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Footprints of Hezbollah and Hamas  

Hezbollah would be extremely reticent to quit their offensives versus Lebanon’s government and beyond, per their 1985 pamphlet which spelled out a reason to exist and a platform. [CIA (a)]  Their remit is not only material, but also  dependent on dissemination of Shia Muslim tenets in their web of leverage [CIA 3-4; Agnew 130-131, 117].In terms of Hezbollah’s web of leverage [Agnew 130-131, 117] in universal Shia solidarity however, this remit will perhaps make Hezbollah a more obstinate keeper of spirituality [CIA 3-4] than Hamas.    

This last point is in line with “hierarchical network[s]” and “the market-access regime” as ways of overlaying national boundaries.  Elements of both ‘hierarchical network[s]’ [Agnew, 130-131], and “the market-access regime” [Agnew, 117] say that alliances and mutual aid arrangements are fed by commodities “flow.” [Agnew 130-131, 117]  The ire of Hezbollah focused on two distinct arenas: this spiritual [CIA 3-4] web of leverage, as well as the more limited extent of Lebanon’s boundary. Imagining themselves at the front line of universal Shia solidarity, they tagged the US as hegemonic target number one, and colonialism in Palestine as hegemonic target number two [CIA 3-4].   

Hamas likewise drills down to rancor “against the Jews,” [Yale Law School, “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement”] attracting devotees from all over to piety and character in a warped sense.  However, this uplifts a more specialized and narrow web of leverage to unify Palestine and invalidate Israel, per Hamas’ 1988 manifesto. For example, Hamas “strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine.” [Yale Law School, “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement”]  It is mostly this passion that fuels them. 

Hamas made waves as a radical insurgency group in the mid-1980’s. Plugging in to the Pan-Arab Palestinian Liberation Movement, they had a multinational network by 1983. A chapter of Hamas germinated in the West Bank, and pages of the group’s propaganda were left in Jordan by operatives [Chebab 28].  There is an underground track of Palestine-bound guns and ammunition, with branches in “Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon, as well as Iran” and Syria [Chehab 171-172].

Shortly after the passing of Palestinian Liberation Organization headman Yasser Arafat came an election which threw competing desires for the role of Hamas into stark relief. Hyper-combative hardliners were overwhelming the agenda, and the message to comrades and affiliates.  This shows how, in Hamas’ web of alliance, hardline conviction and theory outshone the slightly more hesitant tones of regional officer Hassan Yousef, for example, and how (true of any outfit like Hezbollah or Hamas) ballot box agendas can wither next to combativeness [The Green Prince, Schirman].  Theory was an ingredient for not just the character of Hamas, but also its footprint [Agnew, 130-131, 117].  However, unlike Hezbollah, it was not the paramount keeper of a brand of universal Muslim piety.  

Leverage to Mute Them

While Hamas’ leverage reaches out to Jordan and beyond, so does the pulse of Mossad, the bastion of high stakes surveillance and security for Israel. The monarchy of Jordan would not admit that national borders were frequently porous for operatives of the Israeli intelligence organization. This was shown when the regime tried to conceal Mossad’s mission to kill the pointman of Hamas’s Jordanian contingent in 1997 [Chehab 116, 118].  There is also more of a pattern to this. King Abdullah II also sanctions Israeli interference, allowing stations for their interstate commerce inspectors at the border with Jordan [Chehab 171].

Lebanon’s administration is pushing for Hezbollah to turn into solely a civic outfit, with no weaponry. Per Nolga Tarnopolsky of France 24: In theory, the state is angling to be the only entity with weapons, an end which Tel Aviv desires as well. This features a limited term ceasefire [France 24, 15 Apr. 2026]. 2-3 days prior, Israeli infantry and other units compelled such a posture of Beirut, sweeping through a hit list of 150 supposedly Hezbollah sites and assets and imposing leverage.  [France 24, 13 Apr. 2026]. The “technocratic’ local cadre, that is in theory anointed at the helm of Gaza, has broached following a strikingly similar road to strip Hamas [NPR, Bashir and Estrin].  

Zooming out, the geopolitical posture of states towards Hezbollah is due to the patronage that the Iranian treasury paid the outfit.  That said, to a much greater extent than a domestically-leaning Hamas, Hezbollah has seated itself in the same arena as states.  It answers slights to Palestine and Iran, is treated by Europe as a major entity and leverage wielder in the America-Iran ceasefire [France 24, 9 Apr. 2026].  Thus, its web of leverage, in Agnew’s mind, is substantial, not just accepting commodities and theories but sending them out and “playing with the big boys,” [Agnew 130-131, 117] in part made possible because of Hezbollah’s footprint in the Lebanese legislature.     

Theories coursing through the footprint of any outfit- be it Hezbollah, Hamas, etc- are foundational to leverage.  Yet they can also obstruct and confuse each other [Agnew 130-131, 117]. Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen of The Middle East Institute points out that the objective of a Palestinian state seems far- fetched given the multitude of opinions involved and the power that has been robbed from the people, and from Hamas, clogging the gears of improvement in cities and towns. Her colleague Tahani Mustafa talks about this in terms of the argument over whether to be obstinate, or to support negotiation and dialogue with the Netanyahu administration . She says this dichotomy has existed back to about 2010, and been exacerbated by Netanyahu's revenge for the 2023 terror attack on Israel. 

After the attacks, western and Middle Eastern countries activated their leverage, and challenged that the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank ought to become more responsible, and not risk Hamas being the one megaphone for Palestine’s diplomacy [MEI, “Palestinian Politics, Publics and Paths Forward Post October 7”]. Hamas’ leverage was, and still is being degraded, counteracted by bundles of weapons and rhetoric from Western and Middle Eastern countries [Agnew 130-131, 117]. They did not want an only loosely democratic and highly problematic Hamas administration at the vanguard of any dialogue. To mitigate their fears, this cadre of countries [MEI, “Palestinian Politics, Publics and Paths Forward Post October 7”] implemented a web of leveraging [Agnew 130-131, 117] theory and commodity. For example, the Arab Reform Plan was a bipartisan blueprint introduced last year, mirrored by non-partisan Palestinian blueprints. Both were not embraced by the PA. Calling for a perspective outside Hamas is more pronounced pushback [MEI, “Palestinian Politics, Publics and Paths Forward Post October 7”] than the pushback to the administrative side of Hezbollah, with its party (not to say that the weaponized side of it is condoned). Hezbollah’s civics can take place on a process of politics that is, at least in theory, based on balance and due process, whereas Hamas has been pummeled in Gaza and administratively chaotic [MEI, “Palestinian Politics, Publics and Paths Forward Post October 7”].  It has been 20 years and counting since there were elections for an assembly which encompasses all of Palestine [Al-Monitor, “Palestine elections chief: Vote ‘transparent’ despite war, restrictions”].  

All this dims the pulse of Hamas’ efficacy to be a patron for Gaza. Per Palestinian community organizer Wasim Almasri, locals “see little difference between an unaccountable PA or an Imposed transactional council, or even Hamas. All fail the test of protecting civilians and delivering dignity to the people.” [MEI, “Palestinian Politics, Publics and Paths Forward Post October 7”] Lebanese residents seem, by contrast, a degree more likely to back Hezbollah. Hezbollah latches onto acquiescence, enabled because of their more accepted footprint in the legislature in Beirut. In the fall of 2024, the backtracking regulars of Lebanese defense continued to cede the job to Hezbollah. [NPR, The Associated Press]. Four years prior, they formulated a blueprint which mitigated COVID-19 [France 24, 14 April 2020] for residents.  

By contrast, Hamas cannot stop apathy of the residents of Gaza [MEI, “Palestinian Politics, Publics and Paths Forward Post October 7”], the “technocratic” local cadre that outsiders anointed in the wake of a (non-) ”ceasefire” [NPR, Bashir and Estrin] , or the imploring by G7 states to boost NGOs in Gaza [MEI, “Palestinian Politics, Publics and Paths Forward Post October 7”]. These latter two vectors to move forward counteract the apathy vector, but all three are not good news for Hamas. Hamas’ domestic leveraging is stunted. They are not only crushed by the IDF, but also could not receive any votes recently (April 21) because of this ordinance: “recognize Israel and accept a two-state” endgame [Al-Monitor, On eve of Palestinian local elections, competition in short supply”].  Ballots were cast in just one Gaza region, Deir el-Balah [Al-Monitor, same as previous citation].

Hamas’ purview is somewhat less encompassing than that of  Hezbollah, even though both hold clout in the Middle East.  Hezbollah’s bigger footprint is thanks to a universal Shia outlook [CIA 3-4], and posture in the more solid bureaucracy of Lebanon.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Agnew, John. Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics. Second ed. London, Routledge, 2004. 

Bashir, Abu Bakr and Daniel Estrin. “Trump's mediators offer Hamas formal proposal to give up its weapons in Gaza.” NPR. 19 March 2026. Date accessed: 21 May 2026.  https://www.npr.org/2026/03/19/nx-s1-5753798/hamas-weapons-trump-gaza-board-of-peace

Chehab, Zaki. Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement. New York: Avalon Publishing Group, 2007.

“France 24 English-Live- International Breaking News & Top Stories- 24/7 stream.” France 24 English.  YouTube. Date accessed: 9 April 2026.

“France 24 English-Live- International Breaking News & Top Stories- 24/7 stream.” France 24 English.  YouTube. Date accessed: 13 April 2026.

“France 24 English-Live- International Breaking News & Top Stories- 24/7 stream.” France 24 English.  YouTube. Date accessed: 15 April 2026.

“Hezbollah carves out leading role in Lebanon's Covid-19 fight.” France 24, English. 14 April 2020. Date accessed: 23 May 2026. https://www.france24.com/en/video/20200414-en-mg-pkg-beirut-hezbollah-covid19

Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, Lucy et. al. “Palestinian Politics, Publics and Paths Forward Post October 7.” 1 Oct. 2025. Date accessed: 5 May 2026. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i9okjHNvIGQ&t=262s

Kuttab, Daoud. “On eve of Palestinian local elections, competition in short supply.” Al-Monitor. 23 April 2026. Date accessed: 17 May 2026. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/04/eve-palestinian-local-elections-competition-short-supply?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ALM%20Palestine%205-13-2026&utm_content=ALM%20Palestine%205-13-2026+Preview+CID_75cc9eb33666b68bdbdd5c0591d25843&utm_source=campmgr&utm_term=Palestinian%20local%20elections

Kuttab, Daoud. “Palestine elections chief: Vote ‘transparent’ despite war, restrictions.” Al-Monitor. 13 May 2026. Date accessed: 18 May 2026. https://www.al-monitor.com/newsletter/2026-05-13/palestine-elections-chief-vote-transparent-despite-war-restrictions

“Near East/South Asia Report: Hizballah Issues ‘Open Letter’ on Goals, Principles.”  CIA. 16 Feb 1985.  Date accessed: 21 April 2026. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000361273.pdf

The Associated Press. “In separate strikes, Israel kills 2 Lebanese soldiers and injures 2 U.N. peacekeepers.”  NPR. 11 Oct 2024. Date accessed: 23 May 2026. https://www.npr.org/2024/10/11/nx-s1-5150126/israel-lebanon-strikes-un-peacekeepers-lebanese-soldiers

“The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement.”  Yale Law School. 18 Aug. 1988. Date accessed: 27 May 2026. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/21st_century/hamas.asp  

The Green Prince, Schirman, Nadav.  Music Box Films. 2014  

“Travel” is empathy

“Generally” is empathy

The figure Abraham stared up at the eye of the universe

Was promised children like a concert of sky fires

The children became strangers as his decedents; instead of sky fires, they were branded with Religion, or lack of it

“Strangers” is empathy- Abraham, at Generation Zero, before those fires, knew not of other cultures

Empathy is needed for Abraham, whether you consider him a great prayer or a great anime character

Sea and rich man lied to Abraham’s children, “You are different from each other, and some are higher than others.”  The children listened, and it wasn’t crazy that they listened

 “It wasn’t crazy” is empathy- the children thought they needed rich man

Rich man built nations.  The Nation: another brand of Religion

Spear flickered into bow, flickered to sword, rifle, airplane, rocket, laser

“Security Religion.”

I’m empathetic to the dark creation of this Religion.  I swim, unfortunately, in its waters.  It’s all we know

Why don’t we realize that the brand fires that afflict us are perversions of the sky fires made for Abraham?  

The security he was given was the spiritual…and robe…and tent…and family

The family in his present, and the family in the sky.  Let’s eat together, talk together, dance together, cross seas, protect each other from the lasers of rich men

This is empathy. For we are the fires in the sky  

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