I am vary happy to share the link (Open Access for two weeks) to the Correspondence section of the latest issue of International Security. Along with others, you can read the letter that I wrote with Todd H Hall in response to the famous “What Does China Want?” article published by David C. Kang, Jackie S. H. Wong, and Zenobia T. Chan.

The IS team aptly decided to title this exchange “Correspondence: The Challenge of Studying What China Wants.”

Our letter and those of fellow writers , Jamie Gruffydd-Jones, and Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou, unsurprisingly, question the approach adopted by Kang et al. and, based on that, their final argument (especially the part on the fact that the region agrees with Chinese claims) and implications.

This is the part of their abstract that summarize the findings:

Our findings indicate that China is a status quo power concerned with regime stability and is more inwardly focused than externally oriented. China’s aims are unambiguous, enduring, and limited: It cares about its borders, sovereignty, and foreign economic relations. China’s main concerns are almost all regional and related to parts of China that the rest of the region has agreed are Chinese—Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Our argument has three main implications. First, China does not pose the type of military threat that the conventional wisdom claims it does. Thus, a hostile U.S. military posture in the Pacific is unwise and may unnecessarily create tensions. Second, the two countries could cooperate on several overlooked issue areas. Third, the conventional view of China plays down the economic and diplomatic arenas that a war-fighting approach is unsuited to address.

This is the summary of the exchange that Pu Xiaoyu kindly prepared when he shared the link with his GCIR mailing list:

The debate centers on how to infer China’s intentions from official rhetoric, strategic concepts, and observable behavior. Rush Doshi argues that the original article risks cherry-picking evidence and treating absence of evidence as evidence of absence. Andrea Ghiselli and Todd Hall question whether frequency-based analysis can capture the meaning of Chinese political language. They also argue that apparent continuities in Chinese rhetoric may obscure changes in capabilities, risk tolerance, and the expanding scope of “comprehensive national security.” Kang and co-authors defend their systematic approach and argue that corpus expansion, human coding, word-embedding analysis, and LLM-based validation support their main finding: China’s official rhetoric is more constrained, domestic-focused, and cooperative than critics suggest.

I’m not sure how much I buy the authors’ response, probably not. Anyways, as always, do not trust me and read the thing yourself! This is the link.

I have not posted in a long time, but that does not mean I have not been writing! So, I am writing to share a few essays that I have published over the past month or so.

The first was published by RUSI. In it, I discuss what the origins and direction of China’s energy policy tell us about the country’s approach to the Middle East, as well as the implications for policymakers. It also comes with a nice series of charts! You can read the article here.

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The second essay was published last week in Foreign Policy (link, behind paywall). I co-authored it with Andrew Scobell. At its core, as Victor Shih wrote in a comment on X, is a “formalization of the ‘convergence’ thesis”—that is, the idea that the United States and China are converging in terms of the personalisation of power. Andrew and I argue that this is making, and will continue to make, relations between Washington and Beijing more unstable. As we write:

“A stable U.S.-China relationship does not require friendship, strategic trust, or even resolution of all major disputes. Stability does, however, require functioning institutions, reliable channels of communication, and adequate bureaucratic competence to forestall policies of impulsivity and unpredictability. Without this foundation, leaders such as Trump and Xi—who insist they want stability—may find themselves the unwitting generators of diplomatic chaos.”

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Finally, Mohammed Alsudairi, Aaron Glasserman, and I co-authored an essay for Foreign Affairs that was published this morning (link, behind paywall). It combines our three perspectives on the drivers of China’s behaviour during the U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict, how Gulf Arab countries perceived Beijing’s response, and the implications for the region.

I hope that at least one of these recent publications will be of interest to you. If you do not have access to the Foreign Affairs or Foreign Policy articles, DM me your email address.

Cheers,

Andrea

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Hi there! Good morning from Shanghai.

Today I am writing to share some thoughts on the timing and reasons behind China’s diplomatic manoeuvring to bring about the ceasefire between Iran and the U.S.

In essence, I think Trump’s desperate threat that a “whole civilization will die” - which includedong with the increasing possibility of a bombing escalation and ground invasion, played a major role in pushing China to act. Honestly I do not know if and how the Bahrein-sponsored UNSC draft that happened to be discussed, revised, and vetoed around the same time was coordinate with Washington, but that, I would speculate, contributed too.

Here is why I think in this way.

China was relatively well-position to weather the economic/energy effects of a short conflict. Moreover, war had many military/security benefits: depletion of US ammunition stocks, US Navy under great pressure, relocation of assets from Asia, observing American operations and integration of the latest tech, etc. Of course, the substantial diplomatic damage done to U.S.’ relations with the rest of the world was also good news for Beijing.

Yet, as the risk that the conflict could become a prolonged one increased, I think Beijing saw the damages growing while some of the just-mentioned benefits decreasing. The greater the possibility of a global economic metldown, the greater the damage to the world’s largest exporters, especially as experts remain a crucial driver of an economy that otherwise is not doing so great. There are already news about cost-push inflation growing in China. At the same time, the damage to US capabilites and diplomatic standing was already significant. While it could have become even bigger over time, the relative benefits for Beijing would have decreased. The Chinese were also concerned about the survival of the Iranian regime. While it survived numerous decapitation strikes, the country is in truly bad shape. There is likely a limit to how much more punishment it can take.

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Then, there is Trump’s visit. I think that they did not want Trump’s it to be postponed again. It is too important to stabilise the relations with the U.S. over trade and Taiwan (timing of Cheng Li-wun not coincidental). As others have written in the past, China’s diplomatic push in support of the JCPOA was also driven by the awareness that that was an issue that Obama cared a lot about. Thus, helping was seen as a critical action to improve relations with Washington. I think this is precisely how the Chinese thought this time again: they saw a desperate Trump in search for an off-ramp and thought that they can have the cake and eat it too.

So, Beijing tried, and largely succeeded, in turning a possible crisis into an opportunity. Washington and Beijing coordinated. I do not know whether the choice of Pakistan as mediator was coordinate as well, but it surely looks like a great coincidence and overlapping of Chinese and American preferences.

Could have Beijing pushed the Iranians earlier? Maybe. However, especially as the Iranians were/are fighting for their own survival, China’s influence was more limited than in normal times (and it is really reluctant to wield it even then). So, I think they waited for the right moment to make a decisive push.

I do not think they gave any guarantees to Iran. However, there are reports that some Chinese officials are in Islamabad, so they will remain engaged. My guess is that they will do their best to cool the situation down, at least until Trump’s visit. This is the time horizon Beijing is likely working with. They will also push back against the idea of a permanent Iranian tollbooth in Hormuz. So, I would not be surprised if they have promised to work on encouraging other countries to unfreeze Iranian assets and to provide assistance later on.

Naturally, there are limits to what China can do. If any of the parties involved, not just Iran and the U.S., but also Israel and other GCC countries, decide to flip the tables, China will just have to stand aside and watch the world burn for some more time.

We will see.

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Hi there!

Two hours ago, the website of the Chinese MFA proudly published the “Five-Point Initiative of China and Pakistan For Restoring Peace and Stability in the Gulf and Middle East Region”

Twitter is, of course, awash with hot takes about the meaning of this sexily-named initiative launched by Wang Yi and Pakistan’s Mohammad Ishaq Dar. As the post below shows, some are looking at this new initiative as an opening for China to (finally!!!) start to play some role in this conflict.

The logic make sense: China is in a relatively good position in comparison to other countries thanks to its reserves and the electirifaction of its economy. Yet, as the largest exporter of the world, and one with a slowing economy, it is obvious that a global economic melt down cannot but have disastrous effects for Beijing. So, yes, China finally is looking for ways to end this stupid conflict and avoid the worst.

That said, I struggle to see how these new plan brings anything new to the table. In fact, I completely agree with Gregg and Ahmed (see below). This is another nothing burger that is fully in line with both China’s previous peace “plans” and with its position in this specific conflict, as analyzed here for the ChinaMed Project.

I might well be wrong. I am aware of the risk that my previous understanding of the situation might be preventing me from seeing changes that go against it. Moreover, there is so much that we do not know, from what GCC countries wanted at different moments before and during the conflict to the nature of the intelligence and military support provided by Russia (and possibly/likely China through it).

However, as St. Thomas the Apostle said, “I will believe it when I see it.” This is my approach to China in the region. There is so much noise and disinformation. Plus, as Johnathan Fulton rightly put it in his most recent post, a lot of how that “information” is interpreted is often based on the political preferences of the author than else.

I do not dispute that China provides support to Iran, of course. There is the economic lifeline and there is the dual-use tech support. But, IMHO, that’s quite different from whatever “committment” that Iran is looking for from Beijing and Moscow. I believe that there is an evident mismatch between what China and Iran want. The latter is fighting for survival and does not want to find itself in this situation anymore. This requires truly strong and explicit committment. China is simply not in this business. This is what reading the Chinese debate on the Middle East over the past 10+ years tell me. Mohammed Alsudairi and I provide an overview of that in our recent CUP Element as well (freely available here).

If China provided any sort of commitment, I think it would be more a “nucleat umbrella for Ukraine” kind of thing, rather than else. Yes, China’s pledged to protect Ukraine under its nuclear umbrella in 2013, and then did its best to make the world forget. This is what two Chinese scholars that I cite in a manuscript that hopefully will find its place in some good journal wrote (in Chinese) about that episode in a long footnote attached to a paragraph about how political infight undermines Beijing’s policymaking:

“Although we cannot be sure what considerations the decisionmakers made or the role played by the intelligence agencies, the following judgment can at least be made: the relevant parties believed that Yanukovych would not be overthrown and would continue to lean towards Russia, and that China’s support for him aligned with the interests of China, Ukraine, and Russia. However, subsequent developments contradicted China’s expectations: Ukraine’s domestic political turmoil further intensified; Yanukovych was removed from office by the parliament and fled to Russia in haste; a change of power occurred in Ukraine, with the new government fully aligning with the West; and Russia announced the ‘reclamation’ of Crimea”

Anyways, we will see how things evolve. Thanks for reading despite the typos.

Looking at the bright side, we have new Rubio memeds to cheer us up.

In any case, since I work on Chinese foreign policy, I just want to write my initial thoughts on this story from a China angle.

In essence, China’s MENA policy might require some adjustments but, I think, people in Beijing are quite pleased.

To begin with, this attack continues, at lest in the short-run, the depletion of US stocks of key interceptors. It adds pressure one the US Navy. It continues to make the military less likely to speak truth to power over decisions of war an peace. In other words, great news for China as the American superpower becomes less powerful less capable. Moreover, as many keep pointing out, the famous “pivot to Asia” continues to remain faraway.

Beyond East Asia/Taiwan, we see the Western countries remain determined to squander whatever credibility they have left. Europeans, angry because Global South countries continue to deal with Russia, continue to refuse even to write the name of the actual attackers or the fact that the attacks have no legal bases, so much for the rule-based international order. Davos Canadian hero Carney has forgotten about all the good reasons for middle powers to resist great power bullies.

As such, while the actual meaning of China’s Global Security Initiative remains rather unknown, it actually sounds better by the day…as it does not come with bombs (for the moment). There are already studies that show it pretty well: countries around the world often do not support China because it’s China, but because they simply do not like Western policies.

Now, it has been reported that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has been killed. There is no doubt that this is a pivotal moment. Yet, as Robert Pape rightly keeps reminding us, the most likely outcome of this is not regime change. And if regime change happens, it is not going to be a pro-Israel/US/West one. It will more likely be just a new face of autocracy. China, or some in China, will be a bit annoyed by losing the “evil they know” but, I think, they can surely work with this. Whatever new Iranian leadership will emerge from this war, they will still need good relations with China.

Then, there is the Saudi-Iranian relationship, that is the closest thing to a regional architecture in which China has some sort of stake and made some kind of contribution to create. The Saudi, much like the other GCC countries, condemned Iranian missile strikes on their territory and declated to be read to join the U.S. and Israel against Iran. This brings Chinese diplomacy to square one as Beijing hoped to avoid Iranian isolation while continuing to strengthen the critical economic, energy, and tech ties with KSA. Yet, in practice, the end of the current Iranian leadership might well also re-open the door for stable relations with Iran, or so scholars would suggest. Moreover, whatever happens now is not going to make Saudi and GCC countries less interested and dependent on trade relations with China, or less concerned about Israel. In other words, while there might be some loss at the regional level for Beijing, it will likely be limited.

I remain skeptical about any real pain for China with regard to the flow of oil. China’s been building its strategic reserves very quickly last year. Plus, let’s not forget the electrification of its economy, just read this Rhodium Group report.

Anyways. Let’s see, I might be wrong about all or part of this.

Thank you for reading despite the typos.

I will soon write a longer post on an a great article that I read a few days ago. In the meantime, I am truly happy to share the link to the latest episode of the CSIS ChinaPower podcast.

Bonny Lin was very kind to host Mohammed Alsudairi on her show to present our CUP Element book on Sino-Middle Eastern relations, and discuss how China and regional powers look at each other.

You can listen to the podcast here.

The book, instead, can be downloaded for free from here.

As you can see the below, we (I am also part of ChinaMed) will cover discuss a lot of important issues with some of the best scholars and experts out there.

To join, just sign up here.

A few weeks ago, Jaehwan Lim, Asei Ito, and Hongyong Zhang published what looked like a super interesting article in the Journal of Contemporary China.

In short, using “textual data from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) press conferences, this study examines the trajectory of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy, analyzing its rise and decline, the underlying factors influencing the timeline, and its distinctiveness within the broader context of China’s diplomatic assertiveness.”

This article is great on many level.

First, the methods section is clear and detailed. They also spend significant time discussing how and where their approach differs from those adopted by other scholars that also investigated the origin and changes in WWD. They replicate their work also using an index developed by Brazys, Dukalskis, and Müller. So, kudos to them.

Second, they let data speak. And they show a lot of interesting things. So, what do they show?

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These are useful that figures that they created to contextualize WWD in contemporary China’s diplomatic discourse. They help to identify the key moments and factors that shaped the WWD narrative. July 2019 emerges as the starting point of WWD, and February 2020 marks another important moment.

As they write, this suggests that the appointment in January 2019 of Qi Yu to become the MFA Party Secretary appears as likely important factor. Previously Qi was the deputy director of the Central Organization Department. Once appointed, he organized a series of study sessions to remind the MFA ppl that the Party is the only thing that matters. The September 2019-January 2020 tour of a central inspection team, which ended up with the MFA being assigned a failing grade, is, at the authors argue, another likely key element of this story. The data, then, suggest that WWD is not over, though Zhao Lijian’s departure does indicate that it reflected a decision to make China’s diplomatic speaking less caustic.

All in all, I think that this facts say something interesting about the long-discussed role and influence of the MFA. As Dylan Loh wrote his in book on this issue, the ministry appears to have expanded its authority, and WWD was oart of that. Yet, I think that Lim, Ito and Zhang’s astute observations of the WWD patterns indicate that the MFA that has “risen” is not the same MFA that maybe existed before. It is a MFA that was seen as, like the inspection team assessed, “failing” and, thus, had to be brought under control. Therefore, WWD does not look like evidence of strength of the ministry. Rather, it is the product of its weakness within the system. It is the product of the “cure” for its problems.

After all, what was the alternative? Put the ministry aside and let, say, the ILDP take over?

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Yes, Liu Jianchao was given a lot of spotlight. And maybe that was also a symptom of the MFA troubles. However, that does not mean that you can just put the MFA aside when it comes, well, to foreign affairs and relations, state-to-state relations, with other countries. Liu appeared also on his way to become the next minister, until recently.

What I am trying to say is that, well, there was no really other choice: maybe it was not a promotion as reward of its performace, as however defined by the leadership.

What about Wang Yi staying on? Yes, he’s a career diplomat. However, as I usually tell my students, we gotta apply bureacratic politics frameworks with care and cautiousness. After all, I would imagine that his main loyalty is, and must be, to the “center”/“core” not the ministry. I probably was seen as capable and loyal enough to ensure that the ministry could be brought into line. An insider to bring about corrections. Again, this does not seem to me a reward to the ministry.

So, were are we left?

As always, I am not sure! Is the MFA more infuential? Less influential? That should be left to more serious studies with a clear definition of “influence.” However, I think that Lim, Ito and Zhang’s work provides very important insights into this story, and I hope that my reflections made some sense as well.

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So, as usual, sorry for the typos. Go read the article!

Anyways, I have some time today. So, I thought it’d be good to write about a paper that appeared in Survival in July: Nadège Rolland (2025) Thinker, Lawyer, Soldier, Spy: The Makers of Xi Jinping’s Grand Strategy, Survival, 67:4, 81-94, link.

First of all, AWESOME TITLE! I mean…just great. I would cite it in my own work just for the title.

Now, as to the content. Rolland makes the obvious-but-often-neglected point (usually the best type of points that a scholar can make) that “‘Xi Jinping Thought’ is not solely the product of his own brain, recorded in spare moments as he has managed the party, the army and the country, but rather it represents a layered compendium of old and new concepts, formulations and ideas developed over a prolonged period by a hive mind – a large group of theorists and experts who work for the party-state’s sprawling knowledge-production apparatus.” Hence, her goal is to introduce us some of the people that, she argues, have influenced and shaped the ideas that Xi’s policies are meant to put into practice. So we have Xu Guangyu (the soldier), Wang Jisi (the scholar), Wang Huning (the idologue), Jiang Shigong (the legal scholar), and a series of CICIR/MSS senior figures (the intelligence analysts, as Rolland defines them).

At a certain point she writes that “The portraits presented here represent only a fraction of a larger group of academics, military and intelligence officers, and bureaucrats who have contributed to the elaboration of China’s current grand strategy.” Yet, at the end of the paper, she also writes “Given that some of the men introduced here can be expected to depart the public stage soon due to old age, China watchers will need to identify their successors and wrestle with their ideas.”

So, I interpret her article as if she’s arguing that, among the many in the Party-state, the just-mentioned people played some kind of unique and direct role, and by “direct” I mean they influenced key bureacrats and leaders possibly including Xi Jinping himself, in determining what China does at home and abroad.

Empirically, this is a big claim.

I do not know whether Rolland had access to these individuals or to very high-level officials in Beijing. Since the footnotes do not cite any interviews, I assume that that Rolland identified thinkers whose ideas align with the policies later adopted by Xi and his fellow PBSC members.

The connections that she draws are all plausible to me. Yet, are they also robust? Sincerely, I do not know.

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For example, Wang Jisi (see screenshot below). Rolland writes about his previous involvement with the Hu Jintao leadership. Recently, Wang confirmed that as well. However, he also said that “The current leaders are much younger than me now, and I don’t have a personal relationship with them.” Of course, this might just be Wang being humble. Yet, as brilliantly pointed out in a volume on studying the role of experts in Chinese foreign policy that was edited by Huiyun Feng, Kai He, Yan Xuetong, it is extremely hard to identify the presence and direction of a causal arrow between policymakers and experts. Most likely, they influence each other, with scholars, yes, sometimes shaping the ideas of policymakers while, more often, becoming kind of spokespersons for them. So, while many often point to Wang’s 西进 article in the Global Times in October 2012 as evidence of him being behind the BRI, I honestly see correlation but not causation, at least not in the sense that he indeed masterminded that BRI or similar.

What about the others?

For example, Xu Guanyu is credited in the article for inspiring ideas like that of “strategic space” that can be found in the 2013 of SMS and other documents. Reading his section, I cannot but ask myself “was he the only or the first one to come up with theses ideas?” I had the same questions reading about the other “influencers.”

Word count is probably the main culprit for the lack of deeper discussion about how those people were selected and Rolland’s theory of influencer–leader relations under Xi Jinping. Yet, it is a real pity that this essential part is missing…or, at least, this is how the China nerd inside me feels after reading the article.

In conclusion, well, the article is very well written and, surely, very suggestive. She’s a very experienced observer. So, she’s probably correct in connecting certain pillars of Xi’s policies with certain thinkers within the Party-state-PLA system. I encourage everyone to read it. I am 99% sure that I will give it to my students to read and discuss for the seminar session on how to study Chinese foreign policy. It surely gave me to think about this. This is also why I also encourage everyone to remember the importance of making the implicit assumptions about how policymaking works explicit. I believe that this is the only way to approach the famous blackbox in Beijing.

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Unsurprisingly, this article has triggered an animated discussion about, well, what China wants. So, I suggest reading the comments by others, such as (on X), John Sullivan (on X) (here in Substack), (also on X), (here in Substack). They all make very valid and interesing points in defense and against the article. At least in part, I will build on a coauthored manuscript that Todd Hall and I submitted to Cambridge Uni Press about one month ago.

There are a few things that I like in the article but that’s it, I am not very convinced by it.

Let’s start with the “how” the authors propose to shed light on what China wants. While the also mention some documents from the Hu Jintao period, they “examined three main sources: People's Daily, which represents not only the state but also the Central Committee of the CCP; Xi Jinping's and other senior officials' speeches; and Qiushi, a magazine publicizing the CCP's latest policy directions. We used computer-assisted text analysis to systematically assess China's stated goals over time.” The “computer-assisted text analysis” consists of producing a series of figures about the percentage of articles that contain certain terms like the one below.

Doshi has already listed a series of issues with this approach; I share them. So, I just copy-paste his X post below. The result is that while the goal is exploring what China wants, I am not really sure what they shed light on. The authors do mention that “Of course, when gauging intentions, two common pitfalls remain: First, leaders say things all the time that may not reflect their actual preferences. Second, it is impossible to know whether the stated goals are empty rhetoric.” and their response to such kind of criticism is that “whether the statements are sincere or cunning camouflage, repeating these statements to pupils in primary schools shows that they are what China wants its own people to believe.” A bit underwhelming, in my opinion. I’d expect a long, songer and, thus, more convincing line of defense against such kind of critical concerns. In his review, Wang Zichen supports Kang et al.’s point of view by writing that “Once Beijing has chosen to make them the beliefs it wants its citizens to internalize and the Chinese government invests in saturating its domestic audience with a narrative, that narrative becomes a constraint as well as a message: it shapes expectations and raises the political cost of visibly contradicting it later. Messages hammered into 1.4 billion citizens—including the Party’s 100 million members—are not analytically weightless.” While I agree with the last sentence, I cannot but disagree with the idea that such kind of narratives crate any form or constraint. This is because a) they are so vague that an almost infinite number of actions can be framed as consistent with them, and 2) audience constraints should not be exaggerated in democracies, let alone in authoritarian countries (a great article on this here).

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Doshi is essentially saying that Kang et al. have read the wrong sources and have read those that they selected in the wrong way. I agree, but only in part. What are, then the right sources and the right way of addressing a question as ambitious as “what does China want?” I am not sure. I agree with Andrew Scobell when he wrote his review of Doshi’s book that his work is one of the most accurate and rigorous attempts to answer that question. Yet, Scobell writes, “the process of documenting the existence of a grand strategy is inherently a social scientific endeavor, rather than a matter of hard scientific inquiry.” It is unlikely that there is one document or a set of documents in Zhongnanhai that provide a multi-decade plan for China to take over the world, assumed that that’s its goal. There are, instead, an infinite number of policy documents produced by the leaders of the moment and, not less important, their high-ranking generals and bureaucrats. This is a point made also by Todd Hall in his own review of Doshi’s book. Maybe, having access to them all, we could connect the dots and finally know what China (’s government) wants. Yet, that would still require a lot of subjective interpretation of those sources and of the context within which they were produced. In support of this argument, I think one can have a look at how differnt Kang at al.’s and Doshi’s answers to the question are! Yes, they use differnt sources but all produced by the famous “center”. So, one would expect at least some similarities in their works. Instead, are pretty much the opposite. Again, I think Scobell is very much right.

My own personal position is that, at most, we can gain some understanding about what China wants only on certain issues that I’d call “mid-range issues”, lying between the global grand strategy and the position on some specific problems. As I just argued, I think that we cannot truly know what China, or any other country, wants. At the same time, we (or the sources that usually are publicly available) do not have the access to know the real position of the Chinese government on very speficic issues like the recent 12-day war while it was ongoing, to know whether a certain statement reflects a sophisticated plan or is the product of random bureacratic dynamics. Usually, and this is what I try to do in my work (e.g. recent CUP book in OpenAccess), we have some chances of understanding the broad trends on things like China’s Middle East policy.

Anyways, moving forward to the substance of Kang et al.’s argument, I kind of agree with Zichen’s the-truth-probably-is-in-between point:

A more coherent reading applies one symmetrical test. Treat both sets of statements as data, and both things are simultaneously true. First, China’s official discourse emphasizes peaceful development, non-hegemony, and no intention to replace the United States or overturn the world order; this message is carried across Xinhua readouts, China Central TeleVision evening news, provincial outlets, Party training, and schoolbooks. Second, on a narrow set of “core interests,” Beijing’s posture is unyielding and willing to employ coercive measures—and, in one uniquely sensitive case (Taiwan), to reserve the option of force.

I say “kind of” because, as mentioned earlier, I do not think that the peace&love narrative reflect any specific policy. Rather, I think there are issues, like Taiwan, regime survival, Xinjiang, Tibet, etc., on which we do know what China wants. The Chinese are clear and consistent, plus they are clearly part of the founding myth of the PRC. So, yes, Chinese leaders likely face some real constraing on those issues (would any Chinese leader remain in power (or alive) for saying “you know what, let Taiwan be an independent country rather than a provice of ours”?). The rest is mostly improvisation, bureacratic politics, and exogenous shocks. And we can know relatively little about it beyond those mid-range issues that I mentioned before.

Finally, Kang et al.’s policy implications:

1. “The most important implication that arises from our research is that there is no need for a hostile U.S. military posture in the Pacific.”

2. “A second implication of our research is that there is ample room for China and the United States to cooperate on vitally important issues, such as: addressing climate change; transitioning to renewable energy; reducing pollution; and preparing for pandemics.”

3. “Finally, the conventional policy prescriptions for the United States to decouple from China and contain China economically are especially troubling for two reasons. First, China's economy is far more resilient and innovative than many believe. Second, there are multiple robust initiatives across East Asia that focus on trade and diplomacy, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and ASEAN.”

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It is difficult to disagree with no. 2. The world needs China and the US (and other countries) to work together on all those issues and more. I am more uncertain on no. 3, whether they are saying that there should be no decoupling at all or that it is not an effective strategy in the context of the US-China rivarly. In fact, the article and implication no.1 strongly seem to suggest that the authors do not think that the US should look at China as a rival. Otherwise, why miliatary and economic deterrence would not make sense? This to me, seems to be the more or less implicit big point that the authors want to make. If that’s indeed the case, I am not sure how that can be taken seriously. China clearly sees a rival in the US. Additionally, implication no.1 begs the question “what about those Asian countries that see themselves as threatened by China and look at the US for help?”

Kang et al. write that:

Although the conventional wisdom in the United States views the defense of Taiwan as a key element to contain China, almost no country in the region would involve itself in such a war. States in East Asia view the question of Taiwan as a Chinese issue for Chinese people, broadly defined, to resolve. Most publics and elites in East Asia believe that China is concerned about Taiwan because it relates to enduring issues of identity, not because it is economically valuable. East Asian states do not view China's claims over Taiwan as portending an increased Chinese appetite for territory. In fact, countries in the region reject Todd Sechser's “salami slicing” explanation for why a state might contest small claims made today because conceding today might lead to bigger claims tomorrow.

I am very sure a lot of people inside and outside the region disagree with this.

Also, while they describe China’s maritime/territorial claims plus Taiwan as “limited goals”, there is no doubt that the regional and global landscape would dramatically change if all those disputes were risolved in Beijing’s favor. So, while they might be “trans-dynastic” (read Bill Hayton for a detailed analysis of the historical origins of China’s territorial claims) and, so, have not changed under the PRC and, now, Xi Jinping, they are not exactly “limited”. Additionally, it would be good to point out that in theory those disputes can all be solved diplomatically…but in practice? Where would the harmony and peace narrative go if other countries would just say “no, thanks”?

At the end, I think, what I am trying to say is that it takes two to tango. While the American understanding of Chinese behavior is likely distorted by all those things that usually shape the political debate, China is not just there doing nothing wrong or that it does not treat the US as a rival. Whether the US should or should not do something about it, I will leave it to the Americans to decide!

So, I stop here because I feel I am beginning to ramble a bit too much and I am tired. I hope that I did not misunderstood the content of the article. If I did, let me know! In any case, this is an important contribution to the debate (otherwise, I guess, it would not be in IS!) on what China wants and how we can try to understanding it. While I mostly focused on things that I disagree with, the point on how little Chinese goals have changed is an important and super interesting one (Hayton, again, has a lot to say about this).

Thanks for reading this and I hope you found it interesting.

To celebrate this critical moment, Cambridge University Press decided to make a very pleasant surprise to my friend Mohammed Alsudairi and I: our book on Sino-Middle Eastern relations was published online on the 8th of August (a propitious date, says the part of me that lived in China for a decade)!

Even better, thanks to the generous support from the University of Exeter and the Australian National University, this contribution of ours to the CUP Elements in Middle East Politics series is available for free in Open Access! Just click here or on the book cover below and save the PDF from CUP’s website.

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In this book, Mohammed and I use a variety of Chinese and Arabic sources to track the evolution of the debate on Sino-Middle Eastern relations among Chinese, Saudi, and Assadist Syrian elites. (I will tell you why we include the elites of a regime that does not exists anymore in a moment) Our goal is to understand how Chinese and Middle Eastern actors think their relations will evolve. We imagine that there are three possible scenarios:

1. Both sides want China to do more in the region.

2. No one wants China to do more in the region.

3. One of the two sides wants China to do more in the region but the other does not.

In a nutshell, we find that, despite the different framings and drivers of the debates in the three countries that we study, everyone seems quite fine with China being a key economic partner but not another extra-regional hegemon. There are discussions in China and in the region about what could “China doing more” could look like but no consensus and, actually, Mohammed and I believe that there is not interest in going beyond some musing.

We think that this book packs a lot in not-so-many pages.

Chapter 1/Introduction contains a discussion of our framework, cases, and sources. It will be of interest in anyone that wants to look at current events from the points of view of the actors involved. China, Saudi Arabia, and Syria are not easy country to study but, IMHO, we offer a good example of how to do it.

Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are dedicated to the Chinese, Saudi, and Syria. I think we did a pretty good job at shedding light on how elites of three not-that-trasparent countries look at Sino-Middle Eastern relations.

Finally, the last chapter zooms out from the three case studies and extrapolates the findings to make a region-wide argument.

This is where it makes sense to explain why we included Assadist Syria.

We started working on this project before the end of the Assad regime. In fact, the research and writing begun even before October 7. Mohammed and I had to stop more than a couple of times to go back and update and rewrite. We decided, however, to keep the Assadist Syrian chapter. If KSA is one of the rich and powerful actors in the region that has strong relations with both China and the US, Assadist Syria was a weak country that had clearly took one side in the US-China rivarly. As such, comparing the Saudi and the Syrian debates with each other and, then, with the Chinese one allows us to explore how different levels of wealt/power and different positions in the context of US-China rivarly shapes the approaches and of regional actors to Beijing and vice versa.

Many things happened in the Middle East between the day we were kindly contacted by David Roberts (series editor for CUP) and publication. There is still a lot of volatility. Yet, China and regional actors have behaved precisely as one would expect after reading our book. So, Mohammed and I think that our argument has already proven itself quite robust, though we close the book with some considerations regarding the factors that might lead to some change in the Chinese approach or that of regional actors.

Anyways, click here, download the book, and read it. It is just 70-something pages.

Also, Mohammed and I are more than happy to talk about the book to whoever might be interested in our work. Online or in person does not matter. So, if you are, just shoot me a message or email!

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Messingschlager compares how some US think tanks have created platforms for China experts to either rotate in and out the government, or from which they can influence it. He then write “Despite its wealth of academic and analytical talent, Europe has long lacked structural mechanisms to embed China expertise in policymaking. Decision-makers often rely on ad hoc consultations or default to trade ministries with limited geopolitical bandwidth.” As an example of the consequences, Messingschlager points to Italy’s BRI MoU, “an ill-advised move taken with minimal expert consultation and significant strategic repercussions.” He also mentions the lack of a common legal framework to approach Huawei 5G tech.

To turn expert awareness into strategic coherence, Messingschlager offers three suggestions:

1. “European governments and EU institutions should establish dedicated China units or advisory councils within key bodies: national foreign ministries, defense and security councils, the European External Action Service, and the European Commission. These units must have clear mandates, dedicated resources, and consistent access to top decision-makers, ensuring proactive strategic foresight rather than reactive crisis management.”

2. “The EU should also invest in a more coordinated intra-European network for China research and intelligence-sharing.”

3. “Europe must align its rhetoric with its strategy. European leaders have begun to adopt more strategic language – but too often, it still downplays the risks at hand.”

I find these recommendation very sensible. Yet, I cannot but point out that the issue here is not really a lack of expertise.

Although his words make it sound like MERICS, IFRI, and Chatham House are the only places where good China research is done in Europe (let’s say that’s because there was a word limit thatforcefully prevented him from adding more names…), Messingschlager is right in saying that there are actually quite a lot of people in Europe that know stuff about China. Naturally, they include experts in universities and think tanks, as well as those working in government and the private sector.

Rather, his proposals are about sharing expertise and make it reach policymakers. But would that matter?

As Roger A. Pielke, Jr writes in The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics, many often believe that knowing more about something will necessarily lead to identifying the “right solution.” The problem is that, at least in politics, finding said “right solution” rarely depends on information. In this case, Messingschlager seems assuming that if European policymakers were told more/better information about China, they would identify effective ways to work or tackle China to further European interests. Would they?

I honestly doubt it.

Did Italy sign the BRI MoU because Italian politicians did not know what they were actually doing? (Giulio Pugliese , Francesca Ghiretti , Aurelio Insisa wrote an open access article on this) Did Spain decide to award a multi-million contract to Huawei to store judicial wiretaps without knowing about potential risks? (both are cases mentioned by Messingschlager).

Again, I honestly doubt it.

Debates on key issues like climate change or, in this case, China abund with information. Yes, it’d be great to know what Xi Jinping and his comrades think. Yes, it is great to have engineers and IT specialists that can check Chinese tech to ensure it cannot be used to spy in any way (this should be done also for other techs from the outside the EU, by the way….). Yes, it is possible that some mistakes could be avoided if govts knew a bit more about China.

Yet, for example, there is already a good understanding among scholars and experts about the genesis, drivers, and implementation of Chinese policies that have a huge impact on Europe like Made in China 2025. More broadly, we are not totally ignorant about modern China.

So?

Well, I believe that the (obvious issue) is that there is no agreement on what that expertise should be used for, i.e. the ultimate goals of the China policy produced by the EU and European governments more in general. On this, as on other issues, Europe remains “astrategic,” as it is costantly pulled (and pulls) in different directions. So, the problem is not that European policymakers do not want or not use existing expertise. Simply, most of the times, they have other goals that are not those assumed/hoped for by external observers. I know, I am re-inventing the hot water, as we say in Italy.

Again, so?

Well, I do not have a solution. I just think that we should have a more honest discussion about this expertise thing. Calling for more funding to produce and share knowledge is good, especially given the financial pressure on think tanks and universities. Calling for better access to policymakers is also good as, in any case, it might increase the chances that mistakes are not too big. However, I do not think that any of this would really change the situation.

I am a big fan of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. I would assume that politicians would change their approach if their political survival were threatened. Yet, public opinion rarely cares about foreign policy. I cannot imagine Meloni or Starmer losing an election because of how they approached China. At the same time, especially for EU-level people, their elections hardly depend on what European electors think about them. Would von der Leyen lose her position because of China? Yeah, nah.

Again, so?

So, I really do not see any change in the EU China policy without a change in its policymaking structure, with or without more expertise being provided. And at the national level? Some leaders will surely bring some changes but, again, it is unlikely that expertise will plany any role in them.

Anyways, a lot of rambling here, some questions, some obviousness, and no solution. Thanks for reading this.

.

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In the aftermath of the Twelve Day War between Israel, the United States, and Iran, many experts have argued that the weaknesses of China’s Middle East and North Africa (MENA) strategy have been exposed. These comments come despite China appearing to have, in recent years, started to make its mark in the region.

For example, in 2023, Beijing hosted Saudi Arabia and Iranian officials to announce the normalization of ties between Riyadh and Tehran. That same year, it invited now-ousted Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad to Hangzhou and welcomed a special delegation on Gaza from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and Indonesia. Just months later, representatives of Palestinian factions met in Beijing to issue the Beijing Declaration on Ending Division and Strengthening Palestinian National Unity.

While not as involved as Russia, China bolstered its role in the region and did not seem a distant or secondary player anymore.

Yet, today Gaza remains starved and occupied, there is no unity among the Palestinians, and, especially, the so-called “Axis of Resistance” composed of Iran and its regional proxies hardly exists anymore after the Israeli multifront campaign which led to the direct bombing of Iran, as well as the sudden collapse of Syria’s Assad regime in December 2024.

Ultimately, the volatility of Chinese gains can largely be traced back to the fact that the MENA region’s importance in Beijing’s foreign policy is limited and, thus, not much energy and resources are invested in long-term planning. This results in a low-commitment approach that allows China to pick low-hanging fruit while placing it in a passive and reactive position in times of crisis and regional change.

Hence, China’s fortunes in the MENA region are far more dependent on trends there than sophisticated strategizing.

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Priorities

Similar to other countries, China’s leadership spends most of its time on domestic issues, from figuring out how to turn the country into a “mega-sized consumer powerhouse” to managing the gigantic Chinese Communist Party machine. If one takes the Politburo study sessions (i.e., meetings in which the country’s twenty-odd most powerful people meet to listen and interact with one or two experts on topics picked by Xi for about two hours) as a proxy of Beijing’s priorities, foreign policy’s relatively low priority ranking becomes evident. It only stood out during Xi’s first term as China’s top leader. After that, the number of relevant meetings evidently declined to the same level as, or an even lower level than, during the years of his predecessor, Hu Jintao, and was far lower than the number devoted to economic, social, and party affairs. Even in Xi’s “new era,” foreign policy ambitions do not displace domestic preoccupations.

With foreign policy taking up a fraction of the leadership’s working time, China’s relations with certain countries and regions are more important than others. In the classic China’s Search for Security, Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell point out that “China’s immediate periphery has a good claim to be the most challenging geopolitical environment in the world for a major power” due to the presence of nuclear-armed neighbors and unresolved disputes that involve extra-regional powers. Hence, unsurprisingly, relations with neighboring countries and the United States have long been the focus of Chinese foreign policy. The patterns of overseas visits made by Chinese leaders show this well. The same holds true when looking at how being assigned to work on those countries or regions shapes the chances of rising through the ranks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In this context, I find it useful to describe the MENA region as one of the most important among the least important regions. As Mohammed Alsudairi and I show in a forthcoming book, the writings of Chinese experts and former foreign policy professionals are clear in this regard. There is no doubt that much is at stake for China in the region. The region is the place of origin for 40 to 50 percent of oil and a slightly smaller share of natural gas. At the same time, China’s economic presence in the region is rapidly diversifying, from the 2016-announced “1+2+3 cooperation model” to the addition of cooperation in cloud computing and artificial intelligence. Beyond energy and economic relations, conflicts and terrorism in the region shape China’s approach to key concepts such as the responsibility to protect (R2P), while also providing opportunities to criticize the United States for its military interventions and accuse Washington of fueling regional instability.

Yet, none of China’s so-called “core interests” are at stake. Beijing receives consistent support from many countries in the region on issues such as Taiwan and the South China Sea. China’s ethnic and religious policies in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region are not only often endorsed but, at times, even used by some regional governments to justify their own repressive actions toward groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. None challenge the leading position of the Chinese Communist Party.

When it comes to energy security, China has been working hard to diversify its suppliers, sign long-term contracts, and expand the electrification of its economy. For example, the total electric truck fleet alone is already displacing over one million barrels per day in implied oil demand, which is roughly the equivalent to the daily oil production of Oman, according to a report from the Rodium Group. Reportedly, the fear that the Strait of Hormuz could be blocked during the Twelve Day War made China and Russia reconsider the stalled Power of Siberia Two pipeline after years without any progress. In December 2024, Sinopec estimated that Chinese oil imports will peak in 2027, while the country’s strategic reserves continue to expand. Hence, as a recent Center for Strategic and International Studies report argues, “despite notable challenges China faces in energy security, it is in an increasingly strong position to overcome surging demand, environmental costs, import reliance, and energy infrastructure.” In other words, reliance on MENA energy producers is significant, but it does not mean that Beijing has to constantly pay attention to the region in normal times.

As to the Chinese economic and human footprint (figures below), it is increasingly concentrated in a few countries, mostly in the Gulf, that are seen as stable. Additionally, recent data from the Chinese Ministry of Finance suggest that the aggregate value of Chinese investment in the region is plateauing. As such, the threat to Chinese assets and citizens has been decreasing in comparison with the past.

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Delegation and outcomes

The important-but-not-so-important nature of Chinese interests in the MENA region means that much of the country’s diplomacy there is delegated from the top leaders, probably including Chinese Foreign Minister and Politburo member Wang Yi, to the bureaucrats within the various ministries under the State Council and, of course, the large state-owned companies. Such a policymaking configuration typically produces strong path dependence and a reactive approach to events on the ground. The decisions made are usually ad hoc.

Strong evidence in support of this description of decision-making in Beijing can be found in the writings of Chinese experts and former foreign policy professionals. Over the past ten years, they have consistently highlighted how Chinese diplomacy in the MENA region constantly suffers from a lack of coordination among the many agencies and organizations that act, or declare to act, on behalf of the central government. Related to this, it is important to highlight the siloed nature of Chinese decision-making institutions that do not favor interagency cooperation. Moreover, while Chinese diplomats in the MENA are often highly experienced operators who have built their careers by serving in different countries there, recent studies show that this makes them less likely to reach leadership positions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As such, information coming from the region might not always be the basis upon which Chinese leaders make their decisions.

In the face of a long-standing debate about how to approach the United States in the region, with some arguing against direct confrontation and some being in favor of it, no consensus has emerged. At the same time, the experts often complain, China is too reactive in how it approaches the MENA region. Yet, they usually fail to articulate what kind of more proactive actions should be taken. This can again be seen as symptomatic of a lack of clear input and of little interest in investing additional resources by top leaders, who have other, more urgent matters to address.

Naturally, these facts alone do not explain the ups and downs of China’s real or perceived influence in the region. Yet, combined with what is known about the normalization of Saudi-Iranian ties and the announcement of the Beijing Declaration, they shed considerable light on this issue. As discussed in detail elsewhere, China’s role in spring 2023 was mostly performative as both Saudis and Iranians had long agreed that both wanted to stabilize their relations. China was likely chosen because of its good ties with both countries, which could also benefit from giving a win to China. Palestinian sources suggest a somewhat similar scenario with regard to the Beijing Declaration. China did little, but some Palestinian factions were eager to ingratiate themselves with Beijing.

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Hence, China’s influence likely grows when regional dynamics are favorable to it and there are opportunities to act that do not put too much stress on its policy-making system. The corollary of this, however, is that its fortunes can quickly reverse when the facts on the ground change, and Beijing is left waiting and hoping that the damage will not be too great.

Yet, it is important to emphasize that Beijing ultimately can afford this. While the Twelve Day War clearly showed that China is not a country that one should rely on when diplomatic statements are not enough, its permanent seat on the Security Council and its economic prowess make it an actor that regional players cannot afford not to stay on good terms with when the dust settles.

Could China’s approach change? After the Arab Spring, there was a deep rethinking in Beijing with regard to the role of the military in foreign policy, leading to the opening of its base in Djibouti. China’s vetoes over Syria also originate from the fear that Western countries would topple Assad like they did with the former leader in Libya, Muammar Gaddafi. Therefore, something truly damaging for China’s interests, like if the Strait of Hormuz is closed or Iran implodes, might indeed trigger some kind of reorientation or major investment in China’s regional policy. Until then, expect more short-lived ups and downs in Chinese influence as the region changes—but Beijing does not.

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So, this is a great opportunity to share some insights from an article that I wrote with Pippa Morgan and that was published early this year in International Studies Quarterly. There, Pippa and I ask “is the BRI good or bad for Chinese construction companies?” After all, we thought, the BRI has always been to a large extent about connectivity and infrastructure or, in other words, building stuff. So, those firms should gain from this, no? Also, a variety of studies as well as common sense suggest that closer diplomatic alignment should help business.

What did we find? Read below.

Well, before jump to the sexy stuff. Let’s start confirming that the aggregate value of Chinese construction activities is just giganormous. Yes, they are financed by China but also by international lenders, banks, and governments.

Now, since Pippa and I have been working for a while on how the political institutions of other countries shape the Chinese economic footprint abroad, we start by asking what’s the relationship between more or less democratic institutions and Chinese firms. The results is that the less democratic a country is, the more Chinese companies will work there, all things being equal.

Then, could diplomatic alignment as represented by signing a BRI MoU change that?

We tested two competing hypotheses here. The first is that, as mentioned before, diplo aligment = good for business. The second is that international and domestic actors that for a variety of reasons oppose China activate when it is announced that a country will sign that MoU. Democratic institutions ensure that at least some of that pressure will reach policymakers and, so, signing the MoU might have a negative effect!

The results are…

(drum roll sound)

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For “every unit increase in the VDem score, the value of contracts is expected to decrease by approximately 75 percent (Model 3) and 95 percent (Model 5) when the interaction terms are included.” That’s pretty bad! In practice, the BRI is a victim of its own importance as Chinese companies would fare bad but not worse without those MoUs. Things, however, are better when it comes to less democratic countries.

So, in a nutshel, it turns out that Chinese construction activities should concentrate in less democratic countries. The BRI makes that trend even stronger. In the past, Pippa and I found that Chinese workers also tend to concentrate in less democratic countries. This is quite important as it suggest that the stability of those countries is important for China also because its so-called 海外利益 (overseas interests that the PLA should protect) are more in certain countries than others. At the same time, authoritarian countries tend to be very careful in developing security cooperation with others due to regime survival concerns. So…this - China’s security cooperation with other authoritarian countries - surely requires more attention. How do these dynamics play out? What do they mean in the long run for the relations among these countries?

Another interesting question that emerges from this study is “why does China signs these BRI MoUs if they have such a negative effect on those companies that play a very important role in dealing with important problems at home like excessive production of steele and unemployment?”

I am not sure. I can think of two very different but very plausible possible explanations. The first is that China simply values more scoring diplomatic points gained from having democracies signing up to its BRI than the revenues of its companies. The second, instead, is that Chinese diplomats in democracies unsurprisingly see a great opportunity for promotion in bringing the big boss, AKA Xi Jinping, to their country and boost his flagship initiative. So, even if aware of the risks for Chinese companies, they just do not care about them. They will be a problem for the next ambassador.

Isn’t intriguing that one could formulate compelling explanations based on diametrically different assumption about whethere China is a unitary actor or not? Todd Hall and I discuss about this issue in a book manuscript that we just submitted to Cambridge Uni Press.

In the meantime, much food for thought! I’d be happy to know what you think.

Thanks for reading and sorry for the typos.

Anyways, in a nutshel, this study replicates what has already been done for other parts of the sprawling bureaucracy of the Chinese party-state in trying to understand what is that helps bureacrats to get promoted. This paper does so by looking at senior foreign affairs leaders, i.e., those official whose rank is that of vice-minister or above.

Well, for all the talk that foreign policy is a priority of Xi Jinping (on this, however, I strongly suggest this Asia Society piece on the Politburo Study Sessions that shows, yes, more focus on foreign affairs during the 18th Party congress but more Hu Jintao era-like patterns over the past 10 years), it seems that remaining in Beijing to cultivate good 关系 is better for a diplomat’s career. On the contrary, experience overseas is detrimental to that. Interestingly (and tellingly), the negative relationship between overseas experience and promotions is larger int the Reform Era! So, yes, Chinese diplomats have become more professional but personal relations and network have grown even more important.

Jost and Li point out that “Prior to their promotion, China’s foreign ministers spent over twice as much time on average in assignments at home than in assignments abroad. Second, prior assignments abroad skew towards strategically important countries, such as the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom – although there are exceptions to this pattern.” That said, controlling for junior posts in those countries does not change the results.

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Expected? Unexpected? I am not sure. Probably I’d say unexpected. I would also not be so surprised if something similar is found when it comes to other countries as well. If someone knows about papers that do that, please let me know, I’d love to read them.

Now, good or bad (for Chinese foreign policy)? I would say that it would have been better if experience abroad did not have a negative impact on the promotion chances of vice-ministers as they are in charge of macro-areas, connecting rank-and-file diplomats with the minister and, through him, the leadership. So, from this point of view, Jost and Li’s paper suggests that there is a problem in how expertise and information from the embassies are put into use, at least in some cases.

For example, I work on China’s role and approach to the Middle East (West Asia and North Africa, WANA), and my research indicates that Chinese diplomats are true area experts, often with a lot more of regional experience than those posted in Europe. So, from this point of view, it does not look great when it comes to imagine how China elaborates it MENA plolicy. It does not look like a big issue, instead, when it comes to Europe as Chinese diplomats there, in any case, do not appear as expert. (my guess with regard to the difference between these two groups of diplomats is that it originates in the different requirements that are necessary to understand the relatively simple European political and linguistic environment and the much more complex and demanding WANA one, I talk about this in the chapter linked just a few lines above)

That said, as always, it remains difficult to connect however interesting findings with specific implications when it comes to Chinese foreign policymaking. So, take my ideas with a pinch of salt.

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Below you find the ChatGPT summary of the article. As always, however, I cannot but encourage you to read the actual full paper. Your eyes and brain are less likely to hallucinate than any LLM!

Summary of “The Politics of Promotion in China’s Foreign Policy Bureaucracy” by Tyler Jost and Yucong Li (2025)

In their article published in The China Quarterly, Tyler Jost and Yucong Li explore a largely overlooked question: what determines the professional advancement of Chinese diplomats? While much research has focused on the career trajectories of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials in provincial governments, the military, or state-owned enterprises, this study breaks new ground by systematically examining the foreign affairs bureaucracy. The authors base their analysis on a unique dataset of over 11,000 appointments held by 1,357 senior Chinese diplomats between 1949 and 2023, providing the most comprehensive look to date at who rises to the top in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).

Research Questions and Motivation

The core question the authors seek to answer is: what types of postings and career experiences help (or hinder) diplomats in China get promoted? The authors are particularly interested in whether time spent abroad—a hallmark of diplomatic work—is beneficial or detrimental to career advancement. This matters because promotions are a key mechanism through which the CCP controls its bureaucrats and influences their behaviour.

Two competing hypotheses are considered. On one hand, foreign postings might enhance a diplomat’s career by providing valuable expertise and high-profile experience. On the other hand, being abroad may weaken domestic political connections, limit face-time with powerful patrons in Beijing, and even raise questions about a diplomat’s political reliability.

Data and Methodology

Jost and Li constructed a dataset that includes not only diplomats’ career postings but also demographic variables (such as gender and education), family background, and whether they began their careers in other parts of the bureaucracy, such as the International Liaison Department (ILD). They measure professional advancement by whether a diplomat reached the ranks of vice-minister or higher.

Three main independent variables are analysed:

1. Share of postings abroad vs. in Beijing.

2. Performance during international disputes.

3. Performance in negotiating international treaties.

Using logistic regression models with fixed effects for career stage and political period, the authors assess how these factors correlate with promotion.

Main Findings

The article reports two key findings:

1. Time abroad hurts promotion prospects. Diplomats with a higher proportion of foreign postings are significantly less likely to be promoted, especially to vice-minister or minister-level positions. In fact, a one standard deviation increase in foreign postings lowers the odds of promotion by up to 48%. This effect is even stronger after 1982, a period typically associated with greater professionalization in the MFA.

2. Performance matters, but not uniformly. There is only mixed evidence that professional performance helps promotion. Experience in handling international disputes shows a weak positive association with advancement, but there is no consistent link between success in treaty negotiations and promotion.

These findings contradict common assumptions that foreign experience is the key path to success in a diplomatic career. In the Chinese case, it seems domestic postings—especially in Beijing—play a more pivotal role. The authors suggest this is likely because those postings allow diplomats to build patronage networks, which are critical for advancement in the CCP system.

Discussion and Implications

The authors argue that their findings reveal a tension in the Chinese foreign policy bureaucracy. On the surface, the MFA has become more professional over time, with diplomats increasingly drawn from highly educated, non-military backgrounds. Yet, promotion decisions continue to rely heavily on personal networks and political trust rather than performance abroad.

The study also sheds light on how the Party balances meritocratic principles with the need for political control. Diplomats who spend too much time overseas may become socially isolated from powerful figures in Beijing. This helps explain why even senior Chinese diplomats—whose job is to engage with the outside world—still spend a large portion of their careers at home.

The findings also raise broader questions about promotion in authoritarian bureaucracies. If Chinese diplomats—whose job is inherently international—are penalized for spending too much time abroad, then bureaucrats in other sectors likely face even greater disincentives to leave Beijing or take on assignments that isolate them from central political networks.

Conclusion

Jost and Li offer an important and original contribution to our understanding of China’s foreign policy system. By tracking the career paths of over 1,300 diplomats across more than seven decades, they show that foreign postings—though essential to the job—can hurt promotion chances. The study highlights the persistent importance of patronage and political loyalty in the Chinese system, even amid institutional professionalization. Their work opens the door to new research on elite politics and bureaucratic behaviour not only in China but in other authoritarian regimes.

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Given my own research interests, look at how publications on economics and international relations have diminished in the Xi era (below). And look at the apparent gap between where scholars publish and the priorities of the govt (also below).

What does this mean?

Well, of course scholars, we all know that what is published in open source journal reflects the actual depth and variety of the expert debate only to some extent. However, can the policy debate really not be affected?

Like many, my own academic research benefits from my writing shorter, more agile pieces for think tanks and so on. One fuels the other. So, at least, I imagine that this situation is not great for playing with new ideas. Also, since most scholars mostly read academic articles, if the academic debate is less vibrant and diverse, it cannot but become less so over time.

These trends should be seen as running in parallel to calls in China, as elsewhere, to cut funding for humanities and social sciences in favor of, you bet, STEM subjects.

At the same time, many scholars in China read a lot of English articles and publish in Chinese just for KPI. They have a lot of ties with overseas colleagues, go to conferences and so on. So, I also have to say that we should not over-read or over-interpret the findings of this article when it comes to thinking/speculating about the actual policy(making) implications. Also, the data presented in the article likely mask the fact that it is some topics within the broader foreign policy and economics fields that are discussed less. Others, such as global governance, climate, and international organizations, I know they are very hot and there is a lot of excellent scholarship produced in the PRC and that truly ought to be read also by foreign scholars.

If anything, I think that this article shows how increasingly difficult has become to study Chinese foreign policy, or at least certain parts of it. If people are less willing to write in open source journals, you can be sure they will also less likely to talk about those same subjects in person. This is something to be aware as reading the works of Chinese scholars has long been an important part of study of Chinese foreign policy.

This is the reader-friendly summary prepared by ChatGPT:

In “Disappearing Research,” Ning Leng and Elizabeth Plantan deliver a comprehensive and sobering examination of how censorship and self-censorship intertwine to shape the contours of academic life in China—and beyond. Drawing from extensive interviews and a large original dataset of scholarly publications, they offer a reader-friendly yet empirically rigorous account of how state power affects the production of knowledge.

The article opens with two central questions: how does Chinese state censorship incentivize self-censorship in universities, and how does this process affect academic output? These questions are timely and important, given the increasing attention to global authoritarian influence and shrinking academic freedom worldwide.

To tackle these questions, the authors combine qualitative and quantitative methods. First, they conduct in-depth interviews with 22 scholars (six faculty members and 16 PhD students) at top Chinese universities. These interviews reveal four distinct mechanisms of self-censorship, categorized along two dimensions: the source of information (institutional vs. social) and the clarity of that information (high vs. low). The result is a typology of four forms of self-censorship:

1. Surgical self-censorship, where clear guidance from institutional actors like Party Committees leads scholars to avoid very specific sensitive topics.

2. Sweeping self-censorship, shaped by vague but institutional signals from publishers, which prompts scholars to steer clear of entire areas of research.

3. Approximate self-censorship, where mentors and advisors, drawing on personal experience, warn students away from risky topics.

4. Scattershot self-censorship, where informal peer discussions and hearsay lead to overcautious avoidance of potentially sensitive issues, even when the red lines are unclear.

Together, these mechanisms generate a powerful ecosystem of control where even uncertain signals are amplified, producing self-censorship more extensive than what the state may have originally intended.

The second part of the study turns to empirical analysis. The authors build a dataset of over 5,600 publications by 422 scholars trained in the US or Canada but working either in China (385) or the United States (37). This matched sample controls for background differences while allowing the authors to tease out the effects of institutional context.

The findings are striking. Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, the range of topics published by China-based scholars has narrowed considerably. Some subjects—such as political rights, corruption, or focal events like the Tiananmen crackdown—have either “disappeared” from Chinese-language publications or “migrated” to English-language venues. Publishing in English, especially in outlets outside mainland China, emerges as a workaround strategy. It allows scholars to address sensitive topics with less risk—but also limits their domestic impact.

Surprisingly, the authors also find evidence of self-censorship among US-based scholars. Although less constrained overall, their Chinese-language publications—especially those targeting mainland Chinese journals—show similar topic avoidance patterns. This suggests that the reach of China’s censorship mechanisms extends across borders, influencing scholars through mechanisms such as publisher discretion and informal peer signaling.

To determine whether these patterns stem from political pressure rather than changing academic interests, the authors triangulate with two additional sources: China’s Ministry of Education research grant priorities, and topic trends in the journal Comparative Politics. They find that even when the Chinese government explicitly encourages research on certain issues (e.g., labor, corruption, religion), scholars still shy away from them. This indicates not a lack of interest, but a surplus of caution—self-censorship in anticipation of potential risks.

The implications of these findings are broad and troubling. At the individual level, Chinese scholars face deep structural pressures that limit their intellectual freedom and career choices. At the institutional level, universities become enforcers of the regime’s red lines, whether knowingly or not. Globally, the phenomenon blurs the boundary between domestic and international academic spheres, raising concerns about the integrity of knowledge production even outside authoritarian contexts.

Leng and Plantan’s article makes a valuable contribution to the literature on authoritarian governance, censorship, and academic freedom. It avoids sensationalism and instead offers careful, evidence-based insights. While the content may be unsettling, the writing is clear, thoughtful, and accessible, making it a must-read for anyone interested in China, higher education, or the subtle workings of control in modern autocracies.

In short, “Disappearing Research” is both a cautionary tale and a call to attention. It shows how censorship doesn’t need to be overt or coercive to be effective—and how, in an age of transnational repression, no academic is completely immune.

Link to the full article.

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Hi there!

My name is Andrea Ghiselli. I’ve been teaching and conducting research on Chinese foreign policy for a while. In fact, I spent about ten years in the PRC, studying and working. I recently joined the University of Exeter, while retaining my position as Head of Research at the ChinaMed Project—a research initiative sponsored by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the side, I write briefs for consulting companies as a way to reflect on the real-world implications of my research and, why not, make a bit of extra money.

My first book, which examines how Chinese civilian and military policymakers have been thinking about the protection of Chinese nationals abroad—and the role of the PLA in those efforts—was published a few years ago. Two more short books are in the pipeline: one (co-authored with Mohammed Alsudairi) already has a page on the CUP website, while the manuscript of the other, co-authored with Todd Hall, is about to be submitted.

So, what am I planning to do here?

Well, I definitely don’t have the time or energy to write long, original posts. Instead, I’ll be sharing summaries and brief comments on the articles and books I read. I believe that a lot of the research published in peer-reviewed outlets, unfortunately, fails to reach the broader debate on the PRC and its foreign policy. Occasionally, I’ll also share links to my own work.

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Hopefully, this Substack will not only bring you articles and books you might find interesting, but also motivate me to finally tackle the hundreds of unread pieces sitting in Zotero on my laptop—and the equally long list of books waiting for me in my Kindle.

That’s it. Despite the inevitable typos, I hope that you will enjoy my posts! Thanks for reading.