were trying to take your kids away.
In our situation, conservatism allows us, in our independent history, to figure out who we are. This gives us a chance. First, it was Soros, then another, then another, telling us who we are. Our entire education system was destroyed. It was already in crisis, but they destroyed it. Our identity was completely oppressed.
This “Gen Z”... it’s not a generation. It is a social formation of the NGO class.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
There are a lot of conservatives in Gen Z.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
Gen Z is a social category they co-opted; that’s another topic. This “coup” attempt, Georgian conservatism is a reaction against that oppression. You shouldn’t be against it as a leftist. If you go to church, apparently you’re, you shouldn’t add to the cultural oppression. Second, to figure out your identity, our education system should not be so monopolized by liberal ideology. It’s a factory. You should have the chance to think about who you are. Conservatism gives you the chance for that.
The leftist movement is not strong. If it were, it would be very different. You couldn’t create a strong leftist movement for years.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
That’s how it is worldwide.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
In Greece, we remember Syriza... We need the ability to have relations with China, which you don’t have when you’re tied to the West.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
I can’t say I am someone who only wants relations with the West.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
Trump has one positive impact: he disrupts the liberal hegemony. I do not care what his domestic policies are otherwise.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
Conservatism is a Western ideology.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
All ideologies are Western.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
There are two international ideologies, and both are regressive. Culturally, “Woke Culture,” etc., has been instrumentalized. The richest people—Elon Musk, Peter Thiel—the empire is changing its skin and saying “we are now conservative.” The masses are talking about LGBT, immigrants... It ignores that nowhere in history have the richest people controlled this much wealth, and never has the world been as genocidal as it is today. I’m talking about the West and Russia!
The social platforms that control us change our behavior. Either we find some progressive ideas, or we go to world war—and we are heading towards world war. Trump renamed the “War Department” from the “Department of Defense.” I want to change conservatives towards leftism, not become conservative.

Moderator:
Is the Georgian government truly conservative or not?

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
The previous hegemony was liberal. We are a post-Soviet country; it came from that. Leftists should be for breaking this. Liberalism couldn’t destroy everything; our identity was maintained by the Church and the lower classes. As a political formation, we didn’t have the resources to do anything else.
The West doens’t have time to ideological pressure us anymore. Now we have time and space. Hopefully, we have 5-10 years to develop our own self before they make the time. We have only been asking, “Are we European enough?” “Are we fitting into trends in Europe?” No. We can create an authentic self. For this, we need academic freedom, studies different from what we’ve been getting. The grant system needs to be totally changed.
In the 1930s, a national, unified academic system was created. The Georgian grammar was created, foundations for the Georgian language. We can recreate all of this today.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
What you are talking about is creating traditions, which in itself is not bad. But in reality, Georgians didn’t have a conservative ideology traditionally. The end of the 19th century, it was never a big force. It was leftists and liberals. Mainly Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The nation was resisting against capitalism and the Russian empire, and we had socialists. First, we had the First Republic, and then the Soviet Union.
The conservatism that exists today is Western conservatism. You have the right to it. But what will be created here that doesn’t exist in other countries?

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
We will synthesize our culture. China needs to come in. We synthesize East and West.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
Let me say it again: what conditions do we have for these investors? If they are going to build a whorehouse, I don’t want that. Our tradition in the 19th and 20th centuries is socialism! It is not conservatism. Conservatism was associated with the Russian empire.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
Our conservatism is inherently leftist!

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
Which part is socialist?

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
Look at Vasadze. He speaks about collectivity. It was about creating a social welfare state.
You know what the problem with leftists is? They are culturally liberal. Mainstream leftists would work with Soros. They have no problem taking part with liberals.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
This is state propaganda—and I’m not saying you are bad, I believe you are in good faith—but you are also part of it.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
At Post TV, I don’t think of myself as propagandist. I see myself as part of a project that works to pull Georgian Dream away from liberalism.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
You are marking a lot of people with the same brush. I hear this a lot. This is not a formulated flank. I am talking about meaningful action.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
When you want to be part of something and also divide... We talk about liberal-leftists. Do they stand next to liberals or not? Leftists could have played a big role in conservatism. It could have been conservative on the outside and socialist inside.

(Discussion on the “Middle Corridor”)

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
So you’re saying Georgia will be a “Middle Corridor” between Europe and Asia, but it won’t be authoritarian capitalist, according to you?

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
I think we will be a buffer state. I see it as existential survival. I do not believe we will be part of the EU. We need peace here. I see a new dark epoch approaching. For existential survival, you must be flexible. We need a stable state without a revolutionary class internally.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
If this is about existential survival, where do conservative values go? They must stand higher than mere survival, right?

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
This doesn’t interfere with Realpolitik. Georgia should be a buffer in these conflicts between big powers. Everyone is talking about this. The moral imperative is to save your people, to keep Georgia from devastation.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
I also share the view that we are entering a dark age. But I would add that you, as a supporter of this regime, are advocating for a future that includes a one-party police regime. Chiatura, Rustaveli, Kazreti will all be exploited.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
The logic of sovereignty means that if you become more closed off, you are actually more sensitive to the attitudes of your local citizens. You take them more into account. In this instance--

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
(Interrupting) You are closed off, so you think they will be more sensitive to the local population? Three thousand people are getting together, they have bank loans, and they are hungry and where is the sensitivity to them?

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
They have loans from banks controlled by the West. The West doesn’t allow you to bring in other banks with lower rates.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
The people who are organizing... if you are in collusion with the West, Russia, whoever, and you can arrest these leaders, what “attitudes” are you speaking of? The boys sewed their mouths. I was there when one of them... it was heavy. There was no solidarity from, for example, Imedi TV. Have you been to Kazreti?

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
There is a problem for sure.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
This is not a “problem.” This is pressure from above.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
What you are saying is that you speak of a problem without a solution. You have two solutions: the current political forces or the opposition.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
There is no third.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
There is no third option.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
We must create a third option.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
How? You can’t create it because there is foreign pressure.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
Workers can’t organize? Is that what you are saying? There will always be influence.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
You need minimum political stability.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
Are you saying we should reach stability before the working class can organize?

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
When was there successful resistance by the working class historically? It was when there was--

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
(Interrupting) Sovereignty is not related to resistance by the working class. They called Lenin a foreign agent, etc. They were said to be from the outside. The criteria is: Can people organize to defend their interests? The working class?

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
Everything is framed by the liberal media. How can you use their instruments to organize the working class?

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
What you are saying is... the people of Chiatura didn’t care about “Liberty” or “Freedom” channels, and they were arrested anyway.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
Do you want sovereignty or not?

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
Liberalism is defeated. Putin is a conservative, Trump is a conservative, Netanyahu is a conservative. Who else is left?

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
It ended on the 4th of October.

The debate on sovereignty ended.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
A question: Liberal hegemony is over, but it is still culturally hegemonic. Leftism will never be strong under the hegemony of liberalism. Do you agree?

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
The umbrella...

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
Soros, grants, etc.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
It can’t be. I just saw the new DiCaprio film, “One battle after another.” Liberalism subsumes leftism into a fight entirely about minority oppression. I am not against minorities, but the revolution is happening without a class dimension. The problem is class. A fistful of people owns everything and is bringing the world to total destruction.
Leftism must be autonomous and international. The Bolsheviks used to rob banks for funding. That money isn’t there now. You have to get money either from business or from grants.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
A question for you: Would you describe Namakhvani Dam protests as a “sovereignty-verifying protest.” Do you agree?

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
Yes, to some extent. No one knew about the contract. After that, it was confusing because the government took a step and broke the contract.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
ENKA is the one that broke the contract. This kind of polarization minimizes the real issue. This was about both sovereignty and social justice.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
On Frontera, this movement... are these movements supporting the overthrow of the government?

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
Are the Rioni Valley Defenders supporting the coup?

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
No, no. I am speaking about the general sentiment of “if there is no justice, there will be no peace.”

Moderator:
I don’t think it’s fair to say everyone in these protests supports overthrowing the government.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
If you are part of these protests which are led by them, no matter how you feel individually--

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
Most of the people in these protests--

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
How? They openly talk about being financed by these leaders. Nanuka Zhorzholiani writes the budget openly.

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
I’m talking about the boys from Tbilisi. They went there to say “I am against this government,” not “I support Murtaz Zodelava.” You say this is about sovereignty and social justice. Then why does your TV call them (Dam protestors) Russian? They can’t handle real, organic movements from the people.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
The money that keeps coming in... it’s about energy independence. It is part of sovereignty. Turkey--

Giorgi Gvinjilia:
(Interrupting) This was not about energy independence; it was the destruction of energy independence.

Nukri Shoshiashvili:
I agree with you, of course. The green movement... There is an interest not to let us be independent.

Then it was question and answer.

Former ruling party and current opposition, United National Movement (UNM)—Saakashvili’s party—launched a smear campaign against the leftist group Movement for Social Democracy (MSD) involved in the opposition protests after they refused to call Saakashvili a political prisoner in their demands for detainee releases, and often say that “UNM and Georgian Dream” both need to go. One leader of the MSD, Vakhushti Menabde became the central target. UNM activists branded him a “Qoci”—a slur for Georgian Dream supporters—because his father’s construction company in Guria had won millions of lari in state contracts for cement production and road building.

After UNM initiated the smear campaign via one of their leaders Ana Tsitlidze, a particularly vicious opposition activist continued the smearing further. He claimed he had spoken to “locals” in Guria, where Vakhushti’s family is based, and that they had shared their views about the family. His post included screenshots detailing the number of government contracts the family had won. According to him, locals even referred to the family as “Tenderovich,” a mocking nickname derived from their apparent dominance in winning state tenders.

Also read this absolutely insane article written in English and German in record time after this smear campaign was launched with even more wild accusations. written by a German. They even had paid advertising on this article on Facebook, which is how I found it.

When the Social Democrats pointed out that the smear campaign originated with UNM leaders, many regular protestors on Facebook instead assumed that this opposition activist account had been the source all along and that it was false to attribute this to UNM. This obscured the party’s responsibility and made it appear that the scandal had bubbled up organically. The shift was crucial: what began as a party-driven attack was reframed as grassroots outrage. Yet it is difficult to believe the opposition activist that followed Ana’s post just happened to be in Guria, casually speaking with townspeople about the family and then deciding to publish such an exposé. Unless he was from the same town as Vakhushti or vacationed there during the summer, the explanation seemed unlikely. What appeared more plausible was that his post had been coordinated or at least informed by the earlier UNM attacks, giving it a veneer of authenticity while further entrenching the “Tenderovich” image in public discourse.

They claimed that every government contract his family applied for had been won. The opposition believes that winning state tenders is inseparable from political loyalty—that only those close to the ruling party can secure them. They also believe that all those against the government are punished by the government and they are suspicious how Vakhushti evaded punishment?! The optics reinforced the idea that the Social Democrat leader’s family benefited from connections to the government thereby casting doubt on his good faith engagement in opposition politics. When the protests erupted after the elections in October, some members of this left were quick to vilify other leftists (me included) publicly who didn’t join them in the protest accusing them of being secretly funded by Georgian Dream and acting as propagandists of Georgian Dream. Public shaming campaigns based on false virtue signaling cuts both ways.

Vakhushti’s initial response only fueled more resentment. He claimed not to know what his family does or what contracts they had won, saying he had only recently checked in with his father and brother after hearing the rumors. To many, this came across as evasive and disingenuous. For protesters already convinced that government tenders are linked to political loyalty, his denial did not dispel suspicion. Instead, it deepened the sense that he was out of touch and unwilling to take responsibility for the privileges tied to his family’s business. He had more answers today to clear up some of the allegations, but the damage was already done.

The smear campaign quickly spread on Facebook because there was fertile ground. Other opposition activists joined in. Many claimed they had sacrificed their livelihoods for the protests, struggling to pay tens of thousands of lari in penalties and losing their jobs as retaliation by government. They feel they are enduring hardship for their politics, or they point to others who had made these sacrifices and were punished accordingly. They contrasted their situation with that of the Social Democrat’s family, who continued to profit from state contracts. For them, the allegations resonated, tapping into a sense of injustice and resentment.

People are more willing to accept sacrifice as long as it feels shared. But once sacrifice becomes uneven, resentment follows. Many UNM leaders are not struggling; their positions insulate them from hardship. By zeroing in on Vakhushti’s family contracts with the government, they shifted the anger of others onto him. UNM - a rigorously neoliberal party - actually weaponized economic inequality effectively towards a social democrat.

A few people pointed out how Ana Tsitlidze found the time to attack a fellow anti-government movement leader, dedicating dozens of posts against Vakhushti’s father, when UNM seems to be in critical danger itself, and the EU is threatening to cancel EU visa free travel for Georgians in the coming weeks. Why would they spend their time attacking Social Democrats when much more pressing issues are at hand?!

This is where UNM’s deeply ideological character comes into play. UNM is not a party of democracy or a force against authoritarianism. It is a militant right‑wing neoliberal formation, devoted to securing a government that will bend to the interests of the US and Western capital and strictly aligned with US foreign policy and Western civilization narratives. At its core, the party defines itself through an intense anti‑socialist and anti‑communist identity tied to it.

What compounded their hostility toward the Social Democrats was the latter’s insistence on including UNM itself as part of the problem, and on excluding their leader, Mikheil Saakashvili, from the list of political prisoners. Earlier this year, during “Europe Day” one of the members of MSD had torn up a poster of Saakashvili which caused outrage by UNM and other affiliated politicians. For UNM, Saakashvili is untouchable, and the refusal to sanctify him enraged both the leadership and their rank‑and‑file loyalists. It is not far‑fetched to imagine Saakashvili himself pressing his followers to remove this obstacle, treating the small group of leftists as a pebble in the shoe that needed to be taken care of.

For UNM, there can never be trust in leftists of any kind. They see all socialists—whether radical communists or moderate, pro‑EU social democrats—as tainted by association with Russia and as permanent enemies. Their political imagination cannot accommodate even the mildest form of left-wing politics. This is not about a principled struggle for democracy. It is an ideological war, where charges of authoritarianism are tools of convenience - a means to an end, deployed to crush adversaries and secure their rule again. In practice, their model is not democracy but a dictatorship of anti‑communist elites aligned with the interests of Western Civilization (aka superiority of the West). Their previous rule of Georgia happened to be very violent and repressive.

However, because the left is not militantly ideological in the same way as UNM, they end up being mired in liberal narratives.

Background

Vakhushti Menabde is the leader of the “Movement for Social Democracy” and main organizer of the marches to Georgia Public Broadcasting. This new movement emerged from the daily protests outside Public Broadcasting that have been ongoing since the disputed elections in October. Within this space, more left-leaning groups carved out a role for themselves, supporting the protests against what they describe as “authoritarianism,” while also ensuring their own voices were heard by controlling the bullhorns and organizing much of the presence on the ground - however small that may be.

Despite the fact that Public Broadcasting is generally considered the fairest and least biased media outlet in Georgia compared to other media organizations, it was singled out as a protest site precisely for that reason. Because it is publicly owned, activists believed it could be more vulnerable to pressure and thus more responsive to calls to grant protestors access to airtime. For a time, Public Broadcasting did allow protestors, including various movements such as environmental groups, to use the platform and have their concerns heard. This made Public Broadcasting an important site of struggle for them.

From what I can gather, the social democratic organizers likely saw it as a symbolic and practical place to emphasize the idea of the "public good," aligning with left-liberal values. For them, defending a publicly owned institution against ruling party interest carried broader meaning—it was about keeping a space accountable to citizens (whoever they may be), not the ruling party or parties. By contrast, much of the rapidly growing right wing would prefer either to privatize the station or simply shut it down altogether. In this sense, Public Broadcasting became more than just a media outlet to them. It stood at the center of competing visions for Georgia’s future: one rooted in the preservation of shared public resources, the other in dismantling, commodifying them or keeping them as outlets for the ruling party. However, this competing vision was lost on most people who weren’t already ideologically inclined to understand.

Many employees of Public Broadcasting, including those who identified as leftists, felt that the protests were a direct attack on them. They did not understand why they were being singled out when, compared to other media in Georgia, they believed they practiced the closest thing to real journalism (the bar is very low in Georgia). Their frustration grew from the sense that the protests ignored the relatively fair and balanced role the station played.

At the same time, the government was also aware of precedents like Maidan and other uprisings, where protesters tried to seize control of television stations as a way to delegitimize governments and amplify revolutionary demands. For those critical of protests inside the station, it seemed less about protecting a public good and more about using the station as a platform for a movement aimed at forcing the government to resign. The TV station and the ruling party was adamant about not giving in to their demands and not letting it be occupied. They also first limited then de-platformed a show where the host was pro-opposition and finally fired the host.

This is where the idea of "citizenship" became contested. Protesters framed themselves as the voice of the people, but it was never clear who counted as the “people” and who did not. In practice, it was impossible to separate the leftist defense of public goods from the larger opposition movement that sought regime change and the probably the abolishing or privatization of public broadcaster.

A fundamental issue with leftists in Georgia is that their political practice tends to lean more toward the "democrat" side than the "social" side. This is partly because the mainstream political agenda is set within a framework defined by Western actors, where democracy is consistently framed in narrow terms therefore social democrats believe they would have more success in expanding this category. In practice, this version of democracy aligns with capitalism, safeguarded by a ruling elite, and tied to U.S. geopolitical interests and EU investment priorities. For Social Democrats trying to gain visibility or legitimacy, this environment pressures them to speak the language of democracy promotion rather than class politics.

Another factor shaping this tendency is the means of mobilization. Western-backed media outlets, civil society organizations, and political networks are designed to generate mass protests around issues framed as democracy versus authoritarianism. These channels have the infrastructure and resources to bring people into the streets quickly and effectively. By contrast, explicitly social or class-based causes rarely have the same reach. Struggles around wages, working conditions, or social protections do not attract comparable levels of media coverage or donor support. As a result, they cannot mobilize at the same scale. None of us can.

Most of the working class does not see a place for themselves in elite-led protests. They have little reason to march for causes framed as democracy promotion or anti-authoritarianism. For them, life is already ruled by another kind of authoritarianism—the market. Low wages, insecure jobs, high rents, and rising prices weigh heavier than slogans about regime change. These struggles press on their daily lives in ways politics on Rustaveli Street protests do not. There was even an incident where miners came down to Tbilisi to protest the mine being shut down. At the end of their action, someone convinced the organizers to march to Public Broadcasting and join the opposition protest. This was not a decision made collectively but rather an ad hoc move. While there were speeches about how Public Broadcasting was not covering the miners’ struggle. Ironically, at the very same time, one of the miners was inside the station recording a radio program about their protest. In fact, Public Broadcasting had been among the first outlets to report on the miners’ situation. Yes they could have done more, and that is a legitimate critique, however it was more to create the optics that the opposition protest had working class support which, in reality, was a stretch of the imagination.

The left’s participation in the opposition has followed a consistent pattern that ultimately weakens their position. Unlike UNM, which is deeply ideological and militant in its right‑wing neoliberalism, the left has substituted democracy and anti‑authoritarianism as their central ideology. In practice, this means that “authoritarianism” becomes a substitute for socialism, while their strategic horizon is narrowed to liberal democracy and EU integration. Many leftists even assume that EU directives will deliver social policies, relieving them of the need to build an independent socialist program rooted in local struggles which would take years and huge resources.

This orientation leaves them vulnerable in two ways. First, the right‑wing opposition, especially UNM does not see shades of difference within the left. To them, all socialists are, by definition, crypto‑communists, sympathetic to Russia and the Soviet past. No matter how much these leftists smear the USSR and tie their political heritage to the Menshevik government. This perception ensures that leftists are never trusted, no matter how moderate, pro‑EU, or liberal their orientation.

Second, their politics are shaped more by Western scripts than Georgian realities. They frame the struggle in stark terms of light versus darkness, democracy versus authoritarianism, claiming that after the elections Georgia had “woken up in Russia.” Yet the actual level of repression in Georgia, while at times heavy‑handed, does not rise to the authoritarianism they describe. When the government fails to crush all opposition leaders, the narrative begins to collapse, leaving leftists open to suspicion or even conspiracy theories that they are compromised agents.

Meanwhile, the opposition itself has shrunk drastically, with its hopes resting largely on U.S. sanctions against the ruling party. Daily protests adorned with US and EU flags are more performance for Western audiences than a genuine engine of domestic mobilization, meant to prove loyalty and attract intervention. In this way, the opposition as a whole is sustained less by a domestic social base and more by the projection of loyalty to Euro‑Atlantic institutions.

These groups have also centered their critique on Bidzina Ivanishvili, the financier and founder of Georgian Dream, the ruling party, as an oligarch who controls Georgia through money. In this framing, money becomes the essence of political power. Yet this analysis often downplays the role of Western funding and influence. Ironically, the same emphasis on money and influence has now been used against them, with attacks targeting the financial activities of their own families and networks.

All of this makes the opposition camp a profoundly inhospitable environment for leftists. Their presence is resented by the right, who equate them with Georgian Dream, and their own political practice reduces them to an echo of liberal democracy. They are getting ejected by stronger and more militant forces who have the most at stake to win by ousting the government. In fact, while every government in Georgia has engaged in what can be termed a "War on Homo Sovieticus,” UNM's approach has been particularly aggressive when they were in power. That involved not only the condemnation of communist ideology but also legislative measures aimed at erasing symbols associated with it. These anti-communist campaigns have often been framed as part of a broader movement toward European integration and Western civilization’s liberal values, reinforcing the notion that embracing a pro-Western identity requires rejecting the remnants of Soviet influence and communism. This means UNM is doing what it usually does, purging the communists - even if they are social democrats.

Of course, no matter my differences with the social democrats, I am opposed to red scaring, red purges and smear campaigns and will actively oppose it.

If you enjoy my work and have the means, I’d be grateful if you became a paid subscriber.

On January 12, 2025, Mzia Amaghlobeli was arrested in Batumi, in the autonomous region of Adjara, for slapping the city’s police chief. The incident occurred just hours after she had been briefly detained and released for putting up stickers calling for a nationwide strike against the Georgian government—a government the opposition considers illegitimate.

Mzia is the founder and director of two media outlets, Batumelebi and Netgazeti. Following her arrest, she was held in pretrial detention for seven months. On August 6, she was sentenced to two years in prison, with the time already served counted toward that sentence.

Originally, she faced 4 to 7 years under Article 353-1, Part 1 of the Criminal Code, which covers attacks against police officers, penitentiary officials, and other public authorities. However, the court downgraded the charges to Article 353, covering resistance, threats, or violence against law enforcement, since the slap could not be proven to be an attack on a police officer. Mzia also claimed she was verbally abused and spat on by the police in detention. Although the downgraded charge permitted milder penalties such as fines or house arrest, the court imposed the harshest available option: imprisonment.

Just hours after Mzia’s verdict, another high-profile case drew attention; however, in this case, the prisoner was acquitted. Giorgi Akhobadze—who is also seen as a political prisoner by the opposition —had his drug possession charges dropped. Opposition politicians quickly claimed this as a victory, framing it as evidence that pressure is working.

Mzia’s trial began August 1 and was attended by ambassadors from eight different countries. Her imprisonment has become a cause, often framed as the arrest of a journalist for doing journalism, or repression of women journalists. She has been described as Georgia’s “first female journalist prisoner of conscience.” Amnesty International and Reporters Without Borders have condemned her imprisonment.

A joint statement condemning her two-year sentence was issued by 24 diplomatic missions, including the European Union:

The European Parliament recently passed a resolution that calls for the “immediate and unconditional release” of Mzia Amaghlobeli and urges that all politically motivated charges against her be dropped. Advocacy organizations and her supporters also report that her health has worsened in detention, particularly her eyesight. Even George Clooney’s organization has gotten involved. She has also been nominated for the Sakharov Prize.

Her own media outlets have circulated hashtags like “Journalism is not a crime” reinforcing the campaign’s framing that she is imprisoned for being a journalist.

In general, “journalist” is a protected and symbolically powerful category for human rights organizations and Western institutions such as the EU and U.S. government. Any action taken against someone identified as a journalist—regardless of whether they were acting in a journalistic capacity at the time—is often treated as an attack on press freedom. This standard, however, is not always applied consistently, as seen in Gaza.

In Mzia’s case, she was not arrested while reporting or engaged in journalistic work, but for slapping the police chief. That said, she had been briefly detained just hours earlier for a political act: putting up stickers calling for a strike against the government.

Political Context

In Georgia, the boundaries between journalism, activism, and political engagement are often fluid. Many individuals working in the media also engage in public advocacy, protest or take clear political positions, particularly those who are in opposition to the government, and their media are usually created as a way to put their politics into action. In the case of Mzia Amaghlobeli, it is important to note that in addition to her work in journalism, she is an activist.

This kind of overlap is not limited to journalists. There are instances where diplomatic representatives, civil society actors, and media figures engage in political processes in ways that blur conventional roles. Recent reporting has raised concerns about perceived conflicts of interest—for example, the German ambassador was reported to be renting a property owned by an opposition politician, a matter that has since prompted an official inquiry.

In such a political environment, professional identities—whether as journalists, diplomats, or civil society leaders—can take a back seat to political affiliation or engagement. This dynamic contributes to a climate where actions are frequently interpreted through the lens of political alignment, particularly in relation to the current government which opposition and supporters want to oust.

While international statements of support and condemnation frequently describe Mzia Amaghlobeli and her media outlets as “widely respected,” that characterization is subjective and does not necessarily reflect Georgian reality. These statements also frame her reporting as focused on human rights and corruption, implying that she’s being targeted because of her work on these issues.

However, coverage of human rights issues in Georgia is often weaponized and filtered through a political lens. Media outlets in the country are typically aligned with specific political parties or camps, with little pretense of neutrality. The notion of “independent media” is quite weak in Georgia where most outlets openly serve partisan interests and rarely strive for balanced or non-biased reporting. For example, the opposition-leaning TV media frequently use politically loaded language in their news broadcasts, such as “the so-called parliament” when referring to Georgia’s parliament. International coverage also points to one of the outlets’ bank accounts being frozen due to unpaid taxes as another way to pressure Mzia during the trial. Mzia’s media outlets, Batumelebi and Netgazeti, have posted statements on their webpages saying that they refuse to comply with the two foreign influence laws that were introduced by the Georgian Dream government during the last year. Like opposition groups, they label them “Russian laws” and claim that in Russia, a similar law abolished all democratic institutions and consolidated a dictatorship. The outlets state they refuse “to obey the anti-constitutional, anti-democratic law” and therefore refuse to register in the newly created “FARA” database.

What lies at the heart of the Mzia case is not simply press freedom, but a highly polarized and unstable political climate. The opposition accuses the government of electoral manipulation, “totally rigged elections”, of being Russian puppets, and consolidating power through authoritarianism. In response, opposition parties have called for non-recognition of the government, new elections to be administered under international supervision (read: the West) and have lobbied EU and U.S. actors to impose sanctions on the ruling party as a means of pressuring them to step down. Many opposition parties have announced they will boycott the upcoming municipal elections scheduled for this fall, they are hoping that the sanctions package called the “MEGOBARI Act” will be passed by the U.S. Senate, which would impose sanctions on Georgian officials accused of “undermining” democracy, and they feel confident they’ll get their way in ousting this government.

Two opposition parties have broken ranks with the rest of the opposition on the issue of whether to boycott the October 4 municipal elections, and decided to take part in them, earning the wrath of the other opposition parties. One of the leaders of the party Lelo, which plans to take part in the elections, was thrown out of yesterday’s protest celebrating the release of Akhobadze and called a ‘traitor.’

Meanwhile, a number of EU member states and the U.S. have withheld formal recognition of the current government’s legitimacy. The former president, Salome Zourabichvili, continues to publicly assert that she is the only legitimate representative of the Georgian state.

The current situation in Georgia, is that most of the opposition parties show no signs of backing down—they are pursuing full victory, and their supporters in the EU appear willing to back them all the way, as far as their power allows, in achieving that goal.

It’s also important to note that the person Mzia slapped was not just any police officer, but the Batumi Police Chief, Irakli Dgebuadze—a high-ranking official and symbolic figure of state authority far beyond Batumi police headquarters. This is seen by police and Georgian Dream supporters as a direct assault on the leadership of the police force, which in the current situation Georgia finds itself in right now, plays a central role in maintaining the stability of state institutions and preventing the situation from spiraling out of control.

In the current political climate, the police have been the main institution tasked with managing anti-government protests, amid mounting criticism over instances of police brutality, questionable arrests, and excessive use of force. Unlike in previous periods of political crisis in Georgia, the government has not called on its supporters to confront protesters in the streets. Instead, it has relied on the police to contain unrest and avoid a descent into political violence or militia-style conflict, which has occurred at other moments in Georgia’s post-Soviet history.

Because of this reliance, the police have an outsized importance for Georgian Dream’s ability to remain in power. This is why the government has been unwilling to open investigations into police misconduct, despite the existence of multiple credible and potentially winnable cases against them by protestors. To be seen interfering in the case of a police chief—especially one assaulted so publicly—on behalf of a politically active journalist would be politically damaging. It would signal weakness and could fracture the government’s relationship with law enforcement.

Instead, Georgian Dream politicians have chosen to express solidarity with the police chief. At the same time, allowing Mzia to remain in prison makes the government vulnerable to increased pressure from hostile Western governments. Presenting her case without context, as a case only of an imprisoned woman journalist, is a misleading framing that lets EU politicians reaffirm their commitment to human rights and democratic values, while also serving as a political instrument for their broader efforts to pressure a Georgian government they no longer favor.

For the government, releasing her would come with a different kind of political cost at home. Over time, Georgian Dream has come to see Euro-Atlantic support as increasingly unreliable—especially given what it views such support as blatant interference in Georgia’s domestic political affairs—and has gradually shifted away from trying to appease its Western partners.

Hence, there is now talk that Georgia’s president, Mikheil Kavelashvili, may issue a pardon for Mzia Amaghlobeli as a way for Georgian Dream to find an exit from the political quagmire her imprisonment has created for them without domestic political cost.

The release of Giorgi Akhobadze has also left the opposition in a somewhat contradictory position. They celebrated it as a political win thanks to their pressure and proof that the “regime” is weakening. Yet just hours earlier, many of the same figures were condemning the government as an unyielding authoritarian force over Mzia’s sentencing—even while acknowledging that the sentence handed down was lighter than expected. Those two narratives are hard to reconcile.

Georgia is caught up in the aftermath of global crises, not just domestic ones. The Mzia Amaghlobeli case is not just about journalism—it is about what happens when institutions, legitimacy, and political narratives collapse into a state of crisis, triggered by the West’s own strategic unraveling following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In this environment, every arrest becomes a battleground, every speech a provocation, and every release a political move. This won’t end anytime soon—and in many ways, it’s no longer up to Georgia. When Europe and the U.S. sneeze, Georgia catches a cold.

There's nothing I love more than a class composition study – they're incredibly difficult to do yet vitally needed. This work, 'Class Structure in Georgia' by Kote Eristavi and Ana Mikhelidze, maps Georgia’s class composition to expose our real problems beyond superficial political agendas. I deeply welcome this ambitious effort; knowing how painstaking such research is—especially in Georgia, where hostility to class discourse stifles dialogue and resources for such work scarcely exist.

I won't focus on gaps (the authors surely recognize future needs). Below is my summary of their findings—unless noted, these are condensed study points, not my commentary. The Georgian original is available here.

Class Structure in Georgia Study

Why Class Analysis and Background to Georgia

The authors argue class analysis exposes hidden structures of domination and exploitation—from state policies (e.g., Georgia's class-biased criminal justice) to ideological narratives—revealing how class positions shape lives, inequalities, and political potential, while empowering strategic solidarity against systemic injustice.

While sociology offers distinct class models (Weber's life chances, Bourdieu's tripartite capital, Marx's property-based exploitation), the authors adopt Wright's neo-Marxist framework—prioritizing oppression/liberation analysis—to map Georgian class conflicts and alliances, without dismissing complementary insights from other traditions.

The authors use Wright’s framework to expand Marxist class analysis beyond property relations by adding authority (control over others' work) and autonomy (control over one's labor process), revealing three contradictory class locations that occupy antagonistic positions between primary classes.

According to the authors, independent Georgia's class structure emerged from Soviet collapse and IMF/World Bank-mandated neoliberal "shock therapy" (1992–1994), featuring mass privatization, state dismantling, and austerity. These reforms—implemented amid civil war and hyperinflation—triggered catastrophic deindustrialization: industrial employment plummeted from 695,000 (1990) to 284,000 (1996), with total production collapsing 78% by 1995 and formal sector jobs evaporating. The destruction of stable, skilled employment created a permanent underclass while consolidating power among oligarchic capital aligned with foreign financial interests.

The authors note that Georgia's 51% unemployment surge in the 1990s reflected mass displacement into subsistence agriculture and informal work—which comprised 52% of employment by 1999. Concurrent state collapse dismantled social safety nets through pension arrears, gutted worker protections, and confiscation of Soviet-era union assets. These forces, combined with skilled workers embracing neoliberal "meritocracy" over solidarity, catastrophically weakened collective labor power during transition.

According to the authors, Georgia's post-Soviet collapse triggered a mass shift into small-scale farming and a ballooning "surplus population" (unemployed/underemployed/precarious workers), while deindustrialization dismantled skilled labor and social protections—catastrophically impoverishing most citizens. Simultaneously, a politically connected capitalist class emerged through predatory asset grabs rather than productive investment, creating extreme inequality and fragmenting into rival oligarchic factions that would later drive the 2003 regime change.

The authors argue that post-2000s Georgia intensified neoliberal reforms—accelerating privatization, deregulation, and public sector cuts—to attract foreign investment through employer-friendly policies like wage suppression and anti-union measures, culminating in the 2011 Freedom Act that constitutionally restricted taxes and social spending. This, they say, cemented an extractive economic model: manufacturing stagnates at 9.3% of GDP while low-productivity tourism/retail dominates, trapping rural populations in subsistence farming (6% GDP share despite high employment) and workers in precarious, disempowered conditions.

They clarify their class terminology as follows:

Small Employers

Wright considers small employers to be those with fewer than 10 employees. His criterion is conditional, as he does not have access to data that would accurately measure the amount of capital and the involvement of employers in the work process. Such data is not available to the authors either, and therefore, at this stage, they use Wright's criterion.

Self-Employed (petty bourgeoisie) [note: I disagree with categorizing self-employed without any workers as petty bourgeoisie]

For the purposes of the authors’ typology, they refer to the self-employed category as people who 1) engage in economic activity, 2) own the means of production, but 3) do not have hired workers (unlike the Geostat methodology, where self-employed people may have hired workers), and 4) are not involved in agriculture (they include self-employed people involved in agriculture in the class position of small farmers).

The authors define genuine self-employed (petty bourgeoisie) as non-agricultural, workerless owners free from exploitation, but labor surveys fail to distinguish them from dependent self-employed—workers tied to 1–2 clients via service contracts who lack autonomy over work conditions. These workers (e.g., 22,794+ Georgian taxi/delivery drivers under algorithmic control, construction laborers, and salon "renters") are reclassified by the authors as semi-independent workers due to experiencing domination, exposing how "self-employment" masks exploitation in Georgia’s informal economy.

Managers and Supervisors

Managers are identified using Geostat’s ISCO-08 occupational groups, while supervisors are defined as non-managerial employees who report supervising others in labor surveys—including professionals reclassified as non-professionals if they oversee staff. This approach captures critical nuances (e.g., top managers acting as de facto owners/shareholders vs. low-level supervisors functioning as order-relayers with minimal autonomy), but the authors note that future research must refine authority gradients to accurately map class positions.

Semi-independent workers

Semi-independent workers are provisionally defined by the authors as hired professionals (per ISCO/Labor Force Survey) who lack supervisory roles, leveraging specialized knowledge/skills to mitigate workplace domination and exploitation. However, this category requires refinement—not all professionals have meaningful autonomy (e.g., junior roles), while some non-professionals (e.g., skilled technicians) may control their work process, highlighting the need for empirical research on actual job independence in Georgia.

Small Farmers

Georgia’s small farmers (subsistence/market-oriented agriculturists) represent a distinct class position absent in Wright’s Western-centric model, defined by vulnerability to land dispossession and reliance on fragmented wage labor alongside precarious self-employment. Unlike prosperous Western landowners, the authors argue they occupy a semi-proletarianized "contradictory class position" due to high client dependency (often resembling disguised employment) and seasonal proletarianization. This periphery-specific reality necessitates re-theorizing their place in capitalist class structures through empirical study of their hybrid livelihoods.

Dynamics of class structure development

Long-term analysis of Georgia's class structure dynamics is severely limited, according to the authors, by unavailable early-2000s labor data and incompatible pre-2020 surveys (2009/2017), restricting comparative analysis to only the 2020 and 2024 Labour Force Surveys. Technical and methodological discontinuities prevent reliable historical tracking, confining this study's temporal scope to a narrow post-2020 timeframe despite the recognized importance of observing structural shifts across decades.

Georgia’s class structure is divided like this: Class of capitalists (not involved in the production process); Small employers (involved in the production process); Class of self-employed (urban employment. excluding dependent self-employed); Managers (excluding top managers, who are practically no different from employers); Supervisors (in case of real control over the planning and/or implementation of the work process); Semi-independent workers (in the case of substantial control over the planning and implementation of the work process); The working class; Small farmers.

Georgian Language Table from Study.

Total (Employees+those working in subsistence agriculture) 1,689,159 in 2020 and 1,772,583 in 2024.

Capitalists (Large Employers): 2020:4,965 2024:4,068

Small employers (1-10): 2020:34,111 2024:42,422

Self-Employed: 2020: 112,680 2024: 159,658

Managers: 2020: 64,631. 2024: 75,689

Supervisors: 2020: 46,844. 2024: 54,260

Semi-independent workers: 2020: 215,436. 2024: 218,490

Workers: 2020: 546,034 2024: 634,780

Small farmers: 2020: 649,407 2024: 553,400

(My own generated AI diagrams)

According to the authors, Georgia's peripheral economy features an undersized working class and scarce managers due to deindustrialization, while its large semi-independent professional class (58% state-employed) reflects an outsized public sector. High self-employment (fueled by tourism/tax incentives) and widespread small farming emerge as survival strategies amid weak social protections and semi-proletarianization.

This chart below shows the class composition of developed countries, note the category of small farmers.

Chart was translated by me and made by AI using the Georgian language chart in the study.

While wage differences between job positions are often deemed legitimate (unlike discriminatory intra-position gaps), Georgia's 2020–2024 data, as interpreted by the authors, reveals these disparities reflect power imbalances—not merit—as managerial wages surged 20% versus just 7% for workers, outpacing employment growth. This widening gap, driven by weak unions and regressive policies, fractures worker solidarity and aligns privileged employees with capital interests—contrasting sharply with egalitarian models like postwar Sweden’s union-driven solidaristic wage system.

Translated graph from study

The authors observe that Georgia's Soviet legacy created widespread high education (to this day, nearly 1/3 of low/medium-skilled workers hold degrees, including 15–17% with master's), yet this human capital is severely underutilized in its deindustrialized economy—revealing systemic labor market failure. Future research, they argue, must analyze how class positions perpetuate inequality, enable (or block) social mobility, and shape attitudes toward economic organization and capital-labor relations.

Other Important Issues in Class Analysis

Precarity

While Guy Standing's concept of the "precariat" identifies precarious work as defining a new class in modern capitalism, the authors argue that in Georgia, job vulnerability permeates all classes—from managers to self-employed workers—making employment instability insufficient for class distinction. They contend precariousness is a universal condition in Georgia's economy that requires empirical study of its varying intensity within and between existing class positions, rather than constituting a standalone class.

Secondary Exploitation

While primary exploitation occurs through employer-employee relations during production (e.g., wage suppression), secondary exploitation operates via exchange mechanisms (Lapavitsas 2013)—where capital appropriates income through rent, interest, or fees, targeting wages, aid, or self-employment earnings. In Georgia, the authors argue, workers face dual exploitation: exploited first by employers and again as tenants/borrowers. Meanwhile, ostensibly "independent" self-employed market vendors (e.g., stall holders) escape primary exploitation but endure secondary exploitation via punitive stall rents/fees imposed by market owners. This secondary layer proves especially acute for Georgia’s surplus population—those excluded from formal labor and reliant on fragmented incomes vulnerable to financial extraction.

Surplus Population

The "surplus population"—groups superfluous to immediate production needs (e.g., unemployed, pensioners, students)—remains integral to capitalism, according to the authors, through financial exploitation (e.g., Liberty Bank’s predatory pension loans) and its role as a disciplining reserve army of labor that suppresses wages and awaits mobilization, as seen historically with Western women’s entry into the workforce or neoliberal reliance on Global South labor. In Georgia’s peripheral economy, this population is exceptionally large and subjected to heightened state control as a "destabilization risk," while its reproduction systematically undermines worker power through precarization and debt traps.

World Systems and Class Structure

World-systems theory (Frank, Wallerstein) posits that the Global North enriches itself at the expense of the Global South through structural mechanisms like debt regimes, extractive trade policies, and institutions (IMF/WB/WTO), confining peripheral economies like Georgia to roles as raw material suppliers and cheap labor reservoirs. The authors argue that this position in the global hierarchy fundamentally molds national class structures—yet Georgia’s specific patterns of dependency remain critically understudied and demand urgent research focus.

Conclusion

This study maps Georgia’s class structure to expose deep-rooted inequality driven by class oppression, identifies critical research gaps (e.g., surplus populations, global dependency), and argues that centering class conflict is essential—both to understand societal crises and to mobilize for justice beyond superficial cultural/geopolitical debates.

As promised, I’ll be translating a short but incisive book on the Middle East by a Soviet Georgian political scientist, Abon Tsistiashvili which examines two contrasting approaches to conflict resolution in the region. What compelled me to share this work is its sharp critique of U.S. imperialism, Israel and the Middle East—an analysis I believe is still deeply relevant today.

I’ll be posting each chapter as I complete the translation on my Substack. If you’d like to support this effort, consider becoming a paid subscriber! Your backing helps me dedicate more time to bringing overlooked Soviet Georgian books to you in English!

This is the third installment - chapter two.

Suez — The Sunset of Colonialism. The Positions of the Soviet Union and the United States

The Egyptian Revolution of 1952 and Its Historical Role for the Arab World.

The revolution of July 23, 1952 in Egypt created new conditions in the Middle East.1 As the Arab author Ahmed Kerouma figuratively writes, “The imperialists thought that the Arab East was surrounded by the chains of the Atlantic and Baghdad Pacts, as well as their stronghold, Israel... But suddenly they saw that the iron chains had broken, their pacts had lost their power. The walls of this encirclement were crumbling, and Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and North Africa were peeking out from there.”2

On July 23, 1952, the anti-imperialist revolution triumphed in Egypt. King Farouk and his family, loaded with more than two hundred suitcases, set off for Naples on the yacht "El Mahrousa".3 The revolution was led by the organization "Free Officers" under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser.4 A new situation was created in the Middle East. The revolutionary government initiated socio-economic transformations in 1952, implementing agrarian reform that brought it into direct conflict with the large landowning class. Nationalization affected all industries—including the entire banking system and transport—and extended not only to the big bourgeoisie but also to the middle class; as a result, the former were liquidated, while the latter faced restrictions.

On October 19, 1954, in the “Pharaohs” Hall of the Egyptian Parliament, near the black basalt statue of “Pharaoh Ramses II,” the Egyptian-British agreement on the evacuation of the British army was signed. In June 1956, the British army was withdrawn from this great country of the Arab world, Egypt, in particular from the Suez Canal zone. This was a real triumph for the leaders of the revolution.

The British occupation of Egypt, which lasted 74 years, went down in history. The beginning of the end of the once indisputable power of England in the Middle East began. The government of G. A. Nasser began to pursue an independent foreign policy. It was G. A. Nasser who initiated the liquidation of Egypt’s unilateral orientation towards the West. This orientation has brought it quite a lot of trouble in the past. The imperialist cordon around Egypt began to be breached, measures were taken, albeit minimal at first, to establish ties with the socialist states.

In May 1953, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles arrived in Cairo, with the aim of strengthening America's position in Egypt. In a speech in Cairo on May 11, 1953, the leader of the Egyptian revolution, G. Nasser, decisively rebuffed attempts to drag Egypt into an aggressive bloc called to "stop communism" in the Middle East.5 When J.F. Dulles began to intimidate with the threat of the Soviet Union, Nasser asked a reasonable question, with which he would later repeatedly put his Western opponents in a deadlock: “Why should we be afraid of the Soviet Union? It is 5,000 miles away from us, and we have never had any trouble with it. It has never attacked us. It never occupied our territory, it never had a base on our territory, and the British were here for 70 years.”6 This is how the famous Egyptian political commentator M. Heikal describes this meeting.

In 1955, G. Nasser formulated six fundamental principles of the Egyptian revolution: 1) the abolition of imperialism; 2) the abolition of feudalism; 3) the abolition of capitalist monopolies and their political oppression; 4) the establishment of social justice; 5) the creation of a powerful national army; 6) the establishment of a truly democratic system.

The logic of the anti-imperialist course pursued by G. Nasser led him to a second important decision, which marked a turning point in the history of independent Egypt. We have in mind the following: in September 1955, Egypt signed an agreement with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland to the purchase of weapons.

G. Nasser's merit was that he was the first of the political figures of the liberated Suez countries to appreciate the enormous opportunity that the world socialist system created for these countries, "To understand and verify through his own experience that imperialism no longer has a monopoly either on the supply of weapons or on economic, technical and financial assistance.”7

The answer to the challenge. Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company.

The first attempt to establish business cooperation with Western countries showed Nasser the true goals and nature of the loans and “aid” promised by the imperialists. “Dulles and Eden,” Nasser said when he was refused a loan for the construction of the High Dam, “have only been deceiving us all this time. They demanded from us a truce with Israel, participation in pacts, the continuation of the Suez Canal concession, but they only aspired to strengthen their influence.” But this was not just a refusal, it was a challenge. Nasser accepted this challenge.

On July 26, 1956, exactly a week after receiving Dulles’s refusal of the loan, in a speech from the balcony of the Alexandria Cotton Exchange, he announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. It was a well-thought-out move. As Ahmad Hamrush, a famous Egyptian publicist, journalist, left-wing public and political figure, and one of the first members of the Free Officers organization, writes, “This idea did not arise suddenly, as a spontaneous reaction to the refusal to finance the dam. The idea of nationalization always lived in Nasser’s soul and heart and was an expression of the long-awaited desire of the Egyptians.”8 Nasser carried out the measures related to the decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company in an atmosphere of absolute secrecy. He did not even inform the Council of Ministers. Those whom G. Nasser instructed to implement this decision learned about it only two days before its announcement.

The nationalization of the Suez Canal Company had been a dream of the Egyptians for many years.

As is known, the canal was built with the blood of the Egyptians. During the ten years of construction of the canal (1859-1869), 120 thousand Egyptians died. Egypt spent 450 million francs on the construction of the canal.

In 1875, the British Prime Minister Disraeli (Lord Beaconsfield) bought the shares of the Suez Canal Company from the then rulers of Egypt. Prime Minister Disraeli rightly believed that this would open the way for the British army to enter Egypt. And so it did. Just seven years later, the occupation of this Arab country became a fact. The four million pounds sterling that Disraeli paid for the Suez Canal shares yielded such extraordinary political dividends for Britain that this single audacious—and treacherous—move alone rightly cemented Lord Beaconsfield's legacy as a founding architect of British imperialism.9 In the years after World War II, 1/6 of all world shipping, 1/4 of England's foreign trade turnover, eight percent of France's foreign trade turnover, and a significant part of US oil shipments passed through the Suez Canal.10 The Suez Canal Company was called a "State within a state," and it did not obey local laws. The company's shareholders received huge net profits, in 1955 alone - 33 million pound sterling. Of this, only 4-5 million pound sterling were paid to Egypt.

For the Egyptians, the words “Suez Canal Company” had been synonymous with the omnipotence of foreigners for almost 100 years, hanging over their heads like the Sword of Damocles. Now the myth of the omnipotent West had been dispelled.

On July 26, G. Nasser concluded one of his most remarkable, almost four-hour speeches with the following words: “ I look at Americans and say: may you choke to death on your fury. The annual income of the Suez Canal is $100 million. Why not take it ourselves? ... The canal was built by the Egyptians, not by the Frenchman Ferdinand de Lessups. We will build a high dam of the kind we want. The Suez Canal Company will be nationalized and its managers will be Egyptians! Egyptians!”11 The next day, a decree was issued on the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company.12

Egypt's rapprochement with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries provided it with a strong backing, which undoubtedly contributed to its successful attack on the positions of foreign big capital.

The Soviet Union fully recognized the legality and justice of the actions of the Egyptian government.13

In Washington, all of the above was assessed as a serious threat to the positions of imperialism and colonialism not only in the Middle East, but also beyond its borders. J. F. Dulles was furious when he heard of Nasser's decision to participate in the first Bandung Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries, which he saw as "a betrayal of the goals of the crusade against communism." The overthrow of the progressive regime in Egypt became a central link in the policy of Washington and other Western states in the Middle East.

In the fight against Egypt, the Zionist leadership of Israel offered its services to imperialist circles. In his memoirs, M. Sharett (Deputy Prime Minister of Israel) reports about the meeting of the Israeli government on October 3, 1955, at which the head of Israeli intelligence, I. Harel, spoke: “He came to the conclusion that the United States gives us freedom of action. Now the United States is interested in overthrowing the Nasser regime, but at present it has not decided to use the methods with which the Arbenz government in Guatemala and the Mosaddegh government in Iran were overthrown. They prefer that this work be done entirely by Israel.”14

This was precisely the goal of the armed aggression launched against Egypt by Israel, England, and France in October 1956.

Error in the report. The Suez crises of 1956 and Lebanon of 1958.

In bourgeois literature we often find the assertion that the Suez crisis began on July 26, 1956, i.e. after the adoption of a decree by the Egyptian government on the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. But such an explanation of the beginning of the crisis does not correspond to reality. The Suez crisis was caused not by the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company by the Egyptian government, but by the policy of England, France, the United States of America, Israel and other countries, which opposed the lawful act of Egypt. It is very characteristic that already in October 1955, after the announcement of the agreement on the supply of Soviet weapons to Egypt, Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion invited Moshe Dayan to his room at the Gana Hotel in Jerusalem and instructed him to draw up a plan for preparing for war.15

This war began on October 29, 1956. At the beginning of the war, the aggressors achieved great success. A week after the start of the war, on November 6, the Anglo-French units occupied Port Said. On the same day, they moved south, in the direction of Ismailia and Suez, and advanced about 40 kilometers. But at this moment, General Keightley received an order from London to cease fire. The Soviet historian A. M. Goldobin writes in his study of the Suez Crisis: “There is no doubt that by the evening of November 6, Egypt was in a very difficult situation, the battle in the air, the battles in Sinai and Port Said were lost. The Egyptians were preparing for a general guerrilla war as a last resort, but at this moment the hand of the aggressor stopped.” Who stopped him?

English, and mostly American memoirs and historiography, hold the view that the military action of England and France was unsuccessful because the United States opposed them. This version is widespread, which is not accidental.16 First, they do not want to recognize the decisive contribution of the Soviet Union to the restoration of peace in the Middle East. For the Arab countries, showing the true role of the Soviet Union at this difficult moment would have made the concepts of the Soviet Union’s “insidious intentions” towards the Arab countries, which were being increasingly propagated in the West, null and void. Second, during the 1956 war, the version of the “benevolent, gracious role” of the United States is being promoted by the American ruling circles, as it portrays them as a friend of the Arabs. And this is beneficial to them, given the strategic, political and economic interests of the United States in the Middle East.

The facts prove the opposite. During the Suez conflict, the Soviet government actively and decisively sided with Egypt, which was fighting for independence. The Soviet Union's statement of November 5, 1956, that if the aggression did not cease and the interventionist troops were not withdrawn from Egyptian territory, it would use force to crush the aggressors and restore peace in the Middle East,17 as well as the firm actions of the Soviet Union (we are referring, in particular, to Soviet Union Telegraph Agency's statement of November 10, 1956, stating that "in connection with the aggression against Egypt by England, France and Israel, many Soviet citizens have appealed to the authorities with a request to allow them to go to Egypt as volunteers in order to fight together with the Egyptian people to expel the aggressors from Egyptian territory"),18 forced England and France to withdraw their troops from Egyptian territory in December 1956, and Israel in March 1957.

This is the truth.

Naturally, the question arises: what was actually the position of the USA at the time of the Suez crisis?

The US did not officially participate in the October 1956 tripartite aggression against Egypt. American propaganda uses this fact and states that the non-acceptance of American participation in the aggression was as if dictated by the concern for the protection of peace and the national independence of the Arab countries, and this is when the then British foreign minister A. Eden tells us in his memoirs that the United States of America knew about the preparations for war against Egypt and did not even try to prevent it!19

In fact, Washington, on the one hand, during the period of preparation for this aggressive action, tried to exert diplomatic influence on Egypt in order to force it to abandon the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and to accept the plan for foreign management of the canal (the so-called Dulles plan). Moreover, the United States took an active part in the financial blockade of Egypt. On the other hand, Washington publicly took the position of condemning the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt. The ambiguity of Washington's position is explained not only by the desire to draw the Arab countries into the sphere of American influence, but also by the assumption that the suppression of the aggression, which was intended, first of all, to maintain Anglo-French dominance in the Middle East, would make it easier for the United States to occupy the positions of the old colonial countries in this region.

So Washington was driven by its own selfish goals.

Indeed, the collapse of the trilateral aggression heralded the end of Anglo-French dominance in the Middle East, and the United States clearly emerged as the heir to the old colonial empire. Washington assumed hegemony in the region. This is evidenced by the “Eisenhower Doctrine” published on January 5, 1957, which declared the right of the United States to intervene, including by armed means, in the internal affairs of any country in the Middle East under the pretext of fighting “international communism”. It aimed to support Arab reaction in the region and strengthen the positions of colonialism, while continuing the line of liquidation of Nasser’s progressive regime (as early as 1955, the Central Intelligence Agency sent three groups of agents to Egypt to assassinate G. Nasser).20

Tel Aviv supported both the "Eisenhower Doctrine" and the American intervention in Lebanon in 1958.

“I want your attention. I would like to draw your attention to the catastrophic consequences that international communism will lead us to if it settles in the heart of the Middle East,” Ben-Gurion wrote in a secret letter to American leaders. “I believe that the free world should not accept such a situation. Everything depends on the firm and decisive line of the United States.”21

The Soviet Union opposed the "Eisenhower Doctrine" with its own constructive program for ensuring peace in the Middle East. In February 1957, the Soviet Union proposed to the governments of the United States, England, and France to issue a joint declaration on the following basic principles by which the parties would oblige themselves to act in their policy towards the Middle East: 1) Maintaining peace only by peaceful means, through the settlement of disputed issues on the basis of negotiations; 2) Non-interference in the internal affairs of the countries of the region, respect for their sovereignty and independence; 3) Refusal of any attempt to involve these countries in military blocs with the participation of large countries; 4) Liquidation of foreign bases and withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of the countries of the region; 5) Mutual refusal to supply weapons to these countries; 6) To promote their economic development without imposing any political, military or other conditions incompatible with the dignity and sovereignty of these countries.22

The growth of Israel's role in the strategy of imperialism.

The Suez and Lebanon crises showed us that direct armed interventions by Western countries in the Middle East are associated with the risk of a serious weakening of their positions in this region. Therefore, in the 60s-80s, the role of Israel in the strategy of imperialism sharply increases as the main weapon for achieving Washington's goals in the Middle East, which is increasingly used as a battering ram in the fight against the Arab liberation movement and, above all, against progressive regimes.

The role that the US ruling circles attribute to Israel in their expansionist policy towards the Middle East can be judged by the following document. In 1951, a special memorandum was submitted regarding Israel’s inclusion in the “American Mutual Security Assistance Program” under the title “Why does Israel need American assistance?” The section of the memorandum is titled “US Interests,” where we read that “a strong Israel is vital to the US,” “Israel is a bastion of world democracy in this region.” The section “Israel’s Strategic Importance” states: “Israel occupies a strategically advantageous geographical location. It is a bridge between three continents, has a fairly long coastline. It has an important seaport in Haifa and a large airfield in Lydda. It borders oil-rich regions.”

Regarding US-Israeli relations, former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said, "... Americans cannot ignore the fact that the doors of the Arab world were opened to them only thanks to Israel's position and its strength. They (i.e. Americans --- A. Ts.) are still convinced that strengthening Israel is the main condition for establishing their dominance over the Arab world."23

The first American ambassador to Israel, MacDonald, eloquently describes the US-Israeli relationship after the creation of the State of Israel in his book “My Mission to Israel, 1948-1951”. First of all, MacDonald’s appointment as ambassador to Israel was an unprecedented act of diplomacy in its speed. President Truman personally and officially designated MacDonald as ambassador to Israel before the Israeli government announced the appointment — despite Israel's obligation to grant agrément. This happened three hours after the declaration of the creation of Israel. In July 1948, before leaving for Israel, MacDonald received a personal note from President Truman, which said: “I expect that in addition to your regular reports, you will provide me with information personally on such matters as the arms embargo, and on the types of assistance that may be needed and may be provided to the new state.”24

In 1957, the “American-Jewish League of Israel” was created in the USA. The most famous American industrialists and financiers, who emerged in the Israeli arena, became honorary members of the League, such as: J. Mezar — the founder of a paper mill, S. Dorf, chairman of "United Jewish Appeal", V. Harris, the founder of American "Ampali" Trust, etc. In addition to this league, there are more than 50 primarily Jewish institutions and organizations in the United States alone.

The role attributed to Israel by the Western powers in their aggressive plans towards the Middle East and the expansionist intentions of the Israeli ruling circles are two sides of the same process that have been present throughout the existence of the State of Israel. The expansionism of the foreign policy of the Israeli ruling circles has been growing in line with the intensification of the actions and campaigns of the imperialist states. Israel's aggressive aspirations have been and continue to be strengthened in line with the growth of the country's military potential, the accumulation of armaments and military weapons, and the strengthening of the army.

The 'special' relationship between the United States and Israel is explained not only by the frequent alignment of their interests in the Middle East. Its reasons should also be sought within the United States itself: in domestic political life, in the role and importance of the Israel lobby, and in the socio-political situation of American citizens of Jewish origin. American authors recognize that what happens in Israel, or what is related to Israel, finds immediate echo in the States. Meanwhile, the Israel lobby strives to convince average Americans that Israel is a 'bastion against communism' in the Middle East – arguing that U.S. support thus meets vital American interests."

The fact remains that 20 percent of the millionaires in the United States are Jews, while the share of Jews in the country's population does not exceed 3 percent!25 The combined capital of the American Jewish bourgeoisie is 150 billion dollars. The five largest investment banking associations in the United States alone, which are all owned by Jewish financiers Lehman, Kuhn, Loeb, Goldman and Sachs, own 23 percent of the shares of the largest industrial companies in the United States, often this figure reaches 40 percent. At the same time, monopolistic Jews are co-owners of such transnational monopolies as General Motors, Chrysler, Ford, Standard Oil Company of Indiana, General Electric Company, etc.

It is also worth considering that the Zionists control 70 percent of the periodicals in the United States, including such influential newspapers and magazines as The New York Times, The Chicago Tribune, Time, Newsweek, Fortune, U. S. News and World Report, and others. 80 percent of television programs, film companies Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 20th Century Fox, and so on. The pro-Israel lobby is strong in the U. S. Congress. “The Zionists,” writes Harvard University professor Reisman, “can control not only the resources of Jewish voters, but also blackmail those who oppose their political goals related to Israel.”26

At the same time, we would like to emphasize one very important point: it would be an oversimplification to say that such luminaries of modern bourgeois society as the above-mentioned Lehman, Kuhn, Loeb, Goldman, Sachs have no other concern than Zionism, that they all consider their affairs either in the light of their national origin or of their Zionist ideology. It is also clear that the possibilities of Zionists in the USA and other capitalist countries depend, first of all, on the extent to which the goals of Zionism coincide with the goals of the USA and other capitalist countries.

This is the fourth interview in the series! If you want more in-depth investigations like this—and to learn about the overlooked stories of Georgian workers at home and abroad—support my work.

This interview takes place in Florence, Italy in a cafe at the mall.

Sofia: I came back to Georgia from Israel. I was planning to settle and live in Georgia.

S: Were you a caregiver in Israel as well? For how long?

Sofia: Yes, I was in Israel for 4 years and 8 months. I accomplished everything I had planned—I arranged everything for my children, bought them apartments, paid for their education, did everything I could for them. I didn’t just buy one apartment—I bought three for my son, and I put both my daughter and daughter-in-law through school. After all that, I came home expecting to live peacefully in my old age. But I could no longer work in my profession—as a teacher—because I no longer had the necessary qualifications. So it made more sense to find other work in Rustavi.

S: Are you from Rustavi?

Sofia: No, but it so happened that I bought everything in Rustavi. I settled my son there.

S: Did you buy three apartments in Rustavi for your children?

Sofia: I bought three for my son, and one for my daughter as well.

S: So, four in total? You bought them for three children?

Sofia: I bought one for my daughter and three for my son. I was supposed to live with my son, and I needed to have income from one of the apartments by renting it out. What else could I do for income when I returned? That’s just how it is.

S: So, one apartment was for rent?

Sofia: Yes, one to rent out, so there would be some income—and so my grandchildren would never lack even the basics. At least they’d have enough for potato chips. But in the end, I couldn’t adjust to being back in Georgia. I tried working here and there, but how can anyone work for 300–500 GEL? I just couldn’t do it. I couldn’t take it anymore—especially after being used to earning a higher salary. I don’t know... You know what? I also felt a kind of alienation.

S: What do you mean by alienation?

Sofia: I couldn’t adjust. I couldn’t get used to my husband. I couldn’t stand it anymore. The things you used to tolerate—like before, when we lived in Kakheti and I was the one mostly working—he was lazy, always liked being the boss. But once you become independent, once you’ve achieved things on your own, you can’t tolerate those dynamics anymore. And when you go back, all you see is ingratitude—and you just can’t take it. I saw so much ingratitude that I almost went crazy.

I couldn’t return to Israel because I had already completed my time there. Once you leave and they give you your pension, legally you can’t go back again. So I decided to come here—to Florence. Thank God, I moved from Naples to Florence in three months. I started the paperwork and managed to get my documents.

S: So quickly?

Sofia: Of course! I applied in April and started in November.

S: What kind of document do you have?

Sofia: The one that lasts six months—the one they call asilo politico, political asylum. It’s a permesso di soggiorno per asilo politico.

S: Is that part of the amnesty program (sanatoria)?

Sofia: No, I missed that one.

S: Do you have to renew it every six months?

Sofia: Of course. I just received it, and now I have to renew it again in August. I haven’t had my commission yet. Most people are getting refused—it’s become very difficult to get documents through asylum now.

S: What do they ask at the commission? Do you know?

Sofia: How can I not know? They ask you why you left your country. You have to say something like there's gender-based oppression... basically follow what the lawyer says.

S: And what are they telling you to say?

Sofia: That there was violence... I don’t know [laughs].

S: Gender issues?

Sofia: Yeah, they used to care more about those things. But not anymore—or rather, we just can’t convince them anymore. Since the government changed, the Prime Minister or whoever was replaced—this new woman came in—and now... nothing. Fewer and fewer cases are being approved.

S: Really?

Sofia: I don’t know. But they clearly don’t want immigrants anymore. Everyone gets rejected. Then you need money for an appeal. Lawyers need money—it used to be free to file for a delay, now it costs. Prices have gone up, and so have the expenses. It’s always like that.
Where I work now, the family isn’t bad—but the job is incredibly hard.

S: And if you say no, do you have to leave the country?

Sofia: No, no! Where would I go? I have to appeal—I already have a lawyer.

S: How long does that process take?

Sofia: I don’t interfere with anything... It just unfolds on its own. I keep working, and the process doesn’t interfere with that. Even if I get rejected, I still receive a six-month permit. Then I appeal, and that appeal goes to court. You keep working for two or three years, and by then time has passed—and after 2 or 3 years, they usually give everyone a 2-year residency permit. Do you understand?

S: So how long does it actually take?

Sofia: After 2–3 years—even if your appeal gets postponed five or six times—they eventually give it. Then the lawyer takes care of it. I think it’ll cost me around 700 euros. The court hearing happens without you. You send your work documents and contribution records to the lawyer, and they present it all in court. Eventually, they give you a two-year permit—one that allows you to travel in and out.

So yes, the laws seem strict, but they’re actually working in our favor. No one’s going to kick you out of Italy. You just move slowly through the system—work here and there, follow the steps. That’s what I’m doing now. Slowly. The main thing is: I’m not unemployed.

S: What initially led you to go to Israel? Why didn’t you return to Israel, and why did you go to Italy instead?

Sofia: Because when I left Israel, I was there on a legal work visa. I accomplished everything I set out to do—I finished what I needed, and I left on my own terms. When you leave like that, you terminate the contract yourself, and at the airport, Israel pays you your accumulated pension. But if you take that pension and officially end your contract, then—by law—you can’t receive a work visa again. Israel only gives one work visa per person. Otherwise, of course, I would’ve gladly gone back—I had already adjusted and liked living there.

The law is strict: only one work visa per person. Afterward, I even tried to return by other means—I flew to Jordan and hoped to cross from there, to enter Israel illegally and work without documents. But Jordan figured it out quickly. They saw I’d been in Israel and assumed I was trying to return there. So they deported me. Jordan and Israel don’t have the best relations, and... they know everything. Everyone knows everything.

S: And what’s the difference between working in Israel and in Italy?

Sofia: In Israel, the salary is much higher. And there’s no language barrier—there are many Georgian Jews, and all Georgians speak Russian. If you want to work in a Russian family, you speak Russian—they’ll place you there. If you speak Georgian, they’ll place you with a Georgian family. So it’s like you’re working among your own people. It feels familiar. That’s the thing... (interruption) And the salary—most importantly—the salary is high. That’s the biggest difference. The salary is high.

S: How much did you earn in Israel?

Sofia: I used to earn up to $2,000 there. But now—I don’t know—I think the salaries have gone up even more.

S: And how much do you earn here in Italy?

Sofia: You know, when I first came, I worked in Naples for three months without documents. Even if you find work in Naples, the salary is usually no more than 800 euros. If they give you 900—thank God. Then I left there and started my paperwork. A relative of mine took me in—she’s heading back to Georgia herself. That’s when I found a family that pays a higher salary—but the work is extremely hard. There are three people: an elderly mother who needs care, and her two adult sons—both mentally disabled, one is 60, the other 80. It's very hard work.

I care for all three. The mother is very capricious—she gets muscle cramps and demands to be moved around by hand. And the sons—one of them screams all the time, I can’t calm him down, and I have to get him to school somehow. I can barely manage. Working with people like this... it’s not just physically hard, it’s emotionally exhausting too.

S: That sounds incredibly difficult.

Sofia: It really is. I’m trying, but...

S: Are you being paid for taking care of three people?

Sofia: Initially, we agreed on 1,700 euros. Then in January, wages went up a bit across the board. They were still paying me 1,700, but yesterday I finally protested. I told them: "Other girls work with just one person and earn the same as me. Maybe you could raise mine a little?" They said okay—they’d raise it to 2,000 euros, but I would have to pay the contributions myself. That’s the tax. Of course, I agreed. Even if I have to pay 60 euros a month, it’s still better.

S: Is it really just 60 euros?

Sofia: That’s my share—60 euros. At most it would be 100. Still, 1,900 is much better than 1,700, isn’t it?

S: So you don't even have air conditioning?! (She’s visibly drenched in sweat, speaking from a shopping mall where she and other Georgians come just to cool off.)

Sofia: No, where would I have it?

S: They pay you 2,000 euros, you have to pay your own contributions, and you take care of three people—your conditions are terrible in every way. Do they at least give you two hours of rest each day?

Sofia: Not on weekends, but on the other days—Monday, Tuesday...

S: Wait, what do you mean they don’t give you weekends off?

Sofia: No one comes on weekends. We’re locked inside. I don’t even let the “crazy one” go to school. I’m stuck in the house with three unstable people all weekend.

S: So you mean... you don’t rest at all?

Sofia: No. Her child is not coming to relive me, so who am I supposed to leave them with?! I work on Sundays too. They pay me, but I don’t go out on Saturdays or Sundays. And they don’t pay me for the two-hour break that I never get—those hours aren’t included in my pay.

S: Hold on... you don’t rest on weekends, and you don’t even get the daily break you're entitled to?

Sofia: Exactly. And who’s going to pay me that?! The raise I just got, I had to ask them very carefully—and even that, only because Nona helped me.

S: No, no. You’ll burn out. You’ll have burnout in these conditions.

Sofia: Yeah, but you know what? I want to go home soon, and I’m enduring it.

S: No, no. It’s not like that—you will burn out.

Sofia: I’m a tolerant girl. I can endure it.

S: How old are you?

Sofia: I’m 46 years old. I can handle it so far. If I can just endure three more years here... I won’t even think about emigrating ever again. That’s it, I’m done! I can’t stand being in that house either. I can’t cool down there—I'm suffocating.

S: Why did you go to Israel in the first place? What happened—what were the conditions before you decided that?

Sofia: I was living in the village, in Kakheti, and I was working very hard. I had greenhouses, shops, I was teaching at a school—I was handling everything, even taking care of cows. I was killing myself with work. There was a period when my husband was sick for six years—he had leukemia. He was being treated in Tbilisi with the German method. It cost us a lot of money, but he survived. Now he’s healthy—he looks like a bull.

Imagine those six years—I was only 27. I sat on a chair for four years while he went through chemotherapy. I didn’t go home at all. He was a healthy man and he made it through. But after that, I continued to work like crazy.

My son got married young—he brought home a wife when he was just 18. I was 34 and already a grandmother at 35. I had him when I was 15. Then my daughter became a student. My daughter-in-law told me she had just started college and really wanted to continue studying. So I sent her to a private school, did everything I could... but there was not enough money.

In Kakheti, sometimes the harvest is good, sometimes not. I thought about it long and hard—and decided to leave. I already had a granddaughter and I had to leave. I left her when she was 2 years old. I cried the whole time.

I emigrated when I was 38. My granddaughter was a year and a half. Oh my God... When I was walking up the stairs at the airport, I looked back and cried—I thought I was going to die.

When I arrived in Israel, I lost 14 kilos in just two months. Emigrating for the first time is horrible. But now? If someone threw me into a pit, I swear, I could survive there too.

In the beginning, I couldn’t adjust—I cried all the time. When my mother called, I was constantly in tears. And the woman I started working for—she was a capricious old Jewish woman from Kutaisi. She didn’t want a caregiver at all and kept throwing me out of the house. She’d literally put me and my suitcase on the stairs.

She was showing early signs of dementia. But after 2 or 3 months, she fell in love with me—she would kiss my hands. Until the day she died, she couldn’t see anyone else but me.

S: Were these emigrants too? Did they also leave Georgia?

Here is your text formatted as part of the interview, with light edits for clarity and flow:

Sofia: Her children really helped me. They saw how nervous I was—how difficult it was for me—and although the grandmother was very capricious and sick, her children understood me. That helped me endure those years. I started with a low salary, but once they saw they needed me, they increased it.

When I first went to Israel, I paid $12,000. Do you know how much it costs? Going to Israel is very expensive.

S: What do you mean—do you have to buy a visa?

Sofia: No, not exactly. You need to have the right contacts—someone who arranges it. Israel has to send you an official invitation. That way, a family there can sponsor you and request you to come take care of someone. You then go to the embassy, and they issue you the visa based on that invitation.

But the people who organize this, Georgian Jews, you have to pay them $10,000. Plus, you need to sort out so many documents. Do you know what that involves? Everything has to be apostilled. Your criminal record, the origin of your surname, your father and mother’s details... They ask about everything. Whether you've ever had AIDS, or any other serious condition. You have to prove all of that.

S: So, you left, paid a lot of money. When you came to Italy, you didn’t need to pay anything because of the visa liberalization, right?

Sofia: Yes. I didn’t pay anything, only for the trip. I left with a travel company. They brought me to Naples via Ukraine, a year and a half ago.

S: So when you came back from Israel, wages in Georgia weren’t enough—despite all the work—for your children and grandchildren, etc.?

Sofia: You know what... it’s like that. And I’m not even willing to work for 800 euros either.

S: Did you have debts?

Sofia: No, what are you saying? I had returned from Israel for a year.

S: No, I mean before you went to Israel?

Sofia: No, no. I’ve never had bank debt.

S: But the $12,000 or however much it cost you—how did you collect it?

Sofia: Ahh... My mother gave me $4,000, and I took the rest from the bank.

S: So you did take a loan. And then?

Sofia: Do you know what I did? I mortgaged a small plot of land to the bank. They approved it right away. I deposited some property and they gave me the money—this was in Lagodekhi, it was quick.

S: And then you paid it off?

Sofia: Of course! I paid it off right away. I don’t like leaving debts in the bank. Who would let that sit? I don’t like owing money—I handled it right away, paid it off in 5–6 months. And then I started working toward the real reason I left: so I could eventually return.

S: And when you returned, your husband—he missed you?

Sofia: No!!! He scolded me!

S: What?!

Sofia: He said, "Why did you come back? What’s the rush? You had the right to stay there, so why didn’t you stay?" I told him I could have stayed there legally for another 10 years, but I was tired. I was exhausted. It’s not easy staying up all night with an elderly person. I was physically worn out. But he kept saying, “Why were you running back so soon?”

S: Is your husband planning to go abroad to work?

Sofia: No, he’s not. He’s settled in quite comfortably at home. He visits the tenants at the end of the month to collect rent, drives a nice car, he has all the comforts. My husband is doing just fine—he spends time with the grandkids while I’m going crazy here...

S: Is this man living off your money?

Sofia: He hasn’t earned a single lari in his life.

S: That’s shameful.

Sofia: He’s never done anything—ever. I just hoped they would at least leave me alone, just leave me be. I closed the door and left. Now I’m looking after myself. I went to Naples, as soon as I got a job... I’m a risk-taker, I swear. When I got my first salary, I bought an apartment that’s still under construction. I’ll have my own apartment in Tbilisi by September.

S: How much did the apartment in Tbilisi cost?

Sofia: I bought a small one for myself—because I’ll be living alone. It’s 40 square meters and cost me 28,000. I’ll renovate it, rent it out, then buy another small one and finally go home. That’s my plan, if I stay healthy. If not... I’ll go home anyway.

S: Okay, and what are the challenges you face in your current workplace?

Sofia: The main problem is that my documents took longer than expected because the whole process has gotten more difficult.

S: Since Giorgia Meloni came to power, right?

Sofia: Yes, after Meloni, they made everything harder. It’s good I applied last year—now it’s even tougher. Since April, things have changed. I just got my permit and now I have to apply for a renewal. But the real difficulty is the job itself—the people I care for are sick, and it’s physically and emotionally demanding. That’s the main issue, no other major problems.

S: How did you find your first job in Naples?

Sofia: At first, I went to an apartment where Georgians were living , at an employment agent’s house—and I paid for a bed.

S: How much does it cost to rent just one bed?

Sofia: When I arrived at night—after traveling for 36 hours by bus from Poland—they just threw a sheet at my feet. And me, a woman nearly two meters tall, I had to lie on a tiny couch…

S: So you arrived at this shared apartment?

Sofia: I couldn’t settle in well. Four days later, I got COVID—we all got it in that apartment, it was terrible. We were suffocating. Eventually, they told me to go to the hospital and get checked. I went, and they took me in. They gave me IVs, looked after me for four days, then transferred me to a so-called “COVID hotel” for two weeks. Thank you to the Italian government. It was actually great! It was like a five-star hotel—good food, clean linens, everything. Honestly, I preferred it to that apartment. Back in the apartment, no one would hire me for at least another month anyway. I didn’t know the language, and I begged them for help. And they told me, “You’re their caged bird. You have to earn money for them first. You have to stay in the apartment a month or two, pay rent and then money once you get a job, and then eventually they’ll let you go. But only after you’ve paid them.” I didn’t like that at all. I got really angry.

(A Georgian woman passes by and yells, “We all want to live in our own country!”)

S: Everyone says that—don’t worry, it will happen. Okay, so then where did you find a job?

Sofia: After I came back from that COVID hotel, I said, “Let me go—just give me a job.” So they sent me to a job where they knew I wouldn’t get hired, just to shut me up for a while.

S: Wait, what do you mean?

Sofia: This aunt and niece—they’re employment agents and also landlords—they sent me to a job expecting they wouldn’t hire me there. They’re from Rustavi, Armenians. It was just to keep me quiet for a bit, you understand?

S: Wow.

Sofia: When I arrived at the job, and a woman opened the door, she looked at me and said, “I won’t let you go anywhere—I’ll teach you the language.” And I really stayed there for three months. When I said I wanted to leave because I was looking for better conditions… I had already gotten used to her and her husband. Then Nona called me from here—Florence.

Nona is my mother’s cousin. She called me and said, “Come here! Why are you staying there for 800 euros? Come here—I’ll help you. I’ll even help you start the paperwork.” And she gave me her job.

The family cursed me… These Italians. They were offended—told me to go to hell. They can be so respectful, but then suddenly become aggressive. They remind me of Georgians in that way—they suddenly explode. She didn’t hate me, she just got really angry. “What do you mean you’re leaving us? We raised you like a child, and now you’re leaving us?” The husband said to his wife, “Give her 1,000 euros, pay her so she’ll stay.” But I said no, I have to go. He didn’t speak to me for three days. I took my suitcase and left. And now here I am, taking care of three sick people. But I’ll see my plans through. After that, Nona and I will go back together.

S: To Georgia?

Sofia: Yes. I really want to.

This is the third interview in the series! If you want more in-depth investigations like this—and to learn about the overlooked stories of Georgian workers at home and abroad—support my work.

N: Please introduce yourself.
Nestani: My name is Nestani.

N: How old are you?
Nestani: I’m 46 years old. I’ve been an immigrant for two years now.

N: How long did you originally plan to stay abroad?
Nestani: Just one year. But now it’s been two, and I don’t know how much longer I’ll have to stay.

N: Where are you from?
Nestani: I’m from Imereti, from Tskaltubo specifically.

N: What was your profession in Georgia?
Nestani: I’m a nurse specializing in obstetrics. But due to the low pay, I couldn’t work in my field. I had to take jobs in restaurants and bakeries instead—they paid more.

N: How many people are you supporting back in Georgia?
Nestani: Five people. My husband works too, but only here and there—he doesn’t have stable employment. I’m the main breadwinner.

N: Why did you decide to leave Georgia?
Nestani: We had no income. We couldn’t support ourselves. That’s why I left—because of economic hardship.

N: Did you have any debts when you left?
Nestani: Yes, I did. I just finished paying them off.

N: Were any of them bank loans?
Nestani: When I left I did have a bank loan and some small debts.

N: What was your journey like to get here?
Nestani: It was incredibly hard. The language barrier was a huge struggle, and adjusting to a new family was very difficult—though I tolerate it. Honestly, I wouldn’t wish emigration on anyone, not even on my worst enemy.

N: Have you changed jobs often?
Nestani: No, this is only my second job. But soon after I arrived—within two months—I had to have gallbladder surgery. I became very ill.

N: Who helped you during that time?
Nestani: My first host family took me to the hospital.

N: Did you have to pay for the surgery?
Nestani: No, it was an emergency surgery, so I didn’t have to pay.

N: How is your health now?
Nestani: My health is okay now, but I still can’t tolerate the experience of emigration. It’s emotionally very difficult.

N: How much did you pay for the trip when you first left?
Nestani: 500 euros.

N: Was that money borrowed from the bank?
Nestani: No, I borrowed it from a friend.

N: Do you have legal documents now?
Nestani: No, and I’m not planning to get any.

N: So are you working without legal status?
Nestani: Yes

N: Do you know what documents are required to work legally?
Nestani: No, and I’m not interested.

N: Why not?
Nestani: If I start dealing with documents, it’ll only prolong my stay here. This place feels like a swamp—I don’t want to sink into it. If you stop asking yourself when you’ll leave, it pulls you in deeper and deeper. I know life in Georgia is difficult, almost unbearable, but I still prefer it. At first, I didn’t understand what I was getting into here. But once I saw it with my own eyes, I realized—I’d rather eat whatever I can in Georgia and be satisfied.

N: What is your goal in staying here?
Nestani: I want to finish the renovation of my house and then go back.

N: Did you pay any money to start working?
Nestani: No.

N: Do you know how people find employment agencies?
Nestani: I have no idea.

N: So how did you leave Georgia in the first place?
Nestani: A very close acquaintance covered all the expenses and brought me here. I didn’t pay a thing. I stayed with her until I started working—within a month. I never dealt with employment agencies. That acquaintance found both of my jobs.

N: Can you describe a typical day for you?
Nestani: I wake up at 8 in the morning, take care of the grandmother, and prepare breakfast.

N: Do you live alone?
Nestani: No, there are two of us Georgian caregivers. I care for the grandmother; she takes care of the child.

N: What is it like living together with another Georgian?
Nestani: It’s very good—pleasant and supportive. We help each other a lot.

N: Do you have your own room?
Nestani: No, I sleep in the same room as the grandmother. The other caregiver has her own room.

N: Do you have a contract?
Nestani: No.

N: How do you work? What is your agreement with your employer family?
Nestani: I started working because it’s very difficult to find anything without documents. They pay me 1,000 euros for everything.

N: Do you have a day off?
Nestani: Yes. I get two hours off per day, half a day on Saturday, and a full day on Sunday.

N: Do you receive overtime pay?
Nestani: No.

N: Was the salary the only thing you agreed on?
Nestani: Yes.

N: Do you wake up often at night?
Nestani: Yes. She wakes up 3–4 times a night, and it wakes me up too. I have trouble falling back asleep.

N: What role do you think you play in your grandmother's life?
Nestani: I am a servant.

N: How do you perceive yourself as a Georgian caregiver in Italy?
Nestani: Very humiliated.

N: Do you think Italy needs you more, or do you need it more?
Nestani: Probably both.

N: How much of your salary do you send to Georgia?
Nestani: I send 80 percent of my total salary.

N: How do your family members value you?
Nestani: They’re very satisfied. They keep telling me to come back and take care of my health.

N: How do you see your role in your own family now?
Nestani: They would probably be very happy if I returned, but I can’t go yet. I want to do something good for the children in my family. I don’t want them to go through what I’ve gone through.

N: Do you have a husband?
Nestani: Yes, and two daughters—26 and 18 years old.

N: Has your relationship with your husband changed since you left?
Nestani: He hasn’t been able to adjust to my absence.

N: Are your children students?
Nestani: Yes.

N: Are you paying for their studies?
Nestani: Yes.

N: How do you perceive all this psychologically?
Nestani: It’s extremely difficult. It’s very hard to live in someone else’s home and be far from everyone.

N: Does something hurt you physically?
Nestani: No, nothing physically. Only the pain of missing my family.

N: What do you eat? How do you feed yourself?
Nestani: Whatever they eat, I eat too.

N: Have you ever thought about injuring yourself?
Nestani: No, I don’t ever want to imagine reaching that state.

N: How is your family adapting to your being here?
Nestani: It's very difficult for them. They would be happy if I went back immediately.

N: Has anyone ever come to help you? Have you talked to anyone about your hardship?
Nestani: No.

N: What would you be interested in knowing about labor laws?
Nestani: Everything that I am entitled to by law.

N: Do you know any organizations or Italian trade unions? Would you be interested in them?
Nestani: No, I don’t know any.

N: Have you ever used any public institution, like CAF?
Nestani: No.

N: When you're in trouble, who do you go to for help?
Nestani: Only the person who brought me here.

N: How do you imagine your life in Georgia in the future?
Nestani: I hope that everything changes for the better and that I can live peacefully there then I can clearly imagine my life back in Georgia.

There was a "study" released by UNICEF about Georgian youth that has everyone up in arms! While most of the angles have focused on this finding with various explanations why, very typical opposition-government divide:

- Young people face significant challenges with literacy, particularly in formulating and expressing their thoughts clearly.

- One-quarter of participants struggled to articulate their ideas coherently, often using simple, poor vocabulary or failing to express their thoughts fully, which sometimes led to frustration and nervousness.

- Writing skills were a particular concern, especially among language minorities, whose proficiency in the official language was insufficient for academic tasks.

- A third of participants had difficulty providing strong, reasoned arguments, showing a lack of experience in critical thinking and debate.

- Most participants could follow content and engage in discussions, but a significant portion struggled with fluency, making grammatical errors and using slang.

Most of us understand the state of education through lived experience – talking with youth, hearing stories from university friends, or listening to school teachers. I remember visiting a woman who worked in the education ministry years ago. She told me her students could now read only a fraction of the lines from long poems compared to what students managed in the Soviet era. That was her benchmark: the sheer ability to read and digest material had visibly declined. There are also our education rankings that aren’t great either. So most of us know this - maybe not the extent or precisely, but we have a general grasp.

Of course some government accounts used this study to show why the youth were the main composition of anti-government protests, i.e. they are uneducated. While opposition saw this yet another failure of Georgian Dream’s government, the inability to educate youth.

I found most of the assumptions behind the study quite bad and am not a fan of this study. But Unicef just like most of UN is no longer a place of bold visions of emancipation and Global south agency but a neoliberal appendage to Western dominance. The section about “A significant number of participants struggled to transform societal problems into entrepreneurial opportunities” made me want to gag! However, I’ll continue that in part II!

What’s most sad for me of course is how much investment USSR put in literacy and for all of that to unravel now is just tragic! Neoliberal free market economy with neoliberal education has been delivering the ugliest and cruelest results for Georgia.

Information on the study:

“The study used a mixed-methods approach, predominantly qualitative methods supplemented by quantitative data where appropriate. A total of 155 students, aged 18- 20, were selected from diverse backgrounds, ensuring a representative sample that included students from rural and urban areas, various academic levels, and ethnic groups. The study was conducted in OctoberNovember 2024.”

What made me the most annoyed and no one talked about:

Finding: “Many also reported struggles with social media, including distinguishing true from false information, and felt insecure about protecting their personal data.”

Problem with this finding: Georgian youth - and the entire population of all ages - face a manipulated media landscape: party bots and activists, EU/US funded NGO narratives, Western platform censorship and party/donor-controlled media. Official digital literacy programs push a narrow idea of what is fake news, or how to use AI tools and how to stay safe. Though learning how to guard your confidential information is good, the other parts aren’t so neutral. They’re deeply biased. It assumes tech is good and only foreign or government disinformation is bad. Local manipulation from who was controlling Facebook fact-checking, the various “fact-checking accounts” which are often selective. Their mission is usually to target alleged Russian narratives - which could include anything and falsely identify worldwide accepted claims as Russian because the fact-checkers are not only biased but limited in their knowledge of world events and historical facts. They almost always ignore Western information and call something fake simply because it contradicts their worldview. Examples that political or economic intervention is only one-sided, it can only come from Russia and not EU or US.

In fact, most media - party-controlled and “independent” completely erased what is happening in Gaza for two years now. Only one independent, leftist media has been consistently showing Gaza challenging the silence and only pro-Israel perspectives, but of course their reach is minuscule comparatively to party-controlled media.

These dynamics reflect a liberal-technocratic worldview: the assumption that digital literacy equals using tools, verifying facts, and consuming the “right” information as defined by elite consensus. But real literacy in Georgia today must involve recognizing the power relations behind information. Real media literacy means: mapping who funds and what political ties are behind “fact-checkers;” spotting partisan framing masked as neutrality; verifying information without relying on compromised institutions. But even that is flawed approach because, this diagnosis of “poor media literacy skills” reflects an individualist bias, while ignoring the structural and political side: it assumes the problem lies in users' limited competencies, rather than in the systemic manipulation of information by political actors, platforms, and funders. It’s putting most of the responsibility on the youth while ignoring the real agency in why we are all so manipulated!

The Georgian youth don’t need another Western toolkit and trainings by EU/US/UN supported NGO! It must not be defined by Tbilisi-based think tanks, Western grant cycles, or elite media. It must emerge from grassroots, non-aligned spaces where youth can critically dissect all sources of manipulation: whether from Georgian Dream, UNM-aligned media, Eurocentric NGOs, Russian, Isreali or Meta’s own global censorship regime - Not just current enemies of the West grafted onto the Georgia. Teaching youth to “be literate” must include teaching them (and let’s be honest - teach/learn ourselves, because it’s an ongoing process where none of are safe from manipulation) to see through the agendas. Until then, don’t call it “literacy.” It’s just training people to be loyal to one side of a propaganda war.

Second Finding which annoyed me:

Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM):

- While participants recognize the importance of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), their understanding remains limited, especially regarding the practical applications of science in real-world settings.

- Many students do not connect scientific knowledge with career prospects in industries such as agriculture, energy, or chemical production.

- The majority believe in the value of mathematics and financial literacy, but some struggle to apply these skills in practical situations.

- Financial literacy, though recognized as essential, is often seen as irrelevant by younger students.

- Participants show strong awareness of environmental issues and the interconnection between humans and nature.

- Many still view science as primarily an academic pursuit.

Not only does it frame the “correct” model of STEM engagement as global and market-oriented, but there is no space for other knowledge systems which might treat science and math as embedded in everyday life. But what’s equally ironic about this is that the researchers never seem to even realize: where would Georgians see ”scientific knowledge with career prospects in industries such as agriculture, energy, or chemical production?”

We have mostly a service sector and rentier economy filled with landlords, hotels owners, hostel and guesthouse owners, restaurant owners, cooks, servers, couriers, taxis, drivers, cashiers, tourism workers, call centers workers, grape-pickers, caretakers in foreign countries and bank tellers. How many people are working in industries as scientists? We barely have any industry left and low-value added agriculture.

I bet you if you asked them to connect tourism with career prospects, they would have no problems – no one would get that question wrong. They would know at least one person if not most of the family who works in the jobs I listed. The only math you need in Georgia is to maybe add up the product costs at the checkout counter where you work as a cashier, but even that’s done automatically! It’s not that they have trouble connecting – they don’t know practical examples of such careers or even jobs because our economy doesn’t need STEM scientists. That’s only for the global market. So of course: “Many still view science as primarily an academic pursuit.”

Another laughable finding is financial literacy!

“Financial literacy, though recognized as essential, is often seen as irrelevant by younger students.” Yea cause they have NO MONEY! Most of the money they get are from their parents or horrible jobs and if they have to pay rent or anything else, they are most likely unable to cover their costs. What literacy are they supposed to learn? When you’re devastatingly poor, there is not much you can do with financial literacy! I promise you, they are probably much more literate how to make their few GEL go farther than the researchers.

I’ll continue critiquing the study in part 2!

Here is the original post.

All the photos are taken from this public post - until I go there myself, and then post some original photos.

You can also listen to our Soviet tea production podcast here.

This is the second interview in the series! If you want more in-depth investigations like this—and to learn about the overlooked stories of Georgian workers at home and abroad—support my work.

I use AI images and conceal their real names because many of them do not want to be public about their struggles!

N (interviewer): Hello, let's get to know each other

Marina: Marina, 67 years old, from Rustavi (I was born and raised in Borjomi)

N: How long have you been here?

Marina: I have been here for 17 years

N: How many years were you planning to leave initially?

Marina: At first I thought for 1-2 years. You know what's the worst thing? You want to go back but you can't go back because problems keep coming up that need money.

N: How many members are there in your family?

Marina: there are many of us, I have a spouse, four children, 8 grandchildren, there are 15 of us.

N: Are you the sole breadwinner?

Marina: You know how it is, I have 4 children, I have 4 families, I help all four of them, they also work, but it is not enough, and I also have an extraordinary husband, who has worked all his life, and I also help him. But life tore us apart from each other.

N: What is your profession and did you work in Georgia?

Marina: I am a teacher of Russian language and literature by profession. I loved teaching in school, and I still love my profession. I would have progressed further and further in this field. Perhaps if I had stayed in Georgia, I would probably have advanced in my profession to a better place in the education system or somewhere.

N: why did you leave Georgia?

Marina: There were two big reasons for my leaving. First, my 3rd child was studying theater at the university, we couldn't pay the tuition and living expenses anymore. It was very difficult for us. The second one was my father passed away, and I borrowed money from my colleagues, relatives, and neighbors. We couldn't pay them back. We had no other solution, I didn't want to leave, I didn’t want to separate from my husband. We were married with a lot of love, but the only solution was for me to leave.

N: What was your journey to get here?

Marina: I didn't have much trouble, to tell the truth, neither on the way nor when I got here. I got a job easily, although at first I was in the city near Bari, I worked there for 8 years, and I have been here [Bari] for 9 years.

N: Did you have an employment agent?1 How did you find a job?

Marina: My neighbor is the mother of my son's friend, and she helped me. I told her I was coming, she met me and took me to the employment agent.

N: Did you take out loans to come here?

Marina: Yes, I took out a loan and also borrowed money. I was teaching two little boys in Russian, I visited their house before I left, and it was getting close to my departure. I was very sad and anxious. The family noticed my state, and asked why I had changed so much. When I told them, they immediately lent me money. These total total strangers generously lent me money.

N: How long did it take you to leave? How long did you think about it?

Marina: I decided very quickly and left in two weeks

N: Did you live at your employment agent’s apartment when you came here?

Marina: Yes, 1 day and 1 night. I also met Mzia there. [The friend who was with her]. Soon a job appeared and I left.

N: How much did you pay for the apartment?

Marina: 10 euros per day

N: How much did you pay to the agent?

Marina: I had to pay 750 euros for the whole month's salary. When I started working before it was 1 month, I called her and said I have a lot of problems and if I can pay half now and half the next month, they were very against it but agreed anyway.

N: which documents do you have?

Marina: I have a Permesso di Soggiorno (residence permit) valid for 10 years

N: Was it hard to get?

Marina: No, the document eligibility came out [there are special times the government of Italy opens up eligibility when they can apply for a residence permit] the family helped me apply and they paid the state tax.

N: Do you still pay the employment agent if you get a raise?

Marina: I worked in this job for five months, after the death of my old man, the employment agent contacted me, and told me that there was a place and they wanted to interview me in New Zena, they were paying 1000 euros because there were two elderly, the employer asked for 300 euros, I was forced to pay.

N: How did you get into your current job?

Marina: When my job ended because the old man died, I came to Bari. I stayed by sneaking into the house where a friend worked. I’d done this for others many times—when the elder fell asleep, I’d sneak people in and send them off in the morning so they wouldn’t be left out in the cold in the town square.

While staying with my friend at her workplace, a temporary job opened up because another girl left for Tbilisi for just one month. But when she returned, she brought her husband and son. Because of this, the family no longer wanted her and let her go.

So I stayed on. The girl didn’t take any money from me—she let me have the job completely free of charge.

N: Describe one day of your workday

Marina: I don't have a strict schedule, I have a healthy grandmother, she can take care of herself, I wake up early in the morning at 8, grandmother at 10-11, then we have breakfast, we prepare for dinner, I am more of her companion.

N: Do you also clean the house?

Marina: Yes

N: Do you get paid extra when you clean?

Marina: No, but I don't clean all the time. Her son, who sometimes comes and checks the house. If he doesn't like the cleanliness, I respond that I'm a "badante"2, and only in that case he should reprimand me if I don't take good care of his mother. He doesn't say anything to me when I say that.

N: How much is your salary?

Marina: 900 euros

N: How much are you supposed to get paid according to the law?

Marina: 1200 euros

N: So they don't pay you the amount stipulated by law, do you have a contract?

Marina: No. They don't pay us, they violate it

N: How many hours are written in the contract?

Marina: 25 (per week). They also violate this. It should say 55, but they don't want to pay the social contributions, although once in 3 months I also have to pay 75 euros, these contributions will then be returned to them.

N: What if you tell them that they are violating laws? Or if you got to relevant organizations and tell that they do not pay you the amount provided for by law?

Marina: I can't do that because I've passed the age limit where I shouldn’t work anymore, after 60 years of age. I need a job, and so I tolerate it. They also break the law, but it's worth it for them because they don't have to pay extra, taxes and salary

N: Pension is given from what age?

Marina: Over 71, and social over 67, social is unemployment compensation

N: When you work overtime, do you get paid extra, and do you know about overtime?

Marina: There are festivals and holidays here. When it's a holiday, and they have to pay me extra, they don't pay me. They, instead, let me leave the house. Although they don't pay me, by law I am entitled to it.

N: How do you feel about the family you work for, who are you for them?

Marina: They treat me well, they give me 50 euros on my birthday, I don't feel like a stranger. My grandmother is 16 years older than me and I don't even consider herself a grandmother. She also tells me that I am her younger sister

N: As a Georgian carer in Italy, how do you see yourself?

Marina: I could never have imagined working here. I wanted to escape Italy many times, but I came to tolerate for the sake of my children and family

N: Do you need Italy more or does Italy need you more?

Marina: Both

N: What percentage of the money you send home?

Marina: My money is not mine, I send it to everyone else. I am also paying loans from two banks here, I have a loan at 0 percent and 1 percent.

N: Do your family members appreciate you?

Marina: My husband and my children appreciate me. My grandchild made me very happy. I was preparing them for medical school [she was paying for preparatory education like tutors, etc..], they3 passed the medical exam and received a grant covering 50% of tuition costs, they would not have been able to prepare if I had not been here.

N: How has your husband changed towards you or have you changed towards him?

Marina: We are estranged. When I was in Georgia, I couldn't find my place, even though we were married with great love, it seems like we have nothing to say to each other now. I am also estranged from my children, I walk around like an orphan in my house, I don't know where to put my clothes, I don't know where to lie down.

N: How do you perceive all this psychologically?

Marina: We (the Georgian caregivers) all have a neurosis, we keep saying we are leaving. I can't seem to get used to these people and their outbursts.

N: Are you sleeping well?

Marina: Yes

N: How do you eat? Do they control your food intake?

Marina: I have a good diet, no, they don't monitor me

N: Are you in any pain?

Marina: My eyes hurt

N: Have you tried to injure yourself?

Marina: No

N: How is your own family adjusting to your being here?

Marina: Got used to it. They have no reaction

N: What are you interested in learning more about Italian labor law?

Marina: Now I'm wondering how social security and pensions are appointed

N: Do you know any organizations that can help you with this?

Marina: More or less

N: Have you gone to any organization or any institution, and did they help you or not?

Marina: I used CAF4 (Fiscal Assistance Centre)

N: Are you interested in knowing about Italian trade unions?

Marina: Of course

N: Who do you go to for help when you are in trouble?

Marina: CAF with commercialists (Lawyers)

N: How do you imagine your future in Georgia?

Marina: I will answer you when I am back in Georgia. Sometimes I imagine being with my grandchildren, hugging them and making them fall in love with me.

If the Cold War was less narrowly concerned with the behavior of the Soviet Union, and more concertedly about how intellectual life was organized in the United States, then the origins of the Cold War should be situated firmly within the boundaries of World War II, due to the unprecedented incursion of military funding and organization into knowledge production.

So I decided to make an X thread summarizing the key points because it helped me understand how knowledge production changed and the effects it had on the kind of intellectual it produced.

I wanted to share the summary of this article interlaced with quotes, in case you- just like me - have noticed the decline and didn’t know how it unfolded.

The Cold War wasn’t just a geopolitical standoff—it completely reorganized intellectual life. In the US and beyond, it reshaped universities, research, academic freedom, and even the meaning of knowledge. In the US and beyond, it reshaped universities, research, academic freedom, and even the meaning of knowledge. During WWII, massive military funding flowed into science. After 1945, attempts to shift that into civilian hands failed. Instead, the university-military-industrial complex was born—cemented by the 1957 Sputnik panic.

Entire universities were subsidized in the name of national security. Academic freedom was strategically tolerated—it helped portray Western democracies as intellectually free, unlike the USSR.

This system didn’t just fund hard sciences—it restructured the university itself. Teaching and research merged.

Graduate education exploded. Foreign students were brought in to shape elite allies in the Third World.

The Sputnik scare merely reinforced the already accepted principle that a stable and dispersed research base was a necessary prerequisite for national security and therefore not just a few strategic areas of research, but rather whole universities should be subsidized and nourished. This was the period of the belief in the possibility of technological planning.10 Teaching and research functions at universities were welded together as a consequence of the funding process, with lavish inducements to provide all manner of disciplines with graduate students to participate in the research process. Later, subsidies would be extended to foreign nationals, as part of a push to inculcate third-world elites with respect for Western research. Academic freedom in the context of tenure was taken seriously, even when it was violated during periodic Red Scares; freedom of inquiry was tolerated because it served as explicit instantiation of the superiority of Western political and social organization over Soviet totalitarianism. Even if the scholars in question did not themselves have to get security clearances or take money from the Office of Naval Research or the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, they were not insulated from the myriad ways in which the Cold War had transformed academic life from its prewar status. The Cold War mode of knowledge production was so pervasive that, for ashort while, it was literally invisible.

By 1980, that Cold War model started to collapse. The military pulled back from managing science. A new regime took over:
- Knowledge privatization
- Public disinvestment
- Tech transfer
- “Entrepreneurial universities”
- Adjunctification
- Global expansion (e.g. NYU Abu Dhabi)

This shift ended Cold War knowledge production and replaced it with “knowledge management”—flexible, global, corporate. Think "just-in-time" startups, not "citadels of national science."

Technological planning was replaced by “knowledge management,” which was an entirely different animal altogether. This regime was predicated upon the privatization and globalization of knowledge, in conjunction with the offshore outsourcing of manufacturing from much of the developed world. If the Cold War was about building national citadels of knowledge fortification, the new regime was about spawning little dispersed and flexible knowledge startup firms across the globe, fungible and just-in-time, largely disengaged from previous nationalist and cultural rationales. Some universities notoriously sought to emulate their corporate mentors and open “branches” or “subsidiaries” in far-flung climes, such as Abu Dhabi or Shanghai. Hence one might reasonably assert that, for the purposes of periodization of intellectual history, the Cold War had effectively ended circa 1980.

One of the most interesting things he points to is how the political leanings in disciplined reversed due to privatization and how these changes deeply transformed intellectualism.

Although such generalizations need qualification, it can be said to a first approximation that conservative thought was primarily located in the humanities in the 1950s, whereas the sciences frequently viewed themselves as allied with the planning and modernization agendas of the Left. After the long Sixties, a strange reversal took place, with natural scientists becoming notably more conservative and fearful of democratizing impulses, whereas the humanities came to regard themselves as the vanguard voice of the Left. Whatever the veracity of such self-conceptions, the advent of the new regime of privatized science was ushered in by prior profound changes in the political identifications of the intellectual disciplinary landscape. Such role reversals cannot simply be attributed to the Fall of the Wall, but clearly have an intimate relationship to the fate of the Cold War.

As far as I am aware, there is no contemporary intellectual tradition that has managed to successfully hold itself aloof from these profound changes in the funding and management of knowledge. The ongoing reconstruction of the university has breached any ivory tower refuge. While this story has been mostly told so far as an American tale, reconstruction of intellectual life has spread to most developed economies by the new millennium, transforming universities from political institutions to knowledge businesses. This rise of the multinational knowledge consortium would have made no sense during the Cold War. Intellectual historians ignore these vast structural transformations at their own peril.

Disciplinary knowledge also hardened under the Cold War (as in the lines between disciplines were strongly defined). Though interdisciplinary collaboration was celebrated, universities enforced strict disciplinary hierarchies to control and professionalize knowledge. Their attempts to have interdisciplinary collaboration within universities failed miserably.

True interdisciplinary innovation was outsourced—to RAND, Los Alamos, MITRE, etc. Outside the ivory tower, military funders could tolerate more experimental research.

Meanwhile, Cold War opposition to socialism helped launch the Mont Pèlerin Society (1947), an elite anti-socialist think tank. It produced the foundations of what we now call neoliberalism. Mont Pèlerin created an alternative intellectual universe, bypassing universities to reshape liberal thought in the shadow of WWII and the Great Depression. It prefigured today's political think tanks.

It was not only government functionaries who learned this lesson of the need to outsource interdisciplinarity in the Cold War. Powerful interest groups who were dissatisfied with the state of existing disciplines and of learning in the university tended to mimic this pattern. Perhaps the most important for later developments was the institution of the Mont Pèlerin Society, founded as a private closed interdisciplinary discussion group in 1947 in order to counter the governmental monopoly on knowledge production within universities in the immediate postwar era. The MPS rapidly formed the core of an entirely alternate universe of knowledge production, extending from right-wing foundations to dedicated political think tanks and beyond. The MPS existed because no academic discipline alone was itself capable of revising the whole of liberal thought to better respond to the twin disasters of the Great Depression and World War II. Lippmann, fabricator of the moniker of “‘Cold War,’ was also the original source of inspiration for bringing together many of the subsequent MPS members in a precursor dubbed the “Colloque Walter Lippmann.” Although the MPS was undeniably a Cold War phenomenon, in the sense its members were first and foremost animated by a desire to oppose socialism in all its guises, it eventually provided the wherewithal to theorize the justifications for the new regime of knowledge management that superceded the Cold War system. It was the MPS network that eventually produced the distinctive body of thought now designated as “neoliberalism,” probably the most consequential innovation for intellectual life in the entire period, one that became the white hot center of the program of the eventual commercialization of the entirety of knowledge production.

The intellectual structure of the Cold War also relied on what Paul Edwards called "closed world ontologies"—assumptions that the world was knowable, controllable, and every threat could be mapped. This closed-world mindset appeared across disciplines: - Game theory (Nash equilibrium) - Rational choice theory - AI and behavioral psychology - Modernization theory - Cybernetics + systems theory. Even creativity was boxed in. It became a “trait” measurable by Cold War psychology—distinguished from “authoritarian personalities.” Risk, chaos, and uncertainty were to be eliminated.

But since the 1990s, closed world systems began to break down. Neoliberal restructuring has erased the boundary between universities and think tanks. Today’s knowledge economy is fragmented, privatized, and performative. We now live under open world ontologies—emergence, chaos, networks, flexibility. Think Santa Fe Institute, Latour’s Parliament of Things, or Silicon Valley’s “move fast and break things.”

The Cold War gave the US a highly structured, militarized, disciplined model of intellectual life. Its collapse didn’t bring freedom—it brought a new regime of fragmented, market-driven knowledge. To understand Cold War thought, not just Cold War policy, we must study how its logic shaped how we know, what counts as knowledge, and who gets to produce it.

As promised, I’ll be translating a short but incisive book on the Middle East by a Soviet Georgian political scientist, Abon Tsistiashvili which examines two contrasting approaches to conflict resolution in the region. What compelled me to share this work is its sharp critique of U.S. imperialism and Israel—an analysis I believe is still deeply relevant today.

I’ll be posting each chapter as I complete the translation on my Substack. If you’d like to support this effort, consider becoming a paid subscriber! Your backing helps me dedicate more time to bringing overlooked but vital perspectives to light. I will make each chapter available first for paid subscribers, and then I will open it up for everyone!

This is the second installment - chapter one.

Two Approaches to the Struggle of the Peoples of the Arab Countries for Freedom and Independence

The main task of the Soviet People's Strategy is to ensure that the Soviet people can labor in conditions of lasting peace and freedom. In this regard, great importance is attached to achieving a political settlement of international conflicts on the basis of respect for the legitimate rights of states and peoples.

The principled foundations of the creation of a comprehensive system of international security in the political sphere, put forward by the XXVII congress of CPSU, require in international practice unquestioning respect for the sovereign choice of the paths and forms of its development by each people, and a fair political settlement of international crises and regional conflicts. The Soviet Union is making great efforts to achieve, in particular, the elimination of the dangerous military hotbed in the Middle East, in the Arab world.1

The Middle East in the system of modern international relations. The United States has always considered the Middle East in two dimensions: its strategic location and its vast oil reserves.

At the junction of three continents, at the crossroads of air, sea and land routes connecting Europe with Africa and Asia, and in close proximity to the socialist states, the Arab countries are seen by American imperialism as an important strategic springboard. It is no coincidence that 14 of the 19 states under the jurisdiction of the United States Central Command, created in 1983, are Arab countries. This command has a 250,000-strong intervention corps of the “rapid deployment forces”.

As for oil, it is known that the world economy depends on oil more than on any other raw material. This was reflected not only in the development of international economic relations, but also in the development of world politics as a whole. “Politics and oil are inseparable. One is closely connected with the other everywhere in the world,”2 emphasized the American scientist I. Edmonds.

The main areas of oil deposits and extraction are concentrated in the liberated countries. Almost 3/4 of the oil extracted in the non-socialist world falls on the liberated countries,3 while 3/4 of the consumption falls on the developed capitalist countries.

In 1983, the Middle East accounted for 63.2 percent of the oil reserves of capitalist countries and 44.2 percent of the gas reserves. In the same year, it provided 30.5 percent of the oil production of the capitalist world.4 At the same time, the United States has recently become less dependent on Middle Eastern oil. But its interest in these countries is still great - Washington's partners are still very dependent on Middle Eastern oil. At the end of the 1970s, the share of Middle Eastern oil in all oil imported into the United States was 30%, while for Western Europe and Japan this figure was 66 and 80%, respectively. At the same time, the share of oil from the Persian Gulf countries in American imports of this raw material is constantly decreasing, for example, in 1983 it was already 7%,5 while for America's allies this share remained at a high level. Declaring itself the defender of Western oil interests in the Middle East, Washington wants to use the situation to further subjugate its European partners and Japan, to prevent them from attempting to independently resolve many foreign policy problems, especially since “the relations between the three main centers of modern imperialism—the United States, Western Europe, and Japan—are fraught with overt and covert contradictions. The economic, financial, and technological advantage that the United States enjoyed over its closest competitors until the late 1960s has been seriously tested. Western Europe and Japan have managed to narrow the gap between their American masters in some areas.”6

In this situation, the role of oil in America's political course is growing even more, its aspiration to use oil to exert pressure on its allies in order to make them as obedient as possible and subject them to Washington's dictates.

The two factors mentioned above - the favorable military-strategic location of the Middle East and the oil wealth of this region - have always had priority in the development of American policy towards the Middle East.7 At the same time, since the mid-1970s, we have seen new accents in Washington's approach to the problems of the Middle East. These accents have developed in the process of Washington's retreat from the course of easing international tensions.

Washington, which set itself the goal of reshaping the world according to its own rules, embarked on the path of confrontation with unbridled militarism, socialism, and national liberation forces. “The right-wing group that came to power in the United States and its main NATO allies sharply deviated from the path of de-escalation to the path of military-industrial policy.”8 The main hope is based on trying to achieve American military superiority over the Soviet Union and to resolve the struggle between the two world socio-political systems by military force.

At the same time, preparations for a fierce confrontation with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community are underway simultaneously at the global and regional levels. Here we have in mind the problem of local conflicts, the purpose of which is to “expand” the front of the struggle against the Soviet Union. Several important signs can be observed in the American policy towards local conflicts: 1) “management” of conflict situations in order to further distance them from resolution; 2) strengthening of its own military presence, associated both with attempts to control the development of conflict situations, and with the tasks of their unilateral settlement in the interests of US policy; 3) artificial linking of various conflict situations together; 4) monopolization of the political settlement of conflict situations by the US in order to provide for American interests to a greater extent than before.9 The main focus of President Reagan's administration's approach to the Middle East was America's demands, dictated by the harsh military-political confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Thus, the policy of the United States in the Middle East is aimed at protecting the interests of American oil companies,10 maintaining American control over oil supplies to Western European countries and Japan, strengthening its dominance in this region, and preventing the growth of the Soviet Union's role there.

The Middle East is in the immediate vicinity of the military borders of the Soviet Union, and the events taking place there cannot but concern its interests.

The Soviet Union has emerged and continues to emerge as a potential theater of military action against the destabilization of the Middle East. This is precisely where the United States and Israel are heading. Washington strategists have included the region, along with Western Europe and the Far East, in the so-called "Third Central Zone".

In the near future, there is a real danger of the deployment of American medium-range missiles in the Middle Eastern states. Few, if any, doubt that if Pershing and cruise missiles appear there, they will be directed against the Soviet Union and its allies. It is quite natural that such a development of events cannot but worry the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union consistently opposed and continues to oppose foreign military presence in the region. The Soviet Union did not have and does not have a single military base in the territory of the Near and Middle East. The United States, however, has military bases there. In the Indian Ocean region and the Persian Gulf zone, from American territory. Many thousands of kilometers away, Washington has about 30 military bases, where 140,000 American servicemen are stationed. 48 percent of the White House's military spending outside its own country goes to strengthening its positions in the Near and Middle East.

The Soviet government has consistently spoken out and continues to speak out against the use of force in relations between states, against the acquisition of territories by force. Therefore, the Soviet government believes that in order to achieve a comprehensive, peaceful, just settlement of the Middle East conflict, the Israeli army must be withdrawn from all Arab territories occupied by it.

The Soviet Union, the Western countries and the solution of the Palestinian question at the United Nations in 1947.

“Our ideal is a world without weapons and violence, a world where each peoples freely chooses its path of development and its way of life,”11 we read in the political report of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

41 years ago, the Soviet Union, as a result of its victory in the Great Patriotic War, saved humanity from the danger of fascist enslavement. A world socialist system was created and is successfully developing. “Today, the fate of peace and social progress is especially closely linked to the dynamism of the economic and political development of the world system of socialism.”12 Dozens of independent states have arisen on the ruins of colonial empires. “... the emergence of previously enslaved peoples on the path of independence, the increase in their share in world politics and the economy is one of the distinctive features of the modern era.”13

The victories of the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War gave impetus to the unprecedented rise of the Arab national liberation movement, and the authority of the Soviet Union in the Middle East increased. The Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with Egypt in August 1943, and with Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq in July-August 1944.

Contrary to the United States and other Western countries, the Soviet Union demanded the admission of Syria and Lebanon to the original membership of the United Nations. The Soviet Union was the only major power that supported the demand for the withdrawal of British and French troops from the territories of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq.

The concern for the establishment of a lasting, reliable peace in the Middle East was a red line in the Soviet Union's approach to the Palestinian problem. The Soviet Union demanded the abolition of the British colonial mandate over Palestine, established by the 1920 San Remo Conference, the evacuation of British troops from its territory, and the cessation of foreign interference in Palestinian affairs. It considered the most correct solution to be the creation of a unified, independent Arab-Jewish democratic state on the territory of Palestine, where Arabs and Jews would enjoy equal rights.

Since such a decision could not be implemented in the specific conditions of the time and, above all, as a result of the hostility incited by Western powers between Jews and Arabs, the Soviet Union voted in favor of the United Nations resolution of November 29, 1947, on the partition of Palestine into two independent democratic states: an Arab and a Jewish state, and on the creation of an international zone in Jerusalem.

The Soviet delegation to the United Nations supported this decision only after it became clear that the conditions in Palestine did not allow for the creation of the original option of a unified democratic Arab-Jewish state.

As subsequent events have shown, the United Nations decision on Palestine of November 29, 1947 was not entirely ideal. It failed to unravel the complex and intricate knot of contradictions created by the imperialists and Zionists.

As early as November 2, 1917, the British Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour issued the Balfour Declaration, in which the British government pledged to promote the creation of a "national home for the Jewish people in Palestine."14 The San Remo Conference of the Entente Powers (April 1920) decided to transfer the Mandate for Palestine to Britain, and in July 1922 the British Mandate was approved by the League of Nations, which came into force on September 29, 1923. The Balfour Declaration, which effectively formalized the alliance of British imperialism with international Zionism, served the purpose of strengthening the colonial occupation of Palestine, where the British authorities found a foothold in the form of Jewish settlers. With the support and permission of the British ruling circles, an intensive Zionist invasion began, mass immigration of Jews to the territory of Palestine. In the period from the publication of the Balfour Declaration to the decision of the United Nations to divide the mandated territory of Palestine — 1917-1947 — the number of Jewish settlers increased more than 10 times, from 57 thousand to 608 thousand.15

Immigration received a particularly wide impetus during World War II and the first post-war years. Zionist emissaries launched active work, playing on Jewish feelings, calling on Jews, who had endured all the horrors of the Hitlerite genocide, to emigrate to Palestine, while the expulsion of Arabs from there was ongoing. At the same time, the political struggle of Palestinian Arabs against British colonialism was growing. At the forefront of this struggle were demands for the abolition of the British mandate and an end to Jewish immigration and Zionist encroachment in Palestine.

In May 1942, a representative conference was held at the Biltmore Hotel in New York, attended by about six hundred American Zionists and a number of leaders of the international Zionist movement, including H. Weizmann and D. Ben-Gurion. The conference adopted the "Biltmore Program", which put forward, in particular, the demand that "Palestine should become a Jewish state.”16 In December 1946, at its first post-war congress, the leaders of international Zionism raised the issue of the immediate creation of a state.17

During this period, the Zionists are already placing their main hopes on the United States of America. This is understandable. Before and during World War II, the United States became the leading capitalist country. This led to a change in the orientation of international Zionism from England to Washington. One thing is clear: Zionism has always considered the search for a strong ally as the main task in implementing its plans for the conquest of Palestine.

The same period also includes a sharp intensification of the terrorist activities of the “Haganah”, “Irgun Zvei Leumi”, and the “Stern” gang in Palestine. In this way, they tried, on the one hand, to push the British colonial administration to make a decision to cancel the mandate and lift the restrictions on Jewish immigration introduced to appease the Arabs, and, on the other hand, to create an unbearable situation for the Palestinian Arabs in order to force them to leave their homeland.

As a result of all of the above, the situation in Palestine became quite tense. England could not endure. It managed the situation, while wanting to maintain control over Palestine. In April 1947, London transferred the Palestine issue to the United Nations.

On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 (II) on the partition of Palestine and the creation of two states in Palestine - Jewish and Arab - on the former British Mandate territory.18 The resolution allocated 14.1 thousand sq. km. of territory (56% of the territory of Palestine) to the Jewish state with 498 thousand Jews and 497 thousand Arabs, and 11.1 thousand sq. km. to the Arab state. km (43% of the Palestinian territory) with a population of 725,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews. As for Jerusalem, Part III, paragraph “a” of the resolution states: “The city of Jerusalem shall exist as a separate entity enjoying a special international status.”19 Its population was determined as 105,000 Arabs and 100,000 Jews.

What was the Soviet Union's position?

When discussing the Palestine issue at the United Nations, the Soviet delegation demanded the abolition of the British Mandate, the withdrawal of British occupation troops from the mandated territory, and the cessation of outside interference in the internal affairs of the Palestinians. It supported the creation of a united democratic Arab-Jewish state in Palestine. However, taking into account the real situation in Palestine, which by the time the resolution of November 29, 1947 had turned into a hotbed of violent clashes between the Jewish and Arab communities, the Soviet Union voted for the creation of two separate states. “When the question of the fate of Palestine was being considered,” Comrade A. A. Gromyko pointed out, “the Soviet Union voted in favor of the creation of the State of Israel together with the State of Palestine. By voting for the creation of Israel, we were voting for a peaceful Israel, not for an aggressive Israeli state.”20

On May 14, 1948, at 6:01 a.m., the creation of the State of Israel was announced. At 6:11 a.m., Washington recognized the new state de facto.

Israel — a source of aggression.

Chaim Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organization in 1920–1931 and 1935–1946, became the first president of the State of Israel, and David Ben-Gurion, president of the Executive Committee of the World Zionist Organization, was appointed the first prime minister. The theory and practice of Zionism were elevated to the status of state policy.

Thus, immediately after the creation of the State of Israel, a militant, chauvinistic group came to the head of its government.

The prospect of creating two states in the former British Mandate of Palestine did not suit the Zionist leadership, which had firmly established itself in Palestine with the help and support of American imperialism and which wanted only to create a Jewish state. Under these conditions, the Zionist leaders, after the adoption of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on November 29, 1947, took the course of preventing the creation of an Arab state in the territory of Palestine at any cost.

According to the Arab historian A. Sayegh, the Zionist tactics consisted in the use of force, attacks and occupation of large centers and cities of Palestine in the territory allocated to the Arabs, in order to prevent by all means the creation of the Arab state of Palestine envisaged by the United Nations resolution. From December 1947 to February 1948 alone, the armed units of the "Haganah", "Irgun" and "Stern"21 carried out more than two thousand attacks on the peaceful Arab population in order to force them to leave their native places under the threat of extermination.22

In essence, the Zionists had already launched an undeclared war to drive the Palestinians out of their own lands.23 The culmination of all this was the most brutal massacre of the Arab population by the Zionist units of the Irgun and Stern on April 9 and 10, 1948, in the village of Deir Yassin. During this “operation,” the raiders killed all the inhabitants of the village. 250 women, old people, and children, and then threw them into a well. “Without the victory at Deir Yassin,” the then head of the Irgun, later Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, shamelessly boasted, “there would have been the state of Israel.”

Understandably, faced with the threat of such physical annihilation, many Palestinians were forced to leave their homeland and seek salvation in neighboring Arab countries, primarily Jordan, and as a result of the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli war, during which Washington in every way fueled Tel Aviv's expansionist aspirations, Israel captured 6.6 thousand sq. km of the territory intended for the creation of the Palestinian Arab state and West Jerusalem. The remaining part of the Palestinian territory, which Israel was unable to conquer at that time, was divided between Jordan and Egypt. The West Bank of the Jordan River and the eastern part of Jerusalem were temporarily transferred to Jordanian control, and an Egyptian administration was established in the Gaza Strip.

As a result of the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli war, 340,000 Palestinians left their homelands, and the total number of Palestinian refugees increased to 740,000.

Thus, the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of November 29, 1947 remained unfulfilled. The Arab state of Palestine could not be created.

Thus arose the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Israel's brazen aggressive actions to seize the territory of Palestine. are only part of the general expansionist course based on the ideology of Zionism. As early as 1904, the "father of Zionism" T. Herzl declared that the territory of the Jewish state should stretch from the Nile to the Euphrates. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the issue of Israel's borders was even bypassed in its Charter of Independence. "The size of the Jewish state will be determined by war," these words of Ben-Gurion, the first head of the Israeli government, contain the credo of Tel Aviv's expansionist policy.

In accordance with the general Zionist concept of creating a "Greater Israel", the policy of constant territorial expansion pursued by the Israeli government - the June 1967 aggression - resulted in the occupation of the entire territory of Palestine, in particular, Israel occupied the West Bank of the Jordan River (5.5 thousand sq. km), the Gaza Strip (258 sq. km), the eastern part of Jerusalem, as well as the territories of Egypt (the Sinai Peninsula - 56 thousand sq. km) and Syria (the Golan Heights - about a thousand sq. km), a total of more than 60 thousand sq. km. This, in turn, led to the expulsion of a new significant part of the Palestinian Arabs from this territory.

Throughout the entire 38 years of the existence of the State of Israel, its official policy was based on ignoring the very fact of the existence of the Arab people of Palestine. For example, Golda Meir, while serving as Prime Minister of Israel, theatrically stated: “The Palestinian people? I have never heard of such a thing. Can you tell me where and when there were such people? Did they exist?” The manual for action was developed back in the late 1940s by M. Begin, who stated: “There is no room for two peoples in Palestine... The only solution is Palestine without Arabs. There is no other way out without the deportation of all Arabs from neighboring countries.”24

The occupation of the entire territory of Palestine by Israel and the Zionist policy of racial discrimination against the Palestinian people are in direct contradiction to the Charter of the United Nations and the resolution of its General Assembly of November 29, 1947 on the question of Palestine.

Thus, the state, which was born as a result of the long anti-colonial liberation struggle of the Jewish and Arab population of Palestine against the British colonizers, under the leadership of Zionist leaders, itself became the implementer of a colonial policy towards the Arabs.

This is the first interview in the series! If you want more in-depth investigations like this—and to learn about the overlooked stories of Georgian workers at home and abroad—support my work.

I use AI images and conceal their real names because many of them do not want to be public about their struggles!

Interview with Mariam, A Georgian caregiver in Bari, Italy

Interviewer (N): How old are you?

Mariam: I am 65 years old.

N: How many years have you been an immigrant from Georgia?

Mariam: Seventeen years. I spent seven years in Greece and ten years in Italy. I grew old in emigration.

N: How long did you initially plan to stay abroad?

Mariam: In 2006, I was working as a lecturer at Javakhishvili University when the faculty underwent massive layoffs and reorganization , and I was let go from my position to a position where my salary dropped to just 40 GEL ($23). With a child in school, I had no choice but to leave. I went to Greece, unsure of what to expect, but I had no other options. I often drenched my pillow with tears. What was meant to be a two-year stay turned into seven, as the situation in Georgia kept worsening. When I returned after those seven years, things had only gotten harder. My daughter was still jobless, and I was on the "Do Not Hire" list—at over 45, I was considered too old for work. Desperate, I began searching for a way to emigrate again. Within three months, I left for Italy, but that journey was just as difficult.

N: Why Italy and not Greece?

Mariam: I couldn’t get documents in Greece, so I chose Italy. I was also barred from entering Greece for five years—I had to pay a fine, and a severe economic crisis had started there.

N: How did you get to Italy?

Mariam: I took out a loan of 50,000 GEL at 17% interest and flew there.

N: How long did you plan to stay?

Mariam: For three years—but three years turned into ten.

N: Who helped you when you arrived?

Mariam: Friends who were already there. The worst thing here is that you often have to buy a job—I hate that.

N: Where did you stay initially?

Mariam: Georgians had rented an apartment, and a friend took me there.

N: Was that person your employer?

Mariam: No.

N: What documents do you have now?

Mariam: I’m applying for asylum. At first, my boss refused to help, but when I threatened to hire a lawyer, he got scared and said he had a lawyer who would assist me.

N: How long has this process taken?

Mariam: At first stage they gave me six months residence, the second time- five months, and now they’ll grant me a two-year residence.

N: Who told you about the documents?

Mariam: All the Georgians here know how it works.

N: How do you find employment?

Mariam: I search online, post in groups, or ask around. People here guide each other.

N: Who did you travel with?

Mariam: An acquaintance knew where I could stay and took me there.

N: How much did you pay?

Mariam: Five euros [per day]

N: How long did you stay there?

Mariam: One month. Then a night-care job opened, but I couldn’t handle the night hours. I found another job on my own.

N: How did you get your first job?

Mariam: By chance. I was at the seaside and met a girl who told me about a job. That job turned out to be a nightmare, I didn’t sleep at all.

N: How did you find your current job?

Mariam: A woman I knew told me about an Alzheimer’s patient who needed a caregiver. The salary was 800 euros, but it was still enough for me since I was undocumented, and now I'm getting documents and changing jobs.

N: Did you have to pay for the job?

Mariam: Yes. I have also been duped by my employer. I went to work and was fired in one month. The job was already sold to someone else, but the amount I paid was not returned - my 250 euros.

N: What did the employer say?

Mariam: Nothing. I didn’t even know if they had a badante (Italian for caregiver). Our rights are extremely violated here.

N: Describe a typical day at work.

Mariam: Everyone’s routine is the same: wake up early, prepare breakfast, clean the house, take the patient for a walk, cook dinner, tidy up again, and help them to bed.

N: How many hours do you rest daily?

Mariam: At this stage, I get about two hours. It’s not unbearable.

N: What time does your patient wake up and sleep?

Mariam: She wakes at 7:30 AM and sleeps by 9 PM. She used to wake earlier. Legally, I should be paid more for this level of care, but I’m not.

N: Do you have a contract?

Mariam: Yes, but the conditions aren’t followed. My patient has severe Alzheimer’s—I should earn 1,126 euros, but I get only 830.

N: Is she aggressive?

Mariam: No, she doesn’t understand anything. I feed her by hand; she doesn’t recognize her own children.

N: Do you live alone with her?

Mariam: Yes, though her children visit occasionally to oversee the care.

N: How many hours are in your contract?

Mariam: By law, 24-hour care should mean 10 hours of work—I work different hours than the contract, with an abnormal schedule

N: Do you know about overtime pay? Do they compensate you?

Mariam: I know the law, but they don't pay me, and they don't pay anyone else overtime either.

N: If you say that they don't follow the law, what would they do?

Mariam: They will tell you that they can't pay you more, and if you don't like it, leave!

N: How do you feel about the family you work for?

Mariam: I came here for money and personal needs. They don't want to understand that you are here to work, and they don't give you what you deserve. They tell you, “We don't have more money. You can stay if it suits you, or you can go.” They don't even want you to mention money. Now, the only thing keeping me here in this family are documents I am waiting for.

N: How do you feel about being a Georgian caregiver in Italy?

Mariam: It’s painful and humiliating. Working this job after my professional career, feels like a blow to my dignity.

N: Does Italy need caregivers like you?

Mariam: They don't need us in any way, they have so many workers to choose from. However, there are families who ask for Georgian badantes because we put up with many things. We are very different from everyone else, fascism starts like this, every single cent is accounted for, they count each other's every bite.

N: What percentage of your salary do you send to Georgia?

Mariam: I keep 30%.

N: How does your family view your sacrifice?

Mariam: I think my daughter sees all this, and I was included in the list of the best mothers. This is a prestige, but I gave up everything, my happiness, my emotions, for my child. It is very hard for me to cope.

N: Are you married?

Mariam: No. He died, my husband was only 33, and I never remarried. Then I started fighting for my daughter and forgot my own life. A woman shouldn’t do that.

N: You have one child?

Mariam: Yes, and a grandchild and son-in-law.

N: How do you cope psychologically?

Mariam: I don't recommend this path to anyone. Everything here is grey. Nothing is yours. Nothing belongs to you. This place is very beautiful, but nothing has any value for me here. Nothing makes me happy here. I prefer my land, my homeland. This is the most difficult path. This is a swamp. It will drag you down. No one should choose this path, especially a young person.

N: How is your sleep?

Mariam: My patient doesn’t wake me, but I wake up early from my crushing nostalgia.

N: Do you eat well?

Mariam: Yes, thankfully.

N: Any physical pains?

Mariam: Not at this stage.

N: Have you ever self-harmed?

Mariam: Never. I’m mentally strong, thank God.

N: How is your family coping without you?

Mariam: My daughter struggles. She tries to trick me into returning.

N: Do you have a romantic life?

Mariam: (Recites Galaktion Tabidze’s poem "Without Love")

The greatest sin is the person who walks without love. Love is the greatest gift. Happiness has not come to me yet. I am waiting like Pupala (a character in the film “Wishing Tree).

N: Have any organizations helped you?

Mariam: No.

N: What do you wish you knew about Italian labor laws?

Mariam: Nothing yet, I will contact you

N: Do you know Italian trade unions or any organizations?

Mariam: No, but it is interesting

N: Have you used any public institutions?

Mariam: No, not even CAF (Centro Assistenza Fiscale)

N: Are you interested in knowing about Italian trade unions

Mariam: I will inquire later when I get the legal document

N: Who do you go to when you are in trouble?

Mariam: I have friends who I go to

N: How do I imagine your future in Georgia

Mariam: I don't have anyone there, I lost friends, relatives, I don't know their personal lives anymore, their history, when I go there I don't know who to call to meet up. We all do the same thing here, we have the same hardship and we all help each other

N: How do you imagine your future

Mariam: I declared the next 3 years as my “years of hardship,” and then I will definitely return to my homeland, no matter what happens!