**Strong nonproliferation commitments, technical barriers, and the absence of active weaponization programs by any US ally underpin the 94.8% trader consensus against acquisition before 2027.** Most NATO members and Major Non-NATO Allies remain bound by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or equivalent safeguards, with civilian nuclear cooperation agreements—such as the recent US-Saudi deal—explicitly limiting enrichment and subject to IAEA monitoring. Discussions in South Korea and Japan about independent deterrents or nuclear-powered submarines stay at the level of public debate, polls, and policy reviews, without announced fissile-material production ramps, warhead development, or delivery-system deployments feasible by December 2026. US extended deterrence assurances, even amid alliance strains, continue to shape allied calculations, while historical precedent shows nuclear breakout timelines far exceed the months remaining. Late-breaking diplomatic shifts or covert advances remain theoretically possible but lack supporting evidence in current reporting.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · ActualizadoSí
5% probabilidad
$212,661 Vol.
$212,661 Vol.
31 dic 2026
Sí
5% probabilidad
$212,661 Vol.
$212,661 Vol.
31 dic 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
**Strong nonproliferation commitments, technical barriers, and the absence of active weaponization programs by any US ally underpin the 94.8% trader consensus against acquisition before 2027.** Most NATO members and Major Non-NATO Allies remain bound by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or equivalent safeguards, with civilian nuclear cooperation agreements—such as the recent US-Saudi deal—explicitly limiting enrichment and subject to IAEA monitoring. Discussions in South Korea and Japan about independent deterrents or nuclear-powered submarines stay at the level of public debate, polls, and policy reviews, without announced fissile-material production ramps, warhead development, or delivery-system deployments feasible by December 2026. US extended deterrence assurances, even amid alliance strains, continue to shape allied calculations, while historical precedent shows nuclear breakout timelines far exceed the months remaining. Late-breaking diplomatic shifts or covert advances remain theoretically possible but lack supporting evidence in current reporting.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Mercado abierto: Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
Volumen
$212,661Fecha de finalización
1 ene 2027Mercado abierto
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
**Strong nonproliferation commitments, technical barriers, and the absence of active weaponization programs by any US ally underpin the 94.8% trader consensus against acquisition before 2027.** Most NATO members and Major Non-NATO Allies remain bound by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or equivalent safeguards, with civilian nuclear cooperation agreements—such as the recent US-Saudi deal—explicitly limiting enrichment and subject to IAEA monitoring. Discussions in South Korea and Japan about independent deterrents or nuclear-powered submarines stay at the level of public debate, polls, and policy reviews, without announced fissile-material production ramps, warhead development, or delivery-system deployments feasible by December 2026. US extended deterrence assurances, even amid alliance strains, continue to shape allied calculations, while historical precedent shows nuclear breakout timelines far exceed the months remaining. Late-breaking diplomatic shifts or covert advances remain theoretically possible but lack supporting evidence in current reporting.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Volumen
$212,661Fecha de finalización
1 ene 2027Mercado abierto
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...**Strong nonproliferation commitments, technical barriers, and the absence of active weaponization programs by any US ally underpin the 94.8% trader consensus against acquisition before 2027.** Most NATO members and Major Non-NATO Allies remain bound by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or equivalent safeguards, with civilian nuclear cooperation agreements—such as the recent US-Saudi deal—explicitly limiting enrichment and subject to IAEA monitoring. Discussions in South Korea and Japan about independent deterrents or nuclear-powered submarines stay at the level of public debate, polls, and policy reviews, without announced fissile-material production ramps, warhead development, or delivery-system deployments feasible by December 2026. US extended deterrence assurances, even amid alliance strains, continue to shape allied calculations, while historical precedent shows nuclear breakout timelines far exceed the months remaining. Late-breaking diplomatic shifts or covert advances remain theoretically possible but lack supporting evidence in current reporting.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · Actualizado
Cuidado con los enlaces externos.
Cuidado con los enlaces externos.
Preguntas frecuentes