Since 2021, I have conducted extensive firsthand investigations into Texas election administration in my own county and across the nation, documenting procedural changes over multiple election cycles. To the best of my knowledge, I am the only election observer to have systematically documented these changes in such detail.

My findings revealed a common pattern: the erosion of three foundational principles of election security—Auditable Paper Trails, Ballot Secrecy, and Chain of Custody.

My work now focuses on practical, low-cost solutions that restore these safeguards immediately using existing election infrastructure. I have endorsed the ECHO Hand Count Method for any county ready to make the shift away from electronic tabulation of cast ballots.

TBTR.US demonstrates, with experience and first-hand knowledge, how today’s election systems have become unnecessarily expensive, technologically complex, and increasingly dependent on proprietary vendors while often weakening ballot secrecy, chain of custody, auditability, and voter civil rights.

The solution is not more redactions and more technology that also cannot be audited by average Americans. The solution is returning to transparent, lawful election administration that the public can easily participate in, understand, observe and verify.

At the center of this work are The ABCs of Election Security:

A — Auditable Paper Trails: Every vote should produce a paper record that can be independently audited without redaction.

B — Ballot Secrecy: Only the voter should know which ballot is theirs.

C — Chain of Custody: Every ballot must remain continuously accounted for from issuance through certification.

Everything else follows from these three principles.

The Problem: Redacted Records, Countywide Voting and the Loss of Precinct Accountability = No Auditable Paper Trail

We can no longer audit our elections. Redactions, denials and missing records make it impossible to truly know who won an election conducted with modern US procedures and computerized systems.

For generations, elections were administered by precinct. Every voter reported to an assigned precinct. Ballots were issued, cast, secured, counted and reported within that precinct before becoming part of the countywide report.

The precinct became the smallest auditable unit of an election—the most minute political subdivision available for public review of its election returns. It is also state law to report these results.

This structure naturally preserved ballot secrecy while giving election officials a clear method of reconciliation. Officials could compare voter check-ins, ballots issued, ballots cast, spoiled ballots, provisional ballots and ballots counted without identifying how any individual voted.

The modern practice of allowing regular, non-provisional ballots at countywide vote centers has created significant challenges to all three principles. Countywide vote centers have eliminated the last voting option that inherently guaranteed ballot secrecy—in-precinct voting on Election Day.

Casting all ballots by precinct restores auditability by guaranteeing ballot secrecy and eliminating the need for post-election redaction. It strengthens chain of custody for precinct-level returns by having the evidence of those returns ready and available to be examined without redaction.

Ballot Secrecy

Ballot Secrecy is one of the oldest and most fundamental principles of American elections. It assures that once a voter lawfully casts a ballot, no one can later determine how that individual voted. This protects every citizen from intimidation, coercion, retaliation or influence.

Election transparency and ballot secrecy are not opposing principles. They are complementary safeguards.

Casting regular ballots countywide destroys ballot secrecy as outlined in several of my reports. Susan Valiant, TX, first discovered this issue while investigating the mysterious voting trend shift in Tarrant County, Texas after the 2020 Election. She discovered that any voter who is the only voter from their precinct, or a husband and wife duo, to vote at a countywide vote center will have their ballot and ballot selections immediately identified.

I do not believe this audience needs explaining the danger of seeing a voters’ choices. Our legislatures also understand this danger, hence why ALL 50 STATES have ballot secrecy requirements per Federal law.

Requiring post-election redaction of public election records inherently destroys meaningful auditability of election records and leaves no readily available physical evidence of precinct returns that are reported out. This is why our states’ election officials redacted a variety of election records. They have allowed the practice to expand, though they knew all this.

The election process should be transparent, observable and verifiable from beginning to end. It is the identifiable selections of the voter—not the administration of the election—that must remain confidential.

Ballot secrecy is best preserved when ballots are issued and cast by precinct. It can be enhanced through sequentially numbered ballots presented face down for random voter selection, as is currently done in Texas. Only the voter knows the identifying number of the ballot they selected.

When elections are designed to preserve voter anonymity from the beginning, more election records can be released without extensive review or redaction. Privacy should be built into the process so that transparency will be built into the record. It’s actually the Law already.

An Auditable Paper Trail preserves the physical evidence of voter intent. Ballot Secrecy ensures that evidence cannot be connected to the identity of the voter. Chain of Custody documents where that evidence has been from the moment ballots are issued until the election is certified and retained.

Together, these principles strengthen one another.

Chain of Custody: The Missing Link

Chain of Custody is the documented history of an item from the moment it is created until it is archived, destroyed or presented as evidence.

It records who had possession, when they possessed it, where it was stored, how it was transported and who received it next.

Elections are evidence-based processes.

Every ballot cast is evidence of voter intent. Ballot boxes, ballot bags, poll books, memory devices, tally sheets, batch reports, registration files and precinct returns become part of the evidentiary record supporting the final election result.

Just as a prosecutor must prove where evidence has been from the crime scene to the courtroom, election officials should be able to demonstrate where ballots have been from issuance to final certification.

The public should be able to ask:

• Where were the ballots stored?

• Who transported them?

• Who had access to them?

• When did custody transfer occur?

• Were seals intact?

• Do ballot counts reconcile with voter check-ins and precinct returns?

These are normal questions for any process that relies upon public trust.

Most election workers are dedicated public servants who perform their duties professionally and honestly. Strong chain of custody procedures protect them as much as they protect the election itself. Proper documentation removes doubt, answers questions and provides objective evidence that procedures were followed correctly.

In the absence of documented chain of custody, citizens are asked to trust the process. In the presence of chain of custody, citizens can verify the process.

Trust is important, but verification is vital.

The Turn-Key Solution: Paper Elections - By Precinct

The answer does not require immediately replacing existing voting equipment or reducing voter access. Though the goal is to eliminate the use of machines, it must first be demonstrated that these issues described above are inherent to moder voting systems and their associated practices. Following that, a solution must be provided to ensure a more lawful - yet feasible and affordable - option for consideration.

We have not yet, and will not, see success without proving 1.) these issues came in with the voting systems, and that 2.) we do not need these voting systems to conduct a modern election.

This is an incrimental approach to immediately undermine these modern practices and systems which have so thoroughly destroyed our auditable paper trails, ballot secrecy protections, and chain of custody for the actual ballots, along with our trust in US elections.

I have a proposal. The proposal is simple:

Use existing polling locations and immediately return to precinct-based elections.

Assign voters to nearby precinct locations to restore ballot secrecy. Reinforce chain of custody for precinct returns to simplify audits and recounts. Guarantee full post-election auditability without excessive redaction of ballots that should be anonymous by design.

To do this, your county will need to:

Print a hard-copy paper poll book immediately after each voter registration deadline for each precinct and deliver it to the assigned Early Voting and Election Day locations.

Use the hard-copy paper poll book as the official record for regular, non-provisional voting. Only voters listed in the paper precinct voter book who provide proper identification may cast a regular ballot. Everyone else votes provisionally. Provisional ballots are sorted and verified by precinct, then counted upon verification by precinct. Same with Mail-In Ballots - and GOD BLESS PRESIDENT TRUMP FOR THAT E.O. ON USPS HANDLING OF MAIL BALLOTS. ITS AMAZING.

Back to the proposal.

Electronic Poll Books should be limited to administrative functions: assigning the proper ballot style, recording voter check-in and producing provisional ballots through ballot-on-demand functionality. They do not replace the official paper precinct voter record. They are not what determines who gets a regular ballot. They are no longer relied upon for voter access to ballots. YAY!

This does not totally eliminate countywide voter access, though, and let me explain this crucial point for voter access.

A voter at their assigned polling location receives a regular ballot. A voter at another location receives a provisional ballot containing the proper ballot style associated with their home precinct.

Though many states have laws and rules that authorize the casting of regular ballots countywide, under the guise of expanding voter access, not one single state has a law that guarantees voters a regular, non-provisional ballot at each location. They cannot do that, as it would eliminate the need for all other eligibility criteria for voting. They are not quite there yet, though we see the very groups pushing these modern systems pushing the elimination of precinct voting and provisinal ballot use.

You can still vote at any location. A regular ballot at your precinct’s assigned location, and a provisional ballot everywhere else or if you have no ID.

Provisional ballots already exist to ensure eligible voters are not denied access. Once approved, they can be sorted into their proper precinct before counting.

Thus, countywide voter access and precinct accountability can coexist.

No eligible voter is denied the opportunity to vote. YAY!

Three Turn-Key Options

There are three nationally applicable, turn-key proposals for restoring a significant amount of security to the next election cycle. This is meant to be run during Early Voting as well as Election Day.

Option 1 — Full Paper Ballot + ECHO Hand Count

Use hand-marked, hand-counted paper ballots cast by precinct, with paper poll books determining eligibility and ballot assignment.

• Print and deliver a hard-copy paper poll book after the registration deadline.

• Print the predetermined number of hand-marked paper ballots.

• Consecutively pre-number ballots as an optional security feature, and as required by Texas law.

• Use the paper poll book for official voter check-ins and regular ballot access.

• Electronic poll books only for check-ins of provisional ballot voters.

• Cast ballots by precinct into assigned ballot boxes without scanning.

• Keep ballots grouped by precinct throughout the election.

Three-person counting teams count batches of 50, or less in large counties with 1M+ population.

Teams begin counting Early Voting ballots at 7 a.m. on Election Day, along with mail-ins and cured provisional ballots sorted by precinct. Election Day ballots are counted at the lawful time, on location where they were cast, as outlined in state statute or after polls close, whichever allows counting to begin sooner.

Hand-Counting hand-marked ballots takes an average of 2.5hrs per batch of 50. Under and Over Votes are present, the latter requiring adjudication. The faster you can count, the fewer counting teams needed to count all ballots in the time allotted.

The result being that lead election clerks produce precinct-level returns with strong chain of custody, easily available for recounts and audits.

Reconciliation teams complete hand-tabulation of precinct returns for larger cumulative reports that can be broken down by precinct and verified in a TRUE canvass before certification.

The result is maximum auditability, ballot secrecy by default, the strongest chain of custody, the lowest technology dependence, a transparent public hand count and fast precinct-level recount capability. YAY!

Option 2 — Hand Count the Machine-Marked Ballots

Use existing polling locations, ballot marking devices, electronic poll books, paper poll books, secure ballot boxes and election kits while eliminating reliance on electronic tabulation.

Voters use the ballot marking device, approve their selections and confirm accuracy. The ballot is cast by precinct into an assigned ballot box without being scanned.

The ballots remain grouped by precinct.

Three-person teams hand count batches of 50, or less in large counties with 1M+ population.

Hand-Counting machine-marked ballots takes an average of 1.5hrs per batch of 50. The time saved is due to Over votes being eliminated as you cannot select more than one candidate on a ballot marking device. The faster you can count, the fewer counting teams needed to count all ballots in the time allotted.

This provides minimal worker/ voter process changes, eliminates reliance on electronic tabulation, preserves precinct reporting, strengthens chain of custody and provides a publicly auditable hand count.

The result is maximum auditability, ballot secrecy by default, the strongest chain of custody, the second-lowest technology dependence, a transparent public hand count and fast precinct-level recount capability. YAY!

Option 3 — Ballots Cast by Precinct, Counted by Scanner

Machine-marked, machine-counted paper ballots cast by precinct.

If the only thing you can do is cast ballots by precinct - do it immediately.

This is the simplest method to return to voting by precinct immediately and is the last-resort option.

Use existing polling locations, ballot marking devices, scanners, electronic poll books, paper poll books, secure ballot boxes and election kits as currently used, with a few minor changes.

Print the hard-copy paper poll book after the registration deadline. Use it to determine eligibility for a regular ballot. Use electronic poll books only for administrative functions and provisional ballots.

Cast and scan ballots by precinct. Produce separate precinct reports. Maintain physical ballot records by precinct for audits and recounts.

Reconciliation teams complete precinct returns for larger cumulative reports and verify them in a TRUE canvass before certification.

The result is NOT maximum auditability, but offeres ballot secrecy by default, eliminating the need for post-election redactions, a stronger chain of custody than currently afforded for precinct returns and fast precinct-level recount capability. Yay. Better than current practices by a long shot!

The Common Features

All three options share the same basic framework:

• Precinct-assigned polling locations.

• Countywide voting preserved through provisional ballots.

• Electronic Poll Books used for voter check-in and ballot-style assignment.

• Paper Poll Books used to determine regular ballot eligibility.

• Ballots maintained by precinct.

• Compliance with federal paper trail and record retention requirements.

• Compliance with state party primary election laws governing party authority, provisional voting, ballot secrecy and precinct reporting.

• Identical precinct-based procedures for Early Voting and Election Day.

• Precinct-level ballot accounting from the time a ballot is cast until final certification.

• Polling locations closer to voters’ homes.

• Shorter lines for voters compared to countywide vote centers.

Benefits include the use of existing polling locations in most states and counties, though it may require a county to obtain a few more polling locations, or extra ballot boxes sortedby precicnt to cast voted ballots into. Precinct assignments are optimized to balance voter volume while preserving precinct-based reporting.

Expected turnout can be distributed more evenly among locations, improving staffing efficiency and creating more consistent ballot volumes and hand-count workloads.

The transition may initially increase provisional ballots while voters become familiar with their assigned polling locations again. Electronic poll books ensure every voter receives the correct ballot style regardless of location. As voters transition to assigned polling locations, provisional ballot usage is expected to decline, as is our reliance on electronic poll books. YAY!

The ECHO Hand Count Method

TBTR Strategies has proposed an incremental yet meaningful switch away from dependence on computerized systems to give us our test results and into a precinct-based hand-counted election in a county the size of Tarrant County, Texas.

The faster a team can count a batch of ballots, the fewer teams are needed to count all ballots in the time allotted.

Counting PVRs (Printed Vote Records - Machine Marked Ballots) cuts about an hour from previous records for counting hand-marked ballots. The lack of overvotes on PVR ballots saves time, and the ECHO Hand Count Method is vital to reaching warp speed. There are a few other procedures I have heard are just as fast, accurate and organized and I would love to, one day, host an event where the best of the best can be compared and speed-tested.

A demonstration counted 34 races on 50 PVR ballots in under 1 hour and 30 minutes.

The speedy process is possible using the ECHO Hand Count Method. This is my recommended course for most counties who are struggling to convince their leadership to toss the machines entirely.

The objective is not to create an unnecessarily burdensome election system. It is to create an accurate, organized, speedy and easily auditable counting process that can work in large counties with more than 1M population and is even simpler in smaller counties.

Restoring Auditability, Ballot Secrecy and Chain of Custody

Returning to precinct-based voting for both Early Voting and Election Day restores ballot secrecy by ensuring that voters retain the option of voting within their assigned precinct, while provisional voters also enjoy this privacy guarantee.

Restoring ballot secrecy strengthens auditability and chain of custody because election records can be examined without redactions and reconciled without risking a connection between voters and their ballots.

Approved provisional ballots sorted by precinct before counting ensure every ballot is ultimately counted and reported within the voter’s proper precinct.

When ballots associated with a precinct are physically maintained and reported together, officials can review, audit and recount them without first attempting to locate ballots cast by voters from that precinct at multiple countywide voting locations through electronic records.

Physical precinct ballot groupings provide a clearer chain of custody, reduce administrative complexity and allow officials to focus directly on the ballots being reviewed.

This reduces the time, labor and expense required for audits and recounts while improving confidence in the results.

The Practical Result

Returning to precinct-based voting is a simple, cost-effective reform that can be implemented using existing voting technology.

It preserves countywide voter access.

It guarantees voters receive the correct ballot style.

It restores ballot secrecy.

It strengthens auditability and chain of custody.

It simplifies audits and recounts.

It improves public confidence in election outcomes.

Most importantly, it uses procedures and safeguards that already exist within current election law and election administration practices.

The solution is not more technology. The solution is not more redactions.

The solution is transparent, lawful election administration that the public can easily participate in, understand, observe and verify.

Election integrity should never depend upon blind trust. It should depend upon procedures that produce verifiable evidence while protecting every lawful voter.

The public should be able to observe election procedures, reconcile election records, audit paper ballots, review chain of custody documentation and verify election results without compromising the privacy of a single citizen.

That is the purpose of the ABCs of Election Security.

Auditability. Ballot Secrecy. Chain of Custody.

Election integrity begins with evidence.

Evidence begins with voting by precinct and ends with a solid, complete, accurate and unbroken chain of custody.

If you appreciate this work, we accept donations - though they are NOT required for access to this vital information.

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Aubree
Founder, TBTR.US
Election Security Subject Matter Expert
Subject Matter Expert: Poll Watching, Auditing Election Returns, Recounts, Hand Counting Strategy, Practical Application of Voting Systems, Hand Counting Strategy for Large Counties, etc.

We must immediately return to casting all regular ballots by precinct, print hard-copy paper poll books immediately following each voter registration deadline, and end our reliance on electronic poll books to determine eligibility for regular ballots. Electronic systems should be limited to improving voter convenience—such as ballot style assignment and check-in—while paper poll books and photo identification remain the controlling authority for issuing regular ballots, preserving our ability to prevent unlawful ballots from being cast and counted.

These are three NATIONALLY APPLICABLE, TURN-KEY PROPOSALS to consider for restoring a significant amount of security to your home town’s next election cycle:

Option 1 — Full Paper Ballot + ECHO Hand Cont Implementation (Recommended for Smaller Counties)

Hand-Marked, Hand-Counted Paper Ballots Cast by Precinct using Paper Poll Books to Determine Eligibility and assign ballots.

Hand-Marked Ballot Counting: The ECHO Hand Count Method (countwithecho.org)

Preparation Using existing polling locations, some machines, early voting and election day staff, adding Paper Poll Books, Hand-Marked Ballots for eligible voters, and hand counting teams:

• Print a HARD COPY PAPER POLL BOOK immediately after the registration deadline for each precinct.

• Deliver the HARD COPY PAPER POLL BOOK to the assigned Early Voting and Elecion Day Locations.

• Educate voters on the facts; Vote in your assigned location for a regular ballot, vote anywhere else and you can vote but it will be provisional. Using the epoll books, we can get provisional voters the proper ballot style, but they must cure their identity before their ballot can be approved for counting.

• Print the pre-determined number of hand-marked paper ballots.

• Consecutively pre-number the ballots (optional security feature., but state law in Texas).

Voter CHECK-IN:

• Use the HARD COPY PAPER POLL BOOK for voter check-in. All voters on the list with ID get a regular ballot to hand-mark.

• EPoll Books are used only to produce provisional ballots, like a ballot-on-demand printer. Depending on what system your municipality/ ward/ county uses this process can easily be customized.

• Ballots to be cast by precinct into assigned ballot boxes without ever being scanned.

• Ballots remain grouped by precinct throughout the election.

Counting Process: The ECHO Hand-Count Method (countwithecho.org)

• Three-person counting teams count all ballots cast into precinct ballot boxes in batches of 50 ballots (or less in Large Counties with 1M+ Population).

• Three-person teams begin to hand count all in-person ballots from Early Voting starting at 7am on Election Day, along with mail-ins and cured provisional ballots, all sorted by precinct.

• Three-person teams begin to hand count all in-person ballots from Election Day at polling locations beginning at the lawful time outlined in state statute for counting, or after the close of polls, whichever allows counting to begin sooner.

• Lead Election Clerk at each polling location for Early Voting and Election Day will produce precinct-level returns with strong chain of custody, easily available for recounts and audits.

• Reconciliation teams will complete precinct returns for larger cumulative reports and will be easily broken down by precinct and verified in a TRUE canvass before certification of results.

• Number of counting teams per precinct is determined by a combination of these things: speed of counting method, the number of ballots cast, and the time allotted for precinct returns to be delivered for reporting.

Equipment Used is Already in Place

• Electronic Poll Books

• Paper Poll Books by precinct (if recently eliminated from your county/state procedures - bring them BACK)

• Secure ballot boxes

• Election kits (tally sheets, reconciliation forms, chain of custody forms, precinct returns)

• No scanners required for this option begin securing elections.

Pros

• Maximum auditability.

• Preserves ballot secrecy by default.

• Strongest chain of custody.

• Lowest technology dependence.

• Fully transparent public hand count.

• Fast precinct-level recount capability.

Cons

• Additional counting staff will be required.

• At 2+hrs per 50 ballot batch/voting team, the shift could delay reporting in counties with populations of 1M+.

• Increased number of provisional ballots initially.

Option 2 — Hand Count the Machine-Marked Ballots (PVRs) Cast By Precinct (Quickest to Hand-Count for Large Counties)

Machine-Marked, Hand-Counted Paper Ballots Cast by Precinct.

Machine-Marked Ballot Counting: The ECHO Hand Count Method (countwithecho.org)

Preparation Using existing polling locations, certain machines, early voting and election day staff, adding only Paper Poll Books and hand counting teams:

• Print a HARD COPY PAPER POLL BOOK immediately after the registration deadline for each precinct.

• Deliver the HARD COPY PAPER POLL BOOK to the assigned Early Voting and Elecion Day Locations.

• Educate voters on the facts; Vote in your assigned location for a regular ballot, vote anywhere else and you can vote but it will be provisional. Using the epoll books, we can get provisional voters the proper ballot style, but they must cure their identity before their ballot can be approved for counting.

• Deliver the usual number of PVR ballot blanks (blank machine-marked ballots).

• Consecutively pre-number the ballots (optional security feature, but state law in Texas).

Voter CHECK-IN:

• Use the HARD COPY PAPER POLL BOOK for voter check-in. All voters on the list with ID get a regular ballot to mark by machine.

• EPoll Books are used only to produce provisional ballots, like a ballot-on-demand printer. Depending on what system your municipality/ ward/ county uses this process can easily be customized.

• Ballots to be cast by precinct into assigned ballot boxes without ever being scanned, after voter approves the selections and confirms accuracy.

• Ballots remain grouped by precinct throughout the election.

Counting Process: The ECHO Hand-Count Method (countwithecho.org)

• Three-person counting teams hand count all ballots cast into precinct ballot boxes in batches of 50 ballots (or less in Large Counties with 1M+ Population).

• Three-person teams begin to hand count all in-person ballots from Early Voting starting at 7am on Election Day, along with mail-ins and cured provisional ballots, all sorted by precinct.

• Three-person teams begin to hand count all in-person ballots from Election Day at polling locations beginning at the lawful time outlined in state statute for counting, or after the close of polls, whichever allows counting to begin sooner.

• Lead Election Clerk at each polling location for Early Voting and Election Day will produce precinct-level returns with strong chain of custody, easily available for recounts and audits.

• Reconciliation teams will complete precinct returns for larger cumulative reports and will be easily broken down by precinct and verified in a TRUE canvass before certification of results.

• Number of counting teams per precinct is determined by a combination of these things: speed of counting method, the number of ballots cast, and the time allotted for precinct returns to be delivered for reporting.

Equimpent Used is Already In Place.

• Ballot Marking Devices

• Electronic Poll Books

• Paper Poll Books

• Secure ballot boxes

• Election kits

• No tabulation scanners.

Pros

• Minimal voter process changes.

• Eliminates reliance on electronic tabulation.

• Preserves precinct reporting.

• Strengthens chain of custody.

• Publicly auditable hand count.

Cons

• Additional counting staff will be required.

• At 1.5hrs per 50 ballot batch/voting team, the shift could delay reporting in counties with populations of 1M+.

• Increased number of provisional ballots initially.

• Minimal reliance on voting system technology.

Option 3 — Ballots Cast By Precinct, Counted by Scanner (Simplest Method to Return to Voting By Precinct Immediately - Last Resort Option)

Machine-Marked, Machine-Counted Paper Ballots Cast by Precinct.

Using existing polling locations, PVRs (machine-marked ballots), scanners, early voting and election day staff, adding only Paper Poll Books to determine eligibility for reguar vs provisional ballots:

• Print a HARD COPY PAPER POLL BOOK immediately after the registration deadline for each precinct.

• Deliver the HARD COPY PAPER POLL BOOK to the assigned Early Voting and Elecion Day Locations.

• Educate voters on the facts; Vote in your assigned location for a regular ballot, vote anywhere else and you can vote but it will be provisional. Using the epoll books, we can get provisional voters the proper ballot style, but they must cure their identity before their ballot can be approved for counting.

• Print the pre-determined number of hand-marked paper ballots.

• Consecutively pre-number the ballots (optional security feature., but state law in Texas).

Voter CHECK-IN:

• Use the HARD COPY PAPER POLL BOOK for voter check-in. All voters on the list with ID get a regular ballot to hand-mark.

• EPoll Books are used only to produce provisional ballots, like a ballot-on-demand printer. Depending on what system your municipality/ ward/ county uses this process can easily be customized.

• Ballots to be cast by precinct into assigned ballot boxes without ever being scanned.

• Ballots remain grouped by precinct throughout the election.

Counting Method: Scanner/Tabulator

• Scan ballots by precinct.

• Produce separate precinct reports.

• Maintain physical ballot records by precinct for audits and recounts.

• Reconciliation teams will complete precinct returns for larger cumulative reports and will be easily broken down by precinct and verified in a TRUE canvass before certification of results.

Equipment Used is Already in Place

• Ballot Marking Devices

• Precinct optical scanners

• Electronic Poll Books

• Paper Poll Books

• Secure ballot boxes

• Election Kits

Pros

• Minimal operational changes.

• Restores precinct-level reporting.

• Improves chain of custody over countywide mixing.

• Faster election night reporting.

• Allows meaningful audits using precinct-specific ballot batches.

Cons

• Greatest reliance on voting system technology of the three options.

• Scanner/tabulator use not ideal.

Common Features (All Options)

• Precinct-assigned polling locations.

• Countywide voting preserved through provisional ballots.

• Electronic Poll Books used for voter check-in and ballot style assignment ONLY.

• Paper Poll Books used to determine regular ballot eligibility.

• Ballots maintained by precinct.

• Public voter education campaign.

• Online precinct lookup tool.

• Compliance with federal paper trail and record retention requirements.

• Compliance with State party primary election laws governing party authority, provisional voting, ballot secrecy, and precinct reporting.

• EARLY VOTING and ELECTION DAY run Identically: Ballots Cast by Precinct with Provisional Ballots being used to satisfy any countywide access requirements for either period during an election cycle.

Voter Check-In/ Ballot Issuance for ALL THREE OPTIONS

1. Regular Ballots

A voter receives a regular ballot when they:

• Vote at their assigned polling location.

• Present an acceptable photo ID (or otherwise satisfy Texas identification requirements).

• Appear on the precinct paper poll book.

Regular ballots are cast and counted with that precinct’s election returns.

2. Provisional Ballots

A voter receives a provisional ballot if they:

• Vote at a polling location other than their assigned location or;

• Are not listed on the precinct paper poll book.

• Do not present lawful photo identification.

Using the electronic poll books, election workers will issue the voter the correct ballot style regardless of where they vote, however only voters with proper ID and who appear on the list of eligible voters will be given a regular ballot. Anyone outside of this criteria will vote a provisional ballot, without exception. Provisional ballots satisfy countywide access when used in the proper way, they allow all voters the chance to cast their ballot while affording election staff the chance to prevent unlawful ballots from being cast.

Once the provisional voter successfully verifies their eligibility and identity through the normal provisional ballot review process, the ballot is approved and counted in accordance with State statute.

Voter Access Issues RESOLVED:

• No eligible voter is denied the opportunity to vote.

• Voters may cast a provisional ballot at any polling location.

• Even distribution of assigned voters will reduce lines and wait times.

• Electronic poll books ensure every voter receives the correct ballot style.

• Paper poll books determine eligibility for a regular precinct ballot.

• Precinct Ballots are cast and kept together for Early Voting and Election Day; Ballot Secrecy is restored.

• Post-election redactions are rendered pointless; Auditability is restored.

• Chain of Custody is strengthened for precinct returns; Trust is restored.

General Implementation Considerations

Early Voting & Election Day

• Apply the same precinct-based procedures during both Early Voting and Election Day.

• Use identical voter check-in, ballot issuance, chain of custody, and reporting procedures throughout the voting period.

• Preserve precinct-level ballot accounting from the time a ballot is cast until final certification.

Polling Location Assignments

• Assign voters to polling locations nearest their registered residence, close large-scale “vote-centers” immediately.

• Balance precinct assignments to create more uniform voter traffic across all polling locations and to produce more consistent ballot volumes and hand-count workloads at each polling location.

• Improve staffing efficiency by distributing expected turnout more evenly among locations.

Transition Period

• Expect an initial increase in provisional ballots while voters become familiar with their assigned polling locations.

• Electronic poll books ensure every voter receives the correct ballot style regardless of location.

• Once voter eligibility and identity are verified under existing provisional ballot procedures, eligible provisional ballots are approved and counted.

• As voters transition to their assigned polling locations, provisional ballot usage is expected to decline.

TBTR.US Precinct Mapping

• TBTR.US precinct-based voting maps are designed using each state’s and county’s existing election infrastructure.

• Existing polling locations are retained whenever practical.

• Precinct assignments are optimized to balance voter volume while preserving precinct-based reporting.

Security Benefits

Implementation of any of these three options immediately strengthens several fundamental election security measures by restoring the ABCs of Election Security:

• Auditability

• Ballot Secrecy

• Chain of Custody

Thank you, Patriots, I am available for a small fee to consult and guide you through your efforts in restoring election security in YOUR home town.

Email me at takingtxback@gmail.com to book a consultation!

All Rights Reserved

Hand-Count Strategy by Precinct ‘26

Aubree

TBTR Strategies

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My name is Aubree and I am the founder of TBTR Strategies (formerly Taking Back Texas) (TBTR.US) and an election integrity researcher based in Tarrant County, Texas.

Since 2021, I have conducted extensive firsthand investigations into Texas election administration in my own county and across the nation, documenting procedural changes over multiple election cycles—including those advanced under former Tarrant County Elections Administrator, and later Dallas County Elections Administrator, Heider Garcia, formerly of SmartMatic, and the election-themed NGOs he was a prominent and influential member of. To the best of my knowledge, I am the only election observer to have systematically documented these changes in such detail.

My findings revealed a common pattern: the erosion of three foundational principles of election security—Auditable Paper Trails, Ballot Secrecy, and Chain of Custody.

My work now focuses on practical, low-cost solutions that restore these safeguards immediately using existing election infrastructure, and I have endorsed the ECHO Hand Count Method for any county ready to make the shift away from electronic tabulation of cast ballots. My work investigating Heider Garcia was featured nationally in the This American Life episode “Flies Meet Honey.”

I have a detailed understanding of how to implement these measures which have been surgically removed from US election procedures in what appears to be a coordinated effort across the nation to undermine our ability to prevent unlawful ballots being cast and diluting the votes of lawful citizens.

TBTR.US demonstrates, with experience and first-hand knowledge, how today’s election systems have become unnecessarily expensive, technologically complex, and increasingly dependent on proprietary vendors while often weakening ballot secrecy, chain of custody, auditability, and voter civil rights.

My body of work, along with amazing findings by other election security experts in my county and state, demonstrates that many modern election practices are inconsistent with existing state and federal election laws intended to protect election from undue influence and improper practice. We show how the trend of casting regular ballots across the countywide rather than by precinct has had a detrimental effect on voter turnout, destroyed voter trust, and has devastated the voter’s right to cast a private ballot.

The solution is not more redactions and more technology that also cannot be audited by average Americans, it is returning to transparent, lawful election administration that the public can easily observe and verify.

At the center of every single report related to election security, whether mine or others, are the three issues I have identified as The ABCs of Election Security.

Everything else follows from these three principles.

Read: The ABCs of Election Security

Learn how simple the remedy is in the reports below. You can begin designing your secure elections TODAY using our information and your county’s unique criteria.

Thank you for reading and sharing this critical strategy with your loved ones and representatives.

Resolving Ballot Secrecy Through Precinct-Based Voting

Shows how countywide vote centers weaken ballot secrecy, audits, recounts, and chain of custody while demonstrating how precinct-based voting restores these protections without reducing voter access.

Read: The Dangers of Countywide Voting

Read: How the Federally Mandated Use of Provisional Ballots Satisfies Countywide Access Requirements

Voting by Precinct - a Vital Security Measure

Demonstrates that transparent, precinct-based hand-counted primaries can replace unnecessary technology while improving security, public confidence, and auditability.

Read: Primaries by Precinct

Read: Restoring Auditablity, Ballot Secrecy and Chain of Custody Through Precinct Based Voting

NGOs and Undue Influence on US Elections

Examines the expanding role of private organizations in election administration and the need for transparency and public accountability.

Read: NGOs + Undue Influence

The Deep State Is REAL

Examines how permanent bureaucracies, contractors, and institutional interests influence election administration regardless of political leadership.

Read: The Deep State is REAL

Fastest Hand Counters in the West

Demonstrates that organized precinct hand counts can produce fast, transparent, and highly accurate election results.

Read: Fastest Hand Counters in the West

Beyond Ballot Secrecy - Unlawful Vote Tracking Potential

Investigates evidence suggesting that modern computerized election systems may enable the creation of relational databases capable of linking individual voters to specific ballots, potentially undermining ballot secrecy. The report examines the use of electronic poll books, ballot marking devices, ballot printers, embedded ballot identifiers, and associated election records, while compiling findings from multiple independent researchers. It argues that these practices warrant greater transparency, independent investigation, and stronger protections for ballot secrecy as required under state and federal law.

Read: The Hidden Infrastructure for Voter Surveillance

Will Hart and Smartmatic Dominate the Election Technology Market?

TBTR.US examines the recent release of VVSG 2.0-certified voting system suites by Hart InterCivic and Smartmatic, exploring what increased reliance on a small number of voting system vendors could mean for election administration. Rather than investing in increasingly complex technology, election officials should focus on restoring transparent, precinct-based elections that strengthen The ABCs of Election Security—Auditable Paper Trails, Ballot Secrecy, and Chain of Custody.

Watch:

The Debate Over Lawful Ballot Numbering

Examines how sequential ballot numbering can strengthen chain of custody while preserving ballot secrecy when properly administered.

Read: The Debate Over Lawful Ballot Numbering

Read: (From 2021) Ballot Numbering Violations in Tarrant County, Texas

Texas & the Philippines: Footage of Common Election System Anomalies

This video compares unexplained date and time stamp anomalies found in election records from Smartmatic systems used in the Philippines and Hart InterCivic systems used in Texas. The presentation also examines the role of Heider Garcia, who has been associated with both election environments, and explores whether these similarities warrant further public scrutiny.

The video emphasizes the need for complete, transparent audit logs and independently verifiable election records to strengthen public confidence and accountability.

Watch:

Glossary of Election Terms

A helpful list of acronyms, organizations, verbiage and terminology for you to help our readers more swiftly brief themselves on other election security investigations like an expert.

Read: (From 2022) TBTX: A Glossary of Terms

THE SOLUTION SUMMARIZED

Precinct-Based Election Security Framework

• Use existing polling locations and assign voters to nearby precinct locations while immediately returning to precinct-based elections to:

  • Restore ballot secrecy.

  • Reinforce chain of custody for precinct returns.

  • Simplify audits and recounts.

  • Guarantee full post-election auditability without excessive redaction of ballots that should be anonymous by design.

• Mandate paper precinct voter books with ink signatures as the official record for regular, non-provisional voting:

  • Paper precinct voter lists are created immediately after the registration deadline and delivered to election authorities.

  • No voters may be added to paper poll books after that deadline.

  • Only voters listed in the paper precinct voter book who provide proper identification may cast a regular ballot.

• Limit electronic poll books to administrative functions only:

  • Assign voters their proper ballot style through ballot-on-demand functionality.

  • Record voter check-in.

  • Function regardless of whether ballots are hand-marked or machine-marked, hand-counted or machine-counted.

  • Electronic poll books do not replace the official paper precinct voter record.

• Preserve countywide voting access and Photo ID requirements through provisional ballots:

  • Any voter not on the hard-copy precinct voter list, unable to provide state-issued photo ID, or added to an electronic poll book after the 30-day registration deadline may vote a provisional ballot, not a regular ballot, at any location.

  • Provisional voters receive the proper ballot style based on the address provided.

  • Eligibility is verified before approval for counting.

  • Voters may cure provisional ballots by verifying identity with photo ID within the existing cure period.

  • Provisional ballots satisfy countywide access requirements because no state can guarantee every voter a regular, non-provisional ballot without violating eligibility safeguards required for lawful elections.

• Apply these standards to both Early Voting and Election Day without exception.

  Optional Hand Counting Method (Recommended)

• Where able, implement the ECHO Hand Count Method (CountWithECHO.org), the TBTR.US-endorsed modern hand-counting method designed for:

  • Accurate, organized, speedy, and easily auditable counting.

  • Large counties with 1M+ populations.

  • Even simpler implementation in smaller counties.

• Objective:

  • Reduce dependence on proprietary election technology.

  • Restore trust through simplicity, transparency, and auditabiliy rather than overly complex and impossible-to-audit systems.

  • Reduce cost and time of recounts and audits.

Civic Education for All Ages

TBTR.US also publishes the Color Me Free™ Educational Coloring Books series, including The ABCs of Election Security, to teach constitutional principles and election integrity to students, families, and communities. Get yours today for the family, sponsor the education of an elementary school near you, or order a box for your campaign - we will add your logo and QR directly onto the books for your constituents - a memorable gesture from the candidate to the voters.

Learn more and purchase at TBTR.US/coloring-books

To make direct donations:

I accept Zelle as primary - or -

PayPal: @tbtx7hs
Venmo: @tb-tx
Cashapp: $takingbacktx

Our Color Me Free! Educational Coloring Books series helps children discover America’s founding documents, constitutional principles, patriotism, and civic responsibility through engaging, age-appropriate coloring books that families, schools, churches, and community organizations love.

The Color Me Free educational coloring book series teaches children about the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution, the First Amendment, the Pledge of Allegiance, the Texas Pledge, the American Creed, and the ABCs of US Elections.

Whether you’re running a campaign, a political organization, nonprofit, church, daycare, school or community group, these books provide a meaningful way to invest in the next generation while leaving a positive, lasting impression in your community.

Better yet, campaigns can customize the books with their campaign logo. Simply reply to this email or send your campaign logo to scotagraphics@gmail.com, and we’ll incorporate it into your order (minimum order quantities apply).Campaign signs are forgotten after Election Day. Educational materials are remembered for years.

Browse the Collection here:

Buy Color Me Free! Educational Coloring Books Today

A $1,400 sponsorship sends 700 coloring books (100 each of our seven titles) to an early education institution or youth organization in your community, or you can order quantities that fit your campaign, event, or outreach program.

Pick up 300 copies of coloring books **with your campaign logos** for just $1050. Discounts apply for larger orders.

Or grab the set for your home - all 7 for just $30 +$5 flat shipping.

Order today to begin making a positive impact, or simply reply to this email if you’d like to discuss custom branding, bulk pricing, or community sponsorship opportunities.

Let’s teach the next generation the principles of freedom, responsibility, and the American story—one child at a time.

Thank you,

Aubree

Founder @ Scotagraphics scotagraphics@gmail.com takingtxback@gmail.com aubree@woodruff4texas.org

How do we conduct an election that is completely transparent while simultaneously protecting the privacy of every voter?

At TBTR.US, we teach that Ballot Secrecy is one of the three pillars of election integrity, alongside Auditable Paper Trails and Chain of Custody. Together, these principles form the ABCs of Election Security. Each principle serves a distinct purpose, yet none can stand alone. A ballot may be secure, but if it cannot be audited, confidence suffers. A ballot may be auditable, but if its custody cannot be documented, confidence suffers. Likewise, an election may be transparent, but if voters cannot be assured that their ballot remains forever secret, the foundation of a free election is weakened.

Ballot Secrecy is not intended to hide elections from public scrutiny. Quite the opposite. The election process should be transparent, observable, and verifiable from beginning to end. It is the identifiable selections of the voter—not the administration of the election—that must remain confidential. This distinction allows election officials to demonstrate that every lawful ballot was properly counted while ensuring that no citizen’s vote can ever be traced back to them.

Understanding this distinction is essential to understanding election integrity.

Why Ballot Secrecy Exists

To appreciate the importance of Ballot Secrecy, it is helpful to understand why it became a cornerstone of American elections.

Before the adoption of the secret ballot, voting was often conducted publicly. Political parties printed their own ballots, employers could observe how employees voted, political organizations rewarded loyal supporters, and intimidation, retaliation, and vote buying were common. Citizens often faced pressure from those with political or economic influence because their vote was no longer private.

The secret ballot fundamentally changed American elections by separating the identity of the voter from the ballot itself. Once a ballot was lawfully cast, it became impossible to determine who cast it.

This simple principle protects every voter equally, regardless of political affiliation, race, religion, occupation, or social standing.

A free election requires a secret ballot that only the voter can identify as their own.

Ballot secrecy is best preserved when ballots are issued and cast by precinct. It can be enhanced further through the use of sequentially numbered ballots that are presented face down for random voter selection, as is currently done in Texas. Under this procedure, only the voter knows the identifying number of the ballot they selected.

Ballot Secrecy Under the Law

Ballot Secrecy is more than an administrative preference. It is a legal principle reflected throughout American election law.

Federal constitutional protections for voting, freedom of speech, and freedom of political association recognize that citizens must be able to participate in elections without fear of intimidation or retaliation. Likewise, both federal and state election laws require voting systems and election procedures to preserve the secrecy of each voter’s ballot while ensuring that election results remain subject to audit, canvass, and public verification.

Election transparency and ballot secrecy are not opposing principles, and you do not need to give up one to have the other. These are complementary safeguards which have no justification for being violated.

Why Precinct-Based Voting Matters

For generations, elections were administered by precincts.

Every voter reported to an assigned precinct. Ballots were issued within that precinct, cast, secured, counted within that precinct, and reported as precinct returns before becoming part of the countywide report.

This structure naturally preserved ballot secrecy while providing election officials with a clear method of reconciliation. Officials could compare voter check-ins, ballots issued, ballots cast, spoiled ballots, provisional ballots, and ballots counted without ever identifying how any individual voted.

The precinct became the smallest auditable unit of an election, the most minute political subdivision available for public review of it’s election returns.

At TBTR.US, we know and teach that countywide voter access and precinct accountability can coexist. This is a concept that every election integrity supporter agrees with, but there is nuance to how it is implemented across states, counties and voting systems.

Voters who appear outside their assigned precinct should never be denied the opportunity to vote. Instead, they should cast a provisional ballot that is later validated and counted as part of the voter’s home precinct. This preserves voter access while maintaining the precinct-level accountability that supports Ballot Secrecy, Auditable Paper Trails, and Chain of Custody.

Precinct accountability is one of those procedures that, when implemented again, immediately restores Auditability by ensuring Ballot Secrecy and it also improves Chain of Custody for precinct returns.

Ballot Secrecy and Public Records

One of the often-overlooked benefits of preserving Ballot Secrecy by design is that it increases government transparency.

Election officials regularly receive requests for election records from candidates, political parties, researchers, journalists, and citizens. When election procedures are designed to preserve voter anonymity from the beginning, more election records can be released without extensive review or redaction.

Rather than relying upon attorneys and election staff to determine what information must be withheld after the election, election procedures should be designed so that confidential voter information is never unnecessarily connected to publicly releasable election records.

Privacy should be built into the process so that transparency will be built into the records.

The more effectively Ballot Secrecy is preserved during the election, the less redaction becomes necessary afterward.

Ballot Secrecy and Auditable Paper Trails

Some mistakenly believe that ensuring voter privacy makes elections more difficult to audit, but the opposite is true. An Auditable Paper Trail preserves the physical evidence of voter intent, Ballot Secrecy ensures that evidence cannot be connected to the identity of the voter, and Chain of Custody documents where that evidence has been from the moment ballots are issued until the election is certified and retained.

Together, these three principles strengthen one another. Auditable Paper Trails preserve the evidence. Ballot Secrecy protects the voter. Chain of Custody protects the evidence from compromise.

If even one of these three vital components is missing, the elections will be subject to massive skepticism and turnout may dwindle as a result of voter distrust and fatigue.

The TBTR.US Position

Election integrity should never depend upon blind trust, it should depend upon procedures that produce verifiable evidence while protecting every lawful voter. The public should be able to observe election procedures, reconcile election records, audit paper ballots, review chain of custody documentation, and verify election results without ever compromising the privacy of a single citizen.

That is the purpose of the ABCs of Election Security.

A — Auditable Paper Trails provide the physical evidence necessary to verify and recount elections.

B — Ballot Secrecy protects every citizen’s right to cast a private ballot free from intimidation, coercion, or retaliation.

C — Chain of Custody documents every transfer and safeguard protecting ballots and election records throughout the election process.

These are not partisan principles, but procedural principles designed to protect every voter equally by protecting the process itself.

A constitutional republic depends upon elections that are both transparent and private, with an election process open to public observation… and the voter should always remain anonymous.

When election procedures preserve Ballot Secrecy, maintain an Auditable Paper Trail, and document an unbroken Chain of Custody, public confidence is no longer based solely upon trust, it is then based upon evidence.

For more information, read The ABCs of Election Security and explore additional educational resources available through TBTR.US.

Thank you,

Aubree

Founder TBTR.US

Want to see more truth? Support our work in the following ways:

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ZELLE Now Accepted

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All donation amounts help, thank you, patriots!

Or you can support us through purchasing or sponsorship of our COLOR ME FREE! Educational Coloring Books for your home or school of choice.

They also make great campaign materials to leave with voters!
http://Tbtr.us/coloring-books

At TBTR.US, we teach that election security rests upon three foundational principles: Auditable records, Ballot Secrecy, and Chain of Custody—the ABCs of Election Security. These principles work together to create elections that are transparent, verifiable, and worthy of public trust. Remove any one of these safeguards, and the integrity of the entire process begv cnvhr ins to deteriorate.

What is Chain of Custody?

Chain of Custody is the documented history of an item from the moment it is created until the moment it is archived, destroyed, or presented as evidence. It records who had possession of the item, when they possessed it, where it was stored, how it was transported, and who received it next.

In simple terms, Chain of Custody answers a straightforward question:

Can we prove where this item has been and who controlled it at every step of the process?

Without that proof, the authenticity and reliability of the item become questionable.

The Criminal Evidence Example

To understand the importance of Chain of Custody, consider a homicide investigation.

A firearm is recovered at a murder scene. Investigators photograph the weapon, place it into an evidence bag, seal it, document the location where it was found, and record the identity of the officer who collected it. The firearm is then transferred to an evidence technician, logged into secure storage, transported to a crime laboratory for forensic testing, returned to evidence storage, and eventually presented in court.

At every step, documentation exists showing:

• Who possessed the firearm.

• When possession changed.

• Where the firearm was stored.

• Whether the evidence seal remained intact.

• Who conducted testing or analysis.

If prosecutors cannot establish this chain of custody, defense attorneys may challenge the evidence. Even if the firearm is authentic, the inability to prove who possessed it and how it was handled can undermine confidence in the evidence itself. That means an open-and-close case cannot be prosecuted, and a killer may walk free having escaped justice.

The lesson is simple: evidence is only as trustworthy as the chain of custody that accompanies it.

Elections are Evidence-Based Processes

Elections are no different.

Every ballot cast is evidence of voter intent. Every set of ballot boxes, ballot bags, poll books, memory devices, tally sheets, batch reports, registration files and precinct’s returns become part of the evidentiary record that supports the final election result.

Just as a prosecutor must prove where a firearm has been from crime scene to courtroom, election officials should be able to demonstrate where ballots have been from issuance to final certification.

The public should be able to ask:

• Where were the ballots stored?

• Who transported them?

• Who had access to them?

• When did custody transfer occur?

• Were seals intact?

• Do the ballot counts reconcile with voter check-ins and precinct returns?

These questions are not accusations, they are the normal questions that accompany any process that relies upon public trust.

Why Precinct-Based Elections Matter

Chain of Custody becomes significantly more difficult when ballots are disconnected from the precincts where they were cast.

Historically, elections were conducted within precincts. Voters voted in their assigned precinct, ballots were counted by precinct, and election results were reported by precinct. This structure naturally supported accountability because election records could be reconciled at the lowest level of election administration.

When ballots are aggregated across large geographic areas and reported through countywide vote centers without preserving clear precinct-level accountability, the ability to independently verify custody records becomes more challenging.

TBTR.US advocates a system that preserves countywide voter access while maintaining precinct-level accountability. Voters who appear outside their assigned precinct polling location should be offered provisional ballots in their proper ballot style. This approach protects voter access while preserving the critical election security principles of Auditable Paper Trails, Ballot Secrecy, and Chain of Custody.

Chain of Custody and Public Confidence

Chain of Custody is not merely about preventing fraud. It is about creating transparency and confidence.

Most election workers are dedicated public servants who perform their duties professionally and honestly. Strong chain of custody procedures protect them as much as they protect the election itself. Proper documentation removes doubt, answers questions, and provides objective evidence that procedures were followed correctly.

In the absence of a documented chain of custody, citizens are often asked to trust the process. In the presence of a documented chain of custody, citizens can verify the process.

That distinction is critical because trust is important, but verification is vital.

The TBTR.US Position

The ABCs of Election Security provide a practical framework for restoring confidence in elections:

A — Auditable Paper Trails: Every vote should produce a voter-verifiable paper ballot that can be recounted and audited.

B — Ballot Secrecy: Every citizen should be able to cast a ballot free from coercion, intimidation, or the possibility of their vote being traced back to them.

C — Chain of Custody: Every ballot and election record should be documented, secured, and accounted for from beginning to end.

These principles are procedural and not partisan, despite the claims made about this movement to secure US elections. These are the same standards that Americans expect in banking, law enforcement, accounting, and every other field where public trust depends upon accurate records and accountability.

Election integrity begins with evidence. Evidence begins with voting by precinct and ends with a solid, complete, accurate and unbroken chain of custody.

For more information, read The ABCs of Election Security and explore additional educational resources available through TBTR.US.

Thank you,

Aubree

Founder TBTR.US

Want to see more truth? Support our work in the following ways:

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All donation amounts help, thank you, patriots!

Or you can support us through purchasing or sponsorship of our COLOR ME FREE! Educational Coloring Books for your home or school of choice.

They also make great campaign materials to leave with voters!

http://Tbtr.us/coloring-books

Johnny Q (host of DEADSPIN) and I cover the facts around the departure of Lt. Col. Allen West from the Dallas GOP over he tried to secure elections in a lawful, feasible way.

Learn what Lt. Col. West saw, what the goal was, who managed the Task Force and how the Task Force failed miserably and then tried to blame Lt. Col. Allen West for correcting their mistakes that disenfranchised thousands of Dallas GOP Primary voters.

I was the expert helping the Task Force. I am a fact witness to the Task Force's failures, to their lies about their plan, and their attack on the ONLY man who was brave enough to try to secure his party's primaries, only for a bloodthirsty faction to disenfranchise voters and threaten Lt. Col. Allen West for fixing the problems caused by Stan Woodward and his shameful task force.

Learn more about my work at tbtr.us and see how simple securing elections can be.

Tune into Johnny Q's DEADSPIN on pilled.net and join the weekly discussion with hundreds of other dedicated patriots.

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They also make great campaign materials to leave with voters!

http://Tbtr.us/coloring-books

Citizen trust in election systems is essential to voter participation and confidence in election outcomes. Election procedures must not only be secure and accurate, but must also be transparent enough to allow meaningful public verification of election results. The principles of Auditability, Ballot Secrecy, and Chain of Custody form the foundation of election integrity and are necessary for citizens to independently verify that election outcomes accurately reflect the will of the voters.

The modern practice of allowing regular (non-provisional) ballots to be cast at any countywide vote center has created significant challenges to all three principles. While countywide voting centers were adopted to increase convenience, they have also eliminated the last voting option that inherently guaranteed ballot secrecy—in-precinct voting on Election Day. As a result, election administrators have been forced to redact a variety of election records to prevent the public from reconciling individual voters with their ballots, something that should not be possible under state and federal voting system standards.

The Problem

The need to redact election records has created a conflict between transparency and ballot secrecy. While ballot secrecy must always be protected, the resulting redactions prevent meaningful public examination of election records, hinder recounts, compromise audits, and weaken the chain of custody associated with precinct returns. Election records that should be available for verification become difficult or impossible to reconcile, limiting the public’s ability to independently confirm election accuracy.

These concerns stem from the fact that countywide vote centers break the traditional relationship between a voter’s assigned precinct and the location where the ballot is cast. Precinct-level reporting remains a legal requirement, yet many states have authorized the practice of casting ballots throughout the county and later attribute them back to precincts through electronic mechanisms rather than through direct physical accountability at the precinct level.

The result is an election system that is more difficult to audit, more difficult to recount, and more dependent upon electronic reconciliation processes than traditional precinct-based voting systems ever needed to be.

A Simple Solution

Fortunately, restoring precinct-based voting does not require replacing existing voting equipment or reducing voter access. Modern electronic poll books already identify voters and generate the correct ballot style at check-in. The technology necessary to support precinct-based voting while maintaining countywide voter access already exists in nearly every county.

Under this approach, voters appearing at their assigned precinct would receive a regular ballot. Voters appearing at a location other than their assigned precinct would receive a provisional ballot containing the proper ballot style associated with their home precinct. There is no technical reason for an eligible voter to receive the wrong ballot style using modern election systems.

The only significant procedural change would be restoring the use of a hard-copy precinct poll book at each polling location containing the list of voters assigned to that location. Election workers would use this paper poll book to determine whether a voter receives a regular ballot or a provisional ballot.

Preserving Voter Access

This approach preserves voter access while restoring election integrity safeguards. Eligible voters would still be able to vote anywhere within the county. If a voter chooses to vote outside their assigned precinct, the voter would simply cast a provisional ballot using the correct ballot style for their home precinct.

Provisional ballots already exist as a safeguard to ensure that eligible voters are not denied access to the ballot box. They provide election officials an opportunity to verify eligibility and determine why the ballot was cast provisionally rather than regularly. Once approved, provisional ballots would be sorted into their proper precinct before counting.

This process preserves ballot access while restoring precinct-level accountability for all methods of in-person voting, which is mandated by federal law, as outlined in The Help America Vote Act (HAVA), and is reflected either directly or indirectly in every state statute outlining all modern voting system standards.

Restoring the ABCs of Election Security

Returning to precinct-based voting for both Early Voting and Election Day would immediately restore ballot secrecy for every voter by ensuring that voters always retain the option of voting within their assigned precinct, and by ensuring provisional voters also enjoy this privacy guarantee. Restoring ballot secrecy inherently strengthens auditability and chain of custody because election records can once again be examined,without the need for redactions, and reconciled without the risk of linking individual voters to their ballots.

Approved provisional ballots sorted by precinct before counting would further ensure that every ballot is ultimately counted and reported within the voter’s proper precinct. This restores full forensic auditability while strengthening the chain of custody for all precinct returns.

The result is a system that protects voter privacy, improves public transparency, and allows election records to be meaningfully examined without compromising ballot secrecy.

Benefits for Audits and Recounts

A precinct-based system would also simplify audits and recounts. When all ballots associated with a precinct are physically maintained and reported together, election officials can review, audit, and recount those ballots without first attempting to locate all ballots cast from voters in the precincts eligible for the candidate cast at any voting location through electronic records of countywide ballot distributions.

Physical precinct ballot groupings provide a clearer chain of custody, reduce administrative complexity, and allow election officials to focus directly on the ballots being reviewed. This reduces the time, labor, and expense required to conduct audits and recounts while improving confidence in the results.

Conclusion

Returning to precinct-based voting is a simple, cost-effective reform that can be implemented using existing voting technology. It preserves countywide voter access, guarantees that voters receive the correct ballot style, restores ballot secrecy, strengthens auditability and chain of custody, simplifies audits and recounts, and improves public confidence in election outcomes. Most importantly, it achieves these goals while utilizing procedures and safeguards that already exist within current election law and election administration practices.

Additional Resources

For additional research, reports, and educational materials on election security, hand-counting methods, ballot counting demonstrations, and other VITAL concepts for securing U.S. elections, visit TBTR at tbtr.us.

For those looking to leave a meaningful, positive, pro-America impression on the next generation, educational coloring books featuring America’s founding documents, constitutional principles, civics, history, and patriotic themes are available now. These books provide an engaging way to promote civic education while serving as memorable educational and campaign materials that families can keep and enjoy long after Election Day. Visit tbtr.us/coloring-books to order today!

Thank you.

Aubree

Election Security Subject Matter Expert

Founder tbtr.us

“I was born for the Storm, and a calm does not suit me.” - President Andrew Jackson

Want to see more truth? Support our work in the following ways:

Direct donations -

PayPal: @tbtx7hs

Venmo: @tb-tx

Cashapp: $takingbacktx

All donation amounts help, thank you, patriots!

Or you can support us through purchasing or sponsorship of our COLOR ME FREE! Educational Coloring Books for your home or school of choice.

They also make great campaign materials to leave with voters!

http://Tbtr.us/coloring-books

My prayer is that all who read this understand what I know, as a fact witness to the disastrous design of the DCRP Primary Elections. Col. West made every move to try and protect the voters, from the inception of the Task Force, to when he pulled the plug and opposed his own CEC, all of it was to protect voters.

Stan Woodward was in charge of the task force and Stan Woodward refused to allow the task force to hear out the very experts who brought this plan to Col. West, denying the CEC expert guidance and lawful strategy, which lead to thousands of uninformed voters being turned away from polling locations and not being offered provisional ballots.

Despite Barry and Stan and others knowing that Stan’s Task Force was not covering vital election security laws, both state and federal, they misrepresented their own role and expertise in order to blame the resulting chaos on the state and county, rather than admitting their oversight and correcting the contract, training their staff properly, educating voters. Rather than take responsibility for an underprepared primary plan, they are attacking others for trying to protect the voters from the disaster of a Task Force leader that is Stan Woodward, who apparently thinks that turning thousands of voters away was a perfect strategy.

To remedy the situation, Barry and Stan simply needed to vote with the CEC to amend that contract, as they have all of the responsibility to design it. They should redo their plan to honor provisional voters, redo their maps and assign voters to appropriate polling locations, and engage in some kind of voter education campaign to help people understand what to expect. There is a systemic disinterest in taking responisbility to fix the original contract that left voters and the party vulnerable and they seem disinterested in training their CEC and staff on how to use provisonal ballots when voting by precinct or helping the public understand the plan.

Finally, they have named a woman who had nothing to do with any of this as a respondent to a Writ of Mandamus, the party secretary.

That is why I am coming out against Barry Wernick, my friend, whom I gave all of my work to and whom I respect and care about, and am opposing him vigorously. Stan I have no respect or regard for, and I feel nothing about crushing his misrepresentations. But to have to cut down one of your own… it’ll take some skin off of me too. This is the path we have chosen, but I know what I am doing. That is the difference between the relators and myself.

Read my amicus brief below, it has been officially filed.

NO. 05-26-00550-CV

IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

DALLAS, TEXAS

IN RE: BARRY WERNICK, Relator Original Proceeding Texas Election Code

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE AUBREE CAMPBELL IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT SUSAN CUMBY AND IN CONDITIONAL SUPPORT OF PETITION
Relator: Barry Wernick

Respondent: Susan Cumby

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF FILER

Aubree Campbell is a subject matter expert in election security and previously served as an advisor to the Dallas County Republican Party (“DCRP”) Task Force responsible for developing the in-precinct primary system at issue in this case.

Ms. Campbell withdrew from participation after raising repeated concerns regarding compliance with federal and state election law, including the lawful handling of provisional ballots, voter assignment procedures, and voter education—concerns which were not addressed by Task Force leadership.

Ms. Campbell submits this response in support of Respondent Susan Cumby and to provide the Court with relevant factual and subject-matter context directly bearing on the claims asserted in the Petition.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Petition for Writ of Mandamus should never have named Susan Cumby as a respondent, as she took no action related to the issue.

Relator fails to establish:

1. Any ministerial duty owed or breached by Respondent Susan Cumby;

2. Any act or omission by Respondent Cumby related to the contract at issue;

3. The absence of adequate remedies at law.

Instead, the Petition attempts to improperly shift responsibility away from those who designed and failed to implement a legally compliant in-precinct primary system—namely, the Task Force led by Stan Woodward.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

Respondent Susan Cumby:

• Did not draft, amend, or design the contract at issue;

• Did not sign any contract or amendment;

• Had no responsibility for the development or implementation of the challenged procedures.

Relator Barry Wernick is correct only insofar as the County Executive Committee (“CEC”) approved contract is binding.

However, Relator omits critical facts:

The DCRP Task Force, led by Stan Woodward, was delegated responsibility for designing the in-precinct primary system. Despite repeated presentations of applicable federal and state election law, the Task Force failed to address essential requirements, including:

• The federally mandated use of provisional ballots when voters appear outside assigned precinct locations;

• Training of election workers on provisional ballot procedures;

• Proper assignment of voters to appropriate polling locations;

• Implementation of a voter education campaign.

These failures resulted in significant voter confusion and, in countless instances, voters being turned away from polling locations or ordered to another one without being offered a provisional ballot option.

Additionally, voters were assigned to polling locations requiring travel times exceeding twenty minutes, further burdening access to the ballot.

These issues were not addressed prior to election day, depriving the CEC of the opportunity to evaluate and approve a fully lawful and operational plan.

ARGUMENT

A. No Ministerial Duty Exists as to Respondent Susan Cumby

Mandamus relief requires a clear ministerial duty.

Respondent Cumby had:

• No role in drafting or amending the contract;

• No authority over Task Force design decisions;

• No responsibility for implementation failures cited by Relator.

Accordingly, no ministerial duty exists that could support mandamus relief against her.

No Abuse of Discretion by Respondent

Even if any authority were alleged, which there is none, Barry Wernick and Stan Woodward are the leaders of this strained effort, there is no evidence that Respondent Cumby abused discretion.

All substantive decisions regarding the in-precinct primary system were made by the Task Force under the leadership of Stan Woodward—not by Respondent Cumby.

The Failures Alleged by Relator Are Attributable to the Task Force

The deficiencies cited in the Petition stem from:

• Failure to incorporate federal provisional ballot requirements;

• Failure to train personnel;

• Failure to assign voters appropriately;

• Failure to educate voters.

These failures were within the control of the Task Force and its leadership—not Respondent Cumby.

Adequate Remedies Exist

Relator and the Task Force had, and continue to have, the ability to:

• Amend the contract;

• Implement lawful provisional ballot procedures;

• Reassign polling locations;

• Conduct voter education.

Mandamus is not a substitute for correcting one’s own operational failures.

Standing and Authority of Relator Are in Question

Relator Barry Wernick’s authority to act on behalf of the CEC is unclear.

Under Article XVI, Section 65 of the Texas Constitution, certain officeholders automatically resign upon becoming candidates for another office when sufficient time remains in their current term.

“Sec. 65. AUTOMATIC RESIGNATION ON BECOMING CANDIDATE FOR ANOTHER OFFICE. (a) This section applies to the following offices: District Clerks; County Clerks; County Judges; Judges of the County Courts at Law, County Criminal Courts, County Probate Courts and County Domestic Relations Courts; County Treasurers; Criminal District Attorneys; County Surveyors; County Commissioners; Justices of the Peace; Sheriffs; Assessors and Collectors of Taxes; District Attorneys; County Attorneys; Public Weighers; and Constables.

(b) If any of the officers named herein shall announce their candidacy, or shall in fact become a candidate, in any General, Special or Primary Election, for any office of profit or trust under the laws of this State or the United States other than the office then held, at any time when the unexpired term of the office then held shall exceed one year and 30 days, such announcement or such candidacy shall constitute an automatic resignation of the office then held, and the vacancy thereby created shall be filled pursuant to law in the same manner as other vacancies for such office are filled.”

Relator’s candidacy for Dallas County Commissioner raises substantial questions regarding:

• Whether he lawfully retains his current position;

• Whether he has standing to represent or act on behalf of the CEC;

• Whether a conflict of interest exists in pursuing this action.

These issues warrant clarification by the Court.

REQUEST FOR RELIEF

Ms. Campbell respectfully requests that the Court:

1. Deny the Petition for Writ of Mandamus unless certain legal standards are addressed;

2. Clarify the standing and authority of Relator Barry Wernick;

3. Order that the original CEC-approved contract be honored only upon confirmation that:

   • Federally required provisional ballot procedures will be implemented;

   • Polling locations will be reassigned to reasonably accommodate voters;

   • A voter education campaign will be conducted to ensure voters understand the process.

These measures are necessary to protect ballot access, ballot secrecy, and the integrity of the electoral process.

CONCLUSION

This case does not present a basis for mandamus relief. Instead, it reflects an attempt to redirect responsibility away from those who designed and failed to implement a lawful election system.

Respondent Susan Cumby bears no legal responsibility for the issues raised. The Petition should be denied. Mandamus cannot be used to shift that responsibility.

Respectfully,

Aubree Campbell

Founder TBTR.US

Election Security Subject Matter Expert

Want to see more truth? Support our work in the following ways:

Direct donations -

PayPal: @tbtx7hs

Venmo: @tb-tx

Cashapp: $takingbacktx

All donation amounts help, thank you, patriots!

Or you can support us through purchasing or sponsorship of our COLOR ME FREE! Educational Coloring Books for your home or school of choice.

They also make great campaign materials to leave with voters!

http://Tbtr.us/coloring-books

TBTR Stratgies has proposed a means to make an incremental yet meaningful switch away from dependence on computerized systems to give us our test results and into a precinct-based hand-counted election in a county the size of Tarrant County, Texas. By the beginning of the 2026 primary we will be at over 1.3M registered voters.

The faster a team can count a batch of ballots, the fewer teams will be needed to count ALL ballots in the time allotted for counting ballots.

️

Counting PVRs, which have their own set of issues we are working on, cuts about an hour from the previous records for counting hand-marked ballots. The lack of overvotes on PVR ballots does save us time, and the ECHO Hand Count Method is vital to reaching warp speed!

WATCH as myself, my 13yr old daughter and 86yr old Marilyn count 34 races on 50 PVR Ballots in UNDER 1HR 30MIN!

See more at tbtr.us

️

ALSO, learn how TBTR Strategies recommends securing BOTH Election Day and Early Voting by casting all ballots of a precinct TOGETHER and satisfying countywide access using provisional ballots:

This speedy process is only possible using The ECHO Hand Count Method found at countwithecho.org please visit their website to learn more!

Casting regular ballots countywide destroys Ballot Secrecy, requiring the post-election redaction of public election records, which inherently destroys forensic auditability of election records. Additionally, we have no evidence of precinct returns that are reported out, and the effort necessary to compile the precinct ballots together is too great, so it is never done despite the precinct level reporting.

Casting all ballots by precinct restores Auditability by guaranteeing all voters Ballot Secrecy and eliminating the need for post-election redaction, and it strengthens our Chain of Custody for PRECINCT LEVEL Returns by actually having the evidence of those returns ready and available to be examined without redaction.

Thank you for your attention to this vital feasibility factor in restoring security and trust in US elections by ensuring enforcement of The ABCs of Election Security: Auditability, Ballot Secrecy and Chain of Custody!

HAPPY NEW YEAR, PATRIOTS!

Aubree

Founder TBTR.US

Subject Matter Expert: Poll Watching, Auditing Election Returns, Recounts, Hand Counting Strategy, Practical Application of Voting Systems, Hand Counting Strategy for Large Counties, etc.

Want to see more truth? Support our work in the following ways:

Direct donations -

PayPal: @tbtx7hs

Venmo: @tb-tx

Cashapp: $takingbacktx

All donation amounts help, thank you, patriots!

Or you can support us through purchasing or sponsorship of our COLOR ME FREE! Educational Coloring Books for your home or school of choice.

They also make great campaign materials to leave with voters!

http://Tbtr.us/coloring-books

Texas Election Code - CHAPTER 43

Sec. 43.007. COUNTYWIDE POLLING PLACE PROGRAM. (a) The secretary of state shall implement a program to allow each commissioners court participating in the program to eliminate county election precinct polling places and establish countywide polling places for:

(1) any election required to be conducted by the county;

(2) any election held as part of a joint election agreement with a county under Chapter 271;

(3) any election held under contract for election services with a county under Subchapter D, Chapter 31;

(4) each primary election and runoff primary election if:…

…

(c) In conducting the program, the secretary of state shall provide for an audit of the voting system equipment before and after the election, and during the election to the extent such an audit is practicable.

…

(i) The secretary of state may only select to participate in the program six counties with a population of 100,000 or more and four counties with a population of less than 100,000.

…

(j) Not later than January 1 of each odd-numbered year, the secretary of state shall file a report with the legislature. The report must include any complaints or concerns regarding a specific election that have been filed with the office of the secretary of state before the preparation of the report and any available information about voter turnout and waiting times at the polling places. The report may include the secretary of state's recommendations on the future use of countywide polling places and suggestions for statutory amendment regarding the use of countywide polling places.

…

(k) Each county that previously participated in a program under this section is authorized to continue participation in the program for future elections described by Subsection (a) if:

(1) the commissioners court of the county approves participation in the program; and

(2) the secretary of state determines the county's participation in the program was successful.

Texas Election Code 43.007 is authorization for the Secretary of State (an appointed Executive Branch position in Texas) to implement, monitor, and solicit feedback on a “Countywide Polling Place” program. This new program is in direct violation of Texas Election Code Chapter 66, which outlines the requirement to vote in-precinct, congruent with Texas Election Code 213.001 outlining RECOUNTS are to be conducted by precinct, in further agreement with Texas Election Code 213.011 VOTES COUNTED BY PRECINCT. The recount committee shall count the votes separately by precinct.

This pattern continues into the Texas Election Code Chapter 215 COST OF RECOUNTS, requiring a recount deposit per precinct. Our entire lawful election process, passed by the legislature, is based on precinct-level election returns, for auditablity purposes, for recounts, for reporting, and, shockingly… for voter privacy!

It has been revealed by two local warriors, who shall remain unnamed until given permission to name them, that participation in the Countywide Polling Place program has facilitated a SEVERE violation of VOTER PRIVACY. TBTX is posting this warning to EVERY VOTER IN AMERICA, and ESPECIALLY TEXAS: YOU MUST VOTE IN YOUR ASSIGNED VOTING PRECINCT TO PROTECT YOUR RIGHT TO A SECRET BALLOT.

IF YOU VOTE OUT OF YOUR ASSIGNED PRECINCT, YOUR VOTE MAY BE SUBJECT TO EXPOSURE!

See our Declarations of Truths/ Demands for Immediate Redress of Grievances below!

This affidavit is designed by and for TBTX use, and we have used this to demand many redresses across the state and nation. This is not practicing law, this is standing on your constitutional right to demand a redress of grievances.

Sent on this day to ALL 96 Texas Elections Administrators and the Texas Secretary of State, with a request for a response outlining a remedy within 10 days, or refuting our concerns over this SEVERE violation of Voter Rights to privacy.

Please feel free to use this affidavit in a lawful way to insist that your rights to a secret ballot are protected. It is our right to petition our government for a redress of grievances. Many groups are afraid of using affidavits, and do not know how to make them sharp.

This is how TBTX/ TBTR petitions our own local and state government for a redress of grievances. See below.

To: Christina Adkins, Acting Director of Elections, Texas Secretary of State’s Office

Elections Division

Secretary of State

P.O. Box 12060

Austin, Texas 78711-2060

Declaration of Truth Regarding Blatant Violations of Voter Privacy and Ballot Secrecy in Counties Participating in the Texas Secretary of State’s Countywide Polling Place Program

I, Aubree —, the undersigned, make this Declaration of Truth of my own free will, as a member of the voting population of the Great State of Texas, and I hereby affirm, under the laws of the United States of America, and of this state, that I am of legal age and of sound mind and hereby attest that the statements, averments and information outlined in this Declaration of Truth are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

This Declaration of Truth is lawful notification to you, and is hereby made and sent to you pursuant to the national Constitution, specifically, the Bill of Rights, in particular, Sections I, IV, V, X, and the Bill of Rights of the Texas Constitution, in particular, Article I, Section I, II, VIII, XXIX, XXX, and pursuant to potential violations of Article 6, Section 2(c) of the Texas Constitution, and requires your written rebuttal to me, in kind, specific to each and every point of the subject matter stated herein, within 10 days, via your own sworn or notarized affidavit using true fact, valid law and evidence to support your rebuttal of the specific subject matter in this Declaration.

1. On April 3rd, 2024 , a Wednesday, at the Dallas County Elections Department in Dallas County, Texas, for the Barry Wernick Recount of TX HD 108 Republican Primary Ballots, and for the purposes of lawfully observing the recount on behalf of the Barry Wernick Campaign, I witnessed a series of documents being laid out on each counting table by Heider Garcia, Dallas County Elections Staff, and Jennifer Stoddard-Hajdu’s recount board members. These documents included: the “Voter Roster” by location, a “Batch Report by Polling Location” showing how many HD 108 ballots per precinct were contained in each ballot box, and the paper ballots cast at each location. All of these records are now publicly available from the County and State Websites.

2. Due to this county’s participation in the Texas Secretary of State’s Countywide Polling Place Program, ballots are no longer cast by precinct, but must still be reported by precinct, necessitating the creation of a database showing all precincts from which a vote was cast, and how many votes from each precinct were, at each polling location. This document is referred to as the “Batch Report by Polling Location” by Dallas County Election Administrator Heider Garcia. This document is printed from the Dallas County Central Election Management Server (EMS), and is accessible by elections department staff as well as any state or private entity who requests the data.

3. The “Voter Roster” is simply the record of all voters who cast a ballot, the location in which they cast a ballot, and their assigned voting precinct.

4. Simple visual comparisons of the Voter Roster, the Batch Report by Polling Location, and the paper ballots now publicly available facilitates an improper breach of voter privacy, without the voter’s prior knowledge or agreement, via the creation of the “Batch Report by Polling Location” document.

5. Creation of this document allows for any state or private entity to match ballots and ballot selections to voters in polling locations where a voter(s) is the only voter from a precinct to cast a ballot in a given location, or where more than one voter registered in the same house from a certain precinct voted together, i.e. married couples, roommates, caregivers, etc.

6. I witnessed box after box opened up and presented with these “Batch Report by Polling Location” documents, the hand-written “Voter Roster” and I watched the recount board members pull ballots that could immediately, decisively, certainly determine many voter selections from their very ballot, being that many “Batch Reports by Polling Location” showed one, ten, sometimes 20+ voters who were the only voters from their precinct to vote at that polling location.

7. Removal of citizen access to these paper records, which are part of an auditable paper trail mandated federally by the HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT, does NOT alleviate the severe violations witnessed. No state or private entity should be able to identify a ballot with a voter. To protect the secrecy of the ballot, you must immediately opt OUT of the Countywide Polling Place Program and return to in-precinct voting, or combined precinct voting, IMMEDIATELY.

8. No in-person voter has been made aware, or been offered a waiver to sign, waiving their right to cast their ballot in secret and free from potential intimidation and exposure. The following Constitutional Law and corresponding state statutes outline the severe violations uncovered in Dallas County and confirmed to be occurring in each of the 96 counties who have opted into the Texas Secretary of State’s Countywide Polling Place Program.

9. Article 6, Section 2 of the Texas Constitution states:

   (c) The privilege of free suffrage shall be protected by laws regulating elections and prohibiting under adequate penalties all undue influence in elections from power, bribery, tumult, or other improper practice.

10. Texas Election Code 1.0015. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.

    It is the intent of the legislature that the application of this code and the conduct of elections be uniform and consistent throughout this state to reduce the likelihood of fraud in the conduct of elections, protect the secrecy of the ballot, promote voter access, and ensure that all legally cast ballots are counted.

11. Texas Election Code 62.0115. PUBLIC NOTICE OF VOTERS' RIGHTS.

    (a) The secretary of state shall adopt rules providing for publicizing voters' rights as prescribed by this section. The rules must require that a notice of those rights be publicized:

    (1) by being posted by an election officer in a prominent location at each polling place;

    (2) on the Internet website of the secretary of state;

    (3) through material published by the secretary of state; or

    (4) in another manner designed to give voters notice of their rights.

    (b) Except as revised by the secretary of state under Subsection (d), the notice must state that a voter has the right to:

    (1) vote a ballot and view written instructions on how to cast a ballot;

    (2) vote in secret and free from intimidation…

12. Texas Election Code 62.009. DISARRANGING BALLOTS FOR VOTERS' SELECTION.

    (a) As needed for voting, an election officer shall disarrange a supply of the ballots so that they are in random numerical order.

    (b) The disarranged ballots shall be placed face down on a table in a manner preventing an election officer or other person from ascertaining the number of a ballot selected by a voter.

13. Texas Election Code 122.001. VOTING SYSTEM STANDARDS.

    (a) A voting system may not be used in an election unless the system:

    (1) preserves the secrecy of the ballot;

14. This immediate reversal to in-precinct voting must include the EARLY VOTING period as well.

15. Texas Election Code 81.002. APPLICABILITY OF OTHER CODE PROVISIONS. The other titles of this code apply to early voting except provisions that are inconsistent with this title or that cannot feasibly be applied to early voting.

16. All 96 Texas counties approved to participate in the Countywide Polling Place Program no doubt are aware of this phenomenon, but have not alerted their citizens to the concerns outlined in this Declaration of Truth. The Texas Secretary of State and all 96 participating Texas county Elections Departments are aware of this violation and are sitting in violation of their own oath and citizen’s rights.

17. The Texas Secretary of State is mandated by law to report on complaints or concerns regarding the Countywide Polling Place Program in Texas Election Code 43.007 COUNTYWIDE POLLING PLACE PROGRAM.

    (j) Not later than January 1 of each odd-numbered year, the secretary of state shall file a report with the legislature. The report must include any complaints or concerns regarding a specific election that have been filed with the office of the secretary of state before the preparation of the report and any available information about voter turnout and waiting times at the polling places. The report may include the secretary of state's recommendations on the future use of countywide polling places and suggestions for statutory amendment regarding the use of countywide polling places.

Violation of the above stated statutes may facilitate undue influence in Texas Elections, by allowing state and private entities the ability to identify the ballots of voters who unwittingly participate in the Countywide Polling Place Program, without the knowledge of the Voters or Legislature representing the Voters. Voters have a right to a secret ballot, and neither county nor state entities charged with creating and implementing this program have made Texas Voters aware of the potential exposure of their ballot selections.

To protect voter privacy, you must immediately return to strictly in-precinct voting, or combined precinct voting, and opt out of any future participation in the Countywide Polling Place Program.

You have taken an oath to support and uphold the Constitutions and are constitutionally mandated to abide by that oath in the performance of your official duties.

You have no constitutional authority, or any other form of valid, lawful authority, to oppose, and violate the very documents to which you swore or affirmed your oath and under which you were delegated by the people the limited authority to conduct the duties of your office.

The above stated positions are true, factual, lawful and constitutionally ordained.

The issues arising from these violations of State and federal statute are apparent, blatant and egregious. I attest that the above listed State statutes have been violated, that you are standing in violation of State Law, and violations of said statutes are inherently violations of my right to free suffrage by secret ballot, free from intimidation, as above-stated election and ethics codes were drafted and codified in order to protect our elections from undue influence as outlined in the Article 6 Section 2(c) of the Texas State Constitution.

Lawful notification has been provided to you stating that if you do not rebut the statements, charges, and averments made in this affidavit, then, you tacitly agree with and admit to them. Pursuant to that lawful notification, if you disagree with anything stated under oath in this affidavit, then rebut to me that with which you disagree, with particularity, within 10 days of receipt thereof, by means of your own written, notarized affidavit of truth, based on specific, true, relevant fact and valid law to support your disagreement, attesting to your rebuttal and supportive positions, as valid and lawful, under the pains and penalties of perjury under the laws of the United States of America and the this Great State of Texas.

An unrebutted affidavit stands as truth and fact before any court.

US v Tweel, 550F2d. 297. “Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.”

Your failure to respond, as stipulated, is your tacit agreement with and admission to the fact that everything in this affidavit is true, correct, legal, lawful, and is your admission attesting to this, fully binding upon you in any court of law in America, without your protest, objection and that of those who represent you.

Affiant further sayeth naught. All rights reserved.

___________________________________ _____________________________

Signed and sworn before me, a Notary Public, ___________________ personally appeared before me, and proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the [man/woman] whose name is subscribed herein. In the State of Texas, County of [County] I swear and affirm that on this day, _______________________, the above named affiant, [Your Name], personally appeared before me, and of [his/her] own free will, sworn and signed before me this affidavit of Truth regarding issues found in [Election Date and Type] in the Great State of Texas. I swear under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the Laws of the State of Texas that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct. WITNESS my hand and official seal.

_______________________________________________

Notary Public/ Jurat

My Commission Expires:____________________ Seal:

The Texas Secretary of State Elections Director, Christina Adkins, initially denied the ballot secrecy issue in a public statement seen here. In this statement, Texas Secretary of State Jane Nelson begins with this inherently inaccurate statement

“Texas protects the right of Texans to cast their ballots anonymously. Lawmakers have balanced this right of voters to maintain ballot privacy with the need for election transparency.”

The memo ends with the acknowlegement that “personally identifiable” information will be redacted from ballots, widely understood to mean any markings added by the voter outside of what is added to the ballot by the election system.

However, after a Current Revolt Article was published, revealing the ballot of former Republican Party of Texas Chairman Matt Rinaldi, the Texas Secretary of State’s office reversed their position on ballot secrecy as seen here and here, blaming open records laws as the culprit, as opposed to information collected in accordance with COUNTYWIDE VOTING procedures. As seen in the above advisories, rather than advising to return to precint-based voting, the Texas Secretary of State’s office immediately issued an advisory to REDACT any election system data, voter turnout files, ballot images, or any information potentially capable of linking voters to ballots. This has set election security investigations back further than what limited access we had after the 2020 elections.

Additionally, redaction after the election does not adhere to state laws mandating the inherent protection of voter’s ballot choices, but violates additional state and federal laws related to public access to an auditable paper trail.

Please share and TELL YOUR LOVED ONES TO VOTE IN THEIR ASSIGNED VOTING PRECICNT TO PROTECT THE SECRECY OF THEIR BALLOT.

All donations and subscriptions help us continue our work securing elections from Undue Influence and Improper Practice. Please share this out with someone who is interested.

Thank you!

- Aubree

Founder

tbtr.us

takingbacktexas.org

“I was Born for the Storm, and a Calm Does Not Suit Me.”

Want to see more truth? Support our work in the following ways:

Direct donations -

PayPal: @tbtx7hs

Venmo: @tb-tx

Cashapp: $takingbacktx

All donation amounts help, thank you, patriots!

Or you can support us through purchasing or sponsorship of our COLOR ME FREE! Educational Coloring Books for your home or school of choice.

They also make great campaign materials to leave with voters!

http://Tbtr.us/coloring-books

Option 1 — Full ECHO Implementation (Recommended)

Hand-Marked, Hand-Counted Paper Ballots Cast by Precinct.

Hand-Marked Ballot Counting: The ECHO Hand Count Method (countwithecho.org)

• Hand-marked paper ballots.

• Consecutively pre-numbered ballots (optional., but state law in Texas).

• Ballots cast by precinct into assigned ballot boxes without ever being scanned.

• Ballots remain grouped by precinct throughout the election.

• Three-person counting teams. Batches of 50 Ballots in Large Counties (1M+ Population)

• Hand count all hand-marked in-person ballots from early voting starting at 7am on Election Day along with mail-ins and cured provisional ballots, sorted by precinct.

• Hand count all hand—marked in-person ballots from Election Day at polling locations at lawful time outlined in state statute or after the close of polls, whichever allows counting to begin immediately.

• Produce precinct-level returns with strong chain of custody.

• Complete precinct returns before certification.

• Number of counting teams per precinct is determined by speed of counting method, number of ballots and time allotted for precinct returns to be delivered for reporting.

Equipment Used is Already in Place

• Electronic Poll Books

• Paper Poll Books by precinct (if recently eliminated from your county/state procedures - bring them BACK)

• Secure ballot boxes

• Election kits (tally sheets, reconciliation forms, chain of custody forms, precinct returns)

• No scanners required for this option begin securing elections.

Pros

• Maximum auditability.

• Preserves ballot secrecy by default.

• Strongest chain of custody.

• Lowest technology dependence.

• Fully transparent public hand count.

• Fast precinct-level recount capability.

Cons

• Additional counting staff will be required.

• 2+hrs per 50 ballot batch per voting team could delay results reporting in counties with populations of 1M+.

• Increased number of provisional ballots initially.

Option 2 — Hand Count the Machine-Marked Ballots (PVRs) Cast By Precinct (Quickest to Hand-Count)

Machine-Marked, Hand-Counted Paper Ballots Cast by Precinct.

Machine-Marked Ballot Counting: The ECHO Hand Count Method (countwithecho.org)

• Machine-Marked physical ballots (PVRs).

• Consecutively pre-numbered ballots (optional., but state law in Texas).

• Ballots cast by precinct into assigned ballot boxes without being scanned.

• Ballots remain grouped by precinct throughout the election.

• Three-person counting teams. Batches of 50 Ballots in Large Counties (1M+ Population)

• Hand count all Printed Vote Records (PVRs) (Ballots) from early voting starting at 7am on Election Day, along with mail-ins and cured provisional ballots, sorted by precinct.

• Hand count all Election Day PVRs at polling location at lawful time outlined in state statute.

• Produce precinct-level returns with strong chain of custody.

• Complete precinct returns before certification.

• Number of counting teams per precinct is determined by speed of counting method, number of ballots and time allotted for precinct returns to be delivered for reporting.

Equipment Used is Already in Place

• Ballot Marking Devices

• Electronic Poll Books

• Paper Poll Books

• Secure ballot boxes

• Election kits

• No tabulation scanners.

Pros

• Minimal voter process changes.

• Eliminates reliance on electronic tabulation.

• Preserves precinct reporting.

• Strengthens chain of custody.

• Publicly auditable hand count.

Cons

• Additional counting staff will be required.

• 1.5hrs per 50 ballot batch per voting team could delay results reporting in counties with populations of 1M+.

• Increased number of provisional ballots initially.

• Minimal reliance on voting system technology.

Option 3 — Ballots Cast By Precinct, Counted by Scanner (Simplest Method to Return to Voting By Precinct Immediately)

Machine-Marked, Machine-Counted Paper Ballots Cast by Precinct.

Ballot Method

• Ballot Marking Devices generate Printed Vote Records (PVRs).

• Regular ballot PVRs cast by precinct into ballot box.

• Provisional ballots remain assigned to their precinct, counted upon ID verification.

Counting Method

• Scan ballots by precinct.

• Produce separate precinct reports.

• Maintain physical ballot records by precinct for audits and recounts.

Equipment Used is Already in Place

• Ballot Marking Devices

• Precinct optical scanners

• Electronic Poll Books

• Paper Poll Books

• Secure ballot boxes

• Election Kits

Pros

• Minimal operational changes.

• Restores precinct-level reporting.

• Improves chain of custody over countywide mixing.

• Faster election night reporting.

• Allows meaningful audits using precinct-specific ballot batches.

Cons

• Greatest reliance on voting system technology of the three options.

• Scanner/tabulator use not ideal.

Common Features (All Options)

• Precinct-assigned polling locations.

• Countywide voting preserved through provisional ballots.

• Electronic Poll Books used for voter check-in and ballot style assignment.

• Paper Poll Books used to determine regular ballot eligibility.

• Ballots maintained by precinct.

• Public voter education campaign.

• Online precinct lookup tool.

• Compliance with federal paper trail and record retention requirements.

• Compliance with State party primary election laws governing party authority, provisional voting, ballot secrecy, and precinct reporting.

Voter Check-In & Ballot Issuance

1. Regular Ballots

A voter receives a regular ballot when they:

• Vote at their assigned polling location.

• Present an acceptable photo ID (or otherwise satisfy Texas identification requirements).

• Appear on the precinct paper poll book.

Regular ballots are cast and counted with that precinct’s election returns.

2. Provisional Ballots

A voter receives a provisional ballot if they:

• Vote at a polling location other than their assigned location.

• Are not listed on the precinct paper poll book.

• Do not present acceptable photo identification.

• Are otherwise required by law to vote provisionally.

Using the electronic poll books, election workers will issue the voter the correct ballot style regardless of where they vote.

Once the voter successfully verifies their eligibility and identity through the normal provisional ballot review process, the ballot is approved and counted in accordance with State law.

Voter Access

• No eligible voter is denied the opportunity to vote.

• Voters may cast a provisional ballot at any polling location.

• Electronic poll books ensure every voter receives the correct ballot style.

• Paper poll books determine eligibility for a regular precinct ballot while preserving precinct-based election reporting.

General Implementation Considerations

Early Voting & Election Day

• Apply the same precinct-based procedures during both Early Voting and Election Day.

• Use identical voter check-in, ballot issuance, chain of custody, and reporting procedures throughout the voting period.

• Preserve precinct-level ballot accounting from the time a ballot is cast until final certification.

Polling Location Assignments

• Assign voters to polling locations nearest their registered residence.

• Balance precinct assignments to create more uniform voter traffic across all polling locations.

• Reduce dependence on oversized countywide vote centers serving disproportionately large numbers of voters.

• Improve staffing efficiency by distributing expected turnout more evenly among locations.

• Produce more consistent ballot volumes and hand-count workloads at each polling location.

Transition Period

• Expect an initial increase in provisional ballots while voters become familiar with their assigned polling locations.

• Voters may continue voting at any polling location using a provisional ballot per federal law.

• Electronic poll books ensure every voter receives the correct ballot style regardless of location.

• Once voter eligibility and identity are verified under existing Texas provisional ballot procedures, eligible provisional ballots are approved and counted.

• As voters transition to their assigned polling locations, provisional ballot usage is expected to decline.

TBTR.US Precinct Mapping

• TBTR.US precinct-based voting maps are designed using each state’s and county’s existing election infrastructure.

• Existing polling locations are retained whenever practical.

• Existing election equipment, personnel, and facilities remain in use.

• Precinct assignments are optimized to balance voter volume while preserving precinct-based reporting.

Security Benefits

Implementation of any of these three options immediately strengthens several fundamental election security measures by:

• Producing auditable precinct returns, thereby trengthening chain of custody for precinct returns.

• Restoring the ability to conduct affordable, speedy audits and recounts.

• Increasing public confidence through verifiable, precinct-level election results.

• Restoration of Ballot Secrecy, which eliminates the need for post-eleciton redaction of election records, guraanteeing full public access while protecting voter’s ballot selections from public scrutiny except from the voter themselves.

Below is my example proposal for the Tarrant County GOP and all other Texas Counties to help secure their upcoming primaries by restoring meaningful measures.

Introduction

The Tarrant GOP Leadership recognizes both the right and the duty to ensure auditable elections that protect the secrecy of each voter’s ballot and strengthen the chain of custody for precinct returns. This responsibility is most directly within the Party’s control during its own primary elections—where, in past cycles, numerous instances of obfuscated election anomalies have gone unresolved and certified without satisfactory explanation.

Under Texas law, county election administrators only have authority over the conduct of early voting during a primary election when a joint election agreement is in place between participating political parties—which Tarrant GOP Leadership will not be agreeing to. Accordingly, the Party retains the discretion to hand count its Printed Vote Records (PVRs) and to assign precincts to polling locations in a manner that facilitates accurate, auditable results. This decision does not compel the Democratic Party to hand count their records, nor does it restrict their use of electronic poll books or countywide access in their own primary elections.

Precincts may be strategically assigned to polling locations using certain criteria to balance efficiency and audit integrity. The federally mandated use of provisional ballots remains fully compatible with state-level laws governing countywide access and early voting and on election day, ensuring that no voter is turned away or receives the wrong ballot style. Neither the laws governing countywide access during early voting nor those on Election Day guarantee any voter a “regular” (non-provisional) ballot, since eligibility determination depends on each voter’s individual circumstances at the time they request a ballot, which the law cannot anticipate in advance. Reliance on a hard-copy paper poll book will allow Tarrant GOP to track the number of expected voters casting regular ballots by precinct.

Lawful voters who wish to participate in the party’s primary, but who do not wish to vote at their assigned precinct polling location, will receive the proper ballot style and may vote at any location, though their ballot will not be counted with the precinct returns for that location. Instead, their ballot is considered provisional and will be sent to our own Tarrant GOP ballot board for processing. The Tarrant GOP Leadership recognizes that, under our current system, not every voter will be afforded ballot secrecy if some choose to vote outside of their precinct. However, it is also true that the Tarrant GOP Leadership is the only entity in Tarrant County providing an option for voters that will afford auditability, ballot secrecy and an improved chain of custody for precinct returns.

Importantly, early voting must mirror Election Day procedures to preserve ballot secrecy, auditability, and a robust chain of custody for all precinct returns.

Through these measures, the Tarrant County Republican Party reaffirms its commitment to state and federal laws ordering the creation and preservation of an auditable paper trail, the inherent necessity of any election system to guarantee voters the right to a secret ballot by default, and to allow the unredacted examination of records along with a strong chain of custody for precinct returns to restore trust in our upcoming primary election results.

Contract

The contract and operational procedures for the upcoming Tarrant County Republican Primary will remain standard up to the point of scanner allocation. At that stage, ballot boxes will be delivered and secured without the HART scanners attached, ensuring the integrity of the physical ballot chain of custody. Electronic poll books (e-poll books) will continue to be used for voter check-in, to alert the county regarding provisional voters, and to generate all voter’s proper ballot style. However, paper poll books—ordered and organized by precinct—will be used to determine which voters receive a regular ballot to be counted with that location’s in-person returns, and which will have their vote counted provisionally.

To facilitate voter participation and transparency, the Tarrant County Republican Party will deploy an online link where voters can find their assigned polling locations, also to be added to the Tarrant County Elecitons website. A public education campaign should accompany this rollout to encourage informed participation and to ensure that voters understand the process and its purpose: achieving a hand-counted precinct-level report, which is both auditable and guarantees ballot secrecy while strengthening the chain of custody by casting all precinct ballots together.

Aside from these specific procedural adjustments, additional counting staff of around or under 1k for election day only to count all ballots and deliver returns by 1am ideally, other general operations will remain largely unchanged. Voters’ experiences will be nearly identical to current operations—with the notable exception of the absence of attached scanners at the ballot boxes, and an uptick in provisional ballots, which is inevitable regardless of when or how we return to voting by precint.

The Tarrant County GOP will require approximately 588-1005 temporary workers dedicated to counting both the early voting ballots and election day ballots, along with a predetermined number of election kits to support the hand-counting process at each polling location. These election kits will include tally sheets, batch reporting forms, precinct return documentation, chain of custody forms, and other materials required under state law. Each kit will also contain the poll books for all precincts assigned to that location. Half of the county’s ballot boxes are required by the party, distributed evenly between the two participating parties. This number should equate to approximately 300, possibly more.

Finally, the Tarrant County Republican Party requires to the use of available spaces within the Tarrant County Elections facilities between 7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. on Election Day for the hand counting of early-voted ballots, as well as adjacent rooms to each election day polling location capable of accommodating a three-person counting team to complete the process securely and efficiently. Ideally in all Early Voting locations these will be the same rooms used for election equipment storage during early voting, and similar accommodations for Election Day polling locations would be ideal for hand-counting Election Day ballots.

Contract Items Needed from County:

- All Early Voting and Election Day Polling Locations, along with side rooms used during Early Voting for storage of voting equipment.

- Typical Number of ePoll Books, Controllers, BMDs for the number of polling locations.

- Typical number of consecutively pre-numbered ballots per location.

- 300 Ballot Boxes used between Early Voting and Election Day.

- 699 Paper Poll Books on Carbon Paper for expected In-person and absentee voters. (or one for each precinct)

Citations:

1. Election Administrator’s Authority in Primary Elections: [Chapter 172]

a. Accept Filings for Office from Party Chair [172.029]

b. Maintain County Elections Website [172.055]

c. Produce Miscellaneous Ballots for Chair [172.090]

d. Post Notice of Election and Combined Precincts [172.1112]

e. Produce pre-election List of Registered Precinct Voters and post-election Turnout File for Chair [172.1141]

f. Submit Canvass Report to SOS [172.116]

g. Enter Primary Results to County Database [172.123]

h. Prepare Precinct Results and Report to SOS [172.124]

i. Supervise Overall Conduct of Election Exclusively Under the Agreement to a Joint Primary [172.126]

j. Contract with State Chair in the Absence of a County Chair [172.128]

k. Serve as Early Voting Clerk with the same authority as an Election Day Judge at a regular polling location [83.001, 83.002]

2. Party Rights in State Law:

a. Overall Authority over Primary Elections [172.111]

(Authority lies with the party executive committee to oversee the conduct, no exception for early voting)

b. Right of Chair to negotiate Contract for Primary [31.093]

(Sections c, d, e, outline the requirements of the County Elections Clerk)

(No exceptions made for the supervision of the conduct of primary during Early Voting in the contract)

(No mention of necessity to bind both parties to the same methods in their primaries)

3. Countywide Access Laws:

a. Early Voting Countywide Access [85.066]

(Does not/cannot guarantee every voter a regular, non-provisional ballot at every location)

(No Voter will be denied the right to vote; provisional ballots will allow us to determine eligibility for voters who choose to vote outside of their assigned precinct while keeping most ballots cast by precinct for an accurate and speedy hand count of precinct returns)

a. Election Day (Countywide Polling Place Program) [43.007]

(Does not/ cannot guarantee every voter a regular, non-provisional ballot at every location)

(No Voter will be denied the right to vote; provisional ballots will allow us to determine eligibility for voters who choose to vote outside of their assigned precinct while keeping most ballots cast by precinct for an accurate and speedy hand count of precinct returns)

4. Ballot Secrecy:

a. Ballot Secrecy is outlined as part of the Legislative Intent for the entire election code [1.0015] and applies to all elections in Texas [1.002]

b. Ballot Secrecy is mandated for all voting systems used in Texas Elections [122.001]

c. Ballot Secrecy Violations Acknowledged in HART and ES&S Voting Systems; Redactions Ordered by SOS [Election Advisory 2024-20]

(Redaction destroys auditability and public access to election records to cover up an inherent violation of ballot secrecy. Public access is not the issue, the lack of a guarantee of ballot secrecy is the issue. Redaction is not the solution)

(Casting all ballots of a precinct together is the only remedy, and it must be administered where possible)

5. Federal Laws:

a. Auditability [52USC §21081. Voting systems standards]

(Auditable Paper Trail Mandated)

b. Preservation of Records [52USC §20701. Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; deposit with custodian; penalty for violation]

(Records Preserved for Examination for minimum of 22 months)

c. Paper Record is Official Record [52USC §21081. Voting systems standards]

(Paper Records are Official Records for Elections)

a. Use of Provisional Ballots [52USC §21082. Provisional voting and voting information requirements]

(For Voters Not on Precinct Qualified Voter List Who Are Registered OR Who Cannot Be Properly Identified)

6. State Hand Count Laws:

a. Chapter 65

(Counting Procedures which ECHO follows)

b. Chapter 66

(Reporting Procedures which ECHO follows)

7. Combination of Precinct Polling Location Laws:

a. Combining Precincts in Primary [42.0051]

(Requires adherence to 42.005 for combination of precincts based on ballot style)

b. Consolidating Precincts in Primary [42.009]

(No reference to other code, simply allows parties to consolidate precincts into adequate polling locations as necessary to accommodate all voters)

(TBTR Strategies recommends simply consolidating precincts into existing polling locations and not necessarily combining precincts with identical ballot styles)

8. Texas Constitution Article 6, Section 2

(c) The privilege of free suffrage shall be protected by laws regulating elections and prohibiting under adequate penalties all undue influence in elections from power, bribery, tumult, or other improper practice.

Adherence to federal mandates is non-negotiable, and all state laws must be designed in such a way that honors and upholds both Federal Law and the State Constitution

Citations: Texas Election Code as an EXAMPLE

1. Countywide Access Laws:

a. Early Voting Countywide Access [85.066]

(Does not/cannot guarantee every voter a regular, non-provisional ballot at every location)

(No Voter will be denied the right to vote; provisional ballots will allow us to determine eligibility for voters who choose to vote outside of their assigned precinct while keeping most ballots cast by precinct for an accurate and speedy hand count of precinct returns)

b. Election Day (Countywide Polling Place Program) [43.007]

(Does not/ cannot guarantee every voter a regular, non-provisional ballot at every location)

(No Voter will be denied the right to vote; provisional ballots will allow us to determine eligibility for voters who choose to vote outside of their assigned precinct while keeping most ballots cast by precinct for an accurate and speedy hand count of precinct returns)

2. Ballot Secrecy:

a. Ballot Secrecy is outlined as part of the Legislative Intent for the entire election code [1.0015] and applies to all elections in Texas [1.002]

b. Ballot Secrecy is mandated for all voting systems used in Texas Elections [122.001]

c. Ballot Secrecy Violations Acknowledged in HART and ES&S Voting Systems; Redactions Ordered by SOS [Election Advisory 2024-20]

(Redaction destroys auditability and public access to election records to cover up an inherent violation of ballot secrecy. Public access is not the issue, the lack of a guarantee of ballot secrecy is the issue. Redaction is not the solution)

(Casting all ballots of a precinct together is the only remedy, and it must be administered where possible)

3. Federal Laws:

a. Auditability [52USC §21081. Voting systems standards]

(Auditable Paper Trail Mandated)

b. Preservation of Records [52USC §20701. Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; deposit with custodian; penalty for violation]

(Records Preserved for Examination for minimum of 22 months)

c. Paper Record is Official Record [52USC §21081. Voting systems standards]

(Paper Records are Official Records for Elections)

d. Use of Provisional Ballots [52USC §21082. Provisional voting and voting information requirements]

(For Voters Not on Precinct Qualified Voter List Who Are Registered OR Who Cannot Be Properly Identified)

All Rights Reserved

Hand-Count Strategy by Precinct for Tarrant County GOP Primary ‘26

Aubree

TBTR Strategies

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This report details extensive findings suggesting the unlawful construction and use of a relational database that can track ballots back to individual voters, thereby violating federal and state protections of ballot secrecy. Drawing on public records, grassroots investigations, and expert analyses, including those from Barry Wernick, Dr. Andrew Paquette, Susan Valiant, TBTR Strategies, Dr. Laura Pressley, and more, we outline a pattern of activity and system design that undermines the integrity and transparency of elections in multiple jurisdictions, including Tarrant County, Dallas County in Texas, counties like Nassau County in New York, and potentially every county using computerized voting systems to conduct elections.

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I. Introduction

The secrecy of the ballot is a bedrock principle of democratic elections, mandated by both Texas and federal law. However, research conducted by multiple independent teams, compiled by TBTR Strategies, reveals an alarming pattern in which computerized voting systems—especially those employing electronic poll books (epoll books), ballot marking devices (BMDs), and integrated ballot printers—are producing ballots embedded with identifiable data linked directly to voter check-ins. These identifiers may take the form of barcodes, QR codes, access codes, or hexadecimal-style numerical tags.

Through both human-readable and machine-readable formats, voter data from check-in to ballot creation is potentially being used to build a covert and unlawful relational database, allowing administrative actors or external entities with administrative access, to associate individual ballots with specific voters, in direct violation of constitutional and statutory mandates. Independent researchers report the potentially unlawful inflation and deflation of active voter rosters both pre and post-election, inconsistent vote totals between county and state reports, the facilitation and obfuscation of the replacement of electronic totals and physical ballots, and the inability to audit records to detect these issues inherent in modern computerized voting systems.

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II. Technical Breakdown: How Voter Data is Embedded into Ballots

A. The Role of E-Poll Books and Ballot Printers

In Dallas County, ES&S epoll books were found to have glitched during a recent general election, failing to complete voter check-ins and printing ballots with repetitive barcodes used to create the “ballot style” for the voter. This malfunction in the ES&S epoll book equipment resulted in an untold number of voters receiving the wrong ballot style— meaning multiple voters received the same ballot tied to a single incomplete check-in.

These ballot identifiers, printed from epoll books directly, or using a peripheral machine to transcribe epoll book barcodes created for each voter, included human-readable and machine-readable codes (barcodes or hexadecimal-like identifiers) that were transferred from the epoll book to the ballot marking device, and then on to the ballot which is then scanned into a thumb drive. In many cases it is known that these incorrect ballots were printed and then unknowingly voted and cast, without these voters even being formally checked in, as the epoll books were stuck on the initial voter scanned in, and kept printing ballots for that original voter only, without anyone noticing. Election judges had no idea the voters they were scanning were not being checked in, and that they were all getting the same ballot style. This lack of understanding of how to conduct computerized elections and detect serious issues has created opportunities for multiple votes to be cast by or on behalf of a single registration without detection.

These system malfunctions were later patched mid-election through a firmware update, raising serious concerns about the legal chain of custody, the auditability of ballots, and the security of the voting process.

B. QR Codes and Access Codes as Data Carriers

In systems like HART InterCivic’s Verity Voting, a barcode generated at check-in is translated via a peripheral controller, typically into a six-digit access code that must be manually entered by the voter into the ballot marking device to create that voter’s unique ballot. After voter selections are made, a QR code, and often an additional mysterious number which has gone unexplained by even this author’s friend, Heider Garcia, is printed onto the ballot along with the voter selections. The structure of this data pathway suggests a multi-step digital fingerprinting process by which a single code, tied to the voter’s check-in, survives through every step of the voting process—from check-in to ballot generation to casting and potentially beyond.

Election officials claim that these codes contain no voter-identifiable information. However, without full transparency and vendor cooperation—and under threat of legal consequences for inspecting proprietary software—we cannot verify these assurances. The very structure of these systems, as demonstrated by technical audits and whistleblower reports, indicates the presence of relational logic: one piece of data triggering another, across multiple devices, creating a traceable chain.

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III. Legislative and Procedural Failures

A. The SOS Redaction Order and its Implications

The Texas Secretary of State (SOS) issued a directive after the 2024 primary election requiring the redaction of “personally identifiable” information from cast ballot images and election records. This move followed reports—initiated by grassroots investigator Barry Wernick—revealing that ballots across multiple counties could be matched to individual voters using publicly available election data.

Rather than admit to a systemic issue, the SOS sought to cover it up through redactions, thus acknowledging the problem while simultaneously hiding its scale. This redaction policy placed local election officials in the position of determining what data was “personally identifiable,” leading to inconsistent application and further violations of transparency statutes.

This undermines the statutory mandate that all ballots must be anonymous at the time of creation and violates public access rights under both state and federal law.

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IV. Ballot Fraud by Design: A Workflow for Undetectable Manipulation

TBTR Strategies has compiled all the available evidence from our own investigations, and from thorough examination of work completed by other dedicated American Patriots, that when compiled logically, seem to document a full chain of election manipulation, using both technical and procedural vulnerabilities:

1. **Inflation of Voter Rolls**: Pre-election increases in active voter registrations, including reactivation of inactive voters.

2. **Ballot Generation Loopholes**: Unlimited ballots can be created under one check-in, with systems not designed to flag duplicate ballots.

3. **Non-Sequential Ballot Numbering**: Vendors have advised counties to eliminate sequential numbering, making insertion of fraudulent ballots undetectable.

4. **Excess Ballot Stock**: Thousands of additional blank ballots were allocated to polling locations with historically low turnout. TBTX and TBTR Strategies trained poll watchers observed that election judges were trained only to count ballot stock on the log forms as they opened a packet, leaving thousands unaccounted for. We are only aware of these excessive ballot stock allocations because of properly trained poll watchers.

5. **Ballot Swapping and Mishandling**: Election judges observed opening and sorting of cast ballots from ballot boxes after the close of polls, in violation of chain of custody.

6. **Broken, Missing or Incomplete Chain of Custody**: The removal of lawful ballots and insertion of fraudulently created ballots could be occurring countywide with the severe Chain of Custody violations documented by TBTX and TBTR Strategies trained poll watchers. This is the only evidence the county and state has to prove that a lawful, trustworthy and accurate election was conducted.

7. **Vote Collapsing and Registration Removal**: Post-election, fake registrations are returned to inactive or suspended status, obscuring voter history and eliminating traces of fake votes, while county and state vote totals and voter turnout records fail to reconcile.

In short:

We believe that before an election, inactive voters or suspended voters are somehow activated, polling places are equipped with epoll books to track voter turnout countywide and assign some kind of data to a ballot upon voter check-in, are overstocked with ballots not being tracked, and after an election is conducted that fake voters are removed, fake ballots are created and inserted without detection along with thumb drives of data, and lawfull ballots are removed from ballot boxes after being counted and sorted, with those ballots deemed “undesirable” being swapped prior to delivery to the central election office on election night, or throughout the early voting period.

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V. Data Pattern Analysis: The Findings of Dr. Andrew Paquette

Dr. Andrew Paquette’s research in Nassau County and across other jurisdictions provides critical technical validation of TBTR’s findings. His forensic audits uncovered algorithmic patterns within voter registration files that indicate:

- Cloning of voter files through dual IDs linked to a hidden third.

- Predictable numerical patterns occurring every tenth entry—indicating algorithmic assignment.

- Removal of voters after elections, with corresponding changes in status from active to inactive or suspended.

These anomalies match the patterns uncovered by Susan Valiant, Barry Wernick, and others in multiple Texas counties, and add technical weight to claims of a relational database underpinning the voter rolls, which we have already shown have data linked directly to the ballot from the epoll books (voter rolls), what is supposed to be a separate database.

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VI. The Legal and Constitutional Framework

The Texas Constitution demands that elections be conducted in a manner that preserves the purity of the ballot box, through ballot secrecy, auditability and strong election laws preventing undue influence and improper practice. The United States Constitution and federal law similarly require the protection of voter privacy, access to meaningful audits, and free and fair elections.

Every breakdown outlined in this report—whether in the form of broken chain of custody, insertion of machine-generated identifiers, or unlawful redactions—represents a violation of these core principles. A system which inherently houses a secret database facilitating what we appear to have detected would be wholly illegal and unlawful, should such a system be in existence and in use in US elections.

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VII. Conclusion

The convergence of technical malfunctions, unusual voter registration patterns, procedural irregularities, and embedded identifiers on ballots cannot be dismissed as mere coincidence or clerical error. Taken together, these findings form a cohesive body of evidence pointing to the likely existence of a relational database that unlawfully links ballots to individual voters—potentially enabling the tracking of fraudulent registrations for the purpose of collapsing them after the election.

This database not only facilitates the insertion and deletion of both ballots and voter records but also ensures that such manipulation remains undetectable without access to proprietary systems currently shielded by legal threats and vendor contracts. The database infrastructure is protected by a veneer of procedural legitimacy, but its function appears to be, potentially, entirely unlawful.

This phenomenon can only be occurring at the administrative level, and we will need access to the entire voting system to determine whether there is further evidence of this relational database as documented by Dr. Andrew Paquette and TBTR Strategies with supplementing work from Susan Valiant, Barry Wernick, Dr. Laura Pressley and other unnamed patriots who have dedicated their time, energy, money and good name to this cause to understand how best to secure our elections from undue influence and improper practice.

Aubree

Founder

TBTR Strategies tbtr.us

Taking Back Texas takingbacktexas.org

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At TBTR Strategies, we stress the foundational ABCs of election integrity:

• AUDITABILITY: ensures transparency and accuracy. Without auditable records, there is no way to verify the legitimacy of an election or correct potential errors or fraud. The granularity of an audit must allow for examination of records as reported from the smallest political subdivision, which is typically a voting precinct within county or district bounds. Redaction of records which are mandated to be anonymous destroys auditability of records.

• BALLOT SECRECY: procects voters from coercion, intimidation, vote-buying, and retaliation. It is essential to safeguarding our free and fair elections. Only a voter should be able to identify their ballot, and a voter’s ballot selections must remain between the voter and God. Redaction of election records is not a solution for the destruction of ballot secrecy. Instead it destroys auditability, and is an additional violation of state and federal law, and tantamount to a cover-up of larger civil rights issues.

• CHAIN OF CUSTODY: is the only documented evidence the government can offer to prove thatprecinct returns are legally handled, and that an election was lawfully and securely conducted. It must be unbroken, verifiable, and fully accessible for review of precinct returns and turnout data. The burden of proof is on the government to prove that they conducted a trustworthy election, not on the People to prove that failure to conduct an election adhereing to state and federal law resulted in a different outcome in the election than would have resulted if the government had followed the law.

These three pillars are not optional—they are legal and ethical obligations, state and federally mandated. Yet, in current election practices, all three are under threat along with the People’s ability to maintain and direct our representative republic.

WHO BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROOF?

It is critical to understand that the burden of proof rests on the government, not the people. It is not up to citizens to prove that violations of law changed the outcome of an election. Rather, it is the government’s responsibility to demonstrate—beyond doubt—that they conducted a lawful, secure, and auditable election in accordance with the law. A broken chain of custody or destroyed audit trail means the government cannot meet that burden, and the election results cannot be verified as accurate and trustworthy.

THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE to BALLOT SECRECY VIOLATIONS FOUND

After the quiet confirmation of enormity of the ballot secrecy violations in counties where regular ballots are cast countywide as opposed to by precinct, thanks to the Tammy Lehman, Susan Valiant and Barry Wernick who all exposed this massive civil rights violation - the matter was escalated to the Texas Secretary of State (SOS) and Attorney General (AG).

Initially, the SOS publicly denied the existence of any ballot secrecy issue in Texas, and a formal statement was issued on that point. That statement was later reversed when local election officials and the Attorney General confirmed the problem was, in fact, real beyond the shadow of doubt. The seriousness of this breach was further amplified when a media outlet obtained and published the ballot of a former Chairman of the Republican Party of Texas, using it to shame and embarrass him publicly for his primary selections.

In response, the Texas SOS immediately issued an order to all counties to redact any election records with “personally identifiable” information, especially ballots, claiming the need to protect voter privacy which they had previously denied was in jeopardy. While ballot secrecy is indeed vital, it cannot come at the expense of auditability. If fraud is suspected, we cannot hide behind the veil of secrecy. As existing case law makes clear, secrecy must not shield corruption.

At TBTR Strategies, we do not believe the SOS’s concern for voter privacy is genuine, as this issue has been known for years by election administrators and state election officials, yet never once disclosed to the legislature or the public that if a voter votes outside of their assigned voting precinct that their ballot can be tied back to their name using records created and necessary to audit elections in counties using countywide vote centers.

THE REMEDY

The solution is both simple and powerful: eliminate redaction of what are supposed to be anonymous ballots and return to precinct-based voting. Ballots must be cast collectively at the precinct level to preserve anonymity. This is the only way to ensure both auditability and ballot secrecy. With redactions being unnecessary due to all ballots of a precinct being cast together, audits can be conducted transparently, and ballot secrecy is preserved by casting all ballots truly anonymously.

Precinct-based voting is the most granular level of election reporting, and restoring it is essential to restoring trust. Removal of public access to election records due to ballot secrecy violations inherent to countywide voting or computerized voting systems, or denying the creation of necessary items in an auditable paper trail, is widely considered to be undue influence in our local elections.

Finally, Chain of Custody must be elevated in significance across the nation when it comes to training election workers. Whether seasonal workers from a temp agency or long-time election workers, the Chain of Custody for precinct returns must be taken so seriously that every staffer is trained in how to handle election records. To ensure public trust in election results, we must guarantee the People an Auditable Paper Trail, Ballot Secrecy, and a complete and unbroken Chain of Custody for the precinct returns and results we are expected to accept.

OUR MISSION, GOALS, AND PRIORITIES

At TBTR Strategies, our mission is to raise the level of election education across the country. We train first-time poll watchers, experienced observers, and concerned citizens based on what we’ve uncovered in over three years of investigative work in Tarrant County and across Texas.

We are committed to helping Americans become more informed, engaged, and involved in securing their local elections through education, observation, and proper investigation.

TBTR Strategies is a consulting firm offering election security training and legislative consultation to citizens, elected officials, campaigns, and advocacy groups. We also produce detailed investigative reports that expose the true effects of election procedures adopted in each county and state.

For more information, visit tbtr.us or contact us at takingtxback@gmail.com.

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If you would like to learn more, support or otherwise subscribe to our work, please visit and share out our website tbtr.us

Send our poll watcher training to your friends and family who are concerned about the elections but do not know how to get involved. Also send it to your favorite campaigns and ask them to send it to their teams, maybe even pay for it for their volunteers to get caught up on what to record on location as watchers/ observers or challengers.

Share out this graphic with the QR code linked to our Voter Complaint Form. Have all voters, watchers, and workers who experienced voting issues fill out the complaint form by simply showing them the QR code to scan with their phone. Link to the form is in the description, along with all above citation.

We were born for the storm, and a calm does not suit us.

Once again I would like to thank you all for helping to make this possible, and all donations are greatly appreciated. CashApp, Venmo, PayPal and Zelle are all options for donations, whichever is best for you.

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- Aubree

TBTR Strategies has designed this projection tool for large counties across the nation. This tool will help you determine how many counting teams you will need to process all of your ballots in a given election and have the precinct returns delivered to your county by 1am at the latest.

Our goal is to have each counting team process each batch of ballots (containing 50 ballots maximum), with approximately 34 races on each ballot, in 1.5hrs, and I have video evidence of that being totally feasible. See our related report and video footage of the event.

In counties who do not have hand-marked ballots, but who have legible PVRs (Printed Vote Records) printed from the BMDs (Ballot Marking Devices), we recommend simply removing the scanner/tabulators from the ballot boxes at each location, adding a paper poll book to the process, and counting each precinct’s returns by hand using the ECHO Hand Count Method.

This is most easily done in counties using ballots that look like the HART InterCivics PVRs, and less feasible in counties using ES&S - as their ballots are so small as to possibly be out of compliance with the EAC’s (Election Assistance Commission) standards for legible paper ballots outlined in the VVPAT Guidelines (Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail). Though this is still possible with ES&S ballots, it may be more challenging.

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Here I will post a preview of the text outlining our content inside the excel workbook just in case the example shown here is difficult to read, with the entire workbook linked below. This set of formulas comes along with our projected timeline and our recommended strategy for the upcoming primary elections:

Formula for Calculating Hand-Counted Election Scenarios Using the ECHO Hand Counting Method created in Texas by Elizabeth Baron as the recommended method.

(We did not create the ECHO method, but it is the method we endorse as part of our Best Practices. We did create these formulas independent of the ECHO teams for independent verification of feasibility.)

This set of formulas is ready to use in your county projections. We project 1.5hrs to count a batch of 50 ballots with 34 races. We expect our counters to begin sorting batches from each precinct of Early Voting returns and counting ballots using ECHO during the hours of 7am - 7pm at the elections warehouse where the ballots are dropped off and stored under video surveillance until certification.

The warehouses, which usually contain hundreds of voting systems in their lockers, will be mostly empty and that space is ideal for counting early voted ballots while the voting systems are all deployed on election day, which also happens to be the first day we can begin to count ballots.

To begin, I have an outline for you to review and consider, but a few things are important to understand:

The faster you can accurately count a batch of ballots, the fewer teams you will need to count all ballots in time to have precint returns delivered by around 1am.

And

Voting by precinct is a prerequisite for conducting a hand count. Regardless of when or how we switch back to voting by precinct, there will be an uptick in provisional ballots because we cannot turn any voters away per federal law, and the ePoll books generate their proper ballot style upon check-in.

Step ONE: All inputs in this formula can be adjusted for your county's specific criteria.

This example uses Tarrant County, Texas voter numbers, legal grounds and either establishes or assumes:

- 1.3Million Registered Voters, the exact number of expected voters in the new consolidated precincts. (Etablished by Tarrant County Elections. Consolidated precints by ballot style brings us down to 400 - Our Election Adminstrator has already done this work.)

- 20% turnout, higher than historical turnout trends of the past

- 50% EV turnout

- 49% ED turnout

- 1% Absentee turnout

- Average of 1689 batches of 50 ballots per precinct for EV

- Average of 1655 batches of 50 ballots per precinct on ED

- 500 micro batches of <10 ballots for absentee precincts

- Batches of 50 ballots with 34 races

- 254 counting teams of three to count all Early Voting Ballots in 10hrs on Election Day (7am-7pm) and either the same counting teams or an additional set of 249 teams of three, to deploy to Election Day polling places to help count the rest of the precinct batches and deliver results by 1am.

- 15 teams of three to count available Absentee ballots on ED and with more time to count the following week while the remaining ballots come in. Total number of absentee batches may differ, as even one ballot from a precinct must be batched for that precinct. These batches will be numerous, but small and completed swiftly.

-Using existing poling locations, assign precincts to locations and use Provisional Ballots to satisfy countywide access. See our report on this subject.

-Using ePoll Books to check voters in and generate proper ballot styles, accomodating provisional voters this way as well, along with the BMDs to create a Printed Vote Record as usual. These records will be cast into a ballot box and hand counted later, either at central count or on location.

-Use a Paper Poll Book containing all precinct voters to be delivered on the first day of Early Voting, used to determine who may vote a regular ballot. Any voter not on the list for the location they wish to vote, will vote a provisional ballot.

All inputs and assumptions unique to your county can be adjusted using the formulas provided, beginning with the number of registered voters, number of precincts, and your expected turnout for Early Voting, Election Day and Absentees.

After those numbers have been established and entered into this table, and after adjusting the average number of staffers necessary for your locations or number of ballots you would prefer to batch together if needed, you can then move forward.

Step TWO: Confirm all totals by working the math backwards. Each formula, when double-clicked, will highlight the cells used to determine that specific number for that row.

Step THREE: Consult our outline for Contracting with the County for a Party Primary. We recommend ordering the following from the County elections department:

-Standard number of election kits per precinct

- All available polling locations

- Ballots marked with precinct and consecutively pre-numbered beginning with the number “1”

- Separate Ballot Boxes from other parties for both Early Voting and Election Day

- ePoll books both electronic and paper

- Necessary temporary staff to conduct election based on how many ballots you expect per registered voters and expected turnout, and how fast you can count your ballot batches

See attached workbook, where at the bottom I have highlighted my personal predictions, rather than the over-estimated assumptions above. Also, I originally aimed to count these batches in 1hr, which is reflected in the over-estimated formulas. However, in the outlined items at the bottom of the first sheet, I have adjusted my personal predictions and adjusted the time for each batch to reflect 1.5hrs instead, which is what I have evidence for.

My final predictions are pictured above.

Thank you,

Aubree Campbell

Founder TBTR.US

takingtxback@gmail.com

Echotarrantconsolidatedpctsfinal

90MB ∙ XLSX file

Download

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Federal law already mandates that no voter requesting a ballot may be turned away. Regardless of when or how we make the switch back into precinct-level voting, there will be an initial uptick in provisional ballots. This fact must be accepted by Ballot Board workers in primary elections who have become accustomed to the ease and convenience of unsecured election procedures.

Provisional ballots act as a failsafe, ensuring all eligible voters are able to cast their ballot while allowing the county a chance to confirm the voter’s eligibility prior to the ballot being cast. State level countywide vote center authorizations do not guarantee any voter a regular, non-provisional ballot at any polling location, and they cannot guarantee that. The legislature knows that they cannot predict what Voter ID criteria each voter will appear with to request a ballot. To guarantee every voter a regular ballot at every location eliminates the need for any Voter ID, registration or eligibility requirements, and would be patently absurd to do.

In precinct-based voting, voters can choose to vote a regular ballot at their assigned polling location, or a provisional ballot at any other location they are not assigned to. Provisional voters can easily be accommodated with their proper ballot style at any location, as their ballot style is generated upon check-in with the ePoll Books, which can still be used in a modern, precinct-based system, to prevent double-voting. Paper poll books, when used as the list of which voters can vote a regular ballot at a given location, will be the official turnout record for both the precinct and polling location.

Paper poll books containing the names of all expected voters from a given precinct are part of the federally mandated auditable paper trail. One hard-copy paper poll book for each precinct assigned to a polling location, and the use of provisional ballots, is a transparent method which allows all voters access while allowing the county a chance to prevent the casting and counting of unlawful ballots.

Dallas County has historically used both ePoll books and paper poll books for official voter check-ins each day of every election cycle. This is not unheard of, the cost is negligible, yet the shift is a meaningful one.

Once an unlawful ballot is cast, it cannot be taken back out. The damage will have been done, and our focus must be on the prevention of unlawfully cast ballots. Voting by precinct accomplishes just that.

Keeping Precinct Records Intact While Satisfying Countywide Access Kept Simple

After working with countless patriots across the nation on reported issues in election security, among the most serious concerns among voters is the use of Countywide Vote Centers. In multiple reports seen here and here and here, our collaborative work has outlined the findings of several independent election integrity activists who found that, in counties using countywide vote centers, many voters ballots are easily reconciled with their name at check-in in publicly available records. This means that some Texas voting systems fail to preserve the anonymity of the ballot when paired with epollbooks and countywide vote centers, leading to the explosive reporting that resulted in the SOS order to redact a variety of post-election information, destroying our ability to audit election records allegedly evidenced by a now obsolete chain of custody.

In multiple reports from Texas Candidate for HD108 Barry Wernick, and Tarrant County resident Susan Valiant, we have seen documented findings showing that, in counties using countywide vote centers, many voters’ ballots can be easily matched with their name through publicly available check-in records. What first appeared as isolated, one-off cases quickly grew into evidence that hundreds of thousands of ballots across Texas could be tied back to individual voters. This privacy violation is found across a variety of systems, and not one vendor is solely responsible for this phenomenon.

Historically, ballot secrecy has only been at risk with absentee voting—a concern election offices should have been informing voters about. In-person voting was conducted by precinct, so all ballots of a precinct were cast together, inherently preserving auditability and ballot secrecy. But the adoption of countywide vote centers has exponentially worsened the privacy problem. When only one voter from a given precinct votes in a given polling location, or only one person votes absentee from their precinct, their ballot is easily reconcilable through public records. Married couples who are the only ones from their precinct to vote in a given location can see one another’s ballots from precinct reports, cvrs and voter turnout files. Using “countywide vote centers” even in-person voters are not guaranteed ballot secrecy, as there is no control over where anyone else in their own precincts vote. The illusion of “countywide vote centers” providing voters with more options has facilitated the overlooking of this exacerbated issue. This is not a matter of “voter choice,” because voters were never informed that casting a ballot outside of their precinct would eliminate their guarantee of ballot secrecy, leading to redaction of ballots and other election records, destroying auditability as well.

The only “solution” offered from the Texas Secretary of State to state election officials was to order the redaction of election records to prevent post-election ballot reconciliation. But this approach directly undermines several state laws, as well as the federal mandate for auditability:

52 U.S. Code § 21081 – Voting system standards
(a) Requirements
(2) Audit capacity

• (A) The voting system shall produce a record with an audit capacity for such system.

• (B) Manual audit capacity

  • (i) The voting system shall produce a permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity.

  • (ii) The system must allow the voter to correct errors before the permanent paper record is produced.

  • (iii) The paper record shall serve as the official record for any recount.

Redacting records in the name of secrecy destroys the ability to audit elections—a direct violation of federal law.

Precinct-Based Voting and Provisional Ballots

Before countywide vote centers, voters were assigned to a precinct polling place. If properly registered and presenting photo ID, they cast a regular ballot. If not listed in the paper poll book, or if their eligibility was questioned, they cast a provisional ballot.

Provisional ballots have been federally mandated since the passage of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, which means countywide access to voting has been guaranteed nationwide since 2003.

Federal Use of Provisional voting requires that:

52 U.S. Code § 21082 - Provisional voting and voting information requirements

If an individual declares that such individual is a registered voter in the jurisdiction in which the individual desires to vote and that the individual is eligible to vote in an election for Federal office, but the name of the individual does not appear on the official list of eligible voters for the polling place or an election official asserts that the individual is not eligible to vote, such individual shall be permitted to cast a provisional ballot as follows:

(1) An election official at the polling place shall notify the individual that the individual may cast a provisional ballot in that election.

(2)The individual shall be permitted to cast a provisional ballot at that polling place upon the execution of a written affirmation by the individual before an election official at the polling place stating that the individual is—

(A) a registered voter in the jurisdiction in which the individual desires to vote; and

(B) eligible to vote in that election.

Thus, provisional ballots already satisfy any state-level requirement for countywide access, while preserving precinct-based voting to restore auditable paper records, guarnatee ballot secrecy, and strengthen our chain of custody for precinct returns by keeping all ballots of a precinct together.

This will inherently allow for speedy, accurate and AFFORDABLE recounts, which every candidate will appreciate.

How Countywide Vote Centers Took Hold with ePoll Books

The push for countywide vote centers came alongside the introduction of electronic poll books. Just as paper poll books pair naturally with precinct-level elections, electronic poll books were sold as necessary for countywide systems.

After the passage of HAVA, offering states funding to modernize their election methods, the provisional ballot mandate was a perfect lead into the transition away from paper poll books into computerized poll books with internet connectivity. The concept was that you do not need to use as many provisional ballots if anyone can cast a regular ballot at any location, as opposed to voting in their assigned precinct location closest to their registered home address. Many states authorized the use of countywide vote centers, and either were simply not briefed on the potential exacerbation of the existing ballot secrecy issue with absentee voting, or they deliberately did not inform the voters of that concern when they moved to adopt epoll books in order to switch to voting countywide. Mixing ballots across the county has rendered audits and recounts too time consuming and laborious to conduct in full. Hours are required simply for sorting ballots from all polling locations across the county.

Regardless, countywide vote centers were incorporated into many state election procedures, including passing laws that allow this where it was previously expressly prohibited.

The argument was “convenience”—to allow voters to cast a regular ballot anywhere without duplicate voting. But the reality of this method is:

• Electronic poll books require internet connectivity.

• They can fail or go offline, leaving systems unable to prevent duplicate votes.

• They create unnecessary security vulnerabilities.

Countywide vote centers appear to have been a facade to push electronic poll books into elections nationwide. This is further evidenced by lobbying from voting-system vendors and election-themed NGOs, which aggressively promoted countywide vote centers after HAVA’s passage.

Returning to Secure, Precinct-Based Voting

HAVA already ensures that no eligible voter is denied a ballot. Provisional ballots are the federally mandated fail-safe. They provide countywide access while still allowing ballots to be cast and counted at the precinct level—preserving both secrecy and auditability.

Restoring precinct-based voting would mean:

• Voters cast regular ballots at their assigned precinct or assigned polling place.

• ePoll Books used only for voter check-in and ballot style production.

• Paper poll book determines who casts a regular ballot into the ballot box.

• Voters who appear at location where they are not assigned can still vote their proper ballot style by casting a provisional ballot, as federal law requires.

• Ballots remain grouped by precinct, ensuring accurate election night reporting, speedy recounts and audits, preserving anonymity, and strengthening chain of custody.

This Approach:

• Preserves countywide access without compromising precinct integrity.

• Restores accurate precinct-level election night reporting.

• Protects ballot secrecy by eliminating cross-precinct reconciliation risks.

• Supports auditability through hand-marked, hand-counted paper ballots.

• Relies on existing federal law to ensure no voter is turned away.

• Adheres to state and federal mandates of auditability, ballot secrecy and chain of custody.

With stronger chain of custody, this system restores transparency, security, and public trust—without the need for new laws. It simply relies on the framework we already have, returning to what has worked for generations.

Conclusion

Because auditability and ballot secrecy, evidenced by a strong chain of custody for precinct returns, are federal and state law, we have to return to casting all ballots of a precinct together. To do that, we need to assign them to existing locations.

We also have to give provisionals regardless, and using paper poll books for regular ballots, the rest are provisional, epoll books to check in all voters and generate proper ballot style, we can accommodate all voters, regular and provisional, with their proper ballot style, ensure ballot secrecy, and thats what we have to do.

Otherwise all of our elections are totally unable to be properly audited. Every county does it differently. Heider Garcia of Dallas County redacted all the ballot info. Clint, his replacement in Tarrant has cleverly removed the voter roster by location, so he does not have to redact ballot information. Though this is a clever way to avoid redaction of the actual ballots, this is not auditability, it is a willing cover up of a larger civil rights issue, ordered by the Texas Secretary of State’s office of Elections, to protect an unlawful voting system.

This office of elections is managed by members of election-themed NGOs who are totally sponsored by Voting System Vendors. Americans in every state should be asking whether their Chief Election Official or Election Board is actually serving voters or shielding voting system vendors. When state election staff are tied to vendor-funded nonprofits, and redaction orders are used to block scrutiny, it raises legitimate concerns about conflicts of interest and the fair interpretation of state and federal election law.

Citations:

1. Election Administrator’s Authority in Primary Elections: [Chapter 172]

a. Accept Filings for Office from Party Chair [172.029]

b. Maintain County Elections Website [172.055]

c. Produce Miscellaneous Ballots for Chair [172.090]

d. Post Notice of Election and Combined Precincts [172.1112]

e. Produce pre-election List of Registered Precinct Voters and post-election Turnout File for Chair [172.1141]

f. Submit Canvass Report to SOS [172.116]

g. Enter Primary Results to County Database [172.123]

h. Prepare Precinct Results and Report to SOS [172.124]

i. Supervise Overall Conduct of Election Exclusively Under the Agreement to a Joint Primary [172.126]

j. Contract with State Chair in the Absence of a County Chair [172.128]

k. Serve as Early Voting Clerk with the same authority as an Election Day Judge at a regular polling location [83.001, 83.002]

2. Party Rights in State Law:

a. Overall Authority over Primary Elections [172.111]

(Authority lies with the party executive committee to oversee the conduct, no exception for early voting)

b. Right of Chair to negotiate Contract for Primary [31.093]

(Sections c, d, e, outline the requirements of the County Elections Clerk)

(No exceptions made for the supervision of the conduct of primary during Early Voting in the contract)

(No mention of necessity to bind both parties to the same methods in their primaries)

3. Countywide Access Laws:

a. Early Voting Countywide Access [85.066]

(Does not/cannot guarantee every voter a regular, non-provisional ballot at every location)

(No Voter will be denied the right to vote; provisional ballots will allow us to determine eligibility for voters who choose to vote outside of their assigned precinct while keeping most ballots cast by precinct for an accurate and speedy hand count of precinct returns)

a. Election Day (Countywide Polling Place Program) [43.007]

(Does not/ cannot guarantee every voter a regular, non-provisional ballot at every location)

(No Voter will be denied the right to vote; provisional ballots will allow us to determine eligibility for voters who choose to vote outside of their assigned precinct while keeping most ballots cast by precinct for an accurate and speedy hand count of precinct returns)

4. Ballot Secrecy:

a. Ballot Secrecy is outlined as part of the Legislative Intent for the entire election code [1.0015] and applies to all elections in Texas [1.002]

b. Ballot Secrecy is mandated for all voting systems used in Texas Elections [122.001]

c. Ballot Secrecy Violations Acknowledged in HART and ES&S Voting Systems; Redactions Ordered by SOS [Election Advisory 2024-20]

(Redaction destroys auditability and public access to election records to cover up an inherent violation of ballot secrecy. Public access is not the issue, the lack of a guarantee of ballot secrecy is the issue. Redaction is not the solution)

(Casting all ballots of a precinct together is the only remedy, and it must be administered where possible)

5. Federal Laws:

a. Auditability [52USC §21081. Voting systems standards]

(Auditable Paper Trail Mandated)

b. Preservation of Records [52USC §20701. Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; deposit with custodian; penalty for violation]

(Records Preserved for Examination for minimum of 22 months)

c. Paper Record is Official Record [52USC §21081. Voting systems standards]

(Paper Records are Official Records for Elections)

a. Use of Provisional Ballots [52USC §21082. Provisional voting and voting information requirements]

(For Voters Not on Precinct Qualified Voter List Who Are Registered OR Who Cannot Be Properly Identified)

6. State Hand Count Laws:

a. Chapter 65

(Counting Procedures which ECHO follows)

b. Chapter 66

(Reporting Procedures which ECHO follows)

7. Combination of Precinct Polling Location Laws:

a. Combining Precincts in Primary [42.0051]

(Requires adherence to 42.005 for combination of precincts based on ballot style)

b. Consolidating Precincts in Primary [42.009]

(No reference to other code, simply allows parties to consolidate precincts into adequate polling locations as necessary to accommodate all voters)

(TBTR Strategies recommends simply consolidating precincts into existing polling locations and not necessarily combining precincts with identical ballot styles)

8. Texas Constitution Article 6, Section 2

(c) The privilege of free suffrage shall be protected by laws regulating elections and prohibiting under adequate penalties all undue influence in elections from power, bribery, tumult, or other improper practice.

Adherence to federal mandates is non-negotiable, and all state laws must be designed in such a way that honors and upholds both Federal Law and the State Constitution

Citations: Texas Election Code as an EXAMPLE

1. Countywide Access Laws:

a. Early Voting Countywide Access [85.066]

(Does not/cannot guarantee every voter a regular, non-provisional ballot at every location)

(No Voter will be denied the right to vote; provisional ballots will allow us to determine eligibility for voters who choose to vote outside of their assigned precinct while keeping most ballots cast by precinct for an accurate and speedy hand count of precinct returns)

b. Election Day (Countywide Polling Place Program) [43.007]

(Does not/ cannot guarantee every voter a regular, non-provisional ballot at every location)

(No Voter will be denied the right to vote; provisional ballots will allow us to determine eligibility for voters who choose to vote outside of their assigned precinct while keeping most ballots cast by precinct for an accurate and speedy hand count of precinct returns)

2. Ballot Secrecy:

a. Ballot Secrecy is outlined as part of the Legislative Intent for the entire election code [1.0015] and applies to all elections in Texas [1.002]

b. Ballot Secrecy is mandated for all voting systems used in Texas Elections [122.001]

c. Ballot Secrecy Violations Acknowledged in HART and ES&S Voting Systems; Redactions Ordered by SOS [Election Advisory 2024-20]

(Redaction destroys auditability and public access to election records to cover up an inherent violation of ballot secrecy. Public access is not the issue, the lack of a guarantee of ballot secrecy is the issue. Redaction is not the solution)

(Casting all ballots of a precinct together is the only remedy, and it must be administered where possible)

3. Federal Laws:

a. Auditability [52USC §21081. Voting systems standards]

(Auditable Paper Trail Mandated)

b. Preservation of Records [52USC §20701. Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; deposit with custodian; penalty for violation]

(Records Preserved for Examination for minimum of 22 months)

c. Paper Record is Official Record [52USC §21081. Voting systems standards]

(Paper Records are Official Records for Elections)

d. Use of Provisional Ballots [52USC §21082. Provisional voting and voting information requirements]

(For Voters Not on Precinct Qualified Voter List Who Are Registered OR Who Cannot Be Properly Identified)

All Rights Reserved

Aubree

Founder TBTR.US

©TBTR Strategies

Want to see more truth? Support our work in the following ways:

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Or you can support us through purchasing or sponsorship of our COLOR ME FREE! Educational Coloring Books for your home or school of choice.

They also make great campaign materials to leave with voters!

http://Tbtr.us/coloring-books

There is a school of thought that the only recourse for addressing the various issues uncovered in our elections is through relentless litigation in unfriendly courts. Although it is a reasonable concept to assume that the judicial branch is a path to remedy, and one we should be able to rely upon, when the original sin came from the Legislature the remedy can only be obtained in the place of origin. Until we are able to correct the breach of the separation of powers caused by legislation in violation of the Nondelegation Doctrine, and clarify the intent of a duly elected legislature, our constitutional cases will fail and the Rule of Law will continue to be subject to JUDICIAL DEFERENCE.

Judges are sworn to apply the law to cases brought before them. Case law is not real law as it is case-specific, though rulings can be cited in other cases and in the drafting of legislation, where relevant and constitutional. Judges cannot make a ruling based on information which has not been properly filed as evidence with the court. These elected and appointed judges review lawfully submitted evidence and compare that with cited applicable laws, hear expert and witness testimony, and examine all lawfully entered evidence, prior to the judge issuing a ruling.

At least that is how we believe the Judicial Branch is supposed to work.

What we are seeing in reality is something altogether different in the courts where it comes to applicable election statutes. Due to violations of the Nondelegation Doctrine committed by the legislature, judges are tasked with reconciling suspect advisory codes which plaintiffs allege oppose or violate state statutes, federal law, or constitutional rights.

Ruling after ruling, vague and superfluous dismissals of cases with a preponderance of evidence depicting maladministration, the facilitation of election fraud, general incompetence and lack of concern over adherence with the intent of state and federal legislators and constitutional law. Instead of courts favoring legislative intent by deferring to existing election statutes for context, rulings are made in favor of “expert” testimony, often from those with skin in the game of keeping these unlawful practices in place. These experts often offer blame and excuses for issues revealed through legal discovery, with no justification for discrepancies and constitutional crises created, other than “human errors/ unforeseen circumstances” meant simply to cast doubt over all violations we are able to establish as fact.

Doubt is the most powerful spell cast by the Administrative State to obfuscate their role in the devilish work of obfuscating who is really designing and managing our elections, in order to be found not liable for violations of state and federal election laws. If doubt can be cast on the evidence, it will be done without any attempt to debunk it.

HOWEVER… if it becomes even easier to cast doubt on the LAW itself… They will do so, and with devastating effects. After the following example, I will outline the ROOT CAUSE and IMMEDIATE EFFECT of the issue above described and exampled below.

This is why our Poll Watcher training instructs citizens on how to look for and document commonly reported issues with modern election administration in their own counties.

Here is an excerpt from the ruling on my own case related to access to election records. This case was filed by Heider Garcia, former Tarrant County Election Administrator and current Dallas County Election Administrator, against Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton for Paxton’s ruling that my public information request made to Heider for the Public Machine Testing tapes, be fulfilled per the Texas Public Information Act.

After hearing expert testimony about how the tapes, which I publicly viewed and filmed and touched during the public machine testing, should not be released to the public, the Judge only issued a partial ruling. During the course of this trial the legislature clarified their previously stated intent that the public is allowed access to election records, but the Judge still ruled partially against AG Paxton’s order to provide items related to the other respondent’s request. The Judge was convinced that allowing a more recent code to override a much earlier code, along with the Public Information Act, nullifying both simultaneously. This is what is looks like when a Judge defers to the “expert” testimony from Heider Garcia over the language and clear intent of the legislature:

“… On May 19, 2023, this Court granted the County’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment in part and denied it in part. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff Tarrant County’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, May 19, 2023 (May 19 Order). 6/16/2023 2:21 PM Velva L. Price District Clerk Travis County D-1-GN-22-006259 Susan Schmidt Cause No. D-1-GN-22-006259; Tarrant County v. Paxton Page 2 of 7 DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL This Court found that Texas Election Code § 66.058 “is a more specific statute that Section 1.012 of the Texas Election Code,” and ruled that “[b]ased on the plain language of the statute . . . the information at issue is not subject to disclosure under the Public Information Act until 22 months after the relevant election day.””

CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-22-006259

TARRANT COUNTY, Plaintiff, v. KEN PAXTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, Defendant.

So we cannot seek criminal action as most legislatures have been convinced to pass laws without due penalties and enforcement mechanisms for the violation thereof. We cannot rely on civil cases in court due to weak laws. Will the administrative deep state continue to waive, suspend and amend election laws until voters no longer trust the results and stop participating?

Did you notice the common denominator? Laws. Bad, weak or otherwise unenforceable laws. This is a ray of hope, because laws can be fixed, this we can do as a nation.

Article One, Section Four of the national constitution outlines how only state legislatures decide the time, place and manner of elections, and that congress can establish certain regulations for each state to meet in federal elections.

That means this: instead of allowing lobbyists to sweep our reps off of their feet, then draft bills related to election procedures, lawmakers must take a long, hard look at the current voting systems in place in their county’s elections. Elected representatives must honestly ask themselves whether they could confidently explain all security measures in place in their county’s elections to their constituents.

If your rep cannot show you how to pull a hash value from the voting equipment, they do not know how the details of how modern voting systems are secured from undue influence and improper practice. A significant amount of trust has been placed in the hands of voting systems that even the counties who purchase them cannot fully examine due to “proprietary” code. Representatives should only authorize for their state or federal elections what they understand, and only what systems they know their electorate will be able to understand.

With both the legislatures and judicial branch deferring to the very same “expert” testimonies when citizens become highly suspicious of election procedures and results, the people are left to look to the executive branch for enforcement of what constitutional law we have left. When the chief election official in the executive branch of each state is a member of NGOs funded by modern voting system vendors, the people are left with no recourse for stolen elections, as the voting system vendors have monopolized all three branches of our government.

We, the People must do the hard work to identify the amendments necessary to secure each of our respective state’s elections codes from misinterpretation by both executive and judicial branches. Our focus must be on meaningful legislation, we cannot waste any more time or money on unfavorable rulings setting up terrible precedent which will be cited in future, stronger cases as we continue our work.

The remedy is in the legislature, where the original sin of violations of the nondelegation doctrine initially occurred, NOT in the executive or judicial branches.

Any attorney with integrity will have already taken this position, if they have not then they are simply riding the wave until the money runs out for filing lawsuits on evidence they know won’t be enough. Just because an attorney tells you that they know what they are doing and can win these cases does not make it true.

Read your most recent election bills. Identify issues. Call and email your reps. Tell them to clean up the elections by simplifying the process and adhering to the ABC’s of Election Security: Auditability, Ballot Secrecy, and Chain of Custody.

Thank you, Patriots.

© Aubree Campbell 2024

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66.058 PRESERVATION OF PRECINCT ELECTION RECORDS.

66.059 RETRIEVING ERRONEOUSLY PLACED ELECTION RECORDS

TX Election Codes: Recounts

211.001 ELECTIONS IN WHICH RECOUNT MAY BE OBTAINED.

211.003 CHANGE IN OUTCOME OF ELECTION.

211.006 PROMPT PERFORMANCE OF RECOUNT FUNCTIONS.

211.007 PRESERVATION OF RECOUNT PAPERS.

PIA Requests

1. All information is presumed open, unless there is a specific exception stated regarding the information. All requests must be in writing to trigger the PIA.

2. Paper, Email, Audio, Video and more could be considered public information subject to the PIA. All information produced or maintained by a government agency or individual employee is potentially subject to the PIA.

3. Non-governmental entities and entities supported with public funds are also subject to the PIA. However, the PIA does not apply to the Judicial branch, but the Court’s Custodian of Records may be applied to for any Judicial information.

4. Governmental agencies can charge for the cost of compiling records and materials, but there are rules for how to charge for records on the SOS website.

5. Records requested must already be in existence.

6. Open Records do not need to be addressed to specific individuals in a governmental body, unless otherwise stipulated by Law to be addressed to an individual within an agency.. Identify this particular employee if possible. “Public Information Coordinator” will be their title.

7. There is no need to cite any law or even the PIA to draft a lawful open records request.

8. If an exception applies, the information will not be released, otherwise the agency must release the information. If you believe a factual mistake has been made, a suit must be filed within 30 days of the denial being received. Formal complaints will include a civil or criminal complaint in writing with the DA or County Attorney, or with the Travis County DA or the AG.

9. A Writ of Mandamus can be filed when an agency refuses to give access to public records, refusing to request an ag ruling, refusing to release information that is unchallenged.

10. Requestor cannot be sued, but may sue to intervene in any suit against the AG ruling.

11. It is a crime to destroy, alter or remove public information.

Texas Constitution Article 6, 4 - ELECTIONS BY BALLOT; PURITY OF ELECTIONS; REGISTRATION OF VOTERS

In all elections by the people, the vote shall be by ballot, and the Legislature shall provide for the numbering of tickets and make such other regulations as may be necessary to detect and punish fraud and preserve the purity of the ballot box; and the Legislature shall provide by law for the registration of all voters.

*This report cites codes that may have been amended since it’s original draft and release in 2021. Please cite the Texas Election Code here for the most up-to-date versions of these codes.

© Aubree Campbell 2021

I. Order every county to conduct a "sweep" of voter registrations using the notice form authorized by Section Eight of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) to purge outdated entries [2][3].

II. Immediately reverse Biden’s Executive Order 14019. NGOs and private organizations must be banned from registering any voters [5][11]. Only government officials and their deputies can register voters, no private organizations.

III. States must issue a single, statewide, uniform voter registration application form for use in all public offices authorized to register voters [12]. This will be the only official and legal form used to register voters.

IV. Provisional ballots must be ordered for all cases where voter eligibility is in question, including but not limited to unregistered voters and those without lawful voter ID [4][8][9][10].

BACKGROUND & ANALYSIS:

The 1993 National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), based on Article One, Section Four of the National Constitution, outlined for all states how to handle cleaning old or suspect registrations from their voter registration databases. Should they suspect files may be outdated due to voter relocation, death, or other reason they may necessarily need to be removed from the list of a state or county’s list of registered voters, the outline for how to accomplish this is found in Section Eight of the NVRA.

There is currently no legally outlined means for states to compare active voter rolls.

Biden issued Executive Order 14019 authorizing private organizations to register people to vote, creating unlimited paths of unofficial voter registrations being sent to both state and county registrars, who are expected to enter them into the database without ever having seen the voter. Applications are not uniform and NGOs are not subject public scrutiny in their practices.

Provisional Ballots must be used where a voter does not have ID or is not properly registered. No more exceptions allowing unverified voters to cast regular ballots at polling locations. Once an unlawful ballot is cast, it cannot be recovered, and the damage will have been done. The focus must be on security.

PART ONE: Federally Outlined Registration Sanitation

Section Eight of the NVRA ordered the creation at the state level of a Registration Verification Form designed to be sent to any registered voter to confirm their identity and registered address prior to an election. The law also mandates that voters who receive the letter must provide lawful identification and proof of residency to remain on the state and county’s list of active registered voters, otherwise they are moved into “suspense” status. This proof can be given in the timeline outlined in the form (30 days) or can be presented upon voting in-person or requesting a ballot by mail.

Both state and county databases are mandated to use the Form outlined by Congress and subsequently designed by the state. This means every county already has this Form and is fully aware of its intended use authorized by federal law.

In Texas, for example, this form is called Form 17-1 and can be found on the Texas Secretary of State’s official website. All other states have this form and every county election registrar is aware of this form.

PART TWO: A National Database for Active Voters

For the thorough funding and creation of a National Active Voter Database, action from Congress may be necessary. This would be a relatively simple process, and initiation through an Executive Order would allow federal entities to immediately begin observation of active voter registration changes between states.

Any congressional outline of this database must be able to maintain current and active voter files, must be maintained by each state’s Chief Election Official per federal law and must immediately begin the identification of active voters in their state.

After activation of Section Eight of the NVRA, each state shall issue their Registration Verification Form to each registered voter in each county. All voters who respond or are otherwise legally and lawfully verified as eligible in-county voters. If a voter has not responded in the timeline given, they are marked as “suspended” status but may still vote.

If a suspended voter wishes to vote, they will be put back into “active” status by providing both lawful identification and proof of residency in-person during an election or to a county registrar at any point. Suspended voters are then considered “verified” voters and are immediately added to a state-managed database. Upon completion of the timeline outlined in Section Eight of the NVRA, this new database of “verified” voters is to be sent through a portal provided to each state’s Chief Election Official.

Any voter who does not respond within the timeline of the effort (initiated upon signing of this Executive Order through the 90th day prior to the next general primary election) is not yet removed from the list of registered voters but is designated with a “suspended” status. These voters are still authorized to vote and will be considered “verified” upon showing a lawful form of ID and proof of residency for access to a regular, non-provisional ballot. Any voter whose eligibility is unable to be verified must vote on a provisional ballot, without exception or legal workarounds of state and federal voter ID requirements.

Voters who are “verified” after the initial timeline via voting a regular ballot by showing photo ID and proof of residency, are then added to a portal provided to each state’s chief election official, further building out the national database. This database will then be maintained throughout every federal election via the addition of state information on active voters.

Voters who never respond to the initial NRVA Registration Verification form are removed from the voter roll only once two federal election cycles have passed after the signing of this executive order. The benefit is having federal agencies observe the ever-changing lists of active voters casting ballots in each state.

PART THREE: Uniformity in Application Forms and Banning NGOs From Voter Registration

[THIS SECTION HAS BEEN SATISFIED]

Executive Order 14019, issued by President Joe Biden, authorized the expansion of voter registration efforts through private entities, non-governmental organizations and their affiliated programs. [5]. These organizations are responsible for a significant number of voter registrations, though their practices and affiliated records are not necessarily subject to the Freedom of Information Act, nor through state open records acts. Massive discrepancies and inactive voter registrations in many state voter databases make it nearly impossible to ensure the accuracy of elections and to prevent the dilution of lawful votes by unlawfully casting ballots in the name of suspended voters.

Suspended and active registrations must be monitored to catch any voter fraud or any other form of election fraud. Reversing portions of E.O. 14019 and limiting voter registration to state election officials and federal mail-in applications will restore accountability to the electoral process.

Multiple forms used by different jurisdictions can lead to discrepancies, duplications and potential voter disenfranchisement. A standardized form used only by election officials mitigates these risks by ensuring that all applicants provide the same information, which can be processed uniformly [12]. The NVRA's emphasis on uniform procedures supports this approach, aiming to enhance the accuracy and integrity of voter registration lists [2][3].

The NVRA’s mandate for maintaining clean voter rolls supports an EO enforcing uniformity and database accuracy in alignment with state and federal election law, and this EO adheres to the provisions in the NVRA. [3][5].

THIS SECTION OF OUR EO IS SATISFIED WITH PRESIDENT TRUMP’S REPEAL OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 14019.

PART FOUR: Mandating Terms of Use for Precinct-Level Voting and Provisional Ballots to Satisfy Countywide Access

Provisional ballots were mandated to ensure that all lawful voters can cast a ballot, even if their name does not appear on the voter roll, or if their identity is unable to be verified by the election clerk on-site. Use of provisional ballots is intended to be a safeguard, allowing eligible voters to cast their ballot, while offering the county a means to prevent the casting of ballots from unlawful voters. Use of provisional ballots is not a punishment but is an opportunity for voters to cast their ballot while lacking proper ID or those who are not on the poll book. [4][8][9][10].

This EO orders the strict use of provisional ballots for all voters whose identity cannot be verified via lawful photo ID or who does not appear on the list of registered voters, without exception or work-arounds that may be authorized by state law or state administrative code.

No exception or legal workarounds of state and federal voter ID requirements may exist, an example being Texas’s “Reasonable Impediment” form which allows a voter to cast a regular (non-provisional) ballot without photo ID. These instances must be replaced with a provisional ballot per federal mandate, and access to a regular ballot must be limited to voters on the list of registered voters who possess a lawful form of photo ID confirming their eligibility. [14]

This effort guarantees voters that their voices will not be diluted with unlawfully cast ballots from unverified voters.

Summaries:

Sections I. & II. Legal & Operational Framework for National Voter Registration Clean-Up Effort and Initiation of National Voter Registration Database

Section 8 of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA):
Section 8 of the NVRA mandates that each state implement procedures to maintain accurate and current voter registration lists for federal elections, and the form is already in existence at the state level to verify every voter [2][3].

Deploy Official Notices for Verification Immediately:
To identify voters who may have moved, states send official address confirmation notices to the voters on their files. A voter’s registration can be legally removed if a voter fails to respond and subsequently does not vote in two consecutive presidential elections. This approach prevents the removal of voters solely due to inactivity, focusing instead on non-responsiveness to official notices and lack of verification of voter eligibility [3][13].

In-Person Eligibility Verification for Non-Respondents:
Voters who do not respond to address confirmation notices prior to an election registration deadline, who are categorized as “suspended” can verify their registration details by providing valid identification and proof of residency when they vote in-person. This ensures that eligible voters remain on the rolls, even if they missed prior deadlines for eligibility verification [3]. Every eligible voter will get a regular ballot, only voters who cannot be photo-identified or are not listed on voter roll will be issued a provisional ballot.

90-Day Pre-Election Maintenance Deadline:
The NVRA prohibits systematic voter removal programs within 90 days of a federal election. This "quiet period" aims to prevent erroneous deletions close to elections, ensuring stability and accuracy in voter lists used in each election [3]. All voters who respond with mandated eligibility verification will have their name and voter ID added to National Active Voter Database for all states to utilize.

Utilization of National Change of Address (NCOA) Data:
States election officials should use NCOA data from the U.S. Postal Service to identify voters who have moved within their state to compare county databases prior to determining each of those identified voter’s most accurate registration information. This helps maintain up-to-date voter rolls by initiating address confirmation processes for those flagged as having changed residences [6]. By adhering to these NVRA guidelines, states aim to uphold both the accuracy of voter registration lists and prevent the disenfranchisement of eligible voters [2][13].

III. Uniform Application Forms and a Ban on NGOs from Registration Practices

Ensuring Integrity and Compliance through Transparency and Accountability:
Government agencies are bound by open records laws and public accountability measures. Private entities involved in voter registration may not be subject to the same transparency and accountability standards as government agencies, leading to concerns about the integrity and reliability of the voter registration process [5][13].

Reducing Errors and Fraud:
Centralizing voter registration within government agencies minimizes the risk of errors, duplicate entries resulting from irregular voter verification practices or fraudulent activities. Implementing a single, standardized voter registration application process would ensure uniformity across all public registration sites. This consistency simplifies the registration process for voters and election officials alike, reducing confusion and administrative burdens [2][3].

[Section Satisfied with President Trump’s repeal of Executive Order 14019]f

IV. Use of Provisional Ballots for Voters Missing from Poll Book or Without ID

Ensuring Eligible Votes Are Counted:
Provisional ballots act as a safeguard to ensure that individuals who request a ballot but whose eligibility is in question can still participate in elections while allowing the county a chance to confirm eligibility prior to the ballot being cast.

According to the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), voters who assert they are registered but do not appear on the official list must be allowed to cast a provisional ballot [10]. Additionally, any voter whose identity is called into question by election staff, typically due to an inability to properly identify themselves, is also still able to vote provisionally.

Preventing Disenfranchisement Due to Administrative Errors:
Voters are not always at fault for the discrepancies in registration files. Administrative errors can inadvertently omit eligible voters from registration lists. The Election Assistance Commission (EAC) underscores that provisional voting serves as a critical fail-safe, ensuring that voters are not excluded due to administrative discrepancies.

CONCLUSION & REVIEW:

This executive order must immediately:

I. ACTIVATE SECTION EIGHT OF THE NVRA:

· Directs states to conduct a comprehensive voter registration sanitation process as per NVRA guidelines [2][3][6].

· NVRA mandates completion of this initiative prior to the 90^th day before the next primary election [3].

II. Order the Creation of National Active Voter Database

· This is NOT a Federal Voter Registration Mechanism

· Contains Voter Name and partial Voter ID only, excluding individuals protected under voter protection laws (LEOs, DV victims, etc.)

· Simple and Maintained by each State’s Chief Election Official

· Observable by other State Election Officials

· Auditable

III. Prohibit NGOs & Private Organizations from Registering Voters and Standardize Registration Process

· Require states to issue a single, uniform voter registration application form used only by deputized registrars [12].

· Reverse Biden’s EO, ban NGOs from registering voters.

IV. Mandate Provisional Ballot Use for Unverified Voters Without Exception

· Guarantees due process for all voters while ensuring election integrity and ballot security [4][8][9][10].

· Ensures election officials are confident and protected in the use of provisional ballots.

These measures reinforce the NVRA’s intent, along with EFI's mission to lawfully secure elections nationwide, while adhering to federal election law and ensuring transparent, legally sound voter registration practices.

Citations:

1. Article One, Section Four of the U.S. Constitution

U.S. Constitution – Elections Clause

2. .National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA)

U.S. Department of Justice – NVRA Overview

3. U.S. Department of Justice – NVRA List Maintenance Guidance
https://www.justice.gov/crt/nvra-list-maintenance-guidance

4. Help America Vote Act of 2002 – Provisional Ballots

52 U.S. Code § 21082 – Provisional Voting Requirements

5. Executive Order 14019: Promoting Access to Voting
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/03/10/2021-05087/promoting-access-to-voting

6. U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) – National Change of Address (NCOA) Guidance
https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/NCOA_Memo_Final_508.pdf

7. Federal Election Commission (FEC) – Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002
https://www.fec.gov/hava/law_ext.txt

8. National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) – Provisional Ballots
https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/provisional-ballots

9. U.S. Code – 52 U.S. Code § 21082: Provisional Voting and Voting Information Requirements
https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:52%20section:21082%20edition:prelim)

10. U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) – Best Practices on Provisional Voting
https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/EAC-Best-Practices-on-Provisional-Voting.pdf

11. Brennan Center for Justice – Report on Inadequate Oversight of Private Vendors in Election Infrastructure
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/report-finds-inadequate-oversight-private-vendors-critical-election

12. U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) – National Mail Voter Registration Form
https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/Federal_Voter_Registration_ENG.pdf

13. U.S. Code – 52 U.S. Code § 21083: Computerized Statewide Voter Registration List Requirements
https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:52%20section:21083%20edition:prelim)

14. Texas’s Reasonable Impediment Form https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/forms/pol-sub/reasonable-impediment-declaration.pdf

Thank you, Patriots.

©Aubree Campbell 2025

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