**Strong nonproliferation commitments under the NPT, combined with lengthy technical and political timelines, underpin the market's 94.7% probability on "No."** Most US allies lack active fissile-material production programs or weaponization decisions that could yield operational nuclear weapons before the end of 2026. Recent policy debates in South Korea, Japan, and Poland center on public opinion polls and extended-deterrence assurances rather than announced breakout efforts, while governments continue to reaffirm alliance reliance and NPT compliance. The US-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement, submitted for congressional review in August 2026, emphasizes power generation with enrichment pathways subject to safeguards and described by experts as requiring years or decades to reach weapons-usable material. European initiatives, such as France's forward-deterrence framework joined by additional NATO members in 2026, focus on coordination with existing UK and French arsenals rather than new national programs. These factors align with the wisdom-of-crowds assessment that no qualifying ally will cross the threshold in the remaining months.
基于Polymarket数据的AI实验性摘要。这不是交易建议，也不影响该市场的结算方式。 · 更新于是
5% 概率
$212,871 交易量
$212,871 交易量
2026-12-31
是
5% 概率
$212,871 交易量
$212,871 交易量
2026-12-31
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
**Strong nonproliferation commitments under the NPT, combined with lengthy technical and political timelines, underpin the market's 94.7% probability on "No."** Most US allies lack active fissile-material production programs or weaponization decisions that could yield operational nuclear weapons before the end of 2026. Recent policy debates in South Korea, Japan, and Poland center on public opinion polls and extended-deterrence assurances rather than announced breakout efforts, while governments continue to reaffirm alliance reliance and NPT compliance. The US-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement, submitted for congressional review in August 2026, emphasizes power generation with enrichment pathways subject to safeguards and described by experts as requiring years or decades to reach weapons-usable material. European initiatives, such as France's forward-deterrence framework joined by additional NATO members in 2026, focus on coordination with existing UK and French arsenals rather than new national programs. These factors align with the wisdom-of-crowds assessment that no qualifying ally will cross the threshold in the remaining months.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
市场开放时间： Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
交易量
$212,871结束日期
2027-01-01市场开放时间
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETThis market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
**Strong nonproliferation commitments under the NPT, combined with lengthy technical and political timelines, underpin the market's 94.7% probability on "No."** Most US allies lack active fissile-material production programs or weaponization decisions that could yield operational nuclear weapons before the end of 2026. Recent policy debates in South Korea, Japan, and Poland center on public opinion polls and extended-deterrence assurances rather than announced breakout efforts, while governments continue to reaffirm alliance reliance and NPT compliance. The US-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement, submitted for congressional review in August 2026, emphasizes power generation with enrichment pathways subject to safeguards and described by experts as requiring years or decades to reach weapons-usable material. European initiatives, such as France's forward-deterrence framework joined by additional NATO members in 2026, focus on coordination with existing UK and French arsenals rather than new national programs. These factors align with the wisdom-of-crowds assessment that no qualifying ally will cross the threshold in the remaining months.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
交易量
$212,871结束日期
2027-01-01市场开放时间
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET**Strong nonproliferation commitments under the NPT, combined with lengthy technical and political timelines, underpin the market's 94.7% probability on "No."** Most US allies lack active fissile-material production programs or weaponization decisions that could yield operational nuclear weapons before the end of 2026. Recent policy debates in South Korea, Japan, and Poland center on public opinion polls and extended-deterrence assurances rather than announced breakout efforts, while governments continue to reaffirm alliance reliance and NPT compliance. The US-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement, submitted for congressional review in August 2026, emphasizes power generation with enrichment pathways subject to safeguards and described by experts as requiring years or decades to reach weapons-usable material. European initiatives, such as France's forward-deterrence framework joined by additional NATO members in 2026, focus on coordination with existing UK and French arsenals rather than new national programs. These factors align with the wisdom-of-crowds assessment that no qualifying ally will cross the threshold in the remaining months.
基于Polymarket数据的AI实验性摘要。这不是交易建议，也不影响该市场的结算方式。 · 更新于
警惕外部链接哦。
警惕外部链接哦。
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