Manchester City have been active in the transfer window to bolster their midfield and forward line. One such position was the right wing, when they sold Savinho (or Savio) to Tottenham Hotspur after an underwhelming last season. Antoine Semenyo was signed in January to play in that position, while Phil Foden can do a job there, although he is not a winger by any stretch of the imagination.

A couple of days ago, the 2023/24 Premier League champions completed the signing of Allan from Palmeiras for a fee of around £34.2m. After coming through the Palmeiras academy, the 22-year-old, a left-footed winger, made his first-team debut in the 2025 season, making most of his appearances off the bench then.

In the 2026 season, though, he became a regular starter, playing over 1,500 minutes in the Brazilian Serie A (21 appearances) from January to August, before making the move to Manchester.

In all competitions for the Palmeiras first team, the winger averaged around 0.41 goals or assists per 90. Although a winger by profile and favoured position, he was used quite a few times as a right wing-back whenever Abel Ferreira switched to three at the back.

The Brazilian’s touch map, shown below, represents his positional versatility on the right-hand side of the field.

This is a touch map depicting a player who has done shifts as a wing-back and, to be fair to Allan, he does not shy away from tracking back and helping out the full-back when playing as an orthodox winger in a back four system either. Expect him to cover a lot of ground on the right-hand side whenever Enzo Maresca offers him a chance to play, most probably to replace Semenyo in the team.

Let’s now take a look at a percentile bar chart comparing the 22-year-old’s numbers among the midfielders, wingers and forwards in the Brazilian Serie A for the 2026 season.

• Although not getting into big chance zones a lot of the time (hence a low xG per shot average percentile), Allan was very good at converting the chances he got and adding value to half-chances through good shooting. The winger’s xG on target (xGOT) was 0.96 higher than his xG for the 2026 Serie A season, which shows that he was adding value to the chances he got through good shot placement. We will further analyse his shot-taking ability when looking at his shot map.

• The 22-year-old is not shy of attempting dribbles at a high volume (over 4.5 per 90 in raw terms). He is in the 76th percentile for dribble success rate too. When it comes to assists, while being in the 75th percentile for that is decent, he is only in the 55th percentile for key passes and the 25th percentile for expected assists. So, there is a bit of an overperformance there, just like was the case with his shooting.

• Being in the 77th percentile for fouls won is not a surprise given the high volume of dribbles he attempts. Having said that, he is below the 50th percentile for possession lost. At times, we have seen him be a little careless with the ball. Something he will definitely need to improve now that he is playing for a possession-centric City side.

• Defensively, you can see him having decent tackling numbers and going into ground duels. In addition to that, he was in the 91st percentile for aerial duel win rate, while contesting more than one aerial duel per 90.

Let’s add more to this, starting by looking at his take-on (dribble) map, followed by his progressive carries and their nature, chance creation map, and a discussion of his shot-taking ability via a shot map. All of this will cover his Serie A numbers for the 2026 season.

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As we witness a ‘Marc Guehi-type’ story taking place, with Crystal Palace not willing to sell one of their key players so late in the window while the player (Ismaïla Sarr in this instance) is adamant to make a move to Liverpool, there are doubts among the fan base at Anfield over whether the Senegal international would come as an option on the right wing, or whether he will be a backup to Alexander Isak in the number nine position.

After signing Bradley Barcola, the Reds are open to selling Cody Gakpo to Manchester City, provided they sign another winger or forward before the end of this transfer window. Talks with Brighton and Hove Albion for Yankuba Minteh haven’t ceased either.

For now, we will focus on the Sarr link and try to make sense of what the profile of the player is, what he has offered to Palace in the recent past, and what sort of an option he could be for the Liverpool forward line.

As usual, we start by looking at his percentile ranks among forwards, attacking midfielders and wingers in the Premier League for the 2025/26 season, covering key metrics.

The first impression you get is that this is not a percentile chart of an out-and-out winger, and you would not be wrong to think that. In Oliver Glasner’s 3-4-2-1 system, Sarr chiefly played as a right-sided number 10 behind the striker, Jean-Philippe Mateta. In this system, the wing-backs offer the width, and the two wide number 10s are almost like inside forwards rather than touchline wingers. That was pretty much the case in the 2024/25 season too.

So, in terms of non-penalty expected goals and average xG per shot (the latter representing the average quality of chance a player gets when he is shooting), it is not a surprise that he is over the 70th percentile, even when playing for a side that was 18th for goals scored last season and 8th for xG created.

There isn’t much to talk about in terms of creation, crossing and dribbling. It further underlines the profile of the forward he has become.

The Senegal international was in the 80th percentile for top speed in the league, so he still possesses speed on and off the ball. He is a threat in transitions, especially when carrying the ball forward and pushing close to the opposition box. The end product after the carries can be a mixed bag, with him sitting in the mid-50s percentile for both the proportion of carries ending in a shot and those ending in a chance. This is also reflective of the type of season he had last time around.

To add to the above, the last time Sarr played as an orthodox right winger in a back four system was when he was at Marseille during the 2023/24 season. Long time ago that!

Let’s now add some visuals to further profile the 28-year-old’s playing style, what his preferred action zones have been in the last two Premier League seasons, an analysis of his shot map in detail, and why he should come more as a backup striker or a 10, rather than a touchline winger.

Starting with the trusted touch map.

Yep, a right-sided inside forward rather than a touchline winger. It is a perfect reflection of the average position of a wide number 10 in a 3-4-2-1 system, where he seldom goes wide and prefers to play in the half-space just outside the box to connect with the other two forwards, or come inside and almost become a second striker if a cross or ball is whipped in from the left-hand side.

What types of runs does he make before receiving the ball in the final third and beyond? The visual below shows that:

There is a good mix of runs ending up in the box, centrally just outside it, and moving away from goal towards the right-wing zone. Although not by design or positional requirement, Sarr does have it in him to make off-the-ball runs closer to the right-hand touchline. On very rare occasions, he makes the typical winger run which starts out wide and ends up in the opposition box (a diagonal out-to-in run, as they call it). Not needed to do the latter much, to be fair, since Daniel Muñoz is offering the width from the wing-back position.

Next up, we have the 28-year-old’s progressive carries map, followed by his take-on map, chance creation map and, as mentioned above, an analysis of his shot map.

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Saturday night’s main story was Cody Gakpo agreeing to a move to Manchester City that would cost the Manchester-based club around £85m. It was understandable that the player would say yes to a move away from Anfield, since Liverpool have signed Bradley Barcola in his position, and there has been an indication from the Reds throughout the summer that the Dutchman is up for sale for the right price.

It just feels a bit odd, as a Liverpool fan, that the club are ready to sell one of their first-team assets to a direct rival in the league. Not sure City would have done that the other way around.

Okay, let’s move on from that and try to make sense of why Enzo Maresca and City’s recruitment staff are interested in signing Gakpo. They recently let Omar Marmoush go to Tottenham Hotspur on an initial loan deal, which includes a buy option next summer. The Egyptian was, more or less, an understudy to Erling Haaland in the number nine position, while also being an option to play on the left wing, if required.

Since joining City in the January window of 2025, Marmoush has played 62 games in all competitions, 41 as a striker, 11 on the left wing and seven as a second striker or a number 10 (that ratio is 18:11:5 respectively in the Premier League).

Gakpo, at Liverpool, has been predominantly a left winger, with some shifts as a number nine. He even played on the right wing in the Reds’ 2-2 draw against Nottingham Forest about 30 hours ago.

This article is all about comparing the Dutchman to Marmoush, focusing on their profiles through event data visualisations, and we will discuss the raw numbers along the way. We take their Premier League numbers from the 2024/25 and 2025/26 seasons into account.

Raw goals and assists numbers read as:

• Gakpo: 0.52 goals or assists per 90 in the Premier League over the last two seasons (71 appearances, 55 starts, 4,672 minutes).

• Marmoush: 0.72 goals or assists per 90 in the Premier League at Manchester City (37 appearances, 22 starts, 1,875 minutes).

Sample size matters!

Let’s start with the touch maps.

Gakpo has played far more games as an orthodox left winger over the past two seasons compared to Marmoush, but the proportion of their touches in the opposition box isn’t far apart. The former is at 13.48% to the latter’s 14.55%. So, even in games where Marmoush operates as a second striker or a number nine, he has a tendency to drop into those pockets on the left-hand side rather than be a box presence.

Gakpo, meanwhile, starts on the left wing but has a habit of drifting in a lot, almost becoming a wide striker and making those backpost runs regularly. Albeit not very well at Liverpool, the Dutchman can operate as a nine and produce a similar touch map to the one shown above.

Next up, how is their chance creation like?

It is slightly unfair to compare their chance creation since they are different profiles of players, both positionally and stylistically. But this is more about showing what City can expect from Gakpo if they play him on the left wing or as a forward, or even behind Haaland as a second striker.

The Dutchman cuts inside a lot from the left, hence why there aren’t many chances created from close to the byline. He almost becomes a left-sided number 10 on the ball, connecting with onrushing midfielders around the edge of the box.

He would offer something different to what Jeremy Doku gives on the left wing. The latter offers a lot more one-v-one quality, with sometimes questionable output (although the Belgian is ever-improving in that part).

Next up, what are their dribbling numbers and styles like? We’ll then look at their post-dribble actions, progressive carries and an in-depth analysis of their shot maps.

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This is a free read! But get unlimited access to in-depth, data-driven player and team analyses, scout reports, and breakdowns covering the Premier League and European football for just £3.50/month, or £3.16/month with an annual subscription. Start with a seven-day free trial.

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The transition from Arne Slot football to Andoni Iraola football was never going to be a smooth ride for Liverpool’s players (no disrespect to either style of play, but there is a marked difference in intensity between the two). Moreover, there are glaring gaps in the squad.

That was exploited well by Nottingham Forest, especially in the first half, when the Reds struggled to contain Oliver Glasner’s team in transition. They also targeted the right-hand side of the home side’s defence, with Jeremie Frimpong again struggling to have any impact, either offensively or defensively.

The away side took a deserved lead in the first half before Liverpool hit back midway through the second half. We won’t talk about the mess (from the fourth official) that contributed to Forest’s second goal, but Victor Muñoz’s equalising goal after an excellent Florian Wirtz pass to make it 2-2 was some of the best football Liverpool played all game (in the build-up to the goal).

We dive straight into the key data and visuals from the game, starting with the shot maps of both teams, along with the relevant data.

Even if you deduct 0.75 xG for Forest’s penalty chance, it was a very tight game in terms of the overall quality of chances both teams created relative to their shot attempts. In fact, Glasner’s team missed three chances from inside the six-yard box, one of which was incredibly blocked by Jérémy Jacquet in the first half. Ten of their 11 non-penalty shots came from inside the opposition box, which shows how often they were able to slice through Liverpool, either from the sides or centrally.

For Iraola’s team, five of their 13 shots came from outside the box, while Muñoz, who scored an excellent goal from the right-hand side of the box, missed two good chances from the other side. There wasn’t much created around the six-yard box, with Liverpool frequently underhitting or overhitting their crosses from both sides. The only real chance created with a low cross, from Cody Gakpo, was gobbled up by Alexander Isak.

Next up, we take a look at a plot of the share of the final-third entries and how they flowed throughout the game. Liverpool had close to 70% possession, so expect them to dominate this plot.

Forest had three spells of dominance in terms of final-third entry share in the first half, one of which led to their goal. While it wasn’t as if they were parked in the opposition third with the ball, whenever they entered the final third, they seemed to create a good moment or a big chance.

In the second half, Liverpool scored the equaliser while they were pinning the away side back. However, Forest won and scored from a penalty during a spell when the home side were on the front foot and looking for a second goal. Glasner’s men then had another spell when they looked capable of scoring a third, but, as expected, Iraola’s team responded and finished the game strongly, with that spell eventually producing the second equaliser.

How about the duel-winning happening in both halves of the game? Liverpool struggled in wide areas, especially in zones where their full-backs defended against Newcastle United.

One of the main things needed to win a football match is to be good in duels, be it on the ground or aerially. Forest won 17 more duels than Liverpool throughout the game. They won all the duels around the centre line and in the opposition half in wide areas in the first half, showing that the Reds’ full-backs struggled in those duels. Glasner’s men also won the three duels in or close to the opposition box, meaning they were able to create big moments whenever they entered the final third.

In the second half, in the midfield areas, Forest won 13 duels to Liverpool’s 10. Even in the defensive half on the right-hand side, it was 4-4, and the Reds improved in that zone only after Dominik Szoboszlai moved there and Frimpong was subbed off.

If we summarise this, Steven Gerrard was right in his post-match comments that Liverpool are a nice team that lacks a bit of nastiness and the willingness to win duels and almost earn the right to win games (I am paraphrasing here).

The duel map shown above tells us that, despite having close to 70% possession, the Reds never looked like they were in control of the game because of their inability to win key duels.

Let’s talk about the passing networks next and see what the connections were like.

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Passing Network: First Half

We start by looking at Liverpool’s network for the first half.

With Gakpo starting on the right and Muñoz on the left, it meant that the Liverpool wingers would hold width. It allowed Wirtz to stay central and operate in the zones he is at his best.

While we saw the connections in midfield, the front three could not connect much between themselves, and Wirtz also struggled in that area. Jacquet was once again very good and progressive on the ball. His passes to Gakpo started attacks quite often in the first half.

Against a back three, Isak was always going to struggle to get into the game if the crosses or balls into the box were of low quality. That is exactly what happened in this period.

How were Forest shaped on the ball in the first half?

It was almost a 3-5-2 with Morgan Gibbs-White tucking in from the right-hand side. Dan Ndoye was the furthest forward player for them (he scored the opening goal), while number nine Igor Jesus would almost drop into the number 10 position to connect with James McAtee, who had an excellent game in attacking midfield for the away side.

This network showed how Glasner’s men attacked the right-hand side of Liverpool’s defence, knowing there was a vulnerability there with Frimpong struggling defensively and Gakpo having a tendency to switch off at times. The latter was on display in the build-up to Forest’s opening goal.

Second Half

In this half, it was Liverpool who took control of the game a lot more (they almost had to after a bad first half). We divide the network into two parts: the first looks at the connections until the first three substitutions were made (71st minute), and the second looks at what happened after that until full-time.

There was more of a connection between Wirtz and the front three, while the Jacquet to Gakpo connection stayed strong. This was a period when the home side created more dangerous moments, including the first equaliser, when Gakpo rolled past his marker before a low cross found Isak five yards out at the back post.

What happened after this till the final whistle?

This was a period immediately after Forest took the lead for the second time. They naturally dropped deeper as the clock ticked by. Hence, there were a lot more touches among the back line and the deepest midfielder, Trey Nyoni.

Rio Ngumoha came on and moved to the left, while Muñoz went on the right before scoring the equaliser in the 82nd minute. Ronald Araujo’s passing was impressive in this period, which goes to show that Liverpool have two very good centre-backs (him and Jacquet) on the ball to complement Virgil van Dijk.

After the equaliser, although Iraola’s men dominated the ball and territory, there weren’t many chances or dangerous moments created.

Player Focus: D. Szoboszlai in central midfield means no control

Among the many good traits Szoboszlai has, controlling the tempo of the game and being consistently accurate with his passing are not among them. And you need that in abundance when playing in central midfield. The Hungarian struggled with his passing tendencies in this game and lost the ball stupidly at times. The ball loss map below shows that.

Szoboszlai had 117 touches in the game, but lost the ball 15 times. Losing it three times in his own half, including twice in his own third, is never a good idea. There were eight misplaced passes in the opposition half or close to their third as well, which prompted counter-attacking moments for the away side.

For a central midfielder, this isn’t good enough. He has the running to recover the ball when required, but the idea is to make sure the opposition stay pinned in, rather than give them regular encouragement to win the ball and start counter-attacks against a defensively susceptible side.

Every midfielder will lose the ball; it is the zones where he loses it is more important.

Both he and the team looked better and more balanced when he moved to right-back. Maybe, just maybe, that is his correct position for the moment.

Liverpool’s midfield depth was dealt another blow when the club could not agree on a contract extension with Curtis Jones, meaning the player had to leave this summer for a fee or else become a free agent next summer. Midfield, along with the winger department, was an area where the Reds were short by the end of last season. While they have signed two wingers and plan to sign one more before Tuesday night, the midfield has seen a senior player leave with no arrival, or even any sign of one, yet.

Journalists have relayed the information that Jones’ minutes will be given to 19-year-old Trey Nyoni, who has not started a Premier League game so far.

Now, I know it is all in hindsight, and we are all geniuses in hindsight. I also know that the player wanted to leave in search of regular game time, but could Liverpool have convinced Tyler Morton to stay for another season? Given the lack of form among some of the midfielders last season, he could have got the game time, and following the departure of Jones this summer, he could have become one of the main players in midfield for the Reds.

All this is could and should, of course, but the club decided to sell Morton, keep Wataru Endo and only loan out James McConnell, the latter of whom struggled at Ajax and eventually returned in January.

Since moving to Lyon on a five-year deal 12 months ago, Morton instantly became one of the regulars in the team and performed admirably well in Ligue 1. This article looks at his numbers from last season, analysing them using percentile ranks and event data visuals, while also comparing his raw numbers with a couple of Liverpool midfielders.

We start with the percentile bar chart:

After playing somewhat regularly in the Championship in 22/23 and 23/24, last season was the first time Morton played regular first-team football in the first division of one of Europe’s top leagues. Bearing that in mind, these numbers are relatively excellent when pitted against other Ligue 1 midfielders.

The 23-year-old has always had the gift of passing and making good use of the ball in midfield. He is fairly good under pressure when receiving the ball as well. This is reflected in the decent percentile ranks across the passing metrics.

His defensive numbers are above average too (with room for improvement, of course). He is not one to barge into people and contest a lot of ground duels, but rather someone who focuses on reading the game and sweeping up play whenever required. There is a reason why he ranked in the 71st percentile for fouls committed. He was also in the 85th percentile for being dribbled past, so he is not easy to beat even when caught in one-v-one situations.

Now, Morton is a deeper-lying midfielder who chiefly played in a midfield pivot in a 4-2-3-1, or as a lone six in a 4-3-3 system at Lyon last season. For Liverpool over the past two seasons, Ryan Gravenberch and Alexis Mac Allister have played most often in a midfield pivot. Let’s see how similar or far apart the three are when their raw numbers are compared.

If we look at the passing metrics (open-play passes, long passes and chances created combined), Morton has produced good numbers (and better than the other two), which can be scalable if he plays in a more possession-dominant side (although his Lyon side did have close to 55% possession last season, just 4% shy of Liverpool in the Premier League). The 23-year-old had a better ground-duel win rate comparatively.

But when it comes to key defensive metrics (possession-adjusted), Gravenberch has had excellent returns. It is no surprise to see Mac Allister ahead of the other two in tackles, while Gravenberch is far and away ahead in interceptions and also edges his midfield partner in ball recoveries.

In a way, a midfield two of Gravenberch and Morton would not have been too bad at Liverpool, would it (especially when Mac Allister was going through a troubled patch throughout last season)?

Next up, we analyse Morton’s season at Lyon with the help of event data to further pinpoint the areas he likes to operate in and focus on where he can still improve as a midfielder going forward.

A typical touch map of a central midfielder who chiefly operates in a double pivot, with a slight bias towards the left-hand side when moving into the opposition half. It is also a touch map of a midfielder who does not leave his position much and is unlikely to become a box-to-box player.

Following on from that, we take a look at the 23-year-old’s pass map, the expected threat created via passes in each zone, progression through carry map, what his defensive action map looks like, and his post-recovery passes.

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In the latest Monday Night Football show, Jamie Carragher was quite negative about Florian Wirtz’s place in the Liverpool side in the near future, especially given how open the Reds looked in the opening game of the season against Newcastle United, coupled with the fact that the German international has yet to really spark into life since moving to Anfield last summer.

There has been this huge clamour of negativity around the former Bayer Leverkusen star, with his first season at Liverpool being labelled as a ‘write-off’. The consensus is that he produced next to nothing.

While the player did take time to settle into things and had a stop-start campaign last time around, not many in the whole Liverpool squad could raise their hands and say they were at their best last season. There were plenty of factors behind that, which we will not go into.

What we will cover is Wirtz’s numbers from the 2025/26 season in detail, with the necessary caveats to understand the good and bad bits, and why this overwhelming negativity should stop because the basis is there for him to eventually come good.

If the midfield is open behind him, it is because the club have, so far, been negligent in not signing a defensive midfielder, and hence, we saw offensive-minded midfielders starting in a pivot at St. James’ Park on the opening day fixture.

Okay, back to the topic. Let’s start by looking at Wirtz’s percentile ranks in key metrics among Premier League forwards, wingers and attacking midfielders for the 2025/26 season.

• You see that, and while that is not enough from a player who cost £110m+ and is also one of the brightest young talents in the world game (let’s get that out of the way before looking at the positives), there are areas where he was still good despite having to acclimatise to a new team, a new country and a new league, which is so different from what he experienced in Germany.

• In terms of chance creation and expected assists, he was one of the best in the league among his positional peers (there is a caveat to it discussed later). In expected terms, he should have had 5-6 assists but ended up with three (open play plus set-pieces). He was pretty decent at dribbling too, with the raw numbers of 2.5+ dribbles attempted per 90 along with a success rate of close to 50%.

• The one area where he struggled was in the shooting department. Since the 23-year-old plays as a No. 10 or as an inside winger on the left, we can expect him to have better numbers in this part. The start of that should be him simply taking more shots when they are on, in my opinion. Too many times last season, I saw him trying to pick someone out even when he was in a good position in the opposition box. In raw numbers, he averaged fewer than two shot attempts per 90 last season, which is low. Considering he was in the 61st percentile for non-penalty xG per shot, maybe shooting more could have got him more goals.

• If we do some maths, he attempted 51 shots at an average of 0.137 xG per shot. He scored five goals from 7.03 xG. Had he attempted 20 more shots, let’s say, that would have taken his overall xG to around 10, and slightly better finishing could have got him to 9-10 goals instead of the five he ended up with. Fine margins!

• Amidst all the ‘concerns’ around how his presence in the 10 is making Liverpool weak defensively, the German had some of the best defensive numbers among Premier League forwards last season, as shown in the chart above. He also ranked in the 76th percentile for recoveries in the final third.

Carragher mentioned that Liverpool conceded 53 league goals last season. True! But if we dig into it, the Reds conceded 1.21 goals per 90 when Wirtz was on the field (32 goals conceded in just over 2,300 minutes), and shipped 1.81 goals per 90 (21 goals) when the German was not on the field.

So, this whole idea of Liverpool being ‘open’ cannot solely be attributed to the 23-year-old’s inclusion as an attacking midfielder, despite him not being at his best (we all admit that).

Next up, we take a look at his touch map to see where he preferred operating from.

With the Premier League, especially teams that come to Anfield, obsessed with closing off the central lines in a low block, a number 10 like Wirtz, playing for a possession-dominant team trying to dislodge those low blocks, almost preferred staying away from the central areas and operating in the half-spaces.

Although I am not a football tactician or a coach (far from it), I would love a player with excellent close control, dribbling skills and an eye for a pass to be more central with his positioning and allow the team to pick him out between the lines, rather than pulling out wide and becoming an easy passing option but with less overall effectiveness.

The caveat is that the team struggled to progress through the middle third anyway last season. But, yes, that is one thing I’d like Wirtz to do this season. Only then would he connect better with a striker like Alexander Isak (glimpses of that in pre-season), while it would also create more space for the wingers in wide areas.

Next up, we take a look at his chance-creation map.

Although the overall chance creation numbers were high, ranking in the 98th percentile in the league, we can expect a bit more in terms of box-ending key passes. Last season, only 50% of his key passes/assists ended in the box.

There were quite a few passes into the left-wing position, from where Cody Gakpo would cut inside and have a shot from the edge of the box. This is something I touched on when discussing his touch map. Wirtz can be a bit more central when receiving the ball in advanced areas, which could allow him to play a higher volume of box-ending key passes and, in turn, provide more assists.

Next up, we take a look at his take-on (dribble) map, followed by what he does after completing a dribble, his shot map (and a clear void in it), and his passing connections in the final third.

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Reports from South America claim that young Deportivo Cali midfielder Matías Orozco is set to move to the Premier League, with Liverpool being named as the destination, along with links to Leeds United and Brentford. It remains to be seen how true this is. We will find that out in the next few days. But, as they say, there is no smoke without fire.

For now, we will take that smoke and use it to scout the player, look at what he brings on the football field and analyse everything about him and his performances with the help of data.

First up, an introduction: Orozco (18 years old, height: 5 ft 8 in) is a Colombian U21 international who was at Deportivo Cali (a Colombian club) during his youth days before making his senior debut for them last season (2025). He is a central midfielder who can either play as a number eight or as a number six in a double pivot. Be it in a 4-4-2, 4-2-3-1 or 5-2-1-2, Orozco has either started or come on as one of the pivots in midfield. He has the licence to venture forward with the ball but is defensively solid when required.

We start by looking at his percentile ranks against other midfielders in Colombia’s Primera A league for the 2026 season (covering both the Apertura and Finalización phases so far). He has played close to 1,000 minutes, making 14 appearances, 12 of them as a starter.

• A pass accuracy rate of less than 85% can be something to improve upon for a central midfielder. Orozco has a switch of play and long balls in him, at a decent accuracy rate of more than 55%.

• With more than 1.5 key passes per 90, the 18-year-old is in decent company when it comes to creating chances. He is currently playing for a side that finished ninth in the Apertura phase and is seventh in the Finalización phase so far, with just a smidgeon over 50% average possession.

• So, perhaps, if the midfielder comes to play for a Liverpool side that are expected to keep around 60% of the ball, they might need a bit more control and accuracy in his passing, even if the key pass numbers are curbed. Having said that, he is still only 18, with plenty of room to improve and grow.

• Orozco is averaging more than 2.4 fouls per 90. He loves going to the ground, making attack-breaking fouls and picking up a yellow card once every three games. Off the ball, people relate him to how Moisés Caicedo likes to play, probably on the edge of getting a yellow card every game (wishful yayy!).

• His defensive numbers are decent. Being in the 93rd percentile for possession-adjusted interceptions shows how good a game-reader he is, stepping in to intercept passes and start attacks for the team. He is also in the 86th percentile for aerial win rate, which is decent and important if he is coming to the current form of the Premier League.

Right, enough of just looking at the numbers through the prism of relative analysis and how good or bad the player’s season has been. Let’s now take a deeper look into his profile, the zones he likes to operate in and more with the help of event data visuals. This should paint a picture, as much as I can try, of the type of midfielder Orozco is.

Starting with the touch map:

Although he is a midfielder who covers a lot of ground centrally, on either side of the halfway line, the right-hand side of the midfield takes precedence when it comes to having touches or overall actions, especially 10-12 yards into the opposition half. What’s more, he takes corners as well, hence the small marks near both corner-taking areas.

Next up, pass map.

This is a pass map of a midfielder who is willing to play it forward as much as possible, even if it reduces his overall accuracy rate. There are quite a few final third passes starting from close to the centre circle. They can be switches of play to either side, or recycling passes to move the ball from one side to the other, with him being the central lynchpin. Close to 25% of his successful passes end up in the final third. The latter comes while playing for a side who are keeping the ball like a toss of the coin (~50% average possession).

Next up, we take a look at Orozco’s chance creation map, followed by the zones from which he creates the most expected threat (xT), the progressive carry map and a look at his defensive actions.

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This is a free read! But get unlimited access to in-depth, data-driven player and team analyses, scout reports, and breakdowns covering the Premier League and European football for just £3.50/month, or £3.16/month with an annual subscription. Start with a seven-day free trial.

Newcastle United and Liverpool played out a rather interesting 2-2 draw in the first gameweek of the Premier League campaign. With both teams under a new manager and the transfer window still open for them to shape their squads further, I expected this game to be a little helter-skelter in nature, and so it turned out to be.

This article is not a match report. It will provide you with key data from the game, along with visuals on some of the key actions that shaped the overall pattern of the game. We start by looking at the shot map with the relevant numbers around it. This one is for the whole match.

Even if you remove the 0.75 xG from the last-minute penalty Liverpool won and scored, they had the better chances throughout the game. Aside from the penalty, 15 of their other 26 shots came from inside the opposition box. Cody Gakpo’s goal to make it 1-1 was exceptional, coming from almost 30 yards out.

For Newcastle, the chances were few and far between. Although their two goals came from relatively low-quality chances, especially the second, they missed two big chances late in the second half. Yoane Wissa was the culprit on both occasions, missing chances that would have made it 3-1 and effectively ended the game.

Next up, we analyse the flow of the game with respect to how many final-third entries were made via passes (also called Field Tilt). In my opinion, entering the final third through possession is one way to put pressure on the opposition. Let’s see how that flow went throughout this match.

Even when Newcastle scored the opening goal within six minutes, Liverpool had the territorial dominance. The home side did wrestle back some control around the midway point of the first half, before normal service resumed. At the start of the second half, the Magpies began well before Gakpo’s equaliser. They then went ahead again through a lovely goal from Joe Willock, which shocked a lot of people.

After that, even though Newcastle had a couple of big chances to make it 3-1, Liverpool dominated the ball as their opponents sat deeper and deeper to preserve the lead.

So, on the balance of play, although Andoni Iraola’s men did not play that well, they did not deserve to lose the game.

Following on from the above, one of the main reasons why a team can earn the right to win a football match is by winning their duels all over the pitch and recovering the ball and control of the game in that manner, regardless of playing style, to an extent. Below, we look at the duel win/loss map for both teams, divided into the first and second halves.

In their defensive half on the right-hand side, Newcastle overpowered Liverpool in the duels. Jeremie Frimpong, who had an average game on the ball, was also struggling defensively against Harvey Barnes on that side of the pitch. Even Milos Kerkez, at left-back, lost both his duels against Anthony Elanga near the corner flag in the first half.

There were not many midfield duels throughout the game because of how Newcastle were set up (i.e., looking to play on the counter), and the overall feel of the game was very transitional.

The Magpies winning both duels at the edge of their own box led to them creating big chances in the game. Liverpool had both their midfielders high, and a turnover in that zone left space for the home side to attack.

Overall, there was not a lot between the two teams in this, with Iraola’s men just shading it.

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Passing Networks

In this section, we look at the passing networks (with expected threat layer) of both teams, divided into first and second halves. We start with the first half.

First Half

Liverpool first.

Throughout the pre-season, we read reports of Rio Ngumoha being tried on the right wing this season. Although it was still the first time of asking, the youngster was left isolated in the first half, with no real connection of any major substance with anyone around him.

Jérémy Jacquet and Ryan Gravenberch connected the most in the first half, but the latter was not holding his position as a natural six and ventured forward when the space was available. It was his loss of the ball that led to Newcastle’s first goal on the counter.

The one major positive was that Jacquet was heavily involved in the build-up and looked comfortable even venturing into midfield with the ball before picking out a teammate. Liverpool lacked a technically sound centre-back to aid their build-up last season. Teams could just man-mark Virgil van Dijk. Jacquet’s debut was encouraging on this part.

Newcastle:

They predominantly played on the counter and, hence, had to rely on the pace of their wingers as an out ball. Elanga was their primary outlet not just in the first half, but for as long as he was on the pitch. Sean Steur was the most involved in terms of trying to receive the ball under pressure and play it forward (a decent debut for the Dutchman). Wissa dropped deep quite a bit to help out both in and out of possession.

Second Half

What changes did Liverpool make?

Kerkez and Gakpo connected a lot after half-time, although not every connection led to a shot or a big chance. The former did get into good crossing positions before not playing the right ball. The same was the case on the other side, with Frimpong getting into good positions and either taking too long to release a cross or not picking out the right pass in the box.

Florian Wirtz, who was central in the first half, ventured out wide a bit more, almost into a left-sided number 10 position, but could not connect with the likes of Gakpo and Alexander Isak. No wonder the latter was feeding off scraps all game, despite getting two good chances.

Victor Muñoz came on at right wing and was a live wire in the final part of the game. He put crosses in, made runs in behind and eventually won the penalty that rescued a point for Liverpool.

What about Newcastle?

William Osula was taken off 10 minutes into the second half, so we can ignore his contribution in this pass map. In terms of what Newcastle produced on the ball, it was even less in the second half than in the first. However, the idea was to stay vertical and exploit the spaces on the counter whenever possible.

They did that three times in the second half, scoring once and creating big chances from the other two. Jacob Ramsey also played well after coming on. Lots of positives for Matthias Jaissle to look at from his first game.

Player Focus: Florian Wirtz can do more

It was a feature of Wirtz’s first season in the Premier League that a lot of people ended up wanting more from him from the get-go in this campaign. The first game, albeit a tough one away at Newcastle, did not go to plan. Liverpool’s midfield was struggling, and the German was not much of an influence on the ball.

And as we saw in the passing networks, he did not connect much, if at all, with Isak, and that was supposed to be the main pathway to plenty of goals for Liverpool this season. As I said, it is still early days, but the focus will be on him.

Here’s his touch map from the game:

Started centrally but drifted towards the left-hand side, almost playing in the half-space. Not much in the way of action in or near the box.

What were his passing tendencies like in the final third?

Yep, not much is going through the central zones. Most of it was connecting with the overlapping full-backs and the winger on the side where he predominantly operated.

The German has to get more central and connect better with Isak, which would perhaps allow the wingers to get a little more space out wide, especially when the opposition is in a low block. He cannot stay outside that middle block and expect to influence games creatively. Only one chance created.

All in all, a good game to cover and watch. Plenty of things for Liverpool to work on and improve. The last week of the transfer window is important for them as well, as they look to add some substance to a thin squad.

When Yan Diomandé decided not to entertain the interest from Liverpool and eventually moved to Real Madrid, I wrote a piece on six alternate options the Reds could look at to bolster their winger department, both on the left and on the right. Yankuba Minteh was one of the names mentioned (you can go through that article and the other options here). To be fair, the Gambian international has been on the club’s radar for more than two years now.

Fast forward a number of weeks, and we have had news that the Reds had a bid of £50m rejected by Brighton and Hove Albion for the 22-year-old winger. Reporter Andy Naylor, who covers Brighton for The Athletic, feels that this could be a deal that ends up happening in Liverpool’s favour. So, we could still expect Minteh to move to Anfield before the end of this transfer window, even though he is currently injured and ruled out until the end of October (he suffered the injury during a pre-season game earlier this month).

This article focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of the player, what he could offer Liverpool if he signs, and the idea around the changing setup of the Reds’ attack following the departure of Mohamed Salah.

We start by looking at the 22-year-old’s percentile ranks against Premier League forwards and wingers for the 2025/26 season.

The player’s profile is clearly retrievable by looking at the bar chart above. There isn’t much there in the shooting metrics, be it in terms of chance conversion or getting into good positions. He takes shots from very unprofitable zones and does most of his best work outside the box, even though he was in the 89th percentile for touches in the opposition box last season.

Moving on, Minteh was above the 80th percentile in expected assists, open-play chances created, crosses attempted into the box, dribbles attempted and dribble success rate. He was also in that echelon for carries, the proportion of carries that were progressive and average progressive carrying distance. You can see why he does most of his best work outside the box.

Being only at the 44th percentile for chance-ending carry proportion shows that he could do better in terms of having his carries lead to chances more often, considering his overall chance creation numbers are relatively high.

He was also in the 97th percentile for top speed (36.2 km/h) and the 98th percentile for high-speed sprints per 90 (20.83). An electric player who could be a great supporting option from the right-wing position.

Next up, we take a look at his Premier League performances with the help of event data visuals. The coverage will not only focus on last season (2025/26), but also on the 2024/25 campaign, to gain a better understanding of the type of player he is and the zones he prefers to operate in. He has played a total of 66 league games for Brighton in that period.

We start with the touch map.

Out of the 66 appearances he made in the league over the last two seasons, 55 came as a right winger and 10 from the left. So, the 22-year-old is a left-footed winger who is much more comfortable operating on the other side. He can do a job on the left as well, if required.

If we focus on the right-wing side of the touch map, you can see a bulk of actions executed just outside the box or around its edge. Even though being a left footer playing on the right means coming inside would be natural to him, he prefers to move away from that angle bias and play more of a supporting role.

Next up, we have the type of runs he makes before receiving the ball in the final third and beyond.

The Gambian international does love long, bursting off-the-ball runs, and he has the pace to make those in-behind runs while looking to get at the end of the long balls from midfield or one of the centre-backs (these are also called deep runs).

In terms of their nature, it is not surprising that, even from the right-hand side, quite a few of these runs are towards the byline, either inside or outside the box, with a few mixed in around the half-space outside the box. This is almost a perfect illustration of a pacy winger who isn’t shy about making deep runs on a regular basis.

The doubt is whether he will have the space to make those runs for a Liverpool side that comes up against deep-defending teams quite regularly. Perhaps not. But the nature of the Reds’ game is expected to change under Andoni Iraola this season, meaning there could be room for a winger of this kind after all.

Following on from that, we have the chance creation map, followed by the take-on (dribble) map, what he does after completing a dribble, progressive carries, passing connections, and an analysis of his shot map and why the numbers in that area of his game are pear-shaped. Is there a caveat behind them?

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Arsenal are apparently in talks with Bayer Leverkusen to sign former Liverpool centre-back Jarell Quansah. It has come as a surprise to me because the Gunners are most likely looking for a backup to cover the temporary loss of William Saliba at right centre-back. Signing a promising 23-year-old defender who has had only one full season of first-team football and could still do with regular playing time seems odd.

Regardless, it looks like Leverkusen won’t let the England international go unless Arsenal really want to spend £45m+ on a backup centre-back.

After breaking through into the Liverpool first-team in the middle of the 2023/24 season and doing decently well (albeit with room for improvement), Quansah faced a very tough year in his second season at Anfield. Arne Slot subbed him off at half-time in the first Premier League game against Ipswich Town, which took a toll on his confidence, and he could not quite recover.

It was understandable that the 23-year-old left Liverpool to join Leverkusen last summer. He had a good first season in the Bundesliga, which earned him a call-up to the England squad for the World Cup.

Below, we analyse his numbers from the 25/26 season at the BayArena, how much progress he made compared to his debut season in 2023/24, and why he should stick around for another season in Germany before thinking about a move back to England, be it at Arsenal or Liverpool.

For context, Quansah played all of his games either as a right-sided centre-back in a back four or as a right-sided wide centre-back in a back three last season.

One of his strengths is being comfortable on the ball regardless of whether he plays in a back four or a back three. There is obviously more room and protection, as a wide centre-back, to make a lot more carries, which he is anyway good at if you watched him during his first season at Liverpool.

I remember the goal Alexis Mac Allister scored at Old Trafford in an FA Cup tie against Manchester United. The move was started by Quansah’s carry into the final third, attracting a defender before he released the ball.

The percentile numbers above, ranked among centre-backs in Europe’s top four leagues, are an indication of the good work he did on the ball in Germany.

Defensively speaking, the 23-year-old is not a massive tackler (still decent at it, though). He would prefer reading the game and making key interceptions. He did a lot of that at Leverkusen last season too, including stepping into midfield to make those interceptions and stop opposition attacks at the source. It can be described as ‘front-foot defending’. We won’t see him going to the ground frequently when trying to deal with defensive situations.

In terms of aerial duels, the Englishman’s numbers were not particularly high, partly because he played quite a few games as a wide centre-back. Edmond Tapsoba and Loïc Badé contested more aerials than him at Leverkusen last season. His win rate was around 60%, which is an area he can work on and get closer to 65% or more. To be fair, he won 67% of his aerial duels in the 23/24 Premier League campaign.

The other thing he can improve on is winning ground duels. The contention can be up and down, and that’s not an issue, but when going into those 50-50s, especially in his own half, the win rate can get better.

Let’s add a few more layers to this and look at some event data visuals to pinpoint the good and bad parts of Quansah’s game last season, including a table comparing his raw numbers from 25/26 with 23/24.

We start with the pass map.

Close to 21% of his successful passes ended up in the final third or the opposition box. That’s a high number, even considering that he played for a side that averaged close to 59% possession and operated as a wide centre-back in some games, where he had a bit more room to step into midfield and play those final-third passes. Doing all that with an overall accuracy rate of close to 90% is even more impressive. This is a part of the game where Quansah is very good.

Next up, we have the expected threat (xT) map and the zones where the 23-year-old created a lot more threat with his passes.

The England international averaged close to two accurate long balls per 90 last season. He has that switch in him, starting from the right centre-back zone and ending up finding the overlapping fullback or wing-back, or the left winger. As we can see in the plot above, two of the 10 types of passes that created the most threat were switches of play.

The rest are typical of a wide centre-back in a back three having the room to step into the opposition half (he can and has done that even when playing in a back four, mind you) and play those little through balls, or connect with the right-sided players, be it the fullback or winger.

Next up, we analyse the aerial duel maps (offensive and defensive separately), along with his ball recovery map, the types of runs he makes before making a recovery, his post-recovery passes and ball loss map. Plus, raw numbers comparison between 23/24 and 25/26.

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Just as Tottenham Hotspur are preparing a bid to sign Cody Gakpo from Liverpool (according to reports in the Netherlands), there is a sense of confusion among Liverpool supporters about what to do with the Dutch international. Some are leaning towards the fact that the player is experienced and proven in the Premier League, with his nous likely to be required during a transitional season for the Reds.

Others have seen what he can and cannot offer the team and lean towards the view that this could be the ideal opportunity to get the maximum possible fee from his sale, with a fellow Premier League club eager to secure his services. I am in the latter camp, with my reasoning driven by what the data tells me, with the caveat of the eye test.

Firstly, we take a look at a bar chart looking at the 27-year-old’s percentile ranks among Premier League forwards and wingers for the 2025/26 season.

For a winger whose profile is built around scoring goals, taking a lot of shots and converting chances from wide areas by making back-post runs and similar movements, Gakpo’s overall shooting numbers were well below par last season. Being in the 29th percentile for the average quality of chances he received showed that he was either attempting shots from low-xG zones or simply wasn’t getting into the more dangerous areas often enough.

His chance creation numbers were decent, though, with over 1.5 key passes per 90 from open play. He has never been a high-volume dribbler, either last season or during the title-winning 24/25 campaign.

With the kind of player the 27-year-old is, it is expected that he ranks in a higher percentile for shot-ending carry proportion rather than chance-ending carries.

Not being a high-volume dribbler, combined with his reluctance to hit the byline, made him easier to defend against week after week. And when the goals dried up, as they did last season, he became an ‘average’ player by the lofty standards required at Liverpool.

The drop-off in 25/26 compared to 24/25

This section is all about looking at a bunch of event data visuals, comparing the Dutch international’s performance in the 24/25 campaign to the one in 25/26, and figuring out where he dropped off in the latter. It also helps uncover the sort of player he is and why I am leaning towards the consensus that it would be right to sell him this summer.

The caveat is that he played nine of the 36 games as a centre-forward last season, whereas he predominantly operated from the left wing the season before. I did not want to remove the games he played as a centre-forward, as the raw numbers will be compared side by side as well.

Let’s start by looking at the type of runs he makes before receiving the ball in the final third and how they changed between the two seasons, if at all.

There was, in fact, a far lower proportion of final-third runs ending in the box in 25/26. This was understandable given that Liverpool had an orthodox number nine playing through the middle (Hugo Ekitiké, mostly), compared to the false nines used during the title-winning campaign.

Although it is not in his instincts to do so, the Dutchman was trying to go against his usual angle bias and make runs away from the box more often. The problem, though, is that he is not at his best when operating away from the box. Furthermore, his link-up play with left-back Milos Kerkez was not particularly good (it did get better the more they played together, but still), while dribbling and getting to the byline have never been his strengths.

Next up, we look at his chance creation maps.

Although the volume of chances created per game increased in the 25/26 season, the average expected threat (xT) per chance dropped significantly. The latter measures the quality (or threat) of each chance created.

So, his chance creation effectiveness dropped off in a big way despite the increase in the raw numbers. This is the caveat (or a significant footnote) to his high percentile ranks among Premier League forwards and wingers for open-play chance creation.

The other pattern is that hardly any chances were created from zones close to the byline in the 25/26 season. There were, albeit still only a few, some created from those areas during the title-winning campaign. So, almost everything he created and did came in zones that were already congested, with low-block teams always preferring to block the central areas.

Next up, we take a look at his post-take-on actions (although not in great volume), progressive carries, post-carry actions, shot maps, and a discussion around the tendencies of his passing and connections in the final third (with numbers).

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A consortium consisting of Amazon founder Jeff Bezos, Facebook co-founder Eduardo Saverin and former Queens Park Rangers director Amit Bhatia is set to acquire close to 30% of the minority stake in Liverpool Football Club from Fenway Sports Group (FSG).

This is the biggest stake FSG are set to give up since taking over the club in October 2010. They sold a 2-4% stake to Dynasty Equity in September 2023 to help deal with the rising debts following the effects of Covid-19 and the cost of the growing infrastructure they had invested in. Before that, RedBird Capital acquired an 11% stake in March 2021 to provide capital to FSG’s wider portfolio.

FSG, led by American businessman John W. Henry, took over Liverpool FC from previous owners Tom Hicks and George Gillett following an intense legal battle. They bought the club for around $344 million and saved it from major financial trouble, with the club close to going into administration.

In the last 16 years, they have done some splendid work at Liverpool, keeping it self-sustaining while putting the club back on the map as one of the largest forces in world football. Mistakes have been made along the way, but they have also reversed decisions (such as the idea of the Super League and changes to ticket prices) in response to what the fans had to say about them.

In this article, we will discuss the numbers behind FSG’s tenure at the club so far, both in terms of performance and financial commitment, while also discussing some of the major decisions they have made to put the club back on such a high pedestal.

We start by looking at the valuation of the club over the years and how it has experienced exponential growth since the current owner’s takeover. These valuation figures are from the official Forbes records.

Even though FSG bought the club for somewhere around $344 million, the enterprise value was still well over $800 million (the equity value of a severely damaged business was bought).

The enterprise value did come down over the next four years as the new ownership had to do a lot of work in terms of paying off severance packages for managers before appointing Brendan Rodgers in 2012 (Sir Kenny Dalglish and Roy Hodgson), along with major transfers not working out (i.e., Andy Carroll and Stewart Downing) and much more.

A consistent spell out of the Champions League was also a major factor, along with a lag in global sponsorship deals and stagnant revenue coming from the stadium.

The valuation went up by a decent margin in 2015 after a year back in the Champions League, which was followed by a run to the Europa League final in 2016 under Jürgen Klopp.

The rise since 2017 has been exponential, to say the least. Consistent appearances in the Champions League, combined with rising sponsorship deals, the worldwide reach of the club, major trophies won, TV revenues shooting up, and an expanded Anfield generating greater matchday revenue than ever before, have all contributed to this growth.

All in all, the club is currently in a good place following more than a decade of good work being put in.

Revenue Growth

In keeping with the valuation topic discussed above, let’s have a look at the growth of the club’s revenue over the years and discuss the key factors driving it.

Just a reminder: FSG took over in October, 2010. The fiscal year-end changed from July to May in 2012 to keep the club’s accounting period in line with the European football season.

These are the combined revenue values from commercial deals, broadcasting revenue, and money generated from matchdays at the stadium. Following a period of stagnation in the first couple of years under FSG, Liverpool’s revenue boomed for the first time in 2014 after a return to the Champions League under Brendan Rodgers.

The increases of at least 17% for three years running in 2017, 2018 and 2019 came during the peak years under Klopp, when Liverpool won the Champions League, followed by a Premier League title in 2020.

The expected downturn came during the two years of the pandemic (2020 and 2021), before a boom in 2022 following a historic season for the club on the field, where they came within two games of winning the Quadruple.

Following Klopp’s departure in 2024, Arne Slot leading the team to a Premier League title in his first season helped drive a further rise in the club’s revenue streams (also helped by the expanded format of the Champions League).

The 2025/26 season was disappointing, but staying in Europe’s elite competition would have been a huge relief for everyone involved this summer.

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Wages: FSG are one of the high payers in Europe

FSG are ‘revenue-to-wage ratio’ owners, meaning the wages they pay their playing staff are largely based on the revenue generated by the club. This revenue is mainly driven by success achieved on the field. They are also very big on including bonuses in player contracts, which takes their wage bill to the higher echelons whenever the team wins a major competition.

In the table below, we will see how the above-explained approach meant that slowly but surely, they became one of the highest payers in Europe.

The highest growth in wages came in line with the boom in revenue. As we saw in the revenue section, the period between 2017 and 2019 generated the highest growth in revenue, and the growth in FSG’s wage bill closely matches that, as shown in the table above.

There was another spike in the 2021/22 season, when the team had a historic campaign, again in keeping with the recovery in revenue following the two-year hit during the pandemic. The rise in the 2024/25 season was also expected, with bonus payments being triggered following another Premier League title win.

Although one can question FSG’s approach to transfers and the fact that they are not ‘sugar daddy’ type owners, they are one of the best when it comes to rewarding players and staff when success is generated on the field (in addition to not shying away from paying big wages to key players and the manager). There is a reason why they have been in the top five in Europe for wages spent every year over the past decade or so.

Along with the above, the owners have made significant investments to bring the stadium and training facilities up to modern-day standards. They spent somewhere around £195m on two stand expansions at Anfield (the Main Stand and the Anfield Road End). They also forked out more than £50m on developing the new AXA Training Centre in Kirkby, which opened in 2020 to bring the men’s first team and youth academy onto the same site. In 2023, they bought the old Melwood training facility for the club’s Women’s team.

There is also a £20m investment promised to modernise the youth academy facilities in Kirkby, which includes adding a full-size indoor training centre. This is slated to be completed by 2028.

On-field and Transfer numbers

The first part of the article has covered how well FSG have done in putting a club of Liverpool’s stature back on track after a dark phase under Hicks and Gillett, along with the financials behind it all.

Now, let’s look at some of the footballing numbers, how things have looked over the years on the field, and how the club’s transfer strategy has remained consistent throughout, with a sudden change in 2025.

We start by looking at the monthly Elo Ratings of the club over an 18-year period, starting from 2008 and going up to July 2026. An Elo Rating practically gives us a dynamic, numerical measure of a team’s strength relative to other clubs based on their performances on the field. Since I have extracted this data via the ClubElo API, it is strictly based on clubs under UEFA (Europe).

Around 2008 and 2009, the club was in a decent place on the field, following a consistent period in the Champions League and doing decently well in the Premier League (finishing second in the latter in the 2008/09 season). The decline came after 2009.

The first couple of years under FSG were volatile before a major dip in 2013, following a disappointing first season under Brendan Rodgers, with the team finishing eighth in the league.

It went up drastically in 2014 after Rodgers’ side nearly won the league title. This was followed by a dip, as the Reds’ first season back in Europe’s big time did not go well, alongside a drop-off in Premier League performances.

Klopp was appointed in October 2015, and we can see consistent growth in the team’s Elo Ratings between 2016 and 2018, before striking gold in 2019 by winning the Champions League, followed by a Premier League title in 2020. Liverpool were comfortably the best team in Europe between 2018 and 2020.

The title defence did not go well in 2020/21 following a raft of injuries, but things picked up again for a magnificent 2021/22 campaign. Looking at the two-year Slot era, the spike was recovered as Liverpool won their second league title in five years. This was followed by a disappointing title defence, although there were a lot of caveats involved, including the shock death of first-team player Diogo Jota in the summer of 2025 that hampered the pre-season (and much more).

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How have Liverpool’s Premier League points tally and league position looked over the years?

The nature of the graph we are seeing here was more or less discussed in the previous paragraph. It was a super achievement from Klopp that Liverpool dropped out of the top four only once in his eight full seasons in charge of the team (2016/17 to 2023/24). It is even more impressive when you consider that the team had finished in the top four only once in the previous seven campaigns.

Lastly, we look at some of the transfer window numbers to see how consistent FSG have been in this regard. As mentioned above, they wanted to make Liverpool a self-sustaining model, where whatever is earned is largely spent back into the club.

Let’s go through the net spend per season over the years, along with their relative rank in the league for those seasons.

Net Spend = Money spent on buying players - Money recouped from selling players (the higher the net spend, the better the rank in the plot above).

2018/19 was the first season in which the net spend crossed the €100m mark. The summer of 2018 did involve paying big money to sign Alisson Becker from AS Roma, but it was also the first time in a long time that Liverpool did not have to sell one of their key assets to raise funds for buying players.

Two consecutive seasons of Champions League qualification meant the club had started generating more revenue, while the team was becoming settled under Klopp. As a result, the major transfer activity involved incoming players rather than having to sell key assets to fund them.

The squad did not get much of a boost in the summer after winning the Champions League. Although that did not affect the 2019/20 campaign, it did in 2020/21, when a shortage of centre-backs following a raft of injuries in that position meant everything became a mess.

If we look at the relative league ranking of Liverpool’s net spend, it was first in 2018 and has been underwhelming since. This is despite the team’s growth on the field and the revenue streams flowing through the roof, even with the two-year halt caused by the pandemic.

Following relatively little major transfer activity in the 2024/25 season, the club went big in the summer of 2025 after winning the title and seeing another decent level of revenue growth. In my opinion, they had to do it. The Klopp team was ageing, and quite a few key players had left. That is set to continue this summer as well.

But this is where the current market creates a problem for FSG’s model. Even with revenue increasing significantly and everything around the club looking positive, the idea of ‘paying what we earn’ would not be sustainable.

We have seen good players going for crazy money in the Premier League this summer, and elite players will obviously cost even more.

So, it is not surprising to see FSG inviting major investment from a consortium. It is an acceptance that they may need some help to keep Liverpool competitive at the highest level.

It would also not be surprising if this turns out to be the start of a full takeover of the club by the above-mentioned consortium. I mean, there has to be a reason why Amit Bhatia resigned as a director at QPR to form this consortium alongside Bezos and Saverin, right?

Final Thoughts

Although they have made mistakes during their tenure at Liverpool so far, FSG’s overall work at the club has been positive. This article was about putting the numbers behind the work they have done to improve the stature of the club, both financially and on the field.

At the same time, it feels like the right time for their model to evolve. The game has changed, the transfer market has changed, and keeping Liverpool competitive at the very top is becoming increasingly expensive.

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As of now, this is the last summer Curtis Jones is under contract at Liverpool. An extension does not seem like a solution (at the moment), while a January 2027 exit would leave a sour taste. So, either he leaves now for a fee that the club is happy with, or goes on a free next summer after giving it his all (as he has always done for the club, contrary to a few opinions about him).

Some of the reported reasons why a new contract has not materialised are the fact that the player wants guarantees around playing time, along with a pay rise consistent with what fellow midfielders have received. Liverpool are not going that high as they have seen the numbers around his playing time over the last few years (these are reported reasons, not a made-up opinion from my side).

Jones is 25 now and has been playing first-team football regularly since the 2020/21 season. He has played in different positions across the midfield and was even used at right-back in some games last season. In his corner, he is right to think that he has done all the right things to now warrant game time of some level, with a pay rise that reflects that in a new contract.

In this article, we will first look at the club’s side and run through the numbers around the player’s game time and how his inconsistent availability makes it difficult for managers to pick him. We will follow that up by looking at his 25/26 numbers, as well as visualising his numbers from the past three seasons to see whether he has improved during this time.

If we look at his last three Premier League campaigns for Liverpool, the maximum number of consecutive games he has started came last season (seven), while his maximum number of consecutive appearances came in the 2024/25 season (22), which was probably the campaign when everyone thought he had properly arrived at Anfield as one of the mainstays in midfield.

You look at the different sequences of starts he has made during this time, and it does not resemble the profile of a regular starter in midfield, a position where continuity is paramount given that it is the engine room of the team.

In terms of the percentage of minutes played, it has barely crossed the 50% mark in the last two seasons and was below 40% before that, while his total number of starts in a league campaign has not crossed 50% of the available games. Why is that? Niggly injuries have hampered his progress time and time again.

This comes on the back of spending the 2021/22 and 2022/23 seasons with 17 and 16 games missed, respectively, due to different injury issues.

As you can see in the table above, barring an ankle sprain that kept him out for six weeks in 23/24, the injuries have not been long-term, but they have come at different stages of the season.

He has not had a full season with almost no injury issues where he can start 10 to 12 games on the spin and establish himself as a mainstay in the team. Hence, managers are not always sure about putting him in the bracket of a “regular starter” in the squad.

Now, when the 25-year-old plays, he is often a reliable performer, albeit one with strengths and weaknesses in his game. Although he does not have a specialised position in midfield yet, he provides a stable presence with his ability to recycle the ball, while still playing a particular role for the team.

We start by looking at a bar chart showing his percentile ranks among Premier League midfielders for the 2025/26 season.

This describes Jones as a player, to be honest. He is a very good passer of the ball, with or without pressure, and plays a high volume of passes into the final third. But the flip side is that, considering the number of touches he has (98th percentile in that), and the zones in which he has those touches (mostly in the final third or around areas where the team is in stable possession), his chance creation and chance-ending carry numbers do not match that to any great extent.

Off the ball, he is very good at reading the game and making interceptions or recoveries in general (he improved his tackling last season relatively).

Aerially, though, he can be better for a 6ft 1inch midfielder. Last season, he had an aerial win rate of 28%, which is not good enough for a central midfielder playing in such an up-and-down league (in terms of aerial duels).

So, there are clear strengths and weaknesses to his game.

But why restrict the analysis to just last season? Let’s take a broader look at the 25-year-old’s numbers across the seasons since 2023/24 to see where he has developed as a player and whether there are signs of stagnation.

Let’s start by looking at the touch maps.

He was always preferred on the left-hand side of the midfield under Jürgen Klopp, hence the clear concentration of his actions in the left-midfield zone during the 2023/24 season. Under Arne Slot, in the last two seasons, he was used on both sides of the midfield, either in a two-man setup or as one of the number 10s in a no-striker system during the 2024/25 season. Last season, he also played a few games at right-back, hence the slightly greater concentration of his actions on that side of the field.

Let’s look at the pass map next, followed by the carry map, post-carry actions, chance creation, ball recoveries, and, finally, a discussion around distance covered (which gave up some clues around what he thinks about staying at Anfield for the moment).

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Well, no one saw that coming (at least the people who aren’t inside the workings of the club). Liverpool are completing the signing of Ronald Araújo on a loan deal with an option to buy him for €55m next summer if things go to plan (I still think this would end up being just a one-year loan unless surprising turns of events happen).

Getting a dynamic centre-back was the need of the hour after seeing Joe Gomez get injured once more, just seven minutes into the first pre-season game, while Giovanni Leoni is still recovering from an ACL injury and Jérémy Jacquet is yet to feature in pre-season after picking up a minor issue (we do not know the extent of it).

Not signing a centre-back, even on loan, would have left the squad light in that department going into the season, with so many games to navigate as always.

Araújo (27) sounds like an interesting move if no context is added. However, there is a lot to uncover regarding the player and what he could bring to the table at Anfield.

The Uruguayan international has been at Barcelona since 2018. He initially joined their B side after spending a year playing first-team football for clubs back in his home country (Rentistas and Boston River).

The defender then made his senior debut for the La Liga champions in 2019 and has played 213 games in all competitions, with 157 starts. After playing only 238 minutes in his first season as a Barcelona first-team player, he has averaged around 2,387 minutes per season over the past six campaigns, with his highest playing time coming in the 2021/22 season (3,274 minutes).

Despite being a big part of the leadership group (in the squad) at Barcelona for some time now, why has Araújo’s playing time been relatively low in all competitions? The answer: injuries.

In six full seasons at Barcelona, the 27-year-old has missed 100 games due to injuries and a mental health break (he took the latter in the middle of last season). In total, he has had 16 injuries, nine of them muscle-related. He has had two significant hamstring injuries, one in 2021/22, which made him miss six games, and another in 2024/25, which made him miss 29 games.

So, although he is fit and was part of Barcelona’s pre-season as of now, there is a lingering concern that he might break down again if regular game time is asked of him at Anfield. One to keep an eye on during the season.

Now, about his profile, there are discernible strengths and weaknesses there.

We start the analysis by looking at a bar chart showing his percentile ranks against La Liga centre-backs during the 2025/26 season, since he played just over 1,000 minutes in the league last season, clearing the minutes threshold.

Even in a distorted season in terms of playing time and mental health issues, Araújo managed to be one of the best centre-backs in Spain when it came to passing with accuracy and purpose, as well as ball-carrying. His ground defending numbers were exceptional as well (along with the impressive numbers shown above, he was in the 85th percentile for being dribbled past), while aerial superiority has been one of his strengths for some time now.

One of the drawbacks of his game is his rashness; hence, he is in the 21st percentile for fouls committed (the more fouls committed, the lower the percentile). He has a tendency to rush into challenges and have a brain-fade moment, which can lead to fouls in dangerous positions. Despite being very good on the ball, he can also lose possession in key areas, potentially allowing the opposition to create a chance as a result.

Next up, we have a series of event data visuals that will help us further analyse the player’s profile and identify where his strengths and weaknesses lie. I have used three seasons of La Liga data to ensure there is enough information in the visuals to draw meaningful conclusions from (since he didn’t play much in the last two seasons for various reasons).

We start with the touch map.

Out of the 62 games played during the given period, 45 came from the start, with 40 of those coming as a centre-back and five as a right-back. This is reflected in the touch map above, with a greater concentration of his actions coming as an orthodox right-sided centre-back in a back four.

Next up, we have his pass map.

More than 10% of his completed passes ended up in the final third or the opposition box. Those are high returns for a centre-back, even one playing for a possession-dominant side like Barcelona.

The pass map gives us the impression that he does not attempt a lot of long balls or diagonals from one side to the other. Although his long-pass accuracy was around 50% across the three seasons covered here (relatively decent), he prefers to play passes along the ground, with occasional punchy passes through the lines into the final third. An overall pass accuracy rate of 90% is impressive.

Next up, we have an expected threat (xT) map showing the threat created by the player, along with the passes that generate the most threat. This will be followed by his aerial duel map, defensive actions map, post-recovery pass map, and ball-loss map, including instances where those losses lead to opposition chances.

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Following last night’s updates that Liverpool are among the clubs interested in signing Paris Saint-Germain winger Ibrahim Mbaye, it feels like the right time to analyse the player in detail to get an idea of his profile and the sort of addition he would be to Andoni Iraola’s team.

The Senegal international was previously linked with RB Leipzig, while Bayer Leverkusen remain in the race for his signature, even though reports suggest that the player would prefer a move to Anfield if the Reds make a concrete offer.

Mbaye moved to the PSG youth academy in 2018, when he was 10 years old. He progressed through the various age groups before making his first-team debut during the 2024/25 season. The 18-year-old has made only 33 Ligue 1 appearances (just over 1,300 minutes), so he remains a young prospect with fewer than 2,000 minutes of playing time in the French top flight.

Hence, the reported asking price of around £30-40 million feels about right, given the current state of the market. His performances at the World Cup, where he impressed whenever he was given the opportunity, have almost certainly added a few million to that valuation.

Below, we have a bar chart looking at his percentile ranks among Ligue 1 forwards and wingers for the 2025/26 season. He played 997 league minutes last season (24 appearances, 10 starts).

Looking at that chart, it gives us the impression that Mbaye is more of an orthodox winger than a wide forward. He is a right-footed winger who is comfortable operating on both flanks. So far, for PSG, he has played 18 games as a right winger and 10 as a left winger in all competitions.

Even while playing for a possession-dominant side, the 18-year-old’s shot volume is below 2.5 per 90, which is reflected in his team-adjusted percentile rank. In terms of chance creation, he ranks above the 70th percentile for expected assists, open-play chances created, and crosses attempted into the box. With close to five dribbles attempted per 90, he is also a high-volume dribbler. This is the area of the game where he is very good.

When it comes to carries, he loves driving with the ball and ranks in the 95th percentile for average progressive carry distance per 90.

What does he prefer doing after a carry? Well, the answer is clear. His percentile rank for chance-ending carries is much higher than for shot-ending carries, which ties back to his overall profile as a winger.

Right, we have a good idea of the player now, haven’t we? Let’s dive deeper by looking at some event data visuals to understand the areas where he performs his key actions and how Liverpool could use him if they get the deal over the line. We will be looking at his event data from Ligue 1 matches during the 2025/26 season.

Starting with the touch map.

Mbaye spent more than 60% of his playing time on the right wing last season, which is reflected in the touch map above. As a right-footed winger playing on the right, it is natural for him to hug the touchline and attack the byline far more often than an inverted winger in the same position.

You can see from the touch map that, even when the Senegal international plays on the left, he still tends to hold the width and attack the byline instead of constantly cutting inside and operating more like a left-sided number 10.

We will look at more event data visuals to understand whether he has an angle bias to his game, that is, whether he prefers to shift the ball onto his stronger foot (right) most of the time.

We start doing that by looking at the type of runs he makes before receiving the ball in the final third or beyond.

Regardless of whether Mbaye plays alongside an orthodox number nine (Gonçalo Ramos) or a more fluid nine like Ousmane Dembélé, PSG’s wingers are given the freedom to be flexible with their movements in the final third.

However, in keeping with the 18-year-old’s profile as a winger, he prefers making runs away from goal towards the byline before receiving progressive passes. When playing on the right, he does not yet show a consistent tendency to make those out-to-in runs to attack the far post and get shots away. That said, he is still only 18 and has plenty of time to develop, add more variety to his game, and expand his off-the-ball movement.

Next up, we will look at his take-on map (dribbling), followed by what he does after completing a take-on, his carrying tendencies, chance creation map and shot map.

We will also compare him with Yan Diomandé, another right-footed right winger Liverpool were interested in signing earlier in the window, to understand how similar or different the two profiles are.

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After being linked with him for several weeks, it now seems like Arsenal will get the Bruno Guimarães deal over the line. The Gunners have been active in the midfield market, having missed out on Sandro Tonali and seemingly fallen out of the race for Ayyoub Bouaddi. Securing Guimarães would be a major coup for them as they look to keep their squad competitive and on its toes during their Premier League title defence.

The market is in a crazy place right now, and Arsenal are ‘reportedly’ set to pay around £80m to sign the 28-year-old from Newcastle United. For a 28-year-old midfielder with only two years left on his current deal at St James’ Park, that sounds like an overpayment on the Gunners’ part.

But we have seen Elliot Anderson go for more than £110m and Tonali for around £100m. Given the experience and quality Guimarães offers, regardless of his contract situation at Newcastle (plus the fact he had a £100m release clause in his contract that expired in June), paying around that figure had to be the ballpark.

Last season, Mikel Arteta had Christian Nørgaard as a backup midfield option, presumably to provide cover and rest for either Martin Zubimendi or Declan Rice in the deeper-lying midfield roles. Instead, the former Brentford captain played just 101 minutes of Premier League football (309 in the Champions League, although none beyond the round of 16). There were even games in which Myles Lewis-Skelly was preferred in midfield ahead of Nørgaard. So, letting him join Everton was the right decision.

By signing Guimarães, the Premier League champions would significantly upgrade both the quality and depth of their midfield department. Arsenal could field any two of Rice, Zubimendi and Guimarães in the two central midfield positions without becoming weaker with any combination.

However, there is also the question of adding something different to the mix, and that is exactly what the new signing would bring to the current midfield setup. The Brazilian’s profile differs slightly from those of Rice and Zubimendi. How? Let’s dive into the data.

We will start by looking at their percentile ranks among Premier League midfielders during the 2025/26 season to establish a basic understanding before taking a deeper look through the event data visuals.

• Looking at the passing and chance creation numbers, although Guimarães offers slightly less control in terms of pass completion, he attempts far more final-third passes while still ranking well for both final-third pass accuracy and through balls. He also comes out ahead of Rice and Zubimendi for chances created from open play.

• Rice, as expected, posts excellent carrying numbers, but Guimarães offers a little more when it comes to carries that directly create a chance. Overall, the Brazilian would add a greater creative dimension on the ball compared to what Arsenal had in midfield last season.

• Defensively, there is not much to separate the three in terms of tackling, but Rice and Zubimendi excel at reading the game and making key interceptions. Guimarães, by comparison, is more of a midfield dueller, reflecting the man-to-man defensive approach Eddie Howe implemented, particularly in central areas.

• Whether the Brazilian can evolve that side of his game to suit the way Arteta wants his midfielders to anticipate counter-attacks and make crucial interceptions remains to be seen.

The differences in their profiles are clear from the percentile chart above. We can dive further into these by looking at the event visuals, starting with the touch maps.

In a double pivot last season, Rice typically started on the left, while Zubimendi operated on the right. Looking at their touch maps in the opposition half, there is a clear demarcation in the areas they occupied (half-spaces).

In their own half, both remain fairly central rather than drifting towards the touchline to support the full-backs in possession. That is largely because Arteta’s system is more reserved, with the full-backs not always bombing forward in possession.

The left-back instead inverts into midfield, which explains why Rice’s touch map in his own half contains some actions on the left-hand side. The right-back pushes forward only when Arsenal establish comfortable possession.

As for Guimarães, he operated as the right-sided number eight in a 4-3-3 for Newcastle, with the freedom to be less rigid positionally and join attacks whenever required. That is clearly reflected in his touch map above.

Next up, pass maps.

Of Guimarães’ completed passes, 41% ended in the final third or the opposition penalty area. By comparison, Rice recorded 32% and Zubimendi 26%. That aligns with what we discussed earlier when looking at their percentile ranks.

Guimarães is more attack-minded, not only in terms of his positioning but also because he was given greater freedom to attempt riskier passes or those designed to break open the opposition (and he is capable of doing that), rather than simply recycling possession and leaving the creative work to others.

Despite that, his overall pass completion rate is not far behind what Rice and Zubimendi recorded last season.

Up next, we will look at the chance creation maps (from open play), followed by the progressive carry maps, ball recoveries, post-recovery pass maps, and finally the average distance each player covered before receiving a pass and before making a defensive action.

Together, these would add further layers to the differences between their profiles.

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As much as it was a shock to find out that Eddie Howe has effectively handed in his resignation just after the start of pre-season (or maybe it was handed in before and the club took time to find their replacement before announcing it), the setbacks Newcastle United have suffered in the transfer market (both in terms of keeping key players and losing out on key targets) might have meant that the Englishman did not have it in him to rebuild a team from scratch after losing a chunk of his core over the last 12 months: Alexander Isak to Liverpool, Sandro Tonali to Tottenham Hotspur and Bruno Guimarães to Arsenal (and let’s not even get into the plethora of missed transfers).

It is time to look ahead for the Magpies, with the Al-Ahli and former RB Salzburg manager Matthias Jaissle now set to take over the role. The German, who played for seven years at Hoffenheim (2007-2014), began his coaching career as an assistant to Alexander Zorniger at Brøndby in 2017. A year later, he joined RB Salzburg’s U18 team as a coach.

In 2021, he became the manager of FC Liefering (the feeder club to RB Salzburg). From the start of the 2021/22 season until the end of the 2022/23 season, he was the manager of Salzburg, succeeding Jesse Marsch. They won the league title in both campaigns.

By then, it was clear which system the 38-year-old had graduated through and what his coaching philosophy would be based on: the Red Bull style of a combination of zonal and man-to-man pressing, a narrow shape and fast movement of the ball from back to front.

From the start of the 2023/24 season, Jaissle took over an Al-Ahli side that had just been promoted from the second division. It came following their first-ever relegation from the top flight in the 2021/22 season, which was the result of a combination of things going wrong both inside and outside the dressing room.

Under Jaissle, Al-Ahli have finished third, fifth and third in their three full Saudi Pro League seasons, with their 2025/26 points tally increasing by 14 points from the 67 they recorded in the 2024/25 campaign. They also won the AFC Champions League for the first time in the 2024/25 season before successfully defending the title a year later.

Expected Goal (xG) Trend for 24/25 and 25/26: Al-Ahli

Below, we look at the numbers behind the Saudi side under their German manager to see what patterns emerge, while also looking at their relative numbers from the 2025/26 season to forecast what Newcastle fans can expect from a Jaissle-coached team.

We start by looking at the expected goal trend for the 24/25 and 25/26 seasons (league games).

At the start of the 2024/25 season, Al-Ahli lost four of their first nine league games before going on a five-game winning streak. The close gap between xG created and xG conceded reflects their slow start to the campaign. From November onwards, however, the xG creation line stayed above the concession line. The only time the two came close again was after April, when they lost two of their final four league games to finish fifth.

The 2025/26 season tells a different story. The xG creation line consistently stayed well clear of the concession line, reflecting an excellent campaign overall and a 14-point improvement on the previous season.

Overall, barring a slow start to the 2024/25 season, the xG trend depicts a side that has remained consistent over the past season and a half under Matthias Jaissle.

The most-used formations in each season are also noted in the visual. The 4-2-3-1 takes clear precedence, with inverted wingers (Riyad Mahrez [left-footed] on the right and Galeno [right-footed] on the left) supporting Ivan Toney up front (talking about the 25/26 season in terms of personnel). A pictorial depiction of that is shown below.

At times, the same shape can be moulded into a 4-4-1-1 when the wingers are asked to do a more disciplined job defensively. This then leaves the number 10 operating almost as a second striker, becoming the sole outlet in transition before the wingers join the attack.

All of the above discussed is in keeping with the narrow structure typically deployed by Red Bull coaches, combining high-intensity pressing out of possession with quick counter-attacks.

Stats for 24/25 & 25/26 plus league ranks

Next up, we have tables looking at Al-Ahli’s numbers across the 2024/25 and 2025/26 league campaigns combined and how they ranked among the ever-present teams in the Saudi Pro League over that period. The numbers are split into separate offensive and defensive tables.

These offensive numbers are symbolic of a team that finishes between third and fifth in the league. Over the two-season period, they ranked third for goals scored, xG created and big chances created, while being fourth for shots attempted and touches in the opposition box. The only metric in which they ranked first was the average quality of chances created (denoted by xG per shot).

For a team that plays a high-pressing system with a high defensive line (we will discuss the latter in the next section), the defensive numbers have also been impressive over the two-season period. They ranked first for goals conceded, average quality of chances conceded and big chances allowed. They were second for xG conceded and third for opposition touches in the box and final-third entries allowed. Their average of around 10 shots conceded per game meant they still allowed a fair number of attempts (for a top-five side), although not many were of high quality.

Considering that Al-Ahli’s squad value was fourth in the league at the start of the 2024/25 campaign and second at the start of 2025/26, these numbers and league finishes (fifth and third respectively, with a significant points improvement in the latter) suggest that the underlying numbers and relative rankings were in line with the quality of the squad.

This indicates that Jaissle can get his team performing at a level consistent with its squad value. They did not overperform, but equally they did not underperform, the latter being key when judging a manager’s work with a team over a prolonged period.

Next up, we have the AFC Champions League winner’s offensive, defensive, pressing style and possession metrics from the 2025/26 season, comparing them with what Newcastle produced in the Premier League during the same campaign.

This should give us an understanding of how different an Eddie Howe team can be from a Matthias Jaissle team, even though they play in different leagues. We will, of course, add the necessary caveats before jumping to any conclusions. The aim is to understand what changes in style Newcastle fans can expect during the 2026/27 season.

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If we believe the current direction of travel, Bradley Barcola (23) will end up at Liverpool by the end of this transfer window, while Yan Diomandé (19) will head to Real Madrid. Both deals will comfortably be worth over €100m, with Barcola’s valuation (currently €170m, as quoted by Paris Saint-Germain) higher than what Madrid may end up paying for Diomandé. I know Liverpool will not pay Barcola’s asking price, but I would not be surprised if the French international ends up commanding the higher transfer fee after all.

I know the market does not make sense. A player after one full season of Bundesliga football is set to go for more than €100m, while another player, who admittedly has more experience (128 appearances in Ligue 1 for Lyon and PSG), but played a backup role in PSG’s triumphant 2025/26 season, is being labelled as a €150m+ asset.

Regardless of the inflation, though, both Barcola (France international) and Diomandé (Ivory Coast international) would have commanded relatively high transfer fees. Why, you ask? Because they are elite players in their positions, and wingers and forwards tend to cost more because they make the difference in a low-scoring sport (although even midfielders are going for huge fees these days).

Their percentile ranks against Europe’s top wingers and forwards during the 2025/26 season give us a glimpse of how good they are.

Output-wise, this was not Barcola’s best season (his best came in 2024/25). Yet, the French international still ranks highly across most shooting, chance creation and carrying metrics, with a particular emphasis on shot-ending carries.

Diomandé, in his first full season of first-team football (following half a season at Leganés the previous campaign), posted excellent numbers in chance creation and carrying.

He has, to be fair, significantly overperformed his expected goals despite relatively low shooting numbers. I would class that as something likely to even out over the coming seasons. The combination of his high chance creation and carrying numbers, particularly those that end in chance creation, suggests he would still contribute plenty even if his goalscoring performance regresses towards the mean.

Looking at just one season’s worth of data is not enough to identify the similarities and differences in the profiles of these two players. So, what I have done is feed two seasons of data into the pipeline to analyse them and draw clearer conclusions about what they are like as wingers and what Liverpool and Real Madrid would eventually get as players (bearing in mind that they are still young and have room for growth).

We are looking at Barcola’s numbers across the 2024/25 and 2025/26 seasons for PSG, and Diomandé’s numbers for Leganés in 2024/25 and Leipzig in 2025/26 (league numbers only).

We start with the touch maps.

Over the last two seasons, Barcola has played more than 70% of his games on the left wing and around 15% on the right. We can tell from the touch map that, although he can hold the width on the left, he records more touches around the edge of the box and inside the penalty area, either by making out-to-in runs without the ball or by cutting inside with it. He can also get to the byline when required.

Diomandé played around 70% of the time on the right for Leipzig, while starting predominantly on the left during his brief spell at Leganés. As a right-footed player, the natural tendency is to hold the width more when operating on the right and attack the byline more often than when playing on the opposite flank. The encouraging thing, which we will explore in more detail later, is that the 19-year-old does not appear to have an angle bias. He is equally willing to come inside, both with and without the ball.

Next up, the nature of runs made before receiving the ball in the final third or beyond.

This can be team-dependent as well, but the natural tendencies of a player also come into effect when we are looking at two seasons’ worth of data.

Compared to Barcola’s 32% of runs ending inside the box, Diomandé has just 13%. This highlights the directness in the former’s game when making off-the-ball runs in the attacking third. Even when playing on the left, the latter prefers holding the width rather than making box-crashing runs.

So, it is not surprising that Barcola takes more shots and is more of a goalscoring winger, whereas Diomandé is more of a supporting-cast winger who will score goals but is happier making most of his actions outside the box.

Next up, we have the chance creation maps, followed by take-on maps, post-take-on action maps, progressive carry maps and shot maps, which will help us understand the similarities/differences in their attacking profiles.

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With Real Madrid aiming to sign Yan Diomandé (it would be a difficult deal, but one they appear likely to complete) while also looking to extend Vinícius Júnior’s contract, they already boast an abundance of attacking talent. Alongside Vinícius are Kylian Mbappé, Arda Güler, Franco Mastantuono (whose future is also uncertain) and the currently injured Rodrygo. As a result, it is understandable why there are rumours that José Mourinho may not fancy Endrick. That decision is likely to be made once the Brazilian returns for pre-season following his involvement at the World Cup.

If I were Endrick (20), looking at the options Madrid already have, even if Diomandé does not arrive, there is a strong case for pushing for either a permanent move during this transfer window or another season-long loan following an encouraging spell at Lyon during the second half of the 2025/26 season.

Madrid signed the Brazil international from Palmeiras in the summer of 2024 after he enjoyed a terrific Série A campaign in 2023, scoring 11 goals in 31 appearances as a 17-year-old, while also impressing in the 2024 Copa Libertadores.

He played only 863 minutes in all competitions during his first season in the Spanish capital, which was understandable for a young player arriving from Brazil. In the first half of the 2025/26 season, he featured for just 100 minutes before joining Lyon on loan during the January transfer window.

Below, we analyse Endrick’s numbers from an impressive half-season in Ligue 1, while also breaking down his profile in detail to understand why clubs should take a chance on him if Real Madrid are not prepared to offer him regular game time in the near future.

We begin with his percentile ranks against Ligue 1 wingers and forwards from the 2025/26 season, highlighting both how he performed overall and the areas of his game in which he already excels despite his young age.

• Endrick played just over 1,200 league minutes, starting 10 games as a right winger and five as a striker. Aside from a below-par expected goal performance (something that can improve over time), he was one of Ligue 1’s standout forwards during the second half of the 2025/26 campaign.

• He is certainly not shy about shooting and still produced a respectable goal return despite a relatively low conversion rate. Among the 51 forwards and wingers who played over 1,200 league minutes last season, he ranked 43rd for shot-to-goal conversion rate.

• The creative numbers are particularly impressive. Although his 0.52 assists per 90 overperformed his expected assists (xA) by 0.28, an xA figure of 0.24 per 90 is still impressive when viewed in the context of the league. His open play chance creation and dribbling numbers were also very strong.

• His carrying numbers are above average, with a greater emphasis on carries that end with a shot rather than creating a chance for a team-mate. That aligns well with his profile as a high shot-volume forward, even when deployed on the right wing. He also ranked in the 95th percentile among Ligue 1 forwards for final-third ball recoveries (1.1 per 90).

Next, we examine his profile through event data visualisations to understand the areas of the pitch he likes to operate in and where he is most effective.

Starting with the touch map.

The 20-year-old started 10 games on the right wing and only five as a striker. Even when deployed as a striker, he operated in a front two system, meaning his focus of operation remained heavily towards the right-hand side.

When starting from a wide position, he preferred to hold the width before cutting inside onto his favoured left foot. As a result, there is limited activity close to the byline, with his attacking actions generally occurring in the right half-space and right-centre areas.

Next up, we analyse his runs made before receiving the ball in the final third and beyond.

If we focus on the runs starting from the wide right position, they are typical out-to-in movements that inverted wingers make regularly. We saw similar patterns from Mohamed Salah and Sadio Mané during their peak years at Liverpool.

Although the proportion of runs ending inside the box is relatively low, the intention behind them is clear, with most runs consistently aimed towards crashing the box. I identified only three runs that went against this tendency, where he moved away from goal and towards the byline.

Next, we examine his take-on map, his actions after completing a take-on, carry map, his expected threat (xT) per zone contribution from passes and crosses, and his shot map.

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As we get closer to the start of the Premier League season (still four weeks away, but getting closer), post-World Cup transfer activity is starting to kick into gear for many teams.

Among the three teams in focus for this article (Liverpool, Chelsea and Arsenal), Chelsea have been the most active over the past week. They signed Morgan Rogers out of nowhere (he was destined for Arsenal) while also completing a deal to bolster their central defence with the signing of Maxence Lacroix (26).

Paris Saint-Germain’s Illia Zabarnyi (23) has been offered to both Chelsea and Liverpool, while Arsenal have Ezri Konsa (28) as their top defensive target this summer to cover for the potential long-term absence of William Saliba.

This article focuses on the data-led profiling of the three centre-backs who have been in the news over the past few days. With one deal already completed, we will look at the numbers to see what Chelsea are getting in Lacroix, while also diving into what Zabarnyi and Konsa could offer, provided they complete their moves in the coming days.

We start with a percentile radar chart to see where the three rank across key metrics compared to central defenders in Europe’s top four leagues during the 2025/26 season.

• In raw terms, Zabarnyi’s passing volumes (open-play and final-third passes) are exceptionally high, largely because he played for a side that averaged close to 69% possession last season. Once the data are possession-adjusted to account for team dominance (and league average), Konsa’s open-play pass attempts rank notably high in percentile terms. He also ranks in the 98th percentile for overall pass accuracy, with Zabarnyi performing impressively in that metric as well (secure passers).

• Of the three, the PSG defender ranks highest for both overall carries and average progressive distance covered per carry. Konsa recorded solid returns in these metrics last season. In contrast, Lacroix ranks relatively low for carrying volume, largely owing to his role in the centre of a back three at Crystal Palace (more of a covering defender).

• When evaluating ground defending metrics, Zabarnyi edges out the other two by a comfortable margin. Konsa remains one of Europe’s top performers for winning ground duels (the 50-50s on the turf), whereas Lacroix boasts a far superior aerial profile in both duel volume and win rate. All three are well below the elite level in terms of aerial duel win rate.

• Contesting fewer than two aerial duels per 90 is exceptionally low for Konsa, particularly given the current nature of the Premier League. Zabarnyi has similarly low aerial duel volume dating back to his time in England, although his win rate at Bournemouth (over 60%) was noticeably higher than during his first season at PSG (below 60%).

Next up, we further profile these players using event data visuals. We start with the touch maps.

Konsa and Zabarnyi played in the same position for their respective teams: right-sided centre-back in a back four. The difference is that the latter played for a far more possession-dominant side, hence the hot spot of touches five yards inside the opposition half. He also covered much more ground in wide areas, chiefly when the right-back ventured forward, and any resulting counter-attack needed to be dealt with.

Lacroix, as mentioned in the percentile section, played in the centre of a back three and, hence, has a more central touch map, operating as more of a sweeper-type centre-back. He could be particularly useful if Xabi Alonso reverts to his tried-and-tested 3-4-2-1 system during his first season at Chelsea.

Next up, pass maps.

• Zabarnyi’s pass map is in keeping with how PSG’s centre-backs operate under Luis Enrique in possession. The emphasis is on retaining possession rather than attempting risky passes consistently (that is the job of other players in the team). As a result, the Ukrainian’s pass map is a little more predictable. His long-pass proportion halved during his first season there compared to the more vertical nature of his passing at Bournemouth previously.

• Konsa’s passing success rate being close to Zabarnyi’s, despite being more versatile with his passing (more vertical and distributed towards both sides of the pitch despite starting on the right), highlights just how good the England international was on the ball for Villa last season.

• Lacroix played for a counter-attacking side in Crystal Palace, who did not always dominate possession. As a result, there is a much greater emphasis on playing long. His long-pass proportion is almost double that of Konsa’s last season. There are also more box-ending passes, either from open play or the second phases of set-pieces. With that in mind, it is understandable that his pass success rate was below 90%. Can he improve that now that he is moving to Chelsea? It is certainly one to watch.

Next up, we have the aerial duel maps (covering both offensive and defensive aerial duels), followed by the defensive action map and post-recovery pass map. We end by looking at the similar player table to find the centre-backs most similar to the three players covered in this article (using the Cosine similarity model built by me, a new addition to the Transfer Hub).

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