US extended nuclear deterrence commitments under alliances like NATO and bilateral pacts with partners such as South Korea and Japan continue to anchor security guarantees, reinforced by recent US statements and modernization efforts. Allies face binding NPT obligations, technical barriers to rapid weaponization, and diplomatic pressures that make independent acquisition before 2027 highly improbable. Government officials in key capitals have repeatedly ruled out such programs despite public debates and polling on latent capabilities. Trader consensus at 95.7% for no reflects these structural constraints and the absence of verified breakout signals. Even in scenarios of eroded alliance credibility or acute regional threats, the multi-year timeline for fissile material production, testing, and deployment would likely exceed the resolution window.
Polymarketデータを参照したAI生成の実験的な要約。これは取引アドバイスではなく、このマーケットの解決方法には一切関係ありません。 · 更新日はい
5% 確率
$212,562 Vol.
$212,562 Vol.
2026/12/31
はい
5% 確率
$212,562 Vol.
$212,562 Vol.
2026/12/31
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
US extended nuclear deterrence commitments under alliances like NATO and bilateral pacts with partners such as South Korea and Japan continue to anchor security guarantees, reinforced by recent US statements and modernization efforts. Allies face binding NPT obligations, technical barriers to rapid weaponization, and diplomatic pressures that make independent acquisition before 2027 highly improbable. Government officials in key capitals have repeatedly ruled out such programs despite public debates and polling on latent capabilities. Trader consensus at 95.7% for no reflects these structural constraints and the absence of verified breakout signals. Even in scenarios of eroded alliance credibility or acute regional threats, the multi-year timeline for fissile material production, testing, and deployment would likely exceed the resolution window.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
マーケット開始日： Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
音量
$212,562終了日
2027/01/01マーケット開始日
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETリゾルバー
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
US extended nuclear deterrence commitments under alliances like NATO and bilateral pacts with partners such as South Korea and Japan continue to anchor security guarantees, reinforced by recent US statements and modernization efforts. Allies face binding NPT obligations, technical barriers to rapid weaponization, and diplomatic pressures that make independent acquisition before 2027 highly improbable. Government officials in key capitals have repeatedly ruled out such programs despite public debates and polling on latent capabilities. Trader consensus at 95.7% for no reflects these structural constraints and the absence of verified breakout signals. Even in scenarios of eroded alliance credibility or acute regional threats, the multi-year timeline for fissile material production, testing, and deployment would likely exceed the resolution window.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
音量
$212,562終了日
2027/01/01マーケット開始日
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETリゾルバー
0x65070BE91...US extended nuclear deterrence commitments under alliances like NATO and bilateral pacts with partners such as South Korea and Japan continue to anchor security guarantees, reinforced by recent US statements and modernization efforts. Allies face binding NPT obligations, technical barriers to rapid weaponization, and diplomatic pressures that make independent acquisition before 2027 highly improbable. Government officials in key capitals have repeatedly ruled out such programs despite public debates and polling on latent capabilities. Trader consensus at 95.7% for no reflects these structural constraints and the absence of verified breakout signals. Even in scenarios of eroded alliance credibility or acute regional threats, the multi-year timeline for fissile material production, testing, and deployment would likely exceed the resolution window.
Polymarketデータを参照したAI生成の実験的な要約。これは取引アドバイスではなく、このマーケットの解決方法には一切関係ありません。 · 更新日
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