Much of the attention has returned to Zhao’s military past. He was the first commander of the Western Theatre Command after the PLA’s 2016 reforms and remained in the position until December 2020. The Western Theatre Command covers Tibet and Xinjiang and is responsible for military operations on the frontier with India. Zhao was therefore at the helm of the Western Theatre Command during both the 2017 Doklam standoff and the 2020 eastern Ladakh crisis, which included the Galwan Valley clash. History explains the attention Zhao receives, but not the circumstances behind his removal.

From the Frontier to the Party State

By the time of last week’s decision, Zhao had been out of operational command for six years. Following his retirement from the military, Zhao moved into political and consultative roles, first as Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress and, from 2023, as a member of the CPPCC Standing Committee and Deputy Director of its Committee on Ethnic and Religious Affairs. The CPPCC’s official list confirms his appointment to the latter position in March 2023. The position Zhao held at the time of his removal matters more than his earlier military command.

The Committee on Ethnic and Religious Affairs is not a military command body. Its work focuses on consultation, research and consensus-building on ethnic and religious affairs. This includes policies concerning minority regions, national identity, religious governance and border development. These areas have assumed political importance under Xi Jinping. Since Xi came to power in 2012, ‘forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation’ (铸牢中华民族共同体意识, zhùláo zhōnghuá mínzú gòngtóngtǐ yìshí) has moved to the centre of the Party’s approach to ethnic affairs. The Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law, which came into force on 1 July 2026, further institutionalised this approach and reinforced Party leadership over ethnic affairs. Official CPPCC records from Zhao’s tenure show his engagement in research on ‘border-area development and security’ in Tibet, as well as his writing on the military’s role in supporting frontier development and strengthening a shared Chinese national identity. Zhao’s military experience did not become irrelevant after retirement. It was repurposed within a political-consultative institution concerned with sensitive frontier and ethnic-governance issues. His removal thus warrants analysis through the lens of elite politics, cadre management and Beijing’s approach to the governance of the border regions, rather than as an immediate signal about India. It also forms part of Xi’s efforts to strengthen Party control over sensitive institutions and to ensure adherence to central priorities, in which loyalty and political discipline have become key requirements.

The Purge does not Signal Policy

The precise grounds for Zhao’s removal have not yet been made public. Xinhua’s August 26 report announced the decision but did not mention an investigation, disciplinary action or India. The choice of words is nevertheless notable. At the same session, the CPPCC ‘accepted’ the resignation of another member, whereas Zhao’s membership was explicitly ‘revoked.’ The distinction suggests that Zhao’s departure was not presented as an ordinary voluntary exit. However, without further disclosure from disciplinary, military or other official authorities, any conclusion would be speculative.

Zhao’s removal also coincided with a period of turbulence at the top of China’s military establishment. Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli have now been formally removed from the Central Military Commission following investigations into serious disciplinary and legal violations. Zhao may eventually be shown to belong to the same pattern, though Beijing has made no such formal connection. Therefore, treating Zhao’s removal as a signal about India-China relations risks mistaking biography for policy. The decision to remove him came one day after the India-China boundary talks in Beijing, but there is no evidence that it was a gesture to New Delhi, punishment for past border decisions or a shift in China’s India policy.

The episode should also not be stretched into a BRICS signal. India and China hold the BRICS chair in 2026 and 2027, respectively, but their bilateral relationship has its own logic. The course of India-China relations will depend on negotiations, military posture, border-management mechanisms, political choices and leadership decisions, not on the removal of a commander who retired from the Western Theatre Command in 2020. Zhao’s case also underscores the need for India to develop its own analytical lens on China. Western assessments, including U.S. intelligence claims about his role in Galwan, can inform that process but should not substitute for it. It should be built on institutional analysis alongside India’s own military and diplomatic experience. On the boundary question and the bilateral relationship, there is still a long road ahead.

The U.S. has arrangements with most of the GCC countries for the provision of security by basing U.S. military on their soil. This myth was broken in the current U.S.-Iran conflict. The rampant and unilateral bombing of U.S. military bases in the GCC has sent shock waves among the rulers of these states. They no longer trust the U.S. to safeguard their national interests. While they have not stated it openly yet, there are voices of concern about Washington’s ability to follow through on mutually signed agreements.

Saudi Arabia has been at the forefront of this race. Does signing of this type of defence treaty guarantee safety against an Iran-style missile attack or attack on its own shipping? The answer is an unfortunate ‘No’. If Iran couldn’t be deterred by the U.S., why would it be deterred by Pakistan or Turkey? Then what purpose does the treaty serve?

While the entire text of the treaty is not out yet, it is likely to be similar to what Saudi Arabia signed with Pakistan early last year. The text of these treaties is symbolic, showing intent and alignment of interests between nations, and rarely do they translate to hard military action. If Pakistan is an example, it has helped the Iranian cause in the current standoff with the U.S. This would go contrary to Saudi Arabia’s interest. The media reports of a land route through Pakistan being open to Iran during the Sea Blockade or allowing the Military surveillance aircraft a safe parking facility in Islamabad suggest that Pakistan was more than just an honest mediator. But the Saudis are hedging their bets that, should matters worsen with Iran in future, Pakistan could be counted on at least to represent Saudi interests with Iran.

Coming to Turkey, Saudis will be counting on Turkey’s traditional rivalry with Iran. Iran and Turkey have been bitter foes supporting opposite sides, be it Syria or the Caucasian conflict. What is in it for Turkey? Turkey is a deeply divided country today, with the rise of President Erdogan. Despite being in NATO, President Erdogan has pushed Turkey towards the Islamic world, much to the displeasure of many NATO allies, including the U.S. It also feels threatened by the Israelis, who have now viewed Turkey as the next Iran. The new alignment with the Saudis guarantees some respite from the threat that the Israelis pose for Turkey.

Finally, we check what is in it for Pakistan? And the Indian dissonance to this pact will emerge out of it. Pakistan possesses the largest military force amongst the Islamic nations. They are well-trained and battle-hardened. And above all, they are the only nuclear power in the Islamic world. This combination makes them an ideal choice for any Islamic nation to run to them for a defence pact. Pakistan, on their part, has understood the needs of their Islamic brothers and is using it to cushion itself from the financial mess they find themselves in time and again. All the defence pacts are seen as a guarantee for continued funds in a country which lies in economic ruins. India’s main concern would be that such alliances will help Pakistan stay off the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) list and secure for itself IMF or Saudi money.

Implications for India

The Indian MEA has stated that they are studying the development and will come out with a statement soon. This means there are no obvious red lines which India notices. It is an internal matter between the three nations, and yet as long as Pakistan’s friendship with Turkey does not end up as a defence pact against India, it will not have major objections. Pakistan’s pact with Saudi Arabia was disturbing, yet the foreign ministry was sanguine about the benign nature of the treaty.

Does it have Beijing’s blessings? Any anti-Iran pact is not in China’s interest. Has Pakistan moved away from its influence? It’s hard to predict. Field Marshal Asim Munir’s newfound love of President Trump and his establishment may well cast a doom on the cosiness in the China relationship.

The U.S. war with Iran has yet to see the last chapter. Many things might change, resulting in new alignments and newfound interests. The current defence pact is also a step in that direction. The defence pact that is signed could have tacit, if not direct, approval of the U.S. This pact for the U.S. serves more as a deterrence for the Iranian regime. Amongst the many things the U.S. has tried to get the Iranians to concede defeat, this could be another move to pressure the Iranians. The symbolism is far more important than the deed; the message the pact seems to be conveying.

“Washington’s uncertainty in this war is a result of three fundamental deficiencies: no viable exit plan, lack of a defined war objective, and no clear articulation of a theory of victory.”

The ongoing U.S-Israel-Iran war has completed more than a month of hostilities, a period marked by the widening of the conflict rather than any tangible de-escalation. In fact, with the Houthis bombing Southern Israel, the scope of the conflict has only widened. This development poses a greater risk to the region, particularly considering the proximity of the Houthis to the Bab-Al-Mandeeb Strait - a critical maritime chokepoint in the Red Sea. The ever-widening theatre of conflict in West Asia is not moving towards any form of de-escalation despite Trump’s claims of negotiations and peace talks.

Trump and the Missing Strategy in West Asia

Washington’s uncertainty in this war is a result of three fundamental deficiencies: no viable exit plan, lack of a defined war objective, and no clear articulation of a theory of victory. Trump’s increasingly erratic claims on Truth Social are the perfect reflection of the United States’ lack of resolve regarding the instability it has brought to West Asia. On 21 March, Trump gave a 48-hour ultimatum to the Iranian forces to stop the retaliatory attacks on the American assets and the energy infrastructure in the region. However, in a span of two days, he changed his tune when he paused attacks on Iran for the next five days. With this abrupt reversal, Trump traversed the full spectrum of escalation in a strikingly short time frame. Although this has not given Iran any respite from Israeli attacks, as the latter continues to pursue its hegemonic agenda in West Asia. This highlights the lack of coordination between the U.S and Israel when it comes to this conflict.

The Expanding Humanitarian Crisis

This ongoing war in West Asia has also opened a Pandora’s box in terms of increasing humanitarian costs. As of 1 April, an estimated 3,000 to 7,000 Iranians have died, and 19,000 have been injured. On the very first day of the conflict, Tomahawk missiles struck an elementary school in the southern Iranian city of Minab, killing more than 170 innocent school-going girls aged between 7 and 12

Since this conflict started in Lebanon, around one million people have been displaced, more than 1,000 have been killed, and 3,000 have been injured. The casualties reported in the Gulf region have also reached a staggering number of 2,698 deaths. Israeli casualties are relatively low at 27 fatalities and 5,000 injuries, while the US has reported 15 fatalities and 300 injuries. Civilian infrastructure such as oil fields, refineries, hospitals, residential buildings and desalination plants has also been targeted by both sides, further escalating the humanitarian impact.

The humanitarian costs go beyond this with rising risks of recessions due to inflation caused by the oil price hike. According to Goldman Sachs Analysts, the probability of a U.S. recession is likely to be about 30% in the next 12 months. On 2 March, Iran played the ace up its sleeve by officially closing the Strait of Hormuz- the heart of the global oil supply chain. As the conflict and negotiations evolved, Iran permitted the vessels of China, Russia, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Thailand, and Malaysia to pass through the Strait. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has not only impacted the oil prices but also affected the supply of relief aid and fertilisers all over the world. This disruption has far-reaching consequences affecting the lives of people across the globe.

Washington is Negotiating with Itself Between Truth Social and the Battlefield

Rather than relying on official channels of communication, POTUS has relied on Truth Social to actively articulate his claims about the war and U.S actions. On 14 March, President Trump made the following comment regarding Iran’s war objective.

However, the on-ground situation after 15 days of this comment was totally different, prompting Trump to announce a revived course of action, which was reflected in his post of 27 March.

Iran’s resilience exposed Trump’s ignorant perceptions. Furthermore, calming the soaring oil prices, supply chain disruptions, and mounting global pressure might have been more accurate reasons for the U.S President’s decision to pause strikes on Iran.

In addition to signalling a halt to military operations, Trump has also pointed to the ongoing talks with Iran, claiming that it will result in “complete and total resolution of hostilities.” However, the Iranian authorities have denied any such negotiations, with the remark “Washington is negotiating with itself.” The uncertainty over how this war ends mirrors the ambiguous reasons underlying the conflict. In spite of declaring a pause in hostilities till 6 April, the US has steadily raised the deployment of its troops in the region. In fact, more than 50,000 U.S troops are already stationed in the region. Hence, the probability of a ground invasion in Iran cannot be overruled.

Mediation Without Meaning

On 28 February 2026, the U.S. and Israel launched coordinated strikes against Iran, disrupting the stability of the region. Notably, these attacks were carried out during ongoing nuclear negotiations between Washington and Tehran. Similarly, in June 2025, the US-Israel had launched similar attacks on Iran targeting its nuclear facilities, now known as the 12-day war, again during ongoing negotiations. This highlights a pattern of coercion amid diplomacy. Such actions have deepened mistrust among the Iranian leadership regarding the credibility of peace negotiations with the U.S.

The absence of key stakeholders such as Israel, Lebanon, Yemen and other Gulf states is likely to hinder the development of a comprehensive peace plan and any conflict resolution. An additional player who’s joined the mix is our dear neighbour – Pakistan! It has offered to host the peace negotiations for the warring entities. On 29 March, top senior diplomats from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Türkiye, and Pakistan participated in a quadrilateral peace dialogue hosted in Islamabad. Pakistan has also been instrumental in sharing Washington’s 15-point plan with Tehran. The proposed plan can be viewed as a document of maximalist demands put forth by the United States, and obviously, it was rejected by Iran. Pakistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Muhammad Ishaq Dar visited Beijing on 31 March to meet his counterpart, Mr Wang Yi, to discuss the ongoing situation of West Asia. China and Pakistan have also put forth a five- point initiative to re-establish peace in the region.

West Asia’s War Without an Endgame

Trump appears to favour a speedy, high-impact operation such as the dramatic abduction of Venezuelan President Nicholas Maduro. He might have expected that the military attacks on Iran, too, would lead to a similar outcome. It is becoming increasingly difficult to assess whether his approach to the current conflict is towards a prolonged engagement or a quick strategic outcome. This war is not just dangerous because of its escalation, but also due to the absence of a clear path of de-escalation. Trump and Netanyahu have a lot to lose from this war, while for Iran and its Axis of Resistance, it is a matter of survival and endurance. The conflict may be between the US, Israel, and Iran, but the cost is being borne by the entire world.

The IP Blog is an initiative of Pune International Centre (PIC), an independent and multidisciplinary policy think tank based in Pune, India. It delivers perspectives on the dynamics shaping international politics and examines geopolitical, economic, technological, and historical developments through clear and compelling commentary

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"Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh, in May 2025, had decided to open up the AMCA project to both public and private players. This strategic shift signalled New Delhi’s commitment to realising the potential of the private defence industry in indigenous defence manufacturing. Also, this highlights the government’s vision of achieving Atmanirbharta in the defence sector."

Did HAL just receive a Rap on its Knuckles?

The state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has been dropped from the ₹15,000 crore project to develop five prototypes of India’s first 5th-generation fighter aircraft, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA). Though HAL has been kept out of the race to build the AMCA, this does not mean that none of the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) or the state-owned defence companies will be part of the process. The companies now competing to develop the country’s first 5th-generation fighter jet are Tata Advanced Systems Ltd. (TASL), L&T Defence, and Bharat Forge.

Why has HAL, which was instrumental in the development of the majority of the aerial defence platforms, including the Tejas Mk 1A, been left out of the race? Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh, in May 2025, had decided to open up the AMCA project to both public and private players. This strategic shift signalled New Delhi’s commitment to realising the potential of the private defence industry in indigenous defence manufacturing. Also, this highlights the government’s vision of achieving Atmanirbharta in the defence sector. The main reason for HAL’s exclusion is its large order book. Currently, HAL’s order book is full with Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas Mk1A, Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) Prachand and several other military platforms, none of which have been delivered yet.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) was aware of HAL’s large order book. So we can infer that MoD deliberately floated such a tender to keep HAL out of the race. But is HAL’s large order book the only reason behind its exclusion? HAL has a habit of over-promising and under-delivering. According to experts, if the HAL had remained committed to the project deadlines, LCA Tejas Mk2 would have been delivered by 2018, but here we are in 2026 with only 5 Tejas Mk1A ready for delivery to the Indian Air Force (IAF). And when it comes to AMCA, the government wants IAF to receive the 5th-generation fighter jet at the earliest.

Also, when it comes to fighter jets, there is a difference between an aircraft being ‘structurally ready’ and being ‘combat ready.’ The first batch of Tejas Mk1A is still structurally ready but not combat-ready, according to the IAF, despite extended timelines. So, this might be a major reason for keeping HAL out of the race and making it deliver on its prior commitments.

The larger picture behind HAL’s exclusion could be the government’s long-term focus on building a Military Industrial Complex (MIC) in the country. This is reflected in industry-friendly procurement procedures, including the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020 and the Defence Procurement Manual (DPM) 2025. HAL’s drop-out signals the government’s intention to create an alternate assembly line for fighter jets in the country, reducing dependence on HAL’s existing assembly line. Also, defence manufacturing today sits at the crossroads of cutting-edge electronics, advanced materials, artificial intelligence, propulsion systems and increasingly sophisticated software integration. Unlike the past, when state-owned workshops dominated this space, these capabilities are now concentrated within large, diversified private conglomerates that move faster, think bigger and operate on a global scale.

Did HAL have a Prior Idea of its Exclusion from the AMCA Project?

HAL had already known that it would not succeed in the bidding process. In an interview last year, HAL chief D.K. Sunil stated that the qualifying terms and conditions for the financial performance of companies in the Expression of Interest (EoI) released by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) were such that it would be very difficult for HAL to proceed alone in the procurement process. The clauses under the EoI, part of the lengthy defence procurement process, state that if the company’s order book is three times its turnover, it would be excluded from the race. In the case of HAL, it is almost eight times its turnover.

AMCA Production Timelines and Future Orders

The final bidder to be declared in the next three months will work in tandem with the ADA and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to manufacture 5 prototypes of the AMCA by 2031, with the ministry initially allocating ₹15,000 crore. Once tested and approved, the IAF is expected to place an order of 120 AMCA jets. The AMCA is India’s most ambitious fighter aircraft project to date, designed to position India among the very few countries capable of developing a 5th-generation fighter jet. Currently, only the United States, Russia and China possess this capacity. Regarding the delivery of the AMCA, the Mk1 version and its induction into the IAF are expected to begin by 2034-35. The timeline for the induction of the MK2 version into the IAF still remains unclear.

Other Manufacturing Giants in the Bidding Process

Of the 3 private defence manufacturing giants, the Tata Group is the only solo bidder and has experience setting up and operating an assembly line, having done so for the C-295 aircraft alongside Airbus. The state-run BEML (formerly known as Bharat Earth Movers Ltd.) is part of the consortium led by Bharat Forge Ltd., a part of the Kalyani Group, along with Data Patterns (India) Ltd., a private-sector defence electronics firm. The third private defence player, L&T Defence, leads another consortium with Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL), a DPSU, and the private defence firm Dynamatics Technologies.

Regional Dynamics and Strategic Context

The development of the AMCA has come at a crucial time, as Beijing is developing its 6th-generation aircraft, the J-36 and J-50. Reports suggest that the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has inducted around 195 operational units of the J-20 5th-generation stealth aircraft. The ‘all-weather friendship’ between Islamabad and Beijing, recently demonstrated during Operation Sindoor, in which Pakistan deployed Chinese-made aircraft against India, is a major concern for New Delhi, as Islamabad is expected to benefit from this friendship by gaining access to China’s 5th and 6th-generation aircraft in the near future. According to reports, Pakistan may acquire 40 twin-engine, multi-role 5th-generation J-35A stealth fighter jets from Beijing.

At the same time, looking at India’s domestic fleet, the IAF’s squadron strength has declined to 30, against the sanctioned strength of 42. Currently, both India and Pakistan rely on 4.5-generation fighter jets: India has the Rafale and Su-30 MKI in its fleet, while Pakistan relies on China’s JF-17 and the US-made F-16, which is considered a 4th-generation fighter aircraft. But Pakistan is already in talks with China for procuring J-20 and J-35A, 5th-generation aircraft. The procurement of J-20 or J-35A from Beijing may give Islamabad a technical edge over New Delhi. The evolving Islamabad-Beijing fighter jet axis, the drop in IAF squadrons, current regional geopolitical dynamics, and the slow pace of Tejas LCA deliveries have made AMCA a project of utmost importance. Looking at this from another perspective, it’s worth noting that Pakistan’s procurement of J-20 or J-35A from China and India’s development of the AMCA may help maintain the balance of power in South Asia.

AMCA Mk1 Vs Mk2

One might think that while China is developing J-36 and J-50 6th-generation aircraft, India is kicking off the process of developing a 5th-generation aircraft, and it may be exposed to grave security threats from the northern neighbour. Though this is partially true, a closer look at the AMCA project reveals that the Mk1 version will feature 5th-generation technologies, while the AMCA Mk2 will be a 6th-generation aircraft, bringing it on par with Beijing’s J-36 and J-50.

The Heart of AMCA: Engine Development & Strategic Autonomy

Talking about the engine of the AMCA, while the Mk1 version will be powered by the American General Electric (GE) F-414 engine, the Mk2 version is expected to be developed through a joint venture between French firm Safran and India’s Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), a lab under DRDO. Safran and GTRE will develop 9 prototypes over 12 years, with 100% transfer of technology and intellectual property rights to India. Although India is developing its own Kaveri engine led by GTRE, this could provide an opportunity to scale up investment, set realistic timelines, and provide extensive support to GTRE in delivering a 120 kN engine for AMCA. This will also allow India to minimise its dependence on foreign vendors for aircraft engines, ensuring strategic autonomy. This was recently observed in the case of importing GE F-404 engines for LCA Tejas.

Design, Performance and Stealth Features of AMCA

The AMCA is envisioned as a twin-engine, 25-tonne stealth aircraft featuring cutting-edge technologies. The AMCA is expected to fly at a maximum height of 20,000 metres at a maximum speed of Mach 2.15 (2,600 km/hr), with a combat range of 1,620 km and a payload capacity of 6,500 kg. One of the most important aspects of the AMCA is that its stealth features are designed to reduce radar detection. In technical terms, this means the aircraft will be fitted with an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar rather than a Passive Electronically Scanned Array (PESA) radar, which is fitted to India’s current 4.5-generation fighter aircraft, including the Rafale. The AESA radar minimises the risk of enemy detection.

Why did New Delhi Reject Foreign 5th-generation Fighter Jets?

While India has been offered 5th-generation fighter jets by the US (F-35) and Russia (Su-57), it has decided to move forward with developing the jet indigenously. In February 2025, POTUS Donald Trump said that America is paving the way to provide India with F-35 stealth fighters. On the other hand, Russia had proposed the joint production of Su-57 in India. However, New Delhi has not taken up either offer. Buying the US-made F-35 could seriously limit India’s operational sovereignty and pose serious data security risks. Also, buying the F-35 could hamper the development of the indigenous AMCA aircraft. Also, one reason India is not buying the F-35 is that the export variant of the US-made fighter jet would be a lower version than the original, and the US might impose operational restrictions on India, as it did with Pakistan on the F-16 aircraft.

Talking about the Russian-origin Su-57, India might be sceptical about co-producing the aircraft in India due to the USA’s imposition of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Also, given the current geopolitical dynamics and sanctions imposed on Russia, ensuring an uninterrupted supply of the raw materials needed to manufacture Su-57s can be a challenge for India.

Also, HAL’s exclusion from the project is not just a bureaucratic reshuffle but a strategic signal to the state-owned manufacturing giant. The message is clear: legacy is not enough, performance and timelines matter more. For HAL, this is both a warning and an opportunity to learn from past mistakes and correct them to be on par with private players in the market. A successful AMCA programme could mark India’s transition from years of licensed production to achieving self-reliance in manufacturing a world-class combat aircraft. AMCA’s failure would write another cautionary tale in the long history of delayed indigenous programmes. In that sense, the AMCA race is more than a stealth fighter; it is about which manufacturing giant has the capability to shape India’s future battlespace.

The IP Blog is an initiative of Pune International Centre (PIC), an independent and multidisciplinary policy think tank based in Pune, India. It delivers perspectives on the dynamics shaping international politics and examines geopolitical, economic, technological, and historical developments through clear and compelling commentary.

                            To know more about PIC’s work and upcoming initiatives,  
                                 follow us on our website and social media handles.            

                                       LinkedIn | X | Instagram | YouTube | Spotify

The official statement only states that Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli are under investigation for ‘suspected serious violations of discipline and law.’ No additional details have been disclosed except this careful formulation of words. Such an opaque nature of the Chinese political system and its symbolism, in conjunction with the lack of explanation, invites scrutiny rather than closure.

Zhang is the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest decision-making body in China, and Liu Zhenli is a member of the CMC and the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department. In addition to their military positions, Zhang is also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee. These are not marginal figures. The CMC exercises absolute control over the military, that is, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The investigation confirms that the foundational principle, ‘the Party commands the gun,’ is not negotiable.

Xi Redefines Loyalty in the PLA

Since the beginning of Xi Jinping’s second term, the CMC has been at the centre of his anti-corruption campaign. Though it is presented as a disciplinary campaign, it has also been used to reorganise loyalty within the military. In 2024, Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, members of the CMC and Ministers of National Defence, were expelled from the Party in the name of disciplinary violations and corruption charges. In a similar manner, He Weidong, Vice Chairman of the CMC, and Miao Hua, another CMC member, were removed at the Fourth Plenum of the 20th National Congress in October 2025. He Weidong was the highest-ranking military official to be purged in the period after the Cultural Revolution.

If Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were to meet a similar fate, the political implications would be unprecedented. The CMC would be limited to just two figures, that is, Xi Jinping himself and Zhang Shengmin, Vice Chairman of the CMC, until the National People’s Congress reconvenes in March 2026. This degree of authority is exceptional even within the context of Chinese politics.

Xi’s break from the norm of appointing his close aides to senior positions renders this investigation exceptional. The historical pattern of Chinese leadership states that leaders often represent certain geographic regions. It is natural for leaders to appoint or promote individuals with whom they share work experience that demands loyalty, trust, and competence. Xi has both appointed and promoted individuals who served as his close associates during his provincial career. Most of the senior military officials purged in recent years have worked in the same provinces where Xi spent the formative years of his political career. For instance, He Weidong and Miao Hua both served in the 31st Group Army in Fujian Province, where Xi was building his political experience in the 1980s and 1990s. They were considered part of the so-called ‘Fujian clique,’ a network of PLA leaders whose careers overlapped with Xi’s.

In contrast, Zhang Youxia is the son of Zhang Zongxun, a revolutionary PLA veteran associated with Xi’s father and has thus inherited political trust. Although provincial associations are limited within the CMC, Xi’s retention of Zhang as Vice-Chairman of the CMC indicates the extent of that trust. The investigation of Zhang, therefore, states that even proximity to Xi and revolutionary pedigree can no longer guarantee political security.

The Myth of a Military Coup

The most sensational part of the Zhang–Liu investigation has been speculation about an organised military coup. The high stakes encourage the advancement of such claims. The military has been influential in Chinese politics since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. History reveals that the relations between the Party and the PLA show that a leader who cannot command the majority of the top leadership of the military is destined to be defeated. However, the Leninist structure of the Chinese political system makes a coup complicated, but not impossible.

Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has targeted some of the most powerful officials whom he perceived as a threat. This might lead to widespread resentment and trigger internal resistance. But for all that, Chinese politics is structured around the centralisation of power in the leader. It leaves lieutenants with minimal scope to contest authority. In the end, the Party constitutes more than the sum of its leaders, and cannot be reduced to those who might seize power through a coup. Moreover, the ideological framework of the Chinese system, with its elaborated ideology, adds to the complexity of the matter. The PLA is not a national army in the Western sense; it is a Party army. Therefore, any attempt to depoliticise the military and replace Party control with a national army amounts to the most serious crime in the Chinese political system, equivalent to treason.

Though a leader who cannot command the loyalty of the military is destined to be defeated, the reverse is also true: those who want to expel a leader require military support. Hua Guofeng was successful in carrying out a coup against the Gang of Four with decisive backing from Marshal Ye Jianying. It allowed Hua to move against Jiang Qing, Mao’s wife and her associates and subsequently put them on trial. The lack of military support can put the challengers in a precarious situation. In this case, the only option would be the physical elimination of the leader, though it entails a substantial risk. It also demands a rapid yet total control of the national security apparatus. In light of Xi Jinping’s power consolidation, such an outcome appears implausible.

The Military Question in Xi’s Succession Calculus

Xi pursued a dual purpose through the recent investigations – showcasing discipline and asserting dominance. The investigations reinforce the message that loyalty to Xi and the Party supersedes personal relationships, revolutionary lineage, and competence. Trust is conditional, not permanent. At the same time, they raise two important questions: What circumstances led to such drastic action, and who will Xi appoint to fill the leadership vacuum within the CMC? These questions cannot be separated from succession. Xi’s accumulation of power reflects a concern for long-term political continuity. Hence, control over the military concerns not only presents stability but also the management of future power transitions.

Xi articulated the idea of the ‘Chinese Dream’ in 2012 – a political vision that aims to revive China as a strong, modern, and respected global power. The concept of the Chinese Dream can also be understood from the perspective of the fùguó qiángbīng (富国强兵), the doctrine that helped the progressives of the beleaguered Qing dynasty to survive the Hundred Days’ Reform in 1898. It focuses on the material capabilities of the state, that is, economic prosperity and military strength. Xi has pledged to achieve modernisation by 2035 and to realise the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by 2049, which marks the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. For Xi and China, the most important matter that calls for immediate attention is the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. Xi frequently consults with military-affiliated or hawkish intellectuals to shape strategies that will help to realise the Chinese Dream of a strong China and narrow the disparity with the U.S., the superpower. Thus, the unquestioned loyalty of the PLA is indispensable.

The Zhang-Liu investigations can also be interpreted as part of efforts to align ‘the gun’ with Xi’s long-term vision rather than independent disciplinary actions. The real lesson lies not in the fate of these two generals, but in what their investigation uncovers – as long as Xi Jinping remains in power, ‘the gun’ will be under his control.

[An earlier version of this article was published on moderndiplomacy.eu.]

“A blatant attempt at establishing geopolitical supremacy for the exploitation of natural resources – the American blend of classical and neo-colonialism !”

The flavour of the season once again in the glorious land of Uncle Sam is regime change —and the target is the oil-rich Bolivarian Republic! A section of the U.S. media had been growing hoarse, loudly moralising, and repackaging the old narrative for weeks. With the onset of the new year, the well rehearsed performance reached its explosive climax. On 3 January 2026, Caracas was bombed, approximately 40 people were killed, and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro was captured. Democracy exported, the American way!

Though it might appear unprecedented, the attack was hardly unexpected. Since the beginning of his second term, Donald Trump has repeatedly threatened coercive action against the Maduro administration. He cast the Venezuelan dictator as one of the world’s largest narcotraffickers and placed a $50 million bounty on his head. Apparently, Maduro’s Trump-style kinaesthetic expression did not endear him to the White House.

The Donroe Doctrine

Another indication of armed operation was the U.S.’s National Security Strategy (NSS), released on 4 December 2025. Referred to as the Trump Corollary, it explicitly reaffirms American dominance over the Western Hemisphere by invoking the Monroe Doctrine. The Pentagon had been steadily preparing the ground since August 2025, strengthening air and naval deployments in the Caribbean, including the arrival of a nuclear-powered submarine. In the months leading up to the capture of a sitting president, U.S. strikes on Venezuelan boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific reportedly killed more than a hundred people.

Historically, Venezuela’s resources have shaped its alliances and its vulnerability. Prior to the nationalisation of oil in 1976, much of Venezuela’s petroleum sector was controlled by multinational giants such as Texaco, Chevron, and Exxon. The country was a major oil exporter and a key U.S. ally. But as is the norm with imperial capitalism, the wealth generated through Venezuelan oil did not actually benefit Venezuelans. The country was rife with extreme inequality. Hugo Chávez’s rise to power disrupted this arrangement. His socialist project sought to redistribute oil wealth through expanded access to affordable housing and education—an effort that fundamentally altered Venezuela’s relationship with Washington. Additionally, the allies that Venezuela cultivated - China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba— also became a bone of contention with the U.S.

Republican Shamelessness

In this case, the joke, though tragic, is the Grand Old Party’s intellectual laziness on display – recycling the narrative once used to sell the Iraq invasion. Venezuelan boats allegedly carrying Fentanyl were upgraded to Weapons of Mass Destruction. The bloody outcome when these turn of words were last rallied around by the Neo-Cons has not yet faded from our collective memories. Then the objective was the natural resources of Iraq, this time it is the natural resources of Venezuela. The Bolivarian republic has one of the largest oil reserves (heavy crude oil), along with rich deposits of gold and rare earths.

It was also the brazenness that was unnerving. POTUS declared after the attack that Venezuelan oil and land should be “returned” to American companies, and that the United States would “run” Venezuela until a preferred administration assumed power. Even the pretence of a “civilising mission” was done away with. It’s a blatant attempt at establishing geopolitical supremacy for the exploitation of natural resources – the American blend of classical and neo-colonialism!

Economic Strangulation of Venezuela

Years of economic warfare preceded Washington’s military operation Absolute Resolve in Venezuela. Trump’s first term escalated sanctions on Caracas, moralising it as a response to human rights violations and the erosion of democratic institutions. Beginning in 2017, Washington restricted Venezuela’s access to U.S. financial markets, including that of Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), the state-owned petroleum giant. All this was done while carving out limited exemptions to safeguard U.S. commercial interests and the humanitarian optics.

In 2018, sanctions expanded to prohibit transactions involving Venezuelan-issued digital currencies and to restrict dealings in sovereign debt and debt instruments used as collateral. These measures were designed to further constrict the regime’s access to external financing and close off avenues for sanctions evasion. The U.S. Treasury also prevented the forced liquidation of CITGO (Cities Services Company), PdVSA’s U.S.-based subsidiary, projecting a balance between coercive pressure tempered by asset preservation. By early 2019, U.S. policy strongly proceeded towards imposing sector-specific sanctions. PdVSA’s assets under U.S. jurisdiction were frozen, and parallel sanctions were imposed on Venezuela’s Central Bank, National Development Bank, and the state-owned gold company Minerven. What had begun as targeted financial pressure thus hardened into systemic economic coercion—sanctions not merely as diplomacy by other means, but as a prelude to force.

Political Engineering

In one of his interviews, John Bolton, former National Security Advisor during the first Trump administration, has clearly stated that what Washington seeks in Venezuela is not democracy per se, but a democracy favourable to U.S. interests. Validating this argument, in 2019, the Trump administration recognised Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s acting president, a move which was then endorsed by nearly sixty countries. Despite this, as the U.S. was unable to oust Maduro, it did welcome the 2019 failed coup attempt by Guaidó. In 2024, the Biden administration recognised Edmundo González as the winner of Venezuela’s presidential election after evidence suggested that Maduro’s defeat was likely. This trajectory of events is indicative of the regime change ambitions that the U.S. has long harboured with regard to Venezuela.

Oil has always been the protagonist in this tragedy. In 2022, the international energy market was severely disrupted due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Taking advantage of Western sanctions on Russian energy exports, Maduro attempted to leverage Venezuela’s petroleum reserves to increase the nation’s international relevance. As Washington was eager to curb any spike in energy prices, it entered negotiations with Caracas – disregarding decades of antagonism. The political fallout from an unstable energy market was too big a cross to bear for the Biden administration ahead of the 2022 elections.

Spheres of Influence

What has drawn global attention—including from India—is Washington’s renewed emphasis on enforcing its sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere. Trump’s Corollary brings back the imperial ways of the 19th century, when the sovereign sanctity of nations was repeatedly violated to fulfil the greed of the colonial empire. If such logic is mirrored by Russia in Ukraine or China in its periphery, the result may be a world of hardened spheres of influence, each policed through force. This is not reassuring for India, as it might easily find itself embedded in one such sphere.

The Caracas bombing further solidifies the claim that the rules-based order is completely up in flames with International Organisations effectively losing the negligible authority they had in the first place. The anarchical fabric of International Politics once again has only one prominent element – brute power.

It remains unclear what comes next. Maduro did quite cheerfully wish everyone Happy New Year when he was being frogmarched by the U.S. agents after his capture. Despite Trump’s claims of taking over the Venezuelan state, Vice President Kelcy Rodriguez has been appointed the interim leader by the court of the land. Furthermore, the Venezuelan military also remains largely undisturbed. What is clear, however, is the message sent to Latin America: opposition to U.S. interests will not be tolerated. Regime change, once again, appears to be Washington’s preferred instrument!

Power Struggle on the Waves

The Sino-Japanese skirmishes over Taiwan unveil the manner in which each country perceives the other and the dispute. Beijing’s relationship with Japan, and vice versa, is characterised by deep mistrust on one side and strategic interests on the other. Under Xi’s rule, China has been consistent in following realist traditions centred on power, in contrast to the cooperative nature of Japan’s liberal institutionalist approach. The latter shares similar values of political liberalism and democratisation with Taiwan, thus being sympathetic to the Taiwanese cause against Chinese aggression. Alongside militarism, China’s expansionist policies, such as its claim over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, explain its quest to dominate the Pacific. Its increasing naval power in the region, particularly its undersea warfare capabilities, has prompted Takaichi to raise concerns about her country’s security and survival.

There prevails an assumption in Japanese national security discourse that ‘China is a threat because it is China.’ Japan’s 2025 Defence White Paper mentions China as ‘a serious security concern at present and an unprecedented and greatest strategic challenge.’ It should be noted that China’s military expenditure is five times higher than Japan’s. Taking a close look at Japan’s defence budget, it has spent more than $56.8 billion on defence in the present fiscal year and intends to increase it to $59.3 billion in 2026. After assuming office, Takaichi announced the allocation of 2% of the country’s GDP to defence. China’s expansionist policies and militarism grapple Tokyo with anxiety and challenge its liberal institutionalist perspective. In a potential naval blockade of Taiwan, Japan could face serious disruption of critical sea lanes that connect it to the Middle East and Southeast Asia, at a time when the country relies on maritime trade for energy.

The Chinese side has, time and again, referred to historical facts to assert its sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Most of the time, beneath the surface of all the territorial disputes between the countries lies a competition for energy resources. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute is linked to a controversy over a report published by the United Nations Committee for Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore Areas (CCOP) in 1969. The report suggested the probability of oil, gas, and other hydrocarbon reserves in the seabed between Taiwan and Japan, near the waters off the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The early findings were based on geological and seismic surveys. They indicated possible deposits rather than confirmed, proven reserves. Nevertheless, the dispute continues over maritime jurisdiction and resource ownership.

China’s foreign policy underlines the energy security of the country. At present, China consumes approximately 15.36 million barrels of oil per day, and this figure is expected to rise in the coming years. The country relies heavily on imports for oil; for instance, they accounted for around 74% of its total consumption in 2024. Therefore, from the perspective of resource security, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands hold strategic significance. The control over these disputed islands can also help China expand its military presence near Japan and Taiwan, push the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) further into the Pacific, and subdue U.S.–Japan influence in the region.

Hawkish Japan, China Threats

The Japanese Prime Minister is now hailed as a ‘hawkish nationalist’ after her hardline remarks on Taiwan in Japan’s Diet. Takaichi belongs to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan, a political party critical of Chinese actions and that seems to align with the U.S. on any issue involving China. Unlike her predecessor, Shigeru Ishiba, she is considered a staunch conservative and a ‘China hawk.’ Japan’s foreign policy posture has become assertive after Shinzo Abe’s return to power in 2012, and Takaichi emerges from the same political party and ideological trend. During the post–Cold War era, Japan separated economics from politics — a stance that is no longer feasible. Though it accommodated China’s rise in the initial phase, the entry of a military power into the economic sphere now worries Tokyo. In comparison to the Democratic Party of Japan governments (2009–11) and their pursuit of economic integration, the present LDP administration favours a securitised and cautious approach to economic cooperation.

China has often used trade controls as a bargaining chip in disputes with Japan. It is Japan’s second-largest trading partner, with bilateral trade reaching $292.6 billion in 2024. The trade relationship between these two East Asian countries is more than commercial, being closely linked to geopolitics. After imposing restrictions on the tourism sector in response to Takaichi’s remarks, around 500,000 people are estimated to have cancelled their flights to Japan. Consequently, the shares of Japanese retail and tourism companies went down. There were similar retaliatory actions in 2023 and 2010 as well, when Beijing refused to import Japanese seafood and restricted rare earth exports to Japan. Before 2023, the Chinese market accounted for over one-fifth of Japan’s exports. The country’s trade reliance on China puts Tokyo in a dilemma. It faces a challenge of developing a policy that will promote economic interdependence and, at the same time, clearly define which Chinese provocations would legitimise a forceful Japanese response.

Big Brother Comes to the Rescue

Japanese policymakers contend that China’s militaristic ambitions have pushed Japan towards close cooperation with Western allies, especially the U.S. Japan is comfortable with American dominance in the region but hesitates when it comes to accepting China, or perhaps other Asian nations, as equals. From the Chinese perspective, two things are evident. First, China feels uneasy about the U.S.–Japan alliance despite its mixed reaction towards the friendship in 2005, and second, China showed little resistance to Japan’s involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq in spite of its strategic interests, but it is hypersensitive to the Taiwan issue. The so-called hawkish remarks by the Japanese Prime Minister lead to an important question: how does the U.S. feel about a more nationalistic Japan? The recent round of calls between Trump and Xi, followed by the exchange of words between Trump and Takaichi, point to a couple of signals. Washington has stepped in as the ‘big brother’ to protect Japan. It also serves as a gentle reminder to Tokyo not to disrupt its current course, when Sino–American relations are only just beginning to settle after a period of turbulence. It is uncertain whether the U.S. will provide its official stance on Taiwan, since any disruption in the Taiwan Strait would undermine the interests of all the powers involved. Thus, maintaining the status quo in the Strait is not only in favour of the U.S. and Japan but also of the entire world.

While Japan has a clear sense of how to cooperate with China, judging when and how to confront Beijing is difficult. Furthermore, neither Japan nor China has leaders with adequate knowledge of the other. Yasuo Hakuda and Yukio Hatoyama were the last Japanese leaders to establish friendly relations with Beijing. Similarly, after Wang Yi, the former external affairs minister of China, no Chinese leader has tried to pursue a constructive attitude towards Japan. Japan’s hawkish nationalism also allows China to criticise its behaviour during the Second World War with respect to its wartime atrocities. Tokyo’s unwillingness to connect its past with the present gives China moral authority over Japan and an opportunity to put the country in an inferior position. Along with the absence of high-level interlocutors on both sides, the psychological and emotional unpreparedness continues to affect Sino-Japanese relations.

In the words of Gerald Segal, post–Cold War Japanese foreign policy is like the art of growing bonsai. It requires careful cultivation but never leads to a large plant. It is time for Japan to move beyond this bonsai stage and focus on its backyard, which is China. Whether Taikachi’s regime will be able to do so remains to be seen.

“A moment of paradox occurred when a painting of the Bamiyan Buddha statues destroyed by the Taliban regime in 2001 was displayed behind Muttaqi during the press conference. This symbolised poetic justice and demonstrated how India is engaging with the Taliban on its own terms.”

A Diplomatic Shift in Afghanistan

India’s pragmatic shift in its Afghanistan policy was evident during the eight-day visit of the Taliban’s Acting Foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, which began on 9 October. This marked one of the most significant high-level engagements since the Taliban’s 2021 takeover, symbolising a reoriented Indian approach towards its neighbour. Kautilya’s Mandala theory explores how an enemy’s enemy becomes a natural ally; this idea holds true in the context of India–Afghanistan relations, where Pakistan is seen as a common rival.

This visit also reflects a reversal in New Delhi’s stance from its previous position during the 1996 Taliban regime. Notably, the Taliban 2.0 differs in its approach, priorities, and engagement style from its earlier iteration. Even if the Taliban’s external outlook has changed from its last regime, it is quite evident that its internal policies, core principles and ideology remains the same.

According to the Joint Statement released after the visit, India and Afghanistan are seeking to engage on various fronts, especially healthcare, cricket, infrastructure development, education, and exploration of the mining sector. India has also decided to upgrade its technical mission in Kabul to an embassy, signifying a deeper institutional engagement. This renewed engagement, along with Muttaqi’s visit, highlights India’s efforts to protect its interests and maintain stability in its neighbourhood. Yet, it’s important to note that this move does not account for formal recognition of the Taliban regime, the visit is all about safeguarding ties, not legitimising them.

Strategic Objectives: The Three Pillars of India’s Afghan Policy

India’s foreign policy objectives towards Afghanistan can be categorised into economic, strategic, and security-led goals. Economically, India aims to secure its billions of dollars in investment. From a security viewpoint, India seeks to ensure that Afghanistan does not become a haven for anti-Indian terrorist groups. Strategically, it aims to maintain regional influence through Afghanistan’s pivotal geography.

There are several strategic reasons behind this reoriented approach. From a security perspective, India is seeking closer engagement with Afghanistan amid post–Operation Sindoor tensions with Pakistan. The Taliban regime was also one of the first to condemn the Pahalgam terror attack, highlighting Afghanistan’s interest in recalibrating relations with India. The Joint Statement also emphasised peace, stability, and terrorism prevention as shared interests between the two nations.

Strategically, the geographical positioning of Afghanistan makes it a vital element of India’s foreign policy. As the gateway to Central Asia and the West Asia, Afghanistan plays a crucial role in India’s connectivity ambitions. Recently, both countries agreed to resume collaboration on the Chabahar Port to strengthen the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and to reduce Afghanistan’s dependence on Pakistan for international trade and port access. India should also explore the viability of including Afghanistan in the India–Middle East Economic Corridor (IMEC).

With the ongoing Afghanistan–Pakistan border skirmishes and US claims of regaining control of the Bagram airbase, Afghanistan has become more important than ever for India to establish a strategic foothold in its neighbourhood.

However, it is equally important to understand Afghanistan’s perspective. Engagement with India serves two main purposes: gaining international legitimacy and securing economic aid and investment. India, as the largest economy in the region, has the means to assist a nation struggling with humanitarian crises, as was recently demonstrated when India was among the first responders after the earthquakes in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces of Afghanistan.

Ultimately, India’s objective is to seek a stable government in Afghanistan that stands on its own without illegitimate external influence. Whether the Taliban regime can achieve this remains uncertain.

The Regional Chessboard: China, Pakistan, and Beyond

Afghanistan has always been a chessboard for foreign powers. With other regional countries such as China, Russia, Iran, and Türkiye also engaging with the Taliban, it becomes vital for India to build its own stronghold. Amid all the instability and shifting dynamics, it is ultimately the Afghan people who suffer, making it an unfortunate tragedy.

India must also take into consideration the China factor. The question arises whether India should watch China expand its footprint in Afghanistan or work towards building its own. This recent visit indicates that India seeks deeper engagement with Afghanistan in pursuit of its national interests. This approach is crucial to prevent the emergence of a trilateral axis between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China. Taking a positive outlook, India and China could also collaborate on Afghanistan’s development, which could help thaw Indo–Sino relations.

During Muttaqi’s first press conference in India, the Taliban faced major criticism when women journalists were not involved. Although this oversight was rectified in the following days with an inclusive press conference — a small but meaningful sign of adaptation through engagement this reflects the depth and influence of Indo–Afghan relations and demonstrates how exposure, rather than isolation, can drive regimes towards change.

Deoband Visit: Faith, Politics, and Reactions

Muttaqi’s visit to Darul Uloom Deoband was much more than a simple stop, it was a visit filled with ideology, emotions and quite diplomacy. It was an important step in formalising the Taliban’s ideological roots to India, especially during the Afghan-Pak rift. Muttaqui was given a grand welcome with thousands of Indians trying to take one glimpse of the Taliban’s Foreign Minister, showering him with flowers. This showed a grim picture of Indians aligning along the ideological lines of the Taliban- a regime restricting girls education and employment, minority rights etc.

But what began as a visit meant to build cultural and religious ties gradually turned into a spectacle that exposed deeper social and ideological divides within India.

Looking Ahead: Protecting the Three I’s

A moment of paradox occurred when a painting of the Bamiyan Buddha statues destroyed by the Taliban regime in 2001 was displayed behind Muttaqi during the press conference. This symbolised poetic justice and demonstrated how India is engaging with the Taliban on its own terms.

The stakes couldn’t be higher. India needs to safeguard its Interests, Investments, and Infrastructure — the Three I’s while treading carefully in Afghanistan. The risks are real, but staying engaged offers far more rewards than disengagement. Afghanistan may have earned the reputation as the “graveyard of empires,” yet India is placing its faith in history, humanitarian ties, and a long-term vision to shape a new path forward.

In the past few days, President Trump has made several comments in his social media posts as well as in his interactions with the U.S. media, which appear to us as being aimed at pressurising, even bullying, India into agreeing to U.S. terms and conditions for a Trade Agreement. Not only has he described India as a “dead economy,” he has also played the “P” card, which riles us no end by stating that the U.S. will help Pakistan prospect for oil and natural gas. To pour oil on this fire, he added that perhaps in the future India could import oil from Pakistan. Additionally, 25% tariffs are to come into effect for Indian exports to the U.S. soon, and there is the threat of even more duties because India buys Russian oil and is a member of BRICS, which is aiming for de-dollarisation.

How should India react and respond? First and foremost, we must remain calm and not have an emotional, knee-jerk reaction. We should see which of Trump’s threats are actually put into action from mere words and then respond to them. Very often, Trump’s words are merely that and are not actioned. On the tariffs, however, we can be sure that they will come into effect. Let us see what happens with the threatened penalties for purchasing Russian oil.

There have already been many learned studies on how the 25% tariff will impact Indian imports. We have the option of retaliating with our own tariffs, perhaps on products which do not impact our own exports to other parts of the world.

The one wrong thing to do will be to cave in to Trump’s hectoring and bullying. Our negotiators must stay firm. The rest of the nation will have to back them and the decisions our government takes. We cannot parrot Trump’s words, since that will be letting our side down.

Some commentators have been advocating that we strengthen our ties with China, including relaxing investment rules. That, in our opinion, is an equally bad option as China itself has been attempting to browbeat us in ways different from Trump, but which are probably even more insidious. Putting pressure on India at the border or the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is one of their favourite tactics, but weaponising trade, such as stopping exports of rare earth magnets, speciality fertilisers and tunnel boring machines, is yet another pressure tactic they have used.

This is where Atmanirbharta becomes important. While we don’t have to manufacture or produce absolutely everything in India, it is high time that we manufacture those items in which we continue to have a competitive advantage and which will mean that other nations will not be able to pressurise us with by threatening to stop export or import of those items. EV batteries, Active Pharma Ingredients, and some heavy machinery come to mind immediately. It is incumbent on our private sector to manufacture such items not merely for India but for the world. It is equally important for the government to make it easier to do business in India. Even in 2025, there is far too much government in business, and the faster we remove these aspects from our economy, the better it will be for us.

Perhaps, Trump is doing us a favour by his threats if this results in easier business rules in India and far more manufacturing at home.

Many recent graduates from our Indian Institutes of Technology who habitually used to go off to the U.S. to study and then stay on and work there have now opted for jobs in India. Hopefully, some of them will turn to entrepreneurship in the near term.

It is time for India to convert the present adversity into a huge opportunity for our country and our people.

“There have been long absences from the public eye of the top leader Xi Jinping… an all consuming leadership struggle is indeed taking place in the CPC right now.”

There has been a lot of chatter and rumors about a struggle within the leadership of the CPC over the past two months. Since the CPC is a very opaque organisation, it is difficult to really say what exactly is happening. However, there can be no smoke without fire. There have been long absences from the public eye of the top leader Xi Jinping. Now, he has not attended the BRICS Summit in Brazil. This leads us to believe that an all consuming leadership struggle is indeed taking place in the CPC right now. There have been rumours that the previous duo of Hu Jintao, the former General Secretary of the CPC and Wen Jiabao, former premier of the State Council are now calling the shots within the Party.

Perhaps, the seeds for such a struggle were laid during the last party Congress when Hu Jintao was unceremoniously escorted off the dais in front of the eyes of the world. We believe that moment was the one where the seeds of leadership struggle were put in place.

The real opposition to the continued leadership of Xi Jinping is said to have come from General Zhang Youxia, the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. Former Premier Wen Jiabao continues to have strong linkages within the Party and Military is supposedly playing a very important role in bringing Xi Jinping’s leadership to an end and putting in place a smooth transition to a new top leadership of the Party.

Originally, former head of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC), Wang Yang was tipped to succeed Xi as the General Secretary of the Party. However, he had placed three conditions in order to take on this role. They were leadership of the Party, of the State and of the Military. It is understood that General Zhang Youxia vehemently opposed Wang Yang’s leadership of the Military. At this moment General Chang leads the Central Military Commission as vice-chairman given that Xi Jinping’s power base has been cut down.

Now, it appears that Ding Xuexiang has emerged as the front runner to be the party General Secretary; he is currently one of the members of the Politburo Standing Committee and earlier ran the party’s general office. He appears to be acceptable to both Xi Jinping and General Zhang Youxia. There are also rumors that former Vice Premier Hu Chunhua who was tipped to succeed Xi Jinping may become the premier of the State Council.

Although the lack of transparency in the working of the CPC does not permit any confirmation of these developments, it appears certain that there is a huge turbulence with the Party’s leadership structure by reading what is available in the public eye. It appears the Xi Jinping era is likely to end soon, even though Xi is fighting back against his detractors. Our guess is that there will soon be a change in the top leadership of the CPC.

However, we in India need to be crystal clear that despite a change in leadership, policy towards India will not change as long as the CPC is in power. Therefore we can expect continued difficulties in India- China relations and we must prepare for it.

This monthly blog will critically examine the evolving landscape of global politics, unpacking key geopolitical shifts, economic trends, technological advancements, and strategic affairs. We’ll also delve into historical moments that, while seemingly disconnected from present realities, help us understand how international politics has evolved. Additionally, this space will feature recent publications by Pune International Centre (PIC) in the field of International Relations.

A Decade of Global Upheavals

The past few years have been nothing short of transformative for the international order.

We began this decade with a world-altering pandemic, followed by two major wars -Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing Palestine-Israel conflict. Each of these events has reshaped global alliances, tested multilateral institutions, and forced nations to rethink their strategic priorities.

The Pandemic’s Political Fallout

Additionally, the pandemic raised critical questions about global health governance. The World Health Organization (WHO) faced scrutiny for its handling of the crisis, while national governments responded with varying degrees of efficiency. The crisis underscored the need for stronger global health infrastructure.

Russia-Ukraine: A War Beyond Borders

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the world was forced to confront a geopolitical crisis that extended far beyond the battlefield. The war disrupted energy security, food supply chains, and global trade, sending shockwaves across the international system.

While Western nations, led by the US and EU, rallied behind Ukraine with military aid and economic sanctions against Russia, other countries—including India—chose a more strategic path. New Delhi maintained its neutrality, balancing ties with both the West and Russia. Despite immense pressure, India did not join the US-led embargo against Russia and continued purchasing Russian oil, maintaining its strategic autonomy.

Beyond the immediate conflict, the war also exposed the racial biases of Western media. The large-scale displacement of Ukrainians was covered with a tone of surprise—many journalists openly admitted they associated war and refugee crises with third-world countries, not Europe. This starkly contrasted with the media’s treatment of conflicts in the Global South.

In a future post, we will take a closer look at India’s diplomatic response to the Russia-Ukraine war, its strategic autonomy, and how this conflict is reshaping global power equations.

The Palestine-Israel War: A Deep-Rooted Conflict

The Palestine-Israel conflict resurfaced violently in October 2023, with Hamas’ attackon Israel triggering an unprecedented military response. While some framed this as the beginning of the war, a deeper historical understanding reveals that the roots of this conflict go back decades.

For years, Palestinians have resisted Israeli occupation, facing displacement, military crackdowns, and restrictions on basic rights. The Hamas attack was brutal, but Israel’s response was devastating, with Gaza facing relentless bombardment, mass civilian casualties, and the near-total destruction of infrastructure.

The world’s response to the war was deeply polarized. While the US, UK, Germany, and others backed Israel’s military action, countries like South Africa, Spain, and Ireland condemned it as a violation of international law. Meanwhile, the conflict also disrupted diplomatic efforts—just before the war, the US was working to normalize relations between Israel and Arab states through the Abraham Accords. The violence has now stalled those efforts, reinforcing the reality that no lasting peace in West Asia is possible without addressing Palestinian statehood.

Additionally, this war has impacted India’s strategic ambitions, particularly the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC). With West Asia in turmoil, the future of IMEC remains uncertain.

The India-China Border Standoff

Closer to home, India’s tense border relationship with China reached a boiling point in 2020 with the Galwan Valley clash. A conflict between Chinese and India troops led to a violent skirmish in which 20 Indian soldiers lost their lives. The incident marked a turning point in India-China relations as this was the first such violent conflict since 1975, leading to a freeze in diplomatic engagement and increased military presence on both sides of the border.

Recent negotiations have led to partial de-escalation, with both sides agreeing to withdraw from some conflict zones. However, the broader India-China tensions remain unresolved. The trade imbalance between the two nations continues to widen, with India heavily dependent on Chinese imports despite its push for self-reliance.

We will explore the long-term implications of the India-China border dispute, how it fits into China’s regional strategy, and what it means for India’s foreign policy.

What to Expect from This Blog

Through this platform, we aim to provide insightful and thought-provoking discussions on a wide array of topics in international politics. We will also feature guest writers specializing in fields like technology, economics, healthcare, space diplomacy, and security studies.

New posts will be published at the beginning of every month, covering in-depth analyses of major international developments. However, if a significant global event unfolds, we’ll bring you timely insights and expert opinions as it happens.

Stay Tuned!

Whether it’s the shifting balance of power, economic rivalries, technological competition, or security concerns, The IP Blog will be your go-to space for engaging, critical, and well-researched discussions on international politics.

We look forward to exploring the world with you!