In December, Ukrainian developers traveled to China to build airframes from the manufacturers and saw a factory that built ZTK-150. They saw how production ran and negotiated with the Chinese to buy the drones. The Chinese suggested that they buy the technology and build the drones themselves. The Ukrainian team brought the idea back to senior leadership, which approved it. When the Ukrainian team returned to buy the technology they found that the Chinese factory management refused to sell the technology.

The Chinese intermediaries solved that problem by assembling the drones in a different location that was not under export restrictions and they trained Ukrainian pilots how to fly the drone. While the pilots were training, the Ukrainian team photographed every aspect of the production process. The team and trained pilots took eight drones home, where they immediately took the drones apart to study them.

The first test flight of what was called the MICH 2000 drone was in the summer of 2024 and the drone crashed after 1 km because of poor weight distribution. The second flight stayed aloft for one hour but a propeller fell off after the vibrations sheared a bolt off that held it in place. The third flight failed because of jamming. They kept flying and crashing for two months and Operations Center “Alpha” of the SSU told them they were going to start using them on missions. The developers protested that there were still problems but Alpha didn’t care. In the first combat mission of October 2024, three drones were launched. One was shot down and two missed by ten meters. That was good enough, and production started.

By now, everything is a process and there are constant checks along the way, such as leak-testing the tanks and checking the code in the programming. Weighing the components is important because that shows how closely the process was followed. There are 8 variants that are used for medium- or long-range missions. They can fly up to 2,000 km, carry a payload of 25-60 kg and can use an analogue, digital or Starlink communication system. The price for the basic model is $48,000. The CRPA antennas cost $20-25,000.

Only 6,000 MICH 2000’s are produced each year and they plan to raise that to 10,000. By comparison, Fire Point is trying to produce 100,000 drones, but Alpha is this company’s only customer and they want precision to use analytics and effectiveness. Each month the unnamed company places $1 million of its profits into research and development.

MICH drones destroyed a strategic bomber at Engels, the Wildberries in Ryazan, and a jammer designed to interfere with Starlink communications near one of Putin’s at Gelendzhik, close to Novorossiysk, and it attacked the Baltic Fleet naval base.

More than 20 drones reached Ust-Luga. They ran out of targets so a drone reportedly chased a Pantsir system that ran out of ammo. Most drones don’t have videos of their attacks but trackers are attached to each drone and the data is used to refine the design and software with new changes being introduced every week.

The company is developing a new medium-range drone that will look different than the MICH-2000. It will not have the front canards, will have a 600 km range, carry a 70 kg warhead, will cost $40,000 and will receive guidance during flight. Moscow and Volgograd are within 600 km. A piloted aircraft would be able to attack moving targets and targets that have moved. This includes ballistic launchers, aircraft and air defense components. A expected delivery date for this capability was not provided.

Diplomacy

The president of Finland is confident that Russia will not use a nuclear weapon because China’s foreign minister told him they would never allow it to happen. The only way Russia can escalate is through mobilization and that comes with a domestic effect.

On 4 August, one explosive drone was found next to a Ukrainian transport plane and another hit a DHL plane at Leipzig, damaging the tail and likely being sucked into the engine. A third explosive drone was found in a field west of the airport.

Musk hasn’t allowed Ukraine to use Starlink in Russia, saying it would be an escalation. Zelensky accused Fedorov of misleading him about Musk’s approval. He is hopeful that access will be granted at some point. The ability to pilot drones is what allows Ukraine to attack trucks on the road and air defense systems in the occupied territories. Russia is able to pilot drones through much of Ukraine due to mesh networks and they are extending their reach with the establishment of Rassvet, their version of Starlink. If Ukraine could access Starlink inside Russia, they would be better equipped to attack Iskander ballistic missiles, aircraft on airbases, Russian air defenses, and be more precise in where their drones flew and hitting specific locations on target or specific components in a refinery.

Hungary officially recognized Russia as a threat to Hungary, Europe and the global order, condemns Russian military aggression and fully supports Ukrainian sovereignty. Hungary still opposes fast-tracking Ukraine to EU membership. When negotiations between the EU and Ukraine are completed, Hungary would hold a referendum to decide if Hungary would support Ukrainian membership.

Armenia plans to apply for EU membership at some point but will not withdraw from the CSTO until it becomes unavoidable. Russia said that an Armenian alignment with EU standards may trigger “deep trade contradictions that will primarily harm Armenia.”

Armenia will not question Russians fleeing mobilization and they will be able to stay in Armenia until they decide to return home.

Belarus rebelled against the Russian empire in 1863-1864 and declared itself independent in 1918, but was suppressed by the Russian military. It declared its sovereignty in July 1990 and adopted its constitution on 25 August 1991 despite resistance from the ruling elite. In 1994, Prime Minister Kebich pushed through constitutional reforms to create the office of the president with hopes of becoming a more powerful leader, but Lukashenko was elected and took complete control in 1996. He murdered his political opponents three years later.

In November 2021, the CIA director flew to Moscow to discuss Russian preparations for the invasion of Ukraine. According to US intelligence, Moscow believes the US is weakened by the war with Iran and Russia can escalate action against American interests and allies. The Wall Street Journal says that the CIA director flew to Moscow last week to warn them not to test NATO’s resolve.

Three days after the director left Moscow, Russia test-fired an ICBM missile.

Iran likely hacked the water systems in more than 30 Minnesota communities through the internet. They also are likely turning off freezers in military base commissaries during the night, resulting in widespread food spoilage.

A small snapshot of the current state of US military leadership:

US General LaNeve was commander of the Eighth Army in South Korea when he gave Trump a congratulatory call during the Commander-in-Chief Inaugural Ball January 2025. By February, LTG Jennifer Short was fired early as senior military assistant to the secretary of defense and LaNeve took her place. A year later, in February 2026, General James Mingus was forced to retire early as deputy-chief-of-staff of the army and LaNeve took his place.

Hegseth has fired more than two dozen senior military officers since January 2025, many of them women and minorities. He complained they were insufficiently loyal to the president or caught up in old ways of thinking. The chief of staff of the Army, General George, resisted pulling names of other qualified personnel off the promotion list. In March, two helicopter pilots flew over an anti-Trump protest and then hovered outside the mansion of Trump supporter Kid Rock and were suspended pending an investigation. General LaNeve, the Army’s number two officer, told his boss, General George, that Hegseth wanted the investigation dropped. Hegseth then publicly thanked Kid Rock for sharing the video and wrote, “Pilots suspension LIFTED. No punishment. No investigation. Carry on, patriots.”

George was fired soon after. The secretary of the Army, Dan Driscoll, called George an amazing, transformational leader. LaNeve took George’s place as acting Chief-of-Staff.

LaNeve was not seen by his peers as being qualified to be chief-of-staff and Republican senators aren’t convinced of his abilities, either. In May, they asked him about the canceled deployment of an Army brigade to Poland and he refused to give a reason, saying he was not part of the military’s “policy side.”

The senator replied, “But you’re the chief of staff of the Army.” It would be quite strange if the head of the army wasn’t involved in policy.

In July, the Navy Blue Angels flew low over a beach and sent chairs and tents flying. The Navy said it was going to conduct a safety review. The next morning, Trump officials praised the stunt. Hegseth wrote, “The flyovers will continue until morale improves,” a play on the saying, “The beatings will continue until morale improves.”

A year ago, Hegseth said that “U.S. units are not outfitted with the lethal small drones the modern battlefield requires,” and pledged to revamp the military’s drone acquisition and fielding efforts. General George created an experimental drone battalion to incorporate lessons learned in Ukraine, and Driscoll made note of Ukraine’s integrated information system that incorporates every drone, sensor, and shooting platform into a single network, a capability that the US does not have. Last week, LaNeve disbanded the experimental drone unit.

In the meantime, Driscoll, who was once viewed as a replacement for Hegseth, is planning to leave the administration in a few weeks. And Hegseth is trying to sell LaNeve to the senate as “precisely the kind of leader the U.S. Army needs right now,” interested in strengthening the Army, and “not interested in playing politics in Washington.”

“He is a back-to-basics, no politics, no-nonsense General — exactly what President Trump expects,” Hegseth’s statement said. “The critics coming after him are the same out-of-touch so-called insiders who’ve spent years undermining our military with woke policies and endless wars. They hold deep grudges against any commander willing to put America and our troops first, but their days of influence are over.”

Equipment

Ukrainian intelligence published the data of 140 Russian and foreign components, 35 companies, 108 officials and employees and the equipment used to make the Iskander-M ballistic missile. Only 35 components were made in Russia. 63 came from the US, 8 from Switzerland and Belarus, Germany and Taiwan each contributed four components and China added three.

The four SAMP/T NG air defense systems and seven long-range radars that Italy is transferring to Ukraine are upgrades of the current SAMP-T systems Ukraine is using and supposedly will be able to intercept ballistic missiles. The very low production of Aster 30 missiles will be augmented by production in Ukraine on an undisclosed timeline but Ukraine will receive the licenses to start production “this year”. Both France and Italy will also increase production by October. Italy will transfer Aster 30 missiles from its own stocks by October. The Italian systems and radars will arrive by the end of the year. The decision to provide additional aid to Ukraine was made in secret by the Italian government to avoid internal political disputes about aiding Ukraine. France will also send 4-8 improved SAMP/T NG starting in 2027.

Germany will send 600 PAC-2 missiles it is producing to Ukraine in 2027-2028. The PAC-2 is very effective against cruise missiles, moderately effective against older, simpler ballistic missiles, such as the SCUD, and ineffective against newer ballistic missiles, such as Iskander or KN-24.

Ukraine tested four possible interceptors against Russia jet-powered drones that can travel up to 600 kph. Russia launched 1,500 jet-powered drones in July and over 2,500 in August. Russia is also launching drones throughout the day instead of massed attacks overnight. This is an attempt to paralyze Ukraine’s economic activity by keeping them under constant alert.

The UK will help Ukraine build the 250 km Storm Shadow missile. The missile won’t be available until 2027 at some point, if all goes well.

The Banderol is a jet-powered drone that has a range of 500 km, a speed of over 500 kph and 50 kg of explosives in a fragmentation warhead. It flies between 400 and 2,000 meters altitude, uses satellite navigation and is launched by Orion reconnaissance drones, although Russia is testing ground launches and launches from helicopters. While cruise missiles cost $800,000, Banderols cost between $50-150,000, depending on the components. Russia makes 80 a month and is aiming to make 120 a month.

Ukrainian helicopters are launching interceptor drones.

Russia says they are now serial producing the Volna Kupol Garant EW system that suppresses Starlink communications.

Ukraine’s Delta information system integrates multiple sensors, applications, intelligence platforms and weapons platforms to present a comprehensive battlefield picture to senior leadership and frontline soldiers alike. It is a combat multiplier that increases target detection and reduces target engagement time. In June 2026, Delta confirmed 200,000 hits on enemy targets that were hit by drones, which is 6,600 a day, or 277 an hour. No other nation in the world has its equivalent. Delta now has an AI assistant that works in the interface and processes 25% of user requests. It answers questions about how Delta functions and helps users master the system’s capabilities. The number of user support requests was reduced by 27% and the user wait time for responses for help was reduced by a factor of 30.

A Finnish operator in Tokyo drove an armored vehicle in Finland 7,800 km away.

Kherson

The Kherson thermal power plant was hit by four bombs and the heating and power-generating equipment was destroyed. By early August, the plant had been hit 293 times in 2026.

Back on 12 August, a Hawk missile intercepts a jet-powered drone.

Occupied Territories

A strike on a headquarters in Donetsk. Two generals and three senior officers were among the 27 killed. 58 were wounded and the casualties may rise.

Russia

The Kstovo refinery was hit for the 10th time, and for the fifth time in 2026, and suspended processing. The Afipsky and Novoshakhtinsk refineries shut down operations for an unknown time after being attacked. The Yaroslavl refinery was hit hard. The Kirishi refinery was hit after being repaired.

After the 21 August attack, the Perm refinery is operating somewhere between 10-25%. One CDU unit is out for two weeks, and two others are being repaired.

At the beginning of August, five refineries were not operating and an additional 13 refineries were operating at partial capacity after 70 attacks since the beginning of the year.

The Astrakhan gas processing plant lost 25% of its production capacity and sulfur production used in explosives was the main target.

The Amur gas chemical complex was nearing completion after seven years of construction and is 6,500 km from Ukraine. It exploded, killing 15 Russian and Chinese employees.

Kazakhstan’s Kondensat oil refinery will receive Russian oil and return 70% of the fuel produced to Russia. It produces 200,000 tons of gasoline and 200,000 tons of diesel a year. This would provide 0.6% of the gasoline and 0.4% of the diesel fuels that Russia needs each year. The Kondensat refinery is Kazakhstan’s smallest and is partially owned by a Russian. Kazakhstan’s other refineries will not provide fuel to Russia because of the threat of sanctions, increased domestic demand, At another refinery in Atyrau, Kazakhstan, a fire broke out for reasons unknown. Kazakhstan is conducting military exercises with the inclusion of drone units.

The ban on Russian diesel exports was extended to 30 September.

A chemical plant in Bashkortostan was attacked but the damage is unknown.

A Wildberries in Kotovsk, Tambov, was attacked for a second time and was destroyed this time. The Ozon warehouses in Bashkortostan and Orenburg were attacked but not destroyed. This is the second time Orenburg was attacked. The Ozon warehouses in Rostov-on-Don were attacked with little damage, but a DNS digital and household appliances warehouse nearby suffered extensive damage. Other Ozon warehouses include Dagestan and Adygea. Nevinnomyssk was hit but only lightly damaged.

An Su-33, MiG-29 and an 8-meter long Orion drone were struck at Vityazevo airfield in Krasnodar Krai. The Orion launches the Banderol jet-powered drone. In addition, 8 air defense components (radars, Tor, Pantsir, S-400 component) were attacked in Russia and three radars were struck in Crimea.

A Tu-95MS bomber was damaged during a drone attack on the Engels-2 airbase in Saratov.

One of two drones is shot down over Krasnodar Krai.

Ukraine is currently sending 300 drones into Russia each day. They have plans to send 1,000 drones each day.

A correspondent says that the lines for gasoline in Moscow are the longest he’s seen. Anxiety is countered with patriotic rallies and weapon displays.

Russia received 150 KN-23/24 ballistic missiles between the end of 2023 and August 202. They then received an additional 40 missiles from North Korea and used two of them. They are now requesting 120 of the KN-30 ballistic missiles with six launchers. The KN-23 has a 690-900 km range and a 500 kg warhead, the KN-24 has a 410-480 km range and a 450 kg warhead, and the KN-30 has a range between 600-900 km and a 2,500 kg warhead.

As a member of the 332nd Separate Guards Helicopter Regiment of the 6th Air and Air Defence Army, Major Sergei Sechkov targeted civilians in the Kharkiv region back in 2022. He told his superiors that he was on a kill list and regularly checked his car before starting it. In fact, a 24-year-old woman was contacted and was convinced she was living in the wrong country. She flew into St. Petersburg, attached a bomb under Sechkov’s car and immediately boarded a plane to Turkey. The bomb killed the war criminal and injured his wife sitting next to him. The woman that placed the bomb was identified in videos and her movements were tracked. Russia contacted Turkey to ask them to hold her but she already flew to Moldova by that time.

Ukraine

Ukraine received a small amount of Patriots and 7 Iskander missiles were shot down on 27 August. Zelensky said that 5% of US stockpiles would defend Ukraine through the winter. 10% of US stockpiles would intercept all Russian ballistic missiles.

…guess, somebody might want to inform him that since IQ47’s three days special military operation in Iran, the USA simply do not have that. Neither 5 nor 10%…

A Roshen confectionery warehouse was destroyed. Two warehouses in Kyiv were destroyed.

Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union on 24 August, 1991. Leaders from ten EU nations traveled to Kyiv for the occasion and will discuss additional aid to Ukraine.

A commander of a territorial defense brigade and three others were arrested for embezzling funds meant to be procuring drones.

The EU committed €90 billion for 2026 and 2027, with €45 billion planned for each year. Khmara inherited a €23.3 billion deficit and will cover it with part of the €45 billion reserved for next year.

Fedorov accepted a role as an innovation adviser to Italy’s defense ministry.

Ukrainian grain exports from the Odesa ports fell by 95% in August compared to July. Low water levels prevent transport of grain down the upper Danube, but Ukraine’s Danube river port of Izmail, 70 km from the Black Sea, shipped 169,000 tons of wheat in August, six times more than in July. In Izmail, there are 1,843 wagons of grain that need to be unloaded, with each wagon carrying about 100 tons of wheat.

Rail shipments of grain to the EU increased 119% since July, for a total of 290,000 tons that were shipped in August. Grain can only move through Slovakia and Poland to another destination.

- Poland: 86k tons transited, 50k tons are pending.
- Slovakia: 67k tons transited, 26k tons are pending.
- Hungary: 74k tons shipped.
- Romania: 60k tons shipped, 38k tons pending.

A ship was attacked and sunk in Romanian waters. All 12 crew members were rescued. Romania’s president said, “The ship was hit... it seems to have sunk. There will be an investigation, it will be established, but it is not good for us to start speculating.”

Must’ve been the Mars People then…

(…to be continued…)

Where shall I start this Monday?

Ah yes: Zele ordered his military to ‘triple’ their daily long-range strikes deep into Russian territory. Specifically, targeting civilian distribution centres for major retailers. Because, clearly, Russia is on the brink of collapse if Ivan can’t get his fresh socks and toothbrushes on time. Devastating stuff. Simply fantastic…

Surprisingly enough, amidst the usual Ukrainian cheering, there was actual ‘good’ news, too - even though I suspect that somebody simply mistargeted a few Flamingos. Ukraine managed to set fire to the Kirishi oil refinery, the Slavneft YANOS refinery in Yaroslav, and the Afipsky refinery in Krasnodar. That not only brings August’s total of Russian refineries hit to a tidy 21: even better, at least six of Russian refineries have been re-targeted this August. Read hit for a second or third time. That’s valid for Kirishi, Slavneft-YANOS, Lukoil in Nizhny Novgorod, Afipsky, Novoshakhtinsky, and Perm.

This does create the impression that - whether by accident or design - somebody there in Kyiv might be interested in trying to turn off the tap.

The alternative… sigh… is harder to bear. Considering the number of such strikes is in decline, although they’re obviously still not enough (and far more strikes have targeted other stuff) it’s simply so that some super-clever strategist there in Kyiv is convinced that destroying Russia’s capability to provide fuel to its armed forces is no war-winning strategy after all…

This, alternative conclusion is even more likely considering that - and come on, you knew this was coming - not a single dedicated missile or rocket plant in Russia has been hit in the last seven days. Indeed, only one related facility, the Progress Rocket Space Centre in Samara, took a hit this entire month.

Means: Ukraine is enthusiastically failing to stop the daily Russian missile production.

That’s making such facts little else but 'fantastic news’…

Sigh… One either can’t avoid the feeling that Syrsky (and/or similar characters) is still calling the shots from his former office, or it’s really so that Ukrainians are striking what’s easy to hit for the purpose of creating videos for the social media that are resulting in millions of likes?

Heavily defended missile factories are, naturally, not on that list. Because why risk a ‘precious’ Flamingo cruise missile - or, yiikes! a drone - on a strategic target when you can get a million likes on Instagram for blowing up a Wildberries storage depot?

Clearly, in this age of post-factual warfare, that’s the new metrics… besides, nobody said Ukrainians are better at blocking trolls than they are at blocking incoming missiles.

Meh, let’s try something else... like, say, how often Ukraine has launched so-called ‘counter-battery’ strikes against Russian units equipped with ballistic and cruise missiles?

Well, prepare to be surprised - I know I am - but this month, the Ukrainians actually did undertake entire two confirmed strikes on Russian units equipped with tactical ballistic and hypersonic weapons. On 16 August, they hit a Russian Bastion system firing P-800 Oniks and 3M22 Zircons from occupied Crimea; on 22 August, they also hit an Iskander launcher deployed near the Ukrainian border. Huuusaaa!

Obviously, this is all my fault: I’m unable of soberly analysing this war (and few others, too).

After all, military history is littered with examples of generals winning wars by prioritizing 'content creation' over logistics, right?

Right?

That’s meanwhile as popular as trying to put out a forest fire in France by taking selfies of the smoke..

Sigh & Facepalm… better I hand over to Don.

Overview

Traditionally, a government is supposed to defend the country, its people and their property. Russia can’t protect its critical infrastructure and businesses so the government’s response is to require the businesses to protect themselves or the government will seize the business. This may also force owners to spend the money to make repairs when the repairs will just be damaged in subsequent attacks. The government extracted $4.6 billion from businesses through ‘voluntary contributions’, they raised more money by increasing the value-added tax from 20 to 22%, and companies that fail to provide their quota of workers for the army have to pay in amounts ranging from $1,300-5,900 for each body missing. Forcing refinery or warehouse owners to defend and repair their buildings is just a continuation of this trend.

In 2025, there were 24 bond defaults in Russia. In the first six months of 2026 there were an additional 21 bond defaults. The revenue of Wildberries fell by 15-20% in July.

The most important fact is that Ukraine attacked 21 Russian refineries, the most attacks in a month throughout the war.

Ukrainian attacks in Kupiansk happened a month ago, to clear Russian troops from the west side of the Oskil river. North of Lyman, there are multiple reports that Russian forces in the finger are severely constricted due to significant Ukrainian advances. And Ukraine is still pushing around Komar under the cover of OPSEC.

The Russians are still pushing south of Kupiansk. They are also making small advances towards Sloviansk, although a Ukrainian reorganization and successes at Lyman will make it harder for Russia to keep pushing. Russia still is advancing slowly at Kostiantynivka, Dobropillia and Huliaipole.

My favorite quote of the week: “When I get old, I’ll make wine. And if it turns out tasteless, I’ll say: “It’s all because of damned Russia.” And my grandchildren will tell me: “Calm down, grandma, Russia hasn’t existed for 60 years.”

Kupiansk

Russian infiltrators have been moving into Kupiansk from the north so the 13th Khartiia Brigade sent in their Columbians of the 23rd Assault Regiment to clear out the forest on the west bank south of Dvorichna in order to reduce the flow. The attacks happened a month ago and more news about them will be released later.

Reorganization

The 3rd Corps under Biletskyi was already responsible for the sector from Borova to south of Lyman. Draypatyi assigned Biletskyi control of the 11th Corps in front of Sloviansk, as well. The 1st Corps under Prokopenko was in charge of the Kostiantynivka sector but Prokopenko was also assigned operational control of the 19th Corps in front of Kramatorsk, too. Brovdi, head of the SBS, will coordinate all drone activities in this area.

The 7th Corps will continue to defend Dobropillia.

Lyman/Sloviansk

Russian blogger Rybar claims that Russian forces north of Lyman are close to being cut off. Western bloggers say similar things and OPSEC will likely be lifted soon.

Should this really happen, it would greatly ease the supply situation for Lyman. It will also make it harder for Russia to push towards Sloviansk along the river.

But: the pocket has to be cleared out first.

Kostiantynivka

There have been very few sightings of Ukrainian troops in the southern half of Kostiantynivka in the last couple of weeks. There were no new sightings of Russian infiltrators in the Torske area. Russian troops did advance west of Chasiv Yar.

Dobropillia

Russian deep infiltration continues and Ukraine continues to eliminate them before they can accumulate, but Russia still manages to inch forward.

Komar-Huliaipole

In the south, Russians infiltrated as far as 20 km from the notional front lines, but the deep infiltrations are eliminated or captured soon after making themselves known. Russia has the initiative by Huliaipole and Ukraine has the initiative by Komar.

Zaporizhzhia

Both sides have used drones that are piloted by humans who select a target and then AI takes over and flies the drone until it impacts the target. When signals to human operators are no longer needed in the last moments of flight, jamming is useless. The first documented instance of a fully-AI capable drone was used by Russia on 6 July to attack gas stations.

In the city of Zaporizhzhia, Russia unleashed a group of about six drones. They had no antennas and did not emit radio signals, which meant drone warning devices were not alerted. They were programmed to fly to a coordinate and then start looking for targets on their own using AI. A group of Ukrainians huddled by a wall, hiding from the drones. 19-year old Tetiana Bubynets was crying from fear. A drone was moving towards the nearby gas station but when it was clear it was going to hit the wall the group scattered. Tetiana, a university student, lay on the pavement with blood flowing from her nose, dead. 41-year old Oleksiy Svirin and 48-years old Roman Karpiy were also killed.

Two drones did not explode and their Nvidia Jetson Orin minicomputers were recovered. They cost a few hundred dollars and are sold to students, developers and startups. Many have been resold and used in Russian drones. The Nvidia chips that were recovered were not encrypted so Ukrainian soldiers could see the terrain images that were uploaded to the module. It used these images to navigate to the target. There were also images of propane tanks and other objects that were used by the AI to detect and select targets to attack.

There are 380 km of roads covered with anti-drone netting in Zaporizhzhia. There are drone interceptor teams and plastic sheeting covering propane tanks at odd angles to try and fool AI. But Russia often uses reconnaissance drones and human agents on the ground to assess battle damage and they are constantly improving their AI capabilities.

(…to be continued…)

Command Environment

Zelensky had not signed off on Drapatyi’s dismissals of officers for a month but recently just approved the first five personnel appointments. He supported the concept of lower level initiative, saying, “It is very important that experienced commanders are given greater capabilities to act. There will be decisions at the corps and grouping levels. I have approved the first set of personnel appointments that we discussed with Mykhailo Drapatyi. Five decisions have already been made, and there will be more.”

Zelensky also said that the capabilities of Ukrainian units on the Solviansk, Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk fronts will be strengthened. The heaviest fighting is occurring in these sectors.

In 1991, US satellite images took several days to reach the front line commanders. At the pace of the allied advance, the images were out of date 24 hours after they were taken. That war was the catalyst of changing how the US collected and distributed its satellite intelligence with its military leaders.

In 2022, only senior Ukrainian military leaders would receive satellite imagery to conduct high-level planning. The number of those that had access to the data was increased, but as recently as last year it would still take several days for the front line troops to receive it, and some of that data would be useless by then. But Ukraine has been improving its data flow to gather information from many places, assemble it into one comprehensive picture, and to put that picture into the hands of those that can use the information.

Senior staff still had to authorize the release of data but the process is streamed now. By comparing old images with new images, aided by AI, changes can be detected, such as a recent set of tire tracks that lead into some woods. Electronic signals combined with imagery revealed the location of Russian EW systems that jammed Starlink signals, and they were targeted and destroyed.

The commercial company Vantor has been working with Ukraine for years. Their satellites can scan a piece of ground up to 15 times a day, looking for anything new. Ukraine controls the targeting of the satellites themselves, without any middlemen, and provides the coordinates that they want scanned. Images arrive within a few hours at the most and as little as 15 minutes.

A Ukrainian drone team had been hunting a Russian drone team. They knew the Russians drove a white vehicle and they knew the house they used as a base. They tried to attack them earlier but Shahed drones and glide bombs attacked targets around their launch site and Ukrainian EW gear not only jammed Russian bombs and drones but the Ukrainian drones, as well. One of the pilots had a bandaged hand from a nearby Russian FPV drone explosion.

So they kept tracking the Russian drone team and several nights later they set up operations again. All they needed to know was if the Russians were in the house before they sent a drone to attack it. They prepared for an attack, sat in a vehicle with multiple computers connected to satellites and waited for the latest image. It came back and showed that the white car was in the driveway of the house. “The target is confirmed,” whispered one of the pilots, and two drones were launched.

Soon after the attacks, the team received a new satellite image. There were two large holes in the roof of the house.

Equipment

Ukraine cannot intercept ballistic missiles but they have pretty effective defenses against cruise missiles. The Zircon hypersonic cruise missile is a threat that lies in between ballistic missiles and standard cruise missiles. Designed as an anti-ship missile, its top speed has been reported to be between Mach 8 and 9. It has a range of 500 km at low level, 750 km when using a semi-ballistic trajectory, and Russia claims it can fly 1000 km.

When a missile flies over Mach 5, it ionizes the air around it which creates a plasma shell. This blocks radio waves, making it immune to detection by radar. But the missile also uses a radar to home in on its target so it has to slow down to under Mach 5 so its radar can detect and attack targets. At the same time, air defense radars would then be able to detect the Zircon and missiles could engage it.

It was first used in a land attack in February 2023. It’s been inaccurate but Putin said its accuracy is improving.

Over the centuries, Russians were sent to colonize Ukraine and efforts were made to destroy Ukrainian culture. Yekaterinoslav (The Glory of Catherine) was named in honor of the empress. The Soviets first began renaming nationalized companies after revolutionary events in 1922, and in 1926, Yaksterinoslav was renamed Dnipropetrovsk in honor of the chairman of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, Grigory Petrovsky. He was one of the main executors of Stalin’s policies that led to the Holodomor.

Ukraine changed the names of streets and removed many symbols of Soviet names after independence, but many symbols remained. More names were changed in 2014 Dnipropetrovsk became Dnipro. Dniprodzerzhynsk, named after secret police founder Felix Dzerzhinsky, reverted back to its historic name of Kamianske. Ordzhonikidze, named after a Soviet revolutionary, was changed to Pokrov.

Another surge in changing names happened after 2022. Novomoskovsk (”New Moscow”) was renamed Samar. A hundred streets in Kyiv were changed from Russian and Soviet names. And Ukraine asked the international community to switch from using Russified place names to using spellings based on the Ukrainian language, and “Kiev” officially became “Kyiv”.

The efforts to reestablish national identities also took place in other places. In Georgia, Kazbegi reverted back to its original name, Stepantsminda (“Saint Stephen”). And in Kazakhstan, Ust-Kamenogorsk became Oskemen and Uralsk became Oral. The Kazakh capital was originally Aqmola (“white tomb”) before the Soviets renamed it Tselinograd (“Virgin Lands City”) to give the impression that the country was empty land to be settled by Russians. After independence the name was changed to Akmola and then Astana, which means “capital city” in Kazak.

The imperial and Soviet names support Putin’s dream of recolonization, which is why so many of his supporters continue to use them.

Diplomacy

Denmark was going to produce the solid rocket fuel for the Flamingo and the FP-7 and FP-9 ballistic missiles by the end of 2026, but the original facility selected was not adequate for the job because of safety issues. Denmark removed over 20 legal barriers to building a new facility and construction has begun, but the €50 renovation cost has now increased to a €150 building cost and production of the fuel will not begin until the end of 2027. Despite this setback, Fire Point says that the 300 km FP-7 ballistic missile will be ready by the end of September and the 850 km FP-9 will be ready by the end of 2026.

Germany has been the largest provider of aid to Ukraine since Trump came to power. This year they’re sending €8.5 billion and next year they’re sending €9 billion. Counting the money to replace German equipment that was sent from their army, the total aid will be €11.6 billion.

Moldova will give Ukraine a 50% discount on rail transit for cargo until the end of the year. This will help offset some of the added costs of transporting grain by rail.

Trump said he had a “very good relationship” with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un and said the country is “unthreatening and respectful.” He called the scheduled joint US-South Korea exercises “totally inappropriate and hostile” towards North Korea and ordered them to be scaled down. North Korea said their leader retained ‘good memories and feelings’ about Trump from their meetings but were not interested in the gesture, calling the smaller exercises “provocative and aggressive.” Hours after the statement, North Korea launched 10 short-range ballistic missiles into the sea, its third missile test of the month.

Oman is a longtime US ally and when talking about the Hormuz Strait, Trump said, “If Oman gets in the way, we’ll bomb the shit out of them.”

The Prague Spring: 60 Years Later

In January 1968, Alexander Dubcek was elected First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and he led a series of reforms that were aimed at partially decentralizing the economy, increasing democracy and loosening restrictions on media, speech and travel. On 20-21 August, 1968, over 200,000 Warsaw Pact troops were sent in to occupy the country and enable a coup. The coup never happened due to the popularity of the reforms and Dubcek was able to remain in power until April 1969.

Dubcek urged people not to fight but resistance was widespread. The names of street signs, villages and railroad stations were changed to ‘Dubcek’ or ‘Svodboda’ (freedom), others roadsigns were defaced, but the signs pointing the way to Budapest and Moscow were left untouched. Roads were blocked with vehicles and other obstacles. Protests and demonstrations against the invasion were widespread.

In the absence of social media, newspapers, public radio stations and underground radios provided communication to the resistance and government officials alike, telling people that meetings are taking place without giving the location, and warning others to stay away from their apartment.

In May 1945, the Prague radio station became the heart of the uprising against the Nazis in the last days of the war, calling policemen, firemen and citizens to defend it. The Germans bombed the building with a pair of Me-262’s and disabled the transmitter, but the broadcasts continued from other locations throughout the fight.

In 1968, the Prague radio station once again was at the center of resistance and became the scene of some of the bloodiest repression. Six Russian tanks were sent. Barricades were built and destroyed. The protestors were unarmed, but some removed the pickaxes that were carried on the outside of the tanks and punctured the reserve external fuel tanks and set three of them on fire. Some civilians still warned the tankers to get out when their vehicle was on fire. At some point, the Soviets fired on people and one tank ran over a group in the streets. Gunfire can be heard on an old recording just before the Soviets entered the radio station. 17 were killed and more were wounded. Here is an interactive map showing the ages, locations and dates of everyone that was killed from August 1968 to August 1969.

In March 1969, the Hockey World Championships were supposed to be held in Czechoslovakia but they declined due to their occupation and it was moved to Stockholm. In dual round robin play, the Czechoslovakian team beat the favored Soviets twice, 2-0 and 4-3. They refused to shake hands with the Soviets and four players put black tape on the red star over their national emblem. When they returned to their hotel, the American team was waiting for them and gave each of them a bottle of whiskey to congratulate them. Public celebrations in Prague turned explosive and the Aeroflot office was burned. The numbers “2:0” and “4:3” were written all over the city. Ultimately, the Soviets won the gold and Czechoslovakia won the bronze.

The team was interrogated about the black tape. One of the players, Jan Havel, was banned from international competition for a year and all were forbidden to talk about their wins over the Soviet team.

The unrest from the victories finally forced Dubcek from power the next month. He was replaced by Gustav Husak until 1989, when Husak resigned and Dubcek returned to politics as chairman of the new parliament. The parliament elected Vaclav Havel as president, who was a playwright that had his passport confiscated and plays banned after the Soviet invasion in 1968.

Czechia and Slovakia split in 1993. In 1998, the Czechs met the Russians for the gold medal game at the Nagano winter olympics. Jaromir Jagr wore the number 68 throughout his career in memory of the Russian invasion. The score was 0-0 in the third period when Petr Svoboda (Freedom) scored with a slapshot at the 8:08 mark, and there was joy once again in the streets of Prague. Behind Dominik Hašek’s stellar goaltending, that was all that was needed and the Czech Republic won the goal medal 1-0.

A Boy Scout dipped the national flag in the blood of four people killed in front of the radio station. For twenty years, the Boy Scouts of his troop swore their oaths on the flag and everyone kept its secret until it was safe to speak freely again.

148 lives were lost in the streets in the 1968 invasion. Many more died inside the walls. In the next few years, while travel was still allowed, 450,000 people emigrated from Czechoslovakia, which was 4.6% of the population. 282 people died while trying to escape after that. 205,000 people were convicted for political reasons. 600 were murdered during interrogations and 4,500 more died in prison. 20,000 were sent to forced labor without a trial, and 8,000 total died in mines, prisons and camps.

“The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia has much in common with the invasion of Ukraine more than four years ago. Both societies were going through a period of hope for free development, and both wanted to free themselves from the excessive influence of the Soviet Union, or Russia. In both cases, Moscow violated international law in order to impose its sphere of influence by force. Both invasions were accompanied by deceptive rhetoric. Both were initially planned as blitz operations,” said Czech president Petr Pavel. “It is clear that the historical experience of Russia’s actions is repeating itself, but some people do not want to see it for various reasons.”

(For a detailed- and richly illustrated account of this tragedy, see Operation Danube.)

***

(…to be concluded in the Part 5…)

Two Ukrainian drones attacked the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in the Arkhangelsk region. This is where the rockets launch the Rassvet satellites that are providing communication over Ukraine. Ukraine recently attacked a factory that produces the rockets. They’d flown drones over the site before but were unable to stop the two previous launches. The damage from this strike is unknown.

The Ozon warehouse in Chapayevsk, Samara was destroyed after being hit by multiple drones. Ozon is Russia’s second-largest retailer behind Wildberries and that was their 5th largest warehouse and had only been operating for five years. The Dagestan and Krasnodar Ozon warehouses were also attacked.

Akhtubinsk airbase was attacked and an Su-34 was damaged.

A Ka-52 fails to shoot down an FP-1 drone with a missile. Since the IR seeker isn’t as effective against drones, Russia is bringing back an ATGM modified for air-to-air with semi-active laser guidance that lets the crew paint the target.

Russians have withdrawn €24.4 billion from the banks in 2026 out of fear that the government will seize their deposits and the drone attacks could destabilize the financial system. Government prosecutions seized €44.3 billion in assets in 2025. Last June, the founder of Rusagro, an agricultural holding company, had €6.5 billion seized by the government. Oligarchs gave billions of euros to the government as part of ‘voluntary donations’ in mid-August. Large companies pulled $8 billion out of Russian banks in the second quarter of 2026.

Job advertisements for security guards at Wildberries or Ozon are actually jobs in the military. Ukraine says Russia lost 43,000 troops in July.

In scenes similar to 2022, around 20,000 people a day are crossing into Georgia every day to avoid an expected mobilization. Rental prices in Armenia increased by 30% due to high demand.

Ukraine

Ukraine’s parliament confirmed Khmara as Defense Minister with 312 in favor and two against. This is a clear signal of support from all political parties. People had continued to protest for Fedorov’s return as Defense Minister but many of those same protestors criticized Fedorov when he called for elections while the war was still ongoing. A member of parliament that backed Fedorov said his idea of new elections was “very dangerous and unrealistic.”

Fedorov’s call for elections showed a lack of political judgement (or, so they say).

A veteran and one of the organizers of the protest wrote:
Friends, I want to thank everyone who came out to this protest! I believe it was all worth it: at the very least, we managed to secure the dismissal of Syrskyi and the appointment of Drapatyi, which hardly anyone could have expected just a month ago. I’m incredibly thrilled about this.

It’s a shame that we still couldn’t establish a dialogue between the authorities and society. I hope that this issue will be resolved in time, because, in my opinion, it was precisely the lack of communication that was the root cause of these protests.

As I’ve said repeatedly, for me, these protests were specifically about dialogue and reforms, not about personalities. So I want to wish Mr. Khmara success in his new position and sincerely hope that he will continue the course on reforms and the fight against corruption in defense.

I view elections during wartime negatively—I can’t imagine how to technically enable thousands of soldiers currently on the front lines to vote and run for office. I’m also deeply concerned about the societal divisions during the election process and how that could affect the course of the war. In any case, street protests are definitely not the place for electoral discourse.

Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine’s foreign minister from 2020-2024, had his own view on Fedorov’s statement:
”Churchill wrote he never criticized a wartime decision after the fact unless he’d said so publicly at the time, and that he was ready to be judged by his own actions. Fedorov spent seven years in government, I spent four. We did what we thought was right for Ukraine. Walking away and then saying the social contract is broken and there’s corruption, that’s not very Churchillian to me. That’s my own view, and it’s where we disagree.”

More people have been arrested in the massive money laundering scheme in the Ukrainian energy ministry. The former presidential Deputy Chief of Staff, Iryna Mudra, two members of parliament and top executives of Sense bank were accused of laundering $3.4 million and transferring it to Sense Bank to post bail for the former Justice and then Energy minister.

A year ago, the parliament controlled by Zelensky’s party voted to curb the powers of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). After immediate and large public protests, they quickly reversed their decision nine days later. Five months later, the first wave of arrests in “Operation Midas”, a $100 million money laundering case, took place.

Multiple people in Zelensky’s administration have been arrested for corruption over the years. A Deputy Prosecutor General, Deputy Head of the Presidential Office and the Deputy Defense minister in 2023. And then, two Energoatom Executives, a former ambassador to the US, the Minister of Energy, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice (also former Minister of Energy), Yermak, who was Zelensky’s Chief of Staff, Murday, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and then Mindich, a business partner of Zelensky’s that fled the country (to Israel) to avoid arrest.

Mudra was caught on tape saying things she said were taken out of context. Here are some of those non-contextual statements:

She was frustrated that NABU and SAPO couldn’t be bribed: “Do you see what these two agencies have turned into? This is just crazy—we’re totally freaked out. It was impossible to find out. With the State Bureau of Investigation or the National Police, you can figure out what’s going on there in a heartbeat, but here, you can’t.”

In another recording, discussing how to bypass law enforcement checks on financial transactions, the alleged conspirators can be heard openly quoting prices for illegal hacking services: “How much to get one court ruling via hackers? Five [thousand U.S. dollars]? Five, yeah ... if we can’t do it quickly through the court, we’ll have to use hackers to remove [the arrest].”

In a separate recording concerning the removal of a company director, a suspect says: “For removing the director, I told him: ‘We won’t give you more than 10 grand, don’t even count on it.’ He said, ‘I’ll be grateful even for that.’”

In one of the last excerpts released by NABU, a female voice allegedly belonging to the now-fired Presidential Office deputy head Iryna Mudra can be heard saying: “Corruption needs to be systematized and controlled, controlled, and controlled. There’s no need to fight it. It simply needs to be controlled.”

It is very difficult to fight corruption in peacetime and even more so while in an existential war, but these arrests are both a sign of progress and of work that needs to continue. The $100 million money laundering scheme took money that was meant to harden electrical infrastructure against continued Russian attacks. It will be hard to calculate the hardship or even lives lost because of a lack of power this coming winter, but that’s the internal enemy that has to be fought.

Since the beginning of the war, 4,000 of the 12,000 residential buildings in Kyiv have been hit.

About 70-80 missiles were used on the 20 August attack, including 10 Iskander and 2 North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles, and 13 Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles. Kalibr cruise missiles reach the city ahead of the Kh-101 cruise missiles launched from 7 Tu-95Ms and 2 Tu-160 bombers. Around 54 missiles were used in total and almost all of them were intercepted before they reached Kyiv.

According to Russia, the Antonov plant makes Lyutyi drones. It was attacked in January, June and 20 August. Two industrial logistics warehouses and a military base were hit in the Kyiv area. East of Kyiv, a food warehouse near the Boryspil airport was hit hard, and oil tanks in Brovary and yet another warehouse in Dudarkiv were attacked. A hospital and kindergarten were also hit.

Other targets in Ukraine were hit, such as a border crossing site near Romania.

In August, 6 industrial facilities were hit by more than 20 missiles, 14 logistics warehouses, and a military hospital were hit by missiles and drones.

Out of ammo, a MiG-29 pilot disrupts a Shahed drone with his airflow. The heritage of similar actions goes back 82 years.

A shopping center in Kryvyi Rih was hit by a drone. Everyone ran into the parking lot. One worker ran back inside to get her phone and warn a friend not to come. While she was inside, a second double-tap drone hit the parking lot in an attempt to maximize casualties. At least 16 were killed and 130 wounded.

Fedorov developed a plan to send 1,000 autonomous drones to the Moscow airports to overwhelm Russian air defenses and cripple their air travel. The drones would use detailed maps and images of targets and would identify and attack without operator confirmation. Zelensky had some concerns in early 2026 but allowed the project to continue. Fedorov assembled programmers to build the AI navigation systems and secured funding from allies for autonomous drones.

The project was canceled when he was fired…

(…to be continued…)

Dobropillia

The Russian pressure is heavy and an infiltration team made it to Vodianske.

Komar

Both sides are infiltrating and clearing areas with groups of one to five people, supported by drones and occasional artillery. The arrows indicate the known avenues of attack, but the infiltrations and clearances happen by both sides on a very wide scale.

The 3rd Special Purpose Regiment, whose motto is “I’m coming for you,” cleared out the village of Andriivka-Klevtsove (formerly known as Iskra). This operation likely happened a long while ago. They dropped leaflets offering surrender, and when one did, they used him to convince others to surrender. 30 prisoners were taken and about 30 more were killed.

Zaporizhzhia

Ukrainian positions in Plavni were attacked by drones. Russia is staging infiltration operations out of the high-rise district of Stepnohirsk moving north and west to try and cut off Ukrainian units in Plavni, and northeast into the solar farm. To the east, there are multiple Russian infiltration and Ukrainian clearing operations. Ukraine is working against Stepove, Russia is trying to get behind Mali Shcherbaky, they are still able to trickle people into Orikhiv, and both sides are fighting on the eastern edge of Mala Tokmachka.

422nd brigade destroy a Russian drone workshop with precision flying.

Occupied Territories

An Su-24 was destroyed at Saky airbase in Crimea. Ukraine says that while the Russian navy no longer fully operates from the peninsula, it still uses aircraft based there to attack Ukraine.

Russia

With some exceptions to client states, Russia banned the export of gasoline on 1 April 2026, the export of jet fuel on 1 June 2026 and the export of diesel on 9 July 2026. It was still exporting oil products, such as lubricants, greases, and chemicals. Refinery production began a steady decline after January and oil product exports started to mirror that decline after March.

Russia was the second largest exporter of diesel after the US and their exports remained roughly the same, although increasingly erratic starting in 2024 due to drone attacks. After January, diesel exports plunged and small amounts of diesel imports began in May 2026. All diesel exports ceased in July.

Gasoline exports erratically increased after 2023. The drone attacks in 2025 created long lines at gasoline stations during the summer and fall, but the lines were a symptom of distribution difficulties rather than overall shortages. Many refineries sell much of their fuel to local markets, and if production at a refinery is disrupted then the local fuel supply is disrupted. Surplus gasoline from other refineries was redirected to domestic regions with shortages during the summer/fall of 2025, so exports fell and there was even a small amount of gasoline imports (even though Russia was still exporting) to ease the distribution issues. With the end of vacations and the extra demand on gasoline, exports climbed again in 2026 before they began their steep decline in January. Gasoline imports resumed at an equally steep increase. Existing contracts for gasoline export sales were honored, but new gasoline export sales were banned in April 2026.

Reducing Russian crude oil exports by even 100,000 barrels per day is important as that is the equivalent of about $9 million. But despite the sanctions and attacks on ships, terminals and infrastructure, Russia oil exports were fairly steady, even if they were sold at a discount. They declined slightly in 2025 to a new fairly level. In March 2026, intense attacks on Russian port terminals briefly plunged oil exports to their lowest levels in the war, but they quickly recovered. The decline of refinery production after January made more crude oil available for export, and from March until June 2026, Trump lifted the sanctions on the export of Russian crude oil. Because of this, crude oil exports sharply increased before leveling off in June. Even so, Russia was still pumping oil out of the ground faster than they could refine or export, and their storage capacity was full and steadily being reduced by drone attacks. Russia had to stop production at 400 oil wells in May.

In July, Russian refinery output fell to their lowest levels since May 2002, processing only 3.6 million barrels (MMb/d) of crude oil a day. They had been producing 5.3-5.6 MMb/d between 2020-2025, which is a reduction of 32-36% as of the beginning of August. Ukraine continues to damage the refineries faster than they can be repaired. This is not a trend that can sustain the Russian economy and military, and this has been admitted inside Russia.

Andrei Klepach was the chief economist at the state-owned VEB, Russia’s second largest bank. He gave a speech to fellow economists in May that said Russia is falling behind China and the US economically, and “in some respects, Ukraine”. He said the pressures on the Russian economy would lead to a social crisis that would erupt when no one expects it. “We will not win this competition in a war of attrition with Ukraine.” When the speech was publicly reported he was fired.

On 20 August, 350 drones flew several hours towards Russian targets. The Nizhnekamsk oil refinery was hit by several drones. The “Tamannyeftegaz” oil export terminal was hit. The Taman substation connecting to Crimea was hit.

The Ufa, Perm, and Novokuybyshevsk refineries were hit. Fuel tanks in Yesk, on the Azov Sea, were partially damaged by mid-strike drones.

90% of the oil transported in the CPC pipeline to Novorossiysk comes from Kazakhstan and the rest from Russia. The US asked Ukraine not to attack the pipeline infrastructure of ships loading oil from it and Ukraine agreed provided the ships weren’t loading Russian oil. Since the pipeline is connected to other Russian pipelines, there is the risk that Russian oil may be diverted to the CPC pipeline.

Using the movement of ships, the declared cargo, route, insurance data, historical models of navigation in different weather and market conditions, it was determined that a Greek ship was loading Russian oil from the CPC terminal. The ship was attacked, the first one in three weeks at that terminal.

Gasoline prices rose in 40 of Russia’s 83 regions between 11 August and 17 August. Prices fell in 20 regions. 59 regions have limits on fuel sales. Gasoline and diesel were available at just 28% of Russian gas stations on 16 August, which is down from 41% a week earlier. Siberia has the most shortages. There are no shortages of motor oil yet but prices have risen by 40% in some places and delivery times are longer. People that are protesting the fuel shortages are being arrested and jailed for a short time or fined.

Drivers in Moscow sat in kilometer-long lines for hours to buy restricted amounts of gasoline. The different companies are imposing limits of 30-60 liters. There are no limits on diesel fuel.

(…to be continued…)

Yes, I know: I’m ‘making myself rare’, the last few weeks. Have few good excuses, though: primarily busy preparing yet more stuff for you to read. For example, have helped roll out Andrij Kharuk’s book War in Ukraine, Volume 12: The Battle of Kharkiv and the Slobozhanska Counteroffensive, February-December 2022. Also helping finalise two additional books about this war by an Ukrainian author - Mykhailo Zhirokhov - get into production (one about the Russian Invasion of 2014, the other about Air War over Donbas, in 2014-2015). Finally, Don and me are finalising our first joint book, covering Major Campaigns of 2023-2024.

With other words: for ‘us’ here (at least Don and me), this war - really - ‘never sleeps’: we’re not in the trenches, but the fight is on, all the time.

As for what’s going on ‘in Ukraine and around’… Meh, that’s simple. So simple, one could actually say there are no news. Because we’ve had all the same ‘news’ so many times before.

For example, Zele has unveiled yet another diplomatic masterstroke. A 'joint Ukraine-US-Europe peace proposal.' Man, that’s precisely the sort of thing that gets standing ovations - by all the zombie idiots visiting Kyiv these days (it’s Ukraine’s 35th Independence Day), and those at press conferences all over Europe…

Because entirely pointless peace plans are, meanwhile, the second biggest export success of the EU.

Right after summits.

Back in the real world, Pudding & Co in Kremlin didn’t even take a look: they laughed, and went back to loading ballistic- and cruise missiles. They don't do 'compromise.' They do 'demands,' and right now, and thanks to super-incompetence of ‘our elites’, they remain convinced: they’re winning. Nothing less.

But the circus doesn't stop there. Zele remains busy fighting an election campaign, too. No war. He shot down his recently sacked Defence Minister, Fedorov, for suggesting a vote during wartime. Called it a 'tsunami' that would split the country….

(That’s where the author of these lines has got to take an aspirin, already this early in the morning…)

…rich coming from a man treating the presidency at war like a permanent election campaign. Maybe if he spent less time on revelations and more time on logistics, the front line wouldn't look like a leaky sieve.

The alternative is that there is, actually, a tsunami already: one of ultimate political stupidity and rotten incompetence.

This is obvious when one checks the logistics. You see, the West is about to throw yet more money at Ukraine. Norway pledged $9.2 billion for 2027. France and Germany signed deals for air defences through 2028 (which, BTW, they’ll be wasting by buying in the USA). There’s still nobody explaining how do they all want to defend all the resulting new factories in Ukraine, and/or provide these with electricity - where ‘EU’ is still unable to provide Ukraine with necessary ‘interceptors’ (surface-to-air missiles capable of shooting down incoming Russian ballistic- and cruise missiles)…?

Meh, that remains within realms of ‘nobody’s concern’.

Simply doesn’t matter. What does matter is that Zele finally revealed what is obvious at least since the late 2023: Western aid is dropping off a cliff. Patriot interceptors? 675 in 2023, down to a projected 264 in 2026.

…to the surprise of everybody involved (because, you know: this is really big news - in the fifth year of this fracas): Russia isn't just exploiting that shortage; it’s weaponizing it.

The results are totally invisible - if you’re as skilled in looking the other way, as our super-clever intelligentsia here in Europe is. Then you can’t see that Russia launched yet another round of massive combined aerial bombardments - cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, jet-powered drones, and swarms of decoys. A drone strike on a shopping centre in Kryvyi Rih killed 16 civilians.

…meh, ‘just some 16 Ukrainians’…

Doesn’t matter. Because Ukraine is ‘hitting back’ - but less so on refineries, because that was seriously damaging Russia…

(Now I’m face-slapping myself… OK, OK, at least one or two additional refineries have been hit.)

On the ground? It’s a grind. The Russians are inching forward on Kramatorsk, in general direction of Slovyansk, and massing for a push from Pokrovsk. The Ukrainians managed tiny counter-attacks, deploying some fancy AI tech, but let me remind you: three years of Syrsky chopping apart the ZSU instead of retraining it have left barely any brigades capable of a real punch… We all really have to have ‘steel nerves’ for a while longer, as Drapaty is (I hope, and hope dies the last) sorting out the mess named the ZSU.

The only thing left 'big' is the casualty count. That is: claims by the GenStab in Kyiv. This is now up to claiming 1,200 to 1,000 Russian dead a day.

…while sure the GenStab has no clue, somewhere, I doubt even the heaven knows the truth any more…

…where, arguably: I can’t know. I’m an atheist.

Man, really… one has to have guts the size of a family home - and yes, ‘nerves of steel’ - to remain as insistent on so many illusions and fantasies like the super-incompetents running this tragicomedy.

…and absolutely zero interest in reality (bar that of filling own pockets: greed is such a great motivator).

Over to Don.

Overview

The dominant strategic issue isn’t Ukraine’s inability to defend itself against ballistic missiles, as troubling as that is. It is the continuing decline of Russian refinery production. There has been a steady descent since January, complicating both supply and distribution of fuels. In July, Russia still had enough supplies of fuel and was able to redistribute those supplies to reduce the lines and restrictions at gas stations. A new round of attacks on refineries brought a return of both. At some point, redistribution will no longer solve the local shortages because there simply won’t be enough fuel in the country. Four refineries were attacked last week.

A Russian economist told his colleagues that Russia cannot win this war of attrition. When that statement was published, he was fired from his position at a state-owned bank.

Ozon is Russia’s second-largest retailer behind Wildberries and three of their warehouses were hit. Several Ukrainian warehouses were also hit.

According to Ukraine, Russian casualties had been consistently in the 30-35,000 per month range. In July, they say that Russia suffered 42,860 casualties. They had 39,290 casualties in June. This is a huge increase and is the fourth highest month for Russian casualties since the beginning of the war and the most since January 2025. It is an unsustainable rate of loss even with mobilization and 30-50,000 North Korean troops arriving soon.

Lyman

Nina and Borys Ivanova lived in Lyman for decades, with 20,000 other people. The Russians took the city in May 2022 but Ukraine pushed them out in October of that year. Russian glide bombs, artillery fire and drones slowly destroyed the city over time. Eventually, humanitarian aid, such as food, stopped being delivered in the fall of 2025.

Last December, a drone finally collapsed their roof and blew out their windows. Two days later, the living room was destroyed. Nina and Borys (77 and 79) and their daughters Olha and Tetyana (54 and 53) moved to the basement of an apartment building at the end of the street. Boris, who had been bedridden for eight years, had to be transported to their new shelter. They shared the basement with two men, a family friend and a family of three, a couple and their 31-year-old son.

In temperatures below zero, they slept under three blankets, wore jackets and hats and cooked their food on bricks over an open fire. Boris died in January and the women buried him in the yard. One of the men was killed in an airstrike, and the other man died the next day while digging his grave.

The mayor of Lyman urged people to leave, but the Ivanova women stayed even though the attacks intensified between March and May. The stockpiled food dwindled, and with Ms. Ivoanova saw a body being eaten by dogs, she decided to leave on 23 May.

They left early in the morning and tried to enter the woods at the edge of the city but couldn’t enter because there were too many craters and downed trees. After three hours, they gave up because the morning shelling was about to start. They called the mayor and told him that they would just stay there until they died. The mayor told them to rest for a few days but they had to try again. They did so and packed lighter for the second trip.

They left at 3:40 am when there were fewer drones. The others in the basement came with them. The group balanced backpacks and two cats on bicycles and started walking. The 31-year-old son had two pieces of shrapnel in his back and could not walk fast. They walked past the destroyed buildings, the torn up railroad tracks, and into the burned forest. Burnt wrecks of vehicles and shreds of uniforms were scattered on the highway pitted by craters. The drones started flying at 7 am so they kept moving.

After 15 km, they finally saw the Siverskyi Donets river at 8 am. Tetyana fished there as a child and she ran ahead to find the crossing and called out. The mayor told the Ukrainian military to expect them, and soldiers emerged from the bushes, giving them water and telling them to hide in the shrubs.

The cats and bags were loaded into a small wooden boat that was scarred with shrapnel. It was used to ferry soldiers and supplies across the river and it was pulled to the other shore by a rope. The others went next, two at a time while wearing bulletproof vests. Ms. Ivanova was scared but the soldiers joked with her and told her she would be delivered in comfort.

On the other side of the river, they were loaded into an ATV and told to hold tight. They sped through the forest and onto a highway and transferred to a military vehicle that took them to an evacuation hub in Sloviansk at 10 am, covered in mud. Soon after, they bathed with hot water for the first time in months. Lunch was provided. They had dreamed of store-bought bread and ice cream for seven months but could not bring themselves to eat.

“We are in shock,” Ms. Ivanova explained, sitting hunched on a cot. “We escaped from hell. We took a 50/50 chance, as they say — whether they kill us there, or on the road.”

“Fifty-fifty — nothing to lose.”

Sloviansk

Russian infantry throw an anti-tank mine into basements in Rai-Oleksandrivka. Their infiltration continues and they slowly advance.

Kostiantynivka

Ukrainian soldiers destroy a Russian position in the city. A Russian destroys a bunker outside the city.

On the 800 meter road between Kindrativka and Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka are the wrecks of 41 Ukrainian ground drones, pick up trucks and armored vehicles.

Russia continues to infiltrate north of Sofiivka. A while ago, Russia had been moving Stepanivka and Dovha Balka from the south, but now they’ve taken the treelines to the east. Inside Kostiantynivka, they are moving further north of the city.

Dobropillia

The Russian pressure is heavy and an infiltration team made it to Vodianske.

(…to be continued…)

Mesh networks also extend the range of communications. To disrupt the mesh-networked drones, Ukraine would need more radar and EW stations to cover more territory.

Some of the low-cost Gerbera drones use upward-facing cameras to search for corridors that don’t have interceptors. If an interceptor is present, they can see what type of drone is attacking and what tactics they are using.

With the mesh networks, Shahed/Gerbera drones can be piloted instead of just flying to a coordinate. This allows the pilots to attack locomotives, fuel stations, vehicles, logistical infrastructure, and ships in the Black Sea.

Russia spent a year training their V2U drones on AI and then can now identify railways, roads, warehouses, soldiers, armed soldiers, tanks and other military vehicles. AI and drones were a priority for Russia and about half the AI components they use come from the US. 9% comes from China. The Molniya drones are starting to use AI now, as well.

Ukraine began the war flying Bayraktar reconnaissance drones that did a lot of damage by spotting Russian columns, calling artillery fire and dropping laser-guided bombs. But then Russia started adjusting their air defense posture and began shooting them down, so Ukraine had to find different types of reconnaissance drones that could survive in that environment.

Now Ukraine is losing their reconnaissance drones again. They fly at 1,000-1,200 meters at 70 kph, which makes them easy targets for Russian interceptors that fly at 200-250km/h. Ukraine needs to change their approach to reconnaissance drones again.

Ukraine’s long-range drones rely on satellite navigation. Both Russia and Ukraine use CRPA anti-jamming antennas. Flash said a time is coming that satellite navigation will no longer be possible as Russia improves its electronic warfare. One solution might be using maps in the drone that are matched with images on the ground.

Command Environment

The General Staff of Ukraine (‘GenStab’ in colloquial Ukrainian) used to provide details such as engagement counts, strike tallies and sector-by-sector descriptions that said nothing. This no longer happens.

In addition, we have grown used to units publishing videos of their actions on the front lines. They were never authorized to do that but this is now being enforced. Front-line reporting now will come only from the General Staff.

The purpose for the information shutdown is basic operational security. They do not want to provide Russia with any details they could use to kill Ukrainians. This means it could be weeks to months before the army releases updates about territorial shifts in the front line. Russia is expected to continue to try and sell its narrative.

As previously reported, replacements will be directed to units based on need, which does not include the 225th and 425th assault regiments for now, and their excessive personnel are being transferred to about ten other units. The 425th regiment will remain intact and was assigned to the operational control 1st National Guard Corps Azov, which is responsible for the Dobropillia to Kostiantyniva sector. The 425th is still part of the Assault Forces and is not formally transferred to the 1st Corps.

Some of the 425th battalions were already fighting in Kostiantynivka and the rest will eventually be brought to the corps’ sector. At one time, elements of the (division-sized) regiment were fighting in ten different locations at once. The spokesman for the regiment says they view the assignment positively.

Busification, or snatching recruits off the streets, continues. This is an issue the Khmara and Drapatyi have to resolve. Drapatyi has begun working with Ukraine’s ombudsman to review proposals for comprehensive mobilization reform.

The Politics of Doctrine

The chain of command in Ukraine should be, by law, the President, the Minister of Defense and the Commander-in-chief. They all can have their ideas on how the war should be fought, but when a superior makes a decision, the subordinate needs to act on that decision or must expect be replaced.

Zelensky knew of Fedorov’s vision on how to fight the war before he named him as minister. Presumably, he agreed with it or he wouldn’t have selected him. After hiring Fedorov in January, Zelensky said he wanted him to focus on technology and innovation to “counter Russia’s desire to make this war endless.”

Syrsky represented the opposite of asymmetric operations and how Fedorov wanted to fight the war. When he became the minister of defense, Fedorov asked Zelensky if he could replace Syrsky. Zelensky refused the request. That immediately undercut Fedorov’s ability to implement his plan. Fedorov and Syrsky were ideologically incompatible, and Syrsky resisted all of Fedorov’s plans. When Fedorov asked for the casualty numbers of all the units, Syrsky’s General Staff said to Fedorov, their boss, that they would not release the numbers to his office.

That was reason enough for Fedorov to fire Syrsky, but Zelensky’s micromanagement did not allow Fedorov to exercise his authority.

Zelensky said that the reason he fired Fedorov was because Fedorov and Syrsky had differences of opinions on what equipment and ammo should be procured. Fedorov bought drones and long-range ammo for artillery that supported his idea of fighting as much as possible from a distance in order to reduce casualties. Syrsky wanted short-range artillery ammo to bombard Russian forces at a closer range, which was in line with his ideas of frontal assaults with infantry at close range. His methods had a much higher casualty rate.

Fedorov and Syrsky could not work together with their competing visions, and since Zelensky restricted Fedorov’s ability to fire Syrsky, Zelensky had to choose between the two people and their ideas. He chose to keep Syrsky.

If Zelensky had a change of mind and decided to back Syrsky’s doctrine that created higher casualties then there would be a certain amount of logic behind his decision. But when he hired Khmara and asked him to continue on with Fedorov’s reforms, it contradicted logic.

Ukraine is fortunate that Zelensky reacted to the pressure of the protestors and ended up with firing Syrsky. The country is also fortunate that Zelensky chose to replace Syrsky with Drapatyi, Syrsky’s ideological opposite and a general that closely aligns with Fedorov’s vision. If Zelensky had fired Syrsky instead of Fedorov, Drapatyi and Fedorov would have had the close working relationship that Zelensky said he was looking for.

But this is how Zelensky chose to run his government.

Khmara is the acting minister. Parliament will meet on 18 August and that will be the first chance to endorse him as the permanent minister, for however long ‘permanent’ lasts. His background and public statements all align with Fedorov’s and Draypatyi’s views of asymmetric warfare.

Khmara served in SBU’s Alpha Unit from 2011 until taking command of it in 2023. Asymmetrical combat is their specialty and the June 2025 Operation Spiderweb is their best known achievement, but they also conducted assassinations and used both long-range and FPV drones. In January, Khmara became the head of the SBU.

On 29 July, Khmara said that Ukraine cannot confront Russia “punch for punch” but would have to use resources carefully and act in an “asymmetric” fashion, adding, “I have a real picture in my ​head of what is being used, what can be used against the enemy, and what can be most effective moving forward,”

Khmara also met with Fedorov, who explained his vision and how he had planned to support it through procurement.

The following is the status of four issues that Fedorov was working on before he was fired.

When Fedorov first arrived on the job in January, he conducted an audit of the army and found that 20 of the 120 brigades had weak leadership and poor performance. He wanted to disband them and redistribute them to undermanned competent brigades.

Syrsky did not want to consolidate brigades. When he was fired, he was in the process of creating five new brigades even though there was already a shortage of qualified leaders. In order to create the new brigades, he pulled personnel from existing brigades, weakening them.

Drapatyi disbanded four of the five brigades that were forming and kept one because it was already at full strength. Soon after he became commander-in-chief, there was a report that Drapatyi was conducting an audit of unit performances and he would disband the bottom 20-30% of the units and redistribute the personnel. Drapatyi’s staff said that was a false report.

Units were supposed to be rotated out at least once every 40 days but the brigades didn’t have the resources to rotate, or they didn’t have the firepower to create safe conditions for a rotation, so some soldiers remained on the front for 200 days. Instead of all the brigades in a corps being deployed next to each other to fight as a unit, some brigades are serving under their corps commander and the rest are scattered throughout the country temporarily serving under another corps commander.

…and in some cases, nobody knows where is what part of what brigade…

Fedorov wanted all the brigades assigned to a corps to serve side-by-side so they could establish systematic routines and have ample firepower that would, among other things, support regular rotations. He ordered Syrsky to consolidate them.

Syrsky oversaw the creation of the corps and the scattered assignment of brigades to the different corps. He also said that it would be impossible to move the brigades so they could all fight adjacent to each other within the same corps command. Yet he found it possible to pull some of the best brigades away from their corps and move them to other locations. He certainly showed little interest in the welfare of the soldiers and their basic human need to rotate.

Khmara and Drapatyi have not publicly addressed this issue yet.

Fedorov wanted to reduce losses through technology and wanted to identify commanders that would best use that technology. He would then provide them with extra personnel and equipment. In fact, he made sure all the units had a sufficient number of drones and then provided the more effective units with even more drones since they would obtain better results with the additional equipment. He ordered those same brigades to be enlarged with more personnel.

Syrsky did not enlarge any of the brigades that were using stand-off technologies. Instead, he enlarged the 225th and 425th assault regiments with four times the number of personnel a regiment should have. These regiments continued to conduct frontal attacks and suffered extremely high losses among personnel and equipment, which were always replaced.

Drapatyi will reduce the size of the two expanded assault regiments. There is no word on whether he will increase the size of the technologically-proficient brigades.

Fedorov was tasked with fixing the mobilization system, a difficult situation in which no solution would please everyone. Instead of grabbing people off the streets, he decided to inform people ahead of their draft so they could arrange their affairs, have clearly defined and limited periods of duty, and would be held accountable if they tried to evade. It required changing personnel management, how troops were trained and eliminating corruption.

Syrsky refused to cooperate with any of those reforms and only a minority of those mobilized ended up in combat units. The failure of the reforms was another reason why Zelensky said he fired Fedorov.

Khmara cannot functionally address this issue until he is confirmed as the minister. It is very likely that he and Drapatyi will work together on this issue. It is unknown if he will try to reduce corruption and reorganize the ministry as Fedorov attempted to do.

Zelensky asked Fedorov to change the system and then failed to support him as he tried to change the system. Against all apparent logic, he fired Fedorov and retained Syrsky, the opposite of change. He was pressured to fire Syrsky soon after. Zelensky then replaced Fedorov and Syrsky with two individuals that support asymmetrical warfare and Zelensky asked them to continue pursuing those goals.

“Because we can’t look at things in isolation or pin the blame on anyone – and someone else is not – the issue of the no-fly zone, the issue of the TCC [recruitment], the issue of the normal, if one can put it that way, face of mobilization – all of this, until the war ends, will have to be done together, in unity,” Zelenskyy said.

He added that “unfortunately, such an alliance did not come about earlier.” At the same time, the president noted that Syrsky’s experience should not be lost.

“It is very important to ensure a smooth transition and the stability of the army. I take this very seriously. There are some things that Syrsky did that we don’t see, but it is very important that we don’t lose them,” he emphasized.

At the same time, Zelenskyy emphasized that it is “very important that we pull some of the innovative ideas from Drapato’s plan out of the drawer and implement them now.”

It appears that the president and the current minister of defense and commander-in-chief all broadly agree on the same objectives now. It also seems clear that the minister and commander will work together to achieve those objectives. Time will tell if they have the capability to accomplish their goals.

Equipment

The FP-7 is being jointly developed as a ballistic interceptor with a target cost of $1.35 million. Fire Point built the missile that has a speed of 1,500-2,000 m/s. It has an infrared seeker and there are plans to install a German semi-active seeker, as well, which means the ballistic missile will be illuminated by radar from the ground and the interceptor will follow that signal. Radars from Sweden, France and Germany are being considered for long-range detection. The illumination and guidance radar will come from either Germany or Italy. The control center will be Norwegian and the mobile launcher will be made in Ukraine. The network communications system will be Link 16, which Ukraine already uses under license for Delta and other NATO-standard systems. Building hit-to-kill missiles are much more difficult and expensive so the warhead will be blast fragmentation. Blast fragmentation warheads are not very effective against ballistic missiles, but if the FP-7 is as effective as a $2-4 million PAC-2 missile it will be very useful.

Fire Point’s FP-9 with a 850 km range and 800 km warhead is still supposed to be operational in the Fall. The government’s Sapsan ballistic missile will have a 500 km range with a 500 kg warhead and utilizes inertial and satellite guidance. Fedorov said on his last day that a test in July increased Sapsan’s accuracy and reduced cost by 30%, although the actual costs were not reported. Preparations for serial production were announced a year ago, so those were delayed.

Putin once claimed the Kinzhal missile was unstoppable but by 2023 it already had a poor performance record. Russia stopped the production of the Kinzhal and Kh-32 missiles and used the resources to increase production of the Iskander to 65 missiles a month. The Votkinsk factory that makes the Iskander was partially damaged in February by Ukrainian Flamingo missiles. Two more attacks by Flamingos in July and August were all shot down.

Russia is currently exceeding their missile production goals by 110-120%. The RM-48U ballistic missile, launched from an S-400, has a stockpile of 400 units and 40 are being produced a month. Russia isn’t drawing down on their stockpile, they’re launching the missiles as soon as they come off the production line.

When air defense missiles are available they intercept the Kalibr cruise missile almost 100% of the time. The North Korean Kn-23 ballistic missile that was recently launched missed its target by 15 km.

The Soviet-era S-300 and S-400 systems were designed as air defenses but their missiles could always be used for ground attacks. The S-300 first demonstrated that capability in May 2011 when it fired five missiles at stationary targets on a training range. When the Russians started running low on cruise missiles and ballistic missiles in 2022 they began using S-300 missiles as ballistic missiles, and in December 2022 they had more than 7,000 of the missiles in stock.

As air defense weapons, they are very accurate, but they rely on inertial and radio-command guidance when engaging aerial targets. In the ballistic mode, they lose that guidance once the missile passes the radio horizon and it continues on to the target with only inaccurate internal guidance using mechanical gyroscopes and sensors. Hitting a bunker is unlikely, but landing in a city block or large factory is possible. The further the missile flies, the more its accuracy suffers.

Russia started using S-400 missiles in ground attacks at least since January 2023. Older missiles were used then, but in 2025 Russia produced more than 200 RM-48U missiles that could not intercept aircraft but were less expensive and could be used in a ground attack role. Their first use was reported in January 2026 and expected to produce 480 by the end of this year. It has a 400 km range with a 130 kg warhead. When it reaches its top speed, it can travel 2.5 km per second. Both an S-300 and S-400 can launch the RM-48U missile.

Russians are using radio-controlled drones that can fly up to 40 km without being jammed by using frequency hopping. EW jammers can only jam a few frequencies at a time. Frequency hopping bounces around multiple bandwidths. The time spent on jammed bandwidths is so small that it does not interfere with communications or operations. Bluetooth changes channels 1,600 times a second over 79 channels. Both the sending and receiving stations hop at the same time, and the US SINCGARS radios change frequencies 100 times a second.

There have been multiple cases in which Russians have been prosecuted for buying Chinese equipment and selling it to the military or security services as Russian-produced. There is a report that Ukrainian companies buy electronic warfare systems from China and sell them as domestically produced. A year ago, procurement rules were simplified to speed acquisition so now the government relies on the contractor for the accuracy of the information about the product.

Communications intelligence is the interception and analysis of voice, text or data messages. The NSA in America collections an incredible amount of data every day and uses computers to process it and extract data for analysis. In 2022, a private company used AI to extract data from unencrypted Russian radio transmissions and trained it to identify individuals speaking, activity, equipment and locations. It provided summaries of hours of radio traffic and could provide tactical insights in near real time. It was updated by human operators to learn new terms, such as the use of “helis” for “helicopters.”

In addition to using these methods, Ukraine used facial recognition to identify individual Russians in videos. The US Army detects electronic signals and other data sources to develop insights and both Ukraine and Russia have their own data-flow systems that integrate and display information from sensors, friendly unit status and other information to present a real time situational report available to users at different levels of command.

Two Ukrainian companies are identifying Russian propaganda on the internet and counter with psychological operations of their own.

Ukraine is still using the unencrypted Motorola radios it had at the beginning of the war. It received some encrypted Harris radios but at $20-30,000 each, Ukraine can’t equip their entire army. Flash argues that Ukraine should develop their own domestic encrypted radio production. 90% of Russian forces use Chinese radios that are comparable to Motorola.

A mid-strike drone that was tested in early 2025 had problems with software, batteries, camera feed and, after a few minutes, controls would be unresponsive. It underwent so many changes it is now considered to be a different model from the one first tested over a year ago.

There are now many models of Ukrainian mid-strike drones, most of them domestically produced, and they have varying levels of reliability. Though considered combat ready, they are all tested before being used. Drones that have problems are rigorously tested. One pilot said, “If a manufacturer is not responsible, I do everything possible to prevent their system from reaching combat crews in our unit.” Once it passes testing on the range, it is tested in combat. If it performs well, it is considered combat-ready.

Drone manufacturers are competing with each other and some have insufficient testing in order to get their drone to the market, forcing the military to take pilots and crews off the line to do the testing. Failure to do so could cost lives on the front.

The downside of Ukraine’s open-market procurement system is that many companies do not provide good solutions and there are inefficiencies and overlap. The upside is that the barriers to companies with good solutions are low and there is a rapid iteration of improvements with the feedback between the combat units and the manufacturers.

Ukraine’s HUR intelligence service say they destroyed a train carrying North Korean ballistic missiles and ammo in Siberia. Remotely controlled explosives detonated the warheads, destroyed the train and severely damaged the infrastructure.

In November 2025, a section of railroad was destroyed near Sosnovka in Siberia. In October 2025, three fuel lines of Moscow’s ring pipeline that were protected by drone netting were damaged by sabotage.

The Kombinat Kamensky military-industrial enterprise was attacked and a fire resulted but the extent of the damage hasn’t been reported. The facility produces solid rocket fuel for rocket launchers and cruise missiles, like Onyx and Zircon.

Wildberries in Voronezh were destroyed and one in Chishmy, Bashkortostan was burned. The Tver site was superficially damaged. The largest Wildberries, Koledino, Moscow, was attacked for a second time and there won’t be a need for a third. A logistical warehouse 20 km away in Domodedovo was burned. Both targets were inside the outer air defenses of Moscow.

The commander of Ukraine’s only submarine defected to Russia in 2014. Last week he was killed in Sevastopol when he walked by a trash can that had a bomb in it.

Russian Railways planned tariff increases in October but is raising freight prices by 8.5% and passenger prices by 9.2% now because it is short of money. When the tariffs are increased in October, tariff increases since 2022 will reach 56%. Cargo volumes continue to decrease. The government refused requests for more money so the company will fire 6,000 people.

In April, Chinese workers building a Russian refining unit in a far east facility demonstrated against unpaid wages. There are no reports of them receiving their money. Last week, 1,000 Chinese construction workers demanded their back pay at the Baltic Chemical-Gas complex in Leningrad oblast.

The Yabloko political party that wants a ceasefire and peace has been banned from running in the September elections. The reason given was copyright infringement, even though the holders of the copyright did not object. A vote for Yabloko would be viewed as disapproval of Putin. The party has been criticized for not condemning the war but one member that called out the Russian war crimes of 2022 was sentenced to 7 years in prison, and another member was recently arrested and then fled the country.

Ukraine

Last winter, Ukraine was short of 7,000 megawatts of power. They planned to build smaller decentralized power plants to meet that deficit. Being decentralized meant a single airstrike would do a smaller amount of damage. Ukraine only built 700 megawatts, but Mindich, Yermak and others were able to steal $100 million from the project until they were caught.

Russia dropped 8,300 glide bombs in July, which is 268 per day. 50% of the bombs are falling in open fields due to jamming. There have been instances in which 50 bombs were used on a single treeline with varying degrees of accuracy. Molin estimates that 450 bombs hit actual positions in July and there may or may not have been personnel in those positions. Another 1,000 bombs in cities or fields hit close enough to positions to possibly cause casualties. The size of the bombs varied from 250 kg to 1,000 kg. Some struck within 5 km of the front line and others were 20 km behind the lines. He believes that these airstrikes cause up to 2,000 casualties a month, both dead and wounded.

Ukraine conducted 449,000 unmanned missions in July, a 3% increase from June, and they struck 226,000 targets, which is a 13% increase. 7,800 mid-strike drones were used, which is a 126% increase. They used 376,00 FPV drones, a 6% increase, and used 1.6 drones for every drone Russia uses. Ukraine conducted 23,700 UGV (ground drones), which is a 41% increase.

The Zaporizhzhia steel plant stopped operations after a major attack by ballistic missiles. Russia attacked a Ukrainian tugboat that was towing a damaged cargo ship.

Russia destroyed yet another book warehouse in Kyiv.

A 14-person GRU unit was arrested for passing on information to Russia about take-offs and landings and other info from various airbases. A Ukrainian aviation squadron commander was one of those arrested.

A 12 minute interview with the founder of the Druk (Print) Army, a decentralized organization of 3,500-4,000 volunteers with more than 6,000 printers. Ukrainian units leave requests for 3D printed parts on a web site. Volunteers fulfill those requests with their 3D printers and mail the parts to the units through Nova Poshta, a delivery company that Russia has been bombing. In 2025 they sent 527 tons of printed items to the front lines. At market prices, it would have cost $62 million but most of the items were sent for free.

Diplomacy

Chevron owns 15% of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), through which Kazakhstan exports 80% of its oil. The Chevron CEO talked to the Trump administration and now Ukraine agreed to stop attacking the CPC infrastructure and the non-Russian ships heading to the terminal on the Black Sea. The protected ships cannot be under Ukrainian sanctions, they cannot carry Russian oil or other cargo, and they cannot be owned by Russian entities.

An investigation determined that the drone at Germany’s Leipzig/Halle Airport flew into the wing of a parked Ukrainian cargo but failed to detonate. The explosive and drone were found on the ground at some distance from each other, and the explosive might have separated on impact. It is, of course, and act of aggression that will be passively accepted.

Turkey was part of the US F-35 program until they bought a pair of S-400 systems. The US warned against it because if Turkey had F-35’s and flew them around the S-400 systems, they could learn how to detect the stealth planes and Russia could gain that knowledge. Because Trump likes granting boons and making deals, he agreed to sell F-35’s to Turkey if they sold the S-400s. So now they are trying to sell them to a Gulf state country…where the US flies F-35s all the time. Since Russia sold the systems to Turkey, they need to approve the re-sale to someone else. Turkey refused to sell the systems to Ukraine in order to avoid crossing that line with Russia.

The US used over 1,500 Patriot missiles in the war against Iran and has less than 1,700 left. “Claims of U.S. munition shortages are false,” the chief Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said in a statement. “When the fake news media irresponsibly amplifies these lies, the real-world consequence is clear: Our enemies are emboldened to provoke — or attack — American troops.”

Trump said Ukraine could produce Patriot missiles without talking to Lockheed and Raytheon. Then Lockheed and Raytheon said they didn’t want Ukraine to produce their missiles because they are afraid Ukraine would improve the missile and produce them faster and for less money.

The predictable happened again. In April and May, a US brigade took part in the Combined Resolve exercise in Hohenfels, Germany and used armored vehicles, infantry, helicopters, drones and other equipment. Ukrainian drone teams aided the defenders and destroyed the brigade multiple times over two weeks. Each time, the US became better at dispersing their forces, hiding their movements and using their electronic warfare to make them harder to be observed and attacked. Eventually, the Ukrainian drone teams switched sides and showed the US brigade how drones could be used offensively. The education of NATO forces continues, and it’s a good thing.

The Caroline Bezengi is a sanctioned oil tanker that was carrying one million barrels of Russian oil from Novorossyisk to India. On 8 June, the crew reported an explosion on board. The ship was run aground near a small island 45 km from the shore of Oman to prevent it from sinking and was abandoned by its crew three days later. Heavy waves are damaging the ship. Each of its tanks have been breached and are leaking oil and the ship is sinking lower in the water. The oil fumes in the double hull spaces are at risk for an explosion.

In July, Oman ordered the owners of the Cameroon-flagged ship to remove it from the shore but it is unclear if anyone answered the phone. The address is a dead-letter box in a residential block of Shanghai, which is typical for shadow fleet tankers. The ship was among 39 vessels de-listed from Cameroon’s ship registry in June.

As of a week ago, there was a 400-600 square kilometer oil slick in the nature reserve that was created last year. If the oil remains off shore then it will have less of an impact than if it reached the beaches. The effects of an oil spill can last more than a decade and can eliminate local wildlife populations. There have been no efforts to offload the oil from the tanker. No one has taken credit for the assumed attack.

After receiving threats about an Iranian assassination attempt while he was in Turkey, Trump publicly switched from using the airplane Qatar gave to him to an older presidential plane that had more defenses and the press boarded that plane with him. Trump was then secretly moved from the older plane to a third military plane in a catering truck. The press remained on the decoy plane. All three planes moved to the UK and Trump was secretly moved from the military plane back to the older plane and disembarked in public view. He used the Qatar-provided plane for the flight to the US.

Iranian reaction?

Simple:

Russia supported the Assad regime in Syria for 13 years and killed almost 7,000 Syrian civilians, including over 1,000 children. Syrian rebels overthrew Assad in 2024. Ahmed al-Sharaa was the leader of the rebel forces and is now the leader of Syria. He’s visited Russia twice, praised Russia’s “historic role” in Syria and allowed Russia to maintain two bases in Russia. Syria also wants Assad extradited from Russia to Syria.

Surprising no one, it was announced that Meta was paying political extremists to post on Facebook.

No doubt: that was an isolated instance.

Croatia denied a visa to a Russian gymnast that participated in a pro-war rally. She thinks that’s bad for the sport.

This article talks about the race to develop high-end lithography to build increasingly powerful microchips, with US and Japanese research leading the way, but eventually a single Dutch company having a monopoly on the market.

This video describes how China was barred from using Dutch equipment to make the leading-edge chips but is developing less efficient but potentially equally effective methods of creating leading-edge chips without reliance on foreign tools.

(…to be concluded tomorrow…)

Kherson

Ukraine says Russia has 2,500 troops on the Kinburn peninsula that are short of water, food and ammo because Ukraine has fire control over the sector. The Russians brought in eight vehicles and tried to hide them but Ukraine destroyed them all.

Russians on the islands in the Dnieper river are being starved because of Ukrainian drones and some have died of starvation. Still, Russian drone teams on the islands continue to attack and are being prosecuted by Ukrainian drone attacks.

Odesa

A MiG-29 shoots down a jet-powered drone soon after it crosses the beach.

Unknown Location

A Russian drone sitting behind a wall in a courtyard, lying in ambush and waiting for the sounds of a vehicle.

Occupied Territories

A duel between a drone and a mobile gun team is unresolved. Those machine gun bullets have to land somewhere and the road is straight.

Ukraine posts numbers about how many trucks are destroyed each day, and others post numbers of destroyed vehicles confirmed with video, but no one discusses how many mid-strike drones are used to attack the trucks. Serhii ‘Flash’ Beskrestnov says Russia set up radars, patrolling interceptor drones, mobile gun teams and electronic warfare systems to disrupt Starlinks along the logistical routes. Because of this, unsuccessful attacks have increased.

The 422nd Regiment shows their successful attacks on Russian trucks. With the exception of a single last-second change of targets, the AI impacted the trailers of the trucks instead of the trucks themselves.

9 August: An oil tanker, two cargo ships, and 5 air defense components. 14 August: 27 substations, a thermal power plant and a gas distribution station.

Russia hit four times the number of gas stations that Ukraine has hit, but Ukraine hit more than 100 fuel trucks which deprived some Russian gas stations of fuel for weeks.

Magyar: “Crimea must become uninteresting and unusable for Putin as a military staging ground. If you analyze at least the last five massive missile attacks on Ukraine, then from the peninsula there were only isolated missile launches during simultaneous missile salvos.”

Russia

Instead of Euro-5 gasoline, Russian refineries will produce Euro-2, -3 and -4 standard fuels until 1 July 2027. The lower quality fuels will degrade engine performance, particularly modern engines, but Russia will adjust.

13 regions eliminated restrictions on fuel purchases, indicating that distribution has been adjusted and more attacks are needed on refineries. Ukraine is already trying to be more precise in their attacks, targeting specific pieces of equipment to cause the maximum amount of damage. The additional attacks on 11 of the 34 major refineries in August forced some oblasts to reintroduce restrictions. Russia is now importing gasoline from India, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Morocco. Russian petroleum products (lubricants, asphalt, petrochemical feedstock for plastics) exports by sea fell by 54.7% in July.

The Orsk refinery was attacked and all four AVT’s were hit. The Atmospheric-Vacuum Distillation unit heats and separates the oil by heavier liquids and lighter gases to create different products, such as bitumen, diesel, jet fuel and gasoline. The Orenburg oblast governor said that the refinery is out for six months because key equipment was imported and it will take time due to sanctions. The oblast now has fuel restrictions of how much can be bought, no canisters are allowed, and there is an odd/even license plate schedule.

The Salavat, Tyumen and Nizhnekamsk refineries were attacked. The Komsomolsk-on-Amur refinery, 250 km from the Pacific Ocean, caught fire all by itself. The Ust-Luga gas condensate and hydrocracking units, which refines natural gas, were destroyed.

Three new Pantsir towers were built around the Ryazan refinery and they are constructing Pantsir positions at the Yaroslavl and Kstovo refineries.

The naval base at Novorossiysk was hit by Palyanytsia, Peklo, Bars and Long Neptune alongside MICH, FirePoint, Ramsay, Sichen, Trust, Khariok, Bober, Liutyi and Dovbush drones, plus Sargan and Mamai unmanned surface vessels. Three grain terminals and an S-300 radar were hit. The four warships Project 11356 frigates Admiral Makarov and Admiral Essen, a Project 21631 Buyan-M small missile ship, and Project 22160 patrol ship Vasily Bykov were damaged to varying degrees. Some satellite images of the damage.

A cargo ship was sunk on 7 August. A Russian ship that was damaged on 3 August made it to a Turkish port.

The MiG-31 base at Savasleyka airfield was attacked with damage unknown.

Ukraine deep strikes with Flamingos had a string of failures, but they conducted a successful shorter strike 930 km away, hitting the Progress Space Center in Samara with two of their five missiles launched. The second strike is visible in the first part of the video. One missile was intercepted near Voronezh and two were intercepted near Saratov

Russia is producing a satellite communications network similar to Starlink that will allow them to pilot all their Shahed drones for more precise attacks. The satellites are launched in Soyuz rockets which are built in Samara. Ukraine was twice unable to attack the launch site in Arkangelsk but this is the only production site.

In June 2023, Russia launched three experimental prototypes for the Rassvet system. Three upgraded prototypes were launched in May 2024. After Russia was cut off from Starlink in February 2026, they launched their first set of 16 functioning satellites in March. 16 more satellites were launched in July that are not yet functional. The partial network currently only covers part of Ukraine during part of a day, but the area and time of coverage will increase as additional Rassvet satellites become functional. Counting the prototypes, there are 37 functional satellites. (One malfunctioned). 200-250 satellites are needed to provide continuous and stable data transmission. The plan is to deploy 730 satellites by 2030 and 900 by 2035.

The recent failure of the Flamingo attacks were largely because of Russia’s A-50 planes that use its airborne radar to look down and see targets that ground radars cannot see because they are blocked by terrain. Crucially, there were no A-50 planes in the air at the time when the missiles were launched. With just four A-50 planes, Russia cannot keep one in the sky at all times and the timing of the attack suggests Ukraine anticipated the down time during a regular patrol schedule or has the means to observe whether an A-50 is flying or not in real time and was ready to launch the missiles on short notice. Once on site, it takes 20-40 minutes to launch a Flamingo and it takes them a little more than an hour to fly 1000 km. It followed the Volga river for the last part of its flight to avoid ground radar detection. In that hour of flight, there is a report that all four A-50’s were launched to detect and intercept the Flamingo missiles.

A Russian analysis of events.

Flamingos try to fly low even when not over a river in the hopes that terrain will block the radio waves of ground radars. A Flamingo ran into a pole once before, so it’s possible that they could have run into other terrain, as well. (Ukrainian drones have run into construction cranes, also).

(…to be continued…)

Kostiantynivka

A month ago, Syrsky’s… erm… Ukraine’s 425th Assault Regiment was clearing out the southwestern corner of Kostiantynikva. Last week, Russian forces were dropping anti-tank mines into buildings in that same section of time. No video activity was seen east of the river.

Druzhkivka continues to be pounded. Russian infiltrators reached Torske and Petrivka, up to 9 km from the front.

For some reason, Russians park a convoy of vehicles only 20 km from the front.

Dobropillia

Dobropillia continues to be pounded by airstrikes. Russian infiltrators continue to put pressure across the front.

Both sides sometimes park a drone on a road and wait for a vehicle to arrive to take off and ambush it. For some reason, Ukraine had a hundred drones parked on a road west of Nove Shakhove. Drones have attacked enemy ambush drones before. Since most drones only have a forward-facing camera, infantry have approached ambush drones from behind to disable it. In this case, with so many Ukrainian drones, the Russians use dripping thermite to eliminate a few Ukrainian drones. (Indicated on the map)

Komar

Some history leading up to the current situation around Komar:

Avdiivka fell in February 2024 and the Russians broke through at Ocheretyne in April the same year, starting their long march to Pokrovsk. The rest of the front was stable as late as July 2024, but Russia was putting heavy pressure on Vuhledar. Instead of reinforcing Vuhledar or counterattacking the relatively small penetration at Ocheretyne, Syrsky - with Zele’s agreement, of course - invaded Kursk a month later. Russia kept advancing throughout 2025, but no front was more unstable than the line stretching from Komar to Ternuvate and Huliaipole.

Ukrainian defenses around Oleksandrohrad began to stiffen in January but the units around Huliaipole were in shambles. Reinforcements were sent to the area in December to try and slow the Russians down but they still advanced. In February, 70% of the assault forces were used to counterattack the Russian positions in the north. Other strong Ukrainian brigades were sent to maintain a slow, methodical advance that was designed to maximize Russian casualties and minimize Ukrainian casualties. Throughout the war, these brigades released very few videos. This reduces benefits they may have received from public recognition but it also denies any details that could benefit Russian planning.

In offensive operations, it is best to isolate the battlefield as much as possible. Total encirclement would block any movement of supplies and replacements by ground, but the rate of advance has been slow enough that troops threatened with encirclement have been able to withdraw. Even so, supplies and replacements that pass through a shrinking corridor suffer increasingly higher loss rates as the gap closes. These losses, plus the threatened encirclement, compel the withdrawals, and any forces leaving through the narrow corridor also suffer heavy casualties. The Russians have often used partial encirclements to achieve their objectives.

It is also possible to partially isolate a battlefield without encirclement. In the Second World War, the western Allies would use airpower to restrict movement deep behind enemy lines. Closer to the lines, artillery fire would target enemy movements, and closer still, mortars would engage targets.

In this war, Ukraine uses mid-range drones to attack any traffic, warehouses, depots, headquarters or troop concentration points that are 50-200 km from the front lines. Mariupol is currently 120 km from the front. From the front lines to 50 km, FPV drones are used to attack any target they can find. Artillery, infantry, headquarters and depots are targeted. Russian drone teams are a high priority, and anything that moves is easier to spot.

Russia is trying to do the same with their FPVs. Both sides have positions behind each other in the gray zone, so FPVs from both sides operate there. Further behind Ukrainian lines, Russian drones attack any target they see and Russian bombs confirmed or suspected target with a high level of inaccuracy.

These aerial interdiction attacks do not eliminate the flow of supplies and replacements but it does reduce the rate in which they reach the front. If Ukraine can casualties at a higher rate than Russia can replace the casualties, the number of Russian troops on the front line will be reduced over time.

If there were a thousand people in a unit and they suffered 50 casualties a day and they received 50 replacements a day, they would maintain their strength. But if they suffered 50 casualties a day and only received 90% of their replacements, only 45 troops would refill the unit. 5 people does not make that much difference for just one day, but if that stayed consistent every day then at the end of the month the unit would only have 850 troops. In two months they would be down to 700 personnel, and in three months they would be at nearly half-strength with a roster of 550 people.

The same is true for supplies.

In addition to drones, artillery and bombs, infantry on the ground also reduces the rate of supply. Russia sends infantry in teams of one to four people 5-15 and sometimes 20 km behind Ukraine’s front positions. They wait in different villages and treelines until other infiltrators arrive. If enough accumulate, they move forward again or attack Ukrainian positions. They also observe Ukrainian positions and movements which are attacked by drones, artillery, bombs and infantry. If they reduce enough Ukrainians in forward positions and prevent replacements from arriving then eventually it will become Russian-controlled territory.

On the opening day of the Ukrainian counterattack, the assault regiments made several mechanized attacks with the associated loss of at least a dozen vehicles. Other brigades were more methodical, conducting their own infiltration behind Russian positions. They were supported by drones that kept the battlefield under constant observation and provided firepower. For Russian positions that required an infantry attack, heavy drones flew in machine guns and other equipment to support the attack, and then flew them out so the infantry could move and hide more easily.

Behind the Ukrainian infiltrators, other units were hunting and eliminating any pockets of Russians that moved behind them. This made it easier to supply the forward units and evacuate their casualties.

The primary objective was to preserve Ukrainian lives and destroy Russians, and Ukraine is achieving this objective. They’ve also advanced a kilometer a month over six months. They held onto that info until last week to prevent Russia from learning any info.

A journalist says that more area has been liberated than was shown but that Ukrainian casualties were very high. Other analysts also say that bombardments indicate Ukraine has advanced further than what the government acknowledges. Ukraine already crossed the Mokri Yaly river at Yalta and Zirka in the north.

The orange circles highlight fires in an outlined box representing a snapshot of the attacks on Russian logistics for less than one day. Several drone units stopped a small column of Russian vehicles.

Two soldiers of Ukraine’s 475th Assault Regiment (Code 9.2) eliminated a Russian position but were then attacked by Molniya drones. A ground drone was sent to evacuate them but it was attacked and knocked out. Their company commander raced out by himself in a truck, lifted them into the back and then sped away before another Russian drone arrived.

Zaporizhzhia

In April, Syrsky signed an order that limited the time a unit could be stationed on the front to two months. After that time, they must be rotated for rest within one month. Often, units have to wait until bad weather because drones make movement difficult. Some have lived in a dugout for more than a year.

Platoon Commander Anatolii Syshchuk’s platoon arrived at the front line in April to relieve another unit that had been there for eight months. Syshchuk’s platoon was only supposed to be there for one month. Four months later, they are short of food, drinking water and medical supplies. Food is sometimes delayed 3-7 days and once they didn’t have food for 12 days.

The platoon belongs to the 121st Territorial Defense Brigade, which said they’ve delivered 27 nine kilogram packages over the course of a month. Then they said that weather conditions and Russian forces meant that supplies could not always be delivered on time or in full. The brigade said that the commander was personally communicating with that platoon and the platoon’s message “did not reflect all the circumstances.”

The 121st belongs to Operational Command South, which says the platoon will be rotated out once the security situation allows it, that the platoon is carrying out combat missions in a complex and dynamic sector of the front and the situation remains under the command’s control.

“At the same time, the information presented in the video message reflects only a small part of the complex operational situation and does not convey the full context of the measures being taken,” the Operational Command South statement said. “Over the past 30 days, approximately 240 kilograms of food supplies have been delivered to the positions of soldiers from the 121st Separate Territorial Defense Brigade. A series of measures is currently being implemented to rotate the unit as quickly as possible.”

One of the sisters of a platoon member said, “In our reality, it’s usually the ordinary soldier who is blamed — the one who keeps the front line holding. But if even once a commander had been punished and held accountable for the lives and health of the troops, there would be no need for such appeals.”

Platoon Commander Syshchuk said it’s been over four months now and he decided to lead his troops to the rear when favorable conditions presented themselves, and he would do it whether another unit was there to take their spot or not. Addressing the Commander-in-Chief, he said, “We are not refusing to serve, but we have no other choice. We are asking for safe passage out of the area and transportation for our evacuation. All the other authorities we have approached have failed to help us. You are our only hope.”

(…to be continued…)

Few minutes ago, while drafting this intro, have had a very strong de-ja-vu. Have written all of the following already… and then several times… and weeks, months, or even years ago. Ended up going to my bathroom, splashing some cold water into my face (again… because I did that already earlier in the morning), and then trying it a new…

But OK…

This weekend, Kyiv decided to play a numbers game and launched its biggest drone attack, ever, ever. Probably to deluge that, if nothing else, it can keep the Russian air defence crews on their toes. Moscow, naturally, claimed it swatted 822 of them out of the sky, though the debris raining down on the capital suggests a few slipped through. One particularly unlucky piece of shrapnel killed an 83-year-old man in his home.

…sadly, wars are no spreadsheets of intercepts…

Once again (where have we had that) the ‘true headline-grabber’ wasn’t a military installation, but a warehouse. The Ukrainians flattened Wildberries’ massive distribution hub in Podolsk, turning Russia’s largest online retailer into a very expensive bonfire. It was really ‘fire & smoke’ everywhere: a super-clever way to drag the war into the living rooms of the Russian public…

…and one remains forced to wonder if a similar effort directed at one, two or three of ballistic missile factories or another, two, or three refineries might have actually stopped the missiles rather than just delaying the parcel deliveries.

But hey: it wasn’t just Moscow that was hit. Down south, the Rostov region took a hammering with over 150 drones. They certainly overpowered the local Russian air defences, torched a defence industrial site, wrecked a railway station, and set a forest alight… killing five civilians along the way.

Finally, the Ukrainian Navy went for the throat in occupied Crimea and did something really useful: targeted and smashed launch sites for a Russian Bastion coastal defense system. Provided this was really hit, as claimed by various sources: that would be a solid blow to Moscow’s ability to fire its supersonic missiles.

Of course, Moscow was not content with being on the receiving end. Indeed, it retaliated with a vengeance: missiles and drones battered Kyiv overnight, sparking fires across the city and obliterating its landmark book and second-hand market.

…somehow doubt the irony of a cultural hub going up in smoke was lost on more than a few…

In grand total, across 13 Ukrainian regions, 128 Russian drones and dozens of ballistic missiles killed at least three civilians (in Sumy and Kryvyi Rih).

The one report that really caught my eye came from Kryvyi Rih. There, a Russian missile punched a hole in the ArcelorMittal steel plant. Reminded me of basic industrial physics: you can’t make high-quality steel if your plant is a crater.

But, never mind. Ukrainian officials claim the downing of 106 drones… Great News are always more important…

And on the ground, you ask?

Hand on heart: I’m happy to have Don around, because I wouldn’t find any news. AFAIK, the stalemate is deeply entrenched. Bar for few Russian infiltration squads probing Kharkiv and Sumy. Considering this is middle of the summer, I would say, it’s speaking clear language about much lauded Russian capabilities and intentions to ‘invade NATO… soon, too’…

But, Don does. And regularly so.

Therefore, over to Don.

Overview

On 4 August, 13 Russian regions lifted restrictions on gasoline sale, indicating that enough production was restored or distribution issues were resolved. After attacks on 11 of the 34 major refineries in August, many regions are reinstating restrictions. One refinery is out for six months and another stopped producing for an indeterminate amount of time.

Flamingo missiles hit the Progress Rocket and Space Center in Samara 930 km from Ukraine. This is important because the Flamingo missile attack was successful, and that was because the Ukrainians knew that none of the four Russian A-50 planes were in the air to detect them. It was also important because the space center is the only place where the Soyuz-2 rockets are built. And that is important because the rocket launches military satellites into space, including the Rossvet communication satellites that will provide capabilities similar to Starlink. Besides improving communication for ground troops, Rossvet will allow long-range drones to be piloted.

Ukraine’s long-range drones are not piloted because they do not have the satellite or other communications that support remote flying. If they did, the drones could hit moving targets, or planes that are parked and moved at different locations on the runways. Starlink satellites are deactivated when passing over Russia.

Two warehouses on the outer ring of Moscow’s air defenses were destroyed. Russia is increasing air defenses at some refineries.

Russia is increasingly piloting their long-range drones, which is a capability that Ukraine does not have because they have no communications over Russia.

Ukrainian units need approval from the General Staff to publish videos of military operations. That rule always existed but will supposedly now be enforced. Since it might deny details that Russia didn’t know, that makes sense. Ukraine will also stop publishing reports on the number of missiles Russia launched. That is because Ukraine cannot intercept missiles anymore and it is bad for morale. It still publishes drone data, and civilians will be able to track missiles, and Ukraine has only rebuilt 10% of the 700 megawatt shortage in power production since last winter.

The army continues to make positive changes but the list of things that need changing is long. Very long.

Russia is slowly advancing at Kupiansk and Sloviansk and putting heavy pressure on Kostiantynivka and Dobropillia. Ukraine is slowly advancing at Komar and putting heavy pressure on the Russians north of Lyman.

Kupiansk

Russian infiltration continues. Russians (re-)entering Kupiansk are mostly eliminated before they can accumulate in large numbers but more of them are making their way into the ruined town. Russian infiltration from Pishchane is also continuing and they are accumulating along the way and taking control of the treelines.

A Russian self-propelled gun is destroyed.

Sloviansk

Ukraine has difficulties supplying Mykolaivka and units to the east of the town because of the rivers and canals in the area. Russia already destroyed two highway bridges, but there are other bridges over smaller roads. There are a limited number of places to cross the waterways which makes it easier for Russian drones to find the targets and attack them.

Unless something changes, Russia will eventually take Mykolaivka. Their leading infiltrators already made their way into the city over a month ago. If that happens, the same waterways that make it difficult to supply Ukrainian units will make it hard for Russia to advance. Any barriers, whether they are rivers or engineering obstacles, slow movement and make it easier for targets to be destroyed by firepower, primarily drones. Sloviansk has major rivers and canals to the north and east.

After the collapse of this sector and the loss of Siversk, two brigade commanders were fired in December and the commander of the 11th Corps was replaced in February. Now, after only six months on the job, the new 11th Corps commander was fired because his management approach “did not correspond to the modern realities of decision-making.”

He is being replaced by Colonel Emil Ishkulov. Ishkulov was the commander of the 80th Air Assault Brigade in August 2024 and objected to Syrsky’s plan, or lack of it, to invade Kursk. He was fired by Syrsky and eventually became the deputy commander of the 7th Rapid Reaction Corp of Ukraine’s Air Assault Forces. Having learned operations at the corps level, his appointment to corps command was seen as an opportunity for Drapatyi to place Ishkulov into a major operational command. This is an important and unstable sector so a strong commander is necessary.

Prior to taking command of the 11th Corps, the 81st Airmobile brigade and what’s left of the 54th brigade (mostly drone units) were transferred to the operational control of the 3rd Corps, which is conducting a counterattack north of Lyman. Until the area north of Lyman is cleared - and that could take a long time - the supply routes into Lyman are dependent on the security of Sloviansk.

For those keeping track at home: The 81st Brigade is part of 7th Corp but is ‘temporarily’ (for over a year) assigned to 11th Corps… and is now under operational control of 3rd Corps.

It’s that simple.

Russian infiltrators are entering Mykolaivka from the north and east and being cleared out. Defensive positions between Mykolaivka and Sloviansk have been created in the last few months. The details of the positions weren’t released but there are probably plenty of obstacles to make it easier to detect and eliminate infiltrators.

Ukraine is fighting off Russian efforts to take Rai-Oleksandrivka, but the pressure increases by the week. Russia crossed the canal at Markovka and infiltrators crossed at Pryvillia, as well.

A 53-year-old Kramatorsk resident was arrested for providing locations of Ukrainian rocket-launchers, vehicles and movements to the Russians.

…it never stops amazing how many people never learn anything at all…

(…to be continued…)

Deployment

The radar systems need to detect aerial threats, not engage them. Radars around Moscow should detect any incoming threats, especially since the air defense systems have their own radars in addition to these stand-alone radars. Novorossyisk and Kaliningrad have a high density of radars and Rostov has a fair amount. The rest of the stand-alone radars are scattered opposite the Ukrainian border and throughout the large nation to try and detect any penetrating threats.

Primary means of the Russian ground-based air defences are S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. The mass of these is operated by the Russian Air-Space Force (VKS): S-300s are available in multiple variants, and covering medium- and long-ranges. The Russian army is primarily operating longer-ranged S-300-variants. The S-400s of the VKS can deploy a mix of own and S-300-fired SAMs.

The S-300/400 systems have to engage the threats. Since so many were knocked out over the years, the VKS as attrited to the degree where it lacks enough S-300/400s to establish and maintain a ‘wall’: an extended line dense enough for each other’s radars to be able to detect threats, or to provide mutual protection. This is why early this year they’ve pulled back and established circular point defense positions.

This way, both radars and SAMs - plus point-defence/short-range systems protecting each of S-300/400 SAM-divizions (battalions) can protect each other and crucial installations. Traditionally, Moscow is the best protected piece of real estate in Russia: therefore, it is defended by the biggest concentration of SAM-systems. A handful of other cities are also defended by S-300/400s, but nowhere else is their concentration as dense.

For example: the Kerch bridge and Crimea are still heavily defended. Sure, the 31st Air Defence Division VKS was mauled over the time, and had to be patched up by older S-300s instead of its S-400s, but this good for Ukraine because the Russian air defence on the peninsula have been proven as vulnerable and they continue to suffer losses.

Valdai is notable only because Putin has one of his favorite homes there. There is nothing else to defend at that location, but the VKS has to protect it because it would be a massive blow for the regime to get hit there. Finally, Ashuluk is Russia’s air defense testing and training center.

Exceüt for S-300/400s, Pantsyr systems are the most numerous operated by the VKS. They are point defense systems: short-range weapons combinging missiles and anti-aircraft guns. Their primary purpose nowadays is the defence of S-300/400 SAM-sites, but also different important objects. Therefore, they are available in huge numbers and can be found almost anywhere around Russia. For example, at least a battery each (usually: four Pantsyr vehicles, plus support equipment) is deployed for the defence of each refinery: those in Astrakhan, Perm, Syzran, Ryazan, Yaroslavl are often defended by two batteries.

Moscow is the most heavily defended location. The Pantsirs in the region are often located in specially built platforms or on top of buildings so their radars have a better chance of locating the aerial threats - and doing that from longer range - without being blocked by terrain. Putin’s home at Valdai is heavily protected, and there are a lot of Pantsirs at Yelabuga, also on platforms, because that is where the Shahed/Geran drones are built. Votkinsk has been attacked twice, once successfully, because that is where the Kinzhal, Iskander and Oreshnik missiles are built.

Effectiveness

As far as is known, most of Ukraine’s drones are shot down in Russia by surface-to-air missiles and cannon fire. Relatively few by man portable air defence systems (MANPADs) and air-to-air missiles fired by manned interceptors (MiG-31, Su-35, Su-30, Su-27 etc.) and attack helicopters (Mi-24, Mi-28, Mi-35, and Ka-52), machine gun fire and rifle fire.

It is hard to determine the exact numbers, but to get a rough estimate, take the reported number of drones launched into Russia one night, whether it is 300, 400 or 500, and then count how many hits on different installations have been reported - which is often somewhere in the 5-25 range: by deduction, you can establish a rough percentage of how many drones were shot down by the Russians.

One group was able to provide a more precise estimation of how many drones are successful in the heavily defended region of Moscow.

Deployment of Air Defense Systems.

All good defensive positions on the ground or in the air have depth, and Moscow has, more or less, three rings of defenses. The first ring is fairly well defined, but the second and third rings are packed closer together. If the outer ring doesn’t destroy all the targets in front of them or that fly behind them, the next layer will have a chance for multiple shots and nearby units will also take shots. The first step in engagement is detecting the target, and there are stand-alone radars and radars organic to each air defense system.

Drone Interception Patterns

The group recorded about 1,500 reports of detections and interceptions. These reports were not from the same attack but were scattered reports from across the month of July.

This map shows where the drones were shot down. Videos show how the drones fly usually alone, sometimes with another drone nearby and rarely are there three drones in the same view. So the air defenses shoot at them one at a time. In this map, distinct linear patterns are formed as the drone streams arrive from particular directions and are shot down one at a time at varying distances.

Most of those drones are shot down not as they approach the outer first ring, but after they’ve gone by. With Obninsk and Serpukhov as references, some drones are shot down before Serpukhov and none are shot down in front of Obninsk. The areas in which the most drones were shot down in front of the outer first ring is west and north of Ryazan. Maybe a hundred drones are shot down outside the first ring Moscow defenses. The other 1400 were shot down inside them.

This is a good example of why depth in air defenses is important. The targets have to be detected and all the systems have to be alerted on where to look. The first ring provided that higher level of detection, and then the first, second, and eventually third ring would engage the drones. The drones flying west and north of Ryazan were detected much earlier than from other directions and were engaged much earlier.

In Crimea, the Russian air defenses have relatively little depth (indeed: in the Sevastopol area: next to none). Some drones and missiles were detected by Crimea’s air defenses as the approached but others were only detected at close range or when they went by. If Ukraine knew the location of a Russian air defense component and attacked it, then the air defense unit had a chance to defend itself but too often it was attacked before it recognized there was a threat. When Ukraine used naval drones to launch FPV drones on the coast line, Russian air defenses were helpless. This is why Crimea was a deathtrap for Russian air defenses, and this is why it’s so difficult for Ukraine to defend Odesa against drones and missiles.

It’s also a good example of how Ukraine was able to eat away at Russia’s air defenses behind the front line over the years. Russian systems in the front were the most vulnerable. Sometimes they would defend themselves, sometimes a neighboring system would defend them, but every once in a while a system would be destroyed. As more systems were destroyed, the density of the defenses eroded and there were fewer systems to detect and protect each other, and it became easier to attack the systems that remained.

Evaluating the Cost

Moscow’s air defenses are more dense than Russia’s air defenses near Ukraine everywhere. Because of that, they are very effective. There were reportedly 6,225 drones that headed to Moscow in July. Of those, 780 were supposedly intercepted before they reached Moscow’s defenses. There could be more that were intercepted before reaching Moscow that was not reported, but there were potentially 5,445 drones that reached Moscow.

Of those, 1,500 sightings and interceptions were reported. 1,400 were destroyed by the first and second rings. 100 drones reached the third ring of defenses, and of those, one drone hit a target.

There were about 3,945 drones that did not have reports of interception locations or hits on targets, but in the months of June and July (not July only), Ukraine managed to hit:
-The Kapotnya oil refinery several times to put it out of service until 2027, inside the third ring of defenses.
-The Medvezhi Ozera Space Communications center, adjacent to the second ring of defenses.
-Koledino logistical warehouse, adjacent to the second ring of defenses.
-The Chekov Wildberries 25 km north of Serpukhov, inside the first ring of defenses.
-The Elektrostal Wildberries, adjacent to the first ring of defenses.
-Chekhov Regenerative (rubber recycling) Plant, 25 km north of Serpukhov, inside the first ring of defenses.
-The Dubna Space Communications Center, adjacent to the first ring of defenses.
-The Beloomut Space Communications Center, 20 km in front of the first ring of defenses.
-The Meshcherino Space Communications Center, adjacent to the first ring of defenses.
-The Noginsk oil depot, adjacent to the first ring of defenses.

It’s difficult to say what Russian systems engaged the 1,500 Ukrainian drones, whether the Pantsir used its cannon or missiles, or both, or how many missiles were fired from Pantsir, Tor, Buk or S-300/400 systems, or what the operating costs for the helicopter and jet aircraft that also engaged the drones. One team estimated that it cost Russia $250-450 million in ammo to shoot the 1,500 drones down. Even a conservative $125 million figure is significant.

They also used a figure of $10-30,000 for Ukrainian drones but if the $55,000 cost of an FP-1 drone is used then Ukraine spent $82.5 million in drones for the two months of attacks on Moscow.

The cost to rebuild the Kapotnya refinery is estimated to be $1 billion, plus, it won’t be producing 1.5 million tons of gasoline or 1.5 million tons of diesel, either, in those six months. And there is the damage to all the other facilities.

Moscow is the most heavily defended airspace in the world. Ukraine’s success rate is very low, but the impact of those successes is a very good return on the costs of the attacks. Ukraine’s success rate in other regions is also low, but the impact on the refineries alone makes their campaign a success.

Cruise Missile Defenses

When Russia reorganized their air defenses after so many losses, the stand-alone radars that were spread across the country could not track all the Ukrainian threats. There were too many gaps. Sometimes a target would be tracked for a couple of hours and then it would travel out of coverage range and be lost. In addition, even if a target was being tracked, there might not be any ground systems in range to engage it.

The A-50U is a long-range airborne early warning and control aircraft that was used to detect Ukrainian radars in support of drone and missile attacks on Ukraine. After two of them were shot down, the remaining A50’s patrolled at a greater distance from Ukraine. There are seven A-50U planes, but only four are operational. One was down for maintenance or repairs, but between 4-22 June, an A-50U with the tail number “45 Red” was returned to duty.

At some point, Russia decided that their air defenses needed more help than their air attacks. The A-50 was a mobile radar that could move towards the threat to keep tracking Ukraine’s drones and missiles. It could detect a Flamingo at 600 km and a long-range drone at 200 km. And if a ground air defense system was not in range, a helicopter or fighter aircraft could be directed to move towards the threat and engage it. And so, at some point no later than 4 June 2026, the A-50s were no longer patrolling Ukraine, but were providing radar coverage as part of Russia’s diminishing air defenses while based at Ivano and Ulyanovsk. They switched from offensive operations to defensive operations.

On 23 June, the pattern changed. One plane started flying around Ulyanovsk, mostly at night. They would rotate patrol duties and 60 separate missions were recorded in the next 11 days.

On 4 July, Ukraine launched five Flamingo missiles towards Votkinsk, a Iskander and Kinzhal ballistic missile factory that one Flamingo had hit back in February 2026. The Flamingo was a big missile, about 13 meters long, and can easily be detected and shot down if a radar has a line of sight to it. To avoid this, the Flamingos flew low over rivers so air defense radars on the ground would be blocked by intervening terrain. But the A-50 radar was flying between 5-10,000 meters in the air and wasn’t blocked by any terrain. All 5 missiles were shot down at three locations before they could reach the Votkinsk factory.

After the 4 July Flamingo attack the 4-5 A-50U’s were moved from Ivano and Ulyanovsk to Perm, Chelyabinsk and Orenburg to reduce the chances of them being attacked. On 6 July, it took FP-1 drones 12-15 hours to fly to Omsk. By the time they arrived, an A-50 was above the refinery to direct a Su-57 to intercept the drones, but it only downed one and at least two drones hit the refinery.

The next day, on 7 July, four A-50’s were in the air at the same time, a level of readiness that had not been seen before.

On 24 July, 5 Flamingo missiles were launched. Three were shot down somewhere, but two hit the Avitek plant in Kirov, which makes engines for the Kh-101 cruise missile, among other things.

On 7 August, 5 Flamingo missiles tried a new route to presumably reach Votkinsk and all were shot down.

The Effectiveness of the Flamingo

Increased Ukrainian attacks will likely result in a higher operational pace for the four A-50U planes, which could lead to maintenance and malfunction issues at some point. It is another source of stress for Russian air defenses, but the planes greatly increase Russia’s chances of detecting and engaging Ukrainian drones and missiles.

Ukrainian drones have been very effective against flammable targets, such as Wildberries warehouses, refineries and other energy targets. They also continue to be effective against Russian air defenses when targeting them. But the 60-120 kg warheads do a limited amount of damage to a larger facility that isn’t flammable.

The Flamingo has a 1,150 kg warhead that is very effective against any facility. If just 40% of them hit, a lot of Russian industries would be in ruin. The problem is that they are easy to detect if a radar has a line of sight to them and they are easy to shoot down if they are detected. The Flamingos had some success avoiding radars by flying above rivers, but the A-50s can see down into the rivers. Since A-50s started participating in air defense operations only two of 15 missiles made it to the target. At $600,000 each, a loss of five Flamingos costs $3 million.

Even when a Flamingo isn’t shot down, there are sometimes navigation issues and they land a short distance away. Once a missile had the misfortune of hitting a pole only a couple hundred meters from the target.

Ukraine has been launching Flamingos five at a time, either because that is all they are capable of launching or because they determined that is the most effective tactic. Either way, it doesn’t seem likely that 15 missiles will be launched at a target to overwhelm the defenses.

The 3,000 km range and 1,150 kg warhead are excellent attributes but the navigational issues and the ease with which they can be shot down when an A-50 detects them renders them ineffective. They likely have a much greater chance of hitting targets at 1,000 km or less, but would put many targets off limits, and targets like Votkinsk need to be destroyed.

They are largely ineffective as they are currently being used against Russia’s current air defenses. Ukraine needs to create conditions to make them effective.

The Future

Ukraine’s long-range drones are very effective, even against the toughest air defenses in the world. They have repeatedly attacked air defenses around Kerch, Krasnodar and Novorossiysk but there are very few reports of air defenses being attacked elsewhere deep in Russia. If they could find a way to do so, Russia’s ability to defend itself would be further reduced.

Key Russian facilities that produce missiles and drones need to be attacked. If Ukraine cannot reach them with Flamingos then massed drone attacks should be considered.

Destruction of the A-50s would be difficult but desirable.

The FP-9 is a ballistic missile with an 800 kg warhead and an 855 km range is supposed to become operational in the fall. Nothing counts until it happens, and accuracy would also need to be established, but ballistic missiles are harder to shoot down. Fire Point has a tendency to overpromise, but if the missile turns out to be effective with a decent production rate then it will be one more weapon to stress Russian air defences.

Diplomacy

One of the best things Ukraine can do right now is to escalate their mid- and long-range attacks. In order to do that, they need more drones. In April, Ukraine and Norway agreed to jointly produce several thousand middle-strike drones and Ukraine should be receiving them by now. A month before he was fired, Fedorov said Ukraine and the Netherlands agreed to a joint production of mid- and long-range drones that will be manufactured in the Netherlands and transferred to Ukraine. €250 million will be allocated to that effort. Another €250 will be used to buy PAC-3 missiles through the PURL program, which allows NATO partners to buy US products since Trump opposes aid without compensation. The timeline for delivery of the missiles was not reported.

Mongolia imports all of their fuel, 95% from Russia at a discount and 5% from China. One-third of their imports is fuel. After assessing the situation in February, they stockpiled as much fuel as their storage would allow and started to buy from other sources, which is how they’ve survived so far. Current imports are not sufficient but they haven’t stopped. They started construction on their own refinery in 2018, and when it is completed in 2028, domestic oil production will surpass imports. Mongolia has 1.4 million cars but less than 2,000 are electric despite neighboring China.

The US used to head the Security Assistance Group that assessed Ukraine’s military equipment and training needs and found solutions, if any were available. They are now pulling back from that effort and it will be led by another NATO nation.

Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact that was not aimed at any specific country. Pakistan has provided training and technical assistance to Saudi forces for decades, while Turkey and Pakistan have exchanged warships and training aircraft. Saudi Arabia is a major purchaser ⁠of drones from ​Turkey. Pakistan has deployed about 8,000 troops, fighter jets, drones and an air-defence system to the kingdom and opened negotiations with Kuwait ​to provide security in exchange for energy cooperation and investment. Israel, India and Iran did not comment.

Ukraine plans to buy from Turkey 70 ATACMS ballistic missiles and 12 M270 MLRS, which is the tracked version of HIMARS that has twice the launch capacity. They would also get 2,524 rockets for the MLRS/HIMARS that have DPICM cluster munitions. The amount of the sale is unknown but the original price was $284 million. Turkey will use the money to buy more modern systems. The US said they would approve the transfer. From Bulgaria, Ukraine would receive 47,000 203 mm artillery shells with cluster munitions for the 2S7 self-propelled artillery.

A Turkish analyst said that if Turkey is providing Ukraine with offensive weapons then a lot has changed. Turkey’s deputy foreign minister said, “This time, we truly feel closer to the goal. For the first time in 10-15 years, we have a U.S. administration we trust.”

When Zelensky was in Washington, Ukrainian front-line drone commanders gave a 30 presentation to Republican senators. One described how his brigade of 2,000 personnel destroyed $15 billion worth of Russian equipment. Another said his unit accounted for a small portion of the defense budget but was responsible for 30% of Russian losses through autonomous systems, highly trained operators and relentless adaptation. Ukraine’s greatest comparative advantage was not manufacturing but human capital. Western militaries remain focused on buying new equipment when they should be focusing on redesigning how they fight. Technology can change quickly and even the drone will be countered at some point.

The US thinks Russia will conduct a limited incursion into NATO within weeks in the form of hybrid operations, cyberattacks and other deniable measures short of a conventional military campaign. The intent is to fracture the NATO alliance.

A Russian drone exploded in a Bulgarian sunflower field near their border with Romania and a strategic gas pipeline.

A drone with PETN and Semtex explosives was found on a runway in Germany’s Leipzig/Halle airport, not far from four Ukrainian cargo planes. It was defused without injury or damage. A DHL cargo plane aborted its landing when the runway was closed and collided with a second drone, which caused minor damage. The airport has a fairly small passenger terminal but is a major logistics hub that also supplies Ukraine. In 2024, a package with an incendiary device detonated just before it was loaded onto a DHL plane at that airport.

The Trump administration has limited capabilities to plan and analyze events. Realizing their limitations, the US Central Command is asking military analysts if they have any “new creative and unconventional ways to pressure and punish Iran.” The request for ideas also went out to military officers and enlisted men. A CENTCOM spokesman said, “US Central Command has a long history of thinking and working in innovative ways. Admiral Cooper, in particular, reaches out to members of our great team, regardless of rank, to achieve the highest levels of operational performance possible.”

Crowdsourcing requests for input on policy decisions were notably absent prior to the attack on Iran.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Caine acknowledged that bombing alone is unlikely to accomplish all Trump’s previously stated objectives for the war. “Air power has its limits,” Caine told lawmakers last month.

Trump lowered his expectations and is now hoping to end the war with a symbolic win and possibly using strikes as a “fireworks” display, hitting the same or similar sites that he attacked a year ago that will give him an excuse to declare a symbolic victory. A source said, “At the end of the day, POTUS will want a deal, so he’ll continually look for ways to get tough and get out of this. You need creative minds at times -- especially if you’re running out of conventional options.”

Equipment

After Russia lost access to Starlink with devastating consequences, they rushed to establish their own Rassvet satellite communications network. 16 satellites were launched in a rocket from Plesetsk site 200 km south of Arkhangelsk. 12 are at the right altitude to function, three are climbing and one malfunctioned. This small constellation already provides communication over Ukraine twice a day for 60-90 minutes, which means reconnaissance and strike drones can potentially be remotely piloted through this system at those times. With enough satellites, the Belarusian relay stations would no longer be needed.

A second rocket with 16 satellites was launched from the same location on 19 July. For nine days prior to that, Russia issued a series of aviation and maritime notices about launches and expected areas where the rocket stages would land in the sea to obscure the launch date and trajectory of the rocket. Ukrainian drones attacks on Plesetsk began in December 2025 after the launch of a radar image satellite. Ukraine attempted an attack in March. Russia had plans to put 250 satellites in orbit at a cost of $1.3 billion by 2027, 730 in orbit by 2030, and 900 in orbit by 2035, but to do so they would need to launch a rocket every month and they have been launching one rocket every four months. Even so, they will have full round-the-clock coverage of Ukraine by mid-summer 2027 at that rate and Ukraine would have to counter them with jamming or other measures.

Triada Robotics was co-founded in 2024 by a Ukrainian veteran who worked in investment banking, project management and IT before 2022. Their business model was inspired by the US company Andruil. The company of 20 people develop their own long-range drones and sell them to manufacturers to build. They are currently developing two drones, the Bravo and Kilo. The intention is to make them inexpensive to build but the estimated cost was not reported. The Kilo would have a 500 km range, a combustion engine and would operate without navigation satellites and have autonomous target acquisition.

The Bravo drone has a self-learning model that plans routes based on the experiences of the previous drones. The drone has been built and was being prepared for testing at the end of June. The company will build 100 drones prior to serial production.

As part of the Bravo development, a hardware-software complex called Topaz was created to provide real-time drone tracking and monitoring, intelligent route planning and management, multi-channel communication, and target acquisition and tracking, which suggests moving targets can be hit.

The company also developed the Argon mission control center. The software manages drone swarms, receives real-time onboard analytics and supports target selection. The three software modes are manual with AI recommendations, automatic with minimal human intervention, and swarm mode.

They also developed the Onyx sensor that can be used on any drone to measure pressure, temperature, acceleration, and fuel consumption, and collects navigation and camera data.

The company wants to proceed in a measured way by developing their products, demonstrate their effectiveness through combat missions and then agree to joint production. The company is seeing interest in joint ventures with other manufacturers and is interested in working with the top 20 global partners, such as Lockheed Martin or Northrop Grumman. The first need to determine if their technology falls within export conditions.

The Ukrainian company December1 produces the Damba jamming system that disrupts the electronic frequencies used by radio-controlled drones. It has a 50 km range and is paired with third party sensors and needs an internet connection for 360 degree coverage. 6,000 Damba units have been sent to the front since August 2024 at a discounted price of $10,000. The software is free. They made 400 systems a month in July 2025, and now make 1,000 a month and they could rise to 2,000 a month.

Fiber optic drones are immune to jamming but using jammers forces Russia to use the more expensive fiber optic drones. Russia launches a mid-strike Molniya drone every minute, plus there are reconnaissance drones and long range strike drones. Military units, the Ukrainian government and private businesses are buying the jammer.

Ukraine has a new jammer that can jam FPV drones in two frequency bands, 300-2,500 megahertz and 2,000-6,000 megahertz, with a combined output of 200 watts.

Russian Gerber drones were seen towing an FPV behind it. 4-5 Russian drones do it every day and a reason hasn’t been stated.

The US and Ukraine are modernizing old S-300 missiles and plan to create new ones with improved capabilities by the end of 2026. 1-200 of these missiles can be created each year. It was not reported if the new capabilities included the ability to engage ballistic missiles.

Flamingos were originally built with old engines that had little operating life left. The limited supplies would eventually run out and it seems as if a British engine is now being installed on the missiles.

Ukraine

On 5 August, none of the 24 ballistic missiles and 4 hypersonic missiles were intercepted. 98 of the 115 drones were shot down. At least 17 people were killed. A train depot, a brewing company and civilian warehouses were hit. At a 28 July meeting, Trump told Zelensky that they would not provide any Patriot missiles. He also broke his promise to allow Ukraine to produce Patriot missiles. Zelensky said, “Partners who are not ready to help more actively with interceptor deliveries right now can help through new sanctions measures. A significant part of Russia’s ballistic missile production is not under sanctions. Still.”

Russia attacks Kyiv with cluster munitions. These cause limited damage to buildings but are deadly to people.

North Korea provided 15,000 troops to fight in Kursk as well as missiles, millions of artillery and mortar rounds, and other equipment. About 9,500 North Koreans are still in Kursk but have not crossed the border. Now they are sending a missile unit with six launchers and 120 ballistic missiles. Ukraine says that 30-50,000 more North Korean troops will be received in Voronezh, 200 km from Ukraine. Two possible options for using these troops are combat operations inside Ukraine, which would cross a new threshold, or stationing them on the border so that other Russian troops currently on the border could be sent into Ukraine.

A warehouse that stores electrical cables for vehicles was hit.

Ambassador to the UK and former Commander-in-Chief Zaluzhny told Zelensky that he would run for president if elections were held in the fall. He also said that Ukraine would never join NATO because of its low standards and doctrines dating back to WW2. He later clarified his remarks by saying that he’s been a strong supporter of NATO going back to 2019 when it was an unpopular view but that NATO needs to modernize.

“Scientific and technological progress is moving forward. In 2026, Ukraine used virtually every type of weapon – except Tomahawk missiles, nuclear weapons, aircraft carriers and F-35s that are in NATO service. The resource has been exhausted. Russia has found countermeasures to all of this,” Zaluzhny said. “The Armed Forces of Ukraine have reached a completely different level. NATO has no choice but to move to entirely new standards. Only then will NATO be ready for Ukraine’s accession.”

He also wants to create a new security bloc centered on Europe.

Two more ships were struck in Ukrainian ports and one sailor was killed. Since July, 67 port facilities, 35 ships in port and 22 ships at sea have been attacked.

90% of Ukraine’s agricultural exports went through the Black Sea. The loss of the Odesa ports means there is no cheap way to move Ukrainian wheat. Rail can only handle 50-55% of the Black Sea port capacity while adding $45-50 per ton in transportation costs, plus there is a shortage of drivers. Shipping the grain to Danube river barges is not currently an option due to the drought and low water levels, and that won’t change until October, if it rains then. There will also be a shortage of storage capacity. Prices were at $185-200 per ton and have dropped to $160 a ton and are still declining, and may end up lower than the cost to produce the crops. Losses for Ukraine’s farmers could reach $1.5-3 billion this year. Ukraine provides 6% of the world wheat exports and 11% of the world’s corn. They are also a major exporter of oilseeds and vegetable oils.

About 250 Ukrainian gas stations have been attacked in the last few months, and 194 of them were between the beginning of June and 27 July. FPV drones hit gas stations that are close to the front line and Shahed-type drones hit the rest. Fuel-truck drivers that resupply gas stations are increasingly refusing to service the most dangerous locations.

In addition to endangering civilians, they remove refueling sites for the military’s logistical vehicles and generators. Russian soldiers also require gas for their vehicles and generators and Ukraine started to attack gas stations in Belgorod recently, including at least one attack when several civilian cars were present.

Some are damaged, others are destroyed, and many have sandbags at their entrance. Known for spotless bathrooms, coffee, hot dogs and other amenities, they were a social gathering place for civilians and soldiers alike. Drivers within range of the drones now minimize their stops, avoid bathroom breaks and carry extra fuel cans in their car. Some that stop to fuel then move away from the pumps to wait until their tanks are full. Employees take cigarette breaks at some distance away from the stations. At one station, when soldiers were filling up a truck, the employees left the station to watch from 500 meters a day.

In the city of Trostianets, south of Sumy and 30 km from the border, the government is providing mobile fueling stations. The location of the small refueling vehicles is always changed and they are never in one location very long. Customers have to pay with cash and no fuel will be sold during air raids.

The State of Command

General Drapatyi continues his assessments and reorganization since taking command.

As reported earlier, the 225th and 425th assault regiments are not allowed to accept any replacements as they are already the size of divisions.

Srysky wanted to create more brigades by pulling personnel from existing brigades and weakening them. There now seems to be five that were forming: The 29th, 50th, 55th, 76th, and 167th Mechanized Brigades. The 50th was showing footage of drone attacks from a transferred drone unit to try and create a public image. The 29th Mechanized Brigade was almost completely formed and it will become a new unit. The other four brigades will be disbanded and their soldiers assigned to existing brigades as reinforcements. It is not known if they will be returned to the units from which they were pulled.

The head of Logistics Forces Command, Gen. Vladimir Karpienko was dismissed. He had been distributing supplies to corps and brigades based on loyalty to Syrsky rather than actual needs.

The chief of staff of the Ground Forces, Gen. Oleksandr Guziewicz was dismissed. During discussions with Drapatyi he repeatedly said that his superior was Syrsky.

The expanded reports of the 225th Assault Regiment command climate has a lot of parallels to the 425th Assault Regiment with regards to beating and torturing their own personnel. The two main differences is that there are no reports, as yet, of 225th soldiers dying in training as there was with the 425th. And there are no reports, as yet, of the 425th assigning blocking units to kill retreating soldiers, as has been reported for the 225th.

A battalion of the 39th Marine Infantry Coastal Defense Brigade was assigned to the 225th Regiment as part of the Szkval battalion made up of convicts that were released from prison to join the army. The Marines were told that they were headed to a shitshow. The Marines had served on the right bank of the Dnieper and took part in Krynky, in which some were in basements, other in the swamps, and they were pounded relentlessly by artillery and glide bombs. The Marines interpreted the warning as maybe it was going to be a difficult assignment.

It was as if they were in a different army. None of the planning for combat or logistics that they knew was conducted in that battalion. The atmosphere was oppressive. The Marines had their phones confiscated and they were placed in a basement with an armed guard at the entrance. Sources place the number of troops in the basement at 40-70. Anyone that was going on a mission would exit the basement, get their weapons and gear. When they were not on a mission they were sent to the basement. A sergeant said the commanders and guards spoke to them exclusively in Russian and cursed at them, treating them “like cattle, exactly as shown in videos with the orcs.”

The Marine said that in three weeks of operations under the 225th they suffered twice the number of casualties as when they were fighting at Krynky and on the islands in the Dnieper in three years.

That was the 225th. Thorkill reports that unconfirmed data from 2025 indicates that the 425th had around 10,000 killed and missing in action.

It is an understatement to say that things are expected to be different under Draypatyi. He is not perfect. He is not a magician. But he recognizes that soldiers perform best when they are treated with respect, trained, given clear objectives and held accountable.

Procurement Wars

Ukraine has been fighting for its survival as a nation for over four years now, but for some, the far more important battle is control over government contracts.

In 2022, Yegor Skalykha headed a location scouting company called At Point that worked with Zelensky in 2016 when he was an actor. Iryna Terekh had a business manufacturing concrete furniture. In 2023, they founded Fire Point, in 2025 they had $1 billion in contracts, and now build more than 60% of Ukraine’s long-range drones with 7,000 employees. Terekh says the possibility of producing 100,000 drones in 2026 “looks realistic.” In April 2026, NABU (anti-corruption) wiretaps seemed to reveal that the actual owners were the Mindich group, consisting of Timur Mindich, a co-owner of a television studio started by Zelensky and a target in a $100 million corruption scheme, and two brothers, Oleksandr and Mykhaylo Tsukerman, wanted in the same scheme.

After accusations of a connection to Mindich came out in October 2025, former CIA director and Secretary of State in Trump’s first administration, Mike Pompeo, joined the Fire Point advisory board.

Denys Shtylerman, the chief designer and co-owner, says they never received state funding for development and they have a 21.52% profit margin with 25% allowed. NABU confirmed there were no cases against Fire Point and its management. Shtylerman and Terekh are often promoting their products. Terekh lied once, saying that Fire Point was producing 100 FP-1 drones and one Flamingo missile every day before saying those were the numbers they could produce, not the ones they were actually producing. Last October, Shtilierman said they were producing 2-3 missiles a day but the number of Flamingos launched do not even support a claim of one missile per day for the last year.

There have been numerous accusations of Fire Point receiving preferential treatment and critics say that by monopolizing the market, they hurt the drone industry. The head of parliament’s anti-corruption committee believes that how Fire Point was awarded contracts should be investigated. Some have called for nationalizing Fire Point because of its connection to Mindich.

Oleksandr Konotopski founded Skyfall Industries and builds the P1-SUN interceptor and the Vampire “Baba Yaga” drone that has its own $900 million contract, which is the second largest behind Fire Point. He just revealed a drone with a 600 km range, 40-50 kg warhead and a $25-30k cost. Both sides have covert lobbyists that pose as journalists and industry experts to argue their case in public. One compared the Skyfall drone to the $55k, 75 kg FP-1 from Fire Point and said the cheaper drone was the way to go. Many former commentators point out that the two drones have different characteristics, such as a heavier warhead and a 3,400 km range for the FP-1.

For comparison, the basic Russian Shahed drone costs $35,000, has a 50 kg warhead and a range of 2,000 km.

The Fire Point drones have reached Omsk and have been responsible for much of the attacks on Russia’s refineries. The few Flamingo missiles that have been launched, and weren’t shot down, and didn’t narrowly miss the target, caused significant damage with their 1,150 kg warhead. The P1-SUN interceptors are highly effective at a low cost when intercepting drones and they improved their speed from 310 kph to 370 kph. The Vampire drone has been dropping heavy loads of munitions or transporting supplies and weapons for the infantry for some time now.

All these weapons are needed to defeat Russia. A lot of producers are focused on the fight. It would be nice if they all were.

The State of Command

General Drapatyi continues his assessments and reorganization since taking command.

As reported earlier, the 225th and 425th assault regiments are not allowed to accept any replacements as they are already the size of divisions.

Srysky wanted to create more brigades by pulling personnel from existing brigades and weakening them. There now seems to be five that were forming: The 29th, 50th, 55th, 76th, and 167th Mechanized Brigades. The 50th was showing footage of drone attacks from a transferred drone unit to try and create a public image. The 29th Mechanized Brigade was almost completely formed and it will become a new unit. The other four brigades will be disbanded and their soldiers assigned to existing brigades as reinforcements. It is not known if they will be returned to the units from which they were pulled.

The head of Logistics Forces Command, Gen. Vladimir Karpienko was dismissed. He had been distributing supplies to corps and brigades based on loyalty to Syrsky rather than actual needs.

The chief of staff of the Ground Forces, Gen. Oleksandr Guziewicz was dismissed. During discussions with Drapatyi he repeatedly said that his superior was Syrsky.

The expanded reports of the 225th Assault Regiment command climate has a lot of parallels to the 425th Assault Regiment with regards to beating and torturing their own personnel. The two main differences is that there are no reports, as yet, of 225th soldiers dying in training as there was with the 425th. And there are no reports, as yet, of the 425th assigning blocking units to kill retreating soldiers, as has been reported for the 225th.

A battalion of the 39th Marine Infantry Coastal Defense Brigade was assigned to the 225th Regiment as part of the Szkval battalion made up of convicts that were released from prison to join the army. The Marines were told that they were headed to a shitshow. The Marines had served on the right bank of the Dnieper and took part in Krynky, in which some were in basements, other in the swamps, and they were pounded relentlessly by artillery and glide bombs. The Marines interpreted the warning as maybe it was going to be a difficult assignment.

It was as if they were in a different army. None of the planning for combat or logistics that they knew was conducted in that battalion. The atmosphere was oppressive. The Marines had their phones confiscated and they were placed in a basement with an armed guard at the entrance. Sources place the number of troops in the basement at 40-70. Anyone that was going on a mission would exit the basement, get their weapons and gear. When they were not on a mission they were sent to the basement. A sergeant said the commanders and guards spoke to them exclusively in Russian and cursed at them, treating them “like cattle, exactly as shown in videos with the orcs.”

The Marine said that in three weeks of operations under the 225th they suffered twice the number of casualties as when they were fighting at Krynky and on the islands in the Dnieper in three years.

That was the 225th. Thorkill reports that unconfirmed data from 2025 indicates that the 425th had around 10,000 killed and missing in action.

It is an understatement to say that things are expected to be different under Draypatyi. He is not perfect. He is not a magician. But he recognizes that soldiers perform best when they are treated with respect, trained, given clear objectives and held accountable.

Procurement Wars

Ukraine has been fighting for its survival as a nation for over four years now, but for some, the far more important battle is control over government contracts.

In 2022, Yegor Skalykha headed a location scouting company called At Point that worked with Zelensky in 2016 when he was an actor. Iryna Terekh had a business manufacturing concrete furniture. In 2023, they founded Fire Point, in 2025 they had $1 billion in contracts, and now build more than 60% of Ukraine’s long-range drones with 7,000 employees. Terekh says the possibility of producing 100,000 drones in 2026 “looks realistic.” In April 2026, NABU (anti-corruption) wiretaps seemed to reveal that the actual owners were the Mindich group, consisting of Timur Mindich, a co-owner of a television studio started by Zelensky and a target in a $100 million corruption scheme, and two brothers, Oleksandr and Mykhaylo Tsukerman, wanted in the same scheme.

After accusations of a connection to Mindich came out in October 2025, former CIA director and Secretary of State in Trump’s first administration, Mike Pompeo, joined the Fire Point advisory board.

Denys Shtylerman, the chief designer and co-owner, says they never received state funding for development and they have a 21.52% profit margin with 25% allowed. NABU confirmed there were no cases against Fire Point and its management. Shtylerman and Terekh are often promoting their products. Terekh lied once, saying that Fire Point was producing 100 FP-1 drones and one Flamingo missile every day before saying those were the numbers they could produce, not the ones they were actually producing. Last October, Shtilierman said they were producing 2-3 missiles a day but the number of Flamingos launched do not even support a claim of one missile per day for the last year.

There have been numerous accusations of Fire Point receiving preferential treatment and critics say that by monopolizing the market, they hurt the drone industry. The head of parliament’s anti-corruption committee believes that how Fire Point was awarded contracts should be investigated. Some have called for nationalizing Fire Point because of its connection to Mindich.

Oleksandr Konotopski founded Skyfall Industries and builds the P1-SUN interceptor and the Vampire “Baba Yaga” drone that has its own $900 million contract, which is the second largest behind Fire Point. He just revealed a drone with a 600 km range, 40-50 kg warhead and a $25-30k cost. Both sides have covert lobbyists that pose as journalists and industry experts to argue their case in public. One compared the Skyfall drone to the $55k, 75 kg FP-1 from Fire Point and said the cheaper drone was the way to go. Many former commentators point out that the two drones have different characteristics, such as a heavier warhead and a 3,400 km range for the FP-1.

For comparison, the basic Russian Shahed drone costs $35,000, has a 50 kg warhead and a range of 2,000 km.

The Fire Point drones have reached Omsk and have been responsible for much of the attacks on Russia’s refineries. The few Flamingo missiles that have been launched, and weren’t shot down, and didn’t narrowly miss the target, caused significant damage with their 1,150 kg warhead. The P1-SUN interceptors are highly effective at a low cost when intercepting drones and they improved their speed from 310 kph to 370 kph. The Vampire drone has been dropping heavy loads of munitions or transporting supplies and weapons for the infantry for some time now.

All these weapons are needed to defeat Russia. A lot of producers are focused on the fight. It would be nice if they all were.

Russia

The laws of dictatorship continue to tighten. Anyone that fled arrest in Russia or left for political reasons is stripped of citizenship, bank accounts and property. Anyone who spreads “false information” about the armed forces can now get up to 15 years. Anyone who “discredits” the army is threatened with five years. Media outlets cannot use the words “war”, “invasion” or “assault.” People and organizations can now be labeled foreign agents. 25,000 websites have been blocked in the last year.

The Saratov refinery was hit and is expected to be offline for 2-3 weeks. The Yaroslavl refinery was hit and cars in a parking lot were hit by falling Pantsir cannon fire. The Ufa-Bashneft refinery was hit.

There are dangers in starting up refineries quickly. Russia cannot afford to tolerate any down time with their refineries so they are re-starting them after repairs quickly. The Syzran refinery had a fire after startup and the effect was the equivalent of a drone strike.

18 refineries were attacked in July, surpassing the previous record of the 17 refineries that were attacked in May. Russian refining fell to the lowest levels since May 2022.

A Ukrainian drone attacking a radar at the Black Sea port of Gelendzhik is shot down, killing 7 people.

A woman carried a homemade bomb packed with ball bearings to the entrance of a restaurant in Moscow and it was remotely detonated, killing her and four others while wounding at least 21 others. The event was a birthday party for Alexander Chayko, commander-in-chief of Russia’s Aerospace Forces, who is being tried in absentia in Ukraine for war crimes.

Wildberries attacks: 2 August, Samara. 3 August, the Vladimir warehouse was largely destroyed. 4 August, Krasny Bor was attacked successfully. A 4 August attack in Yekaterinburg failed, Chekhov district in Moscow succeeded. 5 August, Alesksin in the Tula region, a top 10 warehouse was hit twice. Novosemeykina was mostly burnt down.

Russian media says that Wildberries is removing electronics, jewelry and other good to separate warehouses, and then when the large warehouse is burnt, the stored goods are declared destroyed. This has not been confirmed. At the same time, there are many that believe the fuel shortage is a corruption scheme.

The Morrigan is a mid-strike drone that was developed with the 412th Nemesis Brigade and has been used for at least two months. The characteristics of the drone and the company that worked with the brigade to build it were not reported for operational security reasons. Here are the results of the 412th using the Morrigan drones.

Russia is using Geran-4 drones to attack Ukrainian naval drones. For some reason, some Russians parked an airplane in the Belgorod airport.

Ukraine destroyed an expensive Volna-Kupol-Garant Starlink jamming system at Gelendzhik, 20 km southeast of Novorossyisk. Soon after, an S-400 system was attacked at Gelendzhik and at least one launcher was destroyed based on the description. There were no details on whether more components of the system were attacked. Five other air defense components in Russia were destroyed on the same night, and an oil tanker and two cargo ships were hit on the Black Sea.

The Nadezh RO-RO (roll on, roll off) ferry was attacked on the way to Novorossiysk my multiple drones and the crew was evacuated. Russia only has 1-2 ferries left in the Kerch Strait.

Russia hasn’t produced a heavy bomber drone so they’ve been using captured Ukrainian Vampire drones. Sometimes Russia uses EW signals in Russian and Kaliningrad to spoof navigation satellite signal and steer Ukrainian drones into NATO territory. Russia also downed Ukrainian long-range drones with electronic warfare and captured them with little to no damage. Poland believes that Russia might use them in a false flag operation to blame Ukraine for attacks on NATO countries. Poland said a month ago that they were working in a pre-war state of heightened readiness, which was apparently not enough to intercept a Russian cruise missile that approached their border over several hours.

Russia had been completely dependent on China for drone motors. Recently, China sold a large number of production lines to Russia, who will now build their own drone motors. The Chinese company offers to sell and install the equipment for 379,000 yuan ($56,000). The company would cover hotel accommodations, airfare, visas, and insurance, while the Russian customer would cover meals, local transportation, and translation services. Payment was proposed to be made through Russia’s VTB Shanghai branch.

Chinese motors are inexpensive because the process is almost completely automated. First, laminations are cut from sheet iron to match the shape of the stator (the motor’s stationary part). They are stacked, pressed, and their surface is machined. Then, copper wire is wound onto the stator. The stator is mounted on a base. Meanwhile, on another part of the production line, the rotor—the moving part—is manufactured: a cylindrical base is taken, magnets and an end cap are glued to it, the adhesive is sintered for increased strength, and the shaft is installed. Then the rotor is attached to a bearing on the stator base.

(…to be continued…)

Mylove

Throughout Sumy and Kharkiv, Russian forces are skirmishing and trying to find any gaps for infiltration, and when they find them, they try to push forward. While this is standard Russian tactics, the local units don’t have the number of troops that Sloviansk, Kostiantynivka or Dobropillia has. On the other hand, Ukraine doesn’t have the same density of troops, either. So these are smaller versions of what is happening elsewhere.

This particular penetration happened to split the seam between a Border Guard unit and a Territorial Defense unit that were adjacent to each other. Coordination of defenses between adjacent units is sometimes weak, which is why it is a preferred location to attack. How the two units and their corps commander reacts to it remains to be seen.

Kupiansk

A bridge at Urazovo 25 km behind the Russian lines is destroyed.

Sloviansk

After being stable for over two years, despite repeated attacks, the Sloviansk sector started to fall apart over 13 months ago and it’s been unstable ever since. It was a mystery, because something had to have changed and it wasn’t the Russian attacks. There’s a report now that Syrsky removed much of the 54th Brigade, which was in between the 81st Airmobile and the 10th Mountain brigades. Soon after, Russia started pushing in from the south, but six months later the 10th was able to stabilize that front. Then six months after that, the collapse began.

There weren’t many territorial changes this week, but it does make more sense if the 81st is operating by themselves in front of Mykolaivka.

Of the four remaining fortress towns of Donbass, Kostiantynivka is destroyed, Druzhkivka is a heavily damaged ghost town, Kramatorsk suffers a bomb or drone attack every day and is full of people but businesses are moving out, and Sloviansk is the most liveable, even with their bomb and drone attacks. A 37 minute video of life in these places.

Kostiantynivka

There aren’t many videos for geolocations this week. A bridge at Druzhkivka was heavily damaged by an airstrike.

Dobropillia

Local commanders had asked to pull back their lines to shorten them and strengthen their defenses. Syrsky refused and sent five battalions of the 425th, plus three battalions of the 108th Territorial Defense Brigade by Orikhiv, continuing his practice of splintering units and reducing their effectiveness.

Two weeks ago, those units left the area. At the same time, Russian forces advanced. If there was a Russian breakthrough, it would be unlikely for extra Ukrainian forces to be sent away. On the other hand, if the commanders had asked to pull back, it is plausible that Drapatyi gave them permission within a week of taking command and then moved the extra troops elsewhere.

The fighting in Rodynske went on for a year before coming to an end a couple weeks ago.

In the armored attacks a couple of weeks ago, anti-drone systems on the tanks did actually work to some extent. One tank destroyed 7 drones before its defenses were exhausted. It took 15-20 drones to kill each of the 7 tanks. All defenses, whether it is armor, hedgehog tanks, anti-drone systems, or bunkers, provide a certain level of protection, and all defenses can be overcome with either a single attack that overwhelms the protection or a series of attacks that chips away at the protection. Currently, there are enough drones to eliminate tank defenses, even if it takes up to seven additional drones to destroy a tank.

When a tank’s defenses become strong enough to have maybe a 90% chance to complete an operation, and the destruction of the tank doesn’t mean the destruction of the crew, then it is possible that tanks will be a viable option for limited offensive actions. Even with a 90% survival rate, the cost of all the drones that both succeeded to kill 10% of a theoretical tank unit and failed to kill the other 90% of tanks involved would still cost less than the 10% of the tanks that were destroyed in this hypothetical situation, so the use of tanks would need to be reserved for an important goal that could not be achieved by other means.

Komar

Ukraine cleared Russian positions north of the Vovcha river near Filiia and Dachne. Russia tried to disrupt their operations with an attack from Horikhove but that failed.

Ukraine has units adjacent to the Mokri Yaly river in several places, and that may also be true near Komar. Hrushivske and Piddubne need to be cleared out, and there are still small pockets of Russians in Sichneve and near Olekandrohrad.

Ukraine is moving towards Komyshuvakha and Novoivanivka and Russians are counterattacking in small groups out of Novoivanivka. There are still Russians south of Verbove.

Zaporizhzhia

Russian infiltrators made it into Orikhiv and are being attacked.

Kherson

A Russian drone pilot hunts a fruit vendor. He survived, seen sitting here. He talks about his experience and his doctor says he sees 20 patients a day from drone attacks.

SENSITIVE: A passenger in a car was killed after a Russian drone attack and her body is collected.

Odesa

The ports and ships around Odesa have been hit hard in the last couple of months but a Russian cruise missile was shot down by a MiG-29 and a jet drone was shot down by an interceptor off the beach. There were 8 jet drones and two missiles, including the ones shot down, and some hit oil terminals at the Odesa port.

15 Geran drones hit Odesa’s port during a night attack.

Unknown Location

In its last moments, the vehicle became a jet-propelled truck.

Many elderly civilians don’t evacuate their homes because they’ve been living there for decades, if not their whole life, they don’t have the capability to move, or they can’t afford to pay rent in any new location. Somewhere in Donetsk, a Ukrainian soldier asked an elderly woman why she hadn’t evacuated and she said she had nowhere else to go. He offered her his house and she said she couldn’t pay any money. He said she could live there for free and it was a village a thousand kilometers away from the fighting.

Occupied Territories

There is still a lot of Russian logistic traffic on the highways and secondary roads. There has to be or the Russian army dies. Some views of drivers on the roads of wrecks and attacks a few minutes after they happened. ~95+% of Russian trucks make it to their destination, but then a small percentage of trucks that move from there are attacked, and maybe it is moved one more time and FPVs attack a small percentage of the vehicles. The warehouses themselves are attacked when identified. It all adds up to the slow strangulation of the Russian army, particularly in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia area.

A convoy of three truck tankers and three mobile fire teams resulted in the loss of two trucks. It is not known how many drones have been shot down by Russian mobile gun teams. A certain amount, to be sure. The gun teams have also suffered losses. More trucks are using secondary roads, which are more easily blocked when there is an accident or attack. These trucks are prime targets for drone attacks. Maybe the drones don’t arrive in time and they are all just delayed. Even delays in deliveries result in lower rates of supply because it all adds up.

A Russian base in Luhansk was attacked by an airstrike. The 413th Regiment attacks Russian trains. Partisans in the Leningrad and Tyumen regions each set a rail tank car on fire. One of the roads into Crimea.

A Pantsir detects and engages a Ukrainian drone three times but the drone is too small for the missile to effectively intercept it. It does come close twice.

Yet another S-400 system is attacked in Crimea near Kerch.

Substations and gas distribution station: 3 August: 10 facilities, August 4-5: 13 facilities in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Crimea, causing blackouts in Mariupol, Melitopol, Henichesk, Berdiansk, Zuhres, Prymorskyi Posad, and other locations. 5 August: 13 facilities, none in Crimea. 7 August: 10 sub stations.

(…to be continued…)