**Beijing continues to favor sustained gray-zone coercion—routine air and naval patrols, coast guard operations east of Taiwan, and large-scale exercises—over kinetic escalation, keeping the implied probability of a direct military clash (defined as missile strikes, artillery, or gunfire between forces) before the end of 2026 at roughly 7%.** Taiwan’s August 2026 Han Kuang drills and recent defense report highlight Beijing’s efforts to normalize encirclement and shorten warning times while incorporating lessons from Ukraine and other conflicts, yet these remain below the threshold of actual combat. U.S.-China leader-level diplomacy in 2026 has emphasized stability and trade, with no verified large-scale invasion preparations or crossing of the kinetic threshold observed through late August. Traders therefore view the remaining months of the year as unlikely to produce the first direct engagement in decades, consistent with the pattern of pressure short of war.
Ringkasan eksperimental yang dihasilkan AI dengan referensi data Polymarket. Ini bukan saran trading dan tidak berperan dalam bagaimana pasar ini diselesaikan. · DiperbaruiYa
7% peluang
$3,282,723 Vol.
$3,282,723 Vol.
Dec 31, 2026
Ya
7% peluang
$3,282,723 Vol.
$3,282,723 Vol.
Dec 31, 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.**Beijing continues to favor sustained gray-zone coercion—routine air and naval patrols, coast guard operations east of Taiwan, and large-scale exercises—over kinetic escalation, keeping the implied probability of a direct military clash (defined as missile strikes, artillery, or gunfire between forces) before the end of 2026 at roughly 7%.** Taiwan’s August 2026 Han Kuang drills and recent defense report highlight Beijing’s efforts to normalize encirclement and shorten warning times while incorporating lessons from Ukraine and other conflicts, yet these remain below the threshold of actual combat. U.S.-China leader-level diplomacy in 2026 has emphasized stability and trade, with no verified large-scale invasion preparations or crossing of the kinetic threshold observed through late August. Traders therefore view the remaining months of the year as unlikely to produce the first direct engagement in decades, consistent with the pattern of pressure short of war.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Pasar Dibuka: Nov 13, 2025, 5:55 PM ET
Volume
$3,282,723Tanggal Berakhir
Jan 1, 2027Pasar Dibuka
Nov 13, 2025, 5:55 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.**Beijing continues to favor sustained gray-zone coercion—routine air and naval patrols, coast guard operations east of Taiwan, and large-scale exercises—over kinetic escalation, keeping the implied probability of a direct military clash (defined as missile strikes, artillery, or gunfire between forces) before the end of 2026 at roughly 7%.** Taiwan’s August 2026 Han Kuang drills and recent defense report highlight Beijing’s efforts to normalize encirclement and shorten warning times while incorporating lessons from Ukraine and other conflicts, yet these remain below the threshold of actual combat. U.S.-China leader-level diplomacy in 2026 has emphasized stability and trade, with no verified large-scale invasion preparations or crossing of the kinetic threshold observed through late August. Traders therefore view the remaining months of the year as unlikely to produce the first direct engagement in decades, consistent with the pattern of pressure short of war.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$3,282,723Tanggal Berakhir
Jan 1, 2027Pasar Dibuka
Nov 13, 2025, 5:55 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...**Beijing continues to favor sustained gray-zone coercion—routine air and naval patrols, coast guard operations east of Taiwan, and large-scale exercises—over kinetic escalation, keeping the implied probability of a direct military clash (defined as missile strikes, artillery, or gunfire between forces) before the end of 2026 at roughly 7%.** Taiwan’s August 2026 Han Kuang drills and recent defense report highlight Beijing’s efforts to normalize encirclement and shorten warning times while incorporating lessons from Ukraine and other conflicts, yet these remain below the threshold of actual combat. U.S.-China leader-level diplomacy in 2026 has emphasized stability and trade, with no verified large-scale invasion preparations or crossing of the kinetic threshold observed through late August. Traders therefore view the remaining months of the year as unlikely to produce the first direct engagement in decades, consistent with the pattern of pressure short of war.
Ringkasan eksperimental yang dihasilkan AI dengan referensi data Polymarket. Ini bukan saran trading dan tidak berperan dalam bagaimana pasar ini diselesaikan. · Diperbarui
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