You are conducting a motorized security patrol along a designated route in order to locate and provide early warning of enemy activity in your sector. The other platoons of your company are performing similar missions to the north and south of you and can reinforce you in about 30 minutes. You are instructed not to get decisively engaged. Attack helicopters are on-call and can arrive on station in about 20 minutes.

At Checkpoint 73, you spot an enemy column about two kilometers to the south, moving north on Rte. 12. You count 8 vehicles—five armored cars with 23mm guns and three 6-wheeled vehicles with73mm guns. You estimate it will arrive at Checkpoint 73 within 10 minutes.

You anticipate that the enemy column will head east from Checkpoint 73, so you set your vehicles in an ambush east of the stream on Hills 124, 114 and 116.

After 20 minutes there is no sign of the enemy. You receive word via radio that the gunship support you requested has been diverted to 2nd Platoon, which is in contact with another enemy element while performing a similar mission farther north.

You decide to go forward on foot to see what you can learn. With the fire team from Vehicle 13, armed with two AT-4s, you wade across the stream and move through the woods to the edge of the clearing near Checkpoint 73. From there, you’re able to spot a pair of enemy scout cars at the far side of the clearing where Route 60 enters the woods. You spot one of the 73mm wheeled light tanks tucked into the tree line farther south.

From the radio traffic, it sounds like 2nd Platoon is getting into a pretty good fight.

After a couple of minutes, you make out a third scout car tucked into the tree line to your right front about 300m away. Then you spot a pair of 73s detach from the tree line on the east side of the clearing, near Hill 119, and start cutting diagonally northwest across the clearing.

What do you do now, lieutenant?

Requirement

In a time limit of three minutes, post the combat orders you will issue and any reports or requests you will make. Then provide a rationale for your decision.

This is a reminder that we have a TDG this Saturday, August 15th at 11am eastern. This event is open to everyone, regardless of military experience.

If you have not already, it is not too late to sign up! Use the Google form before end of day Friday, and we will add you to the invite: https://forms.gle/f4kxKWD8rym2aNg96

For those who have already signed up, expect an email to your inboxes shortly. Leave a comment below to let others know you will be there!

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We are pleased to announce a live Tactical Decision Game (TDG) on Saturday August 15th at 11am eastern. This event will be hosted by John Schmitt, author of MCDP1 Warfighting, Mastering Tactics, and all the TDGs you see here at Warfighters.

This TDG is open to EVERYONE, regardless of experience or rank. Paid subscribers get priority, but there might be enough slots for everyone, so do not be dissuaded from signing up even as we get closer to the event. Here is the sign-up link:

https://forms.gle/f4kxKWD8rym2aNg96

Doing a live TDG is a rather different experience from doing one on Substack. The engagement, camaraderie, the time pressure…all of it combines to make a unique learning experience unlike any other. We hope to see you there!

You are conducting a motorized security patrol along a designated route in order to locate and provide intelligence/early warning of enemy activity in your sector. Your independent mission gives you wide latitude in how you accomplish it. Your orders require you to gather intelligence and provide early warning of enemy activity, but they do not require you to provide physical protection for the main body, although you can engage the enemy at your own discretion. The other platoons of your company are performing similar missions to the north and south of you and can reinforce you in about 30 minutes. You are instructed not to get decisively engaged. Attack helicopters are on-call and can arrive on station in about 20 minutes. You are traveling west along Route 12, approaching Checkpoint 73.

At Checkpoint 73, you spot an enemy column about two kilometers to the south, moving north on Rte. 12. You count 8 vehicles—five armored cars with 23mm guns and three 6-wheeled vehicles with73mm guns. You estimate it will arrive at Checkpoint 73 within 10 minutes.

You anticipate that the enemy column will head east from Checkpoint 73, and you decide to ambush it in the area east of the stream, with 1st Section on the west side of Hill 114, 2nd Section on the western slope of Hill 124, and the assault guns in the saddle between Hills 114 and 116. You position the dismounted scouts in the tree lines with AT4s. You back the vehicles into full defilade on the rear slope with instructions to quickly occupy firing positions and initiate the ambush on your command. You are positioned with Vehicle 13’s scout team where you can observe the kill zone.

After 20 minutes there is no sign of the enemy. You receive word via radio that the gunship support you requested has been diverted to the platoon farther north, which is in contact with another enemy element while performing a similar mission. You decide to go forward on foot to see what you can learn. With the fire team from Vehicle 13, you ford the stream and move through the woods to the edge of the clearing near Checkpoint 73. From there you’re able to spot a pair of enemy scout cars at the far side of the clearing where Route 60 enters the woods. You spot one of the 73mm wheeled light tanks tucked into the tree line farther south. You cannot locate any of the additional enemy vehicles. From the radio traffic, it sounds like 2nd Platoon is in a pretty good fight farther north.

What do you do now, lieutenant?

Requirement

In a time limit of three minutes, post the combat orders you will issue and any reports or requests you will make. Then provide a rationale for your decision.

You are conducting a motorized security patrol along a designated route in order to locate and provide intelligence/early warning of enemy activity in your sector. Your independent mission gives you wide latitude in how you accomplish it. Your orders require you to gather intelligence and provide early warning of enemy activity, but they do not require you to provide physical protection for the main body, although you can engage the enemy at your own discretion. The other platoons of your company are performing similar missions to the north and south of you and can reinforce you in about 30 minutes. You are instructed not to get decisively engaged. Attack helicopters are on-call and can arrive on station in about 20 minutes.

At Checkpoint 73, you spot an enemy column about two kilometers to the south, moving north on Rte. 12. You count 8 vehicles—five armored cars with 23mm guns and three 6-wheeled vehicles with73mm guns.

You anticipate that the enemy column will head east from Checkpoint 73, and you decide to ambush it in the area east of the stream, with 1st Section on the west side of Hill 114, 2nd Section on the western slope of Hill 124, and the assault guns in the saddle between Hills 114 and 116. You position the dismounted scouts in the tree lines with AT4s. You back the vehicles into full defilade on the rear slope with instructions to quickly occupy firing positions and initiate the ambush on your command. You are positioned with Vehicle 13’s scout team where you can observe the kill zone.

After what seems like an eternity, the enemy arrives. You spot a couple of scout cars at the bridge. They inch across, hugging the tree line south of the road. They pause. Two more scout cars appear on the bridge “Keep coming,” you say to yourself.”

Just then, the Vehicle 22 commander reports dismounted movement in the woods to his west. Seconds later your platoon sergeant reports: “2nd Section now engaging enemy infantry, estimate squad to platoon strength, in the woods 100m due west.”

What do you do, lieutenant?

Requirement

In a time limit of three minutes, post the combat orders you will issue and any reports or requests you will make. Then provide a rationale for your decision.

Day‑to‑day duty provides no time to practice the act of giving orders. Service absorbs attention and must be managed with due regard to its own nature. No one should therefore neglect to set himself tactical problems at home, on the map, and then write out the orders or directives as if for real operations. It is striking to watch how many corrections one makes at once, and how many more suggest themselves later, once problem and order have lain aside for a time.

Later:

Orders whose transmission may face changing conditions, or whose execution may unfold in circumstances that one cannot foresee, must avoid detail. In such cases the directive takes the place of a full order. The directive states the aim and leaves the choice of means open. Orders that reach far ahead in time and descend into particulars almost never see full execution.

And:

One thing stands firm: we raise independent, active, and responsibility‑loving subalterns only when we avoid constricting them and instead grant them free movement within the frame we set. Guided well, that freedom will never grow into the arbitrariness that Paragraph 276 of the Infantry Training Regulations rightly condemns.

To strip a subordinate of rightful independence is to rob him of the joy of service and action. It drains his interest and shrivels the seed of all vitality in his work.

This speaks directly to our objective here at “ShadowBox Decision Games: Warfighters.” Great stuff.

The division has gone into an operational pause and has established defensive positions some 10 kilometers east of the map, with plans to resume the offensive, attacking west within the next week. For the last two weeks, your company has been operating in the contested zone known as the security area forward of the main battle positions, where you are conducting armed reconnaissance and screening missions. It is not uncommon to make contact with enemy forces performing similar missions. Your mission for the day is to conduct a motorized security patrol along a designated route in order to locate and provide intelligence/early warning of enemy activity in your sector. Your independent mission gives you wide latitude in how you accomplish it. Your orders require you to gather intelligence and provide early warning of enemy activity, but they do not require you to provide physical protection for the main body, although you can engage the enemy at your own discretion as long as you do not become decisively engaged. The other platoons of your company are performing similar missions to the north and south of you and can reinforce you in about 30 minutes. Attack helicopters are on-call and can arrive on station in about 20 minutes.

Your route will take you west along Rte. 12 to Checkpoint 73 and then south past Checkpoint 41 for 10 kilometers before returning east to friendly positions. As you move west toward Checkpoint 73, you come to a stream that you determine would be easily fordable even if there were no bridge. Your section moves forward toward Checkpoint 73 while 2nd Section and the Assault Gun Section remain in overwatch. At Checkpoint 73, Rte. 12 turns south into a large opening that extends south and west for several kilometers. You dismount and move forward to have a look. About 1500 meters south on Rte. 12 you spot an enemy column moving north. You count 8 vehicles so far, which you can positively identify—five armored cars with 23mm guns and three 6-wheeled vehicles with 73mm guns. They seem to be moving in a staggered column. At this rate you estimate they will arrive in less than 10 minutes. It is 1700 hours.

What do you do, lieutenant?

Requirement

In a time limit of four minutes, provide the combat orders you will issue and any reports or requests you will make. Then provide a rationale for your decision.

You are to occupy the assembly area south of Hamlet in preparation for the morning attack across the river commencing at 0500.You are moving west toward the assembly area as shown, with the scout platoon reconnoitering the route ahead of you.

At 1945, your scout platoon commander reports enemy infantry occupying your assembly area in strength. He estimates the size of the enemy force to be at least a company. Further, he reports he has just linked up with an allied reconnaissance team that was operating west of the river but has been forced east across the river under fire. The reconnaissance team leader reports there is no sign of friendly forces holding the river line or the bridge and that enemy forces have been moving across the bridge for at least 30 minutes, including tanks within the last 10-15 minutes. This is all the information your scout commander can tell you.

Just then, you hear the sound of machinegun fire coming from the direction of your scout platoon.

What will you do?

Requirement

Within a five-minute time limit, give your solution in the form of the fragmentary order you will issue to your subordinates and any reports or requests you will make to higher headquarters. Then provide an explanation of your decision.

You have arrived at the extraction point and are holding final defensive positions while the rest of the detachment embarks on the first LSM. 1st and 3rd Squads are engaging the enemy force as it advances along Route 1. Meanwhile, 2nd Squad now reports four vehicles cresting Hill 18 along Route 17 on the southern side of the peninsula.

The detachment commander reports that the rest of the detachment is embarked on the first LSM, which is pushing back.He orders you to break contact and load up on the remaining LSM.Both LSMs are able to support you with their 30mm cannons.

What do you do?

Requirement

In a time limit of three minutes, make you decision in the form of any orders you will issue and/or reports or requests you will make. Then provide an explanation of your rationale.

The previous night, you sent 1st Squad on a foot patrol to Hill 28 to be in position at dawn to capture two persons who have been spotted there on successive days observing the battery position should they return. 2nd and 3rd Squads occupied positions on the perimeter.

At 0620 this morning, the missile battery launches a salvo of missiles, which is the signal to immediately begin the displacement procedure to avoid counterbattery fire. But just then, 1st Squad breaks radio silence to report it has engaged a hostile paramilitary force of 10 vehicles with machineguns and mortars that seems to be assembling between Hills 22 and 24 for an attack on the battery position. The squad leader requests fire from the mortar section.

On your recommendation, the detachment commander opts to displace west on Route Bulldog rather than east on Route Tiger as planned. You instruct the mortars to fire one mission before displacing with the rest of the detachment. After one kilometer, it is to drop off from the column to establish a firing position to support your platoon.

You double-time 2nd and 3rd Squads on foot to establish a battle position on Hill 21 to support 1st Squad (and to get out of the immediate impact zone of the expected counterbattery fire). 1st Squad reports that it has inflicted casualties on the enemy mortar section, which had returned to its vehicle and withdrawn east out of sight. You arrive at Hill 21 to see the two enemy machinegun vehicles engaging 1st Squad from the eastern slope of Hill 22. Meanwhile, the remaining seven or eight enemy vehicles disappear behind Hill 22, heading northwest toward Route Buckeye. It has now been 10 minutes since the missile launch.

What do you do?

Requirement

In a time limit of three minutes, make your decision in the form of any orders you will issue and/or reports or requests you will make. Then provide an explanation of your rationale.

To augment its limited supplies, the detachment has contracted with the local village, some five kilometers northeast up the coast, for support. Hills 21, 22 and 28 are all registered targets (A21, A22 and A28 respectively) for the attached mortars.

Standing operating procedure (SOP) calls for the detachment to displace immediately upon missile launch to avoid counterbattery fire. Two additional positions have been reconnoitered and planned, one via Route Tiger and the other via Route Irish. The signal to immediately begin the displacement procedure is the missile launch itself.

You have sent 1st Squad on a foot patrol to Hill 28 to be in position at dawn to capture two persons who have been spotted there on successive days observing your battery position should they return. 2nd and 3rd Squads remain in position on the perimeter around the battery.

At 0620 the following day, the missile battery launches a salvo of missiles, which is the signal to immediately begin the displacement procedure. The planned displacement on Route Tiger will take you past 1st Squad’s position, so you figure you can pick it up on the way. But just then, 1st Squad breaks radio silence to report it has engaged a hostile force with machineguns and mortars that seemed to be assembling between Hills 22 and 24 for an attack on the battery position. The squad leader requests fire from the mortar section.

The entire detachment is now scrambling to displace before the expected counterfire hits your position within the next 20 minutes or so.

What do you do?

Requirement

In a time limit of three minutes, make you decision in the form of any orders you will issue and/or reports or requests you will make. Then provide an explanation of your rationale.

You are one week into a planned three-week deployment on the island, after which you are to be re-embarked on Navy ships and redeployed. To augment its limited supplies, the detachment has contracted with the local village, some five kilometers northeast up the coast, for support.

The missile battery, mortar section and air defense section are under camouflage netting. The rest of the detachment is concealed in the bamboo woods. The entire detachment observes strict radio silence to avoid detection. Transmission is authorized only in emergencies. Hills 21, 22 and 28 are all registered targets (A21, A22 and A28 respectively) for the mortars.

Standing operating procedure (SOP) calls for the unit to displace immediately upon missile launch to avoid counterbattery fire. Two additional positions have been reconnoitered and planned, the primary via Route Tiger and the secondary via Route Irish. The signal to immediately begin the well-rehearsed displacement procedure is the missile launch itself.

The last two days, two unidentified individuals have been spotted on Hill 28 observing the EAB through binoculars. Both times they fled east by vehicle when a motorized patrol was dispatched to investigate. The commander has decided to dispatch a foot patrol to Hill 28, to be in position by dawn to detain the observers if they return. Your platoon commander assigns the task to your squad

You depart the perimeter after dark and follow a concealed route to a bamboo copse on the south slope of Hill 28. You push an observation post/listening post (OP/LP) forward into the scrub brush on the crest. At 0530, you join the OP/LP yourself. By 0600 the observers have not returned. However, at 0615, as the day breaks, you spot a civilian utility vehicle appear from the east on Route Tiger. It leaves the trail and makes its way slowly up the rugged eastern slope of Hill 22 about 300 meters to your north, stopping short of the crest. Two armed men in paramilitary garb exit the vehicle and move by foot to the crest, where they commence surveillance of the missile position. You are formulating a plan to capture them when you see more movement from the east. You spot a mix of civilian vehicles, 12 in total, also approaching from the east on Route Tiger. In the lead are three civilian pickups, each modified with improvised armor and a machinegun mounted in the bed. Following the pickups are nine utility trucks that could each easily carry a squad, similarly modified. They halt east of Hill 22 while the three gun vehicles make their way slowly up the eastern slope of Hill 22 toward the two observers. Meanwhile, men in regular military uniforms with weapons disembark the last truck and appear to begin setting up five mortars in the tall grass at the roadside.

Just then, you hear a familiar Whoosh! and turn to see four missiles streaking seaward from the base.

What do you do?

Requirement

In a time limit of three minutes, make you decision in the form of any orders you will issue and/or reports or requests you will make. Then provide an explanation of your rationale.

1. How participants understood the mission

2. How participants envisioned defeating the enemy

3. How participants used terrain & combined arms

4. How participants conceptualized tempo, initiative, and risk

Each theme reveals a different instinct about how to fight.

1. Mission Understanding: Guard vs. Destroy

A major divide across all solutions was how participants interpreted the mission.

Theme A: “Guard = Disrupt, Not Destroy”

Some recognized that the mission was to buy time, not conduct a major battle.
These participants focused on:

Delay

Disruption

Hit-and-run ambush

Preserving the company’s freedom of action

Protecting the regiment’s flank

This aligns precisely with MCDP 1-2 Campaigning and guard-mission fundamentals.

Theme B: “Guard = Block & Fight”

Others interpreted the mission as:

• Blocking the enemy’s path

• Standing on key terrain

• Trying to halt the enemy’s forward progress by direct confrontation

This reflects a more attritionist or linear understanding of a guard.

Theme C: “Guard = Destroy the Enemy Battalion”

A minority treated the mission as though it required:

• Total destruction

• Aggressive pursuit

• Attrition through sheer firepower (including unrealistic non-organic assets)

This diverges sharply from maneuver-warfare principles and the actual task.

This divergence in mission interpretation sets the stage for all other differences.

2. Defeat Mechanism: Attrition vs. Systemic Disruption

Another major theme was how participants conceptualized defeating a mechanized column.
Two very different instincts emerged:

Theme A: Systemic Disruption (Maneuver Warfare)

This theme treats the enemy as a system, not a target list.
It aims to collapse functioning—not bodies.

Participants using this lens focused on:

• Chokepoints (e.g., CP 66, the “Y”)

• Striking lead and mid-column vehicles simultaneously

• Creating a traffic jam

• Dislocating enemy C2

• Attacking the logic of the enemy’s movement (not its armor)

This aligns strongly with:

• Marinus (On Defeat Mechanisms)

• Boyd (disruption of tempo & orientation)

• MCDP 1 (avoid enemy strength, attack cohesion)

• MCDP 1-3 (ambush, asymmetry, surprise)

Theme B: Attrition (“Just Kill Them”)

A competing instinct was to:

• Destroy enemy vehicles through sheer firepower

• Mass anti-armor assets for direct killing power

• Fight from static blocking positions

• Slow or halt the enemy via physical destruction rather than dislocation

This reflects:

• Linear, attritionist warfighting

• Treating armor as something to outshoot rather than outmaneuver

• Less appreciation for the value of system paralysis vs. system degradation

Theme C: Unrealistic Firepower Solutions

A few leaned toward:

• CAS

• Thermobarics

• Swarms of lethal drones

These often ignored scenario constraints or bypassed the requirement for tactical decisionmaking with organic assets.

3. Terrain, Geometry, and Combined Arms

Across the solutions, terrain use fell into several patterns reflecting different tactical instincts.

Theme A: Terrain as a Force Multiplier (Maneuverist)

Some saw terrain as:

• A way to create surfaces and gaps

• Key to developing an engagement area

• An enabler of flanking fires and standoff

• A means of shaping the enemy’s movement

This included:

• High-ground TOW positions (Hill 328 series)

• Infantry AT teams in broken ground north of CP 66

• Tanks thrusting into the center of the column

• Fires timed with terrain to channel enemy reaction

This is classical maneuver warfare: terrain used to enhance asymmetry.

Theme B: Terrain as a Fixed Defensive Posture (Linear)

Others used terrain more like:

• Static blocking lines

• Strongpoints

• “Hold this hill” rather than “exploit this hill”

This approach tended to:

• Place TOWs in vulnerable positions

• Keep forces spread evenly without a main effort

• Anchor defense rather than shape battle

Theme C: Overextension Due to Terrain Misjudgment

Some solutions:

• Tried to outrun a mechanized column

• Sent platoons to distant terrain they could not reach first

• Underestimated broken terrain’s effect on movement

• Overestimated their own mobility vs. enemy armor

These solutions misaligned tempo, terrain, and mobility.

4. Tempo, Initiative, and Risk

A final set of themes relates to how participants thought about time, initiative, and risk.

Theme A: “Act Before the Enemy Deploys”

Some explicitly tried to:

• Strike while the enemy was still in column

• Leverage early warning from OPs/UAV

• Maintain tempo advantage

• Execute rapid hit-and-run tactics

This is pure Boyd cycle orientation: change the situation faster than the enemy can adjust.

Theme B: “Stand and Fight”

This theme:

• Waits for the enemy to come

• Hopes to win through positional defense

• Has little emphasis on tempo or rapid transitions

• Treats time as something to survive, not something to weaponize

Theme C: Over-Aggressive Maneuver

Some approaches:

• Tried to envelop or intercept the column deep on its route

• Attempted sweeping flanking movements

• Operated on timing assumptions that are unrealistic given distances and mobility

These plans seized initiative but at the cost of unacceptable risk, especially in a guard mission.

Theme D: Extreme Decentralization Without Coherence

One idea stressed:

• Giving platoons maximum autonomy

• Minimal guidance

But lacked:

• A central defeat mechanism

• A coherent engagement plan

• Clear commander’s intent

This results in initiative without purpose, a recognized failure mode in maneuver warfare (MCDP 6).

The Four Big Insights Across All Themes

If we compress all the cross-cutting patterns into the most important doctrinal insights, they are:

1. Many participants misunderstood the nature of a guard mission.

The doctrinal requirement is disrupt → delay → protect the main body → avoid decisive engagement.
Several plans instead attempted to fight a battle to win rather than a battle to buy time.

2. Systemic disruption outperformed attrition across all successful concepts.

The best ideas:

• attacked chokepoints,

• struck key vehicles,

• collapsed column coherence,

• and immediately repositioned.

This matches Marinus’ observation that disruption-driven defeat occurs at lower cost and higher leverage.

3. Terrain was most effective when used to shape—not anchor—the fight.

High ground, broken terrain, and chokepoints are powerful only when used:

• to create asymmetry,

• not to hold ground.

Static hill-holding tended to yield attrition; dynamic flanking integration produced maneuverist solutions.

4. Tempo and feasibility were often misjudged.

The best ideas respected mechanical reality:

• tanks move slowly off-road,

• mech columns move fast on trails,

• infantry must dismount early in broken terrain.

Less successful ideas were built around wishful timing or unreachable terrain.

What These Themes Reveal About Maneuver Warfare Competency

Some thinkers instinctively grasp maneuver warfare’s core:

• use time as a weapon,

• strike cohesion not mass,

• exploit terrain to create surfaces and gaps,

• avoid playing the enemy’s game,

• and preserve freedom of action.

Others defaulted to attrition or linear maneuver:

• treating hills as fixed defensive points,

• trying to kill enemy armor head-on,

• or relying on heavy fires over tactical integration.

A few revealed faulty assumptions:

• unrealistic CAS,

• overextended maneuver,

• or decentralization without synchronization.

ChatGPT’s knowledge base consisted of:

• MCDP 1, Warfighting

• MCDP 1-2, Campaigning

• MCDP 1-3, Tactics

• MCDP 6, Command and Control

• William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook

• Marinus, The Maneuverist Papers

• Sunzi, The Art of War

You arrive in Engine 1 heading west on Third Avenue. You pull past the residence to the A-B corner to get a look at three sides. Two second-floor rooms on the B (north) side are involved, one of them showing fire and the other showing lots of turbulent, thick, black smoke. Extension to the attic is likely but has not occurred yet.

Engine 2 and Ladder 3 are approaching westbound on Fourth Avenue, in that order.

What are you going to do, lieutenant?

Requirement

In a time limit of 5 minutes, provide in the Comment section:

• Your size-up of the situation.

• Your radio traffic/order for each unit.

• A description of apparatus positions.

• Water supply plan.

Then provide a brief explanation of your rationale.

The regiment is advancing north. Your company is deployed to guard the left flank, about 5-10 kilometers west of the main body. As the regiment advances, your mission is to “advance north on Rte. 110 in order to provide early warning and protect the regiment against enemy forces advancing from the west.” Rte. 110 is a 2-lane paved road. You are approaching Rte. 306, an east-west gravel road. These are are the only improved roads in the area, although the freezing temperatures have kept the unimproved routes trafficable for heavy vehicles.

Bad weather has grounded the planned aviation support, so you put temporary observation posts (OPs) on the neighboring hills as you advance along Rte. 110 (although it slows your rate of movement). You reach the hamlet of Timpan-ni at the 110/306 intersection without incident, where you are instructed to hold your position.

1st Platoon is north of the town. 2d Platoon deploys west to Hill 305. You are able to launch a UV, and you send it to reconnoiter west along 306. The tank platoon is located with you at the intersection. The antitank section takes up an overwatch position on Hill 323. 3d Platoon bringing up the rear is still on Rte. 110. The platoon commander has put an OP on Hill 321, which reports 8 medium tanks and 10 APCs heading east in column toward Rte. 110 about 3 kilometers southwest of Timpan-ni. The UAV feed shows nothing on Rte. 306 but about 20 enemy combat vehicles further south, moving east about 4 kilometers southwest of the intersection. 3d Platoon commander reports artillery impacting on the slope of Hill 321.

What now, Captain?

Requirement

In a time limit of five minutes, make your decision in the form of any orders you will issue or reports or requests you will make. Then provide a brief explanation of your decision.

DFCs are first cousins of TDGs. Like TDGs, they require you to decide what to do in the face of a challenging situation, but the twist is that the situation is one that was previously faced by a historical figure. Think combination TDG/historical case study.

You can find the final installment, “River Road,” which provides links to all the preceding installments, here:

The Tactical Notebook

River Road

The following post describes the historical solution to the third problem of a decision-forcing case. For the first five parts of this exercise, please see …

Read more

10 months ago · 6 likes · 1 comment · Bruce Ivar Gudmundsson

You are fighting enemy forces trained and equipped similarly to you who will attempt to maneuver aggressively and use supporting arms upon contact. You are approaching an area known as the Seven Mounds, a series of hummocks covered in tall grass believed to have been an ancient settlement. There is an ancient ruin on the center hummock (designated as Mound 1).

Clearing a wood and arriving at an intermittent stream, your 1st Squad makes contact with the enemy. The squad leader estimates the enemy to be more than a squad. As you hustle forward, you request fire on Mound 1, a preplanned target. You arrive to find 1st Squad in the streambed, which provides good cover, returning fire. The squad leader points out enemy positions on Mounds 1 and 2. He tells you he’s got two fire teams in the streambed and 2nd Fire Team and the machinegun squad on Mound 7 to the right front, also returning fire. He says he’s got a good base of fire set up to support an envelopment to the left.

What will you do, lieutenant?

Requirement

In a time limit of two minutes, make your decision in the form of any orders you will issue or actions you will take. Then draw a sketch of your plan and provide a brief explanation of your decision.

(Note: A version of this scenario first appeared as TDG 97-5, Marine Corps Gazette May97, with solutions published Jul97.)