Book: Between Torah and Derech Eretz

Kollel, or university? Avoiding this world, or redeeming it? Should schools be oriented towards the most elite students, or to the regular students?

These are some of the most consequential questions that everyone confronts at some point in their lives. The decisions can send a person on radically different paths, as they relate to radically different conceptions regarding the essence of Judaism.

Rabbi Rafi Dembovsky’s sefer, Between Torah and Derech Eretz, analyzes this crucial topic starting with the essential Torah sources — a dispute between Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and Rabbi Yishmael. He develops it through later sources and presents his conclusions, followed by an analysis of topics affected by the two approaches.

1. Tell us a bit about your background.

I grew up in Edgware in the UK, which is just down the road from Golders Green (which I assume most people have heard of!). I went to Hasmonean High School, which prides itself on embodying Torah im Derech Eretz, before spending a little over three years learning in Yeshivas Toras Moshe (ToMo) in Yerushalayim. I’ve been privileged to learn in various Kollelim for many years since getting married in 2018, and I currently live with my wife and kids in Ramat Bet Shemesh. Last year I enrolled in the Hebrew University to study Law, and I’ve been attempting to balance learning and studying ever since!

2. How would you summarize your book?

My book attempts to define the machlokes between the “Torah im Derech Eretz” and “Torah Only” approaches to Judaism. The book is split into two parts. The first part traces the roots of the philosophical aspect of the machlokes through sugyos in Shas and various Rishonim and Acharonim. Ultimately, my conclusion is that the machlokes stems from fundamentally different approaches to Judaism at large, as to whether the primary goal of a Jew is internal/intellectual or external/action-based.

The second part of the book explores some of the major halachic sugyos that are relevant to the machlokes, such as the extent of the mitzvah of talmud Torah and the Torah’s approach to secular studies.

Throughout the book, I try to demonstrate the validity of both approaches hashkafically, as well as the authenticity of a spectrum of halachic positions, in order to promote the understanding that ועמך כולם צדיקים (the original title of the book!).

3. What piqued your interest in this topic?

I was raised with a strong respect for derech eretz in a broad sense: professionalism, secular studies, serving the community. I left that behind a little when I went to Yeshiva, and instead I fully embraced the message of “single-minded focus on talmud Torah” that I received in ToMo. In fact, I had initially intended to study medicine after a few years in Yeshiva, but I opted out of that, preferring instead to dedicate my life to learning. I don’t want to give the impression that it’s all or nothing; ToMo is very supportive of their alumni who remain B’nei Torah in the workforce, whilst Hasmonean prides themselves on their excellent Beis Medrash programme run by the inimitable Rabbi Yehoshua Hartman (of the blue Maharal set). But it’s a question of emphasis and lechatchila, and in Yeshiva I absorbed the message that lechatchila, Torah living is to be found specifically within the pages of the Gemoro.

After getting married, the topic of Torah im Derech Eretz was often on my mind. My wife’s family are proud Yekkes, and whilst they were very supportive of our decision to learn in Kollel, they were strong advocates for Torah im Derech Eretz. Over time, I learnt to re-appreciate the values that I was raised to respect.

During the first few years of marriage, a few experiences convinced me to really delve into this sugya. The first was Covid and the questions it raised regarding the balance of da’as Torah and talmud Torah on the one hand versus the authority of science and secular scholarship on the other. The second was the experience of searching for a Cheder for my son that would combine talmud Torah and derech eretz, and the range of reactions I received from rabbanim I discussed it with in Eretz Yisrael. In both instances, I felt as if the very authenticity of Torah im Derech Eretz was being undermined, and I did not have a means of defending it. I needed to understand the sugya as objectively as possible and come to my own informed decision.

4. What inspired you to write this book?

Truthfully, I’d always wanted to write a book and had made a few starts on various topics before this one, but nothing led anywhere. Once I started learning the sugya, starting from the machlokes between Rabi Shimon bar Yochai and Rabi Yishmael in Berachos, one sugya led to the next, and I felt there was real potential to turn my research into a sefer.

Additionally, I hadn’t found any sefer that systematically analysed and contrasted the Torah im Derech Eretz and Torah Only viewpoints from the primary sources. Rav Schwab’s “Eilu v’Eilu” (These and Those) was a huge inspiration, but it’s very brief and presents only final positions, without the intricacies of the sugyos themselves. On the other hand, Rabbi Yehuda Levi’s Torah Study is encylopedic, but I didn’t find it to be as systematic as I was looking for. I see my sefer as somewhat of a combination between the two: the systematic approach of Rav Schwab, together with the analysis of Rabbi Levi. Of course I did things differently as well, but I cite both of them, and quote extensively from Rav Schwab.

Ultimately, if my sefer would be mentioned in the same breath as either of those two, I would be thrilled!

5. What is one major misconception you’ve found people hold about this topic?

A few people have challenged the existence of any substantive machlokes between Torah im Derech Eretz and Torah Only, contending that everyone essentially agrees as to the ultimate goal of Judaism and argue only about its practical implementation. According to them, the main factors in this debate are societal, historical and practical.

In my opinion, this approach often stems from a desire to minimise the existence of disagreement regarding the fundamental positions of Judaism, but I think that it is unnecessary. Hashkafic literature is full of debates on some of the most important issues, such as the nature of G-d, the extent of Divine Providence, and the authenticity of various strands of hashkafic thought. This topic is no different; the Rambam says one thing, the Ramban says another, the Ramchal offers a third position, and so the debate rages.

Moreover, the proponents of Torah im Derech Eretz and Torah Only were very clear as to what they thought the purpose of Judaism really is – essentially, talmud Torah on the one hand versus some form of societal enlightenment and redemption on the other. I don’t think there’s any reason to not believe what they say!

In my opinion, understanding the first principles upon which these viewpoints are based is the only way to understand the practical choices to which they lead. In our lived experience, practical decisions are usually reached through the prioritisation of primary values over secondary ones; that is to say, they cannot be understood without understanding the values that lie behind them. I try to illustrate this in the book in Chapters 5 and 6.

6. Who would gain the most from reading this book?

I wrote this book with a few different target audiences in mind. The most obvious consists of those who are in the process of defining their identity and are interested in understanding the definition and authenticity of the Torah im Derech Eretz/ Torah Only perspectives. Sometimes this search is born of conflict, such as finding oneself within a community or institution that presents a vision of Judaism different to one’s own; often this is the case with Yeshiva or Seminary students. Other times it may be born of genuine dissatisfaction with one’s own trajectory and a feeling that perhaps one may be best suited to another path.

Another group of people who could benefit from the book is those who are grounded and rooted within a given community, yet seek inspiration or clarification as to the contours of their own position. Similarly, and perhaps more importantly, for those who are satisfied with their own choices but want to appreciate the choices of others, I’d hope that the book serves to demonstrate the validity and authenticity of multiple paths within Yiddishkeit.

Beyond those interested in the specific topic of Torah im Derech Eretz and Torah Only, there are various interesting and thought-provoking sugyos analysed (or touched upon) in the sefer, such as Hashgachah Pratis, Kabbalah, philosophy and more.

7. Can you share one idea from the book you find particularly surprising or counterintuitive?

Perhaps the most surprising and counterintuitive argument that I make in the sefer is that the Rambam was not an advocate of Torah im Derech Eretz. From many of the Rambam’s interesting positions, such as his respect for secular studies and his disdain of taking money for learning, many people tend to consider the Rambam a perfect example of Torah im Derech Eretz.

However, I argue that the dispute between Torah im Derech Eretz and Torah Only is more one of hashkafic perspective and framing, rather than one of practical choices. For example, everybody agrees that at least a basic level of hishtadlus for parnassah is required for most people; some will view that requirement positively, as one of many different ways of bringing G-d’s plan to fruition, whilst others will view it negatively, as an unfortunate distraction from what really matters. Ultimately, I argue that the machlokes boils down to whether the goals of the Torah are action-based or thought-based, and that the Rambam was definitely within the second camp. You’ll have to read the book to find out more!

8. If you write another book, what will the topic be?

I’ve already started writing another book on the topic of G-d — what we know about Him, what we think we know about Him, what we cannot know about Him. I want to explore these topics through the prisms of the various schools of thought in hashkafic literature, such as the philosophical, the Kabbalistic, etc. I find that much of what we are led to think about G-d is a little superficial, and that people would have a much more robust comprehension of Judaism if they spent more time understanding G-d.

Additionally, I believe that if we are ever going to succeed in bringing all of Klal Yisrael back to avodas Hashem (not to mention the rest of the world!), it will only be a result of demonstrating the light and truth of Judaism, not of coercion. One cannot do so without talking intelligently about G-d Himself.

9. Did you encounter any challenges while writing this book? How did you overcome them?

I sure did! Perhaps the greatest challenge for me was getting haskamos. I first realised it would be a tricky ordeal when one rav said to me in all seriousness, “Who cares what a 28-year-old thinks about a topic that’s already been decided by the Gedolei Yisrael?” Thankfully, I didn’t receive much other explicitly negative feedback, although I seemed to have touched a nerve with someone else who wrote me a four point email as to why the book was not worth publishing. That email specifically was very hard for me to process, but eventually I went back to the sefer and tried to assess it as objectively as I could in light of this rabbi’s criticisms. After much thought and discussion with others, I decided not to pay it too much attention.

Aside from those who did write me a haskamah, I sent the book to two of the biggest names amongst Chutznik Rabbanim. Both of them read the book and gave wonderful feedback, but wouldn’t write formal haskamos for fear of them being misconstrued. I consider these my unofficial haskamos!

10. What suggestions do you have for an aspiring writer?

Just start writing! Sometimes an idea goes nowhere, and that’s ok. You’ll learn from the process and start again. If you really want it, it’ll happen eventually.

Link to order:

If you prefer people reach out to you to buy directly, contact info/discount/any other information:

https://mosaicapress.com/product/between-torah-and-derech-eretz/?v=4605f628f91d

You can also buy the book from me directly in the UK or in Ramat Bet Shemesh. WhatsApp me at +972556855783

There are very few moments that I remember from more than ten years ago, certainly not with the exact date it took place.

But there’s one I do remember: January 23^rd, 2015. A freezing winter morning in Albany, New York. Friday morning, Parashas Bo.

I had driven up to Albany from Washington Heights the night before with a couple of friends, kosher restaurant food from the city (as much as I remember about this weekend, I don’t remember which one) taking up the trunk. We were on our way to run a Thursday night mishmar for the Albany chapter of Upstate New York/Har Sinai NCSY, followed by a Shabbaton at the local shul, CBAJ.

It was my first chapter Shabbaton (I had previously attended a Regional Shabbaton a couple of months before), so the advisor running the Shabbaton — Shaul, a friend from yeshiva who had started in the region a year prior — offered me the opportunity to give a d’var Torah at shaleshudis. Low stakes, at the end of the Shabbaton, something short and simple — it was a chance to contribute something while still getting a sense of what fit in an NCSY context.

The Commentary to the Torah

We had Friday morning to ourselves, so I had time to check out some of the seforim on the shelves at our host’s house. I was searching for the perfect nugget to share; for many reasons, I wanted this d’var Torah to go over well. In my initial survey of the shelves, I spied five volumes of deep maroon — the new edition of Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch’s commentary to the Torah. Another friend from yeshiva, Reuven, had tried over and over to get me to check out his commentary, but I had stubbornly resisted; I don’t know why. But now, looking for something to get me started, I slid the Shemos volume down and began flipping through.

I came to the beginning of Perek 12 — the Torah’s alternative starting point, the first mitzvah given to the nation: Ha’chodesh ha’zeh la’chem rosh chodashim. My skimming quickly turned into reading — and then rereading more deeply. I was so taken by the content that I felt compelled to interrupt Shaul, deep in his own learning next to me at the table, to share it with him. It felt revolutionary: Over the course of ten pages, Rav Hirsch surveyed the topic of kiddush ha’chodesh (the process of sanctifying the new moon based on witness testimony) incorporating elements of both the Written and Oral Torah. He showed how the conventional understanding of the halachah — that kiddush ha’chodesh is a way to mark the passage of time in a pre-calendar era — just doesn’t fit many of the details of the law, such as:

• If the entire nation, including the court, saw the new moon but did not have time to testify and have the court declare the new month, the new month does not begin until the following day.

• The court’s declaration of a new month is binding even if they did so by mistake — or even on purpose!

Clearly, the goal is not purely calendrical.

Instead, Rav Hirsch suggests that Rosh Chodesh, like the holidays set by their standard, serves as a moed, a call to come face to face with Hashem. Rather than demanding we appear at a certain date and time, Hashem gives us agency in setting the timing of this meeting — even if the moon appears at one time, we can shift it by a day if needed — highlighting that we are meant to be full participants in this meeting. Once a month, we are given the opportunity to notice the renewal of the moon and its return to reflect the sun’s light once again, and we are encouraged to do the same for ourselves: to bring ourselves back towards Hashem, the source of the Light we are meant to reflect into the world, and recommit to sharing it as best we can (of course, this paragraph scarcely does it justice). Over the course of a month, it is natural to unconsciously slide a bit in one’s commitment to Hashem and His Torah; Rosh Chodesh serves as a reminder to refresh (chodesh — chiddush) one’s dedication to both.

I was taken by all elements of this essay: the incorporation of both the Written and Oral Torah, the comprehensive exploration of the relevant halachos, and the inspiring and practical explanation Rav Hirsch offered. I proceeded to share it with anyone who would listen (which, I admit, was a curious way to first get to know the NCSYers on the Shabbaton).

The Nineteen Letters

My first move upon returning to YU after Shabbos was to run to the library to check out what I knew to be the introduction to Rav Hirsch’s thought, his Nineteen Letters. He literally wrote this short sefer as a summary of the much larger Horeb plus the essence of the never-written companion volume Moriah. Even though he wrote it as a twenty-eight-year-old in 1836, nearly two centuries before I picked it up for the first time as a twenty-one-year-old in 2015, I felt like it spoke straight to me.

So much stood out for me in the Nineteen Letters — and has stood out to the tens of students with whom I’ve learned the Nineteen Letters. To highlight two:

• The honesty of the questions on contemporary Judaism with which the sefer opens, many of which I had asked myself or could imagine friends asking.

• The “scaffolding” Rav Hirsch offers for understanding Judaism. My experience until that point had been many trees with little forest; I had learned a lot about specific topics or individual areas of Torah but did not have a good grasp of how the pieces fit together. The Nineteen Letters (especially when supplemented with the rest of Rav Hirsch’s canon but even on its own) provided a structure that filled in the outline of the forest. He explained in broad strokes how we got from Creation to the Jewish People, how we are meant to relate to non-Jews because of that context, and the goal and significance of learning Torah and doing mitzvos/following halachah. This “forest-level” understanding gave me a basis on which to build a deeper understanding of many more concepts.

If you’ve wondered why Judaism cares so much about the details of halachah;

if you’ve felt uncomfortable by the way parts of the Jewish community relate to non-Jews;

if you’re committed to learning Torah but don’t yet feel like you understand why it’s such a big deal;

if you believe that the Torah should enhance our lives and our communities, not live in a bubble separate from them;

if you’ve been bothered by what seems to be fitting the Torah to contemporary life rather than allowing the Torah to mold us and our communities (what Rav Hirsch describes as Torah im Derech Eretz) —

Check out what Rav Hirsch has to offer.

And check the calendar when you do. Maybe it’ll be as defining a date for you as it was for me.

As discussed, Kalba Savua approached Rabbi Akiva and asked him to annul his vow forbidding his daughter from getting benefit from his property due to her choice to marry a simple shepherd apparently against his wishes. Rabbi Akiva — the “simple shepherd” returning from twenty-four years in yeshiva — asked him, “If you had known that your son-in-law would become a gavra rabba, a great man, would you have taken the neder?” Kalba Savua responded, “Even [if he would know] just one perek, just one halachah!” Rabbi Akiva revealed, “I am he!” and everyone lived happily ever after.

We noted that many Rishonim question the mechanics of annuling the vow this way. Among the answers offered, we contrasted the Ran with Tosafos. Whereas the Ran explained that the annulment of the vow was based on Rabbi Akiva qualifying for Kalba Savua’s declaration — “Even just one perek or halachah!” — Tosafos relied on Rabbi Akiva’s question regarding a gavra rabba, stating: “It is the normal way for one going to yeshiva to become an adam gadol.”

More Content vs. Personal Transformation

I want to highlight this point: What is the difference between Rabbi Akiva’s suggestion and Kalba Savua’s response? Kalba Savua spoke about quantity of content: Even if my son-in-law returned from yeshiva knowing just a small amount of material, I would not have taken the neder.

Rabbi Akiva, on the other hand, makes no mention of quantity. He does not ask, “What if your son-in-law made a siyum on the yeshiva masechta over his time in yeshiva?” Instead, he asks about personal transformation: If you had known that your son-in-law would use his learning to become great, would you have taken the neder? As Tosafos argues, benefiting from learning in this way is not limited to the “best guy in the year”; it is the standard assumption that applies to anyone going to yeshiva.

I think that most students enter yeshiva with Kalba Savua’s model in mind. When I would ask guys at the beginning of the year about their goals, most had very concrete, text-focused goals:

• Finish Tanach

• Finish the yeshiva masechta

• Learn halachah

• Be able to make a leining

• Finally understand iyun

There were other elements, as well — develop relationships with the rebbeim, work on a love for learning, etc. — but most guys answered along the lines of Kalba Savua’s “perek echad/halachah achas.”

Becoming a Gavra Rabba

Looking back at the end of the year, though, the picture had often changed. While some reflected on these same types of metrics to consider the success of their year, many had absorbed, either consciously or subconsciously, that the impact of the year had been more than just blatt covered or sugyos explored. They began to reach for Rabbi Akiva’s model, that of the personal transformation — the gavra rabba.

Guys who had been on track to go to secular colleges often reconsidered — not only because of their desire to have a set structure for learning, but because they felt they were no longer the type of person who belonged in that environment.1

Especially for those who benefitted from exposure to what is described here as Toras Eretz Yisrael, they recognized that their values had shifted, especially regarding the significance of seeing oneself as part of Klal Yisrael. In many cases, that led to decisions to shift their career tracks into work that is more klal-oriented than they had originally been considering or to make aliyah and continue their lives in Israel.

Importance of Content Perspective

This is not at all to downplay the focus on quantity and content. In fact, if a talmid told me at the beginning of the year that his goal was to become a gavra rabba, I’d probably suggest he chose a more concrete, measurable goal. The point is to see how those concrete points coalesce to contribute to something broader, a synthesis where the whole is more than the accretion of distinct parts.

Rabbi Twersky speaks of a similar process in this shiur on Halachic Man:

How does this transformation take place? I don’t know. My personal understanding is that it comes from the Halachic Worldviews perspective, which teaches that learning Torah is meant to mold the way we look at all elements of the world and show us how they are meant to look in a Torah-based society. Included in that perspective shift is the element of committing one’s perspective on questions of morals and values to Divine instruction, a difficult and extended process but one that changes the essence of how one sees themselves — kablu Malchusi v’egzor aleihem gezeiros. Others with a different understanding of the significance of talmud Torah will likely have another explanation.

Either way, I think Rabbi Akiva’s perspective highlights a deeper, more challenging but more rewarding way of thinking about one’s time learning. The more such a perspective is reinforced and developed, the stronger the chances the changes brought on by the year will become permanent rather than dissipate after a few months in a non-yeshiva context.

תלמוד בבלי מסכת כתובות דף סב:-סג.

ר”ע רעיא דבן כלבא שבוע הוה, חזיתיה ברתיה דהוה צניע ומעלי, אמרה ליה: אי מקדשנא לך אזלת לבי רב? אמר לה: אין. איקדשא ליה בצינעה ושדרתיה. שמע אבוה אפקה מביתיה, אדרה הנאה מנכסיה. אזיל יתיב תרי סרי שנין בבי רב. כי אתא, אייתי בהדיה תרי סרי אלפי תלמידי. שמעיה לההוא סבא דקאמר לה: עד כמה קא מדברת אלמנות חיים? אמרה ליה: אי לדידי ציית, יתיב תרי סרי שני אחריני. אמר: ברשות קא עבידנא, הדר אזיל ויתיב תרי סרי שני אחריני בבי רב. כי אתא, אייתי בהדיה עשרין וארבעה אלפי תלמידי. שמעה דביתהו הות קא נפקא לאפיה, אמרו לה שיבבתא: שאילי מאני לבוש ואיכסאי, אמרה להו: יודע צדיק נפש בהמתו. כי מטיא לגביה, נפלה על אפה קא מנשקא ליה לכרעיה, הוו קא מדחפי לה שמעיה, אמר להו: שבקוה, שלי ושלכם שלה הוא. שמע אבוה דאתא גברא רבה למתא, אמר: איזיל לגביה, אפשר דמפר נדראי. אתא לגביה, א”ל: אדעתא דגברא רבה מי נדרת? א”ל: אפילו פרק אחד ואפי’ הלכה אחת. אמר ליה: אנא הוא, נפל על אפיה ונשקיה על כרעיה, ויהיב ליה פלגא ממוניה.

Rabbi Akiva was a simple shepherd working for Kalba Savua, one of the richest men in Yerushalayim. Kalba Savua’s daughter, Rachel, noticed Rabbi Akiva’s middos and offered to allow him to marry her, as long as he would agree to go learn in yeshiva following their marriage. Rabbi Akiva accepted her offer, but Kalba Savua was enraged; he did not want an am ha’aretz for a son-in-law when he could have the best bachur in the city due to his wealth! Rachel was unmoved, and they married anyway; in response, Kalba Savua took a neder forbidding them from benefiting from his wealth.

Rabbi Akiva left to yeshiva for twenty-four years with Rachel’s full encouragement and support. After so many years of learning, he returned to town with an entourage of twenty-four thousand students, movingly explaining to them that all of the Torah he had merited to learn and teach them was due to his wife’s sacrifice: “Sheli v’shelachem she’lah hu!”

Kalba Savua heard that a gadol was coming to town, not realizing that it was actually his rejected son-in-law. He decided to approach the gadol and request that he cancel the neder he had taken twenty-four years prior, finally allowing him to alleviate his daughter’s poverty. Rabbi Akiva, of course, recognized his father-in-law, but did not say anything; he first listened to Kalba Savua’s request for the neder to be cancelled.

In order for a chacham to cancel a neder, he needs to find a pesach — a legitimate source of regret that would have been enough to change the mind of the person taking the neder had they thought of it at the time. Rabbi Akiva asked Kalba Savua, “If you had known when taking the neder that your son-in-law would become a talmid chacham, would you have taken the neder?” Kalba Savua forcefully answered, “Even if he would know only a single perek or even a single halachah, I would not have taken the neder!” Upon hearing that, Rabbi Akiva revealed his identity, and the neder was canceled. Kalba Savua fell to the floor and kissed Rabbi Akiva’s feet and gave him half of his wealth.

Invalid!

A beautiful, moving story of dedication to Torah and familial reconciliation. But many Rishonim are perturbed by one detail of the story: The Gemara in Nedarim records a machlokes between Rabbi Eliezer and the chachamim regarding whether a neder can be canceled based on a development that happened only after the neder was taken (known as nolad). For example, if Reuven swears not to get any benefit from Shimon, and then Shimon becomes the town scribe or sage, the Chachamim teach that Reuven would not be able to get his neder annulled due to that later development. The pesach needs to be something that was already extant at the time the neder was taken.

In this case, Rabbi Akiva was still a simple shepherd when Kalba Savua took his neder. The fact that he later became a gadol ha’dor was a later development — and should therefore not be a valid pesach to the neder, based on the rule of nolad!

The Rishonim offer a number of answers to this problem, serving as a window to better understand the exception of nolad to hataras nedarim.

Rashba: Accepts the Question

According to the Rashba, this question is effectively insurmountable. There is no way to square the issue of nolad with Rabbi Akiva using his newfound status as a talmid chacham to cancel his father-in-law’s neder. Instead, the Rashba states that Rabbi Akiva must have come up with another way to cancel the neder: the effect of the neder on the dignity of Kalba Savua’s daughter.

חידושי הרשב”א מסכת כתובות דף סג עמוד א

א”ל ההוא חתנך אי צורבא מרבנן הוה אדעתא דהכי מי נדרת א”ל רבי אפילו פרק אחד וכו’. איכא למידק והא קיי”ל דאין פותחין בנולד כדתנן בנדרים פרק ר’ אליעזר ר’ אליעזר אומר פותחין בנולד וחכמים אוסרים כיצד אמר קונם שאיני נהנה מפלוני ונעשה סופר ואמר אלו הייתי יודע שיעשה סופר או שהיה משיא את בנו לא הייתי נודר והכא נמי בשעת הנדר לא היה ר’ עקיבא חכם, י”ל דר’ עקיבא לא בהכי שרא נדריה אלא שנתכוין לראות אילו היה יודע שחתנו תלמיד חכם אם היה מתחרט או שרצה להודיעו שהוא היה חתנו, וכשראה שנתחרט פתח לו ממקום אחר בכבוד בתו וכדתנן (נדרים ס”ו א’) פותחים לו לאדם בכבוד אשתו ובניו...

Ritva: Not Nolad

The Ritva offers a number of answers rejecting the application of nolad to this situation.

חידושי הריטב”א מסכת כתובות דף סג עמוד א

אילו הוה צורבא מדרבנן אדעתא דהכי מי נדרת. הקשו בתוספות והא נולד הוא ואין פותחין בנולד וכדתנן בנדרים (ס”ד א’) המודר הנאה מחבירו ונעשה סופר ואמר אילו הייתי יודע שנעשה סופר לא הייתי נודר צריך פתח ממקום אחר, ותירצו דהתם הוא שהיה עם הארץ בשעת הנדר אבל הכא כבר היה יודע רבי עקיבא פרק אחד כשקדש את בתו ולאו נולד הוא, ועוד יש לומר דשאני הכא כי היא לא נתקדשה לו אלא על דעת שיהא צורבא מרבנן ואילו הוה ידע אביה כן לא היה נודר והוה ליה כעין נדרי טעות אלא דכיון שנדר סתם צריך התרה ולא הוה נדר טעות ממש, ואפשר כי הוא בפירוש תלה נדרו כשהוא עם הארץ והוה ליה נדר טעות ממש כאומר קונם אשתי נהנית לי שגנבה את כיסי (נדרים כ”ה ב’), והיינו דלא אמרינן דשרא ליה משמע שהותר הנדר מאליו, כן נראה לי.

First, the Ritva suggests that Rabbi Akiva was not a total am ha’aretz at the time the neder was taken. He already knew “perek echad,” some minimal amount of Torah. Because Kalba Savua exclaimed that if he had known his son-in-law had known just “perek echad oh halachah achas,” which had in fact been the case at the time of the neder, this was not in fact a case of nolad. Rather than the circumstances causing Kalba Savua to want to cancel his neder developing after the fact, they had been true already at the moment of the neder. Therefore, this was a perfectly valid pesach to nullify the neder.

The Ritva offers another answer:1 Rachel only agreed to marry Rabbi Akiva with the understanding that he would go to yeshiva to learn. If Kalba Savua had known that that was built into the marriage, would he have taken the neder in the first place? His declaration that he would have been satisfied with even a minimal level of scholarship indicates that had he known Rabbi Akiva was heading off to yeshiva, he would not have taken the neder. Again, this neutralizes the problem of nolad, as that condition had been in place at the time of the neder; Kalba Savua simply hadn’t been aware of it, which is a classic formulation of a permissible pesach.

As a variation on this answer, the Ritva wonders if Kalba Savua explicitly mentioned that his motivation in taking the neder was the fact that Rabbi Akiva was an am ha’aretz. If so, that would explain a textual point that the Ritva realized: The Gemara never says that Rabbi Akiva nullified the vow! If Kalba Savua had specified while taking the neder that his reason for doing so was that Rabbi Akiva was an am ha’aretz, then if that was no longer true, the neder would have been canceled on its own, without even the need for it to be formally canceled by a chacham.

Ran: Common Outcome

The Ran, like the Rashba, accepts the fundamental relevance of nolad to the story. Rabbi Akiva’s development as a talmid chacham only began after Kalba Savua took his neder, so it should not have been in play as a factor to cancel the neder. To answer the question, the Ran calls in an exception to the rule of nolad: While it is true that a post-neder development cannot be used to cancel a neder, if the development is shechiach, common or expected, it is considered a valid pesach. The source for this exception is a humorous Gemara in Nedarim 23a:

תלמוד בבלי מסכת נדרים דף כג עמוד א

ר’ ישמעאל בר ר’ יוסי הוה ליה נדרא למישרא, אתא לקמייהו דרבנן, אמרו ליה: נדרת אדעתא דהכי? אמר להו: אין. נדרתא אדעתא דהכי? אמר להו: אין. כמה זימנין. כיון דחזא ההוא קצרא דמצטערי רבנן, מחייה באוכלא דקצרי, אמר: אדעתא דמחי לי קצרא לא נדרי, ושריה לנפשיה. א”ל רב אחא מדיפתי לרבינא: האי נולד הוא, דלא מסיק אדעתיה דמחי ליה קצרא, ותנינא: אין פותחין לו בנולד! א”ל: האי לאו נולד הוא, דשכיחי אפיקורי דמצערי רבנן.

Rabbi Yishmael bar Rabbi Yosi went to the sages to cancel a neder he had taken. They suggested a number of possible pesachim, but he rejected each one, saying he had already considered them at the time of the neder. A laundryman saw that the chachamim were becoming frustrated, so he smacked Rabbi Yishmael with his washbasin! Rabbi Yishmael noted, “I would never have taken the neder if I had known I would get smacked for it!” and had his neder canceled that way.2

Rav Acha asked Ravina how this was considered a legitimate pesach; it seems like a textbook case of nolad! Ravina answered: “This is not nolad, for it is shechiach [common] for apikorsim [heretics] to bother the rabbis.” Since the potential outcome was considered common enough, it defuses the problem of nolad.3

Therefore, in the case of Rabbi Akiva’s development as a talmid chacham, Kalba Savua expressed that if his son-in-law would know just a single perek or halachah, he wouldn’t have taken his neder. It is certainly shechiach that someone going to yeshiva will learn at least that much! Therefore, the pesach is saved from the disqualification of nolad.

הר”ן מסכת נדרים דף נ עמוד ב

ודאמרן הכא דשמע אבוה ואתשיל על נדרה - מפרש בכתובות בפ’ אף על פי (דף סג) דפתח ליה אילו הוית ידיע דההוא חתנך צורבא מרבנן מי אדרתיה אמר לו אפי’ פרק אחד אפילו הלכה אחת - איכא לאקשויי היכי פתח ליה בהא פתחא והא נולד הוא ותנן לקמן בפ’ פותחין /נדרים/ (דף סד) דאין פותחין בנולד כיצד אמר קונם שאני נהנה לאיש פלוני ונעשה סופר ואמר אילו הייתי יודע שיעשה סופר לא הייתי נודר יש לומר דשאני הכא דר”ע על דעת שיעשה סופר נשאה כדאיתא התם בפ’ אף על פי בהדיא וכיון שכן לאו נולד הוא דשכיח טובא שילמוד פרק אחד והלכה אחת.

An Inspiring Tosafos

Tosafos considers the same question as the other Rishonim: Why wasn’t Rabbi Akiva’s pesach disqualified due to nolad? He offers two answers, the first of which is similar to the above Ran. However, where the Ran adopted a minimalist approach, sufficing with the assumption that a talmid in yeshiva will certainly become familiar with at least a single perek or halachah, Tosafos argues that the standard is much higher:

תוספות מסכת כתובות דף סג עמוד א

אדעתא דגברא רבה מי נדרת - וא”ת והלא אסור לפתוח בנולד דאמרינן בנדרים בפ’ ר’ אליעזר (דף סד.) כיצד אמר קונם שאיני נהנה לפלוני ונעשה סופר כו’ וי”ל דהכא לא חשיב נולד כיון שהלך לבי רב דדרך הוא בהולך ללמוד שנעשה אדם גדול.

Assuming Tosafos’s formulation of derech hu parallels the Gemara’s formulation of shechiach, they are offering an astounding answer: Rabbi Akiva’s pesach of “If you had known your son-in-law would become a gavra rabba, would you have taken the neder?” was not nolad, for it is considered par for the course that a student who goes to yeshiva becomes an adam gadol, a gavra rabba.

Tosafos’s point of diversion from the Ran would seem to be the distance between Rabbi Akiva’s suggested pesach and Kalba Savua’s response: To justify hataras nedarim, does the one who took the neder need to affirm the suggested pesach of the chacham (Tosafos), or is it enough to express his regret for the neder, even if not exactly aligned with the hatarah suggested by the chacham (Ran)? This question highlights another conceptual question: How does pesach work? Is it meant to stimulate charatah, regret for the neder, or is it simply the path the Torah has given to the chachamim to nullify nedarim?

Conclusion

Rabbi Akiva’s pesach to nullify his father-in-law’s neder generated a rich discussion regarding regret for a neder caused by unexpected later developments. While the Rashba accepted that the nolad issue was so strong, the heter must have come from a different argument, most Rishonim found ways of dealing with the nolad issue directly. The Ritva suggested a number of okimtos that would allow the pesach to have been extant at the time of the neder. The Ran leaned on the exception to the disqualification of nolad known as shechiach, arguing that Rabbi Akiva’s intention to go to yeshiva made the outcome of him knowing at least a minimal amount likely enough to be shechiach. Tosafos offered a similar approach, but with the maximalist assumption that anyone going to yeshiva would likely become an adam gadol.

Rabbi Shlomo Wolbe suggests that learning Torah is an extended exercise in confronting and overcoming the challenges and setbacks that block the path of one striving for growth in dedication to Divine ideals.4 We should be zocheh to qualify for Tosafos’s assumption!

שולחן ערוך יורה דעה הלכות נדרים סימן רכח סעיף לו

מי שנדר לעלות לארץ ישראל, יש לו התרה כשאר נדרים.

One who took a vow to make aliyah to Eretz Yisrael may cancel it like all other vows.

The source comes from a similarly abbreviated responsum of the Rosh. He was asked regarding one who took a neder to make aliyah is allowed to cancel the neder if needed; the Rosh answered that he could, but did not explain further.

This ruling needs to be unpacked. The issues that arise include:

• Is there a difference between a neder and a shevua in this case?

• Is making aliyah considered a vow to perform a mitzvah?

• What are the ramifications if it is?

• May a vow to perform a mitzvah be canceled?

To begin, consider: Is there something unexpected about the fact that this neder can be annulled?

Mixing Neder and Shevua

The Shu”t Mayim Amukim notes that one could argue that the neder was never chal in the first place. The Gemara explains that what constitutes a neder, as opposed to a shevua, is the formulation of making a concrete object/item forbidden to oneself (“This loaf of bread is forbidden to me as if it was a korban”). A shevua, on the other hand, is formulated as relating to the person making the shevua (“I will not eat this loaf of bread”).

In this case, declaring as a neder that one will make aliyah would seem to confuse these two categories, forcing the question of the status of a neder taken as a shevua and vice versa. The Ran raises this question and presents a number of possibilities:

הר”ן מסכת נדרים דף ב עמוד ב

איידי דתנא נדרים דמיתסר חפצא עליה - כלומר שאוסר הככר עליו ואומר אכילת ככר זה עלי לאפוקי שבועה דאסר נפשיה מן חפצא, כלומר שאומר שבועה שלא אוכל ככר זה,

ומהא משמע דאין שבועה בלשון נדר ולא נדר בלשון שבועה הילכך כל שהחליף של זה בזה אין בדבריו כלום, ואיכא למידק דהתניא בפרקין /נדרים/ (דף יב) איזהו איסר האמור בתורה הרי עלי שלא אוכל בשר אלמא יש נדר בלשון שבועה דהא שלא אוכל קאמר, ובפ’ שבועות שתים בתרא נמי משמע דיש שבועה בלשון נדר דאמרינן התם /שבועות/ (דף כב) באומר אכילה משתיהן עלי שבועה והא האי לישנא דנדר הוא וקאמר ליה גבי שבועה אלמא מהני, י”ל דהני לישני לאו בדוקא נקיט להו דההוא דאיזהו איסר האמור בתורה לא אתא אלא לאשמועינן דרך איסר ע”י התפסה ומש”ה לא דק בלישניה ולעולם במוציאו בלשון נדר קאמר, וההיא נמי דאמרינן אכילה משתיהן עלי שבועה לאו דוקא דאמר בהאי לישנא אלא דאמר שבועה שלא אוכל שתיהן אלא דהתם איידי דאמר לעיל מינה באומר אכילה משתיהן עלי קונם דהוא לישנא דוקא דנדר אמר נמי אכילה משתיהן עלי שבועה ולאו דוקא וכן דעת ר”ח ז”ל והרב בן מג”ש ז”ל ולזה הסכים הרשב”א ז”ל,

ובירושלמי אפליג בהאי דינא דאמרינן התם דר’ יודן ורבי ורבי מונא סברי אין נדר בלשון שבועה ואין שבועה בלשון נדר ורבי יוסי פליג עלייהו ומשמע דקיימא לן כרבים,

אבל הרמב”ן ז”ל כתב בהלכות נדרים שלו דליכא לשבושי הנך סוגיא ולמימר דלא דייקי בלישנייהו אלא ודאי נדר שאמרו בלשון שבועה ושבועה בלשון נדר מהני מיהו לאו מעיקר נדר ועיקר שבועה דהא אמרינן בסוגיין דנדר ושבועה לא שוין בלישנייהו אלא מדין ידות הוא דמהני דנדר שאמרו בלשון שבועה כיון דפיו ולבו שוין לאסור שבועה על עצמו אף על פי שלא אמרו בלשון מדוקדק יד מיהא הוי וכן בשבועה שאמר שבועה ככר זה עלי כיון שפיו ולבו שוין לאסור אכילתו מככר זה בשבועה מהני מדין יד אלא דבסוגיין דהכא בעיקר לשון נדר ובעיקר לשון שבועה איירינן.

The Ran initially argues that a neder used with a shevua formulation or vice versa would have no effect, identifying Rabbeinu Chananel and the Ri MiGash as agreeing with that approach. He then shows that the Yerushalmi presents a machlokes Tannaim on that question, with the majority espousing the opinion he had previously endorsed. Finally, he cites the Ramban’s opinion that such an oath would take effect, but only due to the din of yados (extending the language used for a neder/shevua to “fill in the blanks”).

Based on this, the Shu”t Mayim Amukim states that according to the Ran, because the oath to make aliyah (an action) was formulated as a neder (which must be formulated to forbid an object), the neder never took hold in the first place.

However, he notes that the Rosh disagrees, stating that an oath to perform a mitzvah, even if it is technically formulated incorrectly, must be kept. This is derived from a derashah teaching that a mere verbal commitment to give something to tzedakah is considered an oath, even without actually formulating the commitment as a neder or shevua.

שו”ת מים עמוקים חלק ב סימן מד

ראובן אמר הריני נודר לעלות לא”י בספינה ההולכת ראשונה לא”י בחדש אלול ובין כך ובין כך הרתה אשתו ומתוך כך מתחרט על נדרו כי רוצ’ להיות עמה בזמן הלידה ולהטפל במילת הילד אם בן הוא גם אשתו מעכב’ עליו מלילך מה יהיה משפט הנדר הזה.

תשובה לכאור’ נר’ דאיפש’ לומר שאין בנדר זה ממש כיון דלא אסר עליו ישיב’ שאר המקומות בקונם או באי זה לשון שהיה הנדר חל עליו. אבל אעשה ולא אעש’ לאו נדר הוא כלל ולא מתסר אא”כ אסר עליו בשבועה כגון שאמר שבוע’ שאעש’ כך או לא אעשה וכן היא סברת הר”ן בההיא דהאומ’ אשכי’ ואשנה פר’ זה נדר גדול נדר לאלהי ישראל דמיירי כגון שאמר אשכים ואשנה פ’ זה בשבוע’ כ”ש =כמו שכתב= בחדושי נדרי’ פ”ק. אבל הרא”ש ז”ל פי’ ההיא דרב גדל בלא שבוע’ ומחייב מדין נדר מפני שהו’ לדבר מצוה וכדאמרי’ בפיך זו צדק’. ולפי זה ודאי צריך התר...

This designation of the neder as a commitment to do a mitzvah raises another question: May one annul a vow to perform a mitzvah? This question itself is based on two assumptions, neither of which may be taken for granted: First, what is the status of an oath made to perform a mitzvah? Second, is an oath to make aliyah considered an oath to perform a mitzvah?

Oath to Perform a Mitzvah

There seems to be a contradiction between two Gemaros regarding the status of an oath to fulfill a mitzvah. On the one hand, the Gemara in Shevuos seems to state explicitly that such an oath has no effect:

תלמוד בבלי מסכת שבועות דף כז עמוד א

מתני’. נשבע לבטל את המצוה ולא ביטל - פטור, לקיים ולא קיים - פטור, שהיה בדין שיהא חייב כדברי ר’ יהודה בן בתירא. א”ר יהודה בן בתירא: מה אם הרשות שאינו מושבע עליו מהר סיני - הרי הוא חייב עליו, מצוה שהוא מושבע עליה מהר סיני - אינו דין שיהא חייב עליה! אמרו לו: לא, אם אמרת בשבועת הרשות - שכן עשה בה לאו כהן, תאמר בשבועת מצוה - שלא עשה בה לאו כהן, שאם נשבע לבטל ולא ביטל - פטור.

גמ’. ת”ר: יכול נשבע לבטל את המצוה ולא ביטל יהא חייב? ת”ל: להרע או להיטיב, מה הטבה רשות, אף הרעה רשות. אוציא נשבע לבטל את המצוה ולא ביטל שהוא פטור; יכול נשבע לקיים את המצוה ולא קיים שיהא חייב? ת”ל: להרע או להיטיב, מה הרעה רשות, אף הטבה רשות. אוציא נשבע לקיים את המצוה ולא קיים שהוא פטור; יכול נשבע להרע לעצמו ולא הרע, יכול יהא פטור? ת”ל: להרע או להיטיב, מה הטבה רשות, אף הרעה רשות. אביא נשבע להרע לעצמו ולא הרע שהרשות בידו; יכול נשבע להרע לאחרים ולא הרע שיהא חייב? ת”ל: להרע או להיטיב, מה הטבה רשות, אף הרעה רשות. אוציא נשבע להרע לאחרים ולא הרע שאין הרשות בידו...

On the other hand, the Gemara in Nedarim seems to say that an oath to perform a mitzvah is binding:

תלמוד בבלי מסכת נדרים דף ז:-ח.

ואמר רב גידל א”ר: מנין שנשבעין לקיים את המצוה? שנאמר: נשבעתי ואקיימה לשמור משפטי צדקך. והלא מושבע ועומד מהר סיני הוא! אלא הא קמ”ל, דשרי ליה לאיניש לזרוזי נפשיה.

ואמר רב גידל אמר רב: האומר אשכים ואשנה פרק זה, אשנה מסכתא זו - נדר גדול נדר לאלהי ישראל. והלא מושבע ועומד הוא, ואין שבועה חלה על שבועה! מאי קמ”ל? דאפי’ זרוזי בעלמא, היינו דרב גידל קמייתא! הא קמ”ל, כיון דאי בעי פטר נפשיה בקרית שמע שחרית וערבית, משום הכי חייל שבועה עליה.

א”ר גידל א”ר: האומר לחבירו נשכים ונשנה פרק זה - עליו להשכים, שנאמר: ויאמר אלי (בן אדם) קום צא אל הבקעה ושם אדבר אותך... ואצא אל הבקעה והנה שם כבוד ה’ עומד.

The Rishonim suggest different ways to resolve this contradiction.

The Ran argues that the two Gemaros are talking about different elements of an oath. The Gemara in Shevuos is teaching that one who makes an oath to perform a mitzvah would not have to bring a korban if he ended up not fulfilling that oath. In principle, though, the oath still takes effect. Therefore, the Gemara in Nedarim is teaching that not only does the oath to perform a mitzvah take effect, it is even seen positively by halachah, as opposed to nidrei reshus (oaths regarding non-mitzvah obligations), which are generally frowned upon.

הר”ן מסכת נדרים דף ח עמוד א

והלא מושבע ועומד מהר סיני הוא אלא הא קמ”ל וכו’ - מסתברא לי דהכי פירושא דמעיקרא קס”ד דרב גידל אתא לאשמועינן ששבועה חלה על דבר מצוה כדבר הרשות ומוכח לה מדכתיב נשבעתי ואקיימה ומש”ה פריך והלא מושבע ועומד הוא דהא מוכיחין בפרק שבועות שתים בתרא (שבועות כז) דהא דכתיב להרע או להיטיב בדבר הרשות כתיב קרא ולא בדבר מצוה וכי תימא ה”מ לקרבן דלהרע או להיטיב גבי קרבן כתיבא אבל בל יחל איכא אפילו בדבר מצוה אם כן מאי נשבעתי ואקיימה הכי הוה ליה למימר דנהי דאמעיטא מצוה מקרבן לא אמעיטא מבל יחל כדחזינן התם בפרק שבועות שתים בתרא (שם כה) דמילתא דליתא בלאו והן אי נמי בלהבא דאמעיטא מקרבן מלהרע או להיטיב ולא אמעיטא ממלקות ולהא לא צריך קרא א”כ מאי קאמר שנאמר נשבעתי ואקיימה ומתרצינן אלא הא קמ”ל דשרי ליה לזרוזי נפשיה כלומר ודאי לא איצטריך האי קרא לומר שהיא חלה לגבי בל יחל אלא ה”ק מנין שדבר הגון הוא להשבע לקיים את המצוה ואפי’ כשרים שנמנעין משבועה נשבעין הן בכך שנאמר נשבעתי ואקיימה כלומר שהרי דוד היה עושה כן.

Similarly, the Rosh writes that the takeaway from the Gemara in Nedarim is that one does not need to be concerned they will unexpectedly find themselves prevented from performing a mitzvah. This implies that an oath to perform a mitzvah is binding, and the extra motivation generated by the oath outweighs the concern that one may violate the oath due to unforeseen circumstances.

On the other hand, the commentary attributed to Rashi implies that an oath to perform a mitzvah would not take hold at all. His comment is regarding the second statement in Nedarim, where Rav Gidel teaches that one who swears to learn a specific perek or masechta is obligated to fulfill that oath. The Gemara challenges his statement, noting that because a person is obligated to learn Torah, his oath should not take hold, just as it asked regarding the previous statement. The Gemara answered that one can fulfill their obligation to learn Torah every day by reciting k’rias Shema in the morning and night, removing the obligation from Sinai to learn. Therefore, an oath to learn something beyond that basic requirement is considered binding. Rashi’s comment indicates that if there was no other way to take care of the requirement to learn Torah, the oath to learn a specific perek or masechta would not take hold, as the requirement to learn from Sinai would render it superfluous.

רש”י מסכת נדרים דף ח עמוד א

כיון דאי בעי פטר נפשיה בקרית שמע שחרית וערבית - דכיון דקרא ק”ש קיים לא ימוש דא”ר שמעון בן יוחי במסכת מנחות (דף צט ב) כל הקורא קרית שמע שחרית וערבית הרי זה קיים מצות לא ימוש וכיון דאי בעי פטר נפשיה מושננתם בקרית שמע דיוצא בה ידי חובתו מאותה שבועה דהר סיני משום הכי כי אמר אשנה פרק זה (אף על גב) דלא הוי מושבע בהכי דכבר פטר נפשיה ואהכי חל עליה שבועה.

The Ramban adopts this position as well in his commentary to the Torah, at least regarding shevuos:

רמב”ן במדבר פרק ל פסוק ג

אבל השבועות אינן כלל אלא לאסור את המותר, אינן נוהגות בדבר מצוה כלל, לא בבטול מצות לא תעשה ולא בקיומו, ולא בביטול מצות עשה כגון שבועה שלא אעשה סוכה ושלא אניח תפילין. ואפילו בקיום מצות עשה אינן חלות, שאלו נשבע לקיים את המצוה ולא קיים אינו מתחייב בה משום שבועה ולא מלקות ולא קרבן, אלא דשרי ליה לזרוזי נפשיה (שם ח א) דכתיב (תהלים קיט קו) נשבעתי ואקימה לשמור משפטי צדקך. ומפני כן בשבועות בלבד הוא נדרש לאסור אסר על נפשו. והלכות גדולות הן, הבקי ימצאם במקומותם:

The same position is implied by Tosafos’s explanation of Rav Gidel, indicating that an oath to fulfill a mitzvah is not considered binding (as indicated by the Gemara in Shevuos). Rather, Rav Gidel’s point is that one who swears to fulfill a mitzvah is not considered to have used Hashem’s name in vain, as there is the positive benefit of the ziruzei nafshei, motivating himself to perform the mitzvah.

תוספות מסכת נדרים דף ח עמוד א

מושבע ועומד מהר סיני הוא - קא ס”ד נשבעין לקיים מצוה דקאמר היינו לחייב משום שבועת ביטוי אם לא [יקיים] ותימה אדפריך לרב גידל תקשי ליה קרא דנשבעתי ואקיימה ופי’ בתוס’ דאה”נ וי”ל דקרא איכא לקיומי במצוה דאפשר ליפטר ממנה כמו באשנה פרק זה אבל לרב גידל ע”כ מיירי במצות שמחויב לעשות דאל”כ מאי קמ”ל וגם היינו דרב גידל בתרייתא לכך פריך אדרב גידל ומשני קמ”ל דשרי לזרוזי נפשי’ פירוש ולא מיתסר משום דמוציא שם שמים לבטלה אבל לא מיירי לענין שבועת ביטוי כך פי’ בתוס’.

Returning to the Shulchan Aruch’s case of an oath to make aliyah, the Shulchan Aruch seems to be assuming that an oath to perform a mitzvah is binding. If it wasn’t, there would be no need to get it formally released. This assumption is bolstered by the Shulchan Aruch’s source, the responsum authored by the Rosh, who we identified above as holding that an oath to perform a mitzvah is binding.

שו”ת הרא”ש כלל יב סימן ז

ששאלת בענין מי שנדר ללכת לא”י. דע שיש לאותו נדר התרה כמו לשאר נדרי’, ואם נדר ונתחרט ילך לפני שלשה יודעים בטיב נדרים ויתירו לו. ומה שאמר בשעת נדרו שלא יוכל שום חכם להתיר זה הנדר גם זה נדר הוא והוי כמו נדר בתוך נדר. וצריך נדר זה שתי התרות תחלה יתירו לו אותו נדר שנדר שלא יתיר חכם אותו נדר ואחר כך יתירו הנדר.

However, in order for this to be meaningful, we must address the second assumption, that an oath to make aliyah is considered an oath to perform a mitzvah. The Rosh does not address this point explicitly in his responsum, leaving it to others to debate his intention.

Oath to Make Aliyah

Now that the first question, regrading the status of an oath to perform a mitzvah, has been clarified, the second question can be considered: Is an oath to make aliyah considered an oath to perform a mitzvah? Again, the Rishonim and poskim provide different responses to this question.

The Maharit, son of the Mabit, offers two possible explanations for the Rosh, rejecting the first and advocating for the second. He writes that one could explain the Rosh as being based on the opinion attributed to Rabbi Chaim Kohen in Tosafos stating that the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisrael does not apply nowadays, when it is challenging to fulfill the mitzvos ha’teluyos ba’aretz. If there is no mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisrael, then the Rosh’s ruling would be simple to understand: The oath to make aliyah would be considered a binding oath on a non-mitzvah activity, but it can be nullified through hataras nedarim, just like any other oath.

However, the Maharit rejects this opinion out of hand, noting that the Rosh does not record this opinion in his writings. Additionally, another version of Rabbi Chaim Kohen’s opinion, this one found in the Mordechai, explains the opinion as due to the danger of travel in his time. According to this version, the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisrael of course applies, but the concern of pikuach nefesh overrides it.

Therefore, the Maharit offers an alternative understanding of the Rosh: There is a difference between aliyah, coming to visit Eretz Yisrael, and dirah, actually living in Eretz Yisrael. The mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisrael applies to living; an oath to merely la’alos, to come to Eretz Yisrael without specifying that one plans to stay there, is considered an oath on a devar reshus, a voluntary activity, as opposed to a devar mitzvah.

שו”ת מהרי”ט חלק ב - יורה דעה סימן כח

שאול שאל האיש הלזה זה שמו אשר יקראו לו הר’ יצחק יצ”ו כי זה שנתים בטא בשפתים ונדר אם תלד אשתו זכר ללכת לארץ ישראל וילדה אשתו זכר ובשנה שעברה לא אסתייעא ליה מלתא ועתה עזב את ביתו ואת ילדיו בעירו אנדרינופלה ובא מדאגה מדבר מעון נדרו ולרש אין כל מאומ’ בידו ובא לשאול את פינו אם יוכל לישאל על נדרו כי אין ידו משגת די הפזור ויצטרך לדפוק על פתחי שערים נדיבי עמים וגם כי רעדה אחזתהו מגאון הים ומשאון גליו אשר ע”כ בקשה נפשו לשון חכמים מרפא.

איברא אעפ”י שאמרו נדרי הקדש אין נשאלין עליהם אלא מדוחק הרי כתב הרא”ש בתשובה סוף כלל י”ב וז”ל ששאלת בענין שנדר ללכת לא”י דע שיש לאותו נדר התרה כמו לשאר נדרים ואם נדר ונתחרט ילך לפני ג’ יודעים בטיב נדרים ויתירו לו ומורי הרב מהר”ר שלמה סאגיש ז”ל היה אומר שטעמו של הרא”ש משום דאזיל לשיטת הר’ חיים שהובא בתשובה בשלהי כתובות דעכשיו אין מצוה לדור בא”י כי יש כמה מצות התלויות בארץ וכמה עונשי’ שאין אנו יכולים ליזהר בהם ולפי’ אמר שיש לנדר הזה התרה כשאר נדרים ולא יתכן דעלה סמך הרא”ש ונ”ל שאינה מיסוד התוס’ שהרי הרא”ש ז”ל לא הביאה בתוספותיו וגם לא בהלכות… והאיר את עיני שמצאתי בהגהות מרדכי כלשון הזה כת’ רבינו חיים כהן בתשובה דה”מ בימיהם שהיה שלום אבל עכשיו שהדרכים משובשים אינו יכול לכופה דהו”ל כמו חפץ להוליכה למקום גדודי חיה ולסטים ואפי’ אם יעמיד לה ערבים מגוף לממון ערביך ערבא צריך ע”כ הרי שתשובת הר’ חיים כהן ז”ל לא באה אלא מטעם סכנת הדרכי’ ומ”ש בתו’ דאין מצוה לדור בא”י הגהת תלמיד היא ולאו דסמכא היא כלל.

ומשמע לי שטעמו של הרא”ש בתשובה זו שהשוה נדר זה כשאר נדרי הרשות היינו משום דנדר זה שנדר לעלות אין בו מצוה שאין עיקר המצוה בעליה אלא בישיבה והדיר’ שמה כמו שהביא הרמב”ן ז”ל אבל מי שעולה לראותה ע”ד לחזור לא מצינו בזה מצוה מפורסמת...

According to these two approaches, an oath to make aliyah, assuming that means just traveling to Eretz Yisrael without necessarily staying to live there, would not be considered an oath to fulfill a mitzvah. Even if the intention is to stay, the trip itself could be termed a hechsher mitzvah as opposed to a full-fledged mitzvah, similar to the relationship between building a sukkah and sitting in it.1

However, it appears from a different context that even simply visiting Eretz Yisrael may be considered a mitzvah. The Shulchan Aruch rules that a person may not leave on an extended trip within three days of Shabbos. However, if the purpose of the trip is a mitzvah, then doing so would be allowed “even on Erev Shabbos.” The Mechaber explicitly identifies traveling to Eretz Yisrael as a mitzvah in this context, but does not relate to whether the person’s intention is to stay or simply visit. The Magen Avraham notes that the K’nesses Hagedolah raises the possibility that even simply coming to visit is considered a devar mitzvah in this context, based on a comment of the Shiltei Giborim that walking four amos in Eretz Yisrael is considered a mitzvah.2 (In Kesubos 111a, the Gemara says that one who walks four amos is considered a ben Olam Haba; other sources write that one who walks four amos in Eretz Yisrael is granted forgiveness for all their sins).

כנסת הגדולה הגהות בית יוסף אורח חיים סימן רמח

טז. שטה ל”ח: וכתב עוד, שהעולה לארץ ישראל, אם נזדמנה לו שיירא בע”ש, כיון דדבר מצוה הוי וכו’. נ”ב: וכן כתב הריב”ש ז”ל בסימן ק”א, והביאה רבינו המחבר ז”ל בסמוך. וכתב שם, דהעלייה על דעת להתיישב מצוה מיקרי. וכמדומה לי שראיתי בספר שלטי הגבורים, וכעת איני זוכר מקומו, דמהלך ארבע אמות בארץ ישראל מצוה קא עביד. ולפי דבריו, אפילו לעלות על מנת לחזור מצוה מיקרי. אבל הרדב”ז ח”א סימן צ”ד [ח”ד סימן עז] כתב על זה שכתבו הריב”ש והרשב”ץ ז”ל שהעלייה לארץ ישראל מצוה מיקרי, וזו קולא גדולא לא שמענוה, ואדרבא יש הסכמה בעזה שלא יצאו משם יום רביעי, דקרוב הדבר שיבוא לידי חילול שבת.

Canceling an Oath to Perform a Mitzvah

This raises a final question: May one cancel an oath to perform a mitzvah? In other words, assuming that an oath to perform a mitzvah is binding, as above, is a person allowed to request hataras nedarim in such a case, the way one can — in fact, should — regarding non-mitzvah oaths?

This question is subject to a machlokes.

The Rashbash (Rabbi Shlomo ben Rabbi Shimon Duran, son of the Tashbetz and descendant of the Ralbag, Ramban, and Rabbeinu Yonah) addresses the question in the second responsum of his teshuvos (the first three relate to inyanei Eretz Yisrael).3 He writes that there is no way to cancel an oath made to fulfill a mitzvah. In order to do so, one would need to identify a pesach (an “opening”) or express charatah (regret). He understands a pesach to work by showing that keeping the oath would cause some sort of sin or disturb the peace between individuals. In a case where the pesach would serve to facilitate a sin — the lack of fulfilling a mitzvah — a pesach is not operable.

He proposes a similar logic regarding charatah. To cancel an oath through charatah, a person needs to express their regret at having taken the oath in the first place; how can a person make such a statement regarding a mitzvah?

שו”ת הרשב”ש סימן ב

ויש טעם אחר כולל הנודר והנשבע, לפי שהנדר והשבועה אינן ניתרים אלא בפתח וחרטה כדאיתא במסכת נדרים בפרק ארבעה ופ”ר אליעזר ובדוכתי אחריני, וכן כתב הר”מ ז”ל פ”ו מהלכות שבועות. והפתח אינו אלא כשהנודר רוצה לקיים נדרו וב”ד רואים שבקיום נדרו יש עבירה או קטטה ובהיתרו יש מצוה, וכן תמצא כל הפתחים הנמצאים במשנה ובגמרא. וכ”כ הר”מ ז”ל בפרק הנזכר וז”ל, מי שנשבע ולא ניחם על שבועתו ובא לב”ד לקיים שבועתו אם ראו ב”ד שהיתר שבועה זו גורם למצוה ולשלום בין איש לאשתו בין אדם לחבירו ושקיום שבועה זו גורם לעבירה ולקטטה פותחים לו פתח וכו’, ובנדון הזה בהיתרו יש עבירה ובקיומו יש מצוה א”כ אין לו פתח. ובפ”ד מהלכות נדרים כתב שדין הנדרים כדין השבועות בהיתרן.

ועל ידי חרטה גם כן אין לה היתר, שאיך יתחרט שלא יעשה מצוה, ובזה צריך חרטה דמעיקרא ואין יכול לומר שנתחרט מלעשות מצוה, וכ”כ הרא”ה ז”ל בפרק אלו עוברים שהנודר לעשות מצוה אין לו היתר...

The Aruch Hashulchan records a different approach to the question of canceling an oath to perform a mitzvah. He initially suggests that the entire institution of hataras nedarim should be limited to oaths regarding divrei reshus and should have no relevance to nidrei mitzvah. Just as one may not request hataras nedarim for an oath meant to prevent sin, like an oath not to gamble, one should not be able to request hatarah for an oath to perform a mitzvah. However, the Aruch Hashulchan concludes based on the Shulchan Aruch 228:42 that one may request cancellation for an oath to perform a mitzvah. He explains that even if a certain action constitutes a mitzvah, if there is no specific obligation for him to perform it (the distinction between a mitzvah chiyuvis and kiyumis), he may cancel the oath.

ערוך השולחן יורה דעה סימן רכח סעיף קכח

כתב רבינו הב”י בסעי’ ל”ו מי שנדר לעלות לארץ ישראל יש לו התרה כשארי נדרים עכ”ל ובסעי’ מ”ב כתב נדר להתענות או לצדקה יש לו התרה ע”י פתח וחרטה והוא שלא באה צדקה ליד גבאי ואם נתן מקצת יכול הוא להשאיל על השאר עכ”ל ביאור הדברים דלכאורא הייתי אומר דהיתר התרת נדרים אינו אלא בנדרי רשות דהא פרשה דהתרת נדרים מיירא בנדרי רשות אבל אם נדר לעשות מצוה אינו מועיל התרת נדר כמו שאינו מועיל בנדר מניעת עבירה כמו שלא לשחוק בקוביא וכיוצא בזה כמו שנתבאר בסעי’ מ”ג שמפני טעם זה צריך לפרט את הנדר לפני החכם כדי שלא יתיר לו נדר שיש בו חשש איסור בהתרתו ולזה קמ”ל דאפילו בנדרי מצוה כמו להתענות וליתן צדקה ואפילו לעלות לא”י דמצוה רבה היא מ”מ יש לזה התרה ואפילו נדר להביא קרבן דאמירתו לגבוה כמסירתו להדיוט יכול להתיר נדרו [הרא”ש בתשו’ כלל י”ב סעי’ ב’] וטעמו של דבר דכיון דמצוה זו לא הטילה התורה עליו שאינה חיובית אלא שברצונו קיבל עליו שוב מועיל לה התרה כמו נדרי רשות ואי משום שיש מצוה בקיומה אך הא גם נדרי רשות יש מצוה בקיומה אחרי הנדר ועכ”ז מועיל התרה וא”כ לנדרי מצוה מועיל ג”כ אם המצוה אינה חיובית עליו מדאורייתא או מדרבנן ואפילו קיים חצי המצוה יש על מחצה שנייה התרה אך בכה”ג לא יתיר בחרטה רק בפתח כמובן:

There is also a third in-between possibility, referenced by the Rashbash above, that nedarim to fulfill a mitzvah may be canceled, but only mi’dochak, in situations of great need. The Rashbash references this in regards to nidrei hekdesh, but from context he seems to apply that in theory to all mitzvos.

Conclusion

One line in the Shulchan Aruch stimulated a wide-ranging discussion touching on many elements of Hilchos Shevuos U’nedarim:

• Granted the difference between a neder and a shevua, what is the status of one formulated as a neder — in our case, a neder to perform the action of going to Eretz Yisrael?

• What is the status of an oath to perform a mitzvah?

• Is an oath to travel to Eretz Yisrael considered an oath to perform a mitzvah?

• Assuming an oath to perform a mitzvah is binding, may it be canceled?

“Already breaking out the drone? We haven’t even started yet!”

“I heard there are more than a hundred fifty new people this year, I just want to get a feel for the size of the crowd.”

“I’m not protesting, I know better than to try to get between you and your drones. I’m still amazed they gave you the permit to bring it here in the first place. I guess that’s what happens when you’re responsible for basically inventing one of the most important parts of our job.”

Yosef straightened up, winked at Eli Moshe, and sent the drone up above the crowd. Watching the screen, he sent the lithe machine zooming forward and back. Words sped down the side of the screen, matching faces to directories and providing names and information about each person gathered with them waiting to march.

After a few moments, he directed the drone all the way up for a bird’s-eye view of the entire group — a gathering thousands strong. Everyone had already arrived, but they were waiting for the five-minute warning they knew they would get before it was time to actually head out. He marveled at the sheer mass of the group and what they represented, what they all must have achieved to be present at this event. According to the readout from his drone, they were 25,648 people this year. Also too many to imagine.

Satisfied with his survey, Yosef brought the drone back down for a careful landing. While he was packing the drone into its case, he asked Eli Moshe, “How was it building the dais this year?”

Eli Moshe waved his hand. “Nothing too difficult, especially with the material they give me to work with here. Anything I need, they get it for me right away. We had it up in half a day or so, I was able to get back before the end of afternoon seder.”

“Wow — I don’t get how you build these things so quickly. Really impressive.” Eli Moshe blushed and waved him off. “Stages, shtenders, they’re not so different. Just trying to help.”

Yosef looked around, noticing the other participants in his vicinity. He saw Elisha standing off to the side speaking to Reb Moshe (who really should have been on the dais already). Elisha was gesturing at a line in his weathered Rambam while Reb Moshe listened carefully, pursing his lips while he considered Elisha’s point. Rabbi Avi Goldberg was surrounded by a large group — nothing unusual about that, Yosef acknowledged, he was so warm and friendly — singing along while he played something on his clarinet. There were too many familiar faces too acknowledge at this point — he would have to wait to catch up until after the march.

Ariel and Aviad were over there — both from Mitzpe Yericho, he knew. Ariel, with his sweet smile, was so different from the larger, muscular Aviad. While Ariel explained the beauty of Judaism to seekers on the internet, Aviad built Eretz Yisrael with his bare hands, building his home and the shul on a hilltop overlooking Mitzpe Yericho. Still, they shared the same values of building up Eretz Yisrael and dedicating themselves to their people, that was clear.

There were more than fifty friends and acquaintances from his mechinah, Eli. Yosef was about to go over to them when he heard the buzz — five minutes, they’d be marching out. He bid Eli Moshe a quick goodbye and hurried to find his spot, along with everyone else.

They were arranged by date, each person by when they had earned their spot in this elite group. Yosef’s cohort was one of the largest out there, a testament to the crucial role they had played that day.

As Yosef found his way to his spot, he felt a hand on his shoulder. It was Eitan, also from Eli; this was his first march. “Hey, I heard that all the biggest names come to this — is that really true?” Yosef nodded; it was true, everyone came out to show their appreciation and respect. “It’s true. But remember, it’s like they say in yeshiva — it’s not about us, it’s about what we did for the klal.” Eitan nodded, familiar with the line that was repeated over and over to him and his friends.

Yosef clapped him on the back and continued on while Eitan rushed to the back. Reaching his spot, Yosef smiled at those to his left and right, just as they had been for the past few years. With a minute to go, Yosef pulled out his drone once more and sent it up to capture the march out.

A high-pitched whistle; the columns began to move. Yosef deftly kept his drone level while walking next to his friends; he knew what they were about to see, but he still couldn’t contain his excitement. Every year, it was the same for him.

Yosef’s cohort left the staging area and began to pass between the thousands of seats that had been set up for the event. Every space was filled with people, each one standing silently, showing their respect and admiration. “Not for me, for the klal,” Yosef repeated to himself. That’s how he had lived, after all; wouldn’t make sense to lose sight of that now.

On the dais that Eli Moshe Zimbalist had built was the VIP section. Like Eitan had said, all the big names were there:

• Moshe Rabbeinu, the leader

• Yehoshua, who had served as the first Ramatkal before taking over for Moshe after his death

• Pinchas, who had created the position Rabbi Avi Goldberg and so many others now filled

• Aharon and his son Elazar, the first Kohanim Gedolim

• David Hamelech, legendary soldier, general, and eventually leader

Behind them were more and more of the leading lights of the Jewish People, and they were all there for one reason: to show their respect for Yosef and his companions.

As one, they stepped off the dais and approached the marching soldiers. Each one was greeted with a kiss, a hug, a clap on the back. They didn’t have to come out like this — you think Moshe Rabbeinu doesn’t have other things to do with his time? — but they always did.

Last year, Yosef had asked one of them about it — Rav Naftali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin, the Netziv. He smiled, a little sadly, and answered, “How can we not pay our respects to those who died defending the nation?”

A friend with more chutzpah than him had asked the Rambam the same question. “Not everyone here is so ‘frum,’” he had said, indicating some bare heads in the crowd, even a few tattoos. “Why do they merit such great honor here?” The Rambam, he recounted, had looked at him sternly and answered, “When the nations attack the Jewish People, they do it as a proxy for attacking Hashem Himself. A Jew who fights on behalf of Hashem’s People is really fighting for God’s honor; there is no greater kiddush Hashem than that.”

Remembering the interaction, Yosef Guedalia squared his shoulders and marched on. It was almost his turn.

Yehi zichram baruch

Rabbi Mayer Twersky, “A Three Thousand Year War”:

In his Epistle to Yemen, Rambam provides a framework for understanding much of Jewish history, which also sheds light on his profound religious depiction of war. HKBH elevated Am Yisroel above all other nations by giving us His Torah.

Remember that ours is the true and authentic divine religion, revealed to us through Moses, the master of the former as well as later prophets, by means of which God has distinguished us from the rest of mankind...God made us unique by His laws and precepts, and our pre-eminence is manifested in His rules and statutes, as Scripture says, in narrating God’s mercies to us, “And what great nation is there, that has statutes and ordinances so righteous as all this law, which I set before you this day?” (Devarim 4:8).

Our pre-eminence, בחירת ישראל, has always been a source of envy and hatred. Rebelling against HKBH’s choice, the nations of the world have continuously sought to destroy us.

Therefore all the nations instigated by envy and impiety rose up against us, and all the kings of the earth motivated by injustice and enmity applied themselves to persecute us. They wanted to thwart God, but He can not be thwarted. Ever since the time of Revelation, every despot or slave that has attained to power, be he violent or ignoble, has made it his first aim and his final purpose, to destroy our law, and to vitiate our religion, by means of the sword, by violence, or by brute force, such as Amalek, Sisra, Sennacherib, Nebuchadnezzar, Titus, Hadrian, may their bones be ground to dust, and others like them. This is one...attempt to foil the divine will. (A Maimonides Reader, pp. 439–440)

This penetrating, historical analysis underlies Rambam’s words, quoted above, in Hilchos Melachim. Every war is a battle for yichud Hashem because our enemies seek to defy HKBH and His sovereign selection of the Jewish people as the Chosen People. “’Those who hate you’ - these are those who hate Israel for whoever hates Israel hates the One who spoke and brought the world into being as it says, ‘And those who hate You have raised their head’. Who are they? ‘Against your nation they conspire secretly.’” (רש"י לבמדבר י:לה ע"פ ספרי. ע' גם רש"י שם ל"א:ג; Translation from Artscroll Sapirstein edition)

In January 2024, I wrote an article arguing that the Yeshivish/Charedi communities, for all their differences, and the Modern/Centrist communities, for all their differences, can be rooted in a single distinction:

Is the essence of avodas Hashem focused on Olam Hazeh or Olam Haba?

I cited from Rav Hirsch and Rav Soloveitchik to support the statement that the Modern/Centrist communities understand Judaism’s focus to be on building a dirah b’tachtonim (in a revealed, non-mystical sense) by applying Torah values and ideals, derived from the mitzvos, to the challenges and structures of this world.

I suggested that the Yeshivish/Charedi community’s perspective could be based on the first perek of Mesillas Yesharim, where the Ramchal writes that a person must know his mission in the world, which he describes as preparing to receive the ultimate good in Olam Haba.

The article received a healthy amount of pushback. Some challenged my characterization of the Mesillas Yesharim as a foundational element of the Yeshivish worldview; mei’heicha teisi?

Thus, I was gratified to hear the following in the Agudah’s recent Q+A by Rav Yosef Elefant, brought to my attention by a post from (transcript courtesy of Sofer.ai):

Birshus HaRabbanim shlit”a, I don’t have too much to add to what the rov said but maybe in a slightly different spin to it. I understand that part of the question that’s being asked is a question that’s being asked vis-à-vis our children, vis-à-vis the young dor where they are seeing guests of honor, they’re seeing participation in events and simchas, they’re seeing relationships between Torah figures with people who are living extravagant lives and the question is what do we tell our kids? What is the message to our kids? I feel that the question that was asked here by Rabbi Heisler shlit”a is a question that’s it’s a very important question because it’s a question that the tzibbur asked. The way the question was asked was the way the tzibbur asks the question.

The question’s been asked in many forums. I would have much rather that somebody would have sent in a question and said tell us what the issue with the gashmius is, like what’s the problem? I’ll explain what I mean. The issue of living extravagant lifestyles is not a problem because intrinsically there’s a problem with gashmius. There’s a fundamental issue which is not about too much gashmius, too little gashmius, too much olam hazeh, too little olam hazeh.

It’s not about taivos. The issue of standard of living today in our world is a... major hashkafik issue which touches at the first perek of Mesilas Yesharim who says that the entire יסוד החסידות ושורש העבודה the entire foundation of Yiddishkeit the entire foundation of Avodas Hashem the entire foundation of what we believe in is based on the fundamental hanacha and the fundamental yesod and shoresh that this world is a temporary world and everything that we’re doing is for Olam Haba. Otherwise what are we doing here, what are we doing here in the Yarhei Kallah, what are we doing in this world, what are we doing killing ourselves for our children, what are we doing killing ourselves in Auschwitz.

So that’s the יסוד החסידות ושורש העבודה. There’s a certain level of standard of living where a person loses touch with that, where we cross over that Rubicon, we cross over that red line where Olam Hazeh becomes a keva, becomes something permanent. For every person it’s different, for every society it’s different, for every family it’s different. When we cross over that line our way of life is at threat because the foundation upon which our skyscraper stands, what Chazal called the Tiras Kesef, which is Klal Yisrael, that tower in Shir Hashirim that Avraham Avinu built is standing on a foundation called יסוד החסידות שיתברר ויתאמת a person knows what he’s in the world for.

There’s a certain amount of involvement in Olam Hazeh which makes a person oblivious to that fundamental knowledge. A person can’t live without that anymore. And that’s the real threat to our world. What does that have to do with the question that was asked? The answer is that that question is so weighty and so deep and so important and so fundamental and so important to inculcate to our young dor, I would say it’s almost absurd that this mega topic got kidnapped by a micro question of should or should not the Roshei Yeshiva go to wedding X or Y.

It got kidnapped. So here we have a mega topic of values, of what are we in the world for, what’s our yesod, what’s our shoresh. And by the way, the issue of the gashmius is an existential threat to our way of life because our way of life is built on this yesod, and when we cross a certain life of gashmius involvement, we’re in trouble…

Rav Elefant identifies this idea, based on the first perek of the Mesillas Yesharim, as a yesod of the Yeshivish worldview, just as I suggested. Exciting!

Thinking about the argument itself, I understand the assertion that overinvolvement in gashmius would serve to negate a mission based on preparing for Olam Haba. The inverse, though, is not true - the fact that Judaism directs us to focus our lives on more than pleasure does not mean that we should instead focus only on preparing for Olam Haba. Both Rav Hirsch and Rav Soloveitchik would agree that a person should be focused on mission and mitzvos, not meat boards.

Rav Aharon Lichtenstein addresses this sharply in the first chapter of By His Light (itself a powerful formulation of the Centrist worldview focusing on serving Hashem through impacting this world):

A DIVINE MANDATE

Our attempt to place the human imprint on nature is part of God’s mandate: “Fill the earth and master it, and rule over the fish of the sea, the birds of the sky, and all living things that creep on earth” (Bereishit 1:28). But whereas that mandate in the first chapter is formulated in terms of rights, in the second chapter (“le-ovdah u-leshomrah”) it is formulated in terms of obligation— it is part of our responsibility, part of our task.

This notion of the centrality and importance of work, as opposed to pursuing a life of leisure and hedonism, runs counter to the message that is inundating the Western world. The implicit idea in all the crass advertising you see is that, ideally, you shouldn’t work at all; ideally, you would retire when you’re eighteen. Small wonder that many people have reached the conclusion that the less they work, the better off they are. The notion of leisure has suddenly become a problem in sociological and moral terms. There is a whole literature about the problem of leisure, precisely because work is perceived as a necessary evil, and not as spiritually redemptive.

For us, however, the sense of effort, of striving, above all of working (in Milton’s phrase) “as ever in my great Taskmaster’s eye,” is very central. “Le-ovdah u-leshomrah,” the sense of the importance of work and a work-oriented life, is part of the universal mandate; it is part of what we, as benei-Torah, understand to be central to our being.

GLATT KOSHER HEDONISM

I mention this point particularly to an American audience. In recent years, one observes on the American scene a terribly disturbing phenomenon: the spread of hedonistic values, but with a kind of glatt-kosher packaging. There was a time when the problem of hedonism for religious Jews didn’t often arise, because even if you wanted to have the time of your life, there wasn’t very much that you could do. The country clubs were all barred to Jews, there weren’t many kosher restaurants, there were no kosher nightclubs, etc. In the last decade or two, a whole culture has developed geared towards frum Jews, where the message is enjoy, enjoy, enjoy, and everything has a hekhsher (kosher certification) and a super-hekhsher. The message is that whatever the gentiles have, we have too. They have trips to the Virgin Islands, we have trips to the Virgin Islands. Consequently, there has been a certain debasement of values, in which people have a concern for the minutiae of Halakha (which, of course, one should be concerned about), but with a complete lack of awareness of the extent to which the underlying message is so totally non-halakhic and anti-halakhic.

Don’t misunderstand me—I am not opposed to people enjoying themselves to some extent. I am not arguing for a totally ascetic approach to life; I don’t live that way myself, and what I don’t practice I certainly am not going to preach. In a sense, I don’t practice it because I don’t really think that it is demanded. (There certainly were gedolim [great rabbis] who did advocate it, but others disagreed.) The question is something else entirely. The question is not whether there is room in human life for a person to have a certain measure of pleasure. Rather, the question is what is his basic perspective? How much does he involve himself in this? Does he see himself as basically being born to enjoy or to work?

There is nothing wrong with a person wanting to enjoy, to have a good meal. But if you open up the food critic’s column in a newspaper it is simply muktzeh machmat mi’us (untouchable because of being revolting)! A person who is morally sensitive finds it impossible to read those columns. They begin discussing, for example, the advantages of one airline food over another: here the food was a little bit underdone, there a little bit overdone, the vegetables were a little too fresh, not fresh enough; they begin to go into the finest details. It is astonishing that a person should devote so much time and effort and energy to these questions, and should assume that his readers are going to do so as well, when it is all merely a matter of knowing exactly what the food will be like when you happen to fly. To assign that kind of attention to this kind of nonsense?

To some extent, this feeling has permeated our world: a whole culture of enjoyment has begun to take hold. This is something which is recent, and with which anyone who is a ben-Torah, certainly, should in no way identify or associate. That whole culture advocates that man is born for pleasure, but unfortunately has to work if he wants to enjoy. In contrast, we have to know that “Adam le-amal yulad,” Man is born to do labor” (Iyyov 5:7).

Some fifteen years ago, I was learning in a yeshiva in the Old City of Yerushalayim. For Purim, the yeshiva bussed us to the houses of our rebbeim, who all lived outside the Old City and therefore celebrated on the 14th of Adar.

As is the custom, the meal was boisterous and loud, fueled by bottles of wine made available on the tables (the yeshiva’s policy was to get permission from parents before allowing the students to drink). Towards the end of the meal, as things were beginning to wind down, a student cooling down on the couch suddenly turned and retched — all over the (new, if I remember correctly) couch!

The room quickly cleared out, save for a few clearer-header tzaddikim who stayed back to help clean things up; the hosts were admirably gracious about it, as well.

My question is a technical one: Would this student be obligated to pay for the damage he caused by vomiting all over the couch? Any other day of the year, the answer would be an obvious yes. A person is responsible for the damage they cause, and the Rambam (Chovel U’Mazik 1:11) explicitly includes damage caused while drunk:

אָדָם מוּעָד לְעוֹלָם בֵּין שׁוֹגֵג בֵּין מֵזִיד בֵּין עֵר בֵּין יָשֵׁן בֵּין שִׁכּוֹר אִם חָבַל בַּחֲבֵרוֹ אוֹ הִזִּיק מָמוֹן חֲבֵרוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם מִן הַיָּפֶה שֶׁבִּנְכָסָיו.

However, it is possible that the equation changes on Purim. The Rema rules that there is a certain amount of exemption granted for damage done on Purim:

שולחן ערוך אורח חיים הלכות מגילה ופורים סימן תרצה סעיף ב

חייב אינש לבסומי בפוריא עד דלא ידע בין ארור המן לברוך מרדכי. הגה... ויש אומרים דאם הזיק אחד את חבירו מכח שמחת פורים, פטור מלשלם. (ת”ה סימן ק”י). ועיין בח”מ בדיני נזיקין.

In Orach Chaim 695:2, the Rema writes that according to some, if one person damages another due to simchas Purim, he is exempt from having to pay.1

One Approach: Mechilah

What is the basis for this leniency? The Pri Megadim, commenting that this leniency can only possible apply when the damage is inflicted without malevolent intent, adds that the reasoning is that on Purim, people are presumably willing to overlook reasonable amounts of unintentional damage:

פרי מגדים אורח חיים אשל אברהם סימן תרצה ס”ק ז

ז דאם. עיין מ”א. היינו שלא בכונה, אבל בכוונה אף הזיק ממונו חייב, דמאי שנא פורים משאר ימים. ושלא בכונה בעלמא חיוב, ובפורים מסתמא מוחלין:

In other words, the Pri Megadim invokes the concept of assumed mechilah to explain why a person would not have to pay for damage caused. However, there seems to be another way to explain the Rema, based on his closing words — “See Choshen Mishpat, Laws of Damages.” While he doesn’t specify where he wants us to look, the most likely candidate is 378:9:

שולחן ערוך חושן משפט הלכות נזיקין סימן שעח סעיף ט

אם בא אחד רוכב בסוסו מאחרי חבירו, ופגע בסוס שחבירו רוכב בו והכה את הסוס, חייב לשלם כל מה שישומו בית דין שנפחת מחמת הכאה זו. ואפילו היה הסוס המוכה של עובד כוכבים, וצריך הניזק לשלם לעובד כוכבים יותר ממה שנפחתו דמי הסוס, אין המזיק חייב לשלם יותר ממה שישומו בית דין. בחורים הרוכבים לקראת חתן וכלה והזיקו זה את זה ממון חבירו דרך שמחה ושחוק, וכן בשאר דבר שמחה, הואיל ונהגו כן, פטורין (מרדכי ס”פ הישן ותוספות והרא”ש ואגודה פרק לולב וערבה), כו] מ”מ אם נראה לב”ד לעשות סייג וגדר, הרשות בידם (פסקי מהרא”י סימן ר”י).

Again, the Shulchan Aruch is discussing damage caused in the context of simchah — this time, not a holiday, but as part of efforts to bring joy to a fresh bride and groom. Rather than making any reference to mechilah, the Shulchan Aruch that the exemption is “because of the minhag.” While this could be translated to mean, “Because of the minhag, everyone participating implies that they are willing to forego payment for damage incurred,” that much is not said. Tracing this halachah back one more step, though, will make it clear that mechilah is not the driver here.

A Sukkos Scandal?

The Shulchan Aruch sends us to a Tosafos in Sukkah (45a). After describing the process of chibut aravah, the Mishnah concludes:

מיד תינוקות שומטין את לולביהן, ואוכלין אתרוגיהן.

Rashi and Tosafos both note two ways to understand this line. According to the first, mi’yad means “from the hands of”; adults (maybe teenagers are more likely) would grab lulavim and esrogim from children and eat the esrogim. Rashi clarifies that there was no issue of stealing, because children cannot make complete kinyanim, nor an issue of darchei shalom (the Rabbinic enactment made to prevent people taking things from children) because it was done out of simchah. Tosafos extends this understanding of the Mishnah to serve as the source to exempt young adults who hurt each other while entertaining a bride and groom in a practice that sounds a bit like jousting:

תוספות מסכת סוכה דף מה עמוד א

מיד תינוקות שומטין לולביהן - לולבי התינוקות שומטין הגדולים מידן ואוכלין אתרוגיהן של תינוקות ואין בדבר גזל ולא משום דרכי שלום אלא שכך נהגו בו מחמת שמחה כך פי’ בקונט’ ויש ללמוד מכאן לאותן בחורים שרוכבים בסוסים לקראת חתן ונלחמים זה עם זה וקורעין בגדו של חבירו או מקלקל לו סוסו שהן פטורין שכך נהגו מחמת שמחת חתן

(This Tosafos is how a fencing match ended up happening during my wedding and will hopefully happen again in just a couple of weeks, but that’s a story for a different time.)

There is no indication from either Rashi or Tosafos that the basis of this exemption is the concept of mechilah. Actually, the fact that the original case involves ketanim would seem to invalidate the possibility of mechilah underpinning the exemption, as ketanim likely don’t have the ability to be mochel their legal rights to an object.

A Second Approach

If so, there must be a different framework at play — either the concept of minhag on its own is enough to generate the exemption, or there is a takanah made to exempt people for damage caused in contexts of simchah (see Rav Soloveitchik’s formulation in the Reshimos to Sukkah 45a, where he calls it a tnai beis din). This would likely be to allow people the freedom to rejoice with a bit more freedom than usual; after all, would people juggle fire at weddings if they knew they would have to pay if they set the kallah’s dress or the roof of the hall on fire? I don’t think so, either… Thus, the exemption would serve to facilitate people expressing their simchah/contributing to the simchah in a less guarded way than they would normally behave, while of course keeping in mind that such an enactment would be limited to 1) reasonable types of damage and 2) intent to cause joy rather than harm.

Terumas Hadeshen: Sinister Simchah

Another important source to consider in this context is a responsum from the Terumas Hadeshen (Pesakim U’Kesavim 210). He describes a case that came before him regarding two individuals, R’ Eliezer bar Shalom and R’ Gershom bar Shalom (it would be sad if they were siblings). R’ Eliezer claimed that R’ Gershom had shoved him during the press of hoshanos in shul on Sukkos, causing him to fall and break his shoulder. R’ Gershom responded that he was merely circling the bimah like everyone else, and a bit of pushing was an unavoidable part of the process.

The Terumas Hadeshen first notes that without proof that R’ Gershom pushed R’ Eliezer with intent to hurt him, he was technically exempt from having to pay because the damage happened in the context of simchah shel mitzvah. This serves as an additional source for the Rema’s contention that simchah is enough to exempt a person for damage caused during simchas Purim, even physical damage (as opposed to monetary damage; see the Knesses Hagedolah, Kappos Temarim, and Reshimos Shiurim, who all at least initially assume the Rema’s leniency must be limited to monetary damage). He adds, though, that if he were to rule that way, it could destroy people’s willingness to participate in hoshanos; after all, who knows if there might be someone out there waiting to give them a shove at just the right moment and get off the hook because they did it “at a time of simchah”?

Because of this concern, as well as two more, the Terumas Hadeshen obligated R’ Gershom to pay R’ Eliezer a k’nas, closing the loophole in a way. In the same way, if beis din were to recognize that a person wsa cynically using simchas Purim as a way to get back at an enemy, all exemptions are off the table; a knas would be imposed to save the simchah.

Applying the Chakirah to the Couch

These two approaches may lead to different answers regarding the opening story. On the one hand, it was not actually Purim for the student who caused the damage — his Purim was only starting that night, Shushan Purim. It will therefore be hard to argue that he should benefit from a takanah made in the context of simchas Purim — as it’s not really his Purim!

On the other hand, the owner of the house invited the student in and provided the drinks that eventually caused the mess, implying that he is willing to accept the consequences — in other words, mechilah.

Mechilah for Bodily Damage

Returning to the question of the underlying reason for the exemption, if the explanation is the minhag or the communal enactment, it is understandable that such a leniency could be extended to bodily damage in addition to monetary damage. However, if the reasoning is based on assumed mechilah, it becomes more difficult to make such an argument. Does a person have the ability to be mochel on damage done to their bodies?

This question is addressed explicitly in the Gemara at the end of Perek Hachovel in Bava Kamma. The Mishnah draws a distinction between Reuven inviting Shimon to “cut off his hand, blind his eye, or break his leg” and Reuven inviting Shimon to “tear his clothing or break his jug.” If Shimon does so, he would have to pay for the bodily damage, but not for the monetary damage. On the surface, this seems to confirm our suspicions above: a person does not have the capacity to forgive damage inflicted on their bodies.

However, things are not so simple, as the discussion continues in the Gemara, where Rav Asi bar Chama asks Rava to explain the distinction between the two cases:

תלמוד בבלי מסכת בבא קמא דף צג עמוד א

האומר סמא את עיני כו’. א”ל רב אסי בר חמא לרבא: מאי שנא רישא ומאי שנא סיפא? אמר ליה: רישא, לפי שאין אדם מוחל על ראשי אברים. א”ל: וכי אדם מוחל על צערו? דתניא: הכני, פצעני, על מנת לפטור - פטור! אישתיק. אמר: מידי שמיע לך בהא? אמר ליה, הכי אמר רב ששת: משום פגם משפחה. איתמר, ר’ אושעיא אמר: משום פגם משפחה; רבא אמר: משום שאין אדם מוחל על ראשי אברים שלו; רבי יוחנן אמר: יש הן שהוא כלאו, ויש לאו שהוא כהן. תניא נמי הכי: הכני, פצעני, על מנת לפטור? ואמר לו הן? הרי יש הן שהוא כלאו; קרע את כסותי, על מנת לפטור? ואמר לו לאו? הרי לאו שהוא כהן.

Rava initially explained that a person cannot/does not forgive damage done to their limbs. Rav Asi bar Chama responded by citing a Beraisa teaching that a person is willing to forgive pain. Rava eventually asked Rav Asi for his explanation, and he cited Rav Sheshes as drawing a distinction between pain and loss of a limb. The Gemara follows with three explanations for the Mishnah’s ruling: Rav Oshiya repeating Rav Sheshes’s distinction, Rava repeating his original answer about people not forgiving damage done to limbs, and Rabbi Yochanan answering that sometimes, “yes” really means “no” and “no” really means “yes.”

Many Rishonim point out that according to Rabbi Yochanan, the Mishnah was dealing with a case where there was some amount of ambiguity in Reuven’s invitation to Shimon to hurt him. If, however, Reuven would unequivocally declare that Shimon would be exempt from having to pay for the damage, Rabbi Yochanan would uphold that exemption.2 Rava and Rav Oshiya, though, would argue that Shimon would still have to pay. In other words, Rabbi Yochanan accepts the possibility of mechilah for bodily damage, while Rava rejects it.3

What’s the Bottom Line?

It is not clear what the bottom line is in this case. The Yam Shel Shlomo points out that although we would normally rule like Rava, as he is the latest authority (halachah k’basraa), in this case, the Gemara supports Rabbi Yochanan by citing a Beraisa that aligns with his approach. This is the position of the Rif and the Rosh, two of the pillars of pesak. However, the Rambam seems to align much more closely with Rava’s position; while the Maggid Mishnah, cited by the Beis Yosef, tries to explain the Rambam as ruling like Rabbi Yochanan as well, the Bach’s position that the Rambam ruled like Rava seems much more convincing.

The level of the Shulchan Aruch brings us right back to where we need to be. The Shulchan Aruch himself seems to reproduce the Rambam, negating the possibility of mechilah for bodily damage:

האומר לחבירו קטע את ידי או סמא את עיני ע”מ שאתה פטור הרי זה חייב בחמשה דברים שהדבר ידוע שאין אדם רוצה בכך

However, the Rema comments with the Rosh’s opinion, ruling like Rabbi Yochanan that explicit mechilah is considered valid:

הגה וי”א דאם א”ל בפי’ ע”מ לפטור פטור אלא שאם לא א”ל בפי’ רק דברים שמשמען כך אנו דנין דבריו שלא פטרו כגון שא”ל קטע ידי או סמא עיני וא”ל המזיק ע”מ לפטור וא”ל הניזק הן אנו דנין שבתמיה קאמר הן וחייב המזיק (טור סי”א בשם הרא”ש)

Thus, when all is said and done, the Rema himself would be able to explain his exemption for even bodily damage done in the context of simchas Purim in one of two ways — either as the result of a communal exemption, or as an assumed mechilah that can relate even to a person’s body.4

Purim is an interesting day — and in some ways, a strange day. Two elements that make it so unique are highlighted by this sugyah. First of all, the possibility that Chazal built in a certain amount of exemption from damage caused in order to create room for people to let loose a little bit and express their simchah in a wilder way than would normally be acceptable. In other words, they proactively allowed for people to loosen the reins a bit, seeming to endorse a bit of a wilder atmosphere as appropriate for Purim. At the same time, the sugyah highlights an assumed feeling of goodwill between people, such that they’re willing to overlook reasonable amounts of damage caused to each other — maybe even damage caused to their bodies — in order to not spoil the Purim spirit. Of course, everyone must maintain full control over their actions and not let themselves get out of hand, but the mix of both of these ingredients — overwhelming joy at Hashem saving us from genocide, and the positive feelings generated towards others — is what gives Purim its unique flavor.

And how do Torah and mitzvos fit into that mission statement?

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Those are the questions raised by Rabbis Yitzchak Adlerstein and Simi Lerner on the two most recent episodes of their podcast, Two Rabbis, Three Opinions:

As I’ve written before, I think this is one of the most basic and fundamental questions we need to be thinking about in order to appreciate our Judaism on anything more than the most superficial level. After all, there is only so much a person can do without any understanding of why they’re supposed to do it; would anyone brush their teeth every night if they had never been told that failing to do so would cost them their ability to eat pizza and steak?

On the other hand, understanding the significance of what one is doing can unlock unbelievable accomplishments. The gevurah of regular men and women, including so many friends and neighbors, becoming superheroes to defend Eretz Yisroel and the Jewish People is the example that jumps to mind:

But the recent story of a thirteen-year-old kid who swam for hours to save his family trapped in a storm illustrates the same point.

To quote Nietzsche:

I love the irony of illustrating this quote with a depiction of Sisyphus’s endless — and meaningless — task of rolling a stone up a hill only to have it roll back down again for him to roll it up once again.

In short, its not surprising to me that we’re struggling with people finding meaning in Judaism (and turning to movements like TYH or neo-chassidus) at a time that we struggle to articulate what the broader goal of the whole thing is and how the pieces fit together to accomplish that goal.

For a much broader, in-depth take on the question of Judaism’s why, start here:

Purpose of Learning: Ramchal

One of the approaches mentioned in the episode on the purpose of learning Torah related the Ramchal’s approach in Derech Hashem to Rav SR Hirsch’s approach of using Torah to understand how Hashem wants us to relate to and perfect all elements of this world. I think it’s worth looking at the cited section more closely to get a sense of what the Ramchal is really arguing.

It’s worth pointing out that I’m no expert in the Ramchal. If his other writings add context that I’m missing here, I’d be happy to hear about them. All I’m working with is how the Ramchal presents his ideas here.

One of the Ramchal’s most impressive qualities as a writer is his obvious talent for organization. In Mesillas Yesharim, it may be less noticeable, as he adopts the framework of Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair to organize the sefer, but it is still present in the way he divides individual middos into sections defining the trait, presenting potential obstacles to its acquisition, and offering strategies to work towards acquiring it.

This talent is even more apparent in Derech Hashem (and even features in his introduction to the work):

• The first section presents the yesodos ha’metzius, the roots of reality, including:

  • Hashem Himself

  • The Purpose of Creation (spoiler — for Hashem to benefit His creations, which practically means people should do as much as they can to connect themselves to Hashem — more below)

  • Humanity

  • Man’s existence in Olam Hazeh

• The second section discusses God-man interaction, mainly about hashgachah (Divine Providence)

• The third section discusses man-God interactions, including:

  • Using the system of kishuf Hashem built into the world

  • Nevuah

  • Ruach Hakodesh

• The fourth section discusses a Jew’s avodah in this world — an exploration of the purpose of specific mitzvos, including Torah study and prayer.

Seeing the Ramchal Inside

For our purposes, the Ramchal relates most directly to the purpose of Torah study in two places: in short in 1:4, and at more length in 4:2.

First, 1:4 (Hebrew isn’t pasting in well, so here’s the English from Sefaria):

The root of service (to God): Behold, the root of all matters of service is that man should always turn to his Creator. And that is that he know and understand that he was only created to cleave to his Creator, and that he was only placed in this world to suppress his [evil] inclination and subordinate himself to his Creator with the power of the intellect - the opposite of the desire of materiality and its inclination. So he should conduct all of his actions to reach this purpose and not incline away from it…

Notice that there’s no mention here of a goal that relates to man working on God’s behalf, to accomplish something meaningful in this world for Him. Rather, the focus is on man working to perfect himself in order to benefit from the closest possible connection to Hashem, fulfilling the Divine intention of providing benefit to His creations.

Study of the Torah: Truly, there is one mechanism that God, may He be blessed, gave to us, the level of which is higher then the other mechanisms that bring man close to Him, and that is Torah study. And this is [achieved] with two approaches. The first is the approach of speech and [simple] study; and the second is the approach of [analytical] understanding. For see that in His kindness, may He be blessed, He willed [to] compose for us a composition of words, like that which was decreed by His wisdom, and gave them to us. And this is the totality of the Book of the Torah; and afterwards, the Books of the Prophets. For through the mystical power of these words, the one who pronounces them with holiness and purity with the correct intention - which is the fulfillment of His will, may He be blessed - will achieve high distinction and truly great perfection. And likewise one who exerts himself to understand and know their explanations which were passed down to us. He will acquire perfection over his perfection according to his effort - all the more so if he toils to understand their secrets and mysteries. For any matter that he understands will establish and achieve one of the highest levels of distinction and true perfection in his soul. And in all of these [things], it is not only that he just acquires distinction and perfection for himself, but rather all of what exists in creation is distinguished and perfected - generally and individually. [This is] especially [true] with Torah [study].

The effects of commandments and sins: However the cause of all of the conditions of man - his darkness and his brightness - is the shining of His face, may He be blessed, upon him or His hiding Himself from him, as we wrote above (Part I, On the Purpose of Creation 2). For behold that the more that the Master, blessed be He, shines His countenance, the more purity and perfection descend to one to whom His shining is coming. And according to the measure of shining, so is the measure of perfection and purity that is drawn after it; and the opposite of this with [His] hiding. However the Master, may be blessed, always shines upon the one that draws close to Him and there is no withholding of it from His side at all. Rather, the one that does not draw close to him will lack His shining; such that the withholding is from the side of the receiver, and not from the side of the Giver. And behold the Supreme Wisdom decreed that the one who does these things that He commanded - meaning the sum of all of the commandments, as we mentioned above - will come a level closer to Him, may He be blessed, with every such act that he does. And through this, he will reach a higher level of the shining of His countenance, and will achieve a higher level of perfection, which is the effect of that [higher] level of shining. And the opposite [of this occurs with] sins: Every one of those acts that man does, God forbid, surely distances him a certain level from Him, may He be blessed, on account of it. And through this, an additional level of deficiency, which is an effect of this hiding, [comes to him].

It comes out according to all that we have prefaced that the true intention in all of the commandments would be to come close to Him, may He be blessed, and to be enlightened by the light of His countenance. And [the intention] of preventing sins is to escape from being distanced from Him. And this is the true purpose for them. Yet the specific matters are very deep, according to the makeup of man and of the creation, as we wrote above. And we will speak more about some of them in a separate part (Part 4), with the help of God, may He be blessed.

In short, the goal is to cleave to Hashem; learning Torah facilitates that through the mystical power of reciting and understanding the words; mitzvos generally open a person to perfection through allowing for the reception of Divine light, while aveiros block a person from receiving that light.

The Ramchal elaborates on this in 4:2:

Behold that Torah study is a necessary matter. As without it, it is impossible to arrive at [proper] action. For if one does not know what he is commanded to do, how will he do it? However besides all this, there is a great function in study towards the perfection of man. And we already mentioned the matter briefly in Part I, Chapter 4 (On Human Responsibility 9). But now we will write about it at greater length.

Regarding Torah study according to the matter of the influences: Among the influences that are brought from Him, may He be blessed, for the needs of His creatures, [Torah study] is the most precious and sublime of all that can be found in existence. That means that it is the greatest entity of all that which can be found to be similar to His true existence, may He be blessed, and that can be found to have preciousness and sublimity similar to His true sublimity, may He be blessed. And it is that which the Master, blessed be His name, shares of His glory and preciousness with His servants. However, the Creator, may His name be blessed, bound this influence to something which was created for this purpose by Him, may He be blessed. And that is the Torah. And this matter is accomplished in two ways – by speaking and by understanding. And this is what we explained there… And He bound this influence in such a way that when these statements would be spoken, this influence would be brought down for the one speaking them; but on condition that this reading be according to the limitations that were set up for it, as we will write further with God’s help. And it is likewise with understanding what is included in those statements - the influence will be brought down for the one who understands them according to their true paths…

And behold it is obvious that the greater the understanding, the greater the level of influence that will be brought down through it. And one who only understands the wording of the verses cannot be compared to one understands their intent, nor one who understands their surface intent with one who deepens [his understanding] more, nor one who deepens it a little to one who deepens it much. Still, it was from His kindness, may He be blessed, that a level of the influence be brought down with every type of understanding, such that any one who understands [some of] it benefits from the great influence that is bound to that understanding. And even the one who has not reached any understanding, but just speaks [its words], will have it as a means though which some of this influence will also be meted out to him.

Regarding the parts of the Torah: However besides this gradation regarding the granting of reward for people’s efforts according to the proper measure, there is another differentiation and division according to what requires refinement in the whole of creation. [This is the case] to the point that there is no part of it that is not refined by [Torah study]; such that a part of the creation will [always] be perfected by it. So it comes out that someone who wants to serve in front of his Creator with complete service must occupy himself with all of its parts according to his ability, so that the refinement come from him to all parts of the creation. And in this light, they, may their memory be blessed, said (Kiddushin 30a), “A man should always divide his days into three: A third for Scripture; a third for Mishnah; and a third for Gemara.” And included in this are all parts of the Torah - such that one divides his time until he has reached all of them…

Conditions of the study: Now the necessary conditions to accompany the study are these: Awe during the study itself; and constant refinement of [one’s] actions. And that is because the whole power of the Torah is only from that which He, may His name be blessed, bound His precious influence to it, to the point that speaking it and understanding it brings down this great influence. But without that, speaking it would not be different from speaking about other affairs or books of wisdom and learning about all the other understandings of natural existence in all its forms. For they only contain knowledge of that matter; but no precious power or elevation comes from it to the spirit of the one that reads, speaks or understands it at all; nor is there any refinement of creation at all. However the content of this influence is surely divine, as we have written. Moreover, it is the highest and most sublime of the matters that are brought down and come to the creatures from Him, may He be blessed. And since this is so, a man should certainly be in awe and tremble during such an occupation. For it comes out that he is coming forth before his God and occupying himself with the bringing down of the great light from Him towards himself. So he should surely be embarrassed by his mortal lowliness, and shake from His loftiness, may He be blessed. And he should surely rejoice greatly in his goodly portion that he has merited this - yet with trembling, as we have mentioned…

And the second condition is refinement of [one’s] actions. For it is fitting for one who wants to bring down influence to be worthy and readied for the bringing down. Hence if he sullies himself with guiltiness and sins, distances himself from his Creator and is unfaithful to Him [by going] after other powers and evil - it will certainly be said about him (Psalms 50:16), “And to the wicked, God said, ‘Who are you to recite My laws, etc.’” ...

The difference in the studies is according to preparation: However the study of one who purifies and sanctifies himself with his actions draws down influence commensurate to the measure that he prepares himself. So according to the measure that he increases preparedness, so does the preciousness of his study and its power increase. That is what we see with the earlier Sages. For the Torah would crown them with a great power and give them stature and preciousness that was not found in the later generations. [This was] because of their greater preparedness than the later ones. And they even said about Jonathan the son of Uziel (Sukkah 28a) that at the time that he was occupied with the Torah, any bird that would fly above him would be burned as a result of the power of the concentration of the Divine Presence that descended upon him through his study.

While everything here is interesting, there are a few points to highlight.

Rational or Mystical Perfection?

First, regarding what type of perfection the Ramchal is talking about: One could try to argue that the Ramchal and Rav Hirsch are both saying the same thing, just with different language. The goal for both is the perfection of the world, and Torah and mitzvos are the “tools” Hashem gave us for bringing that about.

However, reading the Ramchal inside, it seems clear that the Ramchal is not describing a rational process of self-enrichment through understanding Hashem’s Torah and perfecting the world through bringing that Divine wisdom to bear on the world. Rather, he is focusing on a person’s ability to cleave to the Divine and positing that speaking and understanding words of Torah was granted the ability to accomplish that goal — without explaining how or why. This is clearly distinct from Rav Hirsch’s understanding that talmud Torah is about understanding how Hashem wants us to conduct ourselves in regards to all aspects of the world and applying His values to our lives and communities.

The Paradigm: Yonason ben Uziel Burning Birds

Most telling is the example the Ramchal provides at the end of the section depicting someone who succeeds at doing what he describes: Yonasan ben Uziel burning birds above his head due to the intensity of his connection to the Shechinah (the ideal of deveikus) while learning. This indicates that when the Ramchal speaks here of perfection, he is not talking about perfecting oneself in a rational way, through understanding the messages conveyed by the Torah, but in a supernatural way — the act of speaking and understanding the words of Torah have the Divinely ordained effect of perfecting a person’s soul and allowing him to cleave to Hashem in a stronger way, not because of the content, but because of the intrinsic nature of engaging with Torah itself.

Torah Perfects Creation

This is also evident in the explanation he offers for how Torah perfects the rest of creation. Whereas Rav Hirsch would likely explain that Creation is elevated by man using all elements of it to create the ideal society, the “dirah b’tachtonim” he references so frequently throughout his commentary to the Chumash, the Ramchal declares that Creation is elevated in the same way that man is elevated — through the act of learning Hashem’s Torah. He uses this to explain the importance of engaging with all areas of Torah — because each part of Torah connects to and uplifts another element of Creation. Again, not because it provides guidance regarding how Hashem wants us to use or relate to that element of Creation, but as a result of the intrinsic nature of engaging with Torah itself.

L’shitasam Regarding Tefillah

This distinction continues throughout the rest of the sections in this fourth part, which is focused on explaining the purpose of different parts of avodas Hashem/mitzvos. To give just one example (and one I’d like to expand on separately), the Ramchal writes that the purpose of prayer is to bring down Divine bounty both for individuals and for the world as a whole:

Regarding prayer: The matter of prayer is surely from the arrangements that were set up by the Supreme Wisdom for this reason: Since the creatures receive bounty from Him, may He be blessed, there is a need for them to arouse themselves towards Him and seek His presence. So the bounty comes down to them according to the arousal towards Him. But if they do not arouse themselves, it does not come down to them. And behold the Master, blessed be He, desires and wants that the good of His creatures be increased at all times; so He prepared this worship for them on a daily basis. For through it, bounty, success and blessing will come down to them according to their needs [and] according to their situation in this world…

And behold once a man is distinguished with tsitsit and crowned with tefillin, the orders of prayer are set up for him, to refine that which is necessary. And the general intention is to uphold all of creation - all of the worlds - in a proper state that is fit to have the supreme bounty flow upon it; and to bring down the flow from in front of Him, may He be blessed, according to what is necessary…

The correspondence of the sections of prayer to the worlds: And behold that it was according to this order that the divisions of prayer were ordained. Hence the three sections at the beginning are for the refinement of the three worlds - this world, the world of the angels and the world of the throne. And that [corresponds to] the sacrifices, the verses of song and the blessing over the Shema. Afterwards is the standing prayer, which corresponds to the world of divinity, to bring down the influences according to their distinctions. And there are three other parts afterwards to bring down the duration of flow to the worlds - one after another, until the end. And they are the sanctification of the order (kiddushah de’sidrah), the song of [the day of] the Levites and “There is none like our God.” And after all this is Aleynu; and it is to return and affirm His Kingship, may He be blessed, over all the worlds, after they were all blessed.

In short, the Ramchal portrays tefillah as calling down Divine bounty by reciting the right words at the right time, fixing all of the worlds and bringing Hashem’s goodness to all aspects of Creation.

This is radically distinct from Rav Hirsch’s understanding of tefillah as an opportunity for self-reflection — beginning by reflecting on Hashem’s presence in Creation and Jewish history, continuing by affirming our understanding of Hashem as the master of all elements of our lives, and then stepping into His presence, so to speak, to consider how our values match up with those formulated for us by the Anshei K’nesses Hagedolah. As he so strikingly writes, a shul is meant to be a type of “school,” a training grounds that serves to prepare a person to go out into the world and live those values on which he just reflected. The emphasis is placed much less on the tefillah itself and more on the influence the content of the tefillah is meant to have on the person davening.

Conclusion

While both Rav Hirsch and the Ramchal might use language that seems to indicate shared goals — perfecting the world — reading the Ramchal inside seems to indicate that his understanding of the purpose of Judaism, more broadly, and learning, more narrowly, is actually distinct from Rav Hirsch’s in important ways. Whereas Rav Hirsch sees the purpose of learning and davening in the ideas that they communicate and reinforce to a person, giving him the insights he needs to be able to mold the world in a way that aligns with Divine values and Will (nisaveh l’Hakadosh Baruch Hu dirah b’tachtonim), the Ramchal emphasizes the personal journey towards deveikus as well as the cosmic need for sheleimus. Both goals are accomplished through a supernatural, rather than rational, quality embedded within Torah and tefillah.

Parashas Mishpatim marks the Torah’s remarkable genre shift from history book to legal text. For the next sefer and a half, the epic adventure the Torah has brought on us almost entirely pauses, and the focus becomes a slew of mitzvos that practically impact every aspect of our lives.

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If you were going to present rules to live by, how would you start? What would be the first directive you choose to convey? I assume it would be something broadly applicable, constantly relevant — something that would justify it taking the first spot in the lineup. “Be nice,” say, or “take responsibility”; and in fact, we have mitzvos that can convey these values quite well.

But that’s not how Parashas Mishpatim begins.

Instead, it opens with what seems almost like the opposite of “broadly applicable and constantly relevant” — a commandment relating to indentured servitude generated by stealing and being unable to repay the victim. Why begin with something that seems so niche?

Understanding Slavery

A deeper understanding of the concept of avdus, slavery, can point towards an answer.

The Gemara in Bava Metzia wonders what would happen if a person (Reuven) tries to claim a neglected lost object, let’s say a pair of sunglasses, on behalf of a friend (Shimon). Initially, Rav Nachman and Rav Chisda state that this would not work; Shimon would not acquire the sunglasses, as one cannot benefit one person by negatively affecting everyone else. Since the sunglasses were fair game for anyone who happened upon them, Reuven grabbing them for Shimon effectively “steals” them from others, negating his ability to do so.1

Rava challenges this ruling with a Beraisa stating that a worker hired to help out with general tasks actually is able to acquire the sunglasses on behalf of his employer. Doesn’t this show that the original ruling was incorrect, and Shimon in fact would become the owner through Reuven picking up the sunglasses?

Rav Nachman responds that the two cases are different. A poel, a hired worker, has a unique status; “His hand is like the hand of the employer.” Whereas Reuven is not linked in any way to Shimon, there is some form of linkage between an employee and his employer that allows for the former to acquire the sunglasses on behalf of the latter.

Rav Nachman’s distinction is challenged on the basis of a teaching in the name of Rav: “Poel yachol lachzor bo, afilu b’chatzi ha’yom — An employee can break his contract, even in the middle of the day!” How can there be such a close link between an employee and his employer if the employee has the right to break his contract on a moment’s notice?2

Rav Nachman defends his explanation by revealing the reasoning for Rav’s teaching. The default is that there exists a strong link between an employee and his employer — a link that is strong enough to justify the former acquiring the sunglasses on behalf of the latter, something that Reuven cannot do for Shimon. The employee’s ability to break his contract is something imposed on the relationship from the outside, something external to the natural connection that exists until this clause is triggered — it expresses the reality that every Jewish person is an eved Hashem, a servant of God, rather than a servant to another servant — i.e., his employer.3

תלמוד בבלי מסכת בבא מציעא דף י עמוד א

רב נחמן ורב חסדא דאמרי תרוייהו: המגביה מציאה לחבירו - לא קנה חבירו. מאי טעמא - הוי תופס לבעל חוב במקום שחב לאחרים, והתופס לבעל חוב במקום שחב לאחרים - לא קנה. איתיביה רבא לרב נחמן: מציאת פועל - לעצמו. במה דברים אמורים - בזמן שאמר לו בעל הבית נכש עמי היום, עדור עמי היום. אבל אמר לו: עשה עמי מלאכה היום מציאתו של בעל הבית הוא! - אמר ליה: שאני פועל דידו כיד בעל הבית הוא. - והאמר רב: פועל יכול לחזור בו אפילו בחצי היום! - אמר ליה: כל כמה דלא הדר ביה - כיד בעל הבית הוא, כי הדר ביה - טעמא אחרינא הוא, דכתיב כי לי בני ישראל עבדים - עבדי הם, ולא עבדים לעבדים

Questioning the Jump

Did you catch the logical jump at the very last step above? The Gemara was initially talking about a poel, an employee. The Gemara’s proof that an employee can break his contract, though, came from an argument based on an eved relationship — “‘For the Jewish People are My slaves,’4 and not slaves to slaves.” Why should a verse and derivation about slavery establish anything about an employee’s right to break a contract?5

And more broadly, returning to the Gemara’s initial question, what is it about the employer-employee relationship that explains why an employee can acquire the sunglasses for his employer, but Reuven can’t do the same for Shimon?

The Essence of Avdus

Rabbi Shimon Shkop proposes that the Gemara’s description of the “hand of the employee” as being like the “hand of the employer” should actually be taken as more than just an expressive phrase. To a certain extent, it should be taken literally: The worker’s own identity is put to the side, and he becomes an extension of his employer.

This is easier to understand regarding a slave; it is a surprising feature of Jewish law that this is extended even to an employee, who seems to be regarded as a “miniature slave.” However, it makes intuitive sense. Both an eved and a poel are restricted from carrying out their own desires and furthering their own goals — a poel while he’s working, and an eved during the length of his servitude. In place of working for themselves, they are obligated to work on behalf of their employer/adon, even if they are not at all interested in the initiatives they’ve been tasked with furthering. Thus, this halachah reflects the reality of both arrangements (as uncomfortable as it may sound).

Because he loses his own identity and becomes an extension of his employer, he is able to acquire the sunglasses on his behalf. As opposed to independent Reuven picking up the sunglasses for his friend Shimon, halachah sees it as if the employer himself were picking up the glasses himself.

Support for the Explanation

Rabbi Shkop proves this perspective with a surprising ruling from the Machaneh Efrayim. A person who has a usable roof must build a roof around it to prevent anyone from falling off and getting hurt. If a person hires a gentile to build the fence, would the homeowner be able to make the berachah on establishing it? Seeing as the technical category of shelichus does not apply with a non-Jew, that avenue isn’t available to allow for the homeowner to make the berachah.

Rabbi Shkop writes that this insight about the nature of an employee-employer relationship provides the answer. Because the gentile worker is seen as an extension of the homeowner, his action is seen as the homeowner’s action. Therefore, he would be allowed to make the berachah.

חידושי ר’ שמעון שקופ בבא מציעא סימן יב

והטעם דמהני יותר מכל מגביה לחבירו הוא בפשיטות משום דיד פועל כיד בעה”ב ממש, היינו כיון שנמכר לו לענין זה, הרי הוא כידו ממש, ועדיף משאר שליח דעלמא, ... בפועל שהוא כידו ממש לכל פעולותיו שנמכר הוה כמו שהגביה בעה”ב בעצמו. ... ורק בענין שהמעשה הוא מעשה על כל אופן, ורק שבעינן להחשיבו על בעה”ב, אז מהני פועל אף אם אינו בר שליחות, וכגון אם עשה ישראל מעקה ע”י פועל עכו”ם נ”ל דשפיר הדין כמו שחקר בעל מחנה אפרים (דמברך הישראל)...

Returning to Mishpatim

With Rabbi Shkop’s understanding of the essence of avdus in hand, we can return to our question about the mitzvah chosen to open the legal section of the Torah. An employee is a limited eved; the essence of both is that a person becomes an extension of their employer/adon in place of their own autonomous identity.

This is exactly the mindset that Hashem wants the Jewish People to cultivate regarding their relationship with Him: The very first message Hashem told Moshe Rabbeinu to convey to the Jewish People was that when Hashem took them out of Egypt, they would come to “taavdun es ha’Elokim al ha’har ha’zeh — serve Hashem on this mountain.” Similarly, the Ramban cites a Midrash describing the Jewish People approaching Hashem at Sinai and requesting the mitzvos — “Gezor aleinu gezeiros, decree commandments upon us!” Hashem responded, “First, accept My kingship — our relationship as Melech/avadim — and then I will be gozer aleichem gezeiros.”

The Message of Sinai

Har Sinai was meant to mark the moment at which we became Hashem’s avadim — in other words, based on Rabbi Shkop, the moment we put our independent identities aside and freely chose to live as Hashem’s representatives in this world.6 This is practically accomplished through the system of mitzvos. By committing ourselves to the mitzvos, we not only display our subservience to Hashem as our commander, we also internalize the guidance they have to offer regarding what actions Hashem wants us to perform, the outcomes He wants to see in the world, and the values He wants us to represent.

A person who accepts someone else’s authority, then, is the most blatant contradiction to this reality. As Tosafos wrote on the Gemara above, the initial act of selling oneself as a slave already involves the transgression of “Ki Li Bnei Yisrael avadim — For the Jewish People are My servants, My slaves that I brought out from Egypt.” But at least in that case, one can justify what happened based on the circumstances — a person can only sell themselves to escape grinding poverty.

Even more flagrant, then, is the slave who decides that “he loves his master, his [gentile slave] wife and children; I do not want to go free.” He voluntarily extends his servitude “l’olam, forever” (which Chazal explain to mean until Yovel, but is clearly written to connote eternity). In other words, he is choosing to be an extension of his human master — at the expense of serving in his intended role, an extension of Hashem.

For this reason, his ear is pierced at the door: “The door and lintel that witnessed Me passing over them in Egypt and stating that the Jewish People were My servants — Mine, and not servants to servants — yet this person went and acquired a master for himself, let his ear be pierced before them!”7

רש”י שמות פרשת משפטים פרק כא פסוק ו

ומה ראה אזן להרצע מכל שאר אברים שבגוף, אמר רבי יוחנן בן זכאי (קדושין כב ע”ב) אזן זאת ששמעה על הר סיני לא תגנוב, והלך וגנב, תרצע. ואם מוכר עצמו, אזן ששמעה על הר סיני (ויקרא כה נה) כי לי בני ישראל עבדים, והלך וקנה אדון לעצמו, תרצע. ר’ שמעון היה דורש מקרא זה כמין חומר מה נשתנו דלת ומזוזה מכל כלים שבבית, אמר הקדוש ברוך הוא דלת ומזוזה שהיו עדים במצרים כשפסחתי על המשקוף ועל שתי המזוזות ואמרתי כי לי בני ישראל עבדים, עבדי הם ולא עבדים לעבדים, והלך זה וקנה אדון לעצמו, ירצע בפניהם:

Or even more striking, the Yerushalmi’s formulation: “Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai’s students asked him, ‘Why is the ear of this slave more fitting to be pierced than any other limb of the body?’ He answered, ‘The ear that heard at Sinai, “You shall not have any other gods,” yet he went and discarded the yoke of Divine authority and took on the yoke of a human — let it be pierced!’”

תורה תמימה שמות פרק כא פסוק ו

את אזנו - שאלו התלמידים את רבי יוחנן בן זכאי, מה ראה העבד הזה לרצע באזנו יותר מכל אבריו, אמר להם, אזן ששמעה על הר סיני לא יהיה לך אלהים אחרים והלך זה ופרק מעליו עול מלכות שמים וקבל עליו עול בשר ודם - ירצענח) [ירושלמי קדושין פ”א ה”ב]:

The mitzvah of eved Ivri, then, is much more than one mitzvah of many. It encapsulates the essence of what the Jewish People are supposed be — representatives of Hashem in this world, acting on His behalf to finish the process of Creation and make this world into a place in which He can live with us. By opening the Torah’s legal section, the mitzvah content, with the response to a person who rejects that role — piercing the ear that heard this message in Egypt/at Sinai but chose to ignore it — the Torah emphasizes the ideal towards which we should aspire.

Consider a decision you have coming up — choice of careers, spouse, where to live, how to spend your free time on Sunday… If life was up to you, what would you decide? How does that change when you try to adopt this eved perspective, asking what Hashem wants you to decide? For one friend, this is what steered him from his track towards a tech degree into Jewish education; for another, this perspective sent him and his wife on aliyah rather than staying in the familiar community in which they had grown up; for a third, they left Israel after coming on aliyah to spend three years on shlichut in a mid-size Jewish community in the US. Each one understood their abilities and interests and brought them to bear in a way that expressed Hashem’s plan for them rather than their own. Everyone has a role to play, something unique to contribute; what matters is adopting the mindset of Ki Li Bnei Yisrael avadim.

What is the purpose of learning Torah?

These don’t seem like related questions, do they? What could connect the intellectual excitement and rigor of exploring a topic in Gemara, Halachah, Tanach, etc., with the emotional and relational investment needed to have and raise children?

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Shared Purpose

I was surprised to come across a piece in the name of Rabbi Shlomo Kluger stating that having children and learning Torah are ultimately aimed at the same goal: stimulating the advent of redemption, the arrival of Mashiach! (Text below).

He starts by positing that the purpose of having children is to bring Mashiach, as the Gemara says: “Ein ben David ba ad she’yichlu kol neshamos she’b’guf — Mashiach will not come until all of the souls in the “guf” are finished” (Yevamos 62a). Rabbi Kluger innovates that the same holds true for learning, as well (although this jump is not associated with a similarly explicit source): There is a limited quantity of Torah that exists in heaven waiting to be brought into this world, and Mashiach will not come until that happens!

Ben Azzai

There’s even a halachic component to his argument, in the spirit of Halachic Worldviews: He points out the curious case of Ben Azzai, who taught that anyone who doesn’t involve themselves in procreation is considered guilty of bloodshed and is seen as if they minimized the Divine Image — but didn’t himself have children (and may not even have gotten married). When challenged on this disconnect, he answered, “What can I do? My soul desires Torah! The world will be sustained through others” (Yevamos 63b). Ben Azzai is cited as a paradigm in Even Ha’ezer 1:4.

Rabbi Kluger explains that Ben Azzai’s refraining from having children in order to dedicate himself to learning wasn’t simply a choice to put aside the mitzvah of p’ru u’revu because he so deeply desired to learn uninterrupted. Rather, it came from a deep understanding of the shared purpose of both mitzvos. By dedicating himself to learning, Ben Azzai was actually working towards the same purpose as his peers who were getting married and having children — they were working on parallel tracks, clearing the way for Mashiach to come and bring the promised redemption.

(It seems difficult to read this understanding into Ben Azzai’s response. He did not say anything about working towards shared goals; rather, he seems to admit their point yet permit himself to abstain due to other people accomplishing the goal of yishuv ha’olam.)

Selling a Sefer Torah

While Rabbi Kluger doesn’t add this, I wonder if he would point to another interesting connection between having children and learning Torah: The Gemara in Megillah (27a) says that the only two reasons for which one may sell a Sefer Torah is to be able to learn Torah or in order to get married. Just as Ben Azzai sacrificed the mitzvah of procreation for the sake of learning, maybe the same logic could be used to justify overriding the sanctity of the Sefer Torah on behalf of procreation.

Limit, Not Purpose

Other approaches would respond to Rabbi Kluger by pointing out that the foundation of his argument was built on something that the Gemara did not say. He understood the Gemara’s statement in the name of Rav Ashi that “Mashiach will not come until all of the souls are born into the world” to mean that the purpose of having children is to bring Mashiach. While Rav Huna cited Rav Ashi as explaining his understanding of the reason for the mitzvah, the Gemara rejects Rav Huna on the following amud. Rav Ashi’s statement alone does not say that the reason for having children is to bring Mashiach; it just says that until that happens, Mashiach will not come. It does not encourage hastening that process by having as many children as possible; it simply states it as a limiting factor. Of course, Rabbi Kluger could respond that this second step is so obvious, it doesn’t need to be said; who would not want to hasten redemption? While this is a strong response, it significantly weakens the entire presentation.

As a parallel, the Gemara in Shabbos (118b) says that if the Jewish People would keep two Shabbasos properly, they would be immediately redeemed.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַי: אִלְמָלֵי מְשַׁמְּרִין יִשְׂרָאֵל שְׁתֵּי שַׁבָּתוֹת כְּהִלְכָתָן — מִיָּד נִגְאָלִים, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כֹה אָמַר ה׳ לַסָּרִיסִים אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁמְרוּ אֶת שַׁבְּתוֹתַי״, וּכְתִיב בָּתְרֵיהּ: ״וַהֲבִיאוֹתִים אֶל הַר קׇדְשִׁי וְגוֹ׳״.

Would you say that the purpose of keeping Shabbos — or even getting other people to keep Shabbos — is to earn this guaranteed redemption? No — the purpose of keeping Shabbos is to remember Creation and the Exodus (meaning, according to Rav Hirsch, to remind ourselves of our role as Junior Partners in continuing Hashem’s project of creating and molding this world by following the CEO’s directions to close the office, and to celebrate the fact that we have that role with three meals and fancy clothes). A promised outcome is redemption, but that doesn’t make it the reason for the mitzvah.

Extrinsic vs Intrinsic Value

To continue the analysis, it pays to note that Rabbi Kluger’s shared reason for having children and learning Torah is extrinsic, or something separate from the value generated by the actions themselves. Thus, a response to Rabbi Kluger could highlight the intrinsic value of both talmud Torah and having children, unrelated to their connections with the geulah. In fact, the Gemara itself does exactly that. The Gemara in Megillah explains the above-mentioned leniency by saying: Selling a Torah for the sake of learning is permitted because learning facilitates action (talmud meivi li’dei maaseh), and doing so for the sake of marriage is because “Lo tohu beraah, la’sheves yetzarah—Hashem did not create the world to for it lie fallow, but to be settled.” In Gittin (38a), Tosafos identifies this mitzvah as significant enough to even permit transgressing the issur of l’olam ba’hem taavodu (see Chapter 14 of HW, “Slaves and Service,” for more). In other words, the value of learning is the practical knowledge and guidance it generates, and the value of having children is the children themselves!

To me, this fits into a broader paradigm I’ve explored in the past — do Torah and mitzvos have intrinsic or extrinsic value? I’ve cited from the Rambam and Ramban that the purpose of the mitzvos is the “tikkun of the self and the community” (while also recognizing that there are other statements in the Rambam that are more Olam Haba oriented; curious to hear if there are resolutions to the tension there). On the other hand, there are approaches that explain the value of Torah and mitzvos in either the tikkunim they create in the Upper Worlds (the Nefesh Hachaim, discussed here) or in the value they create for a person in Olam Haba (the Ramchal in the beginning of Mesillas Yesharim and Derech Hashem). Focusing on their capacity to bring geulah would be a similar angle.

*UPDATE*

left a terrific comment that I thought enhanced the piece enough to incorporate it:

Great post!

The teffilah of the Shelah also says having children and learning Torah share a common purpose.

Here is the text:

וְעַל קִיּוּם הָעוֹלָם וְעַל קִיּוּם הַתּוֹרָה בָּא לָנוּ מִמְּךָ יְהֹוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ שְׁנֵי צִוּוּיִים, כָּתַבְתָּ בְּתוֹרָתֶךָָ “פְּרוּ וּרְבוּ”, וְכָתַבְתָּ בְּתוֹרָתֶךָָ “וְלִמַּדְתֶּם אֹתָם אֶת בְּנֵיכֶם”, וְהַכַּוָּנָה בִשְׁתֵּיהֶן אֶחָת, כִּי לֹא לְתֹהוּ בָרָאתָ כִּי אִם לָשֶׁבֶת, וְלִכְבוֹדְךָ בָּרָאתָ יָצַרְתָּ אַף עָשִׂיתָ, כְּדֵי שֶּׁנִהְיֶה אֲנַחְנוּ וְצֶאֱצָאֵינוּ (וְצֶאֱצָאֵי צֶאֱצָאֵינוּ) וְצֶאֱצָאֵי כָּל עַמְּךָ בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל יוֹדְעֵי שְׁמֶךָ וְלוֹמְדֵי תוֹרָתֶךָ

In other words, whereas R’ Shlomo Kluger identified the common goal of having children and learning Torah as bringing the geulah, the Shelah explained both as yielding the intrinsic goal of yishuv ha’olam.

This reminded me of the Rambam’s formulation of the purpose of learning at the end of Yesodei HaTorah 4:

וְעִנְיְנֵי אַרְבָּעָה פְּרָקִים אֵלּוּ שֶׁבְּחָמֵשׁ מִצְוֹת הָאֵלּוּ הֵם שֶׁחֲכָמִים הָרִאשׁוֹנִים קוֹרְאִין אוֹתוֹ פַּרְדֵּס כְּמוֹ שֶׁאָמְרוּ אַרְבָּעָה נִכְנְסוּ לַפַּרְדֵּס. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁגְּדוֹלֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל הָיוּ וַחֲכָמִים גְּדוֹלִים הָיוּ לֹא כֻּלָּם הָיָה בָּהֶן כֹּחַ לֵידַע וּלְהַשִּׂיג כָּל הַדְּבָרִים עַל בֻּרְיָן. וַאֲנִי אוֹמֵר שֶׁאֵין רָאוּי לְטַיֵּל בַּפַּרְדֵּס אֶלָּא מִי שֶׁנִּתְמַלֵּא כְּרֵסוֹ לֶחֶם וּבָשָׂר. וְלֶחֶם וּבָשָׂר הוּא לֵידַע הָאָסוּר וְהַמֻּתָּר וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶם מִשְּׁאָר הַמִּצְוֹת. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁדְּבָרִים אֵלּוּ דָּבָר קָטָן קָרְאוּ אוֹתָן חֲכָמִים שֶׁהֲרֵי אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים דָּבָר גָּדוֹל מַעֲשֵׂה מֶרְכָּבָה וְדָבָר קָטָן הֲוָיוֹת דְּאַבַּיֵּי וְרָבָא. אַף עַל פִּי כֵן רְאוּיִין הֵן לְהַקְדִּימָן. שֶׁהֵן מְיַשְּׁבִין דַּעְתּוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם תְּחִלָּה. וְעוֹד שֶׁהֵם הַטּוֹבָה הַגְּדוֹלָה שֶׁהִשְׁפִּיעַ הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא לְיִשּׁוּב הָעוֹלָם הַזֶּה כְּדֵי לִנְחל חַיֵּי הָעוֹלָם הַבָּא. וְאֶפְשָׁר שֶׁיְּדָעֵם הַכּל קָטָן וְגָדוֹל אִישׁ וְאִשָּׁה בַּעַל לֵב רָחָב וּבַעַל לֵב קָצָר:

(Regarding the reference to Olam Haba, the mefaresh explains that the immediate goal of learning is yishuv ha’olam, which creates the context needed for us to be nochel chayei Olam Haba through hasagas Elokus:

אעפ”כ ראויין הם להקדימן וכו’. שמשפטיהם מביאים לידי הטובה הגדולה שהקב”ה צוה על הגזל ועל החמס והגנבה והדינים. וכל אלו הם לישובו של עולם שבעשייתם יהיה השלום בעולם ויסור הנזק ויוכל אדם להשיג בוראו ויגיע לחיי העוה”ב. השם יעזרנו על דבר כבוד שמו:)

It’s also interesting to consider Rav SR Hirsch’s proposal that a possible root of the word “Torah” is הרה — to conceive a child, also linking childbirth and learning.

שו”ת עטרת פז חלק א כרך ב - יורה דעה, הערות הקדמה הערה ג

ואיברא דהנה הגאון רבי שלמה קלוגר בריש הקדמתו לשו”ת טוב טעם ודעת (מהדורא תנינא) עמד לבאר פסוק זה (דסוף קהלת) "ויותר מהמה בני הזהר עשות ספרים הרבה אין קץ ולהג הרבה יגיעת בשר" בענין נשגב מאוד, שכתב שם: כי כשם שאמרו חז"ל בגמ’ יבמות (סב ע”א) אין בן דוד בא עד שיכלו נשמות שבגוף, והרי שכל הולדת האדם הוי לקרב הגאולה, וזה הקדים יתברך תחילה באומרו לאדם הראשון ולאשתו "פרו ורבו ומלאו את הארץ וכבשוה" כלומר ע"י שיפרו וירבו וימלאו הארץ ויכלו כל נשמות שבגוף עי”ז יכבשוה וירדו בדגת הים כי אז תהיה הגאולה שלימה ואמתית,

וכן הוי נמי בעסק התורה כי הנה אם לפני האדם אין לה שיעור ומידה כי היא ארוכה מיני ים אך לפניו יתברך יש גם לתורה שיעור, ולזה למשה רבינו נמסרה כל התורה כולה ולימדה את בני ישראל, אך תיכף אחר הסתלקות מרע”ה נסתמו עיניהם וליבן של ישראל ונשכחו ג’ מאות הלכות, והנה מאז והלאה התחיל השכחה להתגבר מעט מעט עד שבימות הגלות נשכח בעו”ה כל התורה שבע”פ, ולכן נאמר "בגויים אין תורה", אך ברחמיו לא עזבנו אלוקינו ויט עלינו חסד ונתן בכל דור ודור אשר התחילו להחזיר התורה ליושנה מעט מעט איש איש כפי שכלו אשר חנן ה’ אותו.

ולכך כמו שתלוי משיחנו בכליון כל הנשמה שבגוף ויהיו בעוה”ז, כן תלוי ביאת משיחנו בגמר כל התורה שיהיה בעולם כמו שניתנה למשה רבינו, אם יראה יתברך בעיניו הטהורים שכבר כלה תורה כפי אשר נתונה בעוה”ז אז יבוא משיח צדקינו. וזה מפורש בדברי מלאכי הנביא "זכרו תורת משה עבדי אשר ציויתי אותו בחורב וכו’ הנה אנכי שולח לכם את אליה הנביא לפני בא יום ה וגו’," והכוונה מפורש כדברים הנ”ל דאם "יזכרו תורת משה עבדי אשר ציויתי אותו בחורב" אז תיכף "הנה אנכי שולח לכם את אליה הנביא" ומבואר להדיא דבזכרון תורת משה רבינו תלוי ביאת אליהו שיבוא ב”ב.

ולכן בצאת כל ספר וספר כדת הוא התקרבות הגאולה במהרה בימינו, וזה טעם בן עזאי [בגמ’ יבמות סג ע”ב] ומה שקיי"ל כן באבן העזר [סי’ א ס”ד] דמי שחשקה נפשו בתורה פטור מפריה ורביה, ומה ענין זה לזה אך לפי הנ”ל אייתי שפיר דטעם אחד לשניהם דענין פו”ר הוי לקרב הגאולה, ולהיות חשקה נפשו בתורה להוציאה לאורה בעוה”ז היא נמי התקרבות הגאולה וענינו אחד. וזה הוי נמי דברי שלמה המלך ע”ה בקהלת “עשות ספרים הרבה אין קץ ולהג הרבה יגיעת בשר” והכוונה הוי לא כמו שמבינים הטועים [שלא לעשות ספרים הרבה] אלא אדרבא הוא מזהיר לעשות ספרים הרבה, כי מהאי טעמא אין הקץ נגלה עד שיתרבה הרבה ספרים, כמו דהוי להג הרבה יגיעת בשר להעמיד תולדות דהוי כדי לקרב הקץ, כן הוי נמי עשיית ספרים הרבה לקרב הקץ. עכ”ד. ע”ש.

Looking back, I’m realizing that that initial series got relatively few views, as not many people were subscribed at that point. I thought to highlight that series here for everyone who joined after the series completed, which led me to use this post to highlight a range of posts from the past couple of years. (If you’re thrown off by the “Zionism” reference, the series is not specifically about Zionism, although it does relate to Israel… after all, it’s about Judaism.)

The Great Battalion

The Original Series: Great Battalion

The 19 Letters

Once I finished the Great Battalion, I began with Rabbi SR Hirsch’s 19 Letters:

Halachic Worldviews

Along the way, I also shared 8-10 deeper dives into what I call “hashkafas ha’halachah,” my attempts at applying the approach developed by Rabbi SR Hirsch and Rav Soloveitchik to find the values and ideals expressed by mitzvos and the halachic system.

Halachic Worldviews

Taamei Hamitzvos

I’m also proud of a four-part series on taamei ha’mitzvos:

The Great Tuna Can Debate of 2012

Because Reasons

Sad Birds and Embarrassed Bread (bit of an embarrassing title, too)

An Ironic Twist in Taamei Hamitzvos

Posts with the most views:

1. What Should I Learn in Yeshiva?

2. A (Non-Definitive) Guide to Jewish Publishing

3. Ten Suggestions for the Years in Yeshiva

4. All For One and One For Klal (this one is presumably because cross-posted it)

5. Dear Seniors

Yes, I’m a bit surprised by this list (and faintly disappointed, if I’m being honest. Should I keep writing posts about the Yeshiva experience?). I was happy to see that this transcript of Rabbi Michael Rosensweig, shlita, was the next highest, though.

Thanks to those who have read and offered thoughts and feedback over the past two years. If there are any particular posts that you enjoyed or appreciated, I’d be happy to hear about it!

Looking forward to continuing into 2026, iyH.

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Rambam: Highlighting Gratitude

While we have already made significant strides in understanding the significance of birchas ha’roeh specifically and the mitzvah to light Chanukah candles more broadly, the Rambam’s opinion may be even more extreme than anything seen thus far. [The following is speculative; as always, I’m happy to hear indications against this approach.]

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In his Mishneh Torah, the Rambam seems to adopt a stance parallel to Rashi: Even if a person will be lighting later, he should still make the birchas ha’roeh upon seeing a lit menorah.1

רמב”ם הלכות מגילה וחנוכה פרק ג הלכה ד

כל שחייב בקריאת המגילה חייב בהדלקת נר חנוכה והמדליק אותה בלילה הראשון מברך שלש ברכות ואלו הן: בא”י אמ”ה אקב”ו להדליק נר שלחנוכה בא”י אל’ מ”ה שעשה נסים לאבותינו בימים ההם בזמן הזה, בא”י אל’ מ”ה שהחיינו וקיימ’ והגי’ לזמן הזה, וכל הרואה אותה ולא בירך מברך שתים, שעשה נסים לאבותינו ושהחיינו, ובשאר הלילות המדליק מברך שתים והרואה מברך אחת שאין מברכין שהחיינו אלא בלילה הראשון.

The Maggid Mishneh suggests that the Rambam disagrees with the Rashba, like the Bach: Even if Reuven’s family is lighting for him at home, as long as he has not yet lit, he would make the birchas ha’roeh. This makes the Rambam a “birchas ha’roeh maximalist,” as he would agree that it should be said in all of the contexts so far discussed.

One step the Rambam does not seem to take is to endorse a situation raised in the list at the start of our discussion but not yet discussed: What if a person lit at home and then stepped out for a walk around the block to burn off some latkes and donuts? Might he be obligated to say a birchas ha’roeh upon seeing the menoros of his neighbors?2 So far, the answer seems like no.

The Rambam’s Responsum

However, there is another source from the Rambam to consider. The Rambam was asked about just such a case in his responsa:

שו”ת הרמב”ם הלכות מגילה וחנוכה פרק ג הלכה ד

אלה מי שהדליק נר חנוכה ובירך עליה וחזר להדליק חנוכה אחרת או לראותה הצריך לחזור ולברך אם לא.

תשובה הדבר בזה חוזר לכונת המברך כמו בשאר הברכות ואם נתכון להדליק חנוכות הרבה אחד אחר אחד ברכה אחת לכולן ואם בירך והדליק ואח”כ נזדמן לו חנוכה אחרת להדליק יחזור לברך (הל’ ברכות פ”א ה”י) וכן הוא בברכת הרואה. וכתב משה.

In response, the Rambam seems to unambiguously endorse such an approach: If one did not intend to see other menoros while lighting his own candles, he would make the birchas ha’roeh upon seeing them later!

While this initially appears to contradict the Rambam in Mishneh Torah, it is possible to harmonize the two sources. There, the Rambam states that “one who sees the lit candles and has not yet made the berachah makes two berachos, she’asah nisim and she’hecheyanu.” In theory, the qualifier of “one has not yet made the berachah” can relate more to the she’hecheyanu than to the she’asah nisim: If one has not yet made the berachah on their own menorah, they would make she’hecheyanu in addition to she’asah nisim. If, however, they have already lit, then the next time they encounter a lit menorah, they would make not two berachos, but one — just she’asah nisim, as the Rambam wrote in the above responsum.

Imagine what this would look like: Rather than making the berachah of she’asah nisim once a night over the course of Chanukah, the Rambam according to this approach would have you making the berachah of she’asah nisim tens of times.3 Assuming the Bach’s understanding, this would highlight the gratitude element of hadlakas neiros in a very significant way.

All About Thanksgiving

Appropriately, Rav Michael Rosensweig argues that the Rambam actually understands the institution of hadlakas neiros itself, even without the berachah, as an expression of gratitude. Most obviously, the Rambam describes lighting the menorah as an expression of hodaah towards the end of Hilchos Chanukah:

רמב”ם הלכות מגילה וחנוכה פרק ד הלכה יב

מצות נר חנוכה מצוה חביבה היא עד מאד וצריך אדם להזהר בה כדי להודיע הנס ולהוסיף בשבח האל והודיה לו על הנסים שעשה לנו, אפילו אין לו מה יאכל אלא מן הצדקה שואל או מוכר כסותו ולוקח שמן ונרות ומדליק.

Another indication of this understanding, more subtle but potentially more significant, comes from the Rambam’s presentation of the main Talmudic source introducing Chanukah. In response to the question “Mai Chanukah — What is Chanukah?” the Gemara cites an entry from Megillas Taanis presenting the holiday:

תלמוד בבלי מסכת שבת דף כא עמוד ב

מאי חנוכה? דתנו רבנן: בכ”ה בכסליו יומי דחנוכה תמניא אינון, דלא למספד בהון ודלא להתענות בהון. שכשנכנסו יוונים להיכל טמאו כל השמנים שבהיכל, וכשגברה מלכות בית חשמונאי ונצחום, בדקו ולא מצאו אלא פך אחד של שמן שהיה מונח בחותמו של כהן גדול, ולא היה בו אלא להדליק יום אחד, נעשה בו נס והדליקו ממנו שמונה ימים. לשנה אחרת קבעום ועשאום ימים טובים בהלל והודאה.

The Gemara describes three components to the institution of Chanukah: yamim tovim, hallel, and hodaah. Rashi downplays the yamim tovim component, simply saying that this should not be taken to mean that there’s a restriction on melachah on Chanukah.4 He identifies hallel and hodaah as the daily recitation of the full Hallel and the inclusion of al ha’nissim in davening.

In contrast, the Rambam seems to understand the beraisa’s conclusion differently:

רמב”ם הלכות מגילה וחנוכה פרק ג הלכה ג

ומפני זה התקינו חכמים שבאותו הדור שיהיו שמונת הימים האלו שתחלתן מליל חמשה ועשרים בכסלו ימי שמחה והלל ומדליקין בהן הנרות בערב על פתחי הבתים בכל לילה ולילה משמונת הלילות להראות ולגלות הנס, וימים אלו הן הנקראין חנוכה והן אסורין בהספד ותענית כימי הפורים, והדלקת הנרות בהן מצוה מדברי סופרים כקריאת המגילה.

Yamim tovim seems to become simchah, leading some to believe that the Rambam held there’s an obligation to eat a celebratory meal on Chanukah. Hallel remained Hallel, like Rashi. Most surprisingly, hodaah becomes the obligation to light the menorah. As above, the Rambam seems to understand the institution of neros Chanukah as oriented towards expressing gratitude for the miracles of Chanukah.5

This could fit well with the above understanding of the Rambam’s opinion regarding birchas ha’roeh. If the entire institution of lighting ner Chanukah is meant to generate hodaah, it is not surprising that one who meets the menorah is meant to mention their gratitude for the miracle merited by the Jewish People “in those days, at this time.”

To be sure, we do not paskin like the Rambam, in neither his less- or more-extreme formulation. One should not make the birchas ha’roeh unless they are in the unlikely situation described by the Shulchan Aruch in 676:3. However, the double-value perspective advanced by the Bach and the hodaah-centric possible understanding of the Rambam can add to a person’s celebration of Chanukah. Beyond reflecting on the element of pirsumei nisa when lighting your menorah, remember to express your gratitude for Hashem’s involvement in saving us from attack and giving us the opportunity to return Jewish sovereignty to Eretz Yisrael. Even more, each time you step outside and see dancing flames lining the street, use it as an opportunity to say thank you once again — al nisecha v’al niflaosecha v’al yeshuasecha.

In those days, in this time.

In addition to the mitzvah to light the menorah on Chanukah, Chazal include what initially appears to be a rarely applied contingency plan for those who do not have the opportunity to do so: the birchas ha’roeh, the blessing recited upon seeing a lit menorah.

תלמוד בבלי מסכת שבת דף כג עמוד א

אמר רב חייא בר אשי אמר רב: המדליק נר של חנוכה צריך לברך. ורב ירמיה אמר: הרואה נר של חנוכה צריך לברך. אמר רב יהודה: יום ראשון - הרואה מברך שתים, ומדליק מברך שלש. מכאן ואילך - מדליק מברך שתים, ורואה מברך אחת. מאי ממעט? ממעט זמן. ונימעוט נס! נס כל יומי איתיה.

Rav Chiya bar Ashi teaches in the name of Rav: One who lights the menorah must make a blessing. And Rav Yirmiyah says: One who sees the lit menorah must make a blessing. Rav Yehudah says: On the first day, the one who sees makes two blessings, and the one who lights makes three blessings. From then on, one who lights makes two blessings, and one who sees makes one blessing. What is excluded? The blessing of time [shehecheyanu]. What about excluding the blessing over the miracle [she’asah nisim]? The miracle applies each day.

As Tosafos point out, the institution of a birchas ha’roeh on Chanukah is unique in Halachah; there are no other mitzvos that trigger a berachah upon sight.1 Perhaps even more surprising, the other instance in halachah when this berachah is recited, before the reading of the Megillah on Purim, also does not feature a parallel birchas ha’roeh.

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What message are we meant to internalize through this surprising detail in the laws of Chanukah? Before addressing this question, we must first analyze the way this law is expressed in halachah.

A few options could be suggested to explain when one would actually recite the birchas ha’roeh:

• Only if one has no other way to discharge his obligation to light the menorah

• Only if one will not be lighting their own menorah that night

• The first time one encounters a lit menorah

• Any time one encounters a lit menorah

These discussions and the explanations offered by them by Rishonim and poskim will shed light on the details of this halachah. By first understanding its contours, we will better be able to correctly identify its meaning.

Rashba: Backup Plan

According to the Rashba, the birchas ha’roeh may only be recited in the exceedingly rare case that a person — let’s call him Reuven — has no way to fulfill the mitzvah on his own.

חידושי הרשב”א מסכת שבת דף כג עמוד א

הרואה מברך שתים. מסתברא בשלא הדליק ולא הדליקו עליו בתוך ביתו ואינו עתיד להדליק הלילה, הא לאו הכי אין צריך לברך דלא מצינו יוצא מן המצוה וחוזר ומברך על הראיה, ויש מרבוותא ז”ל דפירשו דאע”פ שמדליקין עליו בתוך ביתו צריך לברך על הראיה, ואין להם על מה שיסמוכו.

He states that it seems logical to him that the birchas ha’roeh would only be said if Reuven has not lit, does not have his family lighting on his behalf at home, and will not himself light later that night. After all, what other parallel exists of a person who has accomplished a mitzvah later making a berachah on seeing the fulfillment of that same mitzvah? Apparently, the Rashba understands the birchas ha’roeh as a backup plan for the “real” mitzvah of lighting. Therefore, as long as Reuven is able to perform the mitzvah through lighting in some way — whether on his own later in the night or through his family at home — there would be no reason to use the backup plan.2

Rashi: Will Not vs. Not Yet

Rashi disagrees with the Rashba regarding whether a person who will light later should make the birchas ha’roeh.

רש”י מסכת שבת דף כג עמוד א

הרואה - העובר בשוק ורואה באחד החצרות דולק, ומצאתי בשם רבינו יצחק בן יהודה, שאמר משם רבינו יעקב: דלא הוזקקה ברכה זו אלא למי שלא הדליק בביתו עדיין, או ליושב בספינה.

According to Rashi, one who has not yet lit should make the birchas ha’roeh. This implies that if Reuven is on his way home from work and sees a lit menorah in the window a few houses before his own, he should make the berachah of She’asah Nisim. What Rashi doesn’t specify, though, is whether Reuven will once again make the same berachah when he lights his own menorah at home. This question is itself subject to a machlokes.

• The approach that says Reuven should repeat the berachah3 would seem to indicate that while she’asah nisim can be said on its own upon seeing a lit menorah, it is more ideally packaged together with the act of lighting itself.

• The approach that says Reuven should not say she’asah nisim on his own lighting would seem to indicate that she’asah nisim is independent of the act of lighting.

In other words, even when Reuven lights his menorah in a standard situation, he is actually doing two separate things, each one carrying their own berachah: He is lighting his menorah, preceded by the berachah of l’hadlik ner shel Chanukah, and he is seeing the light of his lit Menorah, accompanied by the berachah of she’asah nisim.4

Application: Splitting Up the Berachos

To say this one more way, this latter approach would mean that every time a person lights their menorah, they’re not making two berachos on lighting. They’re actually making one berachah on lighting, and then the birchas ha’roeh on seeing the candles. In fact, the Ritva records an opinion that affirms this understanding with a nafka mina l’halachah, a practical difference in the way one is meant to do the mitzvah:

חידושי הריטב”א מסכת שבת דף כג עמוד א

מאי מברך וכו’. ונהגו לברך שלשתם קודם הדלקה משום דבכל המצות מברך עליהם עובר לעשייתן (פסחים ז’ ב’), וכמו שמברך שלשתן קודם מקרא מגילה, ויש אומרים כי הראשונה שהיא ברכת המצוה צריך לברך תחלה, אבל השתים האחרות אומרם אחר שהתחיל להדליק שיהא רואה נסו ויברך עליו כעין הרואה נר חנוכה, ואין לשנות בזה המנהג.

As opposed to the common practice of making both l’hadlik and she’asah nisim before beginning to kindle the candles, the Ritva records an opinion that the proper sequence is:

1. Make the berachah of l’hadlik

2. Begin to light

3. Make the berachah of she’asah nisim while lighting the rest of the candles

In fact, the Ritva explicitly describes such an approach as k’ein ha’roeh ner Chanukah, similar to one who sees the lit menorah.5 If the berachah of she’asah nisim is really a birchas ha’roeh, then it is logical that it should be delayed until one can actually see the lit candles. In contrast, the standard approach would argue that the berachah of she’asah nisim is part of the hadlakah. By explicating the point about miracles, we create the context needed for the menorah to accomplish its purpose of pirsumei nisa.6

While this approach gives us potential new insight into the nature of the berachos recited when lighting the menorah, and by extension the mitzvah to light the menorah itself, we do not yet understand why these two elements should be incorporated into the mitzvah.

Bach: Understanding the Split

A third opinion will reveal an underlying logic that explains the above distinction between the berachah on lighting and the berachah on seeing the lit candles. Above, the Rashba stated that if Reuven’s family is lighting on his behalf at home, he should not make the birchas ha’roeh. The Bach disagrees with this position:

ב”ח אורח חיים סימן תרעו

ומ”ש ואין מדליקין עליו וכו’. כתב הסמ”ג (הל’ חנוכה רנ ע”ד) דר”ל דאינו נשוי שתדליק אשתו עליו בביתו דאילו היה נשוי אף על פי שהולך בדרך אינו צריך לברך על הראייה כיון דאשתו מדלקת עליו

ותימה דמה שמדליקין עליו בביתו אינו בא אלא לפטור אותו מחיוב המוטל על ממונו להדליק נרות לפרסם הנס ברבים אבל ההודאה על הנס וברכת שהחיינו הוא בחיוב על גופו ומזה לא נפטר כשמדליקין עליו אם לא שעמד שם בשעת ברכה וענה אמן…

The Bach explains his logic as follows: Reuven’s family lighting on his behalf takes care of the obligation on Reuven’s possessions to publicize the miracle of Chanukah to the public, l’farsem ha’nes b’rabim. However, there is an additional, distinct element to the mitzvah — an obligation to express gratitude for the miracle of Chanukah.7 This facet of the mitzvah devolves not on one’s possessions, but on one’s person; Reuven himself must express this gratitude on his own. It cannot be discharged through the lighting done by his family.

The Bach explains the distinction drawn by the Ritva by stating that the mitzvah to light Chanukah candles is meant to accomplish two separate but related goals: to publicize the miracle, pirsumei nisa, and to express thanks for the miracle, hodaah al ha’nes.8

Making the Berachah Without a Menorah

A unique shitah cited by the Meiri could be an even more extreme expression of this distinction between the two components. The Meiri asks what would happen if Reuven found himself not on his way home to light after a long day of work, but stuck in the middle of Gentileville, USA as an adult bachelor in the middle of the Candle and Oil Recession of the 1800s. He can’t light on his own, has no family or spouse to light on his behalf, and will not even encounter a lit menorah on which to make the birchas ha’roeh. Is there anything for Reuven to do in such a case?

בית הבחירה (מאירי) מסכת שבת דף כג עמוד א

מי שאין לו להדליק ואינו במקום שיהא אפשר לו לראות יש אומרים שמברך לעצמו שעשה נסים ושהחיינו בלילה ראשונה ושעשה נסים בכל הלילות והדברים נראין.

According to the Meiri, Reuven should make the berachos of she’asah nisim and shehecheyanu, entirely disconnected from the act of lighting! Just the day of Chanukah itself is enough to generate both berachos. While this is surprising (and not accepted l’halachah), it could be explained as an extension of the Bach’s understanding: The berachah of she’asah nisim is intended as an expression of gratitude for the miracles Hashem showed us during Chanukah. While this is ideally accomplished connected to the lit menorah, calling to mind the miracles of the war and the everlasting oil, the Meiri could explain that the arrival of Chanukah itself is enough to generate the chiyuv to express such gratitude.

Takeaway Message

The double-value perspective advanced by the Bach — keeping in mind both pirsumei nisa and hodaah al ha’neis — can add depth to a person’s celebration of Chanukah. The Bach identifies pirsum with a person’s possessions, a chiyuv al mammono l’farsem ha’nes b’rabim. Every Jewish home with a menorah at the door or in the window calls to the mind that one Jewish family, Matisyahu and his children, that was willing to sacrifice all to keep the flame burning for just a little longer. For all we know, they were the last stand, a single flame in a country plunged into darkness. Yet when they committed themselves to the cause, Hashem met them with miraculous salvation.9

Beyond reflecting on the element of pirsumei nisa when lighting your menorah, remember to express your gratitude for Hashem’s involvement in saving us from attack and giving us the opportunity to return Jewish sovereignty to Eretz Yisrael — al nisecha v’al niflaosecha v’al yeshuasecha.

In those days, in this time.

There is one option not yet explored — the possibility that one should recite the birchas ha’roeh anytime they see a lit menorah at night, even if they’ve already made the berachah upon lighting their own menorah. That possibility will be explored in part 2.

This approach has served me well both in outlining my own ideas and in taking down shiurim/speeches over the years. Rather than trying to capture every word and phrase, it facilitates preserving the broader structure of the idea, making it easier to capture more of the main points and to scan quickly to review afterwards.

Obviously, this works best on a computer, where you can adjust sections as the structure becomes clearer, but it can work with pencil and paper as well.

If this is obvious to you, great; skip it. If not, see below; notice how the sections are evident from a glance, and how supporting ideas are captured in single lines and placed in a context that makes it clear how they relate to the overall structure of the idea.

1. Benefits of the outline format

   1. Concise - summarize concepts and steps instead of trying to copy word for word

   2. Organized – can scan notes looking for a specific section instead of having to read through whole paragraphs looking for one detail

   3. Don’t get derailed by missing one section — pick up with the next part of the outline while knowing what you’ve missed

2. How to outline

   1. Start with the title

      1. You may not always know it when starting out, so leave it blank and start one indent in

   2. Each section gets its own header

      1. Can often identify a section of content by asking, “What question is the speaker addressing?”

      2. Smaller, supporting details within each section get indented

      3. You can often tell during the course of a shiur or presentation what is a new section and what is brought for support

         1. If you can’t, err on the side of maintaining flow and continue in the same section until you know the speaker has moved on.

      4. Can often be helpful to ask – “What question is this information relevant to?” If not related to the main question of the section, should probably be moved to the next section

   3. There’s no limit to how many times a section can be indented

      1. Support

         1. For

            1. This

               1. Statement

   4. As soon as possible after the shiur, read through your notes

      1. Things to look for and adjust:

         1. Clarity of content

            1. Is there something I should rewrite or resummarize?

            2. Any examples I should include to help clarify the main ideas?

         2. Organization

            1. Is each new chunk of content in its own section?

            2. Are the supporting details lined up where they should be?

            3. Can I identify a main question that each chunk of content is addressing?

      2. Fix spelling or grammar at this point while reviewing

The Torah records a consequential exemption to the laws of damages in the context of shein v’regel. If a person’s animal destroys another’s property in a public space while gaining benefit from the object (such as by eating his produce) or in the course of normal behavior (such as knocking things over while walking by them), the owner is exempt from paying for the damage caused. The Gemara explains that this is derived from the source of these forms of damage:

שמות פרק כב

(ד) כִּי יַבְעֶר אִישׁ שָׂדֶה אוֹ כֶרֶם וְשִׁלַּח אֶת בעירה בְּעִירוֹ וּבִעֵר בִּשְׂדֵה אַחֵר מֵיטַב שָׂדֵהוּ וּמֵיטַב כַּרְמוֹ יְשַׁלֵּם:

A person is only responsible for damage caused by one’s animals through shein or regel (in the process of deriving benefit or due to normal behavior) in a private domain, bi’sdei achier. In a public domain, though, one is exempt from having to pay for damages caused (Bava Kamma 25b).

The Rif’s Taama D’kra

The Rif makes a surprising addition when recording this halachah:

רי”ף מסכת בבא קמא דף א עמוד ב

ושן ורגל ברשות הרבים פטורין משום דאורחייהו הוא:

The reason shein and regel are exempt in the public domain is because “such behavior is normal.” What does the Rif mean to add with this reason? After all, an explanation doesn’t seem to be necessary; there are many dinim derived from pesukim that are accepted as a gezeiras ha’kasuv, a Divine decree, without needing to suggest reasons for them.

The Rosh’s Explanation

The Rosh wonders about this and suggests a potential explanation:

רא”ש מסכת בבא קמא פרק א סימן א

“ושן ורגל פטורין ברה”ר דאורחיה הוא.” תמיה לי מה הוצרך לפרש טעמא דפטירי משום דאורחייהו הוא הא קרא כתיב ובער בשדה אחר ודרשינן ולא ברה”ר.

ואפשר שבא לפרש טעם הפסוק למה פטרתו תורה ברה”ר לפי שדרכו לילך ברה”ר ואי אפשר שילכו הבעלים אחריהן תמיד. אבל קרן חייבת ברה”ר אף על פי שדרכו לילך שם דכיון דאייעד ויודע שהוא נגחן הוה ליה למריה לנטוריה (והכי) קי”ל דקנסא הוא כי היכי דלינטריה לתוריה

ונפקא מינה מטעם זה שאם היה עץ ארוך מונח מקצתו ברה”ר ומקצתו ברה”י ודרסה עליו ברה”ר ושברה ברה”י כלים כיון שדרכה לילך ולדרוס עליו פטורין.

The Rosh suggests that the Rif was suggesting an explanation for the gezeiras ha’kasuv. For what reason did Hashem exempt a person from paying for damage caused by one’s animal through shein or regel in a public space? Because “it is its way to walk through a public space, and it is impossible for the owner to follow after them constantly.” Because of these two factors — the Torah’s unwillingness to forbid an animal’s access to the reshus ha’rabim and the impracticality of demanding the owner trail them at all times — any damage they cause through normal behavior must be exempted.

Questioning the Rosh

The truth is, it is not clear how this explanation serves to fully justify the exemption. After all, it is possible for a person to be allowed to do something in a public space yet still be held responsible for any damage caused. For example, the Gemara states that one may allow their waste water to run into the reshus ha’rabim during the rainy season, but if their water causes damage to someone, they will have to pay for it.1 In theory, the same could apply here: The Torah could allow a person to let their animals roam the reshus ha’rabim — which itself should not be taken for granted, as it is normally prohibited to cause damage to another person, even with the intention of paying them back — yet still demand that they pay for any damages caused by the animal.

Additionally, it is worth nothing that this is not the only explanation offered for this din. For example, the Meiri also suggests an explanation:

בית הבחירה (מאירי) מסכת בבא קמא דף יט עמוד ב

במה דברים אמורים ברשות הניזק הא ברשות הרבים פטור פי’ בפירות וירקות ובכל מה שנקרא שן או תולדת שן שהשן והרגל היזקן מצוי עד הרבה ואם יתחייבו ברשות הרבים לא הנחת ממון אצל בעל בהמה הא אכלה כסות או כלים הרי זה קרן ואף ברשות הרבים חייב:

While he seems to be working with a similar starting point as the Rif, his explanation is still different: Because it is normal for an animal to break things in public spaces while walking or trying to derive benefit from its surroundings, it would be too costly for the owners if they were made to pay for all these damages.

Going Further: A Nafka Mina

The Rosh goes further and suggests a practical ramification of this explanation: Consider a plank of wood extending from one’s front yard (a reshus ha’yachid) to the street (a reshus ha’rabim). What happens if a neighbor’s pet dog walks by the edge in the street and jostles the plank, causing the other end to knock into and dent the car parked in the driveway?

• On the one hand, the actual damage took place in the reshus ha’yachid, which would indicate that the owner of the dog should have to pay for the damage caused.

• On the other hand, the animal actually initiated the damage from the reshus ha’rabim, where the owner enjoys an exemption from damage caused through normal behavior — in this case, regel?

The Rosh rules that according to the reason for the gezeiras ha’kasuv provided by the Rif, this question can be resolved. As long as the animal was acting in a way that can be described as orchei, normal behavior, the owner will be exempt. As such, in this case, the owner of the dog will not have to pay to repair the car, as the dog was behaving normally when it knocked into the plank that caused the damage.

Two Questions

The Pilpula Charifta is troubled by both the Rif’s initial statement as well as the Rosh’s elaboration of it.

פלפולא חריפתא מסכת בבא קמא פרק א סימן א

ואני מתמיה מאוד על כל זה דמנין לו להרי”ף לפרש טעמא דקרא מלבו ולהוציא דין מכח אותו הטעם שהוא דלא כמסקנא דגמרא.

First of all, he asks, on what authority did the Rif come up with this reason for the pasuk? Seeing as it does not seem to be indicated in the pasuk itself, what allowed the Rif to make it up? Second of all, how could such an invented reason be used to overturn a ruling established later on in the Gemara?

The ruling he is referencing is what appears to be a case directly parallel to the case of the plank stretching from the street to the front yard:

תלמוד בבלי מסכת בבא קמא דף יט עמוד א

בעא מיניה ר’ ירמיה מר’ זירא: היתה מהלכת ברה”ר (ובעטה) והתיזה והזיקה, מהו? לקרן מדמינן ליה וחייבת, או דלמא תולדה דרגל הוא ופטורה? אמר ליה: מסתברא, תולדה דרגל הוא. התיזה ברה”ר והזיקה ברה”י, מהו? א”ל: עקירה אין כאן, הנחה יש כאן? איתיביה: היתה מהלכת בדרך והתיזה, בין ברה”י בין ברה”ר - חייב; מאי לאו התיזה ברשות הרבים והזיקה ברה”ר! לא, התיזה ברה”ר והזיקה ברה”י. והאמרת: עקירה אין כאן, הנחה יש כאן? א”ל: הדרי בי.

R’ Yirmiya seems to prove that if an animal knocks a rock from the reshus ha’rabim into a reshus ha’yachid, where it causes damage, the owner is responsible to pay. While this seems to directly mirror the question of the plank case — damage was initiated in the reshus ha’rabim, but actually happened in the reshus ha’yachid — the Gemara’s conclusion seems to be that the owner is held responsible, against the suggested lenient ruling of the Rosh in the case of the plank. In fact, the Shiltei Giborim notices that the Rif himself does not record this case of R’ Yirmiya, further reinforcing the Pilpula Charifta’s suspicion that the Rif was relying on his explanation for the exemption of shein v’regel b’reshus ha’rabim to override what appears to be the Gemara’s consensus. What allows the Rif to do such a thing?

Differentiating the Two Cases

Redefining Reshus Ha’Rabim and Reshus Ha’Yachid

A suggestion from the Even Ha’azel serves to defend the Rif and Rosh from the Pilpula Charifta.

אבן האזל הלכות נזקי ממון פרק א:ח

ד) נמצא דהרי”ף והרמב”ם באו לבאר גדר רה”ר דבמקום שהבהמה אוכלת בדרך הילוכה ממש הוי רה”ר אף שלגבי דיני קנינים הוי רשותו של הניזק...

ועכשיו מיושב שפיר מה שכתב הרא”ש דאם הי’ עץ מקצתו ברה”נ ומקצתו ברה”ר ודרסה על הצד שברה”ר ושברה ברה”נ דפטור, ומקשים על זה מהא דהתיזה ברה”ר והזיקה ברה”י דחייב, דהטעם דהתיזה ברה”ר והזיקה ברה”נ חייב הוא משום דכיון דכתיב ובער בשדה אחר ומשגיחין על המקום שבו נעשה ההיזק כמש”כ הרא”ש ליכא למימר דכיון דיכולה להתיז מרה”ר לרה”נ לכן אין לו רשות לייחד רשותו לפירות ולעשותו לשדה אחר, דהא התזת הצרורות לא הוי אורחי’ בהכרח כמו מה שהבהמה הולכת ודורסת בדרך הילוכה... אבל בעץ ארוך שמקצתו מונח ברה”ר והבהמה הולכת כדרכה ברה”ר ומזקת בהכרח אין לו רשות ליחד המקום שברשותו אצל העץ לכלים והוי כמו מקצה מקום מרשותו לרה”ר דטוען המזיק לאו כל כמינך דמקרבת לפירותיך ומחייבת לתוראי...

Based on a number of indications, the Even Ha’azel innovatively argues that in this context, reshus ha’rabim and reshus ha’yachid do not mean a technical “public domain” and “private domain,” following, let’s say, the definitions used for these terms in HIlchos Kinyanim or Hilchos Shabbos. Rather, they are meant to convey “space where an owner may responsibly leave his object” and “space where an owner may not responsibly leave his object.” Accordingly, if a person leaves his fruit on the edge of his front yard abutting the reshus ha’rabim and they are eaten by an animal, it would be considered as if they were eaten from the public domain, rendering the owner exempt — even though they were technically located in a reshus ha’yachid.

Responsible vs. Irresponsible Behavior

Based on this, the Even Ha’azel notes that while R’ Yirmiya’s case of tzroros seems to exactly parallel the Rosh’s case of the wooden plank, they are actually distinct from each other — regarding exactly this factor. If a plank extends from the street to one’s front yard, the owner of the yard has no right to park his car next to that plank, as doing so is clearly irresponsible. In other words, the space next to the plank becomes a “reshus ha’rabim” regarding the laws of shein v’regel, such that if the owner still chooses to park there and a dog walking through the street knocks the plank into the car, the damage is considered as if it took place in the public domain and the dog’s owner is exempt from having to pay.

However, the possibility of an animal knocking rocks into the air from the street into the front yard — something regarded as in between “normal” and “unusual” — is not prevalent enough to determine that parking the car anywhere in that space is considered irresponsible. If so, the owner has full rights to do so, and any damage subsequently caused by tzroros is seen as taking place in a reshus ha’yachid, rendering the dog’s owner responsible to pay.

The Even Ha’azel’s innovation adds a step to the Rosh’s explanation for the Rif. The Rif had said that the Torah exempts damage caused by shein v’regel in the reshus ha’rabim because orchei hu, such damage is “normal,” “the way of the animal.” The Rosh added that this is because it is normal for animals to roam the reshus ha’rabim and it is unrealistic to expect their owners to follow them around. The Even Ha’azel adds that because this is the case, potential victims are obligated to take this reality into account and respond accordingly. If they choose to place their items irresponsibly — the paradigm of which would be placing one’s item on the floor of the reshus ha’rabim in the path of everyone’s pet dog or cat — the Torah places the responsibility for such a decision on their shoulders, not on the owner of the damaging animal. Only once the owner has taken responsibility for his own item by placing it out of harm’s way — paradigmatically, safely in his reshus ha’yachid — does the Torah then obligate the owner of the animal for any damage caused.

Rosh on the Jumping Animal

The Rosh himself spells out this additional step in a later sugyah. The Gemara wonders about an animal that jumps into the air to reach food left in the reshus ha’rabim:

תלמוד בבלי מסכת בבא קמא דף כ עמוד א

אמר אילפא: בהמה ברשות הרבים, ופשטה צוארה ואכלה מעל גבי חברתה - חייבת; מאי טעמא? גבי חברתה כחצר הניזק דמי. לימא מסייע ליה: היתה קופתו מופשלת לאחוריו, ופשטה צוארה ואכלה ממנו - חייבת; כדאמר רבא: בקופצת, הכא נמי בקופצת. והיכא איתמר דרבא? אהא דאמר רבי אושעיא: בהמה ברשות הרבים, הלכה ואכלה - פטורה, עמדה ואכלה - חייבת; מאי שנא הלכה? דאורחיה הוא, עמדה נמי אורחיה הוא! אמר רבא: בקופצת.

Initially this ruling seems surprising: Seeing as the animal is eating — classic shein — in a reshus ha’rabim, the owner should be exempt for any damage. Why does the fact that the animal “jumped” change the equation enough to cause the owner to be responsible for the damage caused?2

The Rosh explains:

רא”ש מסכת בבא קמא פרק ב סימן ד

...בהמה שקופצת למקום גבוה ואוכלת... כל היכא דיכולה בהמה לאכול כדרכה דרך הילוכה בלא קפיצה אין לו לאדם רשות להניח שם פירותיו והוי רשות הרבים ופטורה אבל היכא דאין יכולה לאכול אלא בקפיצה יש לו רשות להניח פירותיו ומיקרי חצר הניזק.

As the Even Ha’azel wrote above, reshus ha’rabim and reshus ha’yachid in this context are not technical terms; rather, they convey “area where the owner cannot responsibly place his food” and “area where an owner can responsibly place his food.” The case of the jumping animal, then, becomes the inverse of the case of a person who left his fruit right on the edge of his front lawn. There, it was technically in his reshus ha’yachid, but practically, he was deemed irresponsible for placing it there and therefore had to absorb the loss.

In this case, if the owner leaves his fruit on ground level of the reshus ha’rabim, that is obviously irresponsible, triggering the exemption for the owner of the animal that ends up eating it. However, if the owner placed his fruit sufficiently high enough in the reshus ha’rabim that it was not normally accessible to a passing animal, that is enough to establish that spot as his “private space,” rendering the owner of the animal that jumps and eats that fruit responsible for the damage caused.

Conclusion

The Rosh’s understanding of the Torah’s exemption for shein v’regel damages incurred in the public domain add a factor to our standard understanding of the laws of damages. In addition to considering the actions of the animal and its owner, the Rosh adds that the actions of the victim must be considered as well. If he acted irresponsibly by leaving his possessions in a place where he should have expected they could be damaged by a passing animal, the Torah places the onus on him and exempts the owner from paying for those damages.

This approach aligns with another principle in assigning responsibility for damages: “Kol ha’meshaneh u’va acheir v’shinah, patur — When one deviates and then another deviates, [the second actor] is exempt.” For example, the Gemara teaches that if one person’s cow crouches in the middle of the street and is then kicked by someone else’s cow, the owner of the second cow is exempt, for the first cow acted irregularly.3 One way of explaining this rule is that the owner of the first animal accepts responsibility for the unusual behavior of his animal, even though damage was caused through the actions of the second animal. In fact, the Bechor Shor links these two principles in his commentary to the pasuk describing the categories of shein v’regel:

בכור שור לשמות כב:ד

בשדה אחר. של אחר ברשות הניזק דאין שן ורגל חייבין כי אם ברשות הניזק לפי שאין דרך להניח תבואותיו ופירותיו ברשות הרבים ואם הניח ואכלוהו ורמסוהו איהו דאפסיד אנפשיה וכך אמרו רבות’ כל המשנה ובא אחר ושנה בו פטור כלומר אפי’ שנה בו...

In both circumstances, the victim is assessed to be responsible for the damage they incurred due to their negligence in facilitating the damage, even if the damager played a role in causing the damage as well.4

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As mentioned in a different essay, Rav Avraham Yitzchak HaKohen Kook, one of the most influential personalities and Rabbanim in recent Jewish history, writes about Torah as if it’s a sumptuous buffet prepared for you to enjoy. The only way to really find the foods you’ll enjoy best and maximize the experience, he suggests, is to first sample everything. After an initial tasting round to get a sense of what the full spread has to offer, you can go back and load up on the foods you liked while passing over the ones you didn’t.

The same, he suggests, goes for learning. A person who doesn’t take the time to sample different areas of Torah might be stuck with a section that doesn’t speak to them as strongly. By first getting acquainted with all areas of learning, he can later choose to focus on those to which he feels a strong connection. This idea is expressed by the Gemara in Avoda Zara 19a: “Rebbi said, a person only learns (Rashi explains that it means ‘will remember’) learning that his heart desires — mah she’libo chafetz.”

So what are the areas available? We’ll go subject by subject:

Gemara

Gemara has three subcategories: Iyun, Bekius, and Aliba D’Hilchesa. Iyun and Bekius are usually covered through the regular Yeshiva schedule. Morning Seder is often dedicated to Iyun, while the afternoon is used for Bekius.

Iyun

The goal of learning Gemara B’iyun is to understand the Gemara in a deep way. What exactly that means depends on the approach (the derech ha’limud) employed by the rebbi. For example, a Brisker/conceptual approach to a sugya looks to understand the concepts being discussed, rather than deal with technical issues within or between sugyos, like the mechanics of a question/answer or squaring seemingly contradictory Gemaros.

Bekius

The goal of a Bekius limmud is to pick up yedios throughout Shas — basic familiarity with Torah She’baal Peh. Rav Hershel Schachter, shlita, explains the importance of this by comparing Torah to any other area of knowledge. The same way physics and mathematics have their own internal logic that you understand by learning as much as possible within the discipline, Torah, too, is a self-contained discipline with its own system of logic. Only once you’ve seen all the “data points” will you be able to comprehend the content from its own perspective. As Torah is Hashem’s instructions for us to live our lives by, the importance of seeing as much as possible is paramount.

Broad Bekius knowledge is also important to facilitate learning b’iyun, as familiarity with a concept in different contexts will be important for understanding a deeper discussion of that topic — as the Gemara says in Avodah Zarah 19a, “Ligris inish v’hadar lisbar — First learn, then analyze.” For example, seeing hefker beis din hefker throughout Maseches Gittin is important for crafting a definition and explanation broad enough to fit each instance.

There’s another Bekius limmud that is helpful. Learning Shas Bekius can take years to cover all the topics. Learning something like Mishnayos or the Rambam’s Yad Hachazakah is a much shorter and more accessible way to gain exposure to many of the foundational ideas and areas of Halachah, albeit with less detail and discussion.

• The strength of the Rambam is his organization; he brings everything relevant to a specific topic previously scattered across Masechtos together into one section of the Yad.

• The strength of learning Mishnayos is that you’re learning the primary sources, which pays off more directly when the topics come up in learning Gemara.

Both are easily divided into bite-size sections that add up significantly over time. One perek of Rambam a day brings you through the entire Yad Hachazakah in three years; a perek of Mishnayos a day brings you through Shas in a year and a half!

Aliba D’hilchesa

Learning Gemara Aliba D’Hilchesa means learning with an eye to the practical halachic conclusion of a sugya. This is one style employed in Iyun Shiurim, although more often practiced by Israeli ram’im. Rav Aryeh Leibowitz attributed his love for this style of learning to one of his Rebbeim in Kerem B’Yavneh encouraging him to learn Halachah this way, starting with the Gemaras and continuing through the Tur, Beis Yosef, and finally Shulchan Aruch. It is often surprising, engaging and enlightening to track a sugya from start to finish this way.

Chumash

Chumash can also be learned in a few different ways. On the most basic level, you want to make sure you’re doing Shnayim Mikra, covering the Parsha each week (Rav Moshe writes in Igros Moshe that this applies to guys in Yeshiva, as well — no exemptions!). Using Rashi instead of Onkelos will introduce you to many Maamarei Chazal and Halachos that you wouldn’t have seen otherwise, adding depth to the pesukim.

Additionally, you can choose to focus on one mefaresh, learning selected pieces each week. For example, the Ramban is known as a repository of Hashkafas Yisrael on many basic topics, such as hashgachah pratis and Divine justice. There is even a booklet out there with key Rambans in each Parsha, organized by perek/pasuk. Other popular mefarshim are the Netziv’s Ha’emek Davar, Rav Samson Refael Hirsch’s Peirush Al HaTorah, and the Sefas Emes.

Finally, putting together a devar Torah, either once in a while or on a weekly basis, is a very different experience. You can either start from the beginning, the middle, or the end.

• Starting from the beginning means to explore the parsha looking for an idea that resonates and feels relevant to your life.

• Starting from the middle means you start out with a question and look around for mefarshim who address the question. You can either choose one approach and flesh it out, or aggregate a few approaches to the same question.

• Starting from the end means you know what idea you want to speak about or what personal challenge you want to address, and the goal is to find something in the parsha that can be applied to that topic.

All three are good approaches, although the last one can be challenging to find a source that fits your idea naturally; you need to be open to revising your idea to reflect the Chochmas haTorah, rather than the other way around.

Tanach

It’s time to finally acquaint yourself with the other 19 out of the 24 books in Tanach. On a basic level, we should be aware of our own history, knowing who the main players were and what the timeline looks like. Additionally, of the thousands of Neviim who received messages from Hashem when nevua was still around, the only ones that were written down were the ones that had eternally relevant ideas — which means we should probably try to know what they are. Accessing them means learning through with mefarshim: Rashi, Metzudas David/Metzudas Tzion, and Radak for basic p’shat, while someone like the Malbim for some breathtaking ideas.

Halachah

Learning Halachah is a basic necessity for living an Orthodox lifestyle as well as appreciating the nuances of the Halachos you were brought up practicing. There are many topics to learn, and each one seems to have no end to the details that can be learned (in his Hakdamah to the Mishnah Berurah, the Chafetz Chaim recommended starting with Orach Chaim, topics needed to navigate daily life).

There are two complementary approaches: One is to learn something that gives you a basic breakdown of everything, while the other is to choose one area of Halachah and focus on getting the details down. Kitzur Shulchan Aruch, Chayei Adam, Halacha 24/7, and Shaarei Halacha are examples of the former; Mishnah Berurah and Peninei Halachah from R’ Eliezer Melamed (Hebrew, with some available in English) are examples of the latter.

Later, when you have more experience in learning, you can learn Halachah the ideal way — from the original sources — but that is likely not the most efficient or practical way to get started.

Mussar

The goal of a Mussar Seder is to learn something that inspires and guides you to grow as a person and as an eved Hashem. Some of the classic Sefarim you should get acquainted with at some point are: Mesillas Yesharim, Orchos Tzaddikim, and Shaarei Teshuva.

As important as the classics are, recent sefarim might feel more relevant and applicable to modern challenges. Some examples are Bilvavi Mishkan Evneh (a simply written but very deep sefer on getting to know yourself and how to work through your own challenges) and Olam HaMiddos (a very practical sefer that goes middah by middah with actionable suggestions for growth).

Chovas HaTalmidim, written in the mid-1900s by the Piaseczner Rebbe, is an inspiring sefer written to demonstrate to students their own incredible potential. While written very positively, the Rebbe doesn’t shy away from some sharp insights that can really dig deep. Make sure you start with the Hakdamah!

Hashkafah

Finally, developing your Hashkafah (outlook on life, Weltanschauung) should be a top-tier goal for your time in Yeshiva. While a big part of Hashkafic growth comes from building a relationship with a Rebbi who has a similar worldview to what you’re aiming for, seeing the ideas inside is also important. Speak to your Rebbeim for recommendations; Pirkei Avos with Rashi/Rambam/Rabbeinu Yonah, the Kuzari, Ramban Al HaTorah, and parts of Michtav MeiEliyahu and Alei Shur are some examples.

Many of my personal Yesodos come from Rav Samson Refael Hirsch’s 19 Letters and Rav Soloveitchik’s Halachik Man. Another incredible resource is the writings of Rav Aharon Lichtenstein, such as By His Light and the two volumes of Leaves of Faith. All three contain eloquent and inspiring essays developing foundational ideas in Jewish thought.1

Check For Holes

Those are the areas available: Gemara, Bekius, Chumash, Nach, Halachah, Mussar and Hashkafah. Set up your schedule to get at least a taste of each category. Some limmudim demand more time than others — you won’t have a three-hour Mussar Seder, and you likely won’t have a once-a-week Gemara chavrusa, either. But spread out your time enough so that you’re covering each of these areas at some point over a normal Yeshiva/Seminary week. After getting acquainted with everything on the “buffet,” you’ll hopefully have gotten a taste for the sweetness of Torah and will be ready to focus in on the areas that appeal to you personally, mah she’libo chafetz!

After understanding the importance of taamei hamitzvos to religious life, investigating its appearance in the Mishnah, and reflecting on its dual message for our actual practice of the mitzvos, we can take on the question of what happens when taamei hamitzvos are taken, in theory, just a bit too far.

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A number of Gemaros record a machlokes between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehudah regarding the application of reasons for mitzvos to impact the halachic guidelines of specific mitzvos.

For example, the Mishnah in Bava Metzia (115a) teaches that a person may not collect a security from a widow—“whether wealthy or poor”—as a guarantee for a loan. The Gemara reveals that this ruling is actually subject to a debate between Rabbi Yehudah, whose opinion is recorded in the Mishnah, and Rabbi Shimon, who limits it to only poor widows. According to Rabbi Shimon, it is permitted to take a security from a wealthy widow.

Why does the widow’s economic status make a difference according to Rabbi Shimon? The answer is based on Rabbi Shimon’s insistence on darshinan taama d’kra, inferring the reason for a verse in the Torah. Why did the Torah say that one may not take a security from a widow as a guarantee for a loan?1 Because, explains Rabbi Shimon, picture the scene: A poor widow may be forced to give a utensil she needs daily as the security. In fact, this seems to be the exact scenario described by the Torah, where the woman has no choice but to offer a garment—which she presumably needs—as a security. Therefore, the provider of the loan will be obligated to consistently stop by this woman’s house, dropping off and picking up the security as needed—causing this woman’s neighbors to wonder if there’s something more going on than just a loan arrangement. To avoid such a scenario, the Torah forbids taking a security from a widow across the board.

However, this reason for the mitzvah only applies to an indigent widow, who will need the security returned on a consistent basis. A wealthy widow will not require the provider of the loan to return her security over the duration of the loan; there is no concern, then, that she will develop a negative reputation. Because the reason does not apply to a wealthy woman, Rabbi Shimon asserts that the halachah does not apply, as well. Rabbi Yehudah, on the other hand, does not relate to the reason for the mitzvah. While he presumably agrees that reasons for mitzvos exist, as long as they are not explicated in the Torah, he holds that they do not have the power to affect the bottom-line halachah. Because the pasuk simply forbids taking a security from a widow without mentioning her net worth, Rabbi Yehudah rules that there is no distinction made between a poor and wealthy widow.

How Do We Paskin?

How we paskin in this machlokes between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon is not as clear-cut as one might have expected. While a number of Rishonim take for granted that we rule like Rabbi Yehudah, rejecting darshinan taama d’kra as a viable principle in determining halachah,2 there is actually mixed evidence from none other than the Rambam.3

The Ironic Twist

Fascinatingly, there’s a certain irony built into this sugyah when you drill down a bit. The question of the wealthy widow is seen as a paradigm of assigning reasons to mitzvos, implying that the answer is no, in accordance with Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion.

However, it seems that a number of Acharonim actually applied the methodology of darshinan taama d’kra to the ruling not to differentiate between poor and wealthy widows — and used their reasons to broaden the scope of this halachah! In other words, it seems like they applied Rabbi Shimon-style reasoning to Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion, making it much less clear which opinion actually carries the day in the end.

Sema

The Shulchan Aruch rules in accordance with Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion: One may not take a security from a widow, whether rich or poor.4 The Sema surmises that the Torah offers this protection to a widow because “she has less strength, as women generally are.” A widow exemplifies a woman who doesn’t naturally have anyone on whom she can rely, “neither a husband not her father, as she has already left her parents’ home. By the same logic, then, this halachah should apply not only to a widow, but to a divorcee, as well!”

In other words, the Sema understood the blanket ban on taking a security from a widow as reflecting a desire to protect a potentially vulnerable and isolated woman from being financially taken advantage of — and extended it to include another vulnerable and isolated woman, a divorcee.

Taz

The Taz seems to apply the same logic, but goes even farther: “It appears that this would apply to any unmarried woman, divorced or never married; the verse simply used the most common case [to represent the category] as it is normal for a widow to engage in business, whereas that would be uncommon for a woman who had not yet been married.” Just like the Sema, the Taz seems to take Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion and engage in darshinan taama d’kra to extend the halachah past the literal application of the pasuk.

Tumim

The Tumim pushes back against what he perceives to be these rationalizing excesses of the Sema and the Taz. He first notes that once we are adding to that which is explicitly in the Torah, why not include a woman whose husband has traveled overseas in the prohibition on collecting securities? In fact, the stakes are even higher for such a woman, as she remains married; the result of another man paying her consistent visits would be not just grist for the rumor mill and a dent to their reputations, but actually creating concerns regarding her fidelity to her still-living husband upon his return from his trip.

However, the Tumim continues that we are not meant to add anything to the case described explicitly in the pasuk: “Chas v’shalom for us to deviate even one iota from that which it says in the Torah.” Even more incredibly, the Tumim seems to offer a different reason for this halachah, this one applying only to a widow and not to a divorcee or single woman — the Torah is expressing sensitivity to the overwhelming pain she carries from the loss of her husband and therefore mandates an additional restriction in the way she is treated. No other women should be added to that which is explicitly mentioned in the pasuk.

Thus, what started out as a ruling that followed the opinion that seemed to reject the principle of darshinan taama d’kra actually turned out to exemplify the application of a darshinan taama d’kra methodology to expand the relevance of this halachah.

This gruesome question was actually debated in court in Germany in the early 2000s — regarding a case where exactly that happened. Bernd Brandes responded to a Wanted ad posted by Armin Meiwes and gave repeated explicit permission to Armin to slaughter him and eat him. (I suggest not looking up details of the case). Bernd seems to have been of sound mind; Armin had “interviewed” other respondents and turned them away when it turned out that they weren’t willing to consent to the procedure.

Was Armin guilty of murder if Bernd consented — more, encouraged — Armin to go through with it?

Analyzing the Torah’s presentation of the prohibition of self-harm will shed light on the Jewish perspective regarding this question, and the sanctity of life more broadly.

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Chovel B’atzmo — Allowed or Forbidden?

The Mishnah in Bava Kamma records a strange case that came before Rabbi Akiva.

תלמוד בבלי מסכת בבא קמא דף צ עמוד ב

משנה: ...ומעשה באחד שפרע ראש האשה בשוק, באת לפני רבי עקיבא, וחייבו ליתן לה ארבע מאות זוז. אמר לו: רבי, תן לי זמן, ונתן לו זמן. שמרה עומדת על פתח חצרה, ושבר את הכד בפניה ובו כאיסר שמן, גילתה את ראשה והיתה מטפחת ומנחת ידה על ראשה, העמיד עליה עדים ובא לפני רבי עקיבא. א”ל: לזו אני נותן ד’ מאות זוז? א”ל: לא אמרת כלום, החובל בעצמו אף על פי שאינו רשאי - פטור, אחרים שחבלו בו - חייבים, והקוצץ נטיעותיו אף על פי שאינו רשאי - פטור, אחרים - חייבין.

A man had uncovered a married woman’s hair in the shuk, embarrassing her in public. Rabbi Akiva ordered him to pay her four hundred zuz for her boshes. Instead of paying up, the man requested some time before paying, which Rabbi Akiva granted. He waited outside her chatzer with a small jug of oil; as she walked outside, he let the jug fall to the ground, breaking open and spilling the small amount of oil contained inside. Seeing this, the woman rushed forwards, whipped off her own head covering, and soaked up the oil to rub into her hair. This was exactly what the man expected she would do; he marshalled two witnesses to “record” her voluntarily revealing her hair in public and brought them to testify before Rabbi Akiva: “If she’s not embarrassed to reveal her hair for a few drops of oil, why should I have to pay her four hundred zuz for uncovering her hair?!” Unfazed, Rabbi Akiva shot back: “While a person has no right to cause himself damage, whether physically or monetarily, him doing so doesn’t permit anyone else to do so to him.”

The Gemara challenges the assertion that a person is not allowed to cause damage to themselves by presenting another teaching from Rabbi Akiva himself with the exact opposite message: a person is allowed to cause damage to himself.

תלמוד בבלי מסכת בבא קמא דף צא עמוד א-ב

שמרה עומדת על פתח חצירה וכו’. והתניא, אמר לו ר’ עקיבא; צללת במים אדירים והעלית חרס בידך, אדם רשאי לחבל בעצמו! אמר רבא, לא קשיא: כאן בחבלה, כאן בבושת... לא מבעיא בושת, דאדם רשאי לבייש את עצמו, אלא אפי’ חבלה, דאין אדם רשאי לחבל בעצמו, אחרים שחבלו בו – חייבין.

At this point, the Gemara resolves the contradiction by positing a difference between boshes and chavalah — a person is technically allowed to embarrass themselves, but they’re not allowed to hurt themselves. Even that, though, is not so clear, based on a Gemara in Shavuos:

ואין אדם רשאי לחבל בעצמו? והתניא: יכול נשבע להרע בעצמו ולא הרע יהא פטור? ת”ל: להרע או להטיב, מה הטבה רשות, אף הרעה רשות, אביא נשבע להרע בעצמו ולא הרע!... איזהו הרעת אחרים? אכה פלוני ואפצע את מוחו! אלא תנאי היא, דאיכא למ”ד: אין אדם רשאי לחבל בעצמו, ואיכא מ”ד: אדם רשאי לחבל בעצמו.

The Gemara in Shavuos teaches that if a person swears to do a mitzvah or transgress an aveirah, the shavuah does not take hold; if a person swears to eat treif, for example, he should of course not eat it, and he is not considered to have transgressed his oath. In the language of the Gemara, the person is already “mushba v’omed mei’Har Sinai — he was already made to swear (that he would keep the mitzvah) at Har Sinai,” so the second oath does not take hold.

Then the Gemara asks, what if a person swears to hurt himself, and then chose not to do so? Has he transgressed his oath, or not? In other words — is it just as forbidden to hurt yourself as it is to eat a ham and cheese sandwich? The Gemara concludes that such a person would be obligated for transgressing his oath — or, in other words, it is not forbidden to hurt yourself, so the oath took hold. Once he failed to carry out what he swore to do, he is liable for transgressing his oath. This indicates the opposite of the Gemara in Bava Kamma! And in fact, the Gemara in Bava Kamma concludes that the question is subject to a machlokes Tannaim. The Mishnah in Bava Kamma presented the opinion that one is not allowed to hurt himself, while the Gemara in Shavuos presented the opinion that one actually is allowed to hurt himself.

Rambam: Both!

So far, so good; after all, there’s nothing inherently problematic with identifying a machlokes Tannaim. The problem is that the Rambam, in codifying these Gemaras, seems to try to play both sides of the field at once. For the sake of comparison, let’s first look at the Tur:

טור חושן משפט הלכות חובל בחבירו סימן תכ

כא החובל בעצמו אף על פי שאינו רשאי (פטור) אחרים שחבלו בו חייבים כתב הרמ”ה שאינה הלכה אלא האדם רשאי לחבול בעצמו:

The Tur identifies a machlokes here: the standard, nameless approach is that a person is not allowed to injure himself, but the Tur points out that the Ramah disagrees and holds a person is allowed to injure himself. The Knesses Hagedolah identifies the Ramah’s source as this Gemara in Shavuos.[1]

כנסת הגדולה הגהות בית יוסף חושן משפט סימן תכ

והנראה בעיני שטעם הרמ”ה ז”ל דאדם רשאי לחבול בעצמו הוא מכח ברייתא דפרק ג’ דשבועות ומייתי לה בפרק החובל דתניא יכול נשבע להרע לעצמו ולא הרע שיהא פטור להרע או להטיב, והאי נשבע והרע לעצמו מתוקמא תלמוד לומר בחובל בעצמו דומיא דהרעת אחרים כדאמרינן בפרק החובל. וכיון דהך בריתא ס”ל דאדם רשאי לחבול בעצמו אי משום לישנא דקאמר מה הרעה רשות וכו’, אי משום דכיון דחזינן דחיילא עליו שבועה ואי אין אדם רשאי לחבול בעצמו היכי חיילא עליו שבועה.

And in fact, when you look in Dinei Shavuos in Yoreh Deah (236:2), neither the Tur nor the Mechaber record hurting oneself as an example of a shavuah that would not be chal. This makes sense — since the two sugyos represent a machlokes Tannaim, they can’t both be brought down l’halachah, at least not without noting the contradiction.

The problem is that the Rambam does exactly that. In Hilchos Chovel U’mazik:

רמב”ם הלכות חובל ומזיק פרק ה הלכה א

אסור לאדם לחבול בין בעצמו בין בחבירו, ולא החובל בלבד אלא כל המכה אדם כשר מישראל בין קטן בין גדול בין איש בין אשה דרך נציון הרי זה עובר בלא תעשה, שנ’ )דברים כ”ה ג’( לא יוסיף להכותו, אם הזהירה תורה שלא להוסיף בהכאת החוטא קל וחומר למכה את הצדיק.

In Hilchos Shavuos:

רמב”ם הלכות שבועות פרק ה הלכה יז

נשבע להרע לעצמו כגון שנשבע שיחבול בעצמו אף על פי שאינו רשאי שבועה חלה עליו, ואם לא הרע לעצמו חייב משום שבועת בטוי, נשבע להיטיב לאחרים הטבה שבידו לעשותה כגון שידבר עליו לשלטון או יכבדנו שבועה חלה עליו, ואם עבר ולא עשה חייב משום שבועת ביטוי.

How can the Rambam bring down both dinim if they’re based on fundamentally opposing shitos?[2]

Resolving the Contradiction: Inferred, Not Explicated

Many recognized this contradiction. The Lechem Mishnah, for one, pointed it out on the Rambam himself, and marshalled an opinion of the Ran in Shavuos to resolve it:

לחם משנה הלכות דעות פרק ג

קשיא טובא דלפי הך סוגיא דהחובל משמע דלר”א הקפר דאמר אין אדם רשאי לחבול בעצמו לית ליה ההיא ברייתא דנשבע להרע לעצמו ולא הרע דחייב דלדידיה לא שייך לומר הרעה רשות דאין אדם רשאי לחבול בעצמו ואם כן הוא דפסק כאן כר”א הקפר איך כתב בפ”ה מהל’ שבועות נשבע להרע כגון שנשבע שיחבול בעצמו אפ”ה שאינו רשאי שבועה חלה עליו וגם שם לא הונח לי שכתב אף על פי שאינו רשאי דא”כ הם דברים סותרים כפי הנראה מסוגיא דהחובל דמאן דאית ליה אינו רשאי אית ליה פטור כדכתיבנא...

אח”כ ראיתי להר”ן שכתב בפ’ שבועות שתים בתרא גבי ברייתא נשבע להרע לעצמו ולא הרע, נראה דאע”ג דבפרק החובל (דף צ”א) אמרינן דאין אדם רשאי לחבול בעצמו מדרשא אתיא לן וכל דליתא מן התורה מפורש לא מיקרי מושבע ועומד לענין שלא תחול עליו שבועה וכו’. וכן כתב בתשובה הביאה הרב”י סימן רל”ט וז”ל ומה שהוא מדרש חכמים שאינו מפורש בתורה שבועה חלה עליו וזה לי ימים חפשתי דבר זה ומצאתי סעד לדברי מדברי הרמב”ם והארכתי בזה בפ’ שבועות שתים בתרא, ע”כ.

The Ran takes the Mishnah in Bava Kamma as normative; no one is allowed to injure themselves. The explanation of the Gemara in Shavuos is that since there’s no explicit passuk forbidding self-injury, the rule of mushba v’omed mei’Har Sinai does not apply.

Questioning the Ran

While this does seem to resolve the contradiction between the Gemaros, it is not clear that this answer works for the Rambam. In the halachah in Hilchos Shavuos immediately prior to the one about chovel b’atzmo, the Rambam explains the rule of mushba v’omed. There, his language is that a shevuah only takes hold on something which is a davar reshus:

רמב”ם הלכות שבועות פרק ה הלכה טז

נשבע לקיים את המצוה ולא קיים פטור משום שבועת ביטוי, כיצד כגון שנשבע שיעשה לולב או סוכה או שיתן צדקה לעני או שיעיד לו אם ידע לו עדות ולא עשה ולא נתן ולא העיד הרי זה פטור משום שבועת ביטוי, שאין שבועת ביטוי חלה אלא על דברי הרשות שאם רצה עושה ואם לא רצה אינו עושה שנאמר להרע או להיטיב, לפיכך כל הנשבע להרע לאחרים פטור משבועת ביטוי כגון שנשבע שיכה את פלוני או יקללנו או יגזול ממונו או ימסרנו ביד אנס מפני שהוא מצווה שלא לעשות, ויראה לי שהוא לוקה משום שבועת שוא.

Only something that is fully optional, dependent only on the person’s whim, can be subject to a shavuah. It seems difficult to explain that something forbidden, yet not discussed explicitly in the Torah, should fit into this category.

If so, we are back to square one: How do we explain the stirah in the Rambam?

Sourcing the Issur

To address this question, we need to understand the source of this prohibition, which the Rambam accepts. From where do we know that a person is not allowed to be chovel b’atzmo? The Gemara in Bava Kamma investigates this question following its identification of the machlokes Tannaim:

מאן תנא דשמעת ליה דאמר: אין אדם רשאי לחבל בעצמו? אילימא האי תנא הוא, דתניא: ואך את דמכם לנפשותיכם אדרש - ר’ אלעזר אומר: מיד נפשותיכם אדרש את דמכם; ודלמא קטלא שאני!

אלא האי תנא הוא, דתניא: מקרעין על המת ולא מדרכי האמורי, אמר רבי אלעזר: שמעתי, שהמקרע על המת יותר מדאי - לוקה משום בל תשחית, וכ”ש גופו; ודלמא בגדים שאני, דפסידא דלא הדר הוא! כי הא דרבי יוחנן קרי למאני מכבדותא, ורב חסדא כד הוה מסגי ביני היזמי והגא, מדלי להו למאניה, אמר: זה מעלה ארוכה, וזה אינו מעלה ארוכה!

אלא האי תנא הוא, דתניא: אמר ר”א הקפר ברבי, מה ת”ל: וכפר עליו מאשר חטא על הנפש? וכי באיזה נפש חטא זה? אלא שציער עצמו מן היין, והלא דברים ק”ו: ומה זה שלא ציער עצמו אלא מן היין נקרא חוטא, המצער עצמו מכל דבר על אחת כמה וכמה.

The first suggestion is from Hashem’s command to Noach following the Flood. R’ Elazar reads “V’ach es dimchem l’nafshoseichem edrosh… — But for your own lifeblood I will demand…” as teaching that a person is held responsible even for damage he does to himself. The Gemara rejects this with a dilma: maybe that passuk is talking about a person killing himself, but merely hurting himself is actually not forbidden.

Thus, a second source is suggested: Rabbi Elazar teaches that the prohibition of bal tashchis forbids one from damaging clothing for no reason. The Gemara suggests that the same prohibition surely applies to a person damaging his body. However, the Gemara rejects this source as well, again with a dilma: maybe needlessly damaging clothing is forbidden because it will not heal itself; a torn shirt will stay torn until it is mended. But a person’s body has the miraculous ability to regenerate itself, mending rips and tears until they’re no longer even noticeable. The Gemara even brings a story illustrating this distinction: When Rav Chisda would walk among thorns and thistles, he would lift up the hem of his cloak so that it wouldn’t get torn by the thorns. He explained that while doing so meant his skin would get ripped, he preferred that because his skin heals itself, while the cloak would not.

Finally, a third source is proffered: R’ Elazar Hakapar taught that the pesukim describe a nazir as one who sinned against his soul; what soul did the nazir, a person generally portrayed as someone striving for holiness, commit? The Gemara answers that he caused himself pain by forbidding wine to himself. If that alone is enough to each the title “sinner,” for sure that would be true for one who caused himself more significant pain.

Can any of these work for the Rambam? Off the bat, the challenge of the latter two sources is that neither works with Shavuos: assuming they’re meant to be understood as full-fledged issurim, why should a shavuah to injure oneself be chal? The first source, though, actually has potential. As noted above, the reason an oath to observe or violate a mitzvah does not take hold is because the person was already obligated from Sinai. Could it be that the Rambam accepted ach es dimchem from Noach as the source for the prohibition to injure oneself?[3] That would explain the Rambam’s presentation in Hilchos Shavuos: Even though a person is not permitted to injure himself — due to the passuk in Noach — since that source is pre-Sinai, the shavuah still takes hold. [Talmidei chachamim out there — any sources backing this up as a legitimate answer for the stirah in the Rambam?]

The Torah Temimah understood this way, identifying ach es dimchem as the source for the prohibition to hurt oneself:

תורה תמימה בראשית פרק ט

לנפשותיכם אדרוש - תניא, ואך את דמכם לנפשותיכם אדרוש, ר’ אלעזר אומר מיד נפשותיכם אדרוש דמכם, מכאן שאין אדם רשאי לחבל בעצמו [ב”ק צ”א ב’]:[4]

תורה תמימה הערות בראשית פרק ט הערה ח

ח) כנראה מפרש לנפשותיכם כמו מנפשותיכם, וכמו מנחה היא שלוחה לעבדך ליעקב שפירושו מעבדך מיעקב, וכן לה’ הישועה שפירושו מה’ הישועה, ע”פ הכלל הידוע דאותיות הסמוכות זה לזה מתחלפות. ובגמרא פריך די”ל דאין מכאן ראי’ לחבלה, כיון דהכא במיתה איירי ודילמא קטלא שאני, אבל כנראה אין זה אלא דחוי בעלמא, ופשטות הענין כולל גם חבלת הגוף, וכמ”ש בבבא מציעא צ”ה א’ מה לי קטלה כולא מה לי קטלה פלגא...

While he recognizes that the Gemara offered pushback to this passuk as the source, he understands it as a dichui b’alma — a weak rejection, more an alternate read than an actual shutdown. As the Gemara in Bava Metzia explains, injury is often seen as a less severe form of death, a katla palga. For that reason, even if the source from Noach primarily teaches an issur to commit suicide, it can still be extended to prohibit self-injury as an extension of that issur. In what may be the earliest source for such a connection, the Tosefta in Bava Kamma uses this passuk to source the issur to harm oneself:

תוספתא מסכת בבא קמא (ליברמן) פרק ט הלכה לא

וכשם שחייב על נזקי חבירו כך הוא חייב על נזקי עצמו הוא עצמו שרק וטס בפניו כנגד חבירו מתלש בשערו מקרע את כסותו משבר את כליו מפזר את מעותיו בחמתו פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים שנ’ ואך את דמכם לנפשותיכם אדרוש.

If this analysis is correct, what results is that the Rambam locates the issur to injure oneself in a startling and very telling source. The passuk that follows ach es dimchem provides an explanation for the dinim that led up to it:

בראשית פרק ט, ה-ו

(ה) ואך את דמכם לנפשתיכם אדרש מיד כל חיה אדרשנו ומיד האדם מיד איש אחיו אדרש את נפש האדם: (ו) שפך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך כי בצלם אלקים עשה את האדם:

Since man is made in the divine image, he may not hurt another — not even himself. I am not the final arbiter over what happens to my body; I am made in God’s image, and I have a responsibility to respect and honor that image.[5] If so, giving permission, as Bernd did for Armin, does not permit him to violate the sanctity of the Divine image; no person has the right to waive that for themselves.

Why No Lashes?

If this is correct, what punishment would you expect for transgressing this issur? While the Sdei Chemed quotes one opinion who wondered whether one who injured himself would actually be liable for lashes, the overwhelming majority seem to assume that one who does so is not punished with malkos. In fact, this seems to be the assumption in the Mishnah we quoted above:

תלמוד בבלי מסכת בבא קמא דף צ עמוד ב

החובל בעצמו אף על פי שאינו רשאי - פטור, אחרים שחבלו בו - חייבים, והקוצץ נטיעותיו אף על פי שאינו רשאי - פטור, אחרים – חייבין.

תוספות מסכת בבא קמא דף צא עמוד ב

החובל בעצמו אף על פי שאין רשאי פטור - תימה מאי חיוב שייך ואי פטור ממלקות קאמר ע”כ הקוצץ נטיעותיו אף על פי שאין רשאי פטור לאו היינו פטור ממלקות דהא חייב משום קוצץ אילנות טובות ואזהרתיה מואותו לא תכרות כדאיתא בפ’ בתרא דמכות (דף כב.) וצריך לדחוק ולומר פטור אף על פי שאין בו צד חיוב שאין חס על גופו אחרים שחבלו בו חייבין ואחרים שקצצו נטיעה חייבין צריך לאוקמה כר”מ דאמר (כתובות דף לב:) לוקה ומשלם דלוקה משום לא תכרות אי נמי בדלא אתרו ביה.

The Mishnah writes that even though one who injures himself is exempt, others who injure him are obligated. Tosfos asks, what is a person who injures himself exempt from? The only possibility suggested is that such a person is exempt from receiving lashes, but that is rejected based on the comparison to the parallel case of kotzetz netiosav, who is liable to receive lashes but is still called patur in the Mishnah. In the end, Tosfos is forced to explain that “patur” in this context really means “never really liable for anything”; the word is being used merely to complement the upcoming chayiv, not to convey anything on its own.

Tosfos does not go so far as to suggest that one who injures himself actually receive malkus. The question is, why not? After all, doesn’t self-harm qualify as a lav sheyesh bo maaseh?

If the source for the issur is the fact that a nazir, who causes himself pain by taking on nezirus, is called a choteh, the fact that taking on nezirus is permitted and even, in certain cases, encouraged, would seem to eliminate the possibility of malkus. If the original source is muter, so too will be anything learned from it.

If the source for the issur is bal tashchis, then it should depend on whether transgressing bal tashchis outside of its original context, dealing with fruit trees in the context of war, triggers malkus. At least according to the Rambam, the answer is no:

רמב”ם הלכות מלכים פרק ו הלכה ח, י

אין קוצצין אילני מאכל שחוץ למדינה ואין מונעין מהם אמת המים כדי שייבשו, שנאמר לא תשחית את עצה, וכל הקוצץ לוקה, ולא במצור בלבד אלא בכל מקום כל הקוצץ אילן מאכל דרך השחתה לוקה, אבל קוצצין אותו אם היה מזיק אילנות אחרים, או מפני שמזיק בשדה אחרים, או מפני שדמיו יקרים, לא אסרה תורה אלא דרך השחתה.

ולא האילנות בלבד, אלא כל המשבר כלים, וקורע בגדים, והורס בנין, וסותם מעין, ומאבד מאכלות דרך השחתה, עובר בלא תשחית, ואינו לוקה אלא מכת מרדות מדבריהם.

Even though one who destroys things for no purpose transgresses bal tashchis, he is not liable for lashes. Thus, that could explain why one who injures himself is not liable to lashes.[6]

But if the source is ach es dimchem, the reason one who hurts himself is not punished with lashes is very different. His actions cut at the core of who we are as human beings; they scream out in the most violent way, “I can do whatever I want, with whatever I want — including myself!” The perspective advanced by ach es dimchem, though, is the opposite: as beings created b’tzelem Elokim, we do not have free rein to do as we please. For that reason, such an infraction is punished not by human courts, but by Hashem himself:

ספר חסידים (מרגליות) סימן תרעו

כשם שחייב אדם על נזקי חבירו כך חייב על נזקי עצמו שאם הוא עצמו שרק וטש בפני עצמו ומתלש בשערו ומקרע את כסות עצמו ומשבר את הכלי בחמתו ומפזר את מעותיו בחמתו פטור מדיני אדם ודינו מסור לשמים שנאמר (בראשית ט’ ה’) ואך את דמכם לנפשותיכם אדרוש.

Using the same examples and source as the Tosefta, the Sefer Chassidim declares that one who damages himself is not dealt with by beis din; rather, his judgement is passed up the Heavenly Court. Since he infringed on his tzelem Elokim by damaging his body, he will be brought before his true Owner to justify what he did.

One of the most essential points, if not the most essential point, separating between a secular and a religious worldview is the question of autonomy. Do I answer to anyone other than myself? The secularist, with no conception of God, answers that he is fully independent; no one can tell him what to do. Granted, joining society brings with it the restrictions of the social contract to facilitate peaceful coexistence, but there is no force that can lay claim to anything that I don’t voluntarily choose to give up. A religious individual, on the other hand, proudly asserts a different identity: Ki li Bnei Yisrael avadim, avadai heim asher hotzeisi osam meiEretz Mitzrayim. In the words of Rabbi Elazar Ish Bartosa:

משנה מסכת אבות פרק ג משנה ז

רבי אלעזר איש ברתותא אומר תן לו משלו שאתה ושלך שלו וכן בדוד הוא אומר (דברי הימים א’ כ”ט) כי ממך הכל ומידך נתנו לך

Rav Lichtenstein made this point in the context of abortion:

Even if we were to accept that indeed it is the woman’s own body, we totally reject the conception that she can do with it as she pleases. This is a completely anti-halakhic perception. It rests in a secular assumption that, as it were, ‘My Nile is my own; I made it for myself (Eze. 29:3), as if we are the source of our own existence and therefore masters of our own being. This is assuredly not the case. In absolute terms, a person does not own himself. (To Cultivate and to Guard, pg. 6)

Our exploration of this sugyah indicated that this perspective is built into the Halachic system as well. A person is not allowed to hurt themselves because they do not own their own body; to attack it would be just as problematic as attacking another person (putting aside the additional factor of the crime against the individual himself).

This attitude should inform activities that we do or do not participate in. For example, take paintball. Most people, at least the honest ones, will tell you that at least half the fun of the game is nailing your friend with a shot, especially one that doesn’t pop. “Extra points” if a shot of yours leaves a black-and-blue mark. From a dinei mammonos perspective, it seems pretty clear that no one has to pay for damage caused; one can be mochel the money, and everyone involved in the game knows that such things are likely to happen. But what gives you the right to damage his guf? He can’t be mochel that, the same way he has no right to damage his own body! Other forms of violent play, if it can be called that, are similarly problematic; for a person who appreciates the reality of tzelem Elokim, those types of activities should be avoided.

[1] In fact, Tosfos in Shavuos d.h. avi nishba seems to indicate that the purpose of the Gemara at that stage was to resolve the machlokes recorded in Bava Kamma. At the same time, the Ramah himself, recorded in the Shita Mekubetzes, points to Rav Chisda’s testimony that he used to raise up the hem of his garment when walking through thorns allowing his legs to be scratched, rather than let his cloak be torn, as the source that one is permitted to cause damage to himself. The Yam Shel Shlomo asserts that if that is, in fact, the source, then the Ramah would actually be presenting a limited heter: only as long as there is some practical benefit, such as in Rav Chisda’s case, would one be allowed to damage oneself. If there was no purpose to the pain, it would remain forbidden, the default position. If, though, the Ramah’s source was the Gemara in Shavuos, then he could be presenting an unlimited heter, applying even to cases without utilitarian benefit.

[2] While the Rambam does mention that one is “aino rashai” to hurt himself, the fact that the shavuah is chal still needs to be explained. This is especially indicative because the previous halachah in the Rambam includes the example that if one swears to hurt somebody else, the oath does not take effect, highlighting the difference between the two parallel halachos.

[3] See also Hilchos Rotzeiach 1:4 (quoted by Shu”t Kol Mevaser 2:22) for a similar perspective:

ומוזהרין בית דין שלא ליקח כופר מן הרוצח ואפילו נתן כל ממון שבעולם ואפילו רצה גואל הדם לפטרו שאין נפשו של זה הנהרג קנין גואל הדם אלא קנין הקדוש ברוך הוא...

[4] The Torah Temimah’s father, the Aruch Hashulchan (CM 420:43), also brings this passuk as a source for the issur to damage oneself, along with the passuk of hishamer lecha u’shmor nafshecha.

[5] See also the Radvaz to Hilchos Sanhedrin 18:6:

...לפי שאין נפשו של אדם קניינו אלא קנין הקדוש ברוך הוא שנאמר הנפשות לי הנה (יחזקאל י”ח) הילכך לא תועיל הודאתו בדבר שאינו שלו ומלקות פלגו דמיתה הוא אבל ממונו הוא שלו ומש”ה אמרינן הודאת בעל דין כמאה עדים דמי וכי היכי דאין אדם רשאי להרוג את עצמו כן אין אדם רשאי להודות על עצמו שעשה עבירה שחייב עליה מיתה לפי שאין נפשו קניינו.

[6] Even if the source of this issur is an extension of bal tashchis, it’s fascinating to recognize that bal tashchis also serves as the context for the famous passuk of ki ha’adam eitz hasadeh, creating some sort of parallel between a fruit tree and a human being. Both should be seen as valuable for what they are meant to produce, rather than to be used as an inanimate tool or implement.

For the Birds

A Mishnah in Berachos (5:3) records that a person is not allowed to express the following prayer:

הָאוֹמֵר עַל קַן צִפּוֹר יַגִּיעוּ רַחֲמֶיךָ, וְעַל טוֹב יִזָּכֵר שְׁמֶךָ, מוֹדִים מוֹדִים, מְשַׁתְּקִין אוֹתוֹ

One who recites in his supplication: Just as Your mercy is extended to a bird’s nest, as You have commanded us to send away the mother before taking her chicks or eggs (Deuteronomy 22:6–7), so too extend Your mercy to us; and one who recites: May Your name be mentioned with the good or one who recites: We give thanks, we give thanks twice, they silence him.

A chazzan who adds into his prayer that Hashem should have mercy on us the way He has mercy on the birds should be silenced; for some reason, such a sentiment must be suppressed.

What is the problem with this statement?

The Gemara (33b) records two opinions:

גְּמָ׳ בִּשְׁלָמָא, ״מוֹדִים, מוֹדִים״ מְשַׁתְּקִין אוֹתוֹ — מִשּׁוּם דְּמֶיחְזֵי כִּשְׁתֵּי רָשׁוּיוֹת. וְ״עַל טוֹב יִזָּכֵר שְׁמֶךָ״ נָמֵי, מַשְׁמַע עַל הַטּוֹבָה וְלֹא עַל הָרָעָה, וּתְנַן: חַיָּיב אָדָם לְבָרֵךְ עַל הָרָעָה כְּשֵׁם שֶׁמְּבָרֵךְ עַל הַטּוֹבָה. אֶלָּא ״עַל קַן צִפּוֹר יַגִּיעוּ רַחֲמֶיךָ״ מַאי טַעְמָא?

GEMARA: Our mishna cited three instances where the communal prayer leader is silenced. The Gemara clarifies: Granted, they silence one who repeats: We give thanks, we give thanks, as it appears like he is acknowledging and praying to two authorities. And granted that they also silence one who says: May Your name be mentioned with the good, as clearly he is thanking God only for the good and not for the bad, and we learned in a mishna: One is required to bless God for the bad just as he blesses Him for the good. However, in the case of one who recites: Just as Your mercy is extended to a bird’s nest, why do they silence him?

פְּלִיגִי בַּהּ תְּרֵי אָמוֹרָאֵי בְּמַעְרְבָא, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר אָבִין וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר זְבִידָא: חַד אָמַר: מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמֵּטִיל קִנְאָה בְּמַעֲשֵׂה בְּרֵאשִׁית. וְחַד אָמַר: מִפְּנֵי שֶׁעוֹשֶׂה מִדּוֹתָיו שֶׁל הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא רַחֲמִים, וְאֵינָן אֶלָּא גְּזֵרוֹת.

Two amora’im in Eretz Yisrael disputed this question; Rabbi Yosei bar Avin and Rabbi Yosei bar Zevida; one said that this was because he engenders jealousy among God’s creations, as it appears as though he is protesting the fact that the Lord favored one creature over all others. And one said that this was because he transforms the attributes of the Holy One, Blessed be He, into expressions of mercy, when they are nothing but decrees of the King that must be fulfilled without inquiring into the reasons behind them.

The Gemara understands that this statement is an expression of the reason for the mitzvah of shiluach ha’ken, sending away the mother bird before taking its young. Just as Hashem demonstrated His mercy on the birds by restricting people from taking eggs or chicks in the presence of their mother, He should express His mercy towards us, as well.

What is the problem with this statement?

One opinion understands the problem to be a jealousy-inducing expression of favoritism; one should not call attention to the fact that Hashem instituted special protections for birds, but not for other animals. In other words, this opinion does not deny the truth of the statement; it simply thinks it should not be shared publicly or incorporated into one’s tefillah.1

The other opinion, however, seems to take a much more fundamental stance regarding the accuracy of the statement itself: the petitioner is making Hashem’s mitzvos into expressions of mercy, when they are really nothing but Divine decrees.2

Contradiction in the Rambam

Explaining this opinion in his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam writes that if Hashem was really expressing unique favoritism to the birds, He would not have commanded us to slaughter birds in sacrificial contexts. The fact that many sacrifices involve bird offerings belies the claim that Hashem was motivated by special mercy on behalf of the birds in the mitzvah of shiluach ha’ken.

The Rambam seems to adopt this approach not only in his Commentary to the Mishnah, but in his halachic work, the Yad Hachazakah, as well.3

מִי שֶׁאָמַר בְּתַחֲנוּנִים מִי שֶׁרִחֵם עַל קַן צִפּוֹר שֶׁלֹּא לִקַּח הָאֵם עַל הַבָּנִים אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁחֹט אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ בְּיוֹם אֶחָד יְרַחֵם עָלֵינוּ וְכַיּוֹצֵא בְּעִנְיָן זֶה מְשַׁתְּקִין אוֹתוֹ. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמִּצְוֹת אֵלּוּ גְּזֵרַת הַכָּתוּב הֵן וְאֵינָן רַחֲמִים. שֶׁאִלּוּ הָיוּ מִפְּנֵי רַחֲמִים לֹא הָיָה מַתִּיר לָנוּ שְׁחִיטָה כָּל עִקָּר.

While the Rambam consistently adopts the second opinion in the Mishnah in his Commentary and in the Yad, he seems to reject this opinion in favor of the first opinion in his Moreh Nevuchim:

^{אותו ואת בנו)} וכן נאסר לשחוט אותו ואת בנו ביום אחד, כסייג והרחקה שמא יישחט מבין שניהם הבן אל מול האם, כי זהו צער גדול מאוד לבעל החיים. משום שאין הבדל בין צער האדם מכך לצער שאר בעלי החיים; כי אהבת האם וחמלתה על בנה אינה נובעת מן ההיגיון אלא מפעולת הכוח המדמה, המצוי ברוב בעלי החיים כפי שהוא מצוי בבני האדם.
^{פרטי המצווה)} דין זה מיוחד בשור ושה משום שהם אלה שמותר לנו לאוכלם מבין בעלי החיים המבויתים שרגילים לאוכלם בדרך כלל, והם אלה שהאם מכירה בהם מי הבן.

^{שילוח הקן)} זהו גם הטעם לשִלוח הקן. כי בדרך כלל הביצים שדגרו עליהן והאפרוחים הנזקקים לאם אינם ראויים למאכל. וכשישלח את האם והיא תימלט לבדה, לא תצטער בראיית לקיחת הבנים. ואפשר שדבר זה יביא, ברוב המקרים, לעזיבת הכול, משום שמה שיילקח אינו ראוי למאכל בדרך כלל.

ואם התורה מתחשבת בייסורים הנפשיים האלה בבהמות ובעופות, על אחת כמה וכמה לגבי פרטי מין האדם בכללותו. אל תקשה עלי מאמירתם (של חכמינו) ז”ל: “האומר: ‘על קן צפור יגיעו רחמיך’ [...משתקין אותו]” (משנה ברכות ה,ג). כי זוהי אחת משתי הדעות שהזכרנו (ג,כו1), כוונתי לדעתו של מי שסבור שאין לתורה טעם אלא רצון גרידא, ואילו אנחנו הלכנו דווקא אחרי הדעה השנייה.

He writes that the reason for this mitzvah is to prevent pain to the animals and notes the opinion in the Gemara that rejects this reason. However, he identifies that opinion with those who think that the mitzvos don’t have reasons and states that we follow the opposite approach — that mitzvos have reasons and we are meant to pursue them.

This contradiction is noted by many commentators on the Rambam, and they suggested a number of ways to resolve the contradiction. Complicating the matter even more is the Rambam’s numerous statements within the Yad Hachazakah itself both endorsing the importance of searching for reasons for mitzvos and providing potential reasons for mitzvos themselves, as noted by the Yad Hamelech. Thus, notwithstanding the Rambam’s position on this specific question, his position is generally cited as endorsing the search for taamei hamitzvos.

Ramban: A New Read of the Machlokes

As opposed to the Rambam, who presented the two opinions in the Gemara as arguing over the propriety of the entire taamei ha’mitzvos endeavor, the Ramban thinks that both opinions actually endorse the importance of finding reasons for mitzvos.

After citing the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim, the Ramban endorses his view on the importance of taamei ha’mitzvos, stating that “every one has a reason and a purpose/benefit for people, besides for the reward given for performing it.” In a classic move of halachic jiujitsu, he shows that a Midrash used to challenge the Rambam’s position actually supports it:

מָה שֶׁמָּצָא בב”ר (מד א), וְכִי מָה אִכְפַּת לוֹ להקב”ה בֵּין שׁוֹחֵט מִן הַצַּוָּאר לְשׁוֹחֵט מִן הָעֹרֶף, הָא לֹא נִתְּנוּ הַמִּצְוֹת אֶלָּא לְצָרֵף בָּהֶם אֶת הַבְּרִיּוֹת, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (משלי ל ה) כָּל אִמְרַת אֱלוֹהַּ צְרוּפָה….

אֲבָל אֵלּוּ הַהַגָּדוֹת אֲשֶׁר נִתְקַשּׁוּ עַל הָרַב כְּפִי דַּעְתִּי עִנְיָן אַחֵר לָהֶם, שֶׁרָצוּ לוֹמַר שֶׁאֵין הַתּוֹעֶלֶת בַּמִּצְוֹת להקב”ה בְּעַצְמוֹ יִתְעַלֶּה, אֲבָל הַתּוֹעֶלֶת בָּאָדָם עַצְמוֹ, לִמְנֹעַ מִמֶּנּוּ נֶזֶק אוֹ אֱמוּנָה רָעָה אוֹ מִדָּה מְגֻנָּה, אוֹ לִזְכֹּר הַנִּסִּים וְנִפְלְאוֹת הַבּוֹרֵא יִתְבָּרַךְ וְלָדַעַת אֶת הַשֵּׁם. וְזֶהוּ לְצָרֵף בָּהֶן, שֶׁיִּהְיוּ כְּכֶסֶף צָרוּף, כִּי הַצּוֹרֵף הַכֶּסֶף אֵין מַעֲשֵׂהוּ בְּלֹא טַעַם, אֲבָל לְהוֹצִיא מִמֶּנּוּ כָּל סִיג, וְכֵן הַמִּצְוֹת לְהוֹצִיא מִלִּבֵּנוּ כָּל אֱמוּנָה רָעָה וּלְהוֹדִיעֵנוּ הָאֱמֶת וּלְזָכְרוֹ תָּמִיד.

The Midrash asks, “What does it matter to Hashem if we slaughter an animal from the front of its neck or the back? Clearly, the mitzvos were only given to purify people.” Rather than expressing the arbitrary nature of mitzvos, saying Hashem randomly chose the front of the neck but it could just as well have been the back, this Midrash explains that the mitzvos were carefully calibrated to benefit not Hashem, but us. This is the meaning of the Midrash’s conclusion — the mitzvos were given to us for the sake of tziruf, to purify us the way dross is removed from silver to purify it.

Thus, according to the Ramban, the second opinion in the Gemara, who diagnoses the issue with the statement of “Your mercy reaches the birds” as “making Hashem’s mitzvos into expressions of mercy when they’re really gezeiros, Divine decrees,” really means that this person is fundamentally misunderstanding the purpose of the mitzvos. Hashem is not interested in expressing mercy on the birds; if He was, like the Rambam said, He would have outlawed their slaughter and sacrifice rather than mandating it. Instead, the purpose of all the mitzvos is to benefit us — in this case, to train us to be more merciful and sensitive to causing pain to others.

Appreciating Mitzvos (Again)

While this point was made in the first essay, it’s worth reiterating. This perspective perfectly captures the importance of seeking reasons for mitzvos. While the attitude of complete obedience (which, according to the Rambam, is expressed by the second opinion in the Gemara) is still correct and also needs to be reinforced (see Rashi there), there is an entire additional level of meaning unlocked when performing mitzvos with an understanding of their potential reasons. In this case, once we understand that the message of mitzvos like shiluach ha’ken and oso v’es b’no is meant to reinforce a merciful nature, we should find ourselves recoiling from certain games/sports/pastimes that are explicitly violent in nature.

For another example, this one in the realm of minhag rather than mitzvah, one of the reasons we cover the challah at the Shabbos meals is to avoid “embarrassing the challah”; technically, the berachah on bread should come before the berachah on wine, but kiddush needs to open the meal. I’m sure I’m not the first one to wonder what this is supposed to mean; last I checked, bread doesn’t have feelings, etc. etc.

Of course, the message here is the same: this formulation is meant to increase our sensitivity to embarrassing other people, maybe even specifically encouraging us to think about how another person might expect to be treated and ensuring that we hit that standard when possible. (And there’s no better time to reflect on such an idea than at the beginning of the Shabbos seudos, which — at least in my house, and I know I’m not alone over here — can sometimes be a bit fraught, what with each kid and their parsha sheet and the other dynamics of a full family meal.)