US allies such as South Korea, Japan, and Saudi Arabia continue to prioritize extended deterrence commitments and civil nuclear cooperation with Washington over independent weapons programs. Recent US-Saudi 123 Agreement submissions to Congress and trilateral small modular reactor initiatives with Seoul and Tokyo focus on energy security and uranium enrichment for peaceful uses, subject to IAEA safeguards and congressional review, without timelines supporting full weaponization by late 2026. Officials in allied capitals have signaled preferences for nuclear sharing arrangements or alliance enhancements rather than breakout, while domestic polling and strategic analyses highlight barriers including NPT obligations, technical lead times, and alliance cohesion. These factors sustain trader consensus around the low likelihood of any ally acquiring nuclear weapons before 2027.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jourOui
5% chance
$212,871 Vol.
$212,871 Vol.
31 déc. 2026
Oui
5% chance
$212,871 Vol.
$212,871 Vol.
31 déc. 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
US allies such as South Korea, Japan, and Saudi Arabia continue to prioritize extended deterrence commitments and civil nuclear cooperation with Washington over independent weapons programs. Recent US-Saudi 123 Agreement submissions to Congress and trilateral small modular reactor initiatives with Seoul and Tokyo focus on energy security and uranium enrichment for peaceful uses, subject to IAEA safeguards and congressional review, without timelines supporting full weaponization by late 2026. Officials in allied capitals have signaled preferences for nuclear sharing arrangements or alliance enhancements rather than breakout, while domestic polling and strategic analyses highlight barriers including NPT obligations, technical lead times, and alliance cohesion. These factors sustain trader consensus around the low likelihood of any ally acquiring nuclear weapons before 2027.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Marché ouvert : Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
Volume
$212,871Date de fin
1 janv. 2027Marché ouvert
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETRésolveur
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
US allies such as South Korea, Japan, and Saudi Arabia continue to prioritize extended deterrence commitments and civil nuclear cooperation with Washington over independent weapons programs. Recent US-Saudi 123 Agreement submissions to Congress and trilateral small modular reactor initiatives with Seoul and Tokyo focus on energy security and uranium enrichment for peaceful uses, subject to IAEA safeguards and congressional review, without timelines supporting full weaponization by late 2026. Officials in allied capitals have signaled preferences for nuclear sharing arrangements or alliance enhancements rather than breakout, while domestic polling and strategic analyses highlight barriers including NPT obligations, technical lead times, and alliance cohesion. These factors sustain trader consensus around the low likelihood of any ally acquiring nuclear weapons before 2027.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Volume
$212,871Date de fin
1 janv. 2027Marché ouvert
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETRésolveur
0x65070BE91...US allies such as South Korea, Japan, and Saudi Arabia continue to prioritize extended deterrence commitments and civil nuclear cooperation with Washington over independent weapons programs. Recent US-Saudi 123 Agreement submissions to Congress and trilateral small modular reactor initiatives with Seoul and Tokyo focus on energy security and uranium enrichment for peaceful uses, subject to IAEA safeguards and congressional review, without timelines supporting full weaponization by late 2026. Officials in allied capitals have signaled preferences for nuclear sharing arrangements or alliance enhancements rather than breakout, while domestic polling and strategic analyses highlight barriers including NPT obligations, technical lead times, and alliance cohesion. These factors sustain trader consensus around the low likelihood of any ally acquiring nuclear weapons before 2027.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jour
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