The United States and Saudi Arabia signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement on July 23, 2026. Cooperation between Washington and Riyadh on civilian nuclear technology has been under consideration for well over a decade. The finalization of a so-called “123 Agreement,” however, creates real opportunities for the United States to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear power reactors, fuel, and other nuclear-related materials. It also opens the possibility of sharing even more sensitive nuclear technologies with the Kingdom.

Sharing nuclear technology with any country carries risks. Doing so with a country whose leadership has suggested that it would pursue nuclear weapons if regional rival Iran developed them raises even greater concerns. It is therefore unsurprising that the announcement of a civilian nuclear agreement has generated debate and controversy in the United States.

That debate would likely exist regardless of which administration negotiated the agreement. Nevertheless, the fact that the deal was completed under President Trump adds another layer of scrutiny. Trump maintains extensive personal, financial, and political ties to Saudi Arabia, and his administration has a very poor record on negotiating complex nuclear agreements. Efforts to secure a more comprehensive nuclear arrangement with North Korea failed, and questions remain regarding U.S. policy toward nuclear cooperation with partners such as South Korea. Don’t even get me started on the US-Iran 2026 MOU.

Immediately after the agreement was signed, I published a short analysis in The New Republic examining its principal contours and later appeared on the PBS NewsHour to discuss its implications. It may nevertheless be useful to explore some of the agreement’s more specific and consequential elements, particularly those that Congress, congressional staff, and outside experts should monitor closely in the months ahead.

Why Take the Risk?

Why would the United States, under any administration, agree to share sensitive nuclear technology with Saudi Arabia?

The principal argument advanced by supporters is that such cooperation allows Washington to maintain leverage over Saudi nuclear decision-making. If the United States—and not China, Russia, or another foreign supplier—becomes Saudi Arabia’s primary source of nuclear technology, fuel, and expertise, then Washington may retain substantial influence over the future direction of the Kingdom’s nuclear program.

That logic rests on two important assumptions.

The first assumption is that the United States can secure a privileged, if not exclusive, position as Saudi Arabia’s nuclear partner. There are compelling reasons for Washington to maintain influence over Saudi nuclear decisions, particularly given statements by Saudi officials that the Kingdom could seek nuclear weapons if Iran ultimately acquires them. If preserving leverage is a legitimate objective, then it is preferable that the United States—with its relatively stringent safety, security, transparency, and nonproliferation standards—play that role. More on this below.

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Reports indicate that the July 23 agreement may have been accompanied by two as yet unreleased side agreements that include exclusivity provisions. Understanding the contents of those agreements and determining whether any exclusivity commitments are both meaningful and enforceable should be central to Congress’s evaluation of the deal and its associated risks.

Put differently, the choice is not between a U.S.-Saudi nuclear agreement and a Saudi decision to forgo nuclear energy. The more realistic choice is between a U.S.-Saudi deal and a future in which Saudi Arabia turns to suppliers such as China, Russia, Pakistan, or even South Korea. With the possible exception of South Korea, those alternatives are unlikely to impose the same level of nonproliferation, transparency, and security requirements as the United States. Consequently, the risks of inaction must be weighed alongside the risks inherent in cooperation.

The second assumption underlying the agreement is that the United States itself will benefit materially. The Trump administration has made revitalizing the American nuclear industry a policy priority, and there is little doubt that reactor exports historically contributed to America’s technological and industrial leadership in nuclear energy.

Whether the administration’s deregulatory approach ultimately advances or hinders a nuclear renaissance remains an open question. Nevertheless, exporting proven reactor designs has often been an effective way to sustain domestic expertise and industrial capacity.

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At the same time, policymakers should remember the lessons of the U.S.-India nuclear agreement negotiated under President George W. Bush. That agreement relaxed longstanding U.S. nonproliferation standards in the expectation that American industry would gain significant commercial opportunities in India. Despite those concessions, the anticipated economic benefits never fully materialized. As with all things nuclear, caveat emptor remains a useful guiding principle.

The Enrichment Question

The most controversial aspect of the U.S.-Saudi nuclear agreement is the possibility that Washington and Riyadh could eventually agree to allow Saudi Arabia to engage in uranium enrichment.

As anyone familiar with nuclear issues understands, enriched uranium and separated plutonium can be used to produce nuclear weapons. Any country capable of enriching uranium—even if initially for peaceful purposes—possesses the technical foundation necessary to produce highly enriched uranium suitable for a nuclear device.

Currently, the global market already provides reliable access to enriched uranium fuel. As a result, it is not clear that there is a compelling economic rationale for a new national enrichment program. Developing and operating enrichment facilities is expensive, technically demanding, and often less cost-effective than purchasing fuel from established suppliers.

This has long been a central argument regarding Iran’s enrichment program and remains a key issue in efforts to manage Iran’s future nuclear capabilities. The same logic applies to Saudi Arabia. If reactor fuel can be purchased on the international market at stable and affordable prices, any insistence on indigenous enrichment inevitably raises questions that extend beyond economics.

Energy security is a legitimate consideration, and many states prefer greater control over their fuel supply chains. Yet given Saudi Arabia’s demonstrated ability to purchase everything from advanced semiconductors and AI chips to sophisticated military systems, a strong interest in domestic uranium enrichment understandably raises concerns among nonproliferation experts.

A Watchful Eye

There is one additional issue very much on the minds of nuclear experts, and that focuses on the role to be played by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Saudi nuclear activities. After the 1992-3 war in Iraq, it was found that the IAEA’s verification procedures fell far short of what was needed to truly protect against the country developing nuclear weapons in violation of its treaty and political commitments. The result was the development of a new enhanced verification system known as the IAEA Additional Protocol. Since the mid-2000s the United States has made the Additional Protocol it’s standard for pursuing nuclear cooperation with other countries and has pushed all providers of nuclear technology to adopt Additional Protocol as the baseline for nuclear cooperation with other states.

According to reports the US-Saudi nuclear agreement does not require Saudi Arabia to adopt the Additional Protocol, or enable the IAEA to gain access to any facilities and information needed to ensure that our country was meeting it’s nuclear nonproliferation obligations. It is entirely possible that the United States and Saudi Arabia could negotiate a verification agreement that met or even exceeded the standards of the Additional Protocol without having to call the agreement itself by that term. A rose by any other name would be just as effective. But ensuring that the IAEA will have access that it needs to do its job is essential to any deal. At a minimum, the Congress should insist that the State Department and the intelligence community certify annually that the verification procedures arranged under this deal are adequate to ensure that the IAEA will be able to meet its obligations and certify that Saudi Arabia is not pursuing unauthorized nuclear activities that could contribute to a nuclear weapons program. There is no doubt that accepting anything less than the Additional Protocol as a standard for cooperation is a problem, but it is one that is not insurmountable as long as the principles behind the Additional Protocol are maintained.

Bottom Line

The first question, I was asked, when news of the deal broke, remains the most important: Is this agreement in America’s interests and shouldn’t be adopted. As I said on the PBS NewsHour, I’m going to reserve judgment until I see the details of the deal because as always, that’s where the real answer lies. If the agreement ensures American exclusivity in Saudi Arabia, providing the United States with leverage over future Saudi decision, making, if the IAEA has the access that it needs to do his job and verify that there are no unauthorized or military related nuclear activities taking place in Saudi Arabia, and if the criteria for judging whether or not Saudi Arabia can with adequate safe guards develop an enrichment facility on Saudi territory are reasonable, transparent and objective than the deal could very well be in America’s interests. For now, I will take the advice of my former boss Vice President Joe Biden who warned people not to judge other people’s motives, but to judge their actions. I am going to be looking at the details of this deal to determine whether or not the arguments made by this administration hold water. Of course, I have deep, deep suspicions about why President Trump is pursuing this deal, and whether or not he will maintain anything close to reasonable standards for determining how they deal should go forward. But until I see the terms of the deal itself, it’s impossible to judge whether or not it meets the high standards the United States should maintain in seeking to ensure that the benefits of nuclear technology can be shared without adding to the risk that more nuclear weapon states will emerge.

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_{Author’s note - I wrote this post and then asked CoPilot to proof and format. I reviewed the final product and pledge that it is human produced and I stand by its contents.}

Photo Credit: Alice Saltini

The event took place at Castel Gandolfo, outside Rome. The location has nothing to do with the white (or gray) wizard from The Lord of the Rings and is, in fact, the summer residence of the Pope, dating back to the 1500s. It is an amazing location, even if the conference was hosted in a literal greenhouse without central air conditioning. Many attendees remarked that it was appropriate for the Vatican to host an event in conditions similar to those found in Purgatory.

This event came one year after the University of Chicago hosted an esteemed group of Global Laureates at an event marking the 80th anniversary of the Trinity nuclear test during World War II. The Laureates gathered soon after the Vatican released Pope Leo XIV’s encyclical Magnifica Humanitas: On Safeguarding the Human Person in the Time of Artificial Intelligence. The document is, in itself, a remarkable piece of work, and I hope to write about it in a standalone post soon. The encyclical is a well-thought-out and reasoned set of principles addressing how AI may affect concepts of human identity and the importance of protecting the human element in the human-AI balance.

I shared three major points with the Laureates and other experts on AI, nuclear weapons, and global strategy, and I wanted to put them down here for others to consider. My panel included Maria Ressa, Miles Brundage, and Dr. Heigo Sato, and was chaired by Dr. Brian Schmidt. Maria is a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, and Brian was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics along with colleagues for his work on the accelerating expansion of the universe. I was the only panelist with extensive experience in nuclear weapons policy and security, so I focused my remarks on the current fragile state of the global nuclear landscape. Other nuclear experts including my friends and colleagues from Harvard, Stanford, UCS and elsewhere also presented and made valuable contributions to the final statement.

My key point was that attendees needed to understand there is no special room filled with the extra smart or capable people who keep all nuclear risks under control. Just as in every other field, there are human beings doing their best to manage complex challenges with imperfect skills and incomplete information. Beyond that, and somewhat ironically, while human fallibility often contributes to nuclear crises, it is more often than not the human element that identifies and counteracts the risks created by both humanity and complex systems—often in contravention of the procedures and norms put in place to guide nuclear operations. Human judgment and luck have had an inordinate impact on preventing nuclear disasters, even as hard work and commitment continue to play a critical role in preventing nuclear war.

A summary of my three main points follows:

1) The global nuclear system remains unstable.

The general public often assumes that the people responsible for managing nuclear relationships have everything under control. Nothing could be further from the truth. Eighty years after nuclear weapons were invented, humans remain remarkably poor at nuclear signaling and interpretation, and more often than not, nuclear disaster is avoided through a combination of judgment and good fortune. Miscommunication, miscalculation, mirror imaging, mistakes, complacency, and, in some cases, greed, aggression, and hubris all contribute to growing nuclear dangers.

2) It remains difficult to comprehend that developers of cutting-edge AI models are not subject to stricter regulation.

You cannot sell toothpaste in the United States without demonstrating that it is safe, yet new AI models that could help individuals develop weapons of mass destruction are released and made available for $15 per month. That is unacceptable and should change. The public is demanding action, and political leaders should reject AI industry donations and regulate AI laboratories now. The race mentality driving AI development is both flawed and dangerous.

3) AI and machine learning have been integrated into nuclear command-and-control systems for decades.

That is simply a fact. Yet there is no standing U.S. government or Department of Defense guidance governing how these technologies may be used in the future. As a result, leaders who insist they will always maintain human control over launch decisions and keep a human in the loop may not fully appreciate how much of that loop is already AI-generated—and that they are increasingly “on” the loop rather than truly in control of it.

The United States government should establish objective standards, informed by both governmental and non-governmental experts, for testing and evaluating any AI systems intended for use in conventional or nuclear command, control, and communications systems. There should also be a transparent and evidence-based process for demonstrating a clear operational benefit before such systems are integrated. Pursuing a capability simply because it is technically possible, or because others may be doing so, is not sufficient justification for rapid AI-military integration.

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Above all, I respect that fact that accomplished experts from multiple fields around the world, some who have risked their lives and some who have helped us understand the nature of life itself, have come together to engage on this critical new technology. It is fair to say that everyone who gathered - especially those excited about the promise of AI for humanity - are concerned about the accelerating AI and nuclear arms races. They made very clear that these are avoidable. And more than that, our survival likely depends on avoiding these dynamics and disarming AI before it imperils us all.

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Disclaimer: I used MS Co-Pilot to proof read my post before publishing, but reviewed it and certify the work is my own and human-made.

The consensus is that the Trump MOU (that my friends want to refer to as the Versailles MOU) is that the deal is a very clear financial and strategic victory for Iran. It is also a stunning capitulation from both long-standing US, and President Trump’s own stated goals in Iran. Even based on his own confused and shifting justifications put forward from Trump for the war - preventing a nuclear Iran, getting a better deal than 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, destroying Iran’s nuclear, missile and drone capabilities, regime change, and ending Iran’s support for proxies - the war did not achieve any of its goals and likely made some of them harder to achieve.

So, the question is not whether the MOU is a good nuclear agreement but where the MOU leaves the US, Iran and the world. Here is how I see the current situation:

1. US has waived sanctions on Iranian oil exports. This means Iran is now making $150-200 million per day, or $4-6 billion per month. There are no restrictions on this money that I know of. The funds go straight into Iranian bank accounts, presumably controlled by the IRGC/military and can be spent on anything they want. I assume some significant portion will be used to ensure loyalty of leaders and troops, ensure populations are controlled, and rebuild missile and drone production capabilities.

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2. Iran’s nuclear program is unconstrained. Press reports and statements from Vice President JD Vance that Iran has agreed to result “inspections” have been rejected as false by Iran. It is likely true Iran indicated privately they might accept some role for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the future, but history shows that unless a deal is specific that getting Iran to adjust/accept/abide is very hard. So for now, Iran is getting to bank money but still has not yet had to hand over, dilute, provide access over or compromise on its nuclear capabilities.

3. Iran still possess 400 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium, enough for a number of nuclear weapons. Some experts believe that material is likely intact and accessible by Iran, the Administration - with a long and checked history of making inaccurate statements - contends otherwise. Iran also still has - somewhere - over 1 tone of low enriched uranium that can be further enriched to make even more nuclear weapons.

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4. Iran has been offered a $300 billion reconstruction fund and access to previously frozen Iranian funds if they negotiate a final agreement. I have seen reports that some funds have already been unfrozen, but I have not seen the confirmed. If so, this would be a step that is not reversible and a major boon for Iran’s new leaders. Regardless, if funds are unfrozen, a big question is what has Iran done to get that benefit.

5. President Trump desperately wants/needs the Straits of Hormuz to remain open. Iran has opened them and by all repoorts oil flows are getting close to pre-war levels. Oil prices have returned roughly to pre-war levels as well. That is good news for the global and US economy, even if the price hike from oil shortages will take months to flow to consumers. Shipping costs have been high - those prices will flow thought the financial system for a while. And there is still the damage that was done to Gulf oil and natural gas infrastructure. That is reportedly going to take years to fix. But for now, markets seem to like the Straits being open.

6. Iran owns the Straits. The US can say what it wants (and will) but the big strategic shift aside from the US baking away from nuclear and other goals is that Iran has laid claim to and demonstrated that it controls the Straits of Hormuz. The US under President Trump have also made clear they are not going to take actions that might lead Iran to close them nor is the US prepared to risk what it would take to militarily keep the Straits open. This presents Iran with a fascinatingly dangerous new reality - it can hold the world hostage without having to build a nuclear weapon. It has a much more credible and globally significant weapon in its ability to close the Straits. As such, it suggests that if the US was able and willing to focus and organize itself, it might be able to get satisfaction on the nuclear issue.

7. Iran is better at this than Trump. I’ve been to Iran and negotiated with Iranians. Even when the US held a lot of leverage, Iranians are very skilled negotiators and drive hard bargains to achieve their aims. Good for them. the US used to be able to do the same, but it remains far from clear the Trump Administration knows what it wants aside from putting the war in the rear view mirror and keeping the Straits open. If that is what the US wants, it can have them but at the cost of all of the other goals the US has sought for over three decades. A wise person once said elections have consequences. This is a prime example of how having Trump instead of a lot of other options means the US and the world are more likely to face a nuclear Iran in the future.

8. Iran has every incentive to drag out the talks, and the ability to do so. The MOU says the final peace settlement should be done in 60 days, but the time can be extended by mutual agreement. It is going to be extended. A lot. Trump does not want to restart the war. Iran is making money while talks continue. It is not clear who is going to offer $300 billion to Iran for reconstruction. The US Congress is not going to provide that, and the gulf states Iran just attacked have also said they are not going to pay. So the status quo - Iran making money, Straits open but under Iran’s control and thumb and an unresolved nuclear program without strong verification - is likely to continue for many months.

9. The US Congress may have a say on any move to provide Iran with comprehensive relief from US sanction. The terms of the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, adopted to constrain President Obama by a Republican Congress now weigh on President Trump - assuming he intends to comply with the law. That is of course not a given. My colleague has written a very useful piece arguing the INARA should be repealed but unless and until that happens, the law stands. It is likely the President could prevail in a veto fight, but it would not be pretty and he would need to find a way to argue Iran has done enough to warrant such a step. It is also not clear France or the UK - which would have to approve sanctions relief thought the UN, or the EU states who continue to see Iran’s support for Russia in Ukraine as a major threat - are prepared to relieve sanctions or go along with the US.

So, lets lay this out. Before February the Straits were open, Iran did not allow nuclear inspections and Iran oil sales were sanctioned and illegal. Now, the Straits are open, Iran is not allowing nuclear inspections, and Iran is making a lot of money from approved oil sales and the threat of US and Israeli military action is no longer credible or at the very least seen by Iran as a major threat to their survival.

That is why the war is a clear loss for the US, a clear win for Iran and why things are likely to get worse for the US before they get better.

I’ll summarize at the top that this is a stunning document. Wendy Sherman, former Deputy Secretary of State and former lead US negotiator with Iran called it “unconditional surrender” last night on MS Now. Under the deal, Iran will get over $325 billion and the US will remove all of its military force from “Iran’s proximity” whatever that means. The entire Middle East? The deal requires the US to lift all sanctions against Iran - ALL - including those linked to terrorism, missiles, and regional aggression. And Iran gets all this without making clear what Iran has to give up. The agreement does not state whether Iran can have future enrichment capabilities. Trump has already said Iran can have missiles and that they can have some low levels of enrichment. And with the waiver on Iranian oil, petrochemicals and other materials, Iran is going to start getting $150-200 million per day in legal revenue. It has every incentive to drag the talks out, and Trump has demonstrated that he is bored and wants to go home. It is likely this negotiation will be an even greater strategic defeat for the US than the MOU.

All in all, this is a complete reversal of over 30 years of US policy and gives Iran control of the Straits of Hormuz, a lot of money for any thing they want, and abandons most of not all US leverage to get a good nuclear deal.

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Beginning of Text

Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran have jointly agreed in good faith on such-and-such a date on the following.

Paragraph 1

The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran and their allies in the current war by signing this M.O.U. declare the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and undertake from now on not to initiate any war or any military operation against each other, and to refrain [from] the threat or use of force against each other and ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. The final deal will confirm the permanent termination of the war on all fronts, including in Lebanon and other provisions of this paragraph.

• The MOU is signed by the US and Iran but not Israel, so it is not clear how Trump can make a commitment for Israel to stop the war in Lebanon (Israel should stop the war in Lebanon). Also, President Trump repeatedly on June 17, the day the MOU was signed, threatened to resume bombing Iran if they failed to comply with the agreement - so it is not clear whether threats to use force will actually stop under the deal. Iran can use such threats at any time as a pretext to slow or stop the talks while the money rolls in.

Paragraph 2

The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran undertake to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.

• Iran has sought to conduct attacks in the US, and the United States has repeatedly sponsored actions in Iran including dating back to the 1950s. How this will be defined or enforced is not clear.

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Paragraph 3

The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran commit to negotiating and achieving the final deal in maximum 60 days extendable with mutual consent.

• This is fairly standard diplomatic language, but as we will see below it will take much longer for the sides to get to a final deal. I believe it will take more than 60 days just to get IAEA inspectors back into the country and to identify and secure all of Iran’s uranium. And as mentioned above, Iran starts making money on day one after the MOU is signed. This is going to take many many months, if indeed it is even finished under this Administration.

Paragraph 4

Immediately upon the signing of this M.O.U., the United States of America will begin the removal of its naval blockade and any disturbances or impediments against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and will fully end the naval blockade within 30 days. During this period, the traffic of vessels will be in proportion to the numbers of prewar traffic being restored by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America further undertakes to remove its forces from the proximity of the Islamic Republic of Iran within 30 days after the final deal.

• This is what Trump wanted - the Straits of Hormuz will be opened. Rememver they were not only open before the US and Israel started bombing, but everyone understood the Straits were international waters and closing them would be and illegal and dangerous act. Now, Iran lays claim to the Straits, and below even seems to do so with US backing!!!

• This clause also commits the United States to remove its military forces from the region within 30 days of a final deal. The region is undefined. The US has a fleet headquarters in Bahrain, bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and troops in other parts of the region. The US also have a large naval presence in the region. US allies are going to be asking a lot of questions, and Iran and China and Russia are going to take advantage of this retreat very soon.

Paragraph 5

Upon the signing of this M.O.U., the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days only from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman, and vice versa. The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start, and considering the need for removing the technical and military obstacles and demining by the Islamic Republic of Iran, will be instated within 30 days. The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz, in discussion with other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz.

• Iran will open the Straits and remove mines and get shipping moving again. That will return the gulf to the Status Quo Ante. But before, the Straits were international waters. Under this deal, Iran and Oman will define the administration of the Straits? That sounds like a stranglehold and a formula to start charging transit fees. This is a straight up loss for the US and adds a tax to all oil and gas and fertilizers and other products from the Gulf. A global shake down. Under international law, the Straits are international waters. Tolls and fees cannot be applied and no country can control them. This has been US policy for centuries.

Paragraph 6

The United States of America undertakes with regional partners to develop a definitive, mutually agreed plan with at least U.S.D. 300 billion for the reconstruction and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The mechanism for the implementation of this plan will be finalized as part of a final deal within 60 days. All required licenses, waivers and permissions needed for the relevant financial transactions will be granted by the United States of America.

• The US will set up a $300 billion fund for Iran to say we are sorry for bombing you. Trump says the Gulf Allies will pay. This has yet to be confirmed. Where does the money go? How will Iran spend it? Can they use this to rebuild military bases? The money inside Iran will be administered by the IRGC without any doubt. This means the newly empowered military regime will get stronger and richer, and they are going to buy a lot of Russian and Chinese weapons.

Paragraph 7

The United States of America undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the United Nations Security Council resolutions, I.A.E.A. Board of Governors resolutions, and all unilateral U.S. sanctions, primary and secondary, in an agreed-upon schedule as part of the final deal. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America acknowledge the critical importance of the sanctions termination issue above mentioned, and express their intentions to immediately address these issues in the negotiations in order to achieve mutual agreement on them.

• This is just stunning. It is a complete reversal of 30+ years of US policy. The US has imposed sanctions on Iran for violating nuclear agreements, support for terrorism, arms transfers, human rights violations, drug trafficking and other violations of US and international law. Now the US says all are going to be lifted. Under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, these waivers cannnot happen for at least 30 days while Congress reviews the agreement, which has yet to be submitted. It may well pass, but members will have to vote and a number of conservatives have already been negative on the deal. Also, European allied have to agree to list sanctions and they remain very concerned about Iran providing drones to Russia for use in Ukraine. They may not be 100% on board with this deal or its terms. Regardless, this is a massive win for Iran and a complete loss for US policy. The deal on the table in February before the war did not contain such a demand. Trump rolled the dice and lost. Without economic sanctions, the pressure for Iran to make a nuclear deal disappears.

Paragraph 8

The Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran have agreed to resolve the disposition of stockpiled, enriched material pursuant to a mechanism that will be mutually agreed upon in accordance with the schedule mentioned in Paragraph 7, with the minimum methodology to be down-blending on site under the supervision of the I.A.E.A. The two parties also agreed to discuss the issue of enrichment and other mutually agreed matters related to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear needs, based on the statutory framework being agreed upon in the final deal. The final deal will confirm the provisions of this paragraph. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran acknowledge the critical importance of the nuclear issues above mentioned, and express their intention to immediately address these issues in the negotiation in order to achieve mutual agreement on them.

• Iran has promised since 1957 it would not develop a nuclear weapon. Touted by Trump and JD Vance as a breakthrough, this is far weaker terms that the US got in 2015 and weaken than what Iran offered in February (I am updating this to include the excellent new analysis by on how this MOU compares to the 2015 agreement). It does sound like the US and Iran has agreed at least some of Iran’s enriched uranium will be diluted or blended down. But all of it? 60% and 3%? And will this happen in Iran? First, the material has to be located and secured. And the US shoudl want to make sure that is knows how much Iran has produced. That is no quick or easy task. Moreover, if this work is to be done in Iran the facilities to dilute or downblend have to be rebuilt or repaired and put into operation. This will take time. I expect Iran will ask the US to pay for the repairs. That would be stunning as well.

• Also, Trump has publicly stated that Iran can have some low level of peaceful enrichment. I expect Iran to pocket that and insist it is in a final agreement. The term “nuclear needs” is what Iran has said justifies enrichment to 19.75% for its research reactor. You can bet Trump is not going to war again over this issue and Iran knows it. Iran is on the verge of getting the public US endorsement for its program it has long sought, and all without paying much of a price and maybe even get the US to pay for the facilities?

Paragraph 9

Pending the final deal, the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran agree to maintain the status quo. The Islamic Republic of Iran will maintain the current status quo of its nuclear program, and the United States of America will not impose any new sanctions, and will not deploy additional forces in the region.

• Until a deal is done, Iran keeps its 400kg of 60% enriched uranium and its larger stocks of low enriched material. It is not clear if Iran can begin rebuilding other sites. But it is clear US cannot impose any new sanctions or deploy more troops or military assets to the region. Does this include missile defenses for US and gulf allies?

Paragraph 10

The United States of America undertakes that immediately upon the signing of this M.O.U., and until the termination of sanctions, U.S. Department of Treasury will issue waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products and derivatives, and all associated services, including banking transactions, insurances, transportation, etc.

• This is a big payday for Iran. Iran could make $150 - 200 million per day now in legal oil sales. Maybe $4-6 billion / month. Where does that money go? To pay Hamas or Hezbollah? Rebuild the IRGC, now in charge in Iran? To buy more Chinese and Russian arms? Build more missiles and drones? You bet.

Paragraph 11

The United States of America undertakes to make fully available for use the frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran upon the implementation of this M.O.U. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will mutually agree on the procedures related to the release of these funds during the negotiations. Such funds, whether retained in the original account or transferred, shall be made fully usable for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America undertakes to issue all necessary licenses and authorizations accordingly.

• Another big payday for Iran. Anywhere from $24 billion and up of frozen Iranian assets can be used by Iran for anything they want. The US under Obama made sure the unfrozen assets went to pay debts outside of Iran. They got no direct funds. This is much different.

Paragraph 12

The United States of America and Islamic Republic of Iran agree that an executive mechanism will be established to monitor the successful implementation of this M.O.U. and the future compliance of the final deal.

• Does the IAEA have a role? Who from the US and Iran will do this? Under what terms and authority? I suspect this will be like the Gaza Board of Peace. Heaven help us.

Paragraph 13

After signing this M.O.U. and subject to the beginning of the implementation of Paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 10 and 11 of this M.O.U., and the continuing implementation of these measures, the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will start negotiations regarding the final deal exclusively on the other paragraphs.

Paragraph 14

The final deal will be endorsed by a binding U.N.S.C. resolution.

• This is interesting because France in particular has been more hard line on the risk of nuclear Iran than the US has been at times. If this has to go before the UNSC, the UK and France, as well as Russia and China get a veto if they want. PRC, Russia and UK likely to go along. I am not so sure about France.

As someone who has worked on the Iran nuclear challenge since the late 1980s, this one is a real head-scratcher because Iran has committed over and over for almost 70 years that it would not build a nuclear weapon. So, I went back into the archives to look up past examples where Iran has promised the United States or other countries that it would never build a nuclear weapon. They included the following:

In 1957, the United States and Iran signed an agreement for nuclear cooperation as part of President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program. Interestingly, the agreement was signed by Louis Strauss who was played by Robert Downey Jr in the movie Oppenheimer. Stauss was the Chair of the Atomic Energy Commission at the time. The agreement only covered US provided nuclear materials, but at the time Iran had no other suppliers for any nuclear materials and so the agreement covered the entirety of Iran’s nuclear program. In it, Iran pledges that all materials acquired from the United States would only be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and not for any atomic weapons. Interestingly, it also capped the amount of 20% highly enriched uranium that Iran would have at about 6 kilograms. This is of course far below the 400kg of 60% enriched uranium that Iran currently possesses.

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Then in 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the NPT. Under the agreement as a non-nuclear weapon state, Iran pledged to never seek, acquire or receive from anyone nuclear weapons and to place all of its nuclear activities under inspections from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In 1974, Iran signed its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. That agreement states that the IAEA safeguards will be applied to all peaceful nuclear materials in Iran to ensure they are not diverted for the use of producing nuclear weapons.

Interestingly, in 2003 former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a famous religious edict or Fatwa that pledged that Iran would never build a nuclear weapon and that nuclear weapons are, under Islamic law Haram or forbidden. This put Iran’s nuclear commitments in strong religious terms, and the document has been cited in IAEA official documents as well as by many Iranian officials.

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In 2013, in the prelude to the full Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran signed the Joint Plan of Action which stated that “Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons.”

The 2015 full JCPOA states clearly on page 2 that “Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran even seek, develop or acquire nuclear weapons.”

But now we have statements from the US President and Vice President that the new agreement contains a pledge that Iran will never acquire a nuclear weapon. Yes it is good and important that Iran makes this commitment. But this is nothing new. And regardless of what Iran says, the US and the IAEA have to have the means to verify that all of the nuclear materials under its control are secured and not used for military purposes. So a pledge is important to be sure, but by no means earth shattering or ground-breaking stuff.

What is far more interesting is the statement from President Trump that Iran will be able to enrich to “low levels” under the deal he is negotiating. That means Iran gets to keep enrichment. So then the question is how much enrichment capacity will Iran have, and what controls will be in place under any deal the US and Iran negotiate. These were entirely legitimate questions under the JCPOA and they remain so. But if Iran is going to have enrichment, it is going to have the capacity to ensure to levels useful in a nuclear weapon. So Iran will be “capable” of building nuclear weapons, and the question is how far from a bomb will Iran be kept and how. How to keep Iran from taking its capability to go nuclear and doing it was the challange that the Obama Administration took on in the JCPOA. Trump and his supporters did not like that answer and that led to the war the US just fought. And now they have to face their own Kobayashi Maru (look it up).

Under the Obama Administration, it took the US and Iran more than three years to negotiate a detailed text that laid out in excruciating details what Iran could and could not do, and how the US and the world would verify those claims. If Trump can get anything close in 60, I will tip my hat. But odds are long against it. And in the meantime, Iran will retain possession of 400 kilograms of 60% enriched material and the ability to close the Straits of Hormuz at will.

Any objective observer should be skeptical that the final agreement – if one is ever reached – will do better than the 2015 agreement or be an effective check on Iran’s nuclear and military capability. We have been here before. I would prefer that we make new mistakes, not the same ones over and over. The 2015 agreement is the gold standards for what was possible with Iran. If Trump and team can do better, more power to them.

As a nuclear weapon state, America has an inherent and never-ending responsibility to develop and sustain policies to guide the conduct of its nuclear strategy. In a democracy where officials and experts and the public play a role in informing and determining the direction of those policies, and how strategy is achieved, we must engage in a public, respectful and informed discourse about why the responsibilities America has to protect itself and its citizens, and the risks entailed in a world where nuclear weapons exist.

It is widely agreed that the global nuclear and geopolitical landscape is changing. Today, almost every nuclear weapon state - there are currently nine - is modernizing or increasing its nuclear arsenal and enhancing the degree to which they rely on nuclear weapons for its defense, security or diplomatic strategy. Moreover, new states - including many allied or aligned with the United States - are assessing whether they should acquire independent nuclear capabilities to ensure their own security. The bilateral nuclear competition between the United States and Soviet Union gave way to a different bilateral construct, and now that is changing as China increases both its nuclear and conventional capabilities and has the means to directly affect American interests and security.

At the same time, the American political landscape is increasingly ionized. Finding common ground and engaging in a respectful discourse is harder today than it was a generation ago. However, developing a sustainable nuclear strategy for the United States requires such engagement and efforts. For those deeply committed to a sound and responsible set of policies worthy of the American ideal, finding ways to engage in a responsible and respectful discourse should be a requirement. When changes to nuclear strategy and capabilities have both global implications and can take decades to implement, finding common sustainable ground is a key component of sound strategy.

In the search for common ground, there are some basic questions with admittedly complex answers that should be asked and considered. Questions like: What should US nuclear policy be in this new nuclear age? What are America’s nuclear weapons for? How many nuclear weapons and of what kinds should the United States have? How do American nuclear weapons affect our security and the security of others? How do our weapons and the way we behave affect both adversaries and allies? How should America plan for uncertainty? How should America seek to reduce nuclear risks? And in the broadest possible terms, how can the US ensure its nuclear strategy enhances national security strategy and that the US can effectively manage its global nuclear responsibilities?

These are the questions that occupy nuclear experts and should be increasingly considered by elected and appointed officials responsible for America’s national security. To advance this discussion, this article seeks to identify certain statements and goals that might generate broad support, if not consensus. Once this piece is completed, future ones will work to unpack what these concepts/principles/tenets mean for the nuclear policy debate and what choices are before future policy makers.

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It is certain that experts - even when they agree on the goals - will debate at length and with energy what tactics and tools should be employed to achieve these goals. That is not only expected but it should also be welcomed. It is how sound policy should be made.

1. The United States has used an integrated set of deterrence, reassurance, arms control, and disarmament tools to manage nuclear competition over the last 80 years. That policy has helped avoid nuclear use and war, and kept proliferation contained.

2. All these components - deterrence, arms control, and nuclear reductions/disarmament - have advocates. Some maintain that only effective deterrence can eliminate nuclear risks, while others posit just as strongly that only effective disarmament can achieve that goal. Both sides have circumstantial and anecdotal evidence to support their positions, but neither side can effectively prove their contentions. A more likely explanation is that a balance of efforts to maintain effective deterrence while managing nuclear risks and supporting broader nuclear reductions provides a critical set of tools to manage nuclear risks.

3. US policy should seek to avoid any use of nuclear weapons by anyone, anywhere - consistent with core US national security objectives.

4. Any proliferation comes with new risks to US security in the long-term. The US should seek to prevent any further proliferation.

5. There are sound reasons to maintain that nuclear weapons have played a role in deterring global nuclear conflict in the past and influenced adversary decision making in ways that have served American security interests. Having a nuclear arsenal should influence how other leaders think and behave.

6. Even after 80 years, the US is not as good as it should be at understanding how its weapons influence the behavior of other states. There is no perfect understanding of how deterrence works, and there has never been.

7. Nuclear weapons play a role in managing US alliances and preventing proliferation, as long as US commitments and capabilities are both considered credible.

8. Outside of deterrence and reassurance, there are many challenges where nuclear weapons are not particularly relevant.

9. Overreliance on nuclear weapons in non-credible scenarios can reduce the credibility of nuclear deterrent commitments in core areas.

10. Nuclear deterrence and reassurance require a well-managed balance of both capabilities and credibility. If you lack the credible ability to use nuclear weapons, political commitments to use them are less effective. If your political credibility is in doubt, no amount of hardware can compensate. Put another way, deterrence = credibility X capability. If either is 0, the result is 0.

11. It is far from certain that incremental changes to US nuclear strategy affect deterrence and reassurance. The US may be able to deter and reassure and ensure stability with a variety of nuclear capabilities, when considered in the context of broader US strategy and capabilities - including conventional military, economic and security policy, etc.

12. The role of nuclear weapons should be assessed in the broader context of US power, including but not limited to its broader defense strategy. Nuclear weapons are part of a portfolio of deterrence capabilities, and changes to nuclear capabilities without a clear understanding how conventional and other deterrence capabilities play a role or may be affected and likely to be less useful than policy decisions made in a broader context.

13. Arms control, broadly defined, has also contributed to US nuclear and national security in a variety of ways. Arms control is a tool used to advance US security, just as deterrence is a tool to that goal. The US would be in a better position if it could use all tools by making the necessary investments, and ensuring it can use arms control tools to its advantage is a component of sound policy.

14. Deterrence and arms control are tools, not goals and ends in and of themselves. The goal of either, or both in combination is US security.

15. The management of nuclear weapons carries inherent risks that require unfailing investments of time, money and attention to effectively manage.

16. Today and for the foreseeable future, the most likely circumstances that can lead to nuclear use are through escalation or miscalculation. As such, concerted efforts should be made to ensure the US has a credible conventional military capability to avoid the potential need for it to escalate itself to nuclear weapons. And the US should invest time and effort to create the means to effectively manage crises with potential adversaries.

17. Effective deterrence requires understanding what a potential adversary might seek to achieve through any use of force and preventing them from being able to achieve it (denial) or by holding at risk and credibly threatening to destroy or deprive them of the things they care about more than the objective whey may seek to attain through use of force (punishment). Understanding what an adversary cares about and their objectives is of critical importance in maintaining an effective deterrence strategy.

18. The US can be better at understanding what our adversaries care about, and there should be greater efforts to understand these dynamics and link the research and analysis into not only nuclear policy but national security policy more broadly. This requires a whole-of-government effort and is best pursued with a combination of security, military, regional political, and economic analysis.

19. Maintaining strong alliances is a core US national security objective. It enhances US security and makes it easier to deter US adversaries. Credible extended deterrent commitments - built on a broad range of American economic and military capabilities, including credible conventional and nuclear forces - have been a key to the successful sustainment of US alliances in Europe and Asia.

20. The United States has been able to effectively use the norms of nuclear non-use, non-testing and other standards for “responsible nuclear behavior” to enhance its security and that of its allies. Those norms have required the US to constrain some of its own activities but overall, the benefits of having and being able to use those norms to pursue policy goals have enhanced US security and that of US allies.

I wanted 10 but ended up with 20. As MacNamara once said, a nice round number. All of these points are relevant to a policy discussion that seeks to inform a debate about both the role of US weapons; investments the US should make for its own security and that of our allies. They will hopefully be useful in sparking discussion among interested friends and colleagues about the future of US nuclear policy. Reports that the Trump Administration has embarked on a small version of a nuclear posture review are a useful catalyst, but we should be realistic about what the content of any such report will and will not mean. The lack of an interagency process in this Administration, the extreme policies and interpretations that have been adopted, and the complete disconnect in some areas between current Administration policy and long-standing and valuable US security goals are striking. Preparing for a post Trump world and thinking now about what a more sustainable nuclear policy for the United States might look like seems like time well spent.

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The 2015 agreement with Iran, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, was negotiated with the United States, Iran, Russia, China and the EU. That deal was designed to prevent Iran from acquiring not only a nuclear weapon, but from possessing enough material to produce even a single nuclear weapon. To create confidence in that goal, the strategic objective was set by President Obama that the US should be able to have confidence that it would take Iran at least one year to acquire enough material for a single nuclear weapon if it were ever to cheat, violate or break out of any agreement. That one-year period was deemed a politically acceptable “alarm” system to give the US, Israel and the global community time to mount an effective response to any Iranian move to acquire nuclear materials.

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To reach that one-year goal, Iran had to do a lot. It had to eliminate 1000s of uranium enrichment centrifuges, destroy a heavy water reactor under construction, ship out of the country tons of heavy water, useful in producing plutonium (which can also be used for nuclear weapons) and Iran had to down-blend and ship out of country a lot of enriched uranium. On top of that, Iran had to agree not to mine and process more than a specific amount of uranium, so even though it has a small cascade of centrifuges, it would have to loop the system so that any material enriched would immediately be diluted. In addition, Iran would not be able to mine or mill or process more than a small amount of uranium, so that it would never have on-hand a ready stock of uranium that could be enriched. Things like mining and milling uranium are easily observed through satellites and other technical means, so the US intelligence community, Israel and many others could have high confidence in what Iran was doing - on top of the access that the International Atomic Energy Agency would have under the deal which included near constant monitoring at all related nuclear sites. Some even included line electronic monitoring in ways never before accepted by any other state. Lastly, Iran agreed to have key imports of special materials needed to produce uranium enrichment equipment controlled so Iran could not stockpile, for example, a lot of carbon fiber that could be hidden and used to produce a lot of “just in case we need them” centrifuges.

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With all of this, the US intelligence community and outside technical experts had confidence that it would likely take Iran at least a year to acquire enough material to produce a single nuclear device. It would take more time to turn that material into a weapon. A year can be a long time or a short time, depending on what you do with it, but in the end that was the standard the US set and met for a deal.

And this seems a reasonable standard to use in judging anything Trump may produce. Of course, a lot has changed because of Trump’s action and how Iran responded. Iran has done a lot of work on advanced enrichment technology that would have been banned under the JCPOA. So it can accelerate enrichment faster than they could have in 2015 under the deal. Iran has mined and processed a lot of uranium, so has a larger stockpile that will need to be addressed in some way - not just of enriched material but raw ore and uranium hexafluoride. And it is very likely that Iran has purchased and stored away a lot of redundant enrichment equipment and precursors - all of which will make it harder to have confidence in what Iran might be doing under any new deal.

Now, of course, Trump and Israel have bombed Iran’s nuclear and technical infrastructure. This has a material impact on how much Iran can do today and for the months to come. The timeline for Iran to go nuclear will thus have to assess things like how much uranium will Iran retain under a deal, how quickly can Iran rebuild any permitted nuclear infrastructure, and what kind of monitoring will Iran accept under a new deal. All of these are apparently what Trump would leave to negotiate after an initial “memorandum of understanding” is signed. It took the US, with broad global support and an experienced and empowered team. of experts 4+ years to negotiate the JCPOA. While we can want the US to do as well or even better, the proof will be in the pudding and given the failed track record Trump has shown in places like North Korea, Ukraine, Russia, and with health care, infrastructure and the DOGE, I think a little skepticism is warranted.

If a new deal can keep Iran a year away from a bomb under effective monitoring and inspections, I’ll be the first to applaud. But until then, we should expect a lot less and be a lot more worried about Iran’s nuclear potential.

Emphasize Areas of Agreement

As such, I wanted to begin my response to their piece by laying out where I agree with that they put forward. I would go as far as to suggest that the areas where they and I agree represent core areas of broad consensus, if not absolute unanimity on goals for US nuclear policy. In today’s environment, we (and I) should be quicker to point out where we agree than where we disagree, especially among people of good will. I love to argue, and have done so for decades with several of the authors, but where we do agree let us identify those areas and move on from there.

First, the piece is informed with a goal of the US should seek a policy that helps avoid the use of nuclear weapons by anyone. Simple enough - nuclear use is bad. This goal cannot ignore the risk that nuclear weapons could be used, but adheres to the view that the US should seek to avoid their use by anyone if possible. Inherent in the piece therefore it a view that we should ensure that America’s deterrent - conventional, nuclear and non-military - is maintained in a way so that our adversaries know they would not end up in an improved position by crossing the nuclear threshold.

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Second, we should all (even if there are some outliers) agree that nuclear weapons spreading to anyone is a negative development for both America and the world at large. Every state that acquires nuclear weapons - whether allied with the US or not - is another element of global nuclear risk that has to be managed. Proliferation reduces American security, increases the risk of use or loss of control, increases the risk of nuclear use, and undermines a fragile nuclear balance that has been sustained for many many decades. The occasional flirtation by some in the US with the idea that our friends should be able to acquire nuclear weapons should be firmly rejected. The authors explicitly state that they want to prevent US friends from going nuclear, a goal I fully endorse.

Lastly, the authors make clear that for deterrence to work and be sustainable, the US must have the ability to credibly hold at risk the things our adversaries care most about. This is a basic requirement of deterrence, and a firm area of agreement within the American national security and nuclear policy community. Yes, there are some who object to deterrence as a whole, and their views need to be considered as US policy is made, but as long as deterrence is a basis for US military and national security policy the US must maintain both the capability and credibility and knowledge needed to hold at risk (be able to take away) those things our enemies care about. What those things are can change and be debated, and in a moment I will discuss how this is not an area of broad agreement, but determining what they are and being able to make them vulnerable is how deterrence works.

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These are three important areas where I agree with the authors. I think these - non use, nonproliferation, maintain effective and credible deterrence - should be core elements that can find broad agreement and perhaps be used to avoid the increasing tension and polarization in US nuclear policy. I believe it is important that experts in nuclear policy with practical experience move away from attacking motives and judgement, and instead engage on the substance of their arguments and the evidence or lack thereof. Whether you support more weapons now, or never, new arms control agreements or none is not a basis for disqualifying people from a serious professional debate. This seemingly simplistic statement, however, is all the more important because we know in American society and government today there are those who are exerting an influence on nuclear policy with neither the qualifications to do so, nor the dedication to the rule of law and the principles of American democracy. It is this battle for which we should save our energy and passions, and allow for a more reasoned discussion and where needed debate over the nuances of nuclear deterrence and defense strategy.

One Big Elephant in the Room

That being said, there are several points in the article with which I take issue. And most importantly is its glaring omission of the largest cause for concern over the future of deterrence and nuclear credibility - the policies and action of this President and his entire Administration.

Nowhere does the article mention that the greatest source of America’s diminished deterrence credibility is the action and statements of the current Administration. This President, and his officers and staff in the Executive Branch have violated both norms and laws, and the Constitution they have sworn to uphold. The denigration and outright threats of military action against allies actively undermine the ability of the United States now and in the future to act as a credible voice globally. Precipitous statements and actions to undermine NATO, to reward Russia, to empower China, and to target the economic and strategic relationships with Japan and South Korea cannot be ignored nor overlooked in this context. I understand the desire the authors may have to influence the current Administration’s nuclear discussions, there must always be a clear-eyes recognition that the actions undertaken by this President and this Administration as a whole are the chief causes for the increased interest in nuclear weapons among US allies. And they fuel the risk that Russia and China may convince themselves that they will never have a better opportunity to take action against Europe or Taiwan respectively. Yes there are others factors at work that make nuclear weapons more central to global security than in decades past, but none can compare with those fueled by this Administration’s actions.

This brings us to the substantive disagreements I have with the article. The authors maintain that Russia’s large force of sub-strategic nuclear weapons and China’s growing short and strategic range nuclear forces may have created a situation where “[b]oth Moscow and Beijing appear to believe they can exploit this advantage in theater nuclear capabilities to coerce Washington and its allies.” Thus, the authors maintain that the US is facing a deterrence gap because Russia and China are enhancing their regional shorter range nuclear forces and that without additional options the US might not be able to effectively resist efforts are nuclear coercion. This is indeed the possible motive for Russia and China relying more on a variety of nuclear force, but it is equally possible that the motive lies in their conventional and technical inferiority to the United States and its allies. Just as the US relied on small tactical nuclear weapons in the Cold War to confront what it thought was Soviet conventional superiority, Russia has likely done the same and sought to convince the US that it is willing to go nuclear early to prevent a nuclear defeat. Whether the US deployed 10, 100 or 1000 new small tactical nuclear weapons in Europe or elsewhere is unlikely to change how Russia views that risk, or significantly affect the credibility of an American response seeing as the US already has multiple lower yield nuclear options on a variety of platforms at its disposal. Likewise, it is possible China has invested heavily in nuclear force - short range and strategic - to ensure it can course the US and prevent them from intervening in a Taiwan or East Asia scenario. Yet the article lacks any real let alone conclusive evidence that this will be changed in any way by the US building more nuclear weapons and deploying them in the region.

Understanding why countries are investing in the force they are is just as important as understanding what they are building, and goes a long way to informing how the US and its allies should respond.

There remains a reasonable debate about why Russia and China are increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons. It is possible that Putin and Xi and their military advisors have looked at the composition of US forces and calculated that without certain matching capabilities, America may have created a “deterrence-gap” through which Moscow and Beijing might take action. Yet there is little firm evidence to back this up. It is just as likely, and there is strong evidence to support the conclusion, that for Russia smaller nuclear forces have been and continue to be a way to counter NATO and America’s conventional superiority. China may have concluded that building and deploying a diverse set of nuclear options is both now economically possible, and that presenting a credible deterrent over a range of nuclear employment options is what is needed to deter America from intervening in a conventional conflict with Taiwan. This may have little to do with the nuclear options available to the United States and a lot to do with the perception that China lacked a credible military option to deter US action in a Taiwan contingency, especially given the disparity between US (4000 weapons) and Chinese (600 weapons) forces.

This last point - that China seeks to deter America from helping Taiwan defend itself - is a critical issue and does legitimately raise the question of whether the US needs new nuclear options to ensure it can in fact act to protect Taiwan if and when needed. That being said, the US already has a range of nuclear options including the current air-launched cruise missile and the soon to be deployed new long-range stand off missile that present very credible nuclear options. It is far from clear that adding more nuclear capabilities such as deploying sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) would add much if anything to America’s ability to credibly deter Chinese action against Taiwan. Some, if not all of the authors, have supported this program in the past, while many others including President Biden and his Administration opposed it. This debate will likely continue but it would be far more useful to focus instead on rapidly pursuing more credible and cost effective non-nuclear options including low cost anti-ship systems to repel any effort to invade or attack Taiwan. At the same time, it should not be ignored that once a system like a SLCM is deployed specifically to enhance the credibility of US options to defend Taiwan that a type of commitment trap is created that will increase the pressure on a US President to go nuclear, whether such a move is required or not. New nuclear options carry with them certain demands and risks that should also be considered. Not all nuclear options, if pursued, enhance US security.

More and Better Information Needed, Badly
One areas where the US needs to do much more in in developing a more reliable understanding of why our adversaries are doing what they are doing, and what their leaders value the most. Here too I found great alignment with the underlying arguments in the article. The authors state that “[t]o deter aggression against us and our allies, the United States must threaten to destroy (“hold at risk” in bureaucratic jargon) in the event deterrence fails, what enemy leaders value most.” They then go on to state that for five decades US intelligence has stated this includes elements of state control including systems for authoritarian control, nuclear forces and defense supporting industry.

I won’t get into what I have read in the US intelligence products, but I will suffice it to say that there are many elements of state control that Putin and Xi value more than their nuclear weapons. To include intelligence from 50 years ago when nuclear weapons were some of the few elements of state control the US could both identify and target does not mean that other elements have not become more important over time. The inference of their piece, that we must have more nuclear weapons in order to keep pace with the capabilities Russia and China are building leave me unconvinced. Adjustment may be needed, but before we develop and deploy more nuclear weapons, we should have a very firm understanding of what they are for and why they are needed. The urge to “do something” it understandable but for me not enough. The piece maintains that the developments we face “requires a force somewhat larger and certainly more diverse than the one contemplated 15 plus years ago.” If they were to make clear what targets need to be hit that we cannot currently strike, or explain why adding more would effect Russian or Chinese behavior or thinking, I would be open to the arguments. The lack of such details suggest that these are strongly held views informed by their experience, but no more valid that those including in the last Administration or those previous who maintained that deterrence is working, that the US has more than enough weapons to deter both Russia and China, and that more weapons would not make the US or its allies safer or more secure.

From Deterrence to War Fighting

The reason I flag this point is because there is a growing argument that to effectively deter Russia and China, the US must enhance its ability not only to hold key targets at risk but adopt a more effective damage limitation strategy. This is a policy that would require the US to develop the means to reduce if not eliminate the ability of Russia or China to ever target the US with nuclear weapons, even in retaliation to US first nuclear use. I am confident the authors and I agree on the desire to prevent the US from ever being hit with a nuclear weapon. Yet damage limitation as a driver for deterrence strategy, requiring both numerical nuclear superiority and national missile defenses, are a risky and flawed approach. They will require massive investments in search of absolute nuclear protection that is ultimately unobtainable.

They authors do not argue in the piece for either matching Russian and Chinese nuclear force, not do they explicitly support damage limitation. But I know at least one of the authors believes that it the goal the US should pursue, the idea that the US needs to hold all Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons at risk to maintain an effective deterrent is one that is gaining traction in some communities.

I would end with two final points, although I do hope and expect that this broader discussion will continue for some time both with the authors and others. First, the authors rightly point out the need to avoid mirror imaging what America thinks with what our adversaries think. They state “[t]here is a long-standing tendency in the academic literature to treat the Russian and Chinese leadership as if they view the world through American eyes and share American norms regarding “reasonable” behavior.” It is not clear this Administration manifests “reasonable” behavior - a point building on my initial concern with the article. In addition, while I have stated I know the authors are experienced and patriotic, their view seems to ignore that the US is no longer acting as a responsible nuclear state. The President has wantonly threatened to destroy Iranian society, has hinted at nuclear use in Iran and elsewhere, and has undermined the ability of America to argue it has the moral high ground in global affairs. This Administration has undermined the global and domestic norms and checks on power that took generations to established. We ignore this reality at our peril.

That said, I agree that mirror imaging US views on our adversaries is a risk. However, it could well be mirror imaging to assume Russia and China view their nuclear weapons with the same importance America does. What is needed is fresh and credible intelligence work informed by regional experts. Neither I, nor any of the authors are Russian on Chinese language, military or economic experts, even if we have all engaged with and thought a lot about both Russia and China. There is a great deal of public (and I suspect private) evidence that nuclear weapons are not seen as key elements for state control in Russia or China, especially as compared with sources of economic power, internal propaganda communication systems and ideology. Perhaps another area of agreement between the authors and myself would be the need to invest more heavily in US intelligence and public academic capabilities to accurately and reliably understand Russian and Chinese thinking in the context of both geopolitical trends and nuclear policy.

You Are At the Table, or On The Menu

Lastly, I would want to point out that the authors call for the Administration’s mini nuclear review to include representatives from the Department of Defense’s policy office, as well as US Strategic Command, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff (to bring in combatant command perspectives), and the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. This omits the important role the US Department of State and the US Intelligence community can and should play in developing sound and sustainable nuclear policies for the United States. This Administration does not rely much on either an inter-agency process or expertise more broadly, but in my experience, having a broad range of voices from the US Government enhances the discussion and the validity of analysis. If the goal is to provide the President with informed views, then cutting out the senior cabinet agency tasked with managing America’s global affairs - both to deter our adversaries and reassure our allies seems self-defeating. I know that voices inside this and past Defense Departments often find those discussions difficult and frustrating, but in the search for sound policies that serve America’s interests, such processes are important. And one need look no further than the unorthodox and somewhat extreme actions taken by the current US Department of Defense in a range of areas to see the value in having a broader array of voices at the table.

In the end, the authors are to be thanked and congratulated on advancing the nuclear debate. The action by this Administration, and the lack of actions by the current Congress to conduct full and required oversight mean more is demanded of citizens and informed policy experts. These debates will not be settled soon, but we should not settle for policy by fiat. We can and should engage respectfully, emphasize where our goals converge and then seek more information where our analysis might diverge. That is how sustainable policy should be developed and maybe we can get back there soon

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At the core of this risk is the prospect that Presidents Xi and Putin may determine the United States is unlikely or unable to defend US allies in Asia and Europe under President Trump. In turn, China could either choose to invade or issue an ultimatum to Taiwan, and Russia might take steps to undermine the territorial integrity of NATO allies. One does not need to be a “doomer” to see how either leader might think 2027-2028 might be their best, if not last chance to seize Taiwan, violate NATO territory, or undermine America’s role in the world. In this, both leaders could easily turn out to be wrong, and there is a not insignificant chance that either or both leaders may misinterpret and miscalculate how America or its allies might respond to such provocations. Either scenario – miscalculation or American intransigence – is a danger that needs to be acutely addressed.

Sadly, the growing risk of adventurism by these two authoritarian leaders is only increased by President Trump’s decision to go to war against Iran. Trump’s war has already cost the United States over a dozen US lives as well as tens of billions of dollars (growing by the day), and put enormous drains on its limited stocks of both offensive and defensive ordnance. The longer-term impact on the US economy from higher gas prices, higher interest rates, and higher food costs could be enormous.

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Beyond those direct costs, the war has also provided Russia and China with a unique opportunity to assess American military capabilities, and to enhance their own strategies for countering American areas of strength in any potential future conflict. For several years the US has been learning from Russia’s military in Ukraine. Now, with his war of choice, Trump has enabled Russia to do the same with the United States in Iran. In addition, the financial windfall for Russia from surging oil prices may further embolden and enable Putin in the coming year. Rebuilding the diminished Russian military after 4 years and counting of war in Ukraine remains a priority for Putin, and a big increase in oil revenue will only aid Moscow’s ambitions. While the impact from oil prices is a negative for China, its financial position is much less dependent on the price of oil than that of Russia.

These factors and the broader scenario, of course, do not suggest that aggression by China or Russia is guaranteed. Concerns about territorial aggression could be overblown or posturing, and multiple complex factors should affect any strategic decision by either leader. And both countries continue to have very serious problems of their own. Xi keeps replacing generals and military leaders at regular intervals – something that will reduce near-term operational capabilities, readiness and confidence. In addition, the massive tactical successes by US forces in Iran may give China pause as it considers how it might do against a determined American adversary. Even the wholesale depletion of missile defenses and offensive ordnance may not be enough to overcome lingering questions about whether the Trump window is the best last chance for Xi to act. Chinese leaders may be tempted to let American leadership and global standing continue to ebb over the long term. Whether Xi sees Taiwan unification as something that should or must happen in his lifetime or under his leadership will be a critical factor that only Xi knows for sure.

For its part, Russia has and continues to pay dearly for its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. The loss of people, equipment and resources has been significant. Likewise, the drain on Russia’s economic situation due to the war and sanctions has been severe. Yet Putin has been remarkably consistent in his overall vision and approach to Europe, even before the collapse of the Soviet Union and his rise to power. Undermining the perceived commitment of the United States to defend NATO and ensuring that Russia is able to command or dictate a buffer zone along its western border has long been a Putin (and indeed Russian imperial) animator. There are no indications that the invasion of Ukraine and its costs are enough to undermine that vision – indeed, it may still be considered part of a winning strategy by Putin.

It is also important to remember the age factor in all of these considerations. Putin is 73 and Xi is 72. Both know they will not remain in power indefinitely and both appear to be motivated not only by self-interest but by their role in Russian and Chinese history. The same might be said of Donald Trump, who continues to put his name on buildings around Washington while moving to settle long-standing ambitions and grievances, something that might help explain his decision to attack Iran and hints about doing the same to Cuba soon after. We do not know that these considerations will determine how any of the three leaders will act, but it would be unwise to discount their age as a consideration.

No one knows what the future will bring. As either Nils Bohr or Yogi Berra said, “predictions are hard, especially about the future.” But even if Trump’s war miraculously brings about regime collapse in Iran, the larger trends and tactical realities speak to a growing risk in Europe and in Asia in the coming 24 months. Few believe America under President Trump will take action to defend allies in either region even though American security and global stability have rested on this premise for almost three quarters of a century. One need look no further than the recent speech on nuclear deterrence by French President Emmanuel Macron than to see how faith in American commitments is ebbing.

Some argue that Trump’s war against Iran projects strength and resolve and will enhance global deterrence against larger powers. The deeper one looks, however, the more this seems to run counter to the broader trends, as well as how this war was launched. The lack of coordination with allies in advance, the Trump Administration’s failure to adequately plan for the need to evacuate US citizens from the region and Iranian moves to close the Straits of Hormuz , continued aggressive and seemingly vengeful policies of tariffs, and projected animus against America’s oldest friends and closest partners, all speak against the possible benefits “bold” action against a long-standing American antagonist might bring.

On the whole, the risk of Russian and Chinese leaders viewing the last half of the Trump Administration as a unique window of opportunity is one the US military and government as a whole – including increasingly Congress if it hopes to play an equal role to the executive branch in safeguarding American interests and allies - must start grappling with now. The gathering storm may not wait.

Demands for “unconditional surrender” from Iran by Donald Trump should spark new concern among anyone with an understanding of history. Unconditional Surrender is what Harry Truman demanded of Japan at the end of World War II, and Japan’s refusal to comply is what led the United States, in part, to drop the only two nuclear weapons ever used in war on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

It is possible, if not likely, that Donald Trump could initiate the first use of nuclear weapons since 1945. What was dismissed by some in 2021 as extremist fears must be taken with great seriousness given actions taken to date by this Administration to undermine the rule of law in the use of force, and the increasingly belligerent actions and statements by President Trump, and the Department of Defense under Secretary Pete Hegseth. It is not known if the reference to unconditional surrender was a deliberate choice by President Trump but three facts must be recognized as people consider what nuclear actions the weeks and months to come might bring.

1) This Administration apparently believes the President of the United States has the full legal authority, under Supreme Court judgments and the Office of Legal Counsel opinions, to use whatever means the President believes necessary – including presumably the use of nuclear weapons - under Article 2 of the Constitution. There is a strong debate about whether the current interpretation of the constitution and the law is supported by long-standing precedent and norms, but those have failed to constrain President Trump and his administration in the use of force against Venezuela against suspected drug boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific and again in the launching of its war in Iran.

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2) The President has the physical capability and means to order the use of nuclear weapons at any time as part of a system that enables him to bypass the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, and even the commander of US strategic command. There are no processes, nor is there a legal basis for officers in the nuclear chain of command to block or delay an order by the president to initiate the use of nuclear weapons against a legally vetted target.

3) It is increasingly clear that the United States and its allies in the Gulf may run short of missile defense interceptors in the coming weeks. Yet Iran has the ability to sustain its missile and unmanned aerial vehicle and drone attacks for many months. The result will be higher numbers of US casualties. Moreover, American interceptors are very expensive when compared with the cost of Iranian missiles and drones over time. The costs of pursuing the war, as well as the economic impacts of higher oil prices and regional destabilization will increasingly weigh on the Trump Administration.

For these and a host of other reasons, including Donald Trump’s own question about why the United States has all these nuclear weapons if they can’t be used, there needs to be serious concern that the President may soon reach for a nuclear weapon. That prospect must drive a broader and more deliberate discussion among senior leaders in the United States Military, serious officials within the Trump administration, and leading members of Congress in both parties. A failure to consider and take steps now to ensure any decision by the President to use force is done in conformity with the constitution, the principle of checks and balances, and the rule of law could lead to historic and disastrous results.

I was asked by the editors at The New Republic for my immediate thoughts after the US and Israel launched a major military action against Iran today. My thinking is of course heavily influenced by the fact that I supported the successful negotiations of a nuclear agreement with Iran under President Obama. That deal was working and kept Iran more than a year away from building a nuclear weapon and avoided an all out war in the Middle East. That war is now upon us with unforeseeable consequences.

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My larger thought is that any country looking at the US - friend or foe - is likely thinking that it would be better off with nuclear weapons than without them. North Korea, India and Pakistan are better off with them, and Iraq, Libya, Ukraine and now Iran are worse off for not having acquired a nuclear weapon. Even US allies in Europe and East Asia as well as states like Taiwan are likely thinking nuclear weapons look pretty attractive right now - if they can get them quick.

So, here are my thoughts. Tell me what you think:

Link to New Republic article from February 28, 2026.

Thus, it is entirely appropriate to debate what the appropriate response to China’s alleged actions should be. This is a complicated issue with decades of technical and political factors that should be considered before any course of action is taken. The bottom line is that the United States still has no technical or military reason to conduct nuclear test explosions of its own. The only conceivable argument with any validity is that the United States needs to respond to a Chinese nuclear test in order to show resolve, and to reassure our allies that the United States has a fully functioning and capable nuclear arsenal. However, the priorities and policies of the current administration make clear that this is not likely to be a major consideration in whether or not the United States should respond by conducting a nuclear test itself. Instead, there is legitimate concern that a decision by the current administration to resume nuclear testing would be driven mainly by impulse or the perceived need to “do something” without any thoughtful technical, political, or military rationale behind it.

Why Did the US Stop Testing

The US Congress adopted a moratorium on the explosive testing of nuclear weapons in 1991. The end of the cold war reduced the perceived political and military need to test, and the US had high confidence then – and even more so now - that its nuclear arsenal was safe and reliable. Nuclear testing had been used in the past for a variety of reasons, including demonstrating the full effectiveness of new nuclear weapons before they were deployed. However, the US has not needed to deploy any new nuclear weapons over the past 30 plus years and instead has undertaken an extensive series of life extension or “refurbishment” programs on existing weapons. Before 1991, the US had conducted over 1000 explosive nuclear tests, many of which were carefully prepared to produce extensive scientific and technical data that has been used to monitor and predict the reliability of the US nuclear arsenal ever since. As a result of this data, combined with massive annual investments in advanced computer, materials and surveillance capabilities (over $4 billion per year for the last 30 years – so more than $120 billion), the directors of the three nuclear weapons design laboratories as well as the Secretaries of Defense and Energy have annually certified that US nuclear weapons remain safe secure and effective without yield producing explosive nuclear tests.

In short, the US stopped testing because it could, and because it no longer needs full up tests to maintain a lethal and effective nuclear arsenal.

Why Would China Test a Nuclear Weapon

China has conducted far fewer tests than the United States (or Russia). Moreover, when China conducted its nuclear tests, its technical capabilities were far inferior to what they are today. As a result, their tests could not produce the same level or amount of technical data as tests done by the US prior to 1991. Without that data, China’s now advanced computer and technical capabilities cannot perform the same level of simulations or predictive tasks as can the United States. While this does not and has not compromised the ability of China to field an effective nuclear arsenal, China’s expanding nuclear intent may place greater demands on nuclear weapon designers in China who may benefit significantly from additional nuclear testing and the data it can now produce.

In the period when the US was an advocate for both responsible nuclear behavior, and a leader of a global system geared towards reducing nuclear use, proliferation and reductions, China could have been expected to pay a price for violating nuclear norms and rules. The easing of America’s commitment to those norms, international law and restraint – combined with China’s growing military power and regional and global ambitions appear to have overcome the PRC’s aversion to conducting nuclear tests.

What Can the US Do About China’s Tests

Having been involved in discussions over nuclear policy for many decades, including at the highest levels of the US government, it is possible to estimate what the policy and technical debates within the current administration might entail. By the information already released by senior State Department officials, it’s clear that a policy discussion has already decided to declassify very sensitive information about China’s nuclear testing activities and to use that as part of a public campaign to cast China’s actions in the appropriately negative light. Past discussions over treaty violations by Russia and other states have often included sober consideration of whether revealing the information might make it harder for US intelligence to effectively collect information in the future. Thus it’s clear that it has already been decided that putting pressure on China over its nuclear testing behavior has already been determined as being worth the potential loss of sources and methods.

The much harder question is what other steps, if any, the United States should take to respond to Chinese nuclear actions. One obvious option now on the table is whether or not the United States should conduct nuclear tests of its own. The reality is that there is little for the United States technically to gain by conducting explosive nuclear tests since its stockpile of data, simulations and information is already sufficient to maintain an effective arsenal. What is clear, and what has been discussed already in numerous places, is that a decision by the United States to resume nuclear testing would reduce any political pressure on China as a result of its activities and could open the door for Russia to do the same. This would then enable China and Russia to close the gap with the United States and enhance their national nuclear capabilities.

Producing technical data, however, is not the only reason that the United States might want to conduct nuclear test explosions. During the Cold War nuclear testing activities by the United States and Soviet Union were often seen as a sign of resolve, and ways to demonstrate the growing capabilities of the nuclear arsenals of both countries. Today, nobody doubts that the United States, Russia, China, and multiple other states have nuclear weapons that work. However, there is likely a line of argumentation within the Administration that some “nuclear chest beating” will show the Chinese how serious the US is, and convince it to alter its behavior.

Normally, such a question would be asked of the intelligence community to determine whether or not US actions like resuming nuclear testing would have any impact on Chinese nuclear behavior. Not being privy to such information it’s not clear what the answer might be, but it is hard to see how the United States deciding to resume nuclear testing would do anything other than make it easier for China to conduct additional and possibly larger and more effective nuclear tests itself. One also does not need access to intelligence information to know that Russia would likely follow suit, and that the political condemnation that would normally come for a state like China or Russia conducting nuclear test on their own, would likely be muted if the United States were to conduct similar activities.

So it is far from clear that the US resuming nuclear tests would have any benefit to US security or produce a negative consequence for China or for Russia. Thus the question would be what the other actions of the United States could or should take that would either force China to pay a price for its activities or counter them in some entirely, politically, or diplomatic sense. It is far from easy to identify such steps. In the past, when confronted with Russian treaty violations, the United States took steps to ensure that Moscow did not gain any militarily significant advantage through its violation. In the case of Chinese nuclear testing, it’s already clear that China would be benefiting technically, and so the question is are there steps the United States could take that would impose a price on China for its actions.

In a world where the United States was actively supporting and nourishing its alliance system around the world, including in East Asia, then it would be easy to see what those steps might be. In addition, if the United States had not already made a decision to design, develop, and deploy nuclear-armed cruise missiles on ships, than any White House debate over steps would likely include that as a way to counter China’s behavior.

It is clear to all, however, that the United States under this President is not an active supporter of its alliances. President Trump has made no secret of his disdain for alliances. And additionally, the Trump administration has already moved ahead with plans to build a nuclear armed cruise missile. Thus using that as a tool to respond to China’s nuclear behavior is no longer viable.

There is no way, of course, to know whether the US decision to pursue a nuclear-armed cruise missile will have any impact on China’s decision to resume nuclear testing, but one does not need to be a China expert to imagine that a broad combination of Chinese ambitions and US policies, including the election of Donald Trump, and the undermining of US alliances and international law, were likely factors in China’s decision to expand its nuclear arsenal and potentially to violate the norm against nuclear testing.

If the United States was effectively maintaining its alliances, then there are conceivably a number of conventional and even nuclear related activities that could be pursued in a credible way to impose a significant price on China for its behavior. Expanding nuclear coordination and cooperation in the region, enhancing conventional land and sea-based precision strike capabilities, enhancing inter-operability and intelligence sharing, and maintaining a politically credible miliary and economic deterrent to Chinese aggression against the United States and its allies and friends in the region would be the best course of action in response to China’s nuclear actions.

Why Didn’t We Think of This Before

There has long been concern that China or Russia would not abide by the US moratorium on nuclear testing dating back to 1991. Nuclear tests by North Korea, India, and Pakistan in the 1990s and 2000s held in part because the United States remained committed to the norm against nuclear testing and working with other countries through the United Nations and elsewhere were able to impose political prices on those countries for their behavior. That norm against nuclear testing was embodied in the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty that was negotiated in 1996. Unfortunately the United States Senate rejected that treaty in 1999 and the treaty has remained in limbo ever since. Both China and Russia and the United States remained signatories to that treaty, which under international law requires states not to take actions contrary to the central objectives of the treaty. This is the only legal violation that China will have committed by its actions in 2020.

Were the United States under President Trump to be supportive of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or international law in general, then it is possible to imagine courses of action that it could take to impose a price on China as a result of its nuclear testing. The speeches by State Department officials to call out China’s testing as part of effective international campaign to impose sanctions, enhance nuclear test site transparency, or to punish a state for violating international norms would have been potentially effective. However, given the lack of support for both treaties and international law under the current administration. It is still not clear what the statements by senior State Department officials are designed to accomplish other than make it easier for the United States to resume nuclear testing itself.

What to Expect Next

Many long-time US National Security officials and observers have stopped making bets on how the Trump administration is likely to behave given its overall inconsistency and at times incoherence. Statements by lower level officials clearly do not reflect the thinking of the president himself, and the president has taken a variety of inconsistent and illogical steps often at odds with long-standing US national security objectives. However, President Trump has indicated in the past year that he may support a resumption of US nuclear testing and the question of when and how that might take place is now likely also part of the internal US policy debate. This now must be considered an active line of policy debate.

The United States maintains one active nuclear weapons test site: the Nevada National Security site on the outskirts of Las Vegas, Nevada. This is the site of most of America’s nuclear tests that took place above ground before 1963 and underground between 1963 and 1991. Since the US nuclear testing moratorium was adopted in 1991, Congress has provided funds for the US Department of Energy and more recently, the National Nuclear Security Administration to be ready to test nuclear weapons in less than a couple of years if it was ever determined necessary for political or technical reasons.

If it were determined necessary, the United States could rapidly conduct an underground nuclear test within, perhaps as little as 3 to 6 months. This would be a very basic demonstration of a nuclear weapon, either taken from storage or from active deployment, buried underground, and detonated without any extensive scientific or technical instrumentation involved. If however, the United States wanted to conduct a nuclear test that would produce a significant amount of advanced technical data, even though that data would be relatively limited given America’s current capabilities, then developing demonstrating producing and orchestrating. Such a test would likely take on the order of a couple of years. This also does not take into consideration any legal challenges that might emerge from state and local officials who would likely have questions if not outright opposition to any decision to resume explosive nuclear testing within an hour’s drive of one of the most densely populated and rapidly expanding counties in America.

There are no good options in response to China’s nuclear activities. Its testing, combined with its growing nuclear arsenals are now part of America’s and the world’s increasingly dangerous nuclear realities. A renewed public debate over how to manage nuclear risks is needed, and must be informed by people who understand the history and complicated technical and political realities of these dangers. There are no quick fixes or easy answers. The pursuit of such mirages is what made the cold war so dangerous and led the US and Soviet Union to build and possess more than 70,000 nuclear weapons. We should have no desire to move back to such a dangerous place, and serious, informed and sober discussions about how to manage here dangers are needed.